EN BANC

LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO,

Petitioner,

- versus -

THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010,

Respondent.
x-----------------------x
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN,
REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.,
Petitioners,

- versus -

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 192935

G.R. No. 193036

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:

December 7, 2010

x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over
the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts
the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which
that instrument secures and guarantees to them.

--- Justice Jose P. Laurel[1]

The role of the Constitution cannot be overlooked. It is through the Constitution that the fundamental
powers of government are established, limited and defined, and by which these powers are distributed
among the several departments.[2] The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other
laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer.[3]
Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time. It cannot be
simply made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and
caprices of government and the people who run it.[4]

For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases[5] both of which essentially assail the
validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled Creating the Philippine
Truth Commission of 2010.

The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo
(Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative
of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution[6] as it usurps the
constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.[7]

The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners
Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitionerslegislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives.

The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections,
when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption
with his slogan, Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap. The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and
of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency.

To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special body to
investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the previous administration.

Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1
establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). Pertinent provisions of said
executive order read:

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1

CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

WHEREAS, Article XI, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines solemnly enshrines the principle
that a public office is a public trust and mandates that public officers and employees, who are servants of
the people, must at all times be accountable to the latter, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives;

WHEREAS, corruption is among the most despicable acts of defiance of this principle and notorious
violation of this mandate;

WHEREAS, corruption is an evil and scourge which seriously affects the political, economic, and social life
of a nation; in a very special way it inflicts untold misfortune and misery on the poor, the marginalized and
underprivileged sector of society;

WHEREAS, corruption in the Philippines has reached very alarming levels, and undermined the peoples
trust and confidence in the Government and its institutions;

WHEREAS, there is an urgent call for the determination of the truth regarding certain reports of large scale
graft and corruption in the government and to put a closure to them by the filing of the appropriate cases
against those involved, if warranted, and to deter others from committing the evil, restore the peoples
faith and confidence in the Government and in their public servants;

WHEREAS, the Presidents battlecry during his campaign for the Presidency in the last elections kung
walang corrupt, walang mahirap expresses a solemn pledge that if elected, he would end corruption and
the evil it breeds;

WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the truth
concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration, and which will
recommend the prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for all;
WHEREAS, Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised
Administrative Code of the Philippines, gives the President the continuing authority to reorganize the Office
of the President.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of
the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:

SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION,
hereinafter referred to as the COMMISSION, which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward
this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the
moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and employees, their coprincipals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration;
and thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full
measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor.

The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four (4) members who will act as an independent
collegial body.

SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which shall have all the powers of an investigative
body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to
conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in
Section 1, involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories
from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration and thereafter submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
In particular, it shall:

a)

Identify and determine the reported cases of such graft and corruption which it will investigate;

b)
Collect, receive, review and evaluate evidence related to or regarding the cases of large scale
corruption which it has chosen to investigate, and to this end require any agency, official or employee of
the Executive Branch, including government-owned or controlled corporations, to produce documents,
books, records and other papers;

c)
Upon proper request or representation, obtain information and documents from the Senate and the
House of Representatives records of investigations conducted by committees thereof relating to matters or
subjects being investigated by the Commission;

d)
Upon proper request and representation, obtain information from the courts, including the
Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Court Administrator, information or documents in respect to
corruption cases filed with the Sandiganbayan or the regular courts, as the case may be;

e)
Invite or subpoena witnesses and take their testimonies and for that purpose, administer oaths or
affirmations as the case may be;

f)
Recommend, in cases where there is a need to utilize any person as a state witness to ensure that
the ends of justice be fully served, that such person who qualifies as a state witness under the Revised
Rules of Court of the Philippines be admitted for that purpose;

g)
Turn over from time to time, for expeditious prosecution, to the appropriate prosecutorial authorities,
by means of a special or interim report and recommendation, all evidence on corruption of public officers
and employees and their private sector co-principals, accomplices or accessories, if any, when in the
course of its investigation the Commission finds that there is reasonable ground to believe that they are
liable for graft and corruption under pertinent applicable laws;

h)
Call upon any government investigative or prosecutorial agency such as the Department of Justice or
any of the agencies under it, and the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, for such assistance and
cooperation as it may require in the discharge of its functions and duties;

i)
Engage or contract the services of resource persons, professionals and other personnel determined
by it as necessary to carry out its mandate;

j)
Promulgate its rules and regulations or rules of procedure it deems necessary to effectively and
efficiently carry out the objectives of this Executive Order and to ensure the orderly conduct of its
investigations, proceedings and hearings, including the presentation of evidence;

k)
Exercise such other acts incident to or are appropriate and necessary in connection with the
objectives and purposes of this Order.
SECTION 3. Staffing Requirements. x x x.

SECTION 4. Detail of Employees. x x x.

SECTION 5. Engagement of Experts. x x x

SECTION 6. Conduct of Proceedings. x x x.

SECTION 7. Right to Counsel of Witnesses/Resource Persons. x x x.
SECTION 8. Protection of Witnesses/Resource Persons. x x x.
SECTION 9. Refusal to Obey Subpoena, Take Oath or Give Testimony. Any government official or personnel
who, without lawful excuse, fails to appear upon subpoena issued by the Commission or who, appearing
before the Commission refuses to take oath or affirmation, give testimony or produce documents for
inspection, when required, shall be subject to administrative disciplinary action. Any private person who
does the same may be dealt with in accordance with law.
SECTION 10. Duty to Extend Assistance to the Commission. x x x.
SECTION 11. Budget for the Commission. The Office of the President shall provide the necessary funds for
the Commission to ensure that it can exercise its powers, execute its functions, and perform its duties and
responsibilities as effectively, efficiently, and expeditiously as possible.
SECTION 12. Office. x x x.

SECTION 13. Furniture/Equipment. x x x.

SECTION 14. Term of the Commission. The Commission shall accomplish its mission on or before December
31, 2012.

SECTION 15. Publication of Final Report. x x x.

SECTION 16. Transfer of Records and Facilities of the Commission. x x x.

SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the judgment of the President there is a
need to expand the mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation
of cases and instances of graft and corruption during the prior administrations, such mandate may be so
extended accordingly by way of a supplemental Executive Order.

SECTION 18. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Order is declared unconstitutional, the same shall
not affect the validity and effectivity of the other provisions hereof.

SECTION 19. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

DONE in the City of Manila, Philippines, this 30th day of July 2010.

(SGD.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III

By the President:

(SGD.) PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.

Executive Secretary

Nature of the Truth Commission

As can be gleaned from the above-quoted provisions, the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad
hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and
corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations
to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an independent collegial
body, it is essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and subject to his control.
Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is one.[8]

To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37,
Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it cannot
adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do
is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have
subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it
is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing
of an information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative
penalties or sanctions.
The PTC is different from the truth commissions in other countries which have been created as official,
transitory and non-judicial fact-finding bodies to establish the facts and context of serious violations of
human rights or of international humanitarian law in a countrys past.[9] They are usually established by
states emerging from periods of internal unrest, civil strife or authoritarianism to serve as mechanisms for
transitional justice.

Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share the following characteristics: (1) they
examine only past events; (2) they investigate patterns of abuse committed over a period of time, as
opposed to a particular event; (3) they are temporary bodies that finish their work with the submission of a
report containing conclusions and recommendations; and (4) they are officially sanctioned, authorized or
empowered by the State.[10] Commissions members are usually empowered to conduct research, support
victims, and propose policy recommendations to prevent recurrence of crimes. Through their
investigations, the commissions may aim to discover and learn more about past abuses, or formally
acknowledge them. They may aim to prepare the way for prosecutions and recommend institutional
reforms.[11]

Thus, their main goals range from retribution to reconciliation. The Nuremburg and Tokyo war crime
tribunals are examples of a retributory or vindicatory body set up to try and punish those responsible for
crimes against humanity. A form of a reconciliatory tribunal is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of
South Africa, the principal function of which was to heal the wounds of past violence and to prevent future
conflict by providing a cathartic experience for victims.

The PTC is a far cry from South Africas model. The latter placed more emphasis on reconciliation than on
judicial retribution, while the marching order of the PTC is the identification and punishment of
perpetrators. As one writer[12] puts it:

The order ruled out reconciliation. It translated the Draconian code spelled out by Aquino in his inaugural
speech: To those who talk about reconciliation, if they mean that they would like us to simply forget about
the wrongs that they have committed in the past, we have this to say: There can be no reconciliation
without justice. When we allow crimes to go unpunished, we give consent to their occurring over and over
again.

The Thrusts of the Petitions

Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to declare it
unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. A perusal of the arguments of the
petitioners in both cases shows that they are essentially the same. The petitioners-legislators summarized
them in the following manner:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public
office and appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize
E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the
President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely
new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and pertinent statutes when it vested the Truth
Commission with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the
Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the Department of Justice created under the
Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution
officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it
excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

(e) The creation of the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 violates the consistent and general
international practice of four decades wherein States constitute truth commissions to exclusively
investigate human rights violations, which customary practice forms part of the generally accepted
principles of international law which the Philippines is mandated to adhere to pursuant to the Declaration
of Principles enshrined in the Constitution.

(f) The creation of the Truth Commission is an exercise in futility, an adventure in partisan hostility, a
launching pad for trial/conviction by publicity and a mere populist propaganda to mistakenly impress the

people that widespread poverty will altogether vanish if corruption is eliminated without even addressing
the other major causes of poverty.

(g) The mere fact that previous commissions were not constitutionally challenged is of no moment because
neither laches nor estoppel can bar an eventual question on the constitutionality and validity of an
executive issuance or even a statute.[13]

In their Consolidated Comment,[14] the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
essentially questioned the legal standing of petitioners and defended the assailed executive order with the
following arguments:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress to create a public office because the Presidents
executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to
ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative
Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292), [15] Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1416[16] (as amended by P.D. No. 1772),
R.A. No. 9970,[17] and settled jurisprudence that authorize the President to create or form such bodies.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation
but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasijudicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for
laudable purposes.

The OSG then points to the continued existence and validity of other executive orders and presidential
issuances creating similar bodies to justify the creation of the PTC such as Presidential Complaint and
Action Commission (PCAC) by President Ramon B. Magsaysay, Presidential Committee on Administrative
Performance Efficiency (PCAPE) by President Carlos P. Garcia and Presidential Agency on Reform and
Government Operations (PARGO) by President Ferdinand E. Marcos.[18]
From the petitions, pleadings, transcripts, and memoranda, the following are the principal issues to be
resolved:

1.
Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitions
and question Executive Order No. 1;

2.
Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by
usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and
commissions;
3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;

4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause; and

5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief.

Essential requisites for judicial review

Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, the Court needs to
ascertain whether the requisites for a valid exercise of its power of judicial review are present.

Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations,
to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the
person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained,
or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.[19]

Among all these limitations, only the legal standing of the petitioners has been put at issue.

Legal Standing of the Petitioners

The OSG attacks the legal personality of the petitioners-legislators to file their petition for failure to
demonstrate their personal stake in the outcome of the case. It argues that the petitioners have not shown
that they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of
the PTC. Not claiming to be the subject of the commissions investigations, petitioners will not sustain injury
in its creation or as a result of its proceedings.[20]

The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal standing of the petitioners-legislators to assail
Executive Order No. 1. Evidently, their petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress
as a body to which they belong as members. This certainly justifies their resolve to take the cudgels for
Congress as an institution and present the complaints on the usurpation of their power and rights as
members of the legislature before the Court. As held in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez,[21]

To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his
office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless
substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of
Congress can have a resort to the courts.

Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by
the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any
official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.[22]

With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a taxpayer, he has no standing to question the creation of
the PTC and the budget for its operations.[23] It emphasizes that the funds to be used for the creation and
operation of the commission are to be taken from those funds already appropriated by Congress. Thus, the

allocation and disbursement of funds for the commission will not entail congressional action but will simply
be an exercise of the Presidents power over contingent funds.

As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of
sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of Executive Order No. 1.
Nowhere in his petition is an assertion of a clear right that may justify his clamor for the Court to exercise
judicial power and to wield the axe over presidential issuances in defense of the Constitution. The case of
David v. Arroyo[24] explained the deep-seated rules on locus standi. Thus:

Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits,
standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name
of the real party in interest. Accordingly, the real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Succinctly put, the
plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.

The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right
in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be
a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a stranger, or in the
category of a citizen, or taxpayer. In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek
judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public
order and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.

Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both citizen and taxpayer standing in public actions. The
distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayers suit
is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizens suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the
expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As
held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: In matter of mere public right,
howeverthe people are the real partiesIt is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere
and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied.
With respect to taxpayers suits, Terr v. Jordan held that the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an
action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied.

However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act
with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public
service, the United State Supreme Court laid down the more stringent direct injury test in Ex Parte Levitt,
later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the
judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show that he has
sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest
common to all members of the public.

This Court adopted the direct injury test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases,
such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers Association v. De la Fuente,
Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix. [Emphases
included. Citations omitted]

Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence,
can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public
interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance
to society, or of paramount public interest.[25]

Thus, in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,[26] the Court held that in cases of paramount
importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirements may be relaxed
and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of
judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases,[27] ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to
question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an indirect and general
interest shared in common with the public.

The OSG claims that the determinants of transcendental importance[28] laid down in CREBA v. ERC and
Meralco[29] are non-existent in this case. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the
petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court.
There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental and paramount
importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be resolved for the
guidance of all.[30] Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more than interested to know the status of the
Presidents first effort to bring about a promised change to the country. The Court takes cognizance of the
petition not due to overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but
because the Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with
overreaching significance to society.

Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission

In his memorandum in G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo asserts that the Truth Commission is a public office and
not merely an adjunct body of the Office of the President.[31] Thus, in order that the President may create
a public office he must be empowered by the Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested in him by
law. According to petitioner, such power cannot be presumed[32] since there is no provision in the
Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the President to create a truth commission.[33] He adds
that Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987, granting the President the continuing authority to
reorganize his office, cannot serve as basis for the creation of a truth commission considering the aforesaid
provision merely uses verbs such as reorganize, transfer, consolidate, merge, and abolish.[34] Insofar as it
vests in the President the plenary power to reorganize the Office of the President to the extent of creating
a public office, Section 31 is inconsistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the
Constitution and must be deemed repealed upon the effectivity thereof.[35]

Similarly, in G.R. No. 193036, petitioners-legislators argue that the creation of a public office lies within the
province of Congress and not with the executive branch of government. They maintain that the delegated
authority of the President to reorganize under Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code: 1) does not
permit the President to create a public office, much less a truth commission; 2) is limited to the
reorganization of the administrative structure of the Office of the President; 3) is limited to the
restructuring of the internal organs of the Office of the President Proper, transfer of functions and transfer
of agencies; and 4) only to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.[36] Such continuing authority of the
President to reorganize his office is limited, and by issuing Executive Order No. 1, the President
overstepped the limits of this delegated authority.

The OSG counters that there is nothing exclusively legislative about the creation by the President of a factfinding body such as a truth commission. Pointing to numerous offices created by past presidents, it argues
that the authority of the President to create public offices within the Office of the President Proper has long
been recognized.[37] According to the OSG, the Executive, just like the other two branches of government,
possesses the inherent authority to create fact-finding committees to assist it in the performance of its
constitutionally mandated functions and in the exercise of its administrative functions.[38] This power, as
the OSG explains it, is but an adjunct of the plenary powers wielded by the President under Section 1 and
his power of control under Section 17, both of Article VII of the Constitution.[39]

It contends that the President is necessarily vested with the power to conduct fact-finding investigations,
pursuant to his duty to ensure that all laws are enforced by public officials and employees of his
department and in the exercise of his authority to assume directly the functions of the executive

department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of his officials.[40] The power of the
President to investigate is not limited to the exercise of his power of control over his subordinates in the
executive branch, but extends further in the exercise of his other powers, such as his power to discipline
subordinates,[41] his power for rule making, adjudication and licensing purposes[42] and in order to be
informed on matters which he is entitled to know.[43]

The OSG also cites the recent case of Banda v. Ermita,[44] where it was held that the President has the
power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with his constitutionally
granted power of control and by virtue of a valid delegation of the legislative power to reorganize
executive offices under existing statutes.

Thus, the OSG concludes that the power of control necessarily includes the power to create offices. For the
OSG, the President may create the PTC in order to, among others, put a closure to the reported large scale
graft and corruption in the government.[45]

The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the
power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code? Section 31
contemplates reorganization as limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring
the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units
thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of
the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the
Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the provision refers to
reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of
functions. These point to situations where a body or an office is already existent but a modification or
alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned
in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative.

To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President under Section 31 is a
misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term restructure an alteration of
an existing structure. Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President prior to
the enactment of Executive Order No. 1. As held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Executive Secretary,
[46]

But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department or agency in
the executive branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of the power
that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292
(otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy in the
Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President." For this purpose, he
may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canonizado
v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions." It takes
place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including
the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the
Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the Presidents
continuing authority to reorganize. [Emphasis Supplied]

In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidents power of control. Control is
essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter.[47] Clearly,
the power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The former is inherent in
the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty
to faithfully execute the laws.

The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress, empowering the President to
create a public office?

According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission pursuant to the above provision finds
statutory basis under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772.[48] The said law granted the President the
continuing authority to reorganize the national government, including the power to group, consolidate
bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services
and activities, transfer appropriations, and to standardize salaries and materials. This decree, in relation to
Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. 292 has been invoked in several cases such as Larin v. Executive
Secretary.[49]

The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the President to create a
public office. Said decree is already stale, anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation to
then President Marcos of the authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the national
government including the power to create offices and transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the
purposes of the decree, embodied in its last Whereas clause:

WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary form of government will necessitate flexibility in the
organization of the national government.

Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and resiliency during the interim, P.D. No.
1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772, became functus oficio upon the convening of the First Congress, as
expressly provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. In fact, even the Solicitor General
agrees with this view. Thus:

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: Because P.D. 1416 was enacted was the last whereas clause of P.D. 1416 says
it was enacted to prepare the transition from presidential to parliamentary. Now, in a parliamentary form of
government, the legislative and executive powers are fused, correct?

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: That is why, that P.D. 1416 was issued. Now would you agree with me that
P.D. 1416 should not be considered effective anymore upon the promulgation, adoption, ratification of the
1987 Constitution.

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Not the whole of P.D. [No.] 1416, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: The power of the President to reorganize the entire National Government is
deemed repealed, at least, upon the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, correct.

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.[50]

While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as
amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section
17 reads:

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied).

As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal branches of
government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The Presidents power to conduct investigations to
aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability
and transparency is inherent in the Presidents powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the
President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned
in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority.[51] As explained in the
landmark case of Marcos v. Manglapus:[52]

x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of government and restored
the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution among three distinct
branches of government with provision for checks and balances.

It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the
President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions
pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides
that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other
powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign
relations.

On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the
exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within
the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to
the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum
of specific powers so enumerated.

It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor
judicial has to be executive. x x x.

Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. As stated
above, the powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution.[53] One
of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the
power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if
laws have been faithfully executed. Thus, in Department of Health v. Camposano,[54] the authority of the
President to issue Administrative Order No. 298, creating an investigative committee to look into the
administrative charges filed against the employees of the Department of Health for the anomalous
purchase of medicines was upheld. In said case, it was ruled:

The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been
constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the
President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the
law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by
the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the
offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry. [Emphasis supplied]

It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry
into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history
is to be revisited, this was also the objective of the investigative bodies created in the past like the PCAC,
PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo Commission and the Zenarosa Commission. There
being no changes in the government structure, the Court is not inclined to declare such executive power as
non-existent just because the direction of the political winds have changed.

On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to appropriate funds for the
operation of a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but only an allotment or
allocations of existing funds already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the
Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. Further, there is no need to specify the amount to
be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, in the words of the Solicitor General, whatever
funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the
commission.[55] Moreover, since the amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing
auditing rules and regulations, there is no impropriety in the funding.

Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate

The Presidents power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed is well
recognized. It flows from the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution under Article VII, Section 17
thereof.[56] As the Chief Executive, the president represents the government as a whole and sees to it that
all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has the authority to directly
assume the functions of the executive department.[57]

Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports of graft and
corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have
been vested in the said body as it cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it. It has been said
that Quasi-judicial powers involve the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by law itself in
enforcing and administering the same law.[58] In simpler terms, judicial discretion is involved in the
exercise of these quasi-judicial power, such that it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and must be clearly
authorized by the legislature in the case of administrative agencies.

The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated by the Court
in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights.[59] Thus:

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research
on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into
systematically: "to search or inquire into: x x to subject to an official probe x x: to conduct an official
inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information.
Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the
facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or
observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find
out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an
investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of
which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise,
for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine,
resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the
parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: x x to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x act as
judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: x
x to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy x x."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally.
Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide,
settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of
a judgment." [Italics included. Citations Omitted]

Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even
a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of
a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving
at factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or resolved authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.[60] Even respondents
themselves admit that the commission is bereft of any quasi-judicial power.[61]

Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their
respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two
offices. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of
the overall task of the commission to conduct a fact-finding investigation.[62] The actual prosecution of
suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of the charges against them,[63] is certainly not
a function given to the commission. The phrase, when in the course of its investigation, under Section 2(g),
highlights this fact and gives credence to a contrary interpretation from that of the petitioners. The
function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts
remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.[64]

At any rate, the Ombudsmans power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared with
other similarly authorized government agencies. Thus, in the case of Ombudsman v. Galicia,[65] it was
written:

This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution and The Ombudsman Act
is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies such as the PCGG and
judges of municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts. The power to conduct preliminary
investigation on charges against public employees and officials is likewise concurrently shared with the
Department of Justice. Despite the passage of the Local Government Code in 1991, the Ombudsman
retains concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of the President and the local Sanggunians to investigate
complaints against local elective officials. [Emphasis supplied].

Also, Executive Order No. 1 cannot contravene the power of the Ombudsman to investigate criminal cases
under Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770, which states:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or

inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
its primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of government, the
investigation of such cases. [Emphases supplied]

The act of investigation by the Ombudsman as enunciated above contemplates the conduct of a
preliminary investigation or the determination of the existence of probable cause. This is categorically out
of the PTCs sphere of functions. Its power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise
and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the
laws of the land. In this regard, the PTC commits no act of usurpation of the Ombudsmans primordial
duties.

The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority under Section 3 (2), Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV
in the Revised Administrative Code is by no means exclusive and, thus, can be shared with a body likewise
tasked to investigate the commission of crimes.

Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be accorded
conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano Commission and the
Zenarosa Commission, its findings would, at best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so, the
Ombudsman and the DOJ have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the
recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be
aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for violations of graft laws.

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of the President, the
Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent
transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution. Section 1 reads:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional safeguard. They
contend that it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling out
the previous administration as its sole object makes the PTC an adventure in partisan hostility.[66] Thus, in
order to be accorded with validity, the commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption in
virtually all administrations previous to that of former President Arroyo.[67]

The petitioners argue that the search for truth behind the reported cases of graft and corruption must
encompass acts committed not only during the administration of former President Arroyo but also during
prior administrations where the same magnitude of controversies and anomalies[68] were reported to
have been committed against the Filipino people. They assail the classification formulated by the
respondents as it does not fall under the recognized exceptions because first, there is no substantial
distinction between the group of officials targeted for investigation by Executive Order No. 1 and other
groups or persons who abused their public office for personal gain; and second, the selective classification
is not germane to the purpose of Executive Order No. 1 to end corruption.[69] In order to attain
constitutional permission, the petitioners advocate that the commission should deal with graft and grafters
prior and subsequent to the Arroyo administration with the strong arm of the law with equal force.[70]

Position of respondents

According to respondents, while Executive Order No. 1 identifies the previous administration as the initial
subject of the investigation, following Section 17 thereof, the PTC will not confine itself to cases of large
scale graft and corruption solely during the said administration.[71] Assuming arguendo that the
commission would confine its proceedings to officials of the previous administration, the petitioners argue
that no offense is committed against the equal protection clause for the segregation of the transactions of
public officers during the previous administration as possible subjects of investigation is a valid
classification based on substantial distinctions and is germane to the evils which the Executive Order seeks
to correct.[72] To distinguish the Arroyo administration from past administrations, it recited the following:

First. E.O. No. 1 was issued in view of widespread reports of large scale graft and corruption in the previous
administration which have eroded public confidence in public institutions. There is, therefore, an urgent
call for the determination of the truth regarding certain reports of large scale graft and corruption in the
government and to put a closure to them by the filing of the appropriate cases against those involved, if
warranted, and to deter others from committing the evil, restore the peoples faith and confidence in the
Government and in their public servants.

Second. The segregation of the preceding administration as the object of fact-finding is warranted by the
reality that unlike with administrations long gone, the current administration will most likely bear the
immediate consequence of the policies of the previous administration.

Third. The classification of the previous administration as a separate class for investigation lies in the
reality that the evidence of possible criminal activity, the evidence that could lead to recovery of public
monies illegally dissipated, the policy lessons to be learned to ensure that anti-corruption laws are
faithfully executed, are more easily established in the regime that immediately precede the current
administration.

Fourth. Many administrations subject the transactions of their predecessors to investigations to provide
closure to issues that are pivotal to national life or even as a routine measure of due diligence and good
housekeeping by a nascent administration like the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
created by the late President Corazon C. Aquino under Executive Order No. 1 to pursue the recovery of illgotten wealth of her predecessor former President Ferdinand Marcos and his cronies, and the Saguisag
Commission created by former President Joseph Estrada under Administrative Order No, 53, to form an adhoc and independent citizens committee to investigate all the facts and circumstances surrounding
Philippine Centennial projects of his predecessor, former President Fidel V. Ramos.[73] [Emphases
supplied]

Concept of the Equal Protection Clause

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is
embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in
the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play.
It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any
form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on
the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality
or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.[74]

According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.[75] It requires
public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.[76] The purpose of
the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution

through the states duly constituted authorities.[77] In other words, the concept of equal justice under the
law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on
differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.[78]

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature.[79] Its
inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive departments,
and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or
whatever guise is taken. [80]

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be
valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.[81] Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification.[82]

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons
who naturally belong to the class.[83] The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of
the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary
that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should
possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is
achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual
belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable
from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him.[84]

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude
addition to the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may
thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or underinclude those that
should otherwise fall into a certain classification. As elucidated in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers'
Union[85] and reiterated in a long line of cases,[86]
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws
upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional
prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute.
Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but
on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights.
The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they
were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It
does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory
within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in
the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice
because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple
inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere
fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class.
This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. [Citations omitted]

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal
protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the
truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration[87] only.

The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been
made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. Specifically, these are:

WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the truth
concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration, and which will
recommend the prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for all;

SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION,
hereinafter referred to as the COMMISSION, which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward
this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the
moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and employees, their coprincipals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration;
and thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full
measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor.

SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which shall have all the powers of an investigative
body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to
conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in
Section 1, involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories
from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration and thereafter submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. [Emphases supplied]

In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that
is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly
situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective
retribution.

Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo administration and other past
administrations, these distinctions are not substantial enough to merit the restriction of the investigation
to the previous administration only. The reports of widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration
cannot be taken as basis for distinguishing said administration from earlier administrations which were also
blemished by similar widespread reports of impropriety. They are not inherent in, and do not inure solely
to, the Arroyo administration. As Justice Isagani Cruz put it, Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification.[88]

The public needs to be enlightened why Executive Order No. 1 chooses to limit the scope of the intended
investigation to the previous administration only. The OSG ventures to opine that to include other past
administrations, at this point, may unnecessarily overburden the commission and lead it to lose its
effectiveness.[89] The reason given is specious. It is without doubt irrelevant to the legitimate and noble
objective of the PTC to stamp out or end corruption and the evil it breeds.[90]

The probability that there would be difficulty in unearthing evidence or that the earlier reports involving
the earlier administrations were already inquired into is beside the point. Obviously, deceased presidents
and cases which have already prescribed can no longer be the subjects of inquiry by the PTC. Neither is the
PTC expected to conduct simultaneous investigations of previous administrations, given the bodys limited
time and resources. The law does not require the impossible (Lex non cogit ad impossibilia).[91]

Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility, the Court logically recognizes the unfeasibility of
investigating almost a centurys worth of graft cases. However, the fact remains that Executive Order No. 1
suffers from arbitrary classification. The PTC, to be true to its mandate of searching for the truth, must not

exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past
administrations. While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck
down for being unconstitutional. In the often quoted language of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,[92]

Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if applied and administered by
public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal
justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution. [Emphasis supplied]

It could be argued that considering that the PTC is an ad hoc body, its scope is limited. The Court, however,
is of the considered view that although its focus is restricted, the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection under the laws should not in any way be circumvented. The Constitution is the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private
rights determined and all public authority administered.[93] Laws that do not conform to the Constitution
should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.[94] While the thrust of the PTC is specific, that is, for
investigation of acts of graft and corruption, Executive Order No. 1, to survive, must be read together with
the provisions of the Constitution. To exclude the earlier administrations in the guise of substantial
distinctions would only confirm the petitioners lament that the subject executive order is only an adventure
in partisan hostility. In the case of US v. Cyprian,[95] it was written: A rather limited number of such
classifications have routinely been held or assumed to be arbitrary; those include: race, national origin,
gender, political activity or membership in a political party, union activity or membership in a labor union,
or more generally the exercise of first amendment rights.

To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or
embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class.[96] Such a classification must not be based on
existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude additions to the number included within a
class, but must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances
and conditions. Furthermore, all who are in situations and circumstances which are relative to the
discriminatory legislation and which are indistinguishable from those of the members of the class must be
brought under the influence of the law and treated by it in the same way as are the members of the class.
[97]

The Court is not unaware that mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a law under the equal
protection clause.[98] Legislation is not unconstitutional merely because it is not all-embracing and does
not include all the evils within its reach.[99] It has been written that a regulation challenged under the
equal protection clause is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because it happens to be incomplete.
[100] In several instances, the underinclusiveness was not considered a valid reason to strike down a law
or regulation where the purpose can be attained in future legislations or regulations. These cases refer to
the step by step process.[101] With regard to equal protection claims, a legislature does not run the risk of
losing the entire remedial scheme simply because it fails, through inadvertence or otherwise, to cover
every evil that might conceivably have been attacked.[102]

In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence. That the previous administration was picked
out was deliberate and intentional as can be gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at least three
times in the assailed executive order. It must be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even mention
any particular act, event or report to be focused on unlike the investigative commissions created in the
past. The equal protection clause is violated by purposeful and intentional discrimination.[103]

To disprove petitioners contention that there is deliberate discrimination, the OSG clarifies that the
commission does not only confine itself to cases of large scale graft and corruption committed during the
previous administration.[104] The OSG points to Section 17 of Executive Order No. 1, which provides:

SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the judgment of the President there is a
need to expand the mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation
of cases and instances of graft and corruption during the prior administrations, such mandate may be so
extended accordingly by way of a supplemental Executive Order.

The Court is not convinced. Although Section 17 allows the President the discretion to expand the scope of
investigations of the PTC so as to include the acts of graft and corruption committed in other past
administrations, it does not guarantee that they would be covered in the future. Such expanded mandate
of the commission will still depend on the whim and caprice of the President. If he would decide not to
include them, the section would then be meaningless. This will only fortify the fears of the petitioners that
the Executive Order No. 1 was crafted to tailor-fit the prosecution of officials and personalities of the Arroyo
administration.[105]

The Court tried to seek guidance from the pronouncement in the case of Virata v. Sandiganbayan,[106]
that the PCGG Charter (composed of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14) does not violate the equal
protection clause. The decision, however, was devoid of any discussion on how such conclusory statement
was arrived at, the principal issue in said case being only the sufficiency of a cause of action.

A final word

The issue that seems to take center stage at present is - whether or not the Supreme Court, in the exercise
of its constitutionally mandated power of Judicial Review with respect to recent initiatives of the legislature
and the executive department, is exercising undue interference. Is the Highest Tribunal, which is expected
to be the protector of the Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental tenets like the doctrine of
separation of powers? Time and again, this issue has been addressed by the Court, but it seems that the
present political situation calls for it to once again explain the legal basis of its action lest it continually be
accused of being a hindrance to the nations thrust to progress.

The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, is vested with
Judicial Power that includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave of
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the government.

Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with the power of judicial review which is the power to
declare a treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation unconstitutional. This power also includes the duty to rule on the
constitutionality of the application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders,
instructions, ordinances, and other regulations. These provisions, however, have been fertile grounds of
conflict between the Supreme Court, on one hand, and the two co-equal bodies of government, on the
other. Many times the Court has been accused of asserting superiority over the other departments.

To answer this accusation, the words of Justice Laurel would be a good source of enlightenment, to wit: And
when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over
the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts
the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of

authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which
that instrument secures and guarantees to them.[107]

Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing its own will upon a co-equal body
but rather simply making sure that any act of government is done in consonance with the authorities and
rights allocated to it by the Constitution. And, if after said review, the Court finds no constitutional
violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review. Otherwise, the
Court will not be deterred to pronounce said act as void and unconstitutional.

It cannot be denied that most government actions are inspired with noble intentions, all geared towards
the betterment of the nation and its people. But then again, it is important to remember this ethical
principle: The end does not justify the means. No matter how noble and worthy of admiration the purpose
of an act, but if the means to be employed in accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with constitutional
parameters, then it cannot still be allowed.[108] The Court cannot just turn a blind eye and simply let it
pass. It will continue to uphold the Constitution and its enshrined principles.

The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow to the mandate of this law. Expediency must not
be allowed to sap its strength nor greed for power debase its rectitude.[109]

Lest it be misunderstood, this is not the death knell for a truth commission as nobly envisioned by the
present administration. Perhaps a revision of the executive issuance so as to include the earlier past
administrations would allow it to pass the test of reasonableness and not be an affront to the Constitution.
Of all the branches of the government, it is the judiciary which is the most interested in knowing the truth
and so it will not allow itself to be a hindrance or obstacle to its attainment. It must, however, be
emphasized that the search for the truth must be within constitutional bounds for ours is still a
government of laws and not of men.[110]

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from carrying out the
provisions of Executive Order No. 1.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 208566

November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and
QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented
by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 208493

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HONORABLE FELICIANO S.
BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209251
PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial Board Member -Province of
Marinduque, Petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
"Experience is the oracle of truth."1
-James Madison
Before the Court are consolidated petitions2 taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail
the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. Due to the complexity of the subject matter, the Court shall
heretofore discuss the systems conceptual underpinnings before detailing the particulars of the
constitutional challenge.
The Facts
I. Pork Barrel: General Concept.
"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American -English origin.3 Historically, its usage may be traced to the
degrading ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed with pork to a multitude of black slaves who would cast their
famished bodies into the porcine feast to assuage their hunger with morsels coming from the generosity of
their well-fed master.4 This practice was later compared to the actions of American legislators in trying to
direct federal budgets in favor of their districts.5 While the advent of refrigeration has made the actual
pork barrel obsolete, it persists in reference to political bills that "bring home the bacon" to a legislators
district and constituents.6 In a more technical sense, "Pork Barrel" refers to an appropriation of
government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a
representative's district.7 Some scholars on the subject further use it to refer to legislative control of local
appropriations.8
In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of
Members of the Legislature,9 although, as will be later discussed, its usage would evolve in reference to
certain funds of the Executive.
II. History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
A. Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972).
Act 3044,10 or the Public Works Act of 1922, is considered11 as the earliest form of "Congressional Pork
Barrel" in the Philippines since the utilization of the funds appropriated therein were subjected to postenactment legislator approval. Particularly, in the area of fund release, Section 312 provides that the sums
appropriated for certain public works projects13 "shall be distributed x x x subject to the approval of a joint
committee elected by the Senate and the House of Representatives. "The committee from each House
may also authorize one of its members to approve the distribution made by the Secretary of Commerce
and Communications."14 Also, in the area of fund realignment, the same section provides that the said
secretary, "with the approval of said joint committee, or of the authorized members thereof, may, for the
purposes of said distribution, transfer unexpended portions of any item of appropriation under this Act to
any other item hereunder."
In 1950, it has been documented15 that post-enactment legislator participation broadened from the
areas of fund release and realignment to the area of project identification. During that year, the mechanics
of the public works act was modified to the extent that the discretion of choosing projects was transferred
from the Secretary of Commerce and Communications to legislators. "For the first time, the law carried a
list of projects selected by Members of Congress, they being the representatives of the people, either on
their own account or by consultation with local officials or civil leaders."16 During this period, the pork
barrel process commenced with local government councils, civil groups, and individuals appealing to

Congressmen or Senators for projects. Petitions that were accommodated formed part of a legislators
allocation, and the amount each legislator would eventually get is determined in a caucus convened by the
majority. The amount was then integrated into the administration bill prepared by the Department of Public
Works and Communications. Thereafter, the Senate and the House of Representatives added their own
provisions to the bill until it was signed into law by the President the Public Works Act.17 In the 1960s,
however, pork barrel legislation reportedly ceased in view of the stalemate between the House of
Representatives and the Senate.18
B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986).
While the previous" Congressional Pork Barrel" was apparently discontinued in 1972 after Martial Law
was declared, an era when "one man controlled the legislature,"19 the reprieve was only temporary. By
1982, the Batasang Pambansa had already introduced a new item in the General Appropriations Act (GAA)
called the" Support for Local Development Projects" (SLDP) under the article on "National Aid to Local
Government Units". Based on reports,20 it was under the SLDP that the practice of giving lump-sum
allocations to individual legislators began, with each assemblyman receiving P500,000.00. Thereafter,
assemblymen would communicate their project preferences to the Ministry of Budget and Management for
approval. Then, the said ministry would release the allocation papers to the Ministry of Local Governments,
which would, in turn, issue the checks to the city or municipal treasurers in the assemblymans locality. It
has been further reported that "Congressional Pork Barrel" projects under the SLDP also began to cover not
only public works projects, or so- called "hard projects", but also "soft projects",21 or non-public works
projects such as those which would fall under the categories of, among others, education, health and
livelihood.22
C. Post-Martial Law Era:
Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (1986-1992).
After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and the restoration of Philippine democracy,
"Congressional Pork Barrel" was revived in the form of the "Mindanao Development Fund" and the "Visayas
Development Fund" which were created with lump-sum appropriations of P480 Million and P240 Million,
respectively, for the funding of development projects in the Mindanao and Visayas areas in 1989. It has
been documented23 that the clamor raised by the Senators and the Luzon legislators for a similar funding,
prompted the creation of the "Countrywide Development Fund" (CDF) which was integrated into the 1990
GAA24 with an initial funding of P2.3 Billion to cover "small local infrastructure and other priority
community projects."
Under the GAAs for the years 1991 and 1992,25 CDF funds were, with the approval of the President, to
be released directly to the implementing agencies but "subject to the submission of the required list of
projects and activities."Although the GAAs from 1990 to 1992 were silent as to the amounts of allocations
of the individual legislators, as well as their participation in the identification of projects, it has been
reported26 that by 1992, Representatives were receiving P12.5 Million each in CDF funds, while Senators
were receiving P18 Million each, without any limitation or qualification, and that they could identify any
kind of project, from hard or infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, and buildings to "soft projects"
such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.27
D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (1992-1998).
The following year, or in 1993,28 the GAA explicitly stated that the release of CDF funds was to be made
upon the submission of the list of projects and activities identified by, among others, individual legislators.
For the first time, the 1993 CDF Article included an allocation for the Vice-President.29 As such,
Representatives were allocated P12.5 Million each in CDF funds, Senators, P18 Million each, and the VicePresident, P20 Million.
In 1994,30 1995,31 and 1996,32 the GAAs contained the same provisions on project identification and
fund release as found in the 1993 CDF Article. In addition, however, the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) was directed to submit reports to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House
Committee on Appropriations on the releases made from the funds.33
Under the 199734 CDF Article, Members of Congress and the Vice-President, in consultation with the
implementing agency concerned, were directed to submit to the DBM the list of 50% of projects to be
funded from their respective CDF allocations which shall be duly endorsed by (a) the Senate President and
the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, in the case of the Senate, and (b) the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, in the case of the House of
Representatives; while the list for the remaining 50% was to be submitted within six (6) months thereafter.
The same article also stated that the project list, which would be published by the DBM,35 "shall be the
basis for the release of funds" and that "no funds appropriated herein shall be disbursed for projects not
included in the list herein required."

The following year, or in 1998,36 the foregoing provisions regarding the required lists and endorsements
were reproduced, except that the publication of the project list was no longer required as the list itself
sufficed for the release of CDF Funds.
The CDF was not, however, the lone form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" at that time. Other forms of
"Congressional Pork Barrel" were reportedly fashioned and inserted into the GAA (called "Congressional
Insertions" or "CIs") in order to perpetuate the ad ministrations political agenda.37 It has been articulated
that since CIs "formed part and parcel of the budgets of executive departments, they were not easily
identifiable and were thus harder to monitor." Nonetheless, the lawmakers themselves as well as the
finance and budget officials of the implementing agencies, as well as the DBM, purportedly knew about the
insertions.38 Examples of these CIs are the Department of Education (DepEd) School Building Fund, the
Congressional Initiative Allocations, the Public Works Fund, the El Nio Fund, and the Poverty Alleviation
Fund.39 The allocations for the School Building Fund, particularly, shall be made upon prior consultation
with the representative of the legislative district concerned.40 Similarly, the legislators had the power to
direct how, where and when these appropriations were to be spent.41
E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (1998-2001).
In 1999,42 the CDF was removed in the GAA and replaced by three (3) separate forms of CIs, namely,
the "Food Security Program Fund,"43 the "Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program Fund,"44 and the
"Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program Fund,"45 all of which contained a special provision
requiring "prior consultation" with the Member s of Congress for the release of the funds.
It was in the year 200046 that the "Priority Development Assistance Fund" (PDAF) appeared in the GAA.
The requirement of "prior consultation with the respective Representative of the District" before PDAF
funds were directly released to the implementing agency concerned was explicitly stated in the 2000 PDAF
Article. Moreover, realignment of funds to any expense category was expressly allowed, with the sole
condition that no amount shall be used to fund personal services and other personnel benefits.47 The
succeeding PDAF provisions remained the same in view of the re-enactment48 of the 2000 GAA for the
year 2001.
F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) Administration (2001-2010).
The 200249 PDAF Article was brief and straightforward as it merely contained a single special provision
ordering the release of the funds directly to the implementing agency or local government unit concerned,
without further qualifications. The following year, 2003,50 the same single provision was present, with
simply an expansion of purpose and express authority to realign. Nevertheless, the provisions in the 2003
budgets of the Department of Public Works and Highways51 (DPWH) and the DepEd52 required prior
consultation with Members of Congress on the aspects of implementation delegation and project list
submission, respectively. In 2004, the 2003 GAA was re-enacted.53
In 2005,54 the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF shall be used "to fund priority programs and projects
under the ten point agenda of the national government and shall be released directly to the implementing
agencies." It also introduced the program menu concept,55 which is essentially a list of general programs
and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF project may be subsequently chosen by the
identifying authority. The 2005 GAA was re-enacted56 in 2006 and hence, operated on the same bases. In
similar regard, the program menu concept was consistently integrated into the 2007,57 2008,58 2009,59
and 201060 GAAs.
Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were silent with respect to the specific amounts allocated
for the individual legislators, as well as their participation in the proposal and identification of PDAF
projects to be funded. In contrast to the PDAF Articles, however, the provisions under the DepEd School
Building Program and the DPWH budget, similar to its predecessors, explicitly required prior consultation
with the concerned Member of Congress61 anent certain aspects of project implementation.
Significantly, it was during this era that provisions which allowed formal participation of nongovernmental organizations (NGO) in the implementation of government projects were introduced. In the
Supplemental Budget for 2006, with respect to the appropriation for school buildings, NGOs were, by law,
encouraged to participate. For such purpose, the law stated that "the amount of at least P250 Million of the
P500 Million allotted for the construction and completion of school buildings shall be made available to
NGOs including the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Inc. for its
"Operation Barrio School" program, with capability and proven track records in the construction of public
school buildings x x x."62 The same allocation was made available to NGOs in the 2007 and 2009 GAAs
under the DepEd Budget.63 Also, it was in 2007 that the Government Procurement Policy Board64 (GPPB)
issued Resolution No. 12-2007 dated June 29, 2007 (GPPB Resolution 12-2007), amending the
implementing rules and regulations65 of RA 9184,66 the Government Procurement Reform Act, to include,
as a form of negotiated procurement,67 the procedure whereby the Procuring Entity68 (the implementing
agency) may enter into a memorandum of agreement with an NGO, provided that "an appropriation law or
ordinance earmarks an amount to be specifically contracted out to NGOs."69

G. Present Administration (2010-Present).

Differing from previous PDAF Articles but similar to the CDF Articles, the 201170 PDAF Article included
an express statement on lump-sum amounts allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-President:
Representatives were given P70 Million each, broken down into P40 Million for "hard projects" and P30
Million for "soft projects"; while P200 Million was given to each Senator as well as the Vice-President, with a
P100 Million allocation each for "hard" and "soft projects." Likewise, a provision on realignment of funds
was included, but with the qualification that it may be allowed only once. The same provision also allowed
the Secretaries of Education, Health, Social Welfare and Development, Interior and Local Government,
Environment and Natural Resources, Energy, and Public Works and Highways to realign PDAF Funds, with
the further conditions that: (a) realignment is within the same implementing unit and same project
category as the original project, for infrastructure projects; (b) allotment released has not yet been
obligated for the original scope of work, and (c) the request for realignment is with the concurrence of the
legislator concerned.71
In the 201272 and 201373 PDAF Articles, it is stated that the "identification of projects and/or
designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared by each
implementing agency (priority list requirement) x x x." However, as practiced, it would still be the
individual legislator who would choose and identify the project from the said priority list.74
Provisions on legislator allocations75 as well as fund realignment76 were included in the 2012 and 2013
PDAF Articles; but the allocation for the Vice-President, which was pegged at P200 Million in the 2011 GAA,
had been deleted. In addition, the 2013 PDAF Article now allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing
agencies if they have the technical capability to implement the projects.77 Legislators were also allowed to
identify programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and scholarships, outside of his
legislative district provided that he secures the written concurrence of the legislator of the intended
outside-district, endorsed by the Speaker of the House.78 Finally, any realignment of PDAF funds,
modification and revision of project identification, as well as requests for release of funds, were all required
to be favorably endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
Finance, as the case may be.79
III. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members
of Congress, the present cases and the recent controversies on the matter have, however, shown that the
terms usage has expanded to include certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund.
On the one hand, the Malampaya Funds was created as a special fund under Section 880 of Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 910,81 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) on March 22, 1976. In
enacting the said law, Marcos recognized the need to set up a special fund to help intensify, strengthen,
and consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of
indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth.82 Due to the energy-related activities of the
government in the Malampaya natural gas field in Palawan, or the "Malampaya Deep Water Gas-to-Power
Project",83 the special fund created under PD 910 has been currently labeled as Malampaya Funds.
On the other hand the Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV84 of PD 1869,85 or
the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). PD 1869 was similarly issued
by Marcos on July 11, 1983. More than two (2) years after, he amended PD 1869 and accordingly issued PD
1993 on October 31, 1985,86 amending Section 1287 of the former law. As it stands, the Presidential
Social Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential
Management Staff through which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects
not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate
gross earnings of PAGCOR.88
IV. Controversies in the Philippines.
Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have increased tremendously,89 owing in no small part
to previous Presidents who reportedly used the "Pork Barrel" in order to gain congressional support.90 It
was in 1996 when the first controversy surrounding the "Pork Barrel" erupted. Former Marikina City
Representative Romeo Candazo (Candazo), then an anonymous source, "blew the lid on the huge sums of
government money that regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks."91 He said
that "the kickbacks were SOP (standard operating procedure) among legislators and ranged from a low 19
percent to a high 52 percent of the cost of each project, which could be anything from dredging, rip
rapping, sphalting, concreting, and construction of school buildings."92 "Other sources of kickbacks that
Candazo identified were public funds intended for medicines and textbooks. A few days later, the tale of
the money trail became the banner story of the Philippine Daily Inquirer issue of August 13, 1996,
accompanied by an illustration of a roasted pig."93 "The publication of the stories, including those about
congressional initiative allocations of certain lawmakers, including P3.6 Billion for a Congressman, sparked
public outrage."94

Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as enacted in the
2004 GAA for being unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack of "any pertinent evidentiary support that
illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members
of Congress," the petition was dismissed.95
Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into
allegations that "the government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a
syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of
ghost projects."96 The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who
declared that JLN Corporation "JLN" standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) had swindled billions of
pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire
decade. While the NGOs were supposedly the ultimate recipients of PDAF funds, the whistle-blowers
declared that the money was diverted into Napoles private accounts.97 Thus, after its investigation on the
Napoles controversy, criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5)
lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the
lawmakers chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing
agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.98
On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-year audit
investigation99 covering the use of legislators' PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3) years
of the Arroyo administration. The purpose of the audit was to determine the propriety of releases of funds
under PDAF and the Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)100 by the DBM, the application
of these funds and the implementation of projects by the appropriate implementing agencies and several
government-owned-and-controlled corporations (GOCCs).101 The total releases covered by the audit
amounted to P8.374 Billion in PDAF and P32.664 Billion in VILP, representing 58% and 32%, respectively, of
the total PDAF and VILP releases that were found to have been made nationwide during the audit
period.102 Accordingly, the Co As findings contained in its Report No. 2012-03 (CoA Report), entitled
"Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP),"
were made public, the highlights of which are as follows:103
Amounts released for projects identified by a considerable number of legislators significantly exceeded
their respective allocations.
Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts of sponsoring members of the Lower
House.
Total VILP releases for the period exceeded the total amount appropriated under the 2007 to 2009 GAAs.
Infrastructure projects were constructed on private lots without these having been turned over to the
government.
Significant amounts were released to implementing agencies without the latters endorsement and
without considering their mandated functions, administrative and technical capabilities to implement
projects.
Implementation of most livelihood projects was not undertaken by the implementing agencies
themselves but by NGOs endorsed by the proponent legislators to which the Funds were transferred.
The funds were transferred to the NGOs in spite of the absence of any appropriation law or ordinance.
Selection of the NGOs were not compliant with law and regulations.
Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with implementation of seven hundred seventy two (772) projects
amount to P6.156 Billion were either found questionable, or submitted questionable/spurious documents,
or failed to liquidate in whole or in part their utilization of the Funds.
Procurement by the NGOs, as well as some implementing agencies, of goods and services reportedly
used in the projects were not compliant with law.
As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the
operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries
has gone into a dummy NGO."104 According to incumbent CoA Chairperson Maria Gracia Pulido Tan (CoA
Chairperson), the CoA is, as of this writing, in the process of preparing "one consolidated report" on the
Malampaya Funds.105
V. The Procedural Antecedents.

Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, several
petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional. To recount, the relevant procedural antecedents in these cases are as follows:
On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara), President of the Social Justice Society,
filed a Petition for Prohibition of even date under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Alcantara Petition), seeking
that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently
restraining respondents Franklin M. Drilon and Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr., in their respective capacities as
the incumbent Senate President and Speaker of the House of Representatives, from further taking any
steps to enact legislation appropriating funds for the "Pork Barrel System," in whatever form and by
whatever name it may be called, and from approving further releases pursuant thereto.106 The Alcantara
Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208493.
On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L. Gonzalez, Reuben M. Abante,
Quintin Paredes San Diego (Belgica, et al.), and Jose M. Villegas, Jr. (Villegas) filed an Urgent Petition For
Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated August 27, 2013 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Belgica
Petition), seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of
2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executives lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund,107 be declared unconstitutional and null and void for
being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against
respondents Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Florencio B. Abad (Secretary Abad) and Rosalia V. De Leon, in their
respective capacities as the incumbent Executive Secretary, Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM), and National Treasurer, or their agents, for them to immediately cease any
expenditure under the aforesaid funds. Further, they pray that the Court order the foregoing respondents
to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of
their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity
and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"; and (b) "the use of the Executives
lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances
from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities
or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto."108 Also, they pray for the "inclusion in budgetary
deliberations with the Congress of all presently off-budget, lump-sum, discretionary funds including, but
not limited to, proceeds from the Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR."109 The Belgica
Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208566.110
Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Pedrito M. Nepomuceno (Nepomuceno), filed a Petition dated
August 23, 2012 (Nepomuceno Petition), seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease
and desist order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and
Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress and, instead, allow their release to fund
priority projects identified and approved by the Local Development Councils in consultation with the
executive departments, such as the DPWH, the Department of Tourism, the Department of Health, the
Department of Transportation, and Communication and the National Economic Development Authority.111
The Nepomuceno Petition was docketed as UDK-14951.112
On September 10, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date (a) consolidating all cases; (b)
requiring public respondents to comment on the consolidated petitions; (c) issuing a TRO (September 10,
2013 TRO) enjoining the DBM, National Treasurer, the Executive Secretary, or any of the persons acting
under their authority from releasing (1) the remaining PDAF allocated to Members of Congress under the
GAA of 2013, and (2) Malampaya Funds under the phrase "for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910 but not for the purpose of "financing energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government under the same
provision; and (d) setting the consolidated cases for Oral Arguments on October 8, 2013.
On September 23, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Consolidated Comment
(Comment) of even date before the Court, seeking the lifting, or in the alternative, the partial lifting with
respect to educational and medical assistance purposes, of the Courts September 10, 2013 TRO, and that
the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of merit.113
On September 24, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date directing petitioners to reply to the
Comment.
Petitioners, with the exception of Nepomuceno, filed their respective replies to the Comment: (a) on
September 30, 2013, Villegas filed a separate Reply dated September 27, 2013 (Villegas Reply); (b) on
October 1, 2013, Belgica, et al. filed a Reply dated September 30, 2013 (Belgica Reply); and (c) on October
2, 2013, Alcantara filed a Reply dated October 1, 2013.
On October 1, 2013, the Court issued an Advisory providing for the guidelines to be observed by the
parties for the Oral Arguments scheduled on October 8, 2013. In view of the technicality of the issues
material to the present cases, incumbent Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza (Solicitor General) was
directed to bring with him during the Oral Arguments representative/s from the DBM and Congress who

would be able to competently and completely answer questions related to, among others, the budgeting
process and its implementation. Further, the CoA Chairperson was appointed as amicus curiae and thereby
requested to appear before the Court during the Oral Arguments.
On October 8 and 10, 2013, the Oral Arguments were conducted. Thereafter, the Court directed the parties
to submit their respective memoranda within a period of seven (7) days, or until October 17, 2013, which
the parties subsequently did.
The Issues Before the Court
Based on the pleadings, and as refined during the Oral Arguments, the following are the main issues for
the Courts resolution:
I. Procedural Issues.
Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable
controversy; (b) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy not subject to judicial
review; (c) petitioners have legal standing to sue; and (d) the Courts Decision dated August 19, 1994 in
G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766, and 113888, entitled "Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez"114 (Philconsa) and Decision dated April 24, 2012 in G.R. No. 164987, entitled "Lawyers Against
Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management"115 (LAMP) bar the re-litigatio n of the
issue of constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" under the principles of res judicata and stare decisis.
II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of
powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political
dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due
to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines" under
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are
unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.
These main issues shall be resolved in the order that they have been stated. In addition, the Court shall
also tackle certain ancillary issues as prompted by the present cases.
The Courts Ruling
The petitions are partly granted.
I. Procedural Issues.
The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of
a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the
legal requisites for judicial inquiry,117 namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for
the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity ; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.118 Of these
requisites, case law states that the first two are the most important119 and, therefore, shall be discussed
forthwith.
A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy.120 This is
embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which pertinently states that "judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable x x x." Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which
"involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.121 In other words, "there must be a
contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence."122 Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of
"ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication.
"A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by

either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action."123 "Withal, courts will
decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to
resolve hypothetical or moot questions."124
Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these
cases.
The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties
on the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are
ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization such as
the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for
the Presidential Social Fund are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or
threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot
and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more
actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.125
Differing from this description, the Court observes that respondents proposed line-item budgeting scheme
would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is
geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter,
remains legally effective and existing. Neither will the Presidents declaration that he had already
"abolished the PDAF" render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of
government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By constitutional design,
the annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by Congress, through the passage of a repealing
law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality. Instructive on this point is the following
exchange between Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio) and the Solicitor General during the
Oral Arguments:126
Justice Carpio: The President has taken an oath to faithfully execute the law,127 correct? Solicitor General
Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio: And so the President cannot refuse to implement the General Appropriations Act, correct?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Well, that is our answer, Your Honor. In the case, for example of the PDAF, the
President has a duty to execute the laws but in the face of the outrage over PDAF, the President was
saying, "I am not sure that I will continue the release of the soft projects," and that started, Your Honor.
Now, whether or not that (interrupted)
Justice Carpio: Yeah. I will grant the President if there are anomalies in the project, he has the power to
stop the releases in the meantime, to investigate, and that is Section 38 of Chapter 5 of Book 6 of the
Revised Administrative Code128 x x x. So at most the President can suspend, now if the President believes
that the PDAF is unconstitutional, can he just refuse to implement it?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor, as we were trying to say in the specific case of the PDAF
because of the CoA Report, because of the reported irregularities and this Court can take judicial notice,
even outside, outside of the COA Report, you have the report of the whistle-blowers, the President was just
exercising precisely the duty .
xxxx
Justice Carpio: Yes, and that is correct. Youve seen the CoA Report, there are anomalies, you stop and
investigate, and prosecute, he has done that. But, does that mean that PDAF has been repealed?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor x x x.
xxxx
Justice Carpio: So that PDAF can be legally abolished only in two (2) cases. Congress passes a law to repeal
it, or this Court declares it unconstitutional, correct?
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio: The President has no power to legally abolish PDAF. (Emphases supplied)
Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that "the moot and academic
principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case." The Court
will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the

constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and
the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.129
The applicability of the first exception is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners they
essentially allege grave violations of the Constitution with respect to, inter alia, the principles of separation
of powers, non-delegability of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability and local autonomy.
The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the nature of the interests involved
the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds have been and
continue to be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional character as well as
a matter of paramount public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time when the
systems flaws have never before been magnified. To the Courts mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report,
the accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and the governments own recognition that reforms are needed
"to address the reported abuses of the PDAF"130 demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only
underscores the importance of the matter. It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners claims
as not merely theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the
findings made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government. In Delos
Santos v. CoA,131 a recent case wherein the Court upheld the CoAs disallowance of irregularly disbursed
PDAF funds, it was emphasized that:
The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and
conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately the people's, property.
The exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check
and balance system inherent in our form of government.
It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one
which is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of
powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of
administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not
tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the
CoA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. x x x. (Emphases
supplied)
Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in these
cases, the Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to be sufficient.
The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely due to the practical need for a definitive
ruling on the systems constitutionality. As disclosed during the Oral Arguments, the CoA Chairperson
estimates that thousands of notices of disallowances will be issued by her office in connection with the
findings made in the CoA Report. In this relation, Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice
Leonen) pointed out that all of these would eventually find their way to the courts.132 Accordingly, there is
a compelling need to formulate controlling principles relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide
the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the anticipated disallowance
cases, but more importantly, so that the government may be guided on how public funds should be utilized
in accordance with constitutional principles.
Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the recognition that the preparation and
passage of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence.133 The
relevance of the issues before the Court does not cease with the passage of a "PDAF -free budget for
2014."134 The evolution of the "Pork Barrel System," by its multifarious iterations throughout the course of
history, lends a semblance of truth to petitioners claim that "the same dog will just resurface wearing a
different collar."135 In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,136 the government had already backtracked on a
previous course of action yet the Court used the "capable of repetition but evading review" exception in
order "to prevent similar questions from re- emerging."137 The situation similarly holds true to these
cases. Indeed, the myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not
resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review.
B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine.
The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies carries the assurance
that "the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government."138
Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a restatement of the political question doctrine which, under the
classic formulation of Baker v. Carr,139 applies when there is found, among others, "a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department," "a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it" or "the impossibility of deciding without
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non- judicial discretion." Cast against this light,
respondents submit that the "the political branches are in the best position not only to perform budget-

related reforms but also to do them in response to the specific demands of their constituents" and, as
such, "urge the Court not to impose a solution at this stage."140
The Court must deny respondents submission.
Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions which
are within its province to resolve. A political question refers to "those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure."141 The intrinsic
constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political
branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to
act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that the political
branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power.
More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial
power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
cannot be any clearer: "The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law. It includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." In Estrada v. Desierto,142 the expanded concept of judicial power
under the 1987 Constitution and its effect on the political question doctrine was explained as follows:143
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it
expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the
Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts are
given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new
provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. x x x (Emphases supplied)
It must also be borne in mind that when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it
does not assert any superiority over the other departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act
of the legislature or the executive, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution."144 To a great extent, the Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms undertaken by its coequal branches of government. But it is by constitutional force that the Court must faithfully perform its
duty. Ultimately, it is the Courts avowed intention that a resolution of these cases would not arrest or in
any manner impede the endeavors of the two other branches but, in fact, help ensure that the pillars of
change are erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of the people that each
great branch of government, within its own sphere, contributes its share towards achieving a holistic and
genuine solution to the problems of society. For all these reasons, the Court cannot heed respondents plea
for judicial restraint.
C. Locus Standi.
"The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously
affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no
standing."145
Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly,
assert that they "dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury."146 Clearly, as taxpayers, they
possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing "Pork Barrel System" under which the
taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are
bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers
have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law,147 as in these cases.
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues they
have raised may be classified as matters "of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest."148 The CoA Chairpersons statement during the Oral Arguments
that the present controversy involves "not merely a systems failure" but a "complete breakdown of
controls"149 amplifies, in addition to the matters above-discussed, the seriousness of the issues involved
herein. Indeed, of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the
mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.150 All told,
petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases.

D. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis.

Res judicata (which means a "matter adjudged") and stare decisis non quieta et movere (or simply, stare
decisis which means "follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled") are general
procedural law principles which both deal with the effects of previous but factually similar dispositions to
subsequent cases. For the cases at bar, the Court examines the applicability of these principles in relation
to its prior rulings in Philconsa and LAMP.
The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a judgment on the merits in a
previous case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the
first and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.151
This required identity is not, however, attendant hereto since Philconsa and LAMP, respectively involved
constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article, whereas the cases at bar
call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire "Pork Barrel System." Also, the ruling in LAMP is
essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits in
that petitioners therein failed to present any "convincing proof x x x showing that, indeed, there were
direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole
discretion" or "pertinent evidentiary support to demonstrate the illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of
kickbacks and has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress." As such, the Court
up held, in view of the presumption of constitutionality accorded to every law, the 2004 PDAF Article, and
saw "no need to review or reverse the standing pronouncements in the said case." Hence, for the
foregoing reasons, the res judicata principle, insofar as the Philconsa and LAMP cases are concerned,
cannot apply.
On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The principle, entrenched under
Article 8152 of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached
in one case should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even
though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions
relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case
litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate
the same issue.153
Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork Barrel provision, i.e., the 1994
CDF Article, was resolved by the Court. To properly understand its context, petitioners posturing was that
"the power given to the Members of Congress to propose and identify projects and activities to be funded
by the CDF is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said power in an appropriation
act is in implementation of the law" and that "the proposal and identification of the projects do not involve
the making of laws or the repeal and amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the
Constitution."154 In deference to the foregoing submissions, the Court reached the following main
conclusions: one, under the Constitution, the power of appropriation, or the "power of the purse," belongs
to Congress; two, the power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to
be funded under the appropriation law and it can be detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be; and,
three, the proposals and identifications made by Members of Congress are merely recommendatory. At
once, it is apparent that the Philconsa resolution was a limited response to a separation of powers problem,
specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of Congress.
On the contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between the
CDF and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of the entire "Pork Barrel System" as well as
(b) the intra-relation of post-enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article,
including not only those related to the area of project identification but also to the areas of fund release
and realignment. The complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be,
therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale application of the stare
decisis principle.
In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent constitutional
inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. As may be deduced from
the main conclusions of the case, Philconsas fundamental premise in allowing Members of Congress to
propose and identify of projects would be that the said identification authority is but an aspect of the
power of appropriation which has been constitutionally lodged in Congress. From this premise, the
contradictions may be easily seen. If the authority to identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the
power of appropriation is a form of legislative power thereby lodged in Congress, then it follows that: (a) it
is Congress which should exercise such authority, and not its individual Members; (b) such authority must
be exercised within the prescribed procedure of law passage and, hence, should not be exercised after the
GAA has already been passed; and (c) such authority, as embodied in the GAA, has the force of law and,
hence, cannot be merely recommendatory. Justice Vitugs Concurring Opinion in the same case sums up
the Philconsa quandary in this wise: "Neither would it be objectionable for Congress, by law, to appropriate
funds for such specific projects as it may be minded; to give that authority, however, to the individual
members of Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid, would be constitutionally impermissible." As the
Court now largely benefits from hindsight and current findings on the matter, among others, the CoA

Report, the Court must partially abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the postenactment identification authority of Members of Congress on the guise that the same was merely
recommendatory. This postulate raises serious constitutional inconsistencies which cannot be simply
excused on the ground that such mechanism is "imaginative as it is innovative." Moreover, it must be
pointed out that the recent case of Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima155 (Abakada) has effectively
overturned Philconsas allowance of post-enactment legislator participation in view of the separation of
powers principle. These constitutional inconsistencies and the Abakada rule will be discussed in greater
detail in the ensuing section of this Decision.
As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence,
has not set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these
cases. In fine, stare decisis would not apply.
II. Substantive Issues.
A. Definition of Terms.
Before the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issues of these cases, it must first define the terms
"Pork Barrel System," "Congressional Pork Barrel," and "Presidential Pork Barrel" as they are essential to
the ensuing discourse.
Petitioners define the term "Pork Barrel System" as the "collusion between the Legislative and Executive
branches of government to accumulate lump-sum public funds in their offices with unchecked
discretionary powers to determine its distribution as political largesse."156 They assert that the following
elements make up the Pork Barrel System: (a) lump-sum funds are allocated through the appropriations
process to an individual officer; (b) the officer is given sole and broad discretion in determining how the
funds will be used or expended; (c) the guidelines on how to spend or use the funds in the appropriation
are either vague, overbroad or inexistent; and (d) projects funded are intended to benefit a definite
constituency in a particular part of the country and to help the political careers of the disbursing official by
yielding rich patronage benefits.157 They further state that the Pork Barrel System is comprised of two (2)
kinds of discretionary public funds: first, the Congressional (or Legislative) Pork Barrel, currently known as
the PDAF;158 and, second, the Presidential (or Executive) Pork Barrel, specifically, the Malampaya Funds
under PD 910 and the Presidential Social Fund under PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993.159
Considering petitioners submission and in reference to its local concept and legal history, the Court
defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by
which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the
respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members.
The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds:
First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary
fund wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to
effectively control certain aspects of the funds utilization through various post-enactment measures
and/or practices. In particular, petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as
Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure that allows individual legislators
to wield a collective power;160 and
Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary
fund which allows the President to determine the manner of its utilization. For reasons earlier stated,161
the Court shall delimit the use of such term to refer only to the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential
Social Fund.
With these definitions in mind, the Court shall now proceed to discuss the substantive issues of these
cases.
B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel.
1. Separation of Powers.
a. Statement of Principle.
The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental
powers of government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission,162 it
means that the "Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government."163 To the legislative branch of
government, through Congress,164 belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of
government, through the President,165 belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of
government, through the Court,166 belongs the power to interpret laws. Because the three great powers
have been, by constitutional design, ordained in this respect, "each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere."167 Thus,

"the legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the executive has no authority to make or
construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or execute the law."168 The principle of
separation of powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence stem from the notion that the
powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the
division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other branches or the
citizenry.169 To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of
government that are equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates. Lack
of independence would result in the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or selfinterest assertions of another or others.170
Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of government
unduly encroaches on the domain of another. US Supreme Court decisions instruct that the principle of
separation of powers may be violated in two (2) ways: firstly, "one branch may interfere impermissibly with
the others performance of its constitutionally assigned function";171 and "alternatively, the doctrine may
be violated when one branch assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another."172 In other
words, there is a violation of the principle when there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b)
assumption of another departments functions.
The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function both
constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the Executive branch of government. In Guingona, Jr. v.
Hon. Carague173 (Guingona, Jr.), the Court explained that the phase of budget execution "covers the
various operational aspects of budgeting" and accordingly includes "the evaluation of work and financial
plans for individual activities," the "regulation and release of funds" as well as all "other related activities"
that comprise the budget execution cycle.174 This is rooted in the principle that the allocation of power in
the three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them.175 Thus, unless the
Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive department should exclusively exercise all roles and
prerogatives which go into the implementation of the national budget as provided under the GAA as well
as any other appropriation law.
In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members, should not
cross over the field of implementing the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the
domain of the Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that "Congress enters the picture when it
deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President. Thereafter, Congress, "in the exercise of its
own judgment and wisdom, formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by
the Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with
an appropriation made by law." Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress law -making role
necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executives role of implementing the national budget
begins. So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries between them, Congress must "not concern it self
with details for implementation by the Executive."176
The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where the Court held that "from
the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional."177 It must be clarified, however, that since the
restriction only pertains to "any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law," Congress may still
exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism of checks and balances that the Constitution itself
allows. But it must be made clear that Congress role must be confined to mere oversight. Any postenactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis
and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive functions. As the
Court ruled in Abakada:178
Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to scrutiny and investigation.1wphi1
In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in
connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its
Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation; and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.
(Emphases supplied)
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork Barrel among others, the 2013 PDAF
Article "wrecks the assignment of responsibilities between the political branches" as it is designed to
allow individual legislators to interfere "way past the time it should have ceased" or, particularly, "after the
GAA is passed."179 They state that the findings and recommendations in the CoA Report provide "an

illustration of how absolute and definitive the power of legislators wield over project implementation in
complete violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers."180 Further, they point out that
the Court in the Philconsa case only allowed the CDF to exist on the condition that individual legislators
limited their role to recommending projects and not if they actually dictate their implementation.181
For their part, respondents counter that the separations of powers principle has not been violated since the
President maintains "ultimate authority to control the execution of the GAA and that he "retains the final
discretion to reject" the legislators proposals.182 They maintain that the Court, in Philconsa, "upheld the
constitutionality of the power of members of Congress to propose and identify projects so long as such
proposal and identification are recommendatory."183 As such, they claim that "everything in the Special
Provisions [of the 2013 PDAF Article follows the Philconsa framework, and hence, remains
constitutional."184
The Court rules in favor of petitioners.
As may be observed from its legal history, the defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel
would be the authority of legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of project
implementation.
At its core, legislators may it be through project lists,185 prior consultations186 or program menus187
have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded
through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority
of legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be construed from the import of Special Provisions 1 to 3
as well as the second paragraph of Special Provision 4. To elucidate, Special Provision 1 embodies the
program menu feature which, as evinced from past PDAF Articles, allows individual legislators to identify
PDAF projects for as long as the identified project falls under a general program listed in the said menu.
Relatedly, Special Provision 2 provides that the implementing agencies shall, within 90 days from the GAA
is passed, submit to Congress a more detailed priority list, standard or design prepared and submitted by
implementing agencies from which the legislator may make his choice. The same provision further
authorizes legislators to identify PDAF projects outside his district for as long as the representative of the
district concerned concurs in writing. Meanwhile, Special Provision 3 clarifies that PDAF projects refer to
"projects to be identified by legislators"188 and thereunder provides the allocation limit for the total
amount of projects identified by each legislator. Finally, paragraph 2 of Special Provision 4 requires that
any modification and revision of the project identification "shall be submitted to the House Committee on
Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the
implementing agency, as the case may be." From the foregoing special provisions, it cannot be seriously
doubted that legislators have been accorded post-enactment authority to identify PDAF projects.
Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority
in the areas of fund release and realignment. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of
legislators to participate in the area of fund release through congressional committees is contained in
Special Provision 5 which explicitly states that "all request for release of funds shall be supported by the
documents prescribed under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by House Committee on
Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be"; while their statutory authority
to participate in the area of fund realignment is contained in: first , paragraph 2, Special Provision 4189
which explicitly state s, among others, that "any realignment of funds shall be submitted to the House
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM
or the implementing agency, as the case may be ; and, second , paragraph 1, also of Special Provision 4
which authorizes the "Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local Government, Labor
and Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social Welfare and Development and Trade and Industry190
x x x to approve realignment from one project/scope to another within the allotment received from this
Fund, subject to among others (iii) the request is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned."
Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and
fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to
intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue
of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in as Guingona,
Jr. puts it "the various operational aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and financial
plans for individual activities" and the "regulation and release of funds" in violation of the separation of
powers principle. The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated
from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.191 That the said authority is treated as merely
recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to repeat, covers
any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore
abandon its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the guise that
the same is merely recommendatory and, as such, respondents reliance on the same falters altogether.
Besides, it must be pointed out that respondents have nonetheless failed to substantiate their position that
the identification authority of legislators is only of recommendatory import. Quite the contrary,

respondents through the statements of the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments have admitted
that the identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement before his PDAF can be tapped
as a funding source, thereby highlighting the indispensability of the said act to the entire budget execution
process:192
Justice Bernabe: Now, without the individual legislators identification of the project, can the PDAF of the
legislator be utilized?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor.
Justice Bernabe: It cannot?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: It cannot (interrupted)
Justice Bernabe: So meaning you should have the identification of the project by the individual legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
Justice Bernabe: In short, the act of identification is mandatory?
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor. In the sense that if it is not done and then there is no
identification.
xxxx
Justice Bernabe: Now, would you know of specific instances when a project was implemented without the
identification by the individual legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: I do not know, Your Honor; I do not think so but I have no specific examples. I
would doubt very much, Your Honor, because to implement, there is a need for a SARO and the NCA. And
the SARO and the NCA are triggered by an identification from the legislator.
xxxx
Solictor General Jardeleza: What we mean by mandatory, Your Honor, is we were replying to a question,
"How can a legislator make sure that he is able to get PDAF Funds?" It is mandatory in the sense that he
must identify, in that sense, Your Honor. Otherwise, if he does not identify, he cannot avail of the PDAF
Funds and his district would not be able to have PDAF Funds, only in that sense, Your Honor. (Emphases
supplied)
Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other
provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the
separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices, through
which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as
acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the
same unconstitutional treatment. That such informal practices do exist and have, in fact, been constantly
observed throughout the years has not been substantially disputed here. As pointed out by Chief Justice
Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno) during the Oral Arguments of these cases:193
Chief Justice Sereno:
Now, from the responses of the representative of both, the DBM and two (2) Houses of Congress, if we
enforces the initial thought that I have, after I had seen the extent of this research made by my staff, that
neither the Executive nor Congress frontally faced the question of constitutional compatibility of how they
were engineering the budget process. In fact, the words you have been using, as the three lawyers of the
DBM, and both Houses of Congress has also been using is surprise; surprised that all of these things are
now surfacing. In fact, I thought that what the 2013 PDAF provisions did was to codify in one section all the
past practice that had been done since 1991. In a certain sense, we should be thankful that they are all
now in the PDAF Special Provisions. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether through formal measures
written into the law or informal practices institutionalized in government agencies, else the Executive
department be deprived of what the Constitution has vested as its own.
2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power.
a. Statement of Principle.

As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle,194 legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by
the body to which the Constitution has conferred the same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution states that such power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of
a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on
initiative and referendum.195 Based on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral
body, and the people, through the process of initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield
legislative power and no other. This premise embodies the principle of non-delegability of legislative
power, and the only recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative power to local
governments which, by immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on purely local matters;196 and (b)
constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national
emergency,197 or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress
may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.198
Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a restriction to delegate rule-making
authority to implementing agencies for the limited purpose of either filling up the details of the law for its
enforcement (supplementary rule-making) or ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation
(contingent rule-making).199 The conceptual treatment and limitations of delegated rule-making were
explained in the case of People v. Maceren200 as follows:
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation
of powers and is an exception to the nondelegation of legislative powers. Administrative regulations or
"subordinate legislation" calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of "the growing
complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the
increased difficulty of administering the law."
xxxx
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating
the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended
to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.
Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (Emphases supplied)
b. Application.
In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment
identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said
legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which as settled in
Philconsa is lodged in Congress.201 That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through
legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." To understand
what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular
Auditor202 (Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a
certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article,
individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much
from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As
these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given
that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said
legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow.
Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares the
2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar
legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.
3. Checks and Balances.
a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power.
The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept separate and distinct does not
mean that they are absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has also
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the
various departments of the government.203
A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the Presidents power to veto an item
written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a
process known as "bill presentment." The Presidents item-veto power is found in Section 27(2), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution which reads as follows:
Sec. 27. x x x.

xxxx
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or
tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein he may exercise his
power of item-veto, forms part of the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" for
law-passage as specified under the Constitution.204 As stated in Abakada, the final step in the law-making
process is the "submission of the bill to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law
after the required publication."205
Elaborating on the Presidents item-veto power and its relevance as a check on the legislature, the Court,
in Bengzon, explained that:206
The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines make the Chief Executive an
integral part of the law-making power. His disapproval of a bill, commonly known as a veto, is essentially a
legislative act. The questions presented to the mind of the Chief Executive are precisely the same as those
the legislature must determine in passing a bill, except that his will be a broader point of view.
The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the government, but in this
respect it is a grant of power to the executive department. The Legislature has the affirmative power to
enact laws; the Chief Executive has the negative power by the constitutional exercise of which he may
defeat the will of the Legislature. It follows that the Chief Executive must find his authority in the
Constitution. But in exercising that authority he may not be confined to rules of strict construction or
hampered by the unwise interference of the judiciary. The courts will indulge every intendment in favor of
the constitutionality of a veto in the same manner as they will presume the constitutionality of an act as
originally passed by the Legislature. (Emphases supplied)
The justification for the Presidents item-veto power rests on a variety of policy goals such as to prevent
log-rolling legislation,207 impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature, as well as to fortify the executive
branchs role in the budgetary process.208 In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the US
Supreme Court characterized the Presidents item-power as "a salutary check upon the legislative body,
calculated to guard the community against the effects of factions, precipitancy, or of any impulse
unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a majority of that body"; phrased differently,
it is meant to "increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through
haste, inadvertence, or design."209
For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item"
which may be the object of the veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the
particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill." In the case of
Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the Philippine Islands,210 the US Supreme Court characterized an item
of appropriation as follows:
An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific appropriation of
money, not some general provision of law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill. (Emphases
supplied)
On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the President may be able to
exercise his power of item veto, must contain "specific appropriations of money" and not only "general
provisions" which provide for parameters of appropriation.
Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by
singular correspondence meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular
purpose, otherwise known as a "line-item."211 This treatment not only allows the item to be consistent
with its definition as a "specific appropriation of money" but also ensures that the President may
discernibly veto the same. Based on the foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent
Fund and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state a specified amount for a specific purpose,
would then be considered as "line- item" appropriations which are rightfully subject to item veto. Likewise,
it must be observed that an appropriation may be validly apportioned into component percentages or
values; however, it is crucial that each percentage or value must be allocated for its own corresponding
purpose for such component to be considered as a proper line-item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly
pointed out, a valid appropriation may even have several related purposes that are by accounting and
budgeting practice considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating expenses),
in which case the related purposes shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the exercise of the Presidents
item veto power. Finally, special purpose funds and discretionary funds would equally square with the
constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as long as they follow the rule on singular correspondence as
herein discussed. Anent special purpose funds, it must be added that Section 25(4), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution requires that the "special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended,
and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or t o be raised by
a corresponding revenue proposal therein." Meanwhile, with respect to discretionary funds, Section 2 5(6),

Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that said funds "shall be disbursed only for public purposes to
be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law."
In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a singular
lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type
necessitates the further determination of both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose
of the appropriation which must still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be
said that the appropriation law already indicates a "specific appropriation of money and hence, without a
proper line-item which the President may veto. As a practical result, the President would then be faced with
the predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of its purposes wasteful or
undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes.
Finally, it may not be amiss to state that such arrangement also raises non-delegability issues considering
that the implementing authority would still have to determine, again, both the actual amount to be
expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the foregoing determinations constitute the
integral aspects of the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect, be exercising
legislative prerogatives in violation of the principle of non-delegability.
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the PDAF is a lump-sum
appropriation, the legislators identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA denies the
President the chance to veto that item later on."212 Accordingly, they submit that the "item veto power of
the President mandates that appropriations bills adopt line-item budgeting" and that "Congress cannot
choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President
useless."213
On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the Constitution envisions a process which is
intended to meet the demands of a modernizing economy and, as such, lump-sum appropriations are
essential to financially address situations which are barely foreseen when a GAA is enacted. They argue
that the decision of the Congress to create some lump-sum appropriations is constitutionally allowed and
textually-grounded.214
The Court agrees with petitioners.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit
since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive
personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds
based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the
GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF
appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated
without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting
system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of
presentment and consequently impairs the Presidents power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out,
the above-described system forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24.79 Billion
PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be
consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other
legislators with legitimate projects.215
Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would
remain constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation
above-characterized. In particular, the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere
funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending, i.e., scholarships, medical missions, assistance
to indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc. This setup
connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for
further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to
the Presidents power of item veto.
In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson
relays, "limited state auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more
stringently auditing the utilization of said Funds."216 Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a "line
by line budget or amount per proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing agency."217
Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all
Congressional Pork Barrel Laws of similar operation, to be unconstitutional. That such budgeting system
provides for a greater degree of flexibility to account for future contingencies cannot be an excuse to
defeat what the Constitution requires. Clearly, the first and essential truth of the matter is that
unconstitutional means do not justify even commendable ends.218
c. Accountability.

Petitioners further relate that the system under which various forms of Congressional Pork Barrel operate
defies public accountability as it renders Congress incapable of checking itself or its Members. In
particular, they point out that the Congressional Pork Barrel "gives each legislator a direct, financial
interest in the smooth, speedy passing of the yearly budget" which turns them "from fiscalizers" into
"financially-interested partners."219 They also claim that the system has an effect on re- election as "the
PDAF excels in self-perpetuation of elective officials." Finally, they add that the "PDAF impairs the power of
impeachment" as such "funds are indeed quite useful, to well, accelerate the decisions of senators."220
The Court agrees in part.
The aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that "public office is
a public trust," is an overarching reminder that every instrumentality of government should exercise their
official functions only in accordance with the principles of the Constitution which embodies the parameters
of the peoples trust. The notion of a public trust connotes accountability,221 hence, the various
mechanisms in the Constitution which are designed to exact accountability from public officers.
Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the proper expenditure of public funds may be
checked is the power of congressional oversight. As mentioned in Abakada,222 congressional oversight
may be performed either through: (a) scrutiny based primarily on Congress power of appropriation and
the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear
before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation;223 or (b) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power
of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.224
The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of Congressional Pork
Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional oversight. The fact that
individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult
for them to become disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the
implementation of the appropriation law. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as
said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities
in which they themselves participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very same concept of postenactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:
Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before
any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or
special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He
shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he
may be called upon to act on account of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation a matter before
another office of government renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the
individual legislators control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in office. Indeed,
while the Congressional Pork Barrel and a legislators use thereof may be linked to this area of interest, the
use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts and
on a case-to-case basis.
Finally, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity between legislators
and the Executive department, through the formers post-enactment participation, may affect the process
of impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly concern the
Pork Barrel Systems intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment.
In sum, insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate Section 14, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution, thus impairing public accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article and other forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel of similar nature are deemed as unconstitutional.
4. Political Dynasties.
One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables politicians who are members of political
dynasties to accumulate funds to perpetuate themselves in power, in contravention of Section 26, Article II
of the 1987 Constitution225 which states that:
Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is considered as not self-executing due to the
qualifying phrase "as may be defined by law." In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself,

provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies guideline for legislative or
executive action.226 Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on
political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative since it has
not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political
dynasties.
5. Local Autonomy.
The States policy on local autonomy is principally stated in Section 25, Article II and Sections 2 and 3,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
ARTICLE X
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their
powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and
removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to
the organization and operation of the local units.
Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7160,227 otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of
1991" (LGC), wherein the policy on local autonomy had been more specifically explicated as follows:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and
political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to
attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the
attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local
government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of
decentralization shall proceed from the National Government to the local government units.
xxxx
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic
consultations with appropriate local government units, nongovernmental and peoples organizations, and
other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their
respective jurisdictions. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
The above-quoted provisions of the Constitution and the LGC reveal the policy of the State to empower
local government units (LGUs) to develop and ultimately, become self-sustaining and effective contributors
to the national economy. As explained by the Court in Philippine Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate
Appellate Court:228
This is as good an occasion as any to stress the commitment of the Constitution to the policy of local
autonomy which is intended to provide the needed impetus and encouragement to the development of our
local political subdivisions as "self - reliant communities." In the words of Jefferson, "Municipal corporations
are the small republics from which the great one derives its strength." The vitalization of local
governments will enable their inhabitants to fully exploit their resources and more important, imbue them
with a deepened sense of involvement in public affairs as members of the body politic. This objective could
be blunted by undue interference by the national government in purely local affairs which are best
resolved by the officials and inhabitants of such political units. The decision we reach today conforms not
only to the letter of the pertinent laws but also to the spirit of the Constitution.229 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional
principles on local autonomy since it allows district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute
their judgments in utilizing public funds for local development.230 The Court agrees with petitioners.
Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make equal the unequal" and that "it is also a
recognition that individual members of Congress, far more than the President and their congressional
colleagues, are likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority
to be given each project."231 Drawing strength from this pronouncement, previous legislators justified its

existence by stating that "the relatively small projects implemented under the Congressional Pork Barrel
complement and link the national development goals to the countryside and grassroots as well as to
depressed areas which are overlooked by central agencies which are preoccupied with mega-projects.232
Similarly, in his August 23, 2013 speech on the "abolition" of PDAF and budgetary reforms, President
Aquino mentioned that the Congressional Pork Barrel was originally established for a worthy goal, which is
to enable the representatives to identify projects for communities that the LGU concerned cannot
afford.233
Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which
actually belies the avowed intention of "making equal the unequal." In particular, the Court observes that
the gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into
account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this regard, the
allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or
geographic indicators have been taken into consideration. As a result, a district representative of a highlyurbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural
province which would be relatively "underdeveloped" compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver
scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives and in some years, even the Vice-President
who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well. These
certainly are anathema to the Congressional Pork Barrels original intent which is "to make equal the
unequal." Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had become personal funds under the effective control of each
legislator and given unto them on the sole account of their office.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with
the functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to
"assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development, and
coordinating development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction."234 Considering that LDCs are
instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs,235 their
programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who
are national officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting as a body. The
undermining effect on local autonomy caused by the post-enactment authority conferred to the latter was
succinctly put by petitioners in the following wise:236
With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate projects on his
own, and even take sole credit for its execution. Indeed, this type of personality-driven project
identification has not only contributed little to the overall development of the district, but has even
contributed to "further weakening infrastructure planning and coordination efforts of the government."
Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters and thereby
subvert genuine local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other similar forms of Congressional
Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional.
With this final issue on the Congressional Pork Barrel resolved, the Court now turns to the substantive
issues involving the Presidential Pork Barrel.
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel.
1. Validity of Appropriation.
Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of PD1869 (now, amended by PD 1993),
which respectively provide for the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, as invalid
appropriations laws since they do not have the "primary and specific" purpose of authorizing the release of
public funds from the National Treasury. Petitioners submit that Section 8 of PD 910 is not an appropriation
law since the "primary and specific purpose of PD 910 is the creation of an Energy Development Board
and Section 8 thereof only created a Special Fund incidental thereto.237 In similar regard, petitioners
argue that Section 12 of PD 1869 is neither a valid appropriations law since the allocation of the
Presidential Social Fund is merely incidental to the "primary and specific" purpose of PD 1869 which is the
amendment of the Franchise and Powers of PAGCOR.238 In view of the foregoing, petitioners suppose that
such funds are being used without any valid law allowing for their proper appropriation in violation of
Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."239
The Court disagrees.
"An appropriation made by law under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution exists when a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or determinable240 amount of
money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose. These two minimum designations of
amount and purpose stem from the very definition of the word "appropriation," which means "to allot,
assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose," and hence, if written into the law, demonstrate
that the legislative intent to appropriate exists. As the Constitution "does not provide or prescribe any
particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be

made, except that it be made by law," an appropriation law may according to Philconsa be "detailed
and as broad as Congress wants it to be" for as long as the intent to appropriate may be gleaned from the
same. As held in the case of Guingona, Jr.:241
There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of words or
religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be
"made by law," such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential
decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but
subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the
present Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms. The
Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in
special provisions of laws of general or special application which appropriate public funds for specific public
purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention
clearly and certainly appears from the language employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272),
whether in the past or in the present. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, as ruled by the US Supreme Court in State of Nevada v. La Grave:242
To constitute an appropriation there must be money placed in a fund applicable to the designated purpose.
The word appropriate means to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose. An
appropriation in the sense of the constitution means the setting apart a portion of the public funds for a
public purpose. No particular form of words is necessary for the purpose, if the intention to appropriate is
plainly manifested. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the argument that the appropriation must be the
"primary and specific" purpose of the law in order for a valid appropriation law to exist. To reiterate, if a
legal provision designates a determinate or determinable amount of money and allocates the same for a
particular public purpose, then the legislative intent to appropriate becomes apparent and, hence, already
sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an "appropriation made by law" under contemplation of the
Constitution.
Section 8 of PD 910 pertinently provides:
Section 8. Appropriations. x x x
All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources including receipts from service
contracts and agreements such as application and processing fees, signature bonus, discovery bonus,
production bonus; all money collected from concessionaires, representing unspent work obligations, fines
and penalties under the Petroleum Act of 1949; as well as the government share representing royalties,
rentals, production share on service contracts and similar payments on the exploration, development and
exploitation of energy resources, shall form part of a Special Fund to be used to finance energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such other purposes as
may be hereafter directed by the President. (Emphases supplied)
Whereas Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, reads:
Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. After deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty
(50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of the Corporation from this
Franchise, or 60% if the aggregate gross earnings be less than P150,000,000.00 shall be set aside and
shall accrue to the General Fund to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance
the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by
the Office of the President of the Philippines. (Emphases supplied)
Analyzing the legal text vis--vis the above-mentioned principles, it may then be concluded that (a)
Section 8 of PD 910, which creates a Special Fund comprised of "all fees, revenues, and receipts of the
Energy Development Board from any and all sources" (a determinable amount) "to be used to finance
energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" (a specified public purpose), and (b) Section
12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which similarly sets aside, "after deducting five (5%) percent as
Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of
PAGCOR, or 60%, if the aggregate gross earnings be less than P150,000,000.00" (also a determinable
amount) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and x x x the restoration of damaged
or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President
of the Philippines" (also a specified public purpose), are legal appropriations under Section 29(1), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution.
In this relation, it is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal
appropriation under the said constitutional provision precisely because, as earlier stated, it contains postenactment measures which effectively create a system of intermediate appropriations. These intermediate
appropriations are the actual appropriations meant for enforcement and since they are made by individual

legislators after the GAA is passed, they occur outside the law. As such, the Court observes that the real
appropriation made under the 2013 PDAF Article is not the P24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but
rather the post-enactment determinations made by the individual legislators which are, to repeat,
occurrences outside of the law. Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute an "appropriation
made by law" since it, in its truest sense, only authorizes individual legislators to appropriate in violation of
the non-delegability principle as afore-discussed.
2. Undue Delegation.
On a related matter, petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power since the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" gives the President "unbridled discretion to determine for what purpose the funds will be
used."243 Respondents, on the other hand, urged the Court to apply the principle of ejusdem generis to
the same section and thus, construe the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed
by the President" to refer only to other purposes related "to energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government."244
The Court agrees with petitioners submissions.
While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public purpose is sufficient
for a legal appropriation to exist, the appropriation law must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the
same law delegates rule-making authority to the Executive245 either for the purpose of (a) filling up the
details of the law for its enforcement, known as supplementary rule-making, or (b) ascertaining facts to
bring the law into actual operation, referred to as contingent rule-making.246 There are two (2)
fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative guidelines for delegated rule-making are indeed adequate.
The first test is called the "completeness test." Case law states that a law is complete when it sets forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate. On the other hand, the
second test is called the "sufficient standard test." Jurisprudence holds that a law lays down a sufficient
standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.247 To be sufficient, the standard must
specify the limits of the delegates authority, announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions
under which it is to be implemented.248
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such other purposes as
may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of
the Presidents authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it
reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose
he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the
law. That the subject phrase may be confined only to "energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government" under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the
general word or phrase is to be construed to include or be restricted to things akin to, resembling, or of
the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned,249 is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase
"energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government" states a
singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from
which the general phrase "for such other purposes" may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts
the class it represents, namely energy development programs of the government;250 and, third, the
Executive department has, in fact, used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the
subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents own position that it is limited only to "energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the government."251 Thus, while Section 8 of PD
910 may have passed the completeness test since the policy of energy development is clearly deducible
from its text, the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President"
under the same provision of law should nonetheless be stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies
independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. This notwithstanding, it must be
underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds "to finance
energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government," remains legally
effective and subsisting. Truth be told, the declared unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is but
an assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be used as it should be used only in accordance with
the avowed purpose and intention of PD 910.
As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Section 12 of PD 1869 has
already been amended by PD 1993 which thus moots the parties submissions on the same.252
Nevertheless, since the amendatory provision may be readily examined under the current parameters of
discussion, the Court proceeds to resolve its constitutionality.
Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may
be used "to first, finance the priority infrastructure development projects and second, to finance the
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the
Office of the President of the Philippines." The Court finds that while the second indicated purpose
adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration

purposes which arise from calamities, the first indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche
authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a "priority". Verily,
the law does not supply a definition of "priority in frastructure development projects" and hence, leaves
the President without any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one of
"infrastructure" is too broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility. This
may be deduced from its lexicographic definition as follows: "the underlying framework of a system,
especially public services and facilities (such as highways, schools, bridges, sewers, and water-systems)
needed to support commerce as well as economic and residential development."253 In fine, the phrase "to
finance the priority infrastructure development projects" must be stricken down as unconstitutional since
similar to the above-assailed provision under Section 8 of PD 910 it lies independently unfettered by any
sufficient standard of the delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD
1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally effective and subsisting.
D. Ancillary Prayers. 1.
Petitioners Prayer to be Furnished Lists and Detailed Reports.
Aside from seeking the Court to declare the Pork Barrel System unconstitutional as the Court did so in the
context of its pronouncements made in this Decision petitioners equally pray that the Executive
Secretary and/or the DBM be ordered to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete
schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013,
specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all
pertinent data thereto" (PDAF Use Schedule/List);254 and (b) "the use of the Executives lump-sum,
discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the
PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or
individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"255 (Presidential Pork Use Report). Petitioners prayer is
grounded on Section 28, Article II and Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
ARTICLE III Sec. 7.
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.
The Court denies petitioners submission.
Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the right to information is to file a petition for
mandamus. As explained in the case of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission:256
While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government
agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to
public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be
made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right
may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not
being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.
But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public right to be enforced and
the concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution.
The decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is, whether the
information sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. (Emphases
supplied)
Corollarily, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr.257 (Valmonte), it has been clarified that the right to
information does not include the right to compel the preparation of "lists, abstracts, summaries and the
like." In the same case, it was stressed that it is essential that the "applicant has a well -defined, clear and
certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act
required." Hence, without the foregoing substantiations, the Court cannot grant a particular request for
information. The pertinent portions of Valmonte are hereunder quoted:258
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to
official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to
prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public
concern.

It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a welldefined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant
to perform the act required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be
clear and specific Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November 29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido,
G.R. No. L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.
The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of respondent to
prepare the list requested. (Emphases supplied)
In these cases, aside from the fact that none of the petitions are in the nature of mandamus actions, the
Court finds that petitioners have failed to establish a "a well-defined, clear and certain legal right" to be
furnished by the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM of their requested PDAF Use Schedule/List and
Presidential Pork Use Report. Neither did petitioners assert any law or administrative issuance which would
form the bases of the latters duty to furnish them with the documents requested. While petitioners pray
that said information be equally released to the CoA, it must be pointed out that the CoA has not been
impleaded as a party to these cases nor has it filed any petition before the Court to be allowed access to or
to compel the release of any official document relevant to the conduct of its audit investigations. While the
Court recognizes that the information requested is a matter of significant public concern, however, if only
to ensure that the parameters of disclosure are properly foisted and so as not to unduly hamper the
equally important interests of the government, it is constrained to deny petitioners prayer on this score,
without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they, or even the CoA, may choose to pursue through
a separate petition.
It bears clarification that the Courts denial herein should only cover petitioners plea to be furnished with
such schedule/list and report and not in any way deny them, or the general public, access to official
documents which are already existing and of public record. Subject to reasonable regulation and absent
any valid statutory prohibition, access to these documents should not be proscribed. Thus, in Valmonte,
while the Court denied the application for mandamus towards the preparation of the list requested by
petitioners therein, it nonetheless allowed access to the documents sought for by the latter, subject,
however, to the custodians reasonable regulations,viz.:259
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject
to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination,
to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties
of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the
records may be insured Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80
Phil. 383, 387. The petition, as to the second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is
meritorious.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e.,
"to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO
and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos."
The Court, therefore, applies the same treatment here.
2. Petitioners Prayer to Include Matters in Congressional Deliberations.
Petitioners further seek that the Court "order the inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of
all presently, off-budget, lump sum, discretionary funds including but not limited to, proceeds from the x x
x Malampaya Fund, remittances from the PAGCOR and the PCSO or the Executives Social Funds."260
Suffice it to state that the above-stated relief sought by petitioners covers a matter which is generally left
to the prerogative of the political branches of government. Hence, lest the Court itself overreach, it must
equally deny their prayer on this score.
3. Respondents Prayer to Lift TRO; Consequential Effects of Decision.
The final issue to be resolved stems from the interpretation accorded by the DBM to the concept of
released funds. In response to the Courts September 10, 2013 TRO that enjoined the release of the
remaining PDAF allocated for the year 2013, the DBM issued Circular Letter No. 2013-8 dated September
27, 2013 (DBM Circular 2013-8) which pertinently reads as follows:
3.0 Nonetheless, PDAF projects funded under the FY 2013 GAA, where a Special Allotment Release Order
(SARO) has been issued by the DBM and such SARO has been obligated by the implementing agencies
prior to the issuance of the TRO, may continually be implemented and disbursements thereto effected by
the agencies concerned.

Based on the text of the foregoing, the DBM authorized the continued implementation and disbursement of
PDAF funds as long as they are: first, covered by a SARO; and, second, that said SARO had been obligated
by the implementing agency concerned prior to the issuance of the Courts September 10, 2013 TRO.
Petitioners take issue with the foregoing circular, arguing that "the issuance of the SARO does not yet
involve the release of funds under the PDAF, as release is only triggered by the issuance of a Notice of
Cash Allocation [(NCA)]."261 As such, PDAF disbursements, even if covered by an obligated SARO, should
remain enjoined.
For their part, respondents espouse that the subject TRO only covers "unreleased and unobligated
allotments." They explain that once a SARO has been issued and obligated by the implementing agency
concerned, the PDAF funds covered by the same are already "beyond the reach of the TRO because they
cannot be considered as remaining PDAF." They conclude that this is a reasonable interpretation of the
TRO by the DBM.262
The Court agrees with petitioners in part.
At the outset, it must be observed that the issue of whether or not the Courts September 10, 2013 TRO
should be lifted is a matter rendered moot by the present Decision. The unconstitutionality of the 2013
PDAF Article as declared herein has the consequential effect of converting the temporary injunction into a
permanent one. Hence, from the promulgation of this Decision, the release of the remaining PDAF funds for
2013, among others, is now permanently enjoined.
The propriety of the DBMs interpretation of the concept of "release" must, nevertheless, be resolved as it
has a practical impact on the execution of the current Decision. In particular, the Court must resolve the
issue of whether or not PDAF funds covered by obligated SAROs, at the time this Decision is promulgated,
may still be disbursed following the DBMs interpretation in DBM Circular 2013-8.
On this score, the Court agrees with petitioners posturing for the fundamental reason that funds covered
by an obligated SARO are yet to be "released" under legal contemplation. A SARO, as defined by the DBM
itself in its website, is "aspecific authority issued to identified agencies to incur obligations not exceeding a
given amount during a specified period for the purpose indicated. It shall cover expenditures the release of
which is subject to compliance with specific laws or regulations, or is subject to separate approval or
clearance by competent authority."263
Based on this definition, it may be gleaned that a SARO only evinces the existence of an obligation and not
the directive to pay. Practically speaking, the SARO does not have the direct and immediate effect of
placing public funds beyond the control of the disbursing authority. In fact, a SARO may even be withdrawn
under certain circumstances which will prevent the actual release of funds. On the other hand, the actual
release of funds is brought about by the issuance of the NCA,264 which is subsequent to the issuance of a
SARO. As may be determined from the statements of the DBM representative during the Oral
Arguments:265
Justice Bernabe: Is the notice of allocation issued simultaneously with the SARO?
xxxx
Atty. Ruiz: It comes after. The SARO, Your Honor, is only the go signal for the agencies to obligate or to
enter into commitments. The NCA, Your Honor, is already the go signal to the treasury for us to be able to
pay or to liquidate the amounts obligated in the SARO; so it comes after. x x x The NCA, Your Honor, is the
go signal for the MDS for the authorized government-disbursing banks to, therefore, pay the payees
depending on the projects or projects covered by the SARO and the NCA.
Justice Bernabe: Are there instances that SAROs are cancelled or revoked?
Atty. Ruiz: Your Honor, I would like to instead submit that there are instances that the SAROs issued are
withdrawn by the DBM.
Justice Bernabe: They are withdrawn?
Atty. Ruiz: Yes, Your Honor x x x. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be treated as funds which have been
"released." In this respect, therefore, the disbursement of 2013 PDAF funds which are only covered by
obligated SAROs, and without any corresponding NCAs issued, must, at the time of this Decisions
promulgation, be enjoined and consequently reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund.
Verily, in view of the declared unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article, the funds appropriated pursuant
thereto cannot be disbursed even though already obligated, else the Court sanctions the dealing of funds
coming from an unconstitutional source.

This same pronouncement must be equally applied to (a) the Malampaya Funds which have been obligated
but not released meaning, those merely covered by a SARO under the phrase "and for such other
purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910; and (b) funds
sourced from the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which were altogether
declared by the Court as unconstitutional. However, these funds should not be reverted to the general
fund as afore-stated but instead, respectively remain under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential
Social Fund to be utilized for their corresponding special purposes not otherwise declared as
unconstitutional.
E. Consequential Effects of Decision.
As a final point, it must be stressed that the Courts pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a) the
2013 PDAF Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar
thereto, and (c) the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" under Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects"
under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective in effect in
view of the operative fact doctrine.
To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate
case, declares the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional
and thus, entitled to obedience and respect and should be properly enforced and complied with. As
explained in the recent case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation,266 the
doctrine merely "reflects awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which
has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have
elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would
be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had
transpired prior to such adjudication."267 "In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: The
actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination of unconstitutionality, is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored."268
For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore applied prospectively.
Conclusion
The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in the chronicles of our history. In
the final analysis, the Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the
inherent defects in the rules within which it operates. To recount, insofar as it has allowed legislators to
wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution,
the system has violated the principle of separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators
the power of appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund
specific projects which they themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of non-delegability
of legislative power ; insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized into
the appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process, denied
the President the power to veto items ; insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional
oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of governance which
they may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public accountability ;
insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local
nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local
autonomy ; and again, insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended
by law for energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds
under the broad classification of "priority infrastructure development projects," it has once more
transgressed the principle of non-delegability.
For as long as this nation adheres to the rule of law, any of the multifarious unconstitutional methods and
mechanisms the Court has herein pointed out should never again be adopted in any system of
governance, by any name or form, by any semblance or similarity, by any influence or effect.
Disconcerting as it is to think that a system so constitutionally unsound has monumentally endured, the
Court urges the people and its co-stewards in government to look forward with the optimism of change and
the awareness of the past. At a time of great civic unrest and vociferous public debate, the Court fervently
hopes that its Decision today, while it may not purge all the wrongs of society nor bring back what has
been lost, guides this nation to the path forged by the Constitution so that no one may heretofore detract
from its cause nor stray from its course. After all, this is the Courts bounden duty and no others.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional violations discussed in this
Decision, the Court hereby declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire 2013 PDAF Article; (b) all legal
provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles
and the various Congressional Insertions, which authorize/d legislators whether individually or
collectively organized into committees to intervene, assume or participate in any of the various postenactment stages of the budget execution, such as but not limited to the areas of project identification,

modification and revision of project identification, fund release and/or fund realignment, unrelated to the
power of congressional oversight; (c) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel
Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which
confer/red personal, lump-sum allocations to legislators from which they are able to fund specific projects
which they themselves determine; (d) all informal practices of similar import and effect, which the Court
similarly deems to be acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (e)
the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section
8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under
Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, for both failing
the sufficient standard test in violation of the principle of non-delegability of legislative power.
Accordingly, the Courts temporary injunction dated September 10, 2013 is hereby declared to be
PERMANENT. Thus, the disbursement/release of the remaining PDAF funds allocated for the year 2013, as
well as for all previous years, and the funds sourced from (1) the Malampaya Funds under the phrase "and
for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 910, and (2) the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1993, which are, at the time this Decision is promulgated, not covered by Notice
of Cash Allocations (NCAs) but only by Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs), whether obligated or
not, are hereby ENJOINED. The remaining PDAF funds covered by this permanent injunction shall not be
disbursed/released but instead reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund, while the funds
under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund shall remain therein to be utilized for their
respective special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper substantiation, the Court hereby DENIES
petitioners prayer seeking that the Executive Secretary and/or the Department of Budget and
Management be ordered to provide the public and the Commission on Audit complete lists/schedules or
detailed reports related to the availments and utilization of the funds subject of these cases. Petitioners
access to official documents already available and of public record which are related to these funds must,
however, not be prohibited but merely subjected to the custodians reasonable regulations or any valid
statutory prohibition on the same. This denial is without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they
or the Commission on Audit may choose to pursue through a separate petition.
The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to order the inclusion of the funds subject of these cases in the
budgetary deliberations of Congress as the same is a matter left to the prerogative of the political
branches of government.
Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the government to, within the bounds of
reasonable dispatch, investigate and accordingly prosecute all government officials and/or private
individuals for possible criminal offenses related to the irregular, improper and/or unlawful
disbursement/utilization of all funds under the Pork Barrel System.
This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 209287
July 1, 2014
MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN; JUDY M.
TAGUIWALO, PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES DILIMAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON,
PAGBABAGO; HENRI KAHN, CONCERNED CITIZENS MOVEMENT; REP. LUZ ILAGAN, GABRIELA
WOMEN'S PARTY REPRESENTATIVE; REP. CARLOS ISAGANI ZARATE, BAY AN MUNA PARTY-LIST
REPRESENTATIVE; RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAYAN; MANUEL K. DAYRIT,
CHAIRMAN, ANG KAPATIRAN PARTY; VENCER MARI E. CRISOSTOMO, CHAIRPERSON,
ANAKBAYAN; VICTOR VILLANUEVA, CONVENOR, YOUTH ACT NOW, Petitioners,
vs.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; PAQUITO
N. OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; AND FLORENCIO B. ABAD, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209135
AUGUSTO L. SY JUCO JR., Ph.D., Petitioner,
vs.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT; AND HON. FRANKLIN MAGTUNAO DRILON, IN HIS CAP A CITY AS THE SENATE
PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209136
MANUELITO R. LUNA, Petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY FLORENCIO ABAD, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT; AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO OCHOA, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS ALTER EGO OF THE PRESIDENT, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209155

ATTY. JOSE MALV AR VILLEGAS, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.; AND THE SECRETARY OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209164
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), REPRESENTED BY DEAN FROILAN M.
BACUNGAN, BENJAMIN E. DIOKNO AND LEONOR M. BRIONES, Petitioners,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT AND/OR HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209260
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), Petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT (DBM),
Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209442
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA; BISHOP REUBEN MABANTE AND REV. JOSE L. GONZALEZ,
Petitioners,
vs.
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED
BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON; THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED
BY SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR.; THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE, REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.; THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,
REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY FLORENCIO ABAD; THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, REPRESENTED
BY SECRETARY CESAR V. PURISIMA; AND THE BUREAU OF TREASURY, REPRESENTED BY ROSALIA
V. DE LEON, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209517
CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADV AN CEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
(COURAGE), REPRESENTED BY ITS 1ST VICE PRESIDENT, SANTIAGO DASMARINAS, JR.;
ROSALINDA NARTATES, FOR HERSELF AND AS NATIONAL PRESIDENT OF THE CONSOLIDATED
UNION OF EMPLOYEES NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY (CUENHA); MANUEL BACLAGON, FOR
HIMSELF AND AS PRESIDENT OF THE SOCIAL WELFARE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT CENTRAL OFFICE (SWEAPDSWD CO); ANTONIA PASCUAL, FOR HERSELF AND AS NATIONAL PRESIDENT OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (DAREA); ALBERT MAGALANG,
FOR HIMSELF AND AS PRESIDENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND MANAGEMENT BUREAU
EMPLOYEES UNION (EMBEU); AND MARCIAL ARABA, FOR HIMSELF AND AS PRESIDENT OF THE
KAPISANAN PARA SA KAGALINGAN NG MGA KAW ANI NG MMDA (KKKMMDA), Petitioners,
vs.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO Ill, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; PAQUITO
OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; AND HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209569
VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION (VACC), REPRESENTED BY DANTE L. JIMENEZ,
Petitioner,
vs.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND FLORENCIO B. ABAD, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
For resolution are the consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the Disbursement
Acceleration Program(DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and related issuances of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) implementing the DAP.
At the core of the controversy is Section 29(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, a provision of the
fundamental law that firmly ordains that "[n]o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law." The tenor and context of the challenges posed by the petitioners against
the DAP indicate that the DAP contravened this provision by allowing the Executive to allocate public
money pooled from programmed and unprogrammed funds of its various agencies in the guise of the
President exercising his constitutional authority under Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution to transfer
funds out of savings to augment the appropriations of offices within the Executive Branch of the
Government. But the challenges are further complicated by the interjection of allegations of transfer of
funds to agencies or offices outside of the Executive.
Antecedents
What has precipitated the controversy?

On September 25, 2013, Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege speech in the Senate of the
Philippines to reveal that some Senators, including himself, had been allotted an additional P50 Million
each as "incentive" for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.
Responding to Sen. Estradas revelation, Secretary Florencio Abad of the DBM issued a public statement
entitled Abad: Releases to Senators Part of Spending Acceleration Program,1 explaining that the funds
released to the Senators had been part of the DAP, a program designed by the DBM to ramp up spending
to accelerate economic expansion. He clarified that the funds had been released to the Senators based on
their letters of request for funding; and that it was not the first time that releases from the DAP had been
made because the DAP had already been instituted in 2011 to ramp up spending after sluggish
disbursements had caused the growth of the gross domestic product (GDP) to slow down. He explained
that the funds under the DAP were usually taken from (1) unreleased appropriations under Personnel
Services;2 (2) unprogrammed funds; (3) carry-over appropriations unreleased from the previous year; and
(4) budgets for slow-moving items or projects that had been realigned to support faster-disbursing
projects.
The DBM soon came out to claim in its website3 that the DAP releases had been sourced from savings
generated by the Government, and from unprogrammed funds; and that the savings had been derived
from (1) the pooling of unreleased appropriations, like unreleased Personnel Services4 appropriations that
would lapse at the end of the year, unreleased appropriations of slow-moving projects and discontinued
projects per zero based budgeting findings;5 and (2) the withdrawal of unobligated allotments also for
slow-moving programs and projects that had been earlier released to the agencies of the National
Government.
The DBM listed the following as the legal bases for the DAPs use of savings,6 namely: (1) Section 25(5),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which granted to the President the authority to augment an item for his
office in the general appropriations law; (2) Section 49 (Authority to Use Savings for Certain Purposes) and
Section 38 (Suspension of Expenditure Appropriations), Chapter 5, Book VI of Executive Order (EO) No. 292
(Administrative Code of 1987); and (3) the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 2011, 2012 and 2013,
particularly their provisions on the (a) use of savings; (b) meanings of savings and augmentation; and (c)
priority in the use of savings.
As for the use of unprogrammed funds under the DAP, the DBM cited as legal bases the special provisions
on unprogrammed fund contained in the GAAs of 2011, 2012 and 2013.
The revelation of Sen. Estrada and the reactions of Sec. Abad and the DBM brought the DAP to the
consciousness of the Nation for the first time, and made this present controversy inevitable. That the
issues against the DAP came at a time when the Nation was still seething in anger over Congressional pork
barrel "an appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or
primarily to bring money to a representatives district"7 excited the Nation as heatedly as the pork barrel
controversy.
Nine petitions assailing the constitutionality of the DAP and the issuances relating to the DAP were filed
within days of each other, as follows: G.R. No. 209135 (Syjuco), on October 7, 2013; G.R. No. 209136
(Luna), on October 7, 2013; G.R. No. 209155 (Villegas),8 on October 16, 2013; G.R. No. 209164
(PHILCONSA), on October 8, 2013; G.R. No. 209260 (IBP), on October 16, 2013; G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo),
on October 17, 2013; G.R. No. 209442 (Belgica), on October 29, 2013; G.R. No. 209517 (COURAGE), on
November6, 2013; and G.R. No. 209569 (VACC), on November 8, 2013.
In G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo), the petitioners brought to the Courts attention NBC No. 541 (Adoption of
Operational Efficiency Measure Withdrawal of Agencies Unobligated Allotments as of June 30, 2012),
alleging that NBC No. 541, which was issued to implement the DAP, directed the withdrawal of unobligated
allotments as of June 30, 2012 of government agencies and offices with low levels of obligations, both for
continuing and current allotments.
In due time, the respondents filed their Consolidated Comment through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG).
The Court directed the holding of oral arguments on the significant issues raised and joined.
Issues
Under the Advisory issued on November 14, 2013, the presentations of the parties during the oral
arguments were limited to the following, to wit:
Procedural Issue:
A. Whether or not certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper remedies to assail the constitutionality
and validity of the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and
all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP. Subsumed in this issue are whether there is
a controversy ripe for judicial determination, and the standing of petitioners.
Substantive Issues:
B. Whether or not the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: "No money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."
C. Whether or not the DAP, NBC No. 541, and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP
violate Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution insofar as:
(a)They treat the unreleased appropriations and unobligated allotments withdrawn from government
agencies as "savings" as the term is used in Sec. 25(5), in relation to the provisions of the GAAs of 2011,
2012 and 2013;
(b)They authorize the disbursement of funds for projects or programs not provided in the GAAs for the
Executive Department; and
(c)They "augment" discretionary lump sum appropriations in the GAAs.

D. Whether or not the DAP violates: (1) the Equal Protection Clause, (2) the system of checks and balances,
and (3) the principle of public accountability enshrined in the 1987 Constitution considering that it
authorizes the release of funds upon the request of legislators.
E. Whether or not factual and legal justification exists to issue a temporary restraining order to restrain the
implementation of the DAP, NBC No. 541, and all other executive issuances allegedly implementing the
DAP.
In its Consolidated Comment, the OSG raised the matter of unprogrammed funds in order to support its
argument regarding the Presidents power to spend. During the oral arguments, the propriety of releasing
unprogrammed funds to support projects under the DAP was considerably discussed. The petitioners in
G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo) and G.R. No. 209442 (Belgica) dwelled on unprogrammed funds in their
respective memoranda. Hence, an additional issue for the oral arguments is stated as follows:
F. Whether or not the release of unprogrammed funds under the DAP was in accord with the GAAs.
During the oral arguments held on November 19, 2013, the Court directed Sec. Abad to submit a list of
savings brought under the DAP that had been sourced from (a) completed programs; (b) discontinued or
abandoned programs; (c) unpaid appropriations for compensation; (d) a certified copy of the Presidents
directive dated June 27, 2012 referred to in NBC No. 541; and (e) all circulars or orders issued in relation to
the DAP.9
In compliance, the OSG submitted several documents, as follows:
(1) A certified copy of the Memorandum for the President dated June 25, 2012 (Omnibus Authority to
Consolidate Savings/Unutilized Balances and their Realignment);10
(2) Circulars and orders, which the respondents identified as related to the DAP, namely:
a. NBC No. 528 dated January 3, 2011 (Guidelines on the Release of Funds for FY 2011);
b. NBC No. 535 dated December 29, 2011 (Guidelines on the Release of Funds for FY 2012);
c. NBC No. 541 dated July 18, 2012 (Adoption of Operational Efficiency Measure Withdrawal of Agencies
Unobligated Allotments as of June 30, 2012);
d. NBC No. 545 dated January 2, 2013 (Guidelines on the Release of Funds for FY 2013);
e. DBM Circular Letter No. 2004-2 dated January 26, 2004 (Budgetary Treatment of
Commitments/Obligations of the National Government);
f. COA-DBM Joint Circular No. 2013-1 dated March 15, 2013 (Revised Guidelines on the Submission of
Quarterly Accountability Reports on Appropriations, Allotments, Obligations and Disbursements);
g. NBC No. 440 dated January 30, 1995 (Adoption of a Simplified Fund Release System in the Government).
(3) A breakdown of the sources of savings, including savings from discontinued projects and unpaid
appropriations for compensation from 2011 to 2013
On January 28, 2014, the OSG, to comply with the Resolution issued on January 21, 2014 directing the
respondents to submit the documents not yet submitted in compliance with the directives of the Court or
its Members, submitted several evidence packets to aid the Court in understanding the factual bases of
the DAP, to wit:
(1) First Evidence Packet11 containing seven memoranda issued by the DBM through Sec. Abad, inclusive
of annexes, listing in detail the 116 DAP identified projects approved and duly signed by the President, as
follows:
a. Memorandum for the President dated October 12, 2011 (FY 2011 Proposed Disbursement Acceleration
Program (Projects and Sources of Funds);
b. Memorandum for the President dated December 12, 2011 (Omnibus Authority to Consolidate
Savings/Unutilized Balances and its Realignment);
c. Memorandum for the President dated June 25, 2012 (Omnibus Authority to Consolidate
Savings/Unutilized Balances and their Realignment);
d. Memorandum for the President dated September 4, 2012 (Release of funds for other priority projects
and expenditures of the Government);
e. Memorandum for the President dated December 19, 2012 (Proposed Priority Projects and Expenditures
of the Government);
f. Memorandum for the President dated May 20, 2013 (Omnibus Authority to Consolidate
Savings/Unutilized Balances and their Realignment to Fund the Quarterly Disbursement Acceleration
Program); and
g. Memorandum for the President dated September 25, 2013 (Funding for the Task Force Pablo
Rehabilitation Plan).
(2) Second Evidence Packet12 consisting of 15 applications of the DAP, with their corresponding Special
Allotment Release Orders (SAROs) and appropriation covers;
(3) Third Evidence Packet13 containing a list and descriptions of 12 projects under the DAP;
(4) Fourth Evidence Packet14 identifying the DAP-related portions of the Annual Financial Report (AFR) of
the Commission on Audit for 2011 and 2012;
(5) Fifth Evidence Packet15 containing a letter of Department of Transportation and
Communications(DOTC) Sec. Joseph Abaya addressed to Sec. Abad recommending the withdrawal of funds
from his agency, inclusive of annexes; and
(6) Sixth Evidence Packet16 a print-out of the Solicitor Generals visual presentation for the January 28,
2014 oral arguments.
On February 5, 2014,17 the OSG forwarded the Seventh Evidence Packet,18 which listed the sources of
funds brought under the DAP, the uses of such funds per project or activity pursuant to DAP, and the legal
bases thereof.
On February 14, 2014, the OSG submitted another set of documents in further compliance with the
Resolution dated January 28, 2014, viz:

(1) Certified copies of the certifications issued by the Bureau of Treasury to the effect that the revenue
collections exceeded the original revenue targets for the years 2011, 2012 and 2013, including collections
arising from sources not considered in the original revenue targets, which certifications were required for
the release of the unprogrammed funds as provided in Special Provision No. 1 of Article XLV, Article XVI,
and Article XLV of the 2011, 2012 and 2013 GAAs; and (2) A report on releases of savings of the Executive
Department for the use of the Constitutional Commissions and other branches of the Government, as well
as the fund releases to the Senate and the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
RULING
I.
Procedural Issue:
a) The petitions under Rule 65 are proper remedies
All the petitions are filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and include applications for the issuance of
writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction or temporary restraining orders. More specifically, the nature of
the petitions is individually set forth hereunder, to wit:
G.R. No. 209135 (Syjuco)

Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus

G.R. No. 209136 (Luna)

Certiorariand Prohibition

G.R. No. 209155 (Villegas)

Certiorariand Prohibition

G.R. No. 209164 (PHILCONSA)

Certiorariand Prohibition

G.R. No. 209260 (IBP)

Prohibition

G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo)

Certiorariand Prohibition

G.R. No. 209442 (Belgica)

Certiorari

G.R. No. 209517 (COURAGE)

Certiorari and Prohibition

G.R. No. 209569 (VACC)

Certiorari and Prohibition

The respondents submit that there is no actual controversy that is ripe for adjudication in the absence of
adverse claims between the parties;19 that the petitioners lacked legal standing to sue because no
allegations were made to the effect that they had suffered any injury as a result of the adoption of the DAP
and issuance of NBC No. 541; that their being taxpayers did not immediately confer upon the petitioners
the legal standing to sue considering that the adoption and implementation of the DAP and the issuance of
NBC No. 541 were not in the exercise of the taxing or spending power of Congress;20 and that even if the
petitioners had suffered injury, there were plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of
law available to them, like assailing the regularity of the DAP and related issuances before the Commission
on Audit (COA) or in the trial courts.21
The respondents aver that the special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition are not proper actions for
directly assailing the constitutionality and validity of the DAP, NBC No. 541, and the other executive
issuances implementing the DAP.22
In their memorandum, the respondents further contend that there is no authorized proceeding under the
Constitution and the Rules of Court for questioning the validity of any law unless there is an actual case or
controversy the resolution of which requires the determination of the constitutional question; that the
jurisdiction of the Court is largely appellate; that for a court of law to pass upon the constitutionality of a
law or any act of the Government when there is no case or controversy is for that court to set itself up as a
reviewer of the acts of Congress and of the President in violation of the principle of separation of powers;
and that, in the absence of a pending case or controversy involving the DAP and NBC No. 541, any decision
herein could amount to a mere advisory opinion that no court can validly render.23
The respondents argue that it is the application of the DAP to actual situations that the petitioners can
question either in the trial courts or in the COA; that if the petitioners are dissatisfied with the ruling either
of the trial courts or of the COA, they can appeal the decision of the trial courts by petition for review on
certiorari, or assail the decision or final order of the COA by special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64
of the Rules of Court.24
The respondents arguments and submissions on the procedural issue are bereft of merit.
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
Thus, the Constitution vests judicial power in the Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law. In creating a lower court, Congress concomitantly determines the jurisdiction of that court, and that
court, upon its creation, becomes by operation of the Constitution one of the repositories of judicial
power.25 However, only the Court is a constitutionally created court, the rest being created by Congress in
its exercise of the legislative power.
The Constitution states that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice not only "to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable" but also "to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." It has thereby expanded the concept of

judicial power, which up to then was confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual controversies
involving rights that were legally demandable and enforceable.
The background and rationale of the expansion of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution were laid out
during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission by Commissioner Roberto R. Concepcion (a
former Chief Justice of the Philippines) in his sponsorship of the proposed provisions on the Judiciary, where
he said:
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual controversies involving
conflicts of rights which are demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law
but cannot be enforced by a judicial party. In a decided case, a husband complained that his wife was
unwilling to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her duties as such are
and that she is bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main
marital duty to her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to
enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to human dignity." This is why the first part
of the second paragraph of Section 1 provides that: Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or enforceable
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a presidential system
of government, the Supreme Court has, also, another important function. The powers of government are
generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one
is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy power to
determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government
as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or
not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction,
or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgmenton matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade
the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question. (Bold
emphasis supplied)26
Upon interpellation by Commissioner Nolledo, Commissioner Concepcion clarified the scope of judicial
power in the following manner:
MR. NOLLEDO. x x x
The second paragraph of Section 1 states: "Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle
actual controversies" The term "actual controversies" according to the Commissioner should refer to
questions which are political in nature and, therefore, the courts should not refuse to decide those political
questions. But do I understand it right that this is restrictive or only an example? I know there are cases
which are not actual yet the court can assume jurisdiction. An example is the petition for declaratory relief.
May I ask the Commissioners opinion about that?
MR. CONCEPCION. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to grant declaratory judgments.
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial power is not vested in the
Supreme Court alone but also in other lower courts as may be created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify political questions with
jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but where there is a question as to
whether the government had authority or had abused its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or
excess of jurisdiction, that is not a political question. Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.27
Our previous Constitutions equally recognized the extent of the power of judicial review and the great
responsibility of the Judiciary in maintaining the allocation of powers among the three great branches of
Government. Speaking for the Court in Angara v. Electoral Commission,28 Justice Jose P. Laurel intoned:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt
to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the
several department and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
xxxx
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and
extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the
rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other department; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature,
but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is
involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the
Constitution. x x x29
What are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government may be determined under the
Constitution?
The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for certiorari and

prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65. A similar remedy of certiorari exists under Rule 64, but the
remedy is expressly applicable only to the judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on
Elections and the Commission on Audit.
The ordinary nature and function of the writ of certiorari in our present system are aptly explained in Delos
Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company:30
In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari evolved, the writ of certiorari was issued out of
Chancery, or the Kings Bench, commanding agents or officers of the inferior courts to return the record of
a cause pending before them, so as to give the party more sure and speedy justice, for the writ would
enable the superior court to determine from an inspection of the record whether the inferior courts
judgment was rendered without authority. The errors were of such a nature that, if allowed to stand, they
would result in a substantial injury to the petitioner to whom no other remedy was available. If the inferior
court acted without authority, the record was then revised and corrected in matters of law. The writ of
certiorari was limited to cases in which the inferior court was said to be exceeding its jurisdiction or was
not proceeding according to essential requirements of law and would lie only to review judicial or quasijudicial acts.
The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system remains much the same as it has been in the
common law. In this jurisdiction, however, the exercise of the power to issue the writ of certiorari is largely
regulated by laying down the instances or situations in the Rules of Court in which a superior court may
issue the writ of certiorari to an inferior court or officer. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
compellingly provides the requirements for that purpose, viz:
xxxx
The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the
commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of
discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which
means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive
duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such
judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical
manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.31
Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is to be
distinguished from prohibition by the fact that it is a corrective remedy used for the re-examination of
some action of an inferior tribunal, and is directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower court and not to
the court itself, while prohibition is a preventative remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is directed
to the court itself.32 The Court expounded on the nature and function of the writ of prohibition in Holy
Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor:33
A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasilegislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or
person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entitys
or persons jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial or
ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a
writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the
administration of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against
usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling
matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law,
or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be
obtained. Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners remedy is an ordinary action
for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any
case, petitioners allegation that "respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions without
or in excess of their jurisdiction" may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of
injunction or a temporary restraining order.
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in
scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction
committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does
not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the
text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to
review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.34
Necessarily, in discharging its duty under Section 1, supra, to set right and undo any act of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government,
the Court is not at all precluded from making the inquiry provided the challenge was properly brought by
interested or affected parties. The Court has been thereby entrusted expressly or by necessary implication
with both the duty and the obligation of determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed
legislative or executive action. This entrustment is consistent with the republican system of checks and
balances.35
Following our recent dispositions concerning the congressional pork barrel, the Court has become more
alert to discharge its constitutional duty. We will not now refrain from exercising our expanded judicial

power in order to review and determine, with authority, the limitations on the Chief Executives spending
power.
b) Requisites for the exercise of the
power of judicial review were
complied with
The requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review are the following, namely: (1) there must
bean actual case or justiciable controversy before the Court; (2) the question before the Court must be ripe
for adjudication; (3) the person challenging the act must be a proper party; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must be the very litis mota of the case.36
The first requisite demands that there be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power by the
Court.37 An actual case or controversy, in the words of Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa:38
x x x is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of
judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. In other words,
"[t]here must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing
law and jurisprudence." Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of
"ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication.
"A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by
either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action." "Withal, courts will decline to
pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve
hypothetical or moot questions."
An actual and justiciable controversy exists in these consolidated cases. The incompatibility of the
perspectives of the parties on the constitutionality of the DAP and its relevant issuances satisfy the
requirement for a conflict between legal rights. The issues being raised herein meet the requisite ripeness
considering that the challenged executive acts were already being implemented by the DBM, and there are
averments by the petitioners that such implementation was repugnant to the letter and spirit of the
Constitution. Moreover, the implementation of the DAP entailed the allocation and expenditure of huge
sums of public funds. The fact that public funds have been allocated, disbursed or utilized by reason or on
account of such challenged executive acts gave rise, therefore, to an actual controversy that is ripe for
adjudication by the Court.
It is true that Sec. Abad manifested during the January 28, 2014 oral arguments that the DAP as a program
had been meanwhile discontinued because it had fully served its purpose, saying: "In conclusion, Your
Honors, may I inform the Court that because the DAP has already fully served its purpose, the
Administrations economic managers have recommended its termination to the President. x x x."39
The Solicitor General then quickly confirmed the termination of the DAP as a program, and urged that its
termination had already mooted the challenges to the DAPs constitutionality, viz:
DAP as a program, no longer exists, thereby mooting these present cases brought to challenge its
constitutionality. Any constitutional challenge should no longer be at the level of the program, which is now
extinct, but at the level of its prior applications or the specific disbursements under the now defunct policy.
We challenge the petitioners to pick and choose which among the 116 DAP projects they wish to nullify,
the full details we will have provided by February 5. We urge this Court to be cautious in limiting the
constitutional authority of the President and the Legislature to respond to the dynamic needs of the
country and the evolving demands of governance, lest we end up straight jacketing our elected
representatives in ways not consistent with our constitutional structure and democratic principles.40
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.41
The Court cannot agree that the termination of the DAP as a program was a supervening event that
effectively mooted these consolidated cases. Verily, the Court had in the past exercised its power of
judicial review despite the cases being rendered moot and academic by supervening events, like: (1) when
there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) when the case involved a situation of exceptional
character and was of paramount public interest; (3) when the constitutional issue raised required the
formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4) when the case was
capable of repetition yet evading review.42
Assuming that the petitioners several submissions against the DAP were ultimately sustained by the Court
here, these cases would definitely come under all the exceptions. Hence, the Court should not abstain from
exercising its power of judicial review.
Did the petitioners have the legal standing to sue?
Legal standing, as a requisite for the exercise of judicial review, refers to "a right of appearance in a court
of justice on a given question."43 The concept of legal standing, or locus standi, was particularly discussed
in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council,44 where the Court said:
In public or constitutional litigations, the Court is often burdened with the determination of the locus standi
of the petitioners due to the ever-present need to regulate the invocation of the intervention of the Court
to correct any official action or policy in order to avoid obstructing the efficient functioning of public
officials and offices involved in public service. It is required, therefore, that the petitioner must have a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, for, as indicated in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc.:
The question on legal standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Accordingly, it has

been held that the interest of a person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and
personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he
sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not
merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has
been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to
be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.
It is true that as early as in 1937, in People v. Vera, the Court adopted the direct injury test for determining
whether a petitioner in a public action had locus standi. There, the Court held that the person who would
assail the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result." Vera was followed in Custodio v. President of the Senate,
Manila Race Horse Trainers Association v. De la Fuente, Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix, and
Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works.
Yet, the Court has also held that the requirement of locus standi, being a mere procedural technicality, can
be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion. For instance, in 1949, in Araneta v. Dinglasan, the
Court liberalized the approach when the cases had "transcendental importance." Some notable
controversies whose petitioners did not pass the direct injury test were allowed to be treated in the same
way as in Araneta v. Dinglasan.
In the 1975 decision in Aquino v. Commission on Elections, this Court decided to resolve the issues raised
by the petition due to their "far reaching implications," even if the petitioner had no personality to file the
suit. The liberal approach of Aquino v. Commission on Elections has been adopted in several notable cases,
permitting ordinary citizens, legislators, and civic organizations to bring their suits involving the
constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations, and rulings.
However, the assertion of a public right as a predicate for challenging a supposedly illegal or
unconstitutional executive or legislative action rests on the theory that the petitioner represents the public
in general. Although such petitioner may not be as adversely affected by the action complained against as
are others, it is enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in his petition that he is entitled to protection or
relief from the Court in the vindication of a public right.
Quite often, as here, the petitioner in a public action sues as a citizen or taxpayer to gain locus standi. That
is not surprising, for even if the issue may appear to concern only the public in general, such capacities
nonetheless equip the petitioner with adequate interest to sue. In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court
aptly explains why:
Case law in most jurisdiction snow allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public actions. The
distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayers suit
is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizens suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the
expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As
held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: "In matter of mere public right,
howeverthe people are the real partiesIt is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to
interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be
remedied." With respect to taxpayers suits, Terr v. Jordan held that "the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to
maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied."45
The Court has cogently observed in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.46 that
"[s]tanding is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by
parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but by
concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest."
Except for PHILCONSA, a petitioner in G.R. No. 209164, the petitioners have invoked their capacities as
taxpayers who, by averring that the issuance and implementation of the DAP and its relevant issuances
involved the illegal disbursements of public funds, have an interest in preventing the further dissipation of
public funds. The petitioners in G.R. No. 209287 (Araullo) and G.R. No. 209442 (Belgica) also assert their
right as citizens to sue for the enforcement and observance of the constitutional limitations on the political
branches of the Government.47
On its part, PHILCONSA simply reminds that the Court has long recognized its legal standing to bring cases
upon constitutional issues.48 Luna, the petitioner in G.R. No. 209136, cites his additional capacity as a
lawyer. The IBP, the petitioner in G.R. No. 209260, stands by "its avowed duty to work for the rule of law
and of paramount importance of the question in this action, not to mention its civic duty as the official
association of all lawyers in this country."49
Under their respective circumstances, each of the petitioners has established sufficient interest in the
outcome of the controversy as to confer locus standi on each of them.
In addition, considering that the issues center on the extent of the power of the Chief Executive to disburse
and allocate public funds, whether appropriated by Congress or not, these cases pose issues that are of
transcendental importance to the entire Nation, the petitioners included. As such, the determination of
such important issues call for the Courts exercise of its broad and wise discretion "to waive the
requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional
questions raised."50
II.
Substantive Issues
1.
Overview of the Budget System
An understanding of the Budget System of the Philippines will aid the Court in properly appreciating and
justly resolving the substantive issues.
a) Origin of the Budget System

The term "budget" originated from the Middle English word bouget that had derived from the Latin word
bulga (which means bag or purse).51
In the Philippine setting, Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 246 (Budget Act) defined "budget" as the financial
program of the National Government for a designated fiscal year, consisting of the statements of
estimated receipts and expenditures for the fiscal year for which it was intended to be effective based on
the results of operations during the preceding fiscal years. The term was given a different meaning under
Republic Act No. 992 (Revised Budget Act) by describing the budget as the delineation of the services and
products, or benefits that would accrue to the public together with the estimated unit cost of each type of
service, product or benefit.52 For a forthright definition, budget should simply be identified as the financial
plan of the Government,53 or "the master plan of government."54
The concept of budgeting has not been the product of recent economies. In reality, financing public goals
and activities was an idea that existed from the creation of the State.55 To protect the people, the territory
and sovereignty of the State, its government must perform vital functions that required public
expenditures. At the beginning, enormous public expenditures were spent for war activities, preservation
of peace and order, security, administration of justice, religion, and supply of limited goods and services.56
In order to finance those expenditures, the State raised revenues through taxes and impositions.57 Thus,
budgeting became necessary to allocate public revenues for specific government functions.58 The States
budgeting mechanism eventually developed through the years with the growing functions of its
government and changes in its market economy.
The Philippine Budget System has been greatly influenced by western public financial institutions. This is
because of the countrys past as a colony successively of Spain and the United States for a long period of
time. Many aspects of the countrys public fiscal administration, including its Budget System, have been
naturally patterned after the practices and experiences of the western public financial institutions. At any
rate, the Philippine Budget System is presently guided by two principal objectives that are vital to the
development of a progressive democratic government, namely: (1) to carry on all government activities
under a comprehensive fiscal plan developed, authorized and executed in accordance with the
Constitution, prevailing statutes and the principles of sound public management; and (2) to provide for the
periodic review and disclosure of the budgetary status of the Government in such detail so that persons
entrusted by law with the responsibility as well as the enlightened citizenry can determine the adequacy of
the budget actions taken, authorized or proposed, as well as the true financial position of the
Government.59
b) Evolution of the Philippine Budget System
The budget process in the Philippines evolved from the early years of the American Regime up to the
passage of the Jones Law in 1916. A Budget Office was created within the Department of Finance by the
Jones Law to discharge the budgeting function, and was given the responsibility to assist in the preparation
of an executive budget for submission to the Philippine Legislature.60
As early as under the 1935 Constitution, a budget policy and a budget procedure were established, and
subsequently strengthened through the enactment of laws and executive acts.61 EO No. 25, issued by
President Manuel L. Quezon on April 25, 1936, created the Budget Commission to serve as the agency that
carried out the Presidents responsibility of preparing the budget.62 CA No. 246, the first budget law, went
into effect on January 1, 1938 and established the Philippine budget process. The law also provided a lineitem budget as the framework of the Governments budgeting system,63 with emphasis on the observance
of a "balanced budget" to tie up proposed expenditures with existing revenues.
CA No. 246 governed the budget process until the passage on June 4, 1954 of Republic Act (RA) No.
992,whereby Congress introduced performance-budgeting to give importance to functions, projects and
activities in terms of expected results.64 RA No. 992 also enhanced the role of the Budget Commission as
the fiscal arm of the Government.65
The 1973 Constitution and various presidential decrees directed a series of budgetary reforms that
culminated in the enactment of PD No. 1177 that President Marcos issued on July30, 1977, and of PD No.
1405, issued on June 11, 1978. The latter decree converted the Budget Commission into the Ministry of
Budget, and gave its head the rank of a Cabinet member.
The Ministry of Budget was later renamed the Office of Budget and Management (OBM) under EO No. 711.
The OBM became the DBM pursuant to EO No. 292 effective on November 24, 1989.
c) The Philippine Budget Cycle66
Four phases comprise the Philippine budget process, specifically: (1) Budget Preparation; (2) Budget
Legislation; (3) Budget Execution; and (4) Accountability. Each phase is distinctly separate from the others
but they overlap in the implementation of the budget during the budget year.
c.1.Budget Preparation67
The budget preparation phase is commenced through the issuance of a Budget Call by the DBM. The
Budget Call contains budget parameters earlier set by the Development Budget Coordination Committee
(DBCC) as well as policy guidelines and procedures to aid government agencies in the preparation and
submission of their budget proposals. The Budget Call is of two kinds, namely: (1) a National Budget Call,
which is addressed to all agencies, including state universities and colleges; and (2) a Corporate Budget
Call, which is addressed to all government-owned and -controlled corporations (GOCCs) and government
financial institutions (GFIs).
Following the issuance of the Budget Call, the various departments and agencies submit their respective
Agency Budget Proposals to the DBM. To boost citizen participation, the current administration has tasked
the various departments and agencies to partner with civil society organizations and other citizenstakeholders in the preparation of the Agency Budget Proposals, which proposals are then presented
before a technical panel of the DBM in scheduled budget hearings wherein the various departments and

agencies are given the opportunity to defend their budget proposals. DBM bureaus thereafter review the
Agency Budget Proposals and come up with recommendations for the Executive Review Board, comprised
by the DBM Secretary and the DBMs senior officials. The discussions of the Executive Review Board cover
the prioritization of programs and their corresponding support vis--vis the priority agenda of the National
Government, and their implementation.
The DBM next consolidates the recommended agency budgets into the National Expenditure Program
(NEP)and a Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF). The NEP provides the details of
spending for each department and agency by program, activity or project (PAP), and is submitted in the
form of a proposed GAA. The Details of Selected Programs and Projects is the more detailed disaggregation
of key PAPs in the NEP, especially those in line with the National Governments development plan. The
Staffing Summary provides the staffing complement of each department and agency, including the
number of positions and amounts allocated.
The NEP and BESF are thereafter presented by the DBM and the DBCC to the President and the Cabinet for
further refinements or reprioritization. Once the NEP and the BESF are approved by the President and the
Cabinet, the DBM prepares the budget documents for submission to Congress. The budget documents
consist of: (1) the Presidents Budget Message, through which the President explains the policy framework
and budget priorities; (2) the BESF, mandated by Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution,68 which
contains the macroeconomic assumptions, public sector context, breakdown of the expenditures and
funding sources for the fiscal year and the two previous years; and (3) the NEP.
Public or government expenditures are generally classified into two categories, specifically: (1) capital
expenditures or outlays; and (2) current operating expenditures. Capital expenditures are the expenses
whose usefulness lasts for more than one year, and which add to the assets of the Government, including
investments in the capital of government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.69
Current operating expenditures are the purchases of goods and services in current consumption the
benefit of which does not extend beyond the fiscal year.70 The two components of current expenditures
are those for personal services (PS), and those for maintenance and other operating expenses(MOOE).
Public expenditures are also broadly grouped according to their functions into: (1) economic development
expenditures (i.e., expenditures on agriculture and natural resources, transportation and communications,
commerce and industry, and other economic development efforts);71 (2) social services or social
development expenditures (i.e., government outlay on education, public health and medicare, labor and
welfare and others);72 (3) general government or general public services expenditures (i.e., expenditures
for the general government, legislative services, the administration of justice, and for pensions and
gratuities);73 (4) national defense expenditures (i.e., sub-divided into national security expenditures and
expenditures for the maintenance of peace and order);74 and (5) public debt.75
Public expenditures may further be classified according to the nature of funds, i.e., general fund, special
fund or bond fund.76
On the other hand, public revenues complement public expenditures and cover all income or receipts of
the government treasury used to support government expenditures.77
Classical economist Adam Smith categorized public revenues based on two principal sources, stating: "The
revenue which must defraythe necessary expenses of government may be drawn either, first from some
fund which peculiarly belongs to the sovereign or commonwealth, and which is independent of the revenue
of the people, or, secondly, from the revenue of the people."78 Adam Smiths classification relied on the
two aspects of the nature of the State: first, the State as a juristic person with an artificial personality, and,
second, the State as a sovereign or entity possessing supreme power. Under the first aspect, the State
could hold property and engage in trade, thereby deriving what is called its quasi private income or
revenues, and which "peculiarly belonged to the sovereign." Under the second aspect, the State could
collect by imposing charges on the revenues of its subjects in the form of taxes.79
In the Philippines, public revenues are generally derived from the following sources, to wit: (1) tax
revenues(i.e., compulsory contributions to finance government activities); 80 (2) capital revenues(i.e.,
proceeds from sales of fixed capital assets or scrap thereof and public domain, and gains on such sales like
sale of public lands, buildings and other structures, equipment, and other properties recorded as fixed
assets); 81 (3) grants(i.e., voluntary contributions and aids given to the Government for its operation on
specific purposes in the form of money and/or materials, and do not require any monetary commitment on
the part of the recipient);82 (4) extraordinary income(i.e., repayment of loans and advances made by
government corporations and local governments and the receipts and shares in income of the Banko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, and other receipts);83 and (5) public borrowings(i.e., proceeds of repayable obligations
generally with interest from domestic and foreign creditors of the Government in general, including the
National Government and its political subdivisions).84
More specifically, public revenues are classified as follows:85
General Income
1.
Subsidy Income from National
Government
2.
Subsidy from Central Office
3.
Subsidy from Regional
Office/Staff Bureaus
4.
Income from Government
Services
5.
Income from Government
Business Operations

Specific Income
1. Income Taxes
2. Property Taxes
3. Taxes on Goods and Services
4. Taxes on International Trade and
Transactions
5. Other Taxes 6.Fines and Penalties-Tax Revenue
7. Other Specific Income

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Sales Revenue
Rent Income
Insurance Income
Dividend Income
Interest Income
Sale of Confiscated Goods and
Properties
Foreign Exchange (FOREX)
Gains
Miscellaneous Operating and
Service Income
Fines and Penalties-Government
Services and Business Operations
Income from Grants and
Donations

c.2. Budget Legislation86

The Budget Legislation Phase covers the period commencing from the time Congress receives the
Presidents Budget, which is inclusive of the NEPand the BESF, up to the Presidents approval of the GAA.
This phase is also known as the Budget Authorization Phase, and involves the significant participation of
the Legislative through its deliberations.
Initially, the Presidents Budget is assigned to the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee on
First Reading. The Appropriations Committee and its various Sub-Committees schedule and conduct
budget hearings to examine the PAPs of the departments and agencies. Thereafter, the House of
Representatives drafts the General Appropriations Bill (GAB).87
The GABis sponsored, presented and defended by the House of Representatives Appropriations
Committee and Sub-Committees in plenary session. As with other laws, the GAB is approved on Third
Reading before the House of Representatives version is transmitted to the Senate.88
After transmission, the Senate conducts its own committee hearings on the GAB. To expedite proceedings,
the Senate may conduct its committee hearings simultaneously with the House of Representatives
deliberations. The Senates Finance Committee and its Sub-Committees may submit the proposed
amendments to the GAB to the plenary of the Senate only after the House of Representatives has formally
transmitted its version to the Senate. The Senate version of the GAB is likewise approved on Third
Reading.89
The House of Representatives and the Senate then constitute a panel each to sit in the Bicameral
Conference Committee for the purpose of discussing and harmonizing the conflicting provisions of their
versions of the GAB. The "harmonized" version of the GAB is next presented to the President for
approval.90 The President reviews the GAB, and prepares the Veto Message where budget items are
subjected to direct veto,91 or are identified for conditional implementation.
If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the GAB for the ensuing fiscal year,
the GAA for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and effect until
the GAB is passed by the Congress.92
c.3. Budget Execution93
With the GAA now in full force and effect, the next step is the implementation of the budget. The Budget
Execution Phase is primarily the function of the DBM, which is tasked to perform the following procedures,
namely: (1) to issue the programs and guidelines for the release of funds; (2) to prepare an Allotment and
Cash Release Program; (3) to release allotments; and (4) to issue disbursement authorities.
The implementation of the GAA is directed by the guidelines issued by the DBM. Prior to this, the various
departments and agencies are required to submit Budget Execution Documents(BED) to outline their plans
and performance targets by laying down the physical and financial plan, the monthly cash program, the
estimate of monthly income, and the list of obligations that are not yet due and demandable.
Thereafter, the DBM prepares an Allotment Release Program (ARP)and a Cash Release Program (CRP).The
ARP sets a limit for allotments issued in general and to a specific agency. The CRP fixes the monthly,
quarterly and annual disbursement levels.
Allotments, which authorize an agency to enter into obligations, are issued by the DBM. Allotments are
lesser in scope than appropriations, in that the latter embrace the general legislative authority to spend.
Allotments may be released in two forms through a comprehensive Agency Budget Matrix (ABM),94 or,
individually, by SARO.95
Armed with either the ABM or the SARO, agencies become authorized to incur obligations96 on behalf of
the Government in order to implement their PAPs. Obligations may be incurred in various ways, like hiring
of personnel, entering into contracts for the supply of goods and services, and using utilities.
In order to settle the obligations incurred by the agencies, the DBM issues a disbursement authority so that
cash may be allocated in payment of the obligations. A cash or disbursement authority that is periodically
issued is referred to as a Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA),97 which issuance is based upon an agencys
submission of its Monthly Cash Program and other required documents. The NCA specifies the maximum
amount of cash that can be withdrawn from a government servicing bank for the period indicated. Apart
from the NCA, the DBM may issue a Non-Cash Availment Authority(NCAA) to authorize non-cash
disbursements, or a Cash Disbursement Ceiling(CDC) for departments with overseas operations to allow
the use of income collected by their foreign posts for their operating requirements.

Actual disbursement or spending of government funds terminates the Budget Execution Phase and is
usually accomplished through the Modified Disbursement Scheme under which disbursements chargeable
against the National Treasury are coursed through the government servicing banks.
c.4. Accountability98
Accountability is a significant phase of the budget cycle because it ensures that the government funds
have been effectively and efficiently utilized to achieve the States socio-economic goals. It also allows the
DBM to assess the performance of agencies during the fiscal year for the purpose of implementing reforms
and establishing new policies.
An agencys accountability may be examined and evaluated through (1) performance targets and
outcomes; (2) budget accountability reports; (3) review of agency performance; and (4) audit conducted
by the Commission on Audit(COA).
2.
Nature of the DAP as a fiscal plan
a. DAP was a program designed to
promote economic growth
Policy is always a part of every budget and fiscal decision of any Administration.99 The national budget the
Executive prepares and presents to Congress represents the Administrations "blueprint for public policy"
and reflects the Governments goals and strategies.100 As such, the national budget becomes a tangible
representation of the programs of the Government in monetary terms, specifying therein the PAPs and
services for which specific amounts of public funds are proposed and allocated.101 Embodied in every
national budget is government spending.102
When he assumed office in the middle of 2010, President Aquino made efficiency and transparency in
government spending a significant focus of his Administration. Yet, although such focus resulted in an
improved fiscal deficit of 0.5% in the gross domestic product (GDP) from January to July of 2011, it also
unfortunately decelerated government project implementation and payment schedules.103 The World
Bank observed that the Philippines economic growth could be reduced, and potential growth could be
weakened should the Government continue with its underspending and fail to address the large
deficiencies in infrastructure.104 The economic situation prevailing in the middle of 2011 thus paved the
way for the development and implementation of the DAP as a stimulus package intended to fast-track
public spending and to push economic growth by investing on high-impact budgetary PAPs to be funded
from the "savings" generated during the year as well as from unprogrammed funds.105 In that respect,
the DAP was the product of "plain executive policy-making" to stimulate the economy by way of
accelerated spending.106 The Administration would thereby accelerate government spending by: (1)
streamlining the implementation process through the clustering of infrastructure projects of the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and the Department of Education (DepEd),and (2) front
loading PPP-related projects107 due for implementation in the following year.108
Did the stimulus package work?
The March 2012 report of the World Bank,109 released after the initial implementation of the DAP,
revealed that the DAP was partially successful. The disbursements under the DAP contributed 1.3
percentage points to GDP growth by the fourth quarter of 2011.110 The continued implementation of the
DAP strengthened growth by 11.8% year on year while infrastructure spending rebounded from a 29%
contraction to a 34% growth as of September 2013.111
The DAP thus proved to be a demonstration that expenditure was a policy instrument that the Government
could use to direct the economies towards growth and development.112 The Government, by spending on
public infrastructure, would signify its commitment of ensuring profitability for prospective investors.113
The PAPs funded under the DAP were chosen for this reason based on their: (1) multiplier impact on the
economy and infrastructure development; (2) beneficial effect on the poor; and (3) translation into
disbursements.114
b. History of the implementation of
the DAP, and sources of funds
under the DAP
How the Administrations economic managers conceptualized and developed the DAP, and finally
presented it to the President remains unknown because the relevant documents appear to be scarce.
The earliest available document relating to the genesis of the DAP was the memorandum of October
12,2011 from Sec. Abad seeking the approval of the President to implement the proposed DAP. The
memorandum, which contained a list of the funding sources for P72.11 billion and of the proposed priority
projects to be funded,115 reads:
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
xxxx
SUBJECT: FY 2011 PROPOSED DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION PROGRAM (PROJECTS AND SOURCES OF
FUNDS)
DATE: OCTOBER 12, 2011
Mr. President, this is to formally confirm your approval of the Disbursement Acceleration Program totaling
P72.11 billion. We are already working with all the agencies concerned for the immediate execution of the
projects therein.
A. Fund Sources for the Acceleration Program
Fund Sources

Amount
(In
million

Description

Action
Requested

Php)
FY 2011
Unreleased
Personal
Services (PS)
Appropriations

30,000

Unreleased Personnel
Services (PS)
appropriations which
will lapse at the end of
FY 2011 but may be
pooled as savings and
realigned for priority
programs that require
immediate funding

Declare as
savings and
approve/
authorize its use
for the 2011
Disbursement
Acceleration
Program

FY 2011
Unreleased
Appropriations

482

Unreleased
appropriations (slow
moving projects and
programs for
discontinuance)

FY 2010
Unprogrammed
Fund

12,336

Supported by the GFI

Dividends

Approve and
authorize its use
for the 2011
Disbursement
Acceleration
Program

FY 2010
Carryover
Appropriation

21,544

Unreleased
appropriations (slow
moving projects and
programs for
discontinuance) and
savings from Zero-based
Budgeting
Initiative

With prior
approval from
the President in
November 2010
to declare as
savings and with
authority to use
for priority
projects

FY 2011 Budget
items for
realignment

7,748

FY 2011 Agency
Budget items that can
be realigned within the
agency to fund new fast
disbursing projects
DPWH-3.981 Billion
DA 2.497 Billion
DOT 1.000 Billion
DepEd 270 Million

For information

TOTAL

72.110

B. Projects in the Disbursement Acceleration Program

(Descriptions of projects attached as Annex A)
GOCCs and GFIs
Agency/Project
(SARO and NCA Release)

Allotment
(in Million Php)

1. LRTA: Rehabilitation of LRT 1 and 2

1,868

2. NHA:

11,050

a. Resettlement of North Triangle residents to

Camarin A7
b. Housing for BFP/BJMP
c. On-site development for families living
along dangerous
d. Relocation sites for informal settlers
along Iloilo River and its tributaries

450

3. PHIL. HEART CENTER: Upgrading of

ageing physical plant and medical equipment

357

4. CREDIT INFO CORP: Establishment of

centralized credit information system

75

500
10,000
100

5. PIDS: purchase of land to relocate the PIDS

office and building construction

100

6. HGC: Equity infusion for credit insurance

and mortgage guaranty operations of HGC

400

7. PHIC: Obligations incurred (premium

subsidy for indigent families) in January-June
2010, booked for payment in Jul[y] Dec
2010. The delay in payment is due to the
delay in the certification of the LGU
counterpart. Without it, the NG is obliged to
pay the full amount.

1,496

8. Philpost: Purchase of foreclosed property.

Payment of Mandatory Obligations, (GSIS,
PhilHealth, ECC), Franking Privilege

644

9. BSP: First equity infusion out of Php 40B

capitalization under the BSP Law

10,000

10. PCMC: Capital and Equipment Renovation

280

11. LCOP:
a. Pediatric Pulmonary Program
b. Bio-regenerative Technology Program
(Stem-Cell Research subject to legal
review and presentation)

105

12. TIDCORP: NG Equity infusion

570

TOTAL

26,945

35
70

NGAs/LGUs
Agency/Project

Allotment
(SARO)
(In Million
Php)

Cash
Requirement
(NCA)

13. DOF-BIR: NPSTAR

centralization of data
processing and others (To be
synchronized with GFMIS
activities)

758

758

14. COA: IT infrastructure

program and hiring of
additional litigational experts

144

144

15. DND-PAF: On Base Housing

Facilities and Communication
Equipment

30

30

2,959

2,223

1,629

1,629

919

183

411

411

1,293

1,293

1,293

132
5,432

625

625

16. DA:
a. Irrigation, FMRs and
Integrated Community Based Multi-Species
Hatchery and Aquasilvi
Farming
b. Mindanao Rural
Development Project
c. NIA Agno River Integrated
Irrigation Project
17. DAR:
a. Agrarian Reform
Communities Project 2
b. Landowners Compensation
18. DBM: Conduct of National
Survey of
Farmers/Fisherfolks/Ips

19. DOJ: Operating requirements

of 50 investigation agents and
15 state attorneys

11

11

20. DOT: Preservation of the Cine

Corregidor Complex

25

25

21. OPAPP: Activities for Peace

Process (PAMANA- Project
details: budget breakdown,
implementation plan, and
conditions on fund release
attached as Annex B)

1,819

1,819

425

425

275

275

190

190

23. DOF-BOC: To settle the

principal obligations with
PDIC consistent with the
agreement with the CISS and
SGS

2,800

2,800

24. OEO-FDCP: Establishment of

the National Film Archive and
local cinematheques, and other
local activities

20

20

25. DPWH: Various infrastructure

projects

5,500

5,500

26. DepEd/ERDT/DOST: Thin

Client Cloud Computing
Project

270

270

27. DOH: Hiring of nurses and

midwives

294

294

28. TESDA: Training Program in

partnership with BPO industry
and other sectors

1,100

1,100

29. DILG: Performance Challenge

Fund (People Empowered
Community Driven
Development with DSWD and
NAPC)

250

50

30. ARMM: Comprehensive Peace

and Development Intervention

8,592

8,592

31. DOTC-MRT: Purchase of

additional MRT cars

4,500

32. LGU Support Fund

6,500

6,500

33. Various Other Local Projects

6,500

6,500

34. Development Assistance to the

Province of Quezon

750

750

TOTAL

45,165

44,000

22. DOST
a. Establishment of National
Meterological and Climate
Center
b. Enhancement of Doppler
Radar Network for National
Weather Watch, Accurate
Forecasting and Flood Early
Warning

C. Summary
Fund Sources
Identified for
Approval

Allotments
for Release

Cash
Requirements for

(In Million
Php)
Total

72,110

Release in FY
2011
72,110

70,895

GOCCs

26,895

26,895

NGAs/LGUs

45,165

44,000

For His Excellencys Consideration

(Sgd.) FLORENCIO B. ABAD
[/] APPROVED
[ ] DISAPPROVED
(Sgd.) H.E. BENIGNO S. AQUINO, III
OCT 12, 2011
The memorandum of October 12, 2011 was followed by another memorandum for the President dated
December 12, 2011116 requesting omnibus authority to consolidate the savings and unutilized balances
for fiscal year 2011. Pertinent portions of the memorandum of December 12, 2011 read:
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
xxxx
SUBJECT: Omnibus Authority to Consolidate Savings/Unutilized Balances and its Realignment
DATE: December 12, 2011
This is to respectfully request for the grant of Omnibus Authority to consolidate savings/unutilized balances
in FY 2011 corresponding to completed or discontinued projects which may be pooled to fund additional
projects or expenditures.
In addition, Mr. President, this measure will allow us to undertake projects even if their implementation
carries over to 2012 without necessarily impacting on our budget deficit cap next year.
BACKGROUND
1.0 The DBM, during the course of performance reviews conducted on the agencies operations,
particularly on the implementation of their projects/activities, including expenses incurred in undertaking
the same, have identified savings out of the 2011 General Appropriations Act. Said savings correspond to
completed or discontinued projects under certain departments/agencies which may be pooled, for the
following:
1.1 to provide for new activities which have not been anticipated during preparation of the budget;
1.2 to augment additional requirements of on-going priority projects; and
1.3 to provide for deficiencies under the Special Purpose Funds, e.g., PDAF, Calamity Fund, Contingent
Fund
1.4 to cover for the modifications of the original allotment class allocation as a result of on-going priority
projects and implementation of new activities
2.0 x x x x
2.1 x x x
2.2 x x x
ON THE UTILIZATION OF POOLED SAVINGS
3.0 It may be recalled that the President approved our request for omnibus authority to pool
savings/unutilized balances in FY 2010 last November 25, 2010.
4.0 It is understood that in the utilization of the pooled savings, the DBM shall secure the corresponding
approval/confirmation of the President. Furthermore, it is assured that the proposed realignments shall be
within the authorized Expenditure level.
5.0 Relative thereto, we have identified some expenditure items that may be sourced from the said pooled
appropriations in FY 2010 that will expire on December 31, 2011 and appropriations in FY 2011 that may
be declared as savings to fund additional expenditures.
5.1 The 2010 Continuing Appropriations (pooled savings) is proposed to be spent for the projects that we
have identified to be immediate actual disbursements considering that this same fund source will expire on
December 31, 2011.
5.2 With respect to the proposed expenditure items to be funded from the FY 2011 Unreleased
Appropriations, most of these are the same projects for which the DBM is directed by the Office of the
President, thru the Executive Secretary, to source funds.
6.0 Among others, the following are such proposed additional projects that have been chosen given their
multiplier impact on economy and infrastructure development, their beneficial effect on the poor, and their
translation into disbursements. Please note that we have classified the list of proposed projects as follows:
7.0 x x x
FOR THE PRESIDENTS APPROVAL
8.0 Foregoing considered, may we respectfully request for the Presidents approval for the following:
8.1 Grant of omnibus authority to consolidate FY 2011 savings/unutilized balances and its realignment; and
8.2 The proposed additional projects identified for funding.
For His Excellencys consideration and approval.
(Sgd.)
[/] APPROVED
[ ] DISAPPROVED
(Sgd.) H.E. BENIGNO S. AQUINO, III
DEC 21, 2011

Substantially identical requests for authority to pool savings and to fund proposed projects were contained
in various other memoranda from Sec. Abad dated June 25, 2012,117 September 4, 2012,118 December
19, 2012,119 May 20, 2013,120 and September 25, 2013.121 The President apparently approved all the
requests, withholding approval only of the proposed projects contained in the June 25, 2012 memorandum,
as borne out by his marginal note therein to the effect that the proposed projects should still be "subject to
further discussions."122
In order to implement the June25, 2012 memorandum, Sec. Abad issued NBC No. 541 (Adoption of
Operational Efficiency Measure Withdrawal of Agencies Unobligated Allotments as of June 30, 2012),123
reproduced herein as follows:
NATIONAL BUDGET CIRCULAR No. 541
July 18, 2012
TO: All Heads of Departments/Agencies/State Universities and Colleges and other Offices of the National
Government, Budget and Planning Officers; Heads of Accounting Units and All Others Concerned
SUBJECT : Adoption of Operational Efficiency Measure Withdrawal of Agencies Unobligated Allotments as
of June 30, 2012
1.0 Rationale
The DBM, as mandated by Executive Order (EO) No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987), periodically
reviews and evaluates the departments/agencies efficiency and effectiveness in utilizing budgeted funds
for the delivery of services and production of goods, consistent with the government priorities.
In the event that a measure is necessary to further improve the operational efficiency of the government,
the President is authorized to suspend or stop further use of funds allotted for any agency or expenditure
authorized in the General Appropriations Act. Withdrawal and pooling of unutilized allotment releases can
be effected by DBM based on authority of the President, as mandated under Sections 38 and 39, Chapter
5, Book VI of EO 292.
For the first five months of 2012, the National Government has not met its spending targets. In order to
accelerate spending and sustain the fiscal targets during the year, expenditure measures have to be
implemented to optimize the utilization of available resources.
Departments/agencies have registered low spending levels, in terms of obligations and disbursements per
initial review of their 2012 performance. To enhance agencies performance, the DBM conducts continuous
consultation meetings and/or send call-up letters, requesting them to identify slow-moving
programs/projects and the factors/issues affecting their performance (both pertaining to internal systems
and those which are outside the agencies spheres of control). Also, they are asked to formulate strategies
and improvement plans for the rest of 2012.
Notwithstanding these initiatives, some departments/agencies have continued to post low obligation levels
as of end of first semester, thus resulting to substantial unobligated allotments.
In line with this, the President, per directive dated June 27, 2012 authorized the withdrawal of unobligated
allotments of agencies with low levels of obligations as of June 30, 2012, both for continuing and current
allotments. This measure will allow the maximum utilization of available allotments to fund and undertake
other priority expenditures of the national government.
2.0 Purpose
2.1 To provide the conditions and parameters on the withdrawal of unobligated allotments of agencies as
of June 30, 2012 to fund priority and/or fast-moving programs/projects of the national government;
2.2 To prescribe the reports and documents to be used as bases on the withdrawal of said unobligated
allotments; and
2.3 To provide guidelines in the utilization or reallocation of the withdrawn allotments.
3.0 Coverage
3.1 These guidelines shall cover the withdrawal of unobligated allotments as of June 30, 2012 of all
national government agencies (NGAs) charged against FY 2011 Continuing Appropriation (R.A. No.10147)
and FY 2012 Current Appropriation (R.A. No. 10155), pertaining to:
3.1.1 Capital Outlays (CO);
3.1.2 Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE) related to the implementation of programs and
projects, as well as capitalized MOOE; and
3.1.3 Personal Services corresponding to unutilized pension benefits declared as savings by the agencies
concerned based on their updated/validated list of pensioners.
3.2 The withdrawal of unobligated allotments may cover the identified programs, projects and activities of
the departments/agencies reflected in the DBM list shown as Annex A or specific programs and projects as
may be identified by the agencies.
4.0 Exemption
These guidelines shall not apply to the following:
4.1 NGAs
4.1.1 Constitutional Offices/Fiscal Autonomy Group, granted fiscal autonomy under the Philippine
Constitution; and
4.1.2 State Universities and Colleges, adopting the Normative Funding allocation scheme i.e., distribution
of a predetermined budget ceiling.
4.2 Fund Sources
4.2.1 Personal Services other than pension benefits;
4.2.2 MOOE items earmarked for specific purposes or subject to realignment conditions per General
Provisions of the GAA:
Confidential and Intelligence Fund;

 Savings from Traveling, Communication, Transportation and Delivery, Repair and Maintenance, Supplies
and Materials and Utility which shall be used for the grant of Collective Negotiation Agreement incentive
benefit;
Savings from mandatory expenditures which can be realigned only in the last quarter after taking into
consideration the agencys full year requirements, i.e., Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants, Water, Illumination,
Power Services, Telephone, other Communication Services and Rent.
4.2.3 Foreign-Assisted Projects (loan proceeds and peso counterpart);
4.2.4 Special Purpose Funds such as: E-Government Fund, International Commitments Fund, PAMANA,
Priority Development Assistance Fund, Calamity Fund, Budgetary Support to GOCCs and Allocation to
LGUs, among others;
4.2.5 Quick Response Funds; and
4.2.6 Automatic Appropriations i.e., Retirement Life Insurance Premium and Special Accounts in the
General Fund.
5.0 Guidelines
5.1 National government agencies shall continue to undertake procurement activities notwithstanding the
implementation of the policy of withdrawal of unobligated allotments until the end of the third quarter, FY
2012. Even without the allotments, the agency shall proceed in undertaking the procurement processes
(i.e., procurement planning up to the conduct of bidding but short of awarding of contract) pursuant to
GPPB Circular Nos. 02-2008 and 01-2009 and DBM Circular Letter No. 2010-9.
5.2 For the purpose of determining the amount of unobligated allotments that shall be withdrawn, all
departments/agencies/operating units (OUs) shall submit to DBM not later than July 30, 2012, the following
budget accountability reports as of June 30, 2012;
Statement of Allotments, Obligations and Balances (SAOB);
Financial Report of Operations (FRO); and
Physical Report of Operations.
5.3 In the absence of the June 30, 2012 reports cited under item 5.2 of this Circular, the agencys latest
report available shall be used by DBM as basis for withdrawal of allotment. The DBM shall
compute/approximate the agencys obligation level as of June 30 to derive its unobligated allotments as of
same period. Example: If the March 31 SAOB or FRO reflects actual obligations of P 800M then the June 30
obligation level shall approximate to P1,600 M (i.e., P800 M x 2 quarters).
5.4 All released allotments in FY 2011 charged against R.A. No. 10147 which remained unobligated as of
June 30, 2012 shall be immediately considered for withdrawal. This policy is based on the following
considerations:
5.4.1 The departments/agencies approved priority programs and projects are assumed to be
implementation-ready and doable during the given fiscal year; and
5.4.2 The practice of having substantial carryover appropriations may imply that the agency has a slowerthan-programmed implementation capacity or agency tends to implement projects within a two-year
timeframe.
5.5. Consistent with the Presidents directive, the DBM shall, based on evaluation of the reports cited
above and results of consultations with the departments/agencies, withdraw the unobligated allotments as
of June 30, 2012 through issuance of negative Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs).
5.6 DBM shall prepare and submit to the President, a report on the magnitude of withdrawn allotments.
The report shall highlight the agencies which failed to submit the June 30 reports required under this
Circular.
5.7 The withdrawn allotments may be:
5.7.1 Reissued for the original programs and projects of the agencies/OUs concerned, from which the
allotments were withdrawn;
5.7.2 Realigned to cover additional funding for other existing programs and projects of the agency/OU; or
5.7.3 Used to augment existing programs and projects of any agency and to fund priority programs and
projects not considered in the 2012 budget but expected to be started or implemented during the current
year.
5.8 For items 5.7.1 and 5.7.2 above, agencies/OUs concerned may submit to DBM a Special Budget
Request (SBR), supported with the following:
5.8.1 Physical and Financial Plan (PFP);
5.8.2 Monthly Cash Program (MCP); and
5.8.3 Proof that the project/activity has started the procurement processes i.e., Proof of Posting and/or
Advertisement of the Invitation to Bid.
5.9 The deadline for submission of request/s pertaining to these categories shall be until the end of the
third quarter i.e., September 30, 2012. After said cut-off date, the withdrawn allotments shall be pooled
and form part of the overall savings of the national government.
5.10 Utilization of the consolidated withdrawn allotments for other priority programs and projects as cited
under item 5.7.3 of this Circular, shall be subject to approval of the President. Based on the approval of the
President, DBM shall issue the SARO to cover the approved priority expenditures subject to submission by
the agency/OU concerned of the SBR and supported with PFP and MCP.
5.11 It is understood that all releases to be made out of the withdrawn allotments (both 2011 and 2012
unobligated allotments) shall be within the approved Expenditure Program level of the national
government for the current year. The SAROs to be issued shall properly disclose the appropriation source
of the release to determine the extent of allotment validity, as follows:
For charges under R.A. 10147 allotments shall be valid up to December 31, 2012; and
For charges under R.A. 10155 allotments shall be valid up to December 31, 2013.

5.12 Timely compliance with the submission of existing BARs and other reportorial requirements is
reiterated for monitoring purposes.
6.0 Effectivity
This circular shall take effect immediately.
(Sgd.) FLORENCIO B. ABAD
Secretary
As can be seen, NBC No. 541 specified that the unobligated allotments of all agencies and departments as
of June 30, 2012 that were charged against the continuing appropriations for fiscal year 2011 and the 2012
GAA (R.A. No. 10155) were subject to withdrawal through the issuance of negative SAROs, but such
allotments could be either: (1) reissued for the original PAPs of the concerned agencies from which they
were withdrawn; or (2) realigned to cover additional funding for other existing PAPs of the concerned
agencies; or (3) used to augment existing PAPs of any agency and to fund priority PAPs not considered in
the 2012 budget but expected to be started or implemented in 2012. Financing the other priority PAPs was
made subject to the approval of the President. Note here that NBC No. 541 used terminologies like
"realignment" and "augmentation" in the application of the withdrawn unobligated allotments.
Taken together, all the issuances showed how the DAP was to be implemented and funded, that is (1) by
declaring "savings" coming from the various departments and agencies derived from pooling unobligated
allotments and withdrawing unreleased appropriations; (2) releasing unprogrammed funds; and (3)
applying the "savings" and unprogrammed funds to augment existing PAPs or to support other priority
PAPs.
c. DAP was not an appropriation
measure; hence, no appropriation
law was required to adopt or to
implement it
Petitioners Syjuco, Luna, Villegas and PHILCONSA state that Congress did not enact a law to establish the
DAP, or to authorize the disbursement and release of public funds to implement the DAP. Villegas,
PHILCONSA, IBP, Araullo, and COURAGE observe that the appropriations funded under the DAP were not
included in the 2011, 2012 and 2013 GAAs. To petitioners IBP, Araullo, and COURAGE, the DAP, being
actually an appropriation that set aside public funds for public use, should require an enabling law for its
validity. VACC maintains that the DAP, because it involved huge allocations that were separate and distinct
from the GAAs, circumvented and duplicated the GAAs without congressional authorization and control.
The petitioners contend in unison that based on how it was developed and implemented the DAP violated
the mandate of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that "[n]o money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."
The OSG posits, however, that no law was necessary for the adoption and implementation of the DAP
because of its being neither a fund nor an appropriation, but a program or an administrative system of
prioritizing spending; and that the adoption of the DAP was by virtue of the authority of the President as
the Chief Executive to ensure that laws were faithfully executed.
We agree with the OSGs position.
The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed to stimulate the economy through accelerated
spending. In the context of the DAPs adoption and implementation being a function pertaining to the
Executive as the main actor during the Budget Execution Stage under its constitutional mandate to
faithfully execute the laws, including the GAAs, Congress did not need to legislate to adopt or to
implement the DAP. Congress could appropriate but would have nothing more to do during the Budget
Execution Stage. Indeed, appropriation was the act by which Congress "designates a particular fund, or
sets apart a specified portion of the public revenue or of the money in the public treasury, to be applied to
some general object of governmental expenditure, or to some individual purchase or expense."124 As
pointed out in Gonzales v. Raquiza:125 "In a strict sense, appropriation has been defined as nothing more
than the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of the
Treasury, while appropriation made by law refers to the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to
a particular use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the State to its
creditors."126
On the other hand, the President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient
discretion during the execution of the budget to adapt the budget to changes in the countrys economic
situation.127 He could adopt a plan like the DAP for the purpose. He could pool the savings and identify
the PAPs to be funded under the DAP. The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP, and the identification of
the PAPs to be funded under the DAP did not involve appropriation in the strict sense because the money
had been already set apart from the public treasury by Congress through the GAAs. In such actions, the
Executive did not usurp the power vested in Congress under Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
3.
Unreleased appropriations and withdrawn
unobligated allotments under the DAP
were not savings, and the use of such
appropriations contravened Section 25(5),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Notwithstanding our appreciation of the DAP as a plan or strategy validly adopted by the Executive to
ramp up spending to accelerate economic growth, the challenges posed by the petitioners constrain us to
dissect the mechanics of the actual execution of the DAP. The management and utilization of the public
wealth inevitably demands a most careful scrutiny of whether the Executives implementation of the DAP
was consistent with the Constitution, the relevant GAAs and other existing laws.

a. Although executive discretion

and flexibility are necessary in
the execution of the budget, any
transfer of appropriated funds
should conform to Section 25(5),
Article VI of the Constitution
We begin this dissection by reiterating that Congress cannot anticipate all issues and needs that may come
into play once the budget reaches its execution stage. Executive discretion is necessary at that stage to
achieve a sound fiscal administration and assure effective budget implementation. The heads of offices,
particularly the President, require flexibility in their operations under performance budgeting to enable
them to make whatever adjustments are needed to meet established work goals under changing
conditions.128 In particular, the power to transfer funds can give the President the flexibility to meet
unforeseen events that may otherwise impede the efficient implementation of the PAPs set by Congress in
the GAA.
Congress has traditionally allowed much flexibility to the President in allocating funds pursuant to the
GAAs,129 particularly when the funds are grouped to form lump sum accounts.130 It is assumed that the
agencies of the Government enjoy more flexibility when the GAAs provide broader appropriation items.131
This flexibility comes in the form of policies that the Executive may adopt during the budget execution
phase. The DAP as a strategy to improve the countrys economic position was one policy that the
President decided to carry out in order to fulfill his mandate under the GAAs.
Denying to the Executive flexibility in the expenditure process would be counterproductive. In Presidential
Spending Power,132 Prof. Louis Fisher, an American constitutional scholar whose specialties have included
budget policy, has justified extending discretionary authority to the Executive thusly:
[T]he impulse to deny discretionary authority altogether should be resisted. There are many number of
reasons why obligations and outlays by administrators may have to differ from appropriations by
legislators. Appropriations are made many months, and sometimes years, in advance of expenditures.
Congress acts with imperfect knowledge in trying to legislate in fields that are highly technical and
constantly undergoing change. New circumstances will develop to make obsolete and mistaken the
decisions reached by Congress at the appropriation stage. It is not practicable for Congress to adjust to
each new development by passing separate supplemental appropriation bills. Were Congress to control
expenditures by confining administrators to narrow statutory details, it would perhaps protect its power of
the purse but it would not protect the purse itself. The realities and complexities of public policy require
executive discretion for the sound management of public funds.
xxxx
x x x The expenditure process, by its very nature, requires substantial discretion for administrators. They
need to exercise judgment and take responsibility for their actions, but those actions ought to be directed
toward executing congressional, not administrative policy. Let there be discretion, but channel it and use it
to satisfy the programs and priorities established by Congress.
In contrast, by allowing to the heads of offices some power to transfer funds within their respective offices,
the Constitution itself ensures the fiscal autonomy of their offices, and at the same time maintains the
separation of powers among the three main branches of the Government. The Court has recognized this,
and emphasized so in Bengzon v. Drilon,133 viz:
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and
flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and
constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds
appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express
mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and
separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based.
In the case of the President, the power to transfer funds from one item to another within the Executive has
not been the mere offshoot of established usage, but has emanated from law itself. It has existed since the
time of the American Governors-General.134 Act No. 1902 (An Act authorizing the Governor-General to
direct any unexpended balances of appropriations be returned to the general fund of the Insular Treasury
and to transfer from the general fund moneys which have been returned thereto), passed on May 18, 1909
by the First Philippine Legislature,135 was the first enabling law that granted statutory authority to the
President to transfer funds. The authority was without any limitation, for the Act explicitly empowered the
Governor-General to transfer any unexpended balance of appropriations for any bureau or office to
another, and to spend such balance as if it had originally been appropriated for that bureau or office.
From 1916 until 1920, the appropriations laws set a cap on the amounts of funds that could be transferred,
thereby limiting the power to transfer funds. Only 10% of the amounts appropriated for contingent or
miscellaneous expenses could be transferred to a bureau or office, and the transferred funds were to be
used to cover deficiencies in the appropriations also for miscellaneous expenses of said bureau or office.
In 1921, the ceiling on the amounts of funds to be transferred from items under miscellaneous expenses to
any other item of a certain bureau or office was removed.
During the Commonwealth period, the power of the President to transfer funds continued to be governed
by the GAAs despite the enactment of the Constitution in 1935. It is notable that the 1935 Constitution did
not include a provision on the power to transfer funds. At any rate, a shift in the extent of the Presidents
power to transfer funds was again experienced during this era, with the President being given more
flexibility in implementing the budget. The GAAs provided that the power to transfer all or portions of the
appropriations in the Executive Department could be made in the "interest of the public, as the President
may determine."136

In its time, the 1971 Constitutional Convention wanted to curtail the Presidents seemingly unbounded
discretion in transferring funds.137 Its Committee on the Budget and Appropriation proposed to prohibit
the transfer of funds among the separate branches of the Government and the independent constitutional
bodies, but to allow instead their respective heads to augment items of appropriations from savings in
their respective budgets under certain limitations.138 The clear intention of the Convention was to further
restrict, not to liberalize, the power to transfer appropriations.139 Thus, the Committee on the Budget and
Appropriation initially considered setting stringent limitations on the power to augment, and suggested
that the augmentation of an item of appropriation could be made "by not more than ten percent if the
original item of appropriation to be augmented does not exceed one million pesos, or by not more than
five percent if the original item of appropriation to be augmented exceeds one million pesos."140 But two
members of the Committee objected to the P1,000,000.00 threshold, saying that the amount was arbitrary
and might not be reasonable in the future. The Committee agreed to eliminate the P1,000,000.00
threshold, and settled on the ten percent limitation.141
In the end, the ten percent limitation was discarded during the plenary of the Convention, which adopted
the following final version under Section 16, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, to wit:
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the Prime
Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions
may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
The 1973 Constitution explicitly and categorically prohibited the transfer of funds from one item to
another, unless Congress enacted a law authorizing the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional omissions to transfer funds for the
purpose of augmenting any item from savings in another item in the GAA of their respective offices. The
leeway was limited to augmentation only, and was further constricted by the condition that the funds to be
transferred should come from savings from another item in the appropriation of the office.142
On July 30, 1977, President Marcos issued PD No. 1177, providing in its Section 44 that:
Section 44. Authority to Approve Fund Transfers. The President shall have the authority to transfer any
fund appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive
Department which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project, or activity of
any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment.
The President shall, likewise, have the authority to augment any appropriation of the Executive
Department in the General Appropriations Act, from savings in the appropriations of another department,
bureau, office or agency within the Executive Branch, pursuant to the provisions of Article VIII, Section 16
(5) of the Constitution.
In Demetria v. Alba, however, the Court struck down the first paragraph of Section 44 for contravening
Section 16(5)of the 1973 Constitution, ruling:
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over-extends the privilege granted under said Section
16. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or
agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or
office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to
whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be
taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to
be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby
amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof.
Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.143
It is significant that Demetria was promulgated 25 days after the ratification by the people of the 1987
Constitution, whose Section 25(5) of Article VI is identical to Section 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution, to wit:
Section 25. x x x
xxxx
5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President
of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and
the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.
xxxx
The foregoing history makes it evident that the Constitutional Commission included Section 25(5), supra,
to keep a tight rein on the exercise of the power to transfer funds appropriated by Congress by the
President and the other high officials of the Government named therein. The Court stated in Nazareth v.
Villar:144
In the funding of current activities, projects, and programs, the general rule should still be that the
budgetary amount contained in the appropriations bill is the extent Congress will determine as sufficient
for the budgetary allocation for the proponent agency. The only exception is found in Section 25 (5), Article
VI of the Constitution, by which the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions are
authorized to transfer appropriations to augmentany item in the GAA for their respective offices from the
savings in other items of their respective appropriations. The plain language of the constitutional
restriction leaves no room for the petitioners posture, which we should now dispose of as untenable.

It bears emphasizing that the exception in favor of the high officials named in Section 25(5), Article VI of
the Constitution limiting the authority to transfer savings only to augment another item in the GAA is
strictly but reasonably construed as exclusive. As the Court has expounded in Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections:
When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application of the general rule, the exceptions
are strictly but reasonably construed. The exceptions extend only as far as their language fairly warrants,
and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the exceptions. Where the
general rule is established by a statute with exceptions, none but the enacting authority can curtail the
former. Not even the courts may add to the latter by implication, and it is a rule that an express exception
excludes all others, although it is always proper in determining the applicability of the rule to inquire
whether, in a particular case, it accords with reason and justice.
The appropriate and natural office of the exception is to exempt something from the scope of the general
words of a statute, which is otherwise within the scope and meaning of such general words. Consequently,
the existence of an exception in a statute clarifies the intent that the statute shall apply to all cases not
excepted. Exceptions are subject to the rule of strict construction; hence, any doubt will be resolved in
favor of the general provision and against the exception. Indeed, the liberal construction of a statute will
seem to require in many circumstances that the exception, by which the operation of the statute is limited
or abridged, should receive a restricted construction.
Accordingly, we should interpret Section 25(5), supra, in the context of a limitation on the Presidents
discretion over the appropriations during the Budget Execution Phase.
b. Requisites for the valid transfer of
appropriated funds under Section
25(5), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution
The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), supra, must be made upon a
concurrence of the following requisites, namely:
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions
to transfer funds within their respective offices;
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their respective offices;
and (3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices.
b.1. First RequisiteGAAs of 2011 and
2012 lacked valid provisions to
authorize transfers of funds under
the DAP; hence, transfers under the
DAP were unconstitutional
Section 25(5), supra, not being a self-executing provision of the Constitution, must have an implementing
law for it to be operative. That law, generally, is the GAA of a given fiscal year. To comply with the first
requisite, the GAAs should expressly authorize the transfer of funds.
Did the GAAs expressly authorize the transfer of funds?
In the 2011 GAA, the provision that gave the President and the other high officials the authority to transfer
funds was Section 59, as follows:
Section 59. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate President, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions
enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to augment any item in this Act from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
In the 2012 GAA, the empowering provision was Section 53, to wit:
Section 53. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate President, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions
enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to augment any item in this Act from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
In fact, the foregoing provisions of the 2011 and 2012 GAAs were cited by the DBM as justification for the
use of savings under the DAP.145
A reading shows, however, that the aforequoted provisions of the GAAs of 2011 and 2012 were textually
unfaithful to the Constitution for not carrying the phrase "for their respective offices" contained in Section
25(5), supra. The impact of the phrase "for their respective offices" was to authorize only transfers of funds
within their offices (i.e., in the case of the President, the transfer was to an item of appropriation within the
Executive). The provisions carried a different phrase ("to augment any item in this Act"), and the effect was
that the 2011 and 2012 GAAs thereby literally allowed the transfer of funds from savings to augment any
item in the GAAs even if the item belonged to an office outside the Executive. To that extent did the 2011
and 2012 GAAs contravene the Constitution. At the very least, the aforequoted provisions cannot be used
to claim authority to transfer appropriations from the Executive to another branch, or to a constitutional
commission.
Apparently realizing the problem, Congress inserted the omitted phrase in the counterpart provision in the
2013 GAA, to wit:
Section 52. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate President, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions
enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to use savings in their respective

appropriations to augment actual deficiencies incurred for the current year in any item of their respective
appropriations.
Even had a valid law authorizing the transfer of funds pursuant to Section 25(5), supra, existed, there still
remained two other requisites to be met, namely: that the source of funds to be transferred were savings
from appropriations within the respective offices; and that the transfer must be for the purpose of
augmenting an item of appropriation within the respective offices.
b.2. Second Requisite There were
no savings from which funds
could be sourced for the DAP
Were the funds used in the DAP actually savings?
The petitioners claim that the funds used in the DAP the unreleased appropriations and withdrawn
unobligated allotments were not actual savings within the context of Section 25(5), supra, and the
relevant provisions of the GAAs. Belgica argues that "savings" should be understood to refer to the excess
money after the items that needed to be funded have been funded, or those that needed to be paid have
been paid pursuant to the budget.146 The petitioners posit that there could be savings only when the PAPs
for which the funds had been appropriated were actually implemented and completed, or finally
discontinued or abandoned. They insist that savings could not be realized with certainty in the middle of
the fiscal year; and that the funds for "slow-moving" PAPs could not be considered as savings because such
PAPs had not actually been abandoned or discontinued yet.147 They stress that NBC No. 541, by allowing
the withdrawn funds to be reissued to the "original program or project from which it was withdrawn,"
conceded that the PAPs from which the supposed savings were taken had not been completed, abandoned
or discontinued.148
The OSG represents that "savings" were "appropriations balances," being the difference between the
appropriation authorized by Congress and the actual amount allotted for the appropriation; that the
definition of "savings" in the GAAs set only the parameters for determining when savings occurred; that it
was still the President (as well as the other officers vested by the Constitution with the authority to
augment) who ultimately determined when savings actually existed because savings could be determined
only during the stage of budget execution; that the President must be given a wide discretion to
accomplish his tasks; and that the withdrawn unobligated allotments were savings inasmuch as they were
clearly "portions or balances of any programmed appropriationfree from any obligation or encumbrances
which are (i) still available after the completion or final discontinuance or abandonment of the work,
activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized"
We partially find for the petitioners.
In ascertaining the meaning of savings, certain principles should be borne in mind. The first principle is
that Congress wields the power of the purse. Congress decides how the budget will be spent; what PAPs to
fund; and the amounts of money to be spent for each PAP. The second principle is that the Executive, as
the department of the Government tasked to enforce the laws, is expected to faithfully execute the GAA
and to spend the budget in accordance with the provisions of the GAA.149 The Executive is expected to
faithfully implement the PAPs for which Congress allocated funds, and to limit the expenditures within the
allocations, unless exigencies result to deficiencies for which augmentation is authorized, subject to the
conditions provided by law. The third principle is that in making the Presidents power to augment
operative under the GAA, Congress recognizes the need for flexibility in budget execution. In so doing,
Congress diminishes its own power of the purse, for it delegates a fraction of its power to the Executive.
But Congress does not thereby allow the Executive to override its authority over the purse as to let the
Executive exceed its delegated authority. And the fourth principle is that savings should be actual. "Actual"
denotes something that is real or substantial, or something that exists presently in fact, as opposed to
something that is merely theoretical, possible, potential or hypothetical.150
The foregoing principles caution us to construe savings strictly against expanding the scope of the power
to augment. It is then indubitable that the power to augment was to be used only when the purpose for
which the funds had been allocated were already satisfied, or the need for such funds had ceased to exist,
for only then could savings be properly realized. This interpretation prevents the Executive from unduly
transgressing Congress power of the purse.
The definition of "savings" in the GAAs, particularly for 2011, 2012 and 2013, reflected this interpretation
and made it operational, viz:
Savings refer to portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act free from any obligation
or encumbrance which are: (i) still available after the completion or final discontinuance or abandonment
of the work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized; (ii) from appropriations balances
arising from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of absence
without pay; and (iii) from appropriations balances realized from the implementation of measures resulting
in improved systems and efficiencies and thus enabled agencies to meet and deliver the required or
planned targets, programs and services approved in this Act at a lesser cost.
The three instances listed in the GAAs aforequoted definition were a sure indication that savings could be
generated only upon the purpose of the appropriation being fulfilled, or upon the need for the
appropriation being no longer existent.
The phrase "free from any obligation or encumbrance" in the definition of savings in the GAAs conveyed
the notion that the appropriation was at that stage when the appropriation was already obligated and the
appropriation was already released. This interpretation was reinforced by the enumeration of the three
instances for savings to arise, which showed that the appropriation referred to had reached the agency
level. It could not be otherwise, considering that only when the appropriation had reached the agency level
could it be determined whether (a) the PAP for which the appropriation had been authorized was

completed, finally discontinued, or abandoned; or (b) there were vacant positions and leaves of absence
without pay; or (c) the required or planned targets, programs and services were realized at a lesser cost
because of the implementation of measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies.
The DBM declares that part of the savings brought under the DAP came from "pooling of unreleased
appropriations such as unreleased Personnel Services appropriations which will lapse at the end of the
year, unreleased appropriations of slow moving projects and discontinued projects per Zero-Based
Budgeting findings."
The declaration of the DBM by itself does not state the clear legal basis for the treatment of unreleased or
unalloted appropriations as savings.
The fact alone that the appropriations are unreleased or unalloted is a mere description of the status of the
items as unalloted or unreleased. They have not yet ripened into categories of items from which savings
can be generated. Appropriations have been considered "released" if there has already been an allotment
or authorization to incur obligations and disbursement authority. This means that the DBM has issued
either an ABM (for those not needing clearance), or a SARO (for those needing clearance), and
consequently an NCA, NCAA or CDC, as the case may be. Appropriations remain unreleased, for instance,
because of noncompliance with documentary requirements (like the Special Budget Request), or simply
because of the unavailability of funds. But the appropriations do not actually reach the agencies to which
they were allocated under the GAAs, and have remained with the DBM technically speaking. Ergo,
unreleased appropriations refer to appropriations with allotments but without disbursement authority.
For us to consider unreleased appropriations as savings, unless these met the statutory definition of
savings, would seriously undercut the congressional power of the purse, because such appropriations had
not even reached and been used by the agency concerned vis--vis the PAPs for which Congress had
allocated them. However, if an agency has unfilled positions in its plantilla and did not receive an allotment
and NCA for such vacancies, appropriations for such positions, although unreleased, may already
constitute savings for that agency under the second instance.
Unobligated allotments, on the other hand, were encompassed by the first part of the definition of
"savings" in the GAA, that is, as "portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act free
from any obligation or encumbrance." But the first part of the definition was further qualified by the three
enumerated instances of when savings would be realized. As such, unobligated allotments could not be
indiscriminately declared as savings without first determining whether any of the three instances existed.
This signified that the DBMs withdrawal of unobligated allotments had disregarded the definition of
savings under the GAAs.
Justice Carpio has validly observed in his Separate Concurring Opinion that MOOE appropriations are
deemed divided into twelve monthly allocations within the fiscal year; hence, savings could be generated
monthly from the excess or unused MOOE appropriations other than the Mandatory Expenditures and
Expenditures for Business-type Activities because of the physical impossibility to obligate and spend such
funds as MOOE for a period that already lapsed. Following this observation, MOOE for future months are
not savings and cannot be transferred.
The DBMs Memorandum for the President dated June 25, 2012 (which became the basis of NBC No. 541)
stated:
ON THE AUTHORITY TO WITHDRAW UNOBLIGATED ALLOTMENTS
5.0 The DBM, during the course of performance reviews conducted on the agencies operations,
particularly on the implementation of their projects/activities, including expenses incurred in undertaking
the same, have been continuously calling the attention of all National Government agencies (NGAs) with
low levels of obligations as of end of the first quarter to speedup the implementation of their programs and
projects in the second quarter.
6.0 Said reminders were made in a series of consultation meetings with the concerned agencies and with
call-up letters sent.
7.0 Despite said reminders and the availability of funds at the departments disposal, the level of financial
performance of some departments registered below program, with the targeted obligations/disbursements
for the first semester still not being met.
8.0 In order to maximize the use of the available allotment, all unobligated balances as of June 30, 2012,
both for continuing and current allotments shall be withdrawn and pooled to fund fast moving
programs/projects.
9.0 It may be emphasized that the allotments to be withdrawn will be based on the list of slow moving
projects to be identified by the agencies and their catch up plans to be evaluated by the DBM.
It is apparent from the foregoing text that the withdrawal of unobligated allotments would be based on
whether the allotments pertained to slow-moving projects, or not. However, NBC No. 541 did not set in
clear terms the criteria for the withdrawal of unobligated allotments, viz:
3.1. These guidelines shall cover the withdrawal of unobligated allotments as of June 30, 2012 ofall
national government agencies (NGAs) charged against FY 2011 Continuing Appropriation (R.A. No. 10147)
and FY 2012 Current Appropriation (R.A. No. 10155), pertaining to:
3.1.1 Capital Outlays (CO);
3.1.2 Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE) related to the implementation of programs and
projects, as well as capitalized MOOE; and
3.1.3 Personal Services corresponding to unutilized pension benefits declared as savings by the agencies
concerned based on their undated/validated list of pensioners.
A perusal of its various provisions reveals that NBC No. 541 targeted the "withdrawal of unobligated
allotments of agencies with low levels of obligations"151 "to fund priority and/or fast-moving
programs/projects."152 But the fact that the withdrawn allotments could be "[r]eissued for the original

programs and projects of the agencies/OUs concerned, from which the allotments were withdrawn"153
supported the conclusion that the PAPs had not yet been finally discontinued or abandoned. Thus, the
purpose for which the withdrawn funds had been appropriated was not yet fulfilled, or did not yet cease to
exist, rendering the declaration of the funds as savings impossible.
Worse, NBC No. 541 immediately considered for withdrawal all released allotments in 2011 charged
against the 2011 GAA that had remained unobligated based on the following considerations, to wit:
5.4.1 The departments/agencies approved priority programs and projects are assumed to be
implementation-ready and doable during the given fiscal year; and
5.4.2 The practice of having substantial carryover appropriations may imply that the agency has a slowerthan-programmed implementation capacity or agency tends to implement projects within a two-year
timeframe.
Such withdrawals pursuant to NBC No. 541, the circular that affected the unobligated allotments for
continuing and current appropriations as of June 30, 2012, disregarded the 2-year period of availability of
the appropriations for MOOE and capital outlay extended under Section 65, General Provisions of the 2011
GAA, viz:
Section 65. Availability of Appropriations. Appropriations for MOOE and capital outlays authorized in this
Act shall be available for release and obligation for the purpose specified, and under the same special
provisions applicable thereto, for a period extending to one fiscal year after the end of the year in which
such items were appropriated: PROVIDED, That appropriations for MOOE and capital outlays under R.A. No.
9970 shall be made available up to the end of FY 2011: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That a report on these
releases and obligations shall be submitted to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee
on Appropriations.
and Section 63 General Provisions of the 2012 GAA, viz:
Section 63. Availability of Appropriations. Appropriations for MOOE and capital outlays authorized in this
Act shall be available for release and obligation for the purpose specified, and under the same special
provisions applicable thereto, for a period extending to one fiscal year after the end of the year in which
such items were appropriated: PROVIDED, That a report on these releases and obligations shall be
submitted to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations, either in
printed form or by way of electronic document.154
Thus, another alleged area of constitutional infirmity was that the DAP and its relevant issuances
shortened the period of availability of the appropriations for MOOE and capital outlays.
Congress provided a one-year period of availability of the funds for all allotment classes in the 2013 GAA
(R.A. No. 10352), to wit:
Section 63. Availability of Appropriations. All appropriations authorized in this Act shall be available for
release and obligation for the purposes specified, and under the same special provisions applicable
thereto, until the end of FY 2013: PROVIDED, That a report on these releases and obligations shall be
submitted to the Senate Committee on Finance and House Committee on Appropriations, either in printed
form or by way of electronic document.
Yet, in his memorandum for the President dated May 20, 2013, Sec. Abad sought omnibus authority to
consolidate savings and unutilized balances to fund the DAP on a quarterly basis, viz:
7.0 If the level of financial performance of some department will register below program, even with the
availability of funds at their disposal, the targeted obligations/disbursements for each quarter will not be
met. It is important to note that these funds will lapse at the end of the fiscal year if these remain
unobligated.
8.0 To maximize the use of the available allotment, all unobligated balances at the end of every quarter,
both for continuing and current allotments shall be withdrawn and pooled to fund fast moving
programs/projects.
9.0 It may be emphasized that the allotments to be withdrawn will be based on the list of slow moving
projects to be identified by the agencies and their catch up plans to be evaluated by the DBM.
The validity period of the affected appropriations, already given the brief Lifes pan of one year, was further
shortened to only a quarter of a year under the DBMs memorandum dated May 20, 2013.
The petitioners accuse the respondents of forcing the generation of savings in order to have a larger fund
available for discretionary spending. They aver that the respondents, by withdrawing unobligated
allotments in the middle of the fiscal year, in effect deprived funding for PAPs with existing appropriations
under the GAAs.155
The respondents belie the accusation, insisting that the unobligated allotments were being withdrawn
upon the instance of the implementing agencies based on their own assessment that they could not
obligate those allotments pursuant to the Presidents directive for them to spend their appropriations as
quickly as they could in order to ramp up the economy.156
We agree with the petitioners.
Contrary to the respondents insistence, the withdrawals were upon the initiative of the DBM itself. The text
of NBC No. 541 bears this out, to wit:
5.2 For the purpose of determining the amount of unobligated allotments that shall be withdrawn, all
departments/agencies/operating units (OUs) shall submit to DBM not later than July 30, 2012, the following
budget accountability reports as of June 30, 2012;
Statement of Allotments, Obligation and Balances (SAOB);
Financial Report of Operations (FRO); and
Physical Report of Operations.
5.3 In the absence of the June 30, 2012 reports cited under item 5.2 of this Circular, the agencys latest
report available shall be used by DBM as basis for withdrawal of allotment. The DBM shall

compute/approximate the agencys obligation level as of June 30 to derive its unobligated allotments as of
same period. Example: If the March 31 SAOB or FRO reflects actual obligations of P 800M then the June 30
obligation level shall approximate to P1,600 M (i.e., P800 M x 2 quarters).
The petitioners assert that no law had authorized the withdrawal and transfer of unobligated allotments
and the pooling of unreleased appropriations; and that the unbridled withdrawal of unobligated allotments
and the retention of appropriated funds were akin to the impoundment of appropriations that could be
allowed only in case of "unmanageable national government budget deficit" under the GAAs,157 thus
violating the provisions of the GAAs of 2011, 2012 and 2013 prohibiting the retention or deduction of
allotments.158
In contrast, the respondents emphasize that NBC No. 541 adopted a spending, not saving, policy as a lastditch effort of the Executive to push agencies into actually spending their appropriations; that such policy
did not amount to an impoundment scheme, because impoundment referred to the decision of the
Executive to refuse to spend funds for political or ideological reasons; and that the withdrawal of
allotments under NBC No. 541 was made pursuant to Section 38, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative
Code, by which the President was granted the authority to suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure
of funds allotted to any agency whenever in his judgment the public interest so required.
The assertions of the petitioners are upheld. The withdrawal and transfer of unobligated allotments and
the pooling of unreleased appropriations were invalid for being bereft of legal support. Nonetheless, such
withdrawal of unobligated allotments and the retention of appropriated funds cannot be considered as
impoundment.
According to Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez:159 "Impoundment refers to a refusal by the
President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or
obligate budget authority of any type." Impoundment under the GAA is understood to mean the retention
or deduction of appropriations. The 2011 GAA authorized impoundment only in case of unmanageable
National Government budget deficit, to wit:
Section 66. Prohibition Against Impoundment of Appropriations. No appropriations authorized under this
Act shall be impounded through retention or deduction, unless in accordance with the rules and regulations
to be issued by the DBM: PROVIDED, That all the funds appropriated for the purposes, programs, projects
and activities authorized under this Act, except those covered under the Unprogrammed Fund, shall be
released pursuant to Section 33 (3), Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292.
Section 67. Unmanageable National Government Budget Deficit. Retention or deduction of appropriations
authorized in this Act shall be effected only in cases where there is an unmanageable national government
budget deficit.
Unmanageable national government budget deficit as used in this section shall be construed to mean that
(i) the actual national government budget deficit has exceeded the quarterly budget deficit targets
consistent with the full-year target deficit as indicated in the FY 2011 Budget of
Expenditures and Sources of Financing submitted by the President and approved by Congress pursuant to
Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution, or (ii) there are clear economic indications of an impending
occurrence of such condition, as determined by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee and
approved by the President.
The 2012 and 2013 GAAs contained similar provisions.
The withdrawal of unobligated allotments under the DAP should not be regarded as impoundment because
it entailed only the transfer of funds, not the retention or deduction of appropriations.
Nor could Section 68 of the 2011 GAA (and the similar provisions of the 2012 and 2013 GAAs) be
applicable. They uniformly stated:
Section 68. Prohibition Against Retention/Deduction of Allotment. Fund releases from appropriations
provided in this Act shall be transmitted intact or in full to the office or agency concerned. No retention or
deduction as reserves or overhead shall be made, except as authorized by law, or upon direction of the
President of the Philippines. The COA shall ensure compliance with this provision to the extent that suballotments by agencies to their subordinate offices are in conformity with the release documents issued by
the DBM.
The provision obviously pertained to the retention or deduction of allotments upon their release from the
DBM, which was a different matter altogether. The Court should not expand the meaning of the provision
by applying it to the withdrawal of allotments.
The respondents rely on Section 38, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code of 1987 to justify the
withdrawal of unobligated allotments. But the provision authorized only the suspension or stoppage of
further expenditures, not the withdrawal of unobligated allotments, to wit:
Section 38. Suspension of Expenditure of Appropriations.- Except as otherwise provided in the General
Appropriations Act and whenever in his judgment the public interest so requires, the President, upon notice
to the head of office concerned, is authorized to suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure of funds
allotted for any agency, or any other expenditure authorized in the General Appropriations Act, except for
personal services appropriations used for permanent officials and employees.
Moreover, the DBM did not suspend or stop further expenditures in accordance with Section 38, supra, but
instead transferred the funds to other PAPs.
It is relevant to remind at this juncture that the balances of appropriations that remained unexpended at
the end of the fiscal year were to be reverted to the General Fund.1wphi1 This was the mandate of
Section 28, Chapter IV, Book VI of the Administrative Code, to wit:
Section 28. Reversion of Unexpended Balances of Appropriations, Continuing Appropriations.- Unexpended
balances of appropriations authorized in the General Appropriation Act shall revert to the unappropriated
surplus of the General Fund at the end of the fiscal year and shall not thereafter be available for

expenditure except by subsequent legislative enactment: Provided, that appropriations for capital outlays
shall remain valid until fully spent or reverted: provided, further, that continuing appropriations for current
operating expenditures may be specifically recommended and approved as such in support of projects
whose effective implementation calls for multi-year expenditure commitments: provided, finally, that the
President may authorize the use of savings realized by an agency during given year to meet non-recurring
expenditures in a subsequent year.
The balances of continuing appropriations shall be reviewed as part of the annual budget preparation
process and the preparation process and the President may approve upon recommendation of the
Secretary, the reversion of funds no longer needed in connection with the activities funded by said
continuing appropriations.
The Executive could not circumvent this provision by declaring unreleased appropriations and unobligated
allotments as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year.
b.3. Third Requisite No funds from
savings could be transferred under
the DAP to augment deficient items
not provided in the GAA
The third requisite for a valid transfer of funds is that the purpose of the transfer should be "to augment an
item in the general appropriations law for the respective offices." The term "augment" means to enlarge or
increase in size, amount, or degree.160
The GAAs for 2011, 2012 and 2013 set as a condition for augmentation that the appropriation for the PAP
item to be augmented must be deficient, to wit:
x x x Augmentation implies the existence in this Act of a program, activity, or project with an
appropriation, which upon implementation, or subsequent evaluation of needed resources, is determined
to be deficient. In no case shall a non-existent program, activity, or project, be funded by augmentation
from savings or by the use of appropriations otherwise authorized in this Act.
In other words, an appropriation for any PAP must first be determined to be deficient before it could be
augmented from savings. Note is taken of the fact that the 2013 GAA already made this quite clear, thus:
Section 52. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the Senate President, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions
enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to use savings in their respective
appropriations to augment actual deficiencies incurred for the current year in any item of their respective
appropriations.
As of 2013, a total of P144.4 billion worth of PAPs were implemented through the DAP.161
Of this amount P82.5 billion were released in 2011 and P54.8 billion in 2012.162 Sec. Abad has reported
that 9% of the total DAP releases were applied to the PAPs identified by the legislators.163
The petitioners disagree, however, and insist that the DAP supported the following PAPs that had not been
covered with appropriations in the respective GAAs, namely:
(i) P1.5 billion for the Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army;
(ii) P1.8 billion for the Moro National Liberation Front;
(iii) P700 million for assistance to Quezon Province;164
(iv) P50 million to P100 (million) each to certain senators;165
(v) P10 billion for the relocation of families living along dangerous zones under the National Housing
Authority;
(vi) P10 billion and P20 billion equity infusion under the Bangko Sentral;
(vii) P5.4 billion landowners compensation under the Department of Agrarian Reform;
(viii) P8.6 billion for the ARMM comprehensive peace and development program;
(ix) P6.5 billion augmentation of LGU internal revenue allotments
(x) P5 billion for crucial projects like tourism road construction under the Department of Tourism and the
Department of Public Works and Highways;
(xi) P1.8 billion for the DAR-DPWH Tulay ng Pangulo;
(xii) P1.96 billion for the DOH-DPWH rehabilitation of regional health units; and
(xiii) P4 billion for the DepEd-PPP school infrastructure projects.166
In refutation, the OSG argues that a total of 116 DAP-financed PAPs were implemented, had appropriation
covers, and could properly be accounted for because the funds were released following and pursuant to
the standard practices adopted by the DBM.167 In support of its argument, the OSG has submitted seven
evidence packets containing memoranda, SAROs, and other pertinent documents relative to the
implementation and fund transfers under the DAP.168
Upon careful review of the documents contained in the seven evidence packets, we conclude that the
"savings" pooled under the DAP were allocated to PAPs that were not covered by any appropriations in the
pertinent GAAs.
For example, the SARO issued on December 22, 2011 for the highly vaunted Disaster Risk, Exposure,
Assessment and Mitigation (DREAM) project under the Department of Science and Technology (DOST)
covered the amount of P1.6 Billion,169 broken down as follows:
APPROPRIATION
CODE

PARTICULARS

A.03.a.01.a

Generation of new knowledge and

technologies and research capability
building in priority areas identified as

AMOUNT
AUTHORIZED

strategic to National Development

Personnel Services
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses
Capital Outlays

P 43,504,024
1,164,517,589
391,978,387
P 1,600,000,000

the pertinent provision of the 2011 GAA (R.A. No. 10147) showed that Congress had appropriated only
P537,910,000 for MOOE, but nothing for personnel services and capital outlays, to wit:

III.

Personnel
Services

Maintenance
and Other
Operating
Expenditures

Capital
Outlays

TOTAL

177,406,000

1,887,365,000

49,090,000

2,113,861,000

Operations
a.

Funding Assistance to Science

and Technology Activities
1.

Central Office

1,554,238,000

1,554,238,000

a. Generation of new
knowledge and
technologies and research
capability building in
priority areas identified as
strategic to National
Development

537,910,000

537,910,000

Aside from this transfer under the DAP to the DREAM project exceeding by almost 300% the appropriation
by Congress for the program Generation of new knowledge and technologies and research capability
building in priority areas identified as strategic to National Development, the Executive allotted funds for
personnel services and capital outlays. The Executive thereby substituted its will to that of Congress.
Worse, the Executive had not earlier proposed any amount for personnel services and capital outlays in the
NEP that became the basis of the 2011 GAA.170
It is worth stressing in this connection that the failure of the GAAs to set aside any amounts for an expense
category sufficiently indicated that Congress purposely did not see fit to fund, much less implement, the
PAP concerned. This indication becomes clearer when even the President himself did not recommend in the
NEP to fund the PAP. The consequence was that any PAP requiring expenditure that did not receive any
appropriation under the GAAs could only be a new PAP, any funding for which would go beyond the
authority laid down by Congress in enacting the GAAs. That happened in some instances under the DAP.
In relation to the December 22, 2011 SARO issued to the Philippine Council for Industry, Energy and
Emerging Technology Research and Development (DOST-PCIEETRD)171 for Establishment of the Advanced
Failure Analysis Laboratory, which reads:
APPROPRIA
TION
CODE

A.02.a

PARTICULARS

Development, integration and coordination of the

National Research System for Industry, Energy and
Emerging Technology and Related Fields
Capital Outlays

AMOUNT
AUTHORIZED

P 300,000,000

the appropriation code and the particulars appearing in the SARO did not correspond to the program
specified in the GAA, whose particulars were Research and Management Services(inclusive of the following
activities: (1) Technological and Economic Assessment for Industry, Energy and Utilities; (2) Dissemination
of Science and Technology Information; and (3) Management of PCIERD Information System for Industry,
Energy and Utilities. Even assuming that Development, integration and coordination of the National
Research System for Industry, Energy and Emerging Technology and Related Fields the particulars stated
in the SARO could fall under the broad program description of Research and Management Services as
appearing in the SARO, it would nonetheless remain a new activity by reason of its not being specifically
stated in the GAA. As such, the DBM, sans legislative authorization, could not validly fund and implement
such PAP under the DAP.
In defending the disbursements, however, the OSG contends that the Executive enjoyed sound discretion
in implementing the budget given the generality in the language and the broad policy objectives identified
under the GAAs;172 and that the President enjoyed unlimited authority to spend the initial appropriations
under his authority to declare and utilize savings,173 and in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the
laws.
Although the OSG rightly contends that the Executive was authorized to spend in line with its mandate to
faithfully execute the laws (which included the GAAs), such authority did not translate to unfettered
discretion that allowed the President to substitute his own will for that of Congress. He was still required to
remain faithful to the provisions of the GAAs, given that his power to spend pursuant to the GAAs was but
a delegation to him from Congress. Verily, the power to spend the public wealth resided in Congress, not in
the Executive.174 Moreover, leaving the spending power of the Executive unrestricted would threaten to
undo the principle of separation of powers.175

Congress acts as the guardian of the public treasury in faithful discharge of its power of the purse
whenever it deliberates and acts on the budget proposal submitted by the Executive.176 Its power of the
purse is touted as the very foundation of its institutional strength,177 and underpins "all other legislative
decisions and regulating the balance of influence between the legislative and executive branches of
government."178 Such enormous power encompasses the capacity to generate money for the
Government, to appropriate public funds, and to spend the money.179 Pertinently, when it exercises its
power of the purse, Congress wields control by specifying the PAPs for which public money should be
spent.
It is the President who proposes the budget but it is Congress that has the final say on matters of
appropriations.180 For this purpose, appropriation involves two governing principles, namely: (1) "a
Principle of the Public Fisc, asserting that all monies received from whatever source by any part of the
government are public funds;" and (2) "a Principle of Appropriations Control, prohibiting expenditure of any
public money without legislative authorization."181 To conform with the governing principles, the
Executive cannot circumvent the prohibition by Congress of an expenditure for a PAP by resorting to either
public or private funds.182 Nor could the Executive transfer appropriated funds resulting in an increase in
the budget for one PAP, for by so doing the appropriation for another PAP is necessarily decreased. The
terms of both appropriations will thereby be violated.
b.4 Third Requisite Cross-border
augmentations from savings were
prohibited by the Constitution
By providing that the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the Heads of the Constitutional Commissions may be
authorized to augment any item in the GAA "for their respective offices," Section 25(5), supra, has
delineated borders between their offices, such that funds appropriated for one office are prohibited from
crossing over to another office even in the guise of augmentation of a deficient item or items. Thus, we call
such transfers of funds cross-border transfers or cross-border augmentations.
To be sure, the phrase "respective offices" used in Section 25(5), supra, refers to the entire Executive, with
respect to the President; the Senate, with respect to the Senate President; the House of Representatives,
with respect to the Speaker; the Judiciary, with respect to the Chief Justice; the Constitutional
Commissions, with respect to their respective Chairpersons.
Did any cross-border transfers or augmentations transpire?
During the oral arguments on January 28, 2014, Sec. Abad admitted making some cross-border
augmentations, to wit:
JUSTICE BERSAMIN:
Alright, the whole time that you have been Secretary of Department of Budget and Management, did the
Executive Department ever redirect any part of savings of the National Government under your control
cross border to another department?
SECRETARY ABAD:
Well, in the Memos that we submitted to you, such an instance, Your Honor
JUSTICE BERSAMIN:
Can you tell me two instances? I dont recall having read your material.
SECRETARY ABAD:
Well, the first instance had to do with a request from the House of Representatives. They started building
their e-library in 2010 and they had a budget for about 207 Million but they lack about 43 Million to
complete its 250 Million requirements. Prior to that, the COA, in an audit observation informed the Speaker
that they had to continue with that construction otherwise the whole building, as well as the equipments
therein may suffer from serious deterioration. And at that time, since the budget of the House of
Representatives was not enough to complete 250 Million, they wrote to the President requesting for an
augmentation of that particular item, which was granted, Your Honor. The second instance in the Memos is
a request from the Commission on Audit. At the time they were pushing very strongly the good governance
programs of the government and therefore, part of that is a requirement to conduct audits as well as
review financial reports of many agencies. And in the performance of that function, the Commission on
Audit needed information technology equipment as well as hire consultants and litigators to help them
with their audit work and for that they requested funds from the Executive and the President saw that it
was important for the Commission to be provided with those IT equipments and litigators and consultants
and the request was granted, Your Honor.
JUSTICE BERSAMIN:
These cross border examples, cross border augmentations were not supported by appropriations
SECRETARY ABAD:
They were, we were augmenting existing items within their (interrupted)
JUSTICE BERSAMIN:
No, appropriations before you augmented because this is a cross border and the tenor or text of the
Constitution is quite clear as far as I am concerned. It says here, "The power to augment may only be
made to increase any item in the General Appropriations Law for their respective offices." Did you not feel
constricted by this provision?
SECRETARY ABAD:
Well, as the Constitution provides, the prohibition we felt was on the transfer of appropriations, Your Honor.
What we thought we did was to transfer savings which was needed by the Commission to address
deficiency in an existing item in both the Commission as well as in the House of Representatives; thats
how we saw(interrupted)

JUSTICE BERSAMIN:
So your position as Secretary of Budget is that you could do that?
SECRETARY ABAD:
In an extreme instances because(interrupted)
JUSTICE BERSAMIN:
No, no, in all instances, extreme or not extreme, you could do that, thats your feeling.
SECRETARY ABAD:
Well, in that particular situation when the request was made by the Commission and the House of
Representatives, we felt that we needed to respond because we felt(interrupted).183
The records show, indeed, that funds amounting to P143,700,000.00 and P250,000,000.00 were
transferred under the DAP respectively to the COA184 and the House of Representatives.185 Those
transfers of funds, which constituted cross-border augmentations for being from the Executive to the COA
and the House of Representatives, are graphed as follows:186
AMOUNT
DATE
(In thousand pesos)
RELEAS
Reserve
Releases
ED
Imposed

OFFICE

PURPOSE

Commission
on
Audit

IT Infrastructure Program and hiring of 11/11/1

additional litigation experts
1

Congress
Completion of the construction of the
House of
Legislative Library and Archives
Representati Building/Congressional e-library
ves

07/23/1 207,034
2
(Savings of
HOR)

143,700

250,000

The respondents further stated in their memorandum that the President "made available" to the
"Commission on Elections the savings of his department upon [its] request for funds"187 This was
another instance of a cross-border augmentation.
The respondents justified all the cross-border transfers thusly:
99. The Constitution does not prevent the President from transferring savings of his department to another
department upon the latters request, provided it is the recipient department that uses such funds to
augment its own appropriation. In such a case, the President merely gives the other department access to
public funds but he cannot dictate how they shall be applied by that department whose fiscal autonomy is
guaranteed by the Constitution.188
In the oral arguments held on February 18, 2014, Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, representing Congress,
announced a different characterization of the cross-border transfers of funds as in the nature of "aid"
instead of "augmentation," viz:
HONORABLE MENDOZA:
The cross-border transfers, if Your Honors please, is not an application of the DAP. What were these crossborder transfers? They are transfers of savings as defined in the various General Appropriations Act. So,
that makes it similar to the DAP, the use of savings. There was a cross-border which appears to be in
violation of Section 25, paragraph 5 of Article VI, in the sense that the border was crossed. But never has it
been claimed that the purpose was to augment a deficient item in another department of the government
or agency of the government. The cross-border transfers, if Your Honors please, were in the nature of [aid]
rather than augmentations. Here is a government entity separate and independent from the Executive
Department solely in need of public funds. The President is there 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Hes in
charge of the whole operation although six or seven heads of government offices are given the power to
augment. Only the President stationed there and in effect in-charge and has the responsibility for the
failure of any part of the government. You have election, for one reason or another, the money is not
enough to hold election. There would be chaos if no money is given as an aid, not to augment, but as an
aid to a department like COA. The President is responsible in a way that the other heads, given the power
to augment, are not. So, he cannot very well allow this, if Your Honor please.189
JUSTICE LEONEN:
May I move to another point, maybe just briefly. I am curious that the position now, I think, of government
is that some transfers of savings is now considered to be, if Im not mistaken, aid not augmentation. Am I
correct in my hearing of your argument?
HONORABLE MENDOZA:
Thats our submission, if Your Honor, please.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
May I know, Justice, where can we situate this in the text of the Constitution? Where do we actually derive
the concepts that transfers of appropriation from one branch to the other or what happened in DAP can be
considered a said? What particular text in the Constitution can we situate this?
HONORABLE MENDOZA:
There is no particular provision or statutory provision for that matter, if Your Honor please. It is drawn from
the fact that the Executive is the executive in-charge of the success of the government.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
So, the residual powers labelled in Marcos v. Manglapus would be the basis for this theory of the
government?

HONORABLE MENDOZA:
Yes, if Your Honor, please.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
A while ago, Justice Carpio mentioned that the remedy is might be to go to Congress. That there are
opportunities and there have been opportunities of the President to actually go to Congress and ask for
supplemental budgets?
HONORABLE MENDOZA:
If there is time to do that, I would say yes.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
So, the theory of aid rather than augmentation applies in extra-ordinary situation?
HONORABLE MENDOZA:
Very extra-ordinary situations.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
But Counsel, this would be new doctrine, in case?
HONORABLE MENDOZA:
Yes, if Your Honor please.190
Regardless of the variant characterizations of the cross-border transfers of funds, the plain text of Section
25(5), supra, disallowing cross border transfers was disobeyed. Cross-border transfers, whether as
augmentation, or as aid, were prohibited under Section 25(5), supra.
4.
Sourcing the DAP from unprogrammed
funds despite the original revenue targets
not having been exceeded was invalid
Funding under the DAP were also sourced from unprogrammed funds provided in the GAAs for 2011,
2012,and 2013. The respondents stress, however, that the unprogrammed funds were not brought under
the DAP as savings, but as separate sources of funds; and that, consequently, the release and use of
unprogrammed funds were not subject to the restrictions under Section 25(5), supra.
The documents contained in the Evidence Packets by the OSG have confirmed that the unprogrammed
funds were treated as separate sources of funds. Even so, the release and use of the unprogrammed funds
were still subject to restrictions, for, to start with, the GAAs precisely specified the instances when the
unprogrammed funds could be released and the purposes for which they could be used.
The petitioners point out that a condition for the release of the unprogrammed funds was that the revenue
collections must exceed revenue targets; and that the release of the unprogrammed funds was illegal
because such condition was not met.191
The respondents disagree, holding that the release and use of the unprogrammed funds under the DAP
were in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the GAAs. In particular, the DBM avers that the
unprogrammed funds could be availed of when any of the following three instances occur, to wit: (1) the
revenue collections exceeded the original revenue targets proposed in the BESFs submitted by the
President to Congress; (2) new revenues were collected or realized from sources not originally considered
in the BESFs; or(3) newly-approved loans for foreign assisted projects were secured, or when conditions
were triggered for other sources of funds, such as perfected loan agreements for foreign-assisted
projects.192 This view of the DBM was adopted by all the respondents in their Consolidated Comment.193
The BESFs for 2011, 2012 and 2013 uniformly defined "unprogrammed appropriations" as appropriations
that provided standby authority to incur additional agency obligations for priority PAPs when revenue
collections exceeded targets, and when additional foreign funds are generated.194 Contrary to the DBMs
averment that there were three instances when unprogrammed funds could be released, the BESFs
envisioned only two instances. The third mentioned by the DBM the collection of new revenues from
sources not originally considered in the BESFs was not included. This meant that the collection of
additional revenues from new sources did not warrant the release of the unprogrammed funds. Hence,
even if the revenues not considered in the BESFs were collected or generated, the basic condition that the
revenue collections should exceed the revenue targets must still be complied with in order to justify the
release of the unprogrammed funds.
The view that there were only two instances when the unprogrammed funds could be released was
bolstered by the following texts of the Special Provisions of the 2011 and 2012 GAAs, to wit:
2011 GAA
1. Release of Fund. The amounts authorized herein shall be released only when the revenue collections
exceed the original revenue targets submitted by the President of the Philippines to Congress pursuant to
Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution, including savings generated from programmed appropriations for
the year: PROVIDED, That collections arising from sources not considered in the aforesaid original revenue
targets may be used to cover releases from appropriations in this Fund: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in case
of newly approved loans for foreign-assisted projects, the existence of a perfected loan agreement for the
purpose shall be sufficient basis for the issuance of a SARO covering the loan proceeds: PROVIDED,
FURTHERMORE, That if there are savings generated from the programmed appropriations for the first two
quarters of the year, the DBM may, subject to the approval of the President, release the pertinent
appropriations under the Unprogrammed Fund corresponding to only fifty percent (50%) of the said
savings net of revenue shortfall: PROVIDED, FINALLY, That the release of the balance of the total savings
from programmed appropriations for the year shall be subject to fiscal programming and approval of the
President.
2012 GAA

1. Release of the Fund. The amounts authorized herein shall be released only when the revenue collections
exceed the original revenue targets submitted by the President of the Philippines to Congress pursuant to
Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution: PROVIDED, That collections arising from sources not considered
in the aforesaid original revenue targets may be used to cover releases from appropriations in this Fund:
PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in case of newly approved loans for foreign-assisted projects, the existence of a
perfected loan agreement for the purpose shall be sufficient basis for the issuance of a SARO covering the
loan proceeds.
As can be noted, the provisos in both provisions to the effect that "collections arising from sources not
considered in the aforesaid original revenue targets may be used to cover releases from appropriations in
this Fund" gave the authority to use such additional revenues for appropriations funded from the
unprogrammed funds. They did not at all waive compliance with the basic requirement that revenue
collections must still exceed the original revenue targets.
In contrast, the texts of the provisos with regard to additional revenues generated from newly-approved
foreign loans were clear to the effect that the perfected loan agreement would be in itself "sufficient basis"
for the issuance of a SARO to release the funds but only to the extent of the amount of the loan. In such
instance, the revenue collections need not exceed the revenue targets to warrant the release of the loan
proceeds, and the mere perfection of the loan agreement would suffice.
It can be inferred from the foregoing that under these provisions of the GAAs the additional revenues from
sources not considered in the BESFs must be taken into account in determining if the revenue collections
exceeded the revenue targets. The text of the relevant provision of the 2013 GAA, which was substantially
similar to those of the GAAs for 2011 and 2012, already made this explicit, thus:
1. Release of the Fund. The amounts authorized herein shall be released only when the revenue collections
exceed the original revenue targets submitted by the President of the Philippines to Congress pursuant to
Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution, including collections arising from sources not considered in the
aforesaid original revenue target, as certified by the BTr: PROVIDED, That in case of newly approved loans
for foreign-assisted projects, the existence of a perfected loan agreement for the purpose shall be
sufficient basis for the issuance of a SARO covering the loan proceeds.
Consequently, that there were additional revenues from sources not considered in the revenue target
would not be enough. The total revenue collections must still exceed the original revenue targets to justify
the release of the unprogrammed funds (other than those from newly-approved foreign loans).
The present controversy on the unprogrammed funds was rooted in the correct interpretation of the phrase
"revenue collections should exceed the original revenue targets." The petitioners take the phrase to mean
that the total revenue collections must exceed the total revenue target stated in the BESF, but the
respondents understand the phrase to refer only to the collections for each source of revenue as
enumerated in the BESF, with the condition being deemed complied with once the revenue collections
from a particular source already exceeded the stated target.
The BESF provided for the following sources of revenue, with the corresponding revenue target stated for
each source of revenue, to wit:
TAX REVENUES
Taxes on Net Income and Profits
Taxes on Property
Taxes on Domestic Goods and Services
General Sales, Turnover or VAT
Selected Excises on Goods
Selected Taxes on Services
Taxes on the Use of Goods or Property or Permission to Perform Activities
Other Taxes
Taxes on International Trade and Transactions
NON-TAX REVENUES
Fees and Charges
BTR Income
Government Services
Interest on NG Deposits
Interest on Advances to Government Corporations
Income from Investments
Interest on Bond Holdings
Guarantee Fee
Gain on Foreign Exchange
NG Income Collected by BTr
Dividends on Stocks
NG Share from Airport Terminal Fee
NG Share from PAGCOR Income
NG Share from MIAA Profit
Privatization
Foreign Grants
Thus, when the Court required the respondents to submit a certification from the Bureau of Treasury (BTr)
to the effect that the revenue collections had exceeded the original revenue targets,195 they complied by
submitting certifications from the BTr and Department of Finance (DOF) pertaining to only one identified
source of revenue the dividends from the shares of stock held by the Government in government-owned
and controlled corporations.

To justify the release of the unprogrammed funds for 2011, the OSG presented the certification dated
March 4, 2011 issued by DOF Undersecretary Gil S. Beltran, as follows:
This is to certify that under the Budget for Expenditures and Sources of Financing for 2011, the
programmed income from dividends from shares of stock in government-owned and controlled
corporations is 5.5 billion.
This is to certify further that based on the records of the Bureau of Treasury, the National Government has
recorded dividend income amounting to P23.8 billion as of 31 January 2011.196
For 2012, the OSG submitted the certification dated April 26, 2012 issued by National Treasurer Roberto B.
Tan, viz:
This is to certify that the actual dividend collections remitted to the National Government for the period
January to March 2012 amounted to P19.419 billion compared to the full year program of P5.5 billion for
2012.197
And, finally, for 2013, the OSG presented the certification dated July 3, 2013 issued by National Treasurer
Rosalia V. De Leon, to wit:
This is to certify that the actual dividend collections remitted to the National Government for the period
January to May 2013 amounted to P12.438 billion compared to the full year program of P10.0198 billion for
2013.
Moreover, the National Government accounted for the sale of the right to build and operate the NAIA
expressway amounting to P11.0 billion in June 2013.199
The certifications reflected that by collecting dividends amounting to P23.8 billion in 2011, P19.419 billion
in 2012, and P12.438 billion in 2013 the BTr had exceeded only the P5.5 billion in target revenues in the
form of dividends from stocks in each of 2011 and 2012, and only the P10 billion in target revenues in the
form of dividends from stocks in 2013.
However, the requirement that revenue collections exceed the original revenue targets was to be
construed in light of the purpose for which the unprogrammed funds were incorporated in the GAAs as
standby appropriations to support additional expenditures for certain priority PAPs should the revenue
collections exceed the resource targets assumed in the budget or when additional foreign project loan
proceeds were realized. The unprogrammed funds were included in the GAAs to provide ready cover so as
not to delay the implementation of the PAPs should new or additional revenue sources be realized during
the year.200 Given the tenor of the certifications, the unprogrammed funds were thus not yet supported
by the corresponding resources.201
The revenue targets stated in the BESF were intended to address the funding requirements of the
proposed programmed appropriations. In contrast, the unprogrammed funds, as standby appropriations,
were to be released only when there were revenues in excess of what the programmed appropriations
required. As such, the revenue targets should be considered as a whole, not individually; otherwise, we
would be dealing with artificial revenue surpluses. The requirement that revenue collections must exceed
revenue target should be understood to mean that the revenue collections must exceed the total of the
revenue targets stated in the BESF. Moreover, to release the unprogrammed funds simply because there
was an excess revenue as to one source of revenue would be an unsound fiscal management measure
because it would disregard the budget plan and foster budget deficits, in contravention of the
Governments surplus budget policy.202
We cannot, therefore, subscribe to the respondents view.
5.
Equal protection, checks and balances,
and public accountability challenges
The DAP is further challenged as violative of the Equal Protection Clause, the system of checks and
balances, and the principle of public accountability.
With respect to the challenge against the DAP under the Equal Protection Clause,203 Luna argues that the
implementation of the DAP was "unfair as it [was] selective" because the funds released under the DAP
was not made available to all the legislators, with some of them refusing to avail themselves of the DAP
funds, and others being unaware of the availability of such funds. Thus, the DAP practised "undue
favoritism" in favor of select legislators in contravention of the Equal Protection Clause.
Similarly, COURAGE contends that the DAP violated the Equal Protection Clause because no reasonable
classification was used in distributing the funds under the DAP; and that the Senators who supposedly
availed themselves of said funds were differently treated as to the amounts they respectively received.
Anent the petitioners theory that the DAP violated the system of checks and balances, Luna submits that
the grant of the funds under the DAP to some legislators forced their silence about the issues and
anomalies surrounding the DAP. Meanwhile, Belgica stresses that the DAP, by allowing the legislators to
identify PAPs, authorized them to take part in the implementation and execution of the GAAs, a function
that exclusively belonged to the Executive; that such situation constituted undue and unjustified legislative
encroachment in the functions of the Executive; and that the President arrogated unto himself the power of
appropriation vested in Congress because NBC No. 541 authorized the use of the funds under the DAP for
PAPs not considered in the 2012 budget.
Finally, the petitioners insist that the DAP was repugnant to the principle of public accountability enshrined
in the Constitution,204 because the legislators relinquished the power of appropriation to the Executive,
and exhibited a reluctance to inquire into the legality of the DAP.
The OSG counters the challenges, stating that the supposed discrimination in the release of funds under
the DAP could be raised only by the affected Members of Congress themselves, and if the challenge based
on the violation of the Equal Protection Clause was really against the constitutionality of the DAP, the

arguments of the petitioners should be directed to the entitlement of the legislators to the funds, not to
the proposition that all of the legislators should have been given such entitlement.
The challenge based on the contravention of the Equal Protection Clause, which focuses on the release of
funds under the DAP to legislators, lacks factual and legal basis. The allegations about Senators and
Congressmen being unaware of the existence and implementation of the DAP, and about some of them
having refused to accept such funds were unsupported with relevant data. Also, the claim that the
Executive discriminated against some legislators on the ground alone of their receiving less than the
others could not of itself warrant a finding of contravention of the Equal Protection Clause. The denial of
equal protection of any law should be an issue to be raised only by parties who supposedly suffer it, and, in
these cases, such parties would be the few legislators claimed to have been discriminated against in the
releases of funds under the DAP. The reason for the requirement is that only such affected legislators could
properly and fully bring to the fore when and how the denial of equal protection occurred, and explain why
there was a denial in their situation. The requirement was not met here. Consequently, the Court was not
put in the position to determine if there was a denial of equal protection. To have the Court do so despite
the inadequacy of the showing of factual and legal support would be to compel it to speculate, and the
outcome would not do justice to those for whose supposed benefit the claim of denial of equal protection
has been made.
The argument that the release of funds under the DAP effectively stayed the hands of the legislators from
conducting congressional inquiries into the legality and propriety of the DAP is speculative. That deficiency
eliminated any need to consider and resolve the argument, for it is fundamental that speculation would not
support any proper judicial determination of an issue simply because nothing concrete can thereby be
gained. In order to sustain their constitutional challenges against official acts of the Government, the
petitioners must discharge the basic burden of proving that the constitutional infirmities actually
existed.205 Simply put, guesswork and speculation cannot overcome the presumption of the
constitutionality of the assailed executive act.
We do not need to discuss whether or not the DAP and its implementation through the various circulars
and memoranda of the DBM transgressed the system of checks and balances in place in our constitutional
system. Our earlier expositions on the DAP and its implementing issuances infringing the doctrine of
separation of powers effectively addressed this particular concern.
Anent the principle of public accountability being transgressed because the adoption and implementation
of the DAP constituted an assumption by the Executive of Congress power of appropriation, we have
already held that the DAP and its implementing issuances were policies and acts that the Executive could
properly adopt and do in the execution of the GAAs to the extent that they sought to implement strategies
to ramp up or accelerate the economy of the country.
6.
Doctrine of operative fact was applicable
After declaring the DAP and its implementing issuances constitutionally infirm, we must now deal with the
consequences of the declaration.
Article 7 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be
excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the
latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to
the laws or the Constitution.
A legislative or executive act that is declared void for being unconstitutional cannot give rise to any right
or obligation.206 However, the generality of the rule makes us ponder whether rigidly applying the rule
may at times be impracticable or wasteful. Should we not recognize the need to except from the rigid
application of the rule the instances in which the void law or executive act produced an almost irreversible
result?
The need is answered by the doctrine of operative fact. The doctrine, definitely not a novel one, has been
exhaustively explained in De Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank:207
The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for that matter an
executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any
legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental
law once judicially declared results in its being to all intents and purposes a mere scrap of paper. As the
new Civil Code puts it: When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former
shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be
valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution. It is understandable why it should be
so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms
cannot survive.
Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may not however be sufficiently
realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or
executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in
an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted
under it and may have changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent
litigation regard be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and
presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its
existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the
judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive

measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that
may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then,
if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to particular
relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official."
The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the
determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that cannot
always be erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its
effects. It provides an exception to the general rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no
effect.208 But its use must be subjected to great scrutiny and circumspection, and it cannot be invoked to
validate an unconstitutional law or executive act, but is resorted to only as a matter of equity and fair
play.209 It applies only to cases where extraordinary circumstances exist, and only when the extraordinary
circumstances have met the stringent conditions that will permit its application.
We find the doctrine of operative fact applicable to the adoption and implementation of the DAP. Its
application to the DAP proceeds from equity and fair play. The consequences resulting from the DAP and its
related issuances could not be ignored or could no longer be undone.
To be clear, the doctrine of operative fact extends to a void or unconstitutional executive act. The term
executive act is broad enough to include any and all acts of the Executive, including those that are quasi
legislative and quasi-judicial in nature. The Court held so in Hacienda Luisita, Inc. v. Presidential Agrarian
Reform Council:210
Nonetheless, the minority is of the persistent view that the applicability of the operative fact doctrine
should be limited to statutes and rules and regulations issued by the executive department that are
accorded the same status as that of a statute or those which are quasi-legislative in nature. Thus, the
minority concludes that the phrase executive act used in the case of De Agbayani v. Philippine National
Bank refers only to acts, orders, and rules and regulations that have the force and effect of law. The
minority also made mention of the Concurring Opinion of Justice Enrique Fernando in Municipality of
Malabang v. Benito, where it was supposedly made explicit that the operative fact doctrine applies to
executive acts, which are ultimately quasi-legislative in nature.
We disagree. For one, neither the De Agbayani case nor the Municipality of Malabang case elaborates what
executive act mean. Moreover, while orders, rules and regulations issued by the President or the
executive branch have fixed definitions and meaning in the Administrative Code and jurisprudence, the
phrase executive act does not have such specific definition under existing laws. It should be noted that in
the cases cited by the minority, nowhere can it be found that the term executive act is confined to the
foregoing. Contrarily, the term executive act is broad enough to encompass decisions of administrative
bodies and agencies under the executive department which are subsequently revoked by the agency in
question or nullified by the Court.
A case in point is the concurrent appointment of Magdangal B. Elma (Elma) as Chairman of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC) which was
declared unconstitutional by this Court in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma. In said case, this Court ruled
that the concurrent appointment of Elma to these offices is in violation of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of
the 1987 Constitution, since these are incompatible offices. Notably, the appointment of Elma as Chairman
of the PCGG and as CPLC is, without a question, an executive act. Prior to the declaration of
unconstitutionality of the said executive act, certain acts or transactions were made in good faith and in
reliance of the appointment of Elma which cannot just be set aside or invalidated by its subsequent
invalidation.
In Tan v. Barrios, this Court, in applying the operative fact doctrine, held that despite the invalidity of the
jurisdiction of the military courts over civilians, certain operative facts must be acknowledged to have
existed so as not to trample upon the rights of the accused therein. Relevant thereto, in Olaguer v. Military
Commission No. 34, it was ruled that military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department of the
Government and are simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by the legislature for the
President as Commander-in-Chief to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing
discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military representatives.
Evidently, the operative fact doctrine is not confined to statutes and rules and regulations issued by the
executive department that are accorded the same status as that of a statute or those which are quasilegislative in nature.
Even assuming that De Agbayani initially applied the operative fact doctrine only to executive issuances
like orders and rules and regulations, said principle can nonetheless be applied, by analogy, to decisions
made by the President or the agencies under the executive department. This doctrine, in the interest of
justice and equity, can be applied liberally and in a broad sense to encompass said decisions of the
executive branch. In keeping with the demands of equity, the Court can apply the operative fact doctrine
to acts and consequences that resulted from the reliance not only on a law or executive act which is quasilegislative in nature but also on decisions or orders of the executive branch which were later nullified. This
Court is not unmindful that such acts and consequences must be recognized in the higher interest of
justice, equity and fairness.
Significantly, a decision made by the President or the administrative agencies has to be complied with
because it has the force and effect of law, springing from the powers of the President under the
Constitution and existing laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decision, it may have produced acts

and consequences in conformity to and in reliance of said decision, which must be respected. It is on this
score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the
implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. (Bold underscoring supplied for
emphasis)
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation,211 the Court likewise declared that
"for the operative fact doctrine to apply, there must be a legislative or executive measure, meaning a law
or executive issuance." Thus, the Court opined there that the operative fact doctrine did not apply to a
mere administrative practice of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, viz:
Under Section 246, taxpayers may rely upon a rule or ruling issued by the Commissioner from the time the
rule or ruling is issued up to its reversal by the Commissioner or this Court. The reversal is not given
retroactive effect. This, in essence, is the doctrine of operative fact. There must, however, be a rule or
ruling issued by the Commissioner that is relied upon by the taxpayer in good faith. A mere administrative
practice, not formalized into a rule or ruling, will not suffice because such a mere administrative practice
may not be uniformly and consistently applied. An administrative practice, if not formalized as a rule or
ruling, will not be known to the general public and can be availed of only by those with informal contacts
with the government agency.
It is clear from the foregoing that the adoption and the implementation of the DAP and its related
issuances were executive acts.1avvphi1 The DAP itself, as a policy, transcended a merely administrative
practice especially after the Executive, through the DBM, implemented it by issuing various memoranda
and circulars. The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP from the allotments made available to the
different agencies and departments was consistently applied throughout the entire Executive. With the
Executive, through the DBM, being in charge of the third phase of the budget cycle the budget execution
phase, the President could legitimately adopt a policy like the DAP by virtue of his primary responsibility as
the Chief Executive of directing the national economy towards growth and development. This is simply
because savings could and should be determined only during the budget execution phase.
As already mentioned, the implementation of the DAP resulted into the use of savings pooled by the
Executive to finance the PAPs that were not covered in the GAA, or that did not have proper appropriation
covers, as well as to augment items pertaining to other departments of the Government in clear violation
of the Constitution. To declare the implementation of the DAP unconstitutional without recognizing that its
prior implementation constituted an operative fact that produced consequences in the real as well as
juristic worlds of the Government and the Nation is to be impractical and unfair. Unless the doctrine is held
to apply, the Executive as the disburser and the offices under it and elsewhere as the recipients could be
required to undo everything that they had implemented in good faith under the DAP. That scenario would
be enormously burdensome for the Government. Equity alleviates such burden.
The other side of the coin is that it has been adequately shown as to be beyond debate that the
implementation of the DAP yielded undeniably positive results that enhanced the economic welfare of the
country. To count the positive results may be impossible, but the visible ones, like public infrastructure,
could easily include roads, bridges, homes for the homeless, hospitals, classrooms and the like. Not to
apply the doctrine of operative fact to the DAP could literally cause the physical undoing of such worthy
results by destruction, and would result in most undesirable wastefulness.
Nonetheless, as Justice Brion has pointed out during the deliberations, the doctrine of operative fact does
not always apply, and is not always the consequence of every declaration of constitutional invalidity. It can
be invoked only in situations where the nullification of the effects of what used to be a valid law would
result in inequity and injustice;212 but where no such result would ensue, the general rule that an
unconstitutional law is totally ineffective should apply.
In that context, as Justice Brion has clarified, the doctrine of operative fact can apply only to the PAPs that
can no longer be undone, and whose beneficiaries relied in good faith on the validity of the DAP, but
cannot apply to the authors, proponents and implementors of the DAP, unless there are concrete findings
of good faith in their favor by the proper tribunals determining their criminal, civil, administrative and other
liabilities.
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petitions for certiorari and prohibition; and DECLARES the
following acts and practices under the Disbursement Acceleration Program, National Budget Circular No.
541 and related executive issuances UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being in violation of Section 25(5), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers, namely:
(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the declaration of the
withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal
year and without complying with the statutory definition of savings contained in the General
Appropriations Acts;
(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the appropriations of other
offices outside the Executive; and
(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not covered by any appropriation in the
General Appropriations Act.
The Court further DECLARES VOID the use of unprogrammed funds despite the absence of a certification
by the National Treasurer that the revenue collections exceeded the revenue targets for non-compliance
with the conditions provided in the relevant General Appropriations Acts.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 204819

April 8, 2014
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor
children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD
DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and
HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government,
Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204934
ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its
President, Maria Concepcion S. Noche, Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro, Jose S.
Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr.
& Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho &
Traquilina Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne C. Tansingco for themselves and
on behalf of their minor children, Therese Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco,
Miguel F emando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco,
Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for themselves and on behalf of their minor
children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor &
Mildred C. Castor for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor,
Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphael C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho &
Zara Z. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Margarita Racho, Mikaela
Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Francine V.
Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Michael Racho, Mariana Racho,
Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A.
Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor child Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on
behalf of her minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M.
Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws & Katrina R. Laws, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture
and Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and
Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management,
HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and NEDA Director-General,
THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its Chairperson, Remedios lgnacioRikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, represented by its President
Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its
President Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its
President Oscar Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by its President Donato Marcos, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204957
TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S. AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204988
SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D., as
President and in his personal capacity, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr.
Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of the school board and in his personal capacity,
ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP. NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G.
NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUELA.
ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205003
EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT,

HON. SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL,

Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205043
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM SECRETARY
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, DILG SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205138
PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its National
President, Atty. Ricardo M . Ribo, and in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B.
Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan,
Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno
and Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS
II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, HON. CORAZON J. SOLIMAN,
Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON. ARSENIO BALISACAN,
Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority, HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO,
Director-General, Food and Drugs Administration, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Philippine
Health Insurance Corporation, and THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission on
Women, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205478
REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND
JOSEPHINE MILLADO-LUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors For Life, and ANTHONY
PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G. MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE
NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY LIACCO collectively known as Filipinos For Life,
Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department
of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the Department of Education; and HON.
MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government,
Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205491
SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for themselves,
their Posterity, and the rest of Filipino posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondent.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205720
PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as Executive
Director, and in her personal capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A.
CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA, CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON
CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L. POLICARPIO III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUEL A.
ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 206355
MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA BORROMEOGARCIA, STELLAACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207111
JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN Q.
VERDEJO, ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.

HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and
HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government,
Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207172
COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO AND
FRANCESCA ISABELLE BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and
DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N. RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and
HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government,
Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207563
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the
Department of Health, and HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department of Budget
and Management, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court
has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest
possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his
beliefs , and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the
common good."1
To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a developed country,
leaving our people beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy and unemployment. While governmental
policies have been geared towards the revitalization of the economy, the bludgeoning dearth in social
services remains to be a problem that concerns not only the poor, but every member of society. The
government continues to tread on a trying path to the realization of its very purpose, that is, the general
welfare of the Filipino people and the development of the country as a whole. The legislative branch, as the
main facet of a representative government, endeavors to enact laws and policies that aim to remedy
looming societal woes, while the executive is closed set to fully implement these measures and bring
concrete and substantial solutions within the reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is the judicial
branch, oftentimes regarded as an inert governmental body that merely casts its watchful eyes on clashing
stakeholders until it is called upon to adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive when called into action, the
Judiciary then willingly embarks on its solemn duty to interpret legislation vis-a-vis the most vital and
enduring principle that holds Philippine society together - the supremacy of the Philippine Constitution.
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control,
abortion and contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects
and their perceived consequences freely circulate in various media. From television debates2 to sticker
campaigns,3 from rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the
clergy4 - the clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and
progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold
support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood
and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of
society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down
constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the
Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions- inintervention, to wit:
(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C.
Imbong, in their personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor
children; and the Magnificat Child Leaming Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-owned educational institution
(Jmbong);
(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its
president, Atty. Maria Concepcion S. Noche7 and several others8 in their personal capacities as citizens
and on behalf of the generations unborn (ALFI);
(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in
their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);
(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc.,11 Rosevale
Foundation, Inc.,12 a domestic, privately-owned educational institution, and several others,13 in their
capacities as citizens (Serve Life);
(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);

(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic Xybrspace
Apostolate of the Philippines,16 in their capacities as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);
(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians Inc.,18 and
several others19 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (PAX);
(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others,21 in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers (Echavez);
(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C. Tatad and Atty.
Alan F. Paguia, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F.
Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity as a member of the Bar (Tatad);
(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation Inc.24 and several
others,25 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of its associates who are members of
the Bar (Pro-Life);
(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita
Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers
and members of the Bar (MSF);
(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and several others,29 in their
capacities as citizens (Juat) ;
(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and several
others,31 in their capacities as citizens (CFC);
(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their capacities
as citizens and taxpayers (Tillah); and
(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen and a
taxpayer (Alcantara); and
(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited political party.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law
on the following GROUNDS:
The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its
declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of
hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section
12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of
the unborn from conception.35
The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The
petitioners posit that the RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's
health, as it causes cancer and other health problems.36
The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the
constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of
contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to
their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom.37
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution,
imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who
seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct
information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs and
convictions.38
In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-IRR),39
provides that skilled health professionals who are public officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial, City,
or Municipal Health Officers, medical officers, medical specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff
nurses, public health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are specifically charged with the duty to
implement these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.40
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools
should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.41
While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that
the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to
justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.42
The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners,
the RH Law subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the
PhilHealth program, they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent
women, under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment.43
The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner
would effectively be forced to render reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation
would mean that the majority of the public would no longer be able to avail of the practitioners services.44
The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law discriminates
against the poor as it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes
contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor,
the RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor.45
The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. In imposing
the penalty of imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague because it does not define the type
of conduct to be treated as "violation" of the RH Law.46
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by removing
from them (the people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they

shall be and what kind of services they shall offer."47 It ignores the management prerogative inherent in
corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their own discretion and judgment.
The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of family
planning methods is plainly to curtail his right to expound only his own preferred way of family planning.
The petitioners note that although exemption is granted to institutions owned and operated by religious
groups, they are still forced to refer their patients to another healthcare facility willing to perform the
service or procedure.48
The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is
contended that the RH Law providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon their
constitutional right to raise their children in accordance with their beliefs.49
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive health
procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses
to mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-being of their family. In the same breath, it is
also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of parental authority
to determine whether their child should use contraceptives.50
The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority. The petitioners
question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product is nonabortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List (EDL).51
The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the
Constitution.52
The RH Law violates Natural Law.53
The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health
measures at the local government level and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and
the ARMM under the Local Government Code and R.A . No. 9054.54
Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-in-intervention in
defense of the constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which
commented on the petitions in behalf of the respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C. Lagman,56 former
officials of the Department of Health Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G.
Romualdez,57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for Reproductive Health (C4RH),58 Ana Theresa "Risa"
Hontiveros,59 and Atty. Joan De Venecia60 also filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention in
conjunction with several others. On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted leave to
intervene.61
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal
of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the
issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to question the RH
Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo
Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one
hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.62
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to determine
and/or identify the pertinent issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which these issues were to
be discussed in the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases
were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered extended until further orders of the
Court.63
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty (60) days and,
at the same time posed several questions for their clarification on some contentions of the parties.64
The Status Quo Ante
(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws
Prior to the RH Law
Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation and distribution
of contraceptive drugs and devices. As far back as June 18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729
entitled "An Act to Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and
Devices." Although contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed, they could not be sold, dispensed or
distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner."65
In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to "dispensing of
abortifacients or anti-conceptional substances and devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided that
"no drug or chemical product or device capable of provoking abortion or preventing conception as
classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall be delivered or sold to any person without a proper
prescription by a duly licensed physician."
On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population, which recognized
that the population problem should be considered as the principal element for long-term economic
development, enacted measures that promoted male vasectomy and tubal ligation to mitigate population
growth.67 Among these measures included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August 16, 1971, entitled "An Act
Establishing a National Policy on Population, Creating the Commission on Population and for Other
Purposes. " The law envisioned that "family planning will be made part of a broad educational program;

safe and effective means will be provided to couples desiring to space or limit family size; mortality and
morbidity rates will be further reduced."
To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential Decree. (P.D.)
No. 79,68 dated December 8, 1972, which, among others, made "family planning a part of a broad
educational program," provided "family planning services as a part of over-all health care," and made
"available all acceptable methods of contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino citizens desirous of
spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods evolved from being a
component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly,
reproductive health.69 Under that policy, the country gave priority to one's right to freely choose the
method of family planning to be adopted, in conformity with its adherence to the commitments made in
the International Conference on Population and Development.70 Thus, on August 14, 2009, the country
enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna Carta for Women, " which, among others, mandated the State to
provide for comprehensive health services and programs for women, including family planning and sex
education.71
The RH Law
Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at an
uncontrollable pace. From a paltry number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the
country reached over 76 million in the year 2000 and over 92 million in 2010.72 The executive and the
legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH Law was
enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and information to the full
range of modem family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples' right
to reproductive health be achieved. To make it more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health
providers to provide information on the full range of modem family planning methods, supplies and
services, and for schools to provide reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law
criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.
Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws
on contraception, women's health and population control.
Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in
particular, argues that the government sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law,
violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect and
promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo ante - the situation prior to the passage of the RH Law must be maintained."73 It explains:
x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As provided under
Republic Act No. 5921 and Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are prohibited
unless dispensed by a prescription duly licensed by a physician. What the Petitioners find deplorable and
repugnant under the RH Law is the role that the State and its agencies - the entire bureaucracy, from the
cabinet secretaries down to the barangay officials in the remotest areas of the country - is made to play in
the implementation of the contraception program to the fullest extent possible using taxpayers' money.
The State then will be the funder and provider of all forms of family planning methods and the
implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of, and universal access to, a full
range of family planning methods, devices and supplies.74
ISSUES
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and
refined them to the following principal issues:
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
1] Power of Judicial Review
2] Actual Case or Controversy
3] Facial Challenge
4] Locus Standi
5] Declaratory Relief
6] One Subject/One Title Rule
II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
1] Right to Life
2] Right to Health
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
4] The Family
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6] Due Process
7] Equal Protection
8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM
DISCUSSION
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the Court to
resolve some procedural impediments.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
The Power of Judicial Review

In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to the
legislative and political wisdom of Congress and respect the compromises made in the crafting of the RH
Law, it being "a product of a majoritarian democratic process"75 and "characterized by an inordinate
amount of transparency."76 The OSG posits that the authority of the Court to review social legislation like
the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests the discretion to implement the
constitutional policies and positive norms with the political departments, in particular, with Congress.77 It
further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council,78 the
remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the
acts of the legislature.79
Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the
assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government has yet to
distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged
"on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure.80
In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and the
Legislature, it is often sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to
the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the
separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government, which obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.81
Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines;82 (b) the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines;83 and (c) the
judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.84 The Constitution has truly blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of powers
among the three branches of government.85
In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which
imposes upon the courts proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the
other branches of government, in striking down the acts of the Executive or the Legislature as
unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and caution.86
It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability, the great
landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated.87 In order to
address this, the Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal
branch done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line
of separation - but only at a very limited and specific point - to determine whether the acts of the
executive and the legislative branches are null because they were undertaken with grave abuse of
discretion.88 Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the
RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.89 The
Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights and principles
embodied in the Constitution.
In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the
Constitution makes no distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it
in the form of social legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back to the earlier point. The
Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive branches, since its
duty is not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in consonance
with their respective authorities and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review,
the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the
actions under review.90 This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly
provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. [Emphases supplied]
As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify,
when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on applied in Macalintal v. COMELEC,92 Aldaba
v. COMELEC,93 Magallona v. Ermita,94 and countless others. In Tanada, the Court wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the
petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary
to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate)
remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the
application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it
becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. [Emphasis supplied]
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is essential
for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the
three great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of
authority and control between them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of
participation - or instrument of intervention - of the judiciary in that balancing operation.95

Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule
on just any and every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power
of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.96
Actual Case or Controversy
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any actual case or controversy
because the RH Law has yet to be implemented.97 They claim that the questions raised by the petitions
are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged with violating any of its
provisions and that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by
its operation.98 In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law is premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion.99 The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly
interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete,
touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must
show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other;
that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be
an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.100
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness.101 A question
is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then
been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the
challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of the act complained of102
In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines,103 where the
constitutionality of an unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was
put in question, it was argued that the Court has no authority to pass upon the issues raised as there was
yet no concrete act performed that could possibly violate the petitioners' and the intervenors' rights. Citing
precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of the law or act in question being not yet effective does not
negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a
singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for
judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect
and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject
petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the
Judiciary to settle the dispute.104
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical
providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof,
particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of
retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that
the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure.105
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is
one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all
other rights in the First Amendment.106 These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the
right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.107
After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but
component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are
externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained,
albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly
penal statues,108 it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also
those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights.109 The underlying reason for this
modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is
mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.110 Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with
its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional
human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been
violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions
and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the
simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive

branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of
the Filipino people.
Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It contends
that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be
enforced and applied against them,111 and the government has yet to distribute reproductive health
devices that are abortive.112
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status
as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act.113 It
requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.114
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the
constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from
challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not
before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.115
Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure,
hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when
the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest."116
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,117 the Court held that in cases of paramount importance
where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit
may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial
review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases,118 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question
the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an indirect and general interest
shared in common with the public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-applied
challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus s tandi requirement. It has
accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest
affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The
rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion,
waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or
legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of
a law or any other government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR:119
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical
defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised
herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the
youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the
well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to
facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
(Emphasis supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench
and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects
the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and
other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and
reproductive health have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court
entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance warranting immediate
court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn
which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the
Constitution are being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child is
at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.
Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over
which the Court has no original jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying for
injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over
which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive
reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.121
One Subject-One Title
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ),
Article VI of the Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one
for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional
standards of due process by concealing its true intent - to act as a population control measure.123

To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control
measure,124 and that the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both
interrelated as they are inseparable.125
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a
population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's
population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes
pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos,
especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the full range of modem family
planning products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or modem, however, are clearly
geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the
country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large
portion of the law, however, covers the dissemination of information and provisions on access to medicallysafe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods,
devices, and supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the
entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH Law.126 Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to
contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses its very foundation.127 As earlier explained, "the
other positive provisions such as skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-natal
services, prevention and management of reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already
provided for in the Magna Carta for Women."128
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v.
The Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of
the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the
minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to
include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are
informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this
Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or
impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health"
and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the
population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons
including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human
development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and
information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that
the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as
to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or
different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or
scope of the act."129
Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears
to the attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its terms, the
Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents
of the assailed legislation.
II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1-The Right to Life
Position of the Petitioners
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the unborn child under
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to abortifacients/abortives
effectively sanctions abortion.130
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law
considers contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb
as an abortifacient; thus, sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after fertilization and prior to
implantation, contrary to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution to afford protection to the fertilized
ovum which already has life.
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal contraceptives,
intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning
products and supplies, medical research shows that contraceptives use results in abortion as they operate
to kill the fertilized ovum which already has life.131
As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that the State
sanction of contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man.132
Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
to certify that the product or supply is not to be used as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively
confirms that abortifacients are not prohibited. Also considering that the FDA is not the agency that will
actually supervise or administer the use of these products and supplies to prospective patients, there is no
way it can truthfully make a certification that it shall not be used for abortifacient purposes.133

Position of the Respondents

For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was
simply the prohibition of abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since
the said law emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive health care services, methods, devices
products and supplies shall be made accessible to the public.134
According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are not
abortifacients by enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law was enacted with due consideration to various
studies and consultations with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other experts in the medical field,
it is asserted that the Court afford deference and respect to such a determination and pass judgment only
when a particular drug or device is later on determined as an abortive.135
For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to life is not
violated considering that various studies of the WHO show that life begins from the implantation of the
fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is constitutional since the law specifically
provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized ovum are
allowed.136
The Court's Position
It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life.137
Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore,
not a creation of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any
authority or the laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not of
recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation,
and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on
contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent fertilization,138 to the promotion of male vasectomy and
tubal ligation,139 and the ratification of numerous international agreements, the country has long
recognized the need to promote population control through the use of contraceptives in order to achieve
long-term economic development. Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and other family
planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one centered on the
promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.140
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health and the
overall promotion of the family's well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The
Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of Women"
were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national population program has
always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-abortion" and the "principle of noncoercion."141 As will be discussed later, these principles are not merely grounded on administrative policy,
but rather, originates from the constitutional protection expressly provided to afford protection to life and
guarantee religious freedom.
When Life Begins*
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a scientific
and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During
the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that the individual members of the Court could express their
own views on this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12
which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn
from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable because
before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is
mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen because,
amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception is
reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of
when life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the
female ovum by the male sperm.142 On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that
conception refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.143
Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in their plain
and ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council:144
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear,
plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much
as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use.

What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the
power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say.
Verba legis non est recedendum - from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because
the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in whose
consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as
described and defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant, formation of a
viable zygote; the fertilization that results in a new entity capable of developing into a being like its
parents.145
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the female
ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of survival and maturation under normal
conditions.146
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing
Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano,147 it was written:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she
could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of
the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn
already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
[Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said that the State
"has respect for human life at all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial interest in
preserving and promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was referred to, or cited, as a
baby or a child.149
Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding the term
"conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to
the moment of "fertilization." The records reflect the following:
Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:
"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of
conception."
When is the moment of conception?
xxx
Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm that
there is human life. x x x.150
xxx
As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human life, it was
explained:
Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question that needs to be
answered is: Is the fertilized ovum alive? Biologically categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive.
First of all, like all living organisms, it takes in nutrients which it processes by itself. It begins doing this
upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it multiplies itself at
a geometric rate in the continuous process of cell division. All these processes are vital signs of life.
Therefore, there is no question that biologically the fertilized ovum has life.
The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the moment of
conception, the nuclei of the ovum and the sperm rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes from the
ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the sperm to form a total of 46 chromosomes. A chromosome
count of 46 is found only - and I repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human.
Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if the fertilized ovum is
both alive and human, then, as night follows day, it must be human life. Its nature is human.151
Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the moment of
fertilization" was not because of doubt when human life begins, but rather, because:
Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described by us here before with the
scientific phrase "fertilized ovum" may be beyond the comprehension of some people; we want to use the
simpler phrase "from the moment of conception."152
Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the Constitution, it was
discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a Constitution,
without specifying "from the moment of conception."
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the Commissioner's own
admission, he would leave it to Congress to define when life begins. So, Congress can define life to begin
from six months after fertilization; and that would really be very, very, dangerous. It is now determined by
science that life begins from the moment of conception. There can be no doubt about it. So we should not
give any doubt to Congress, too.153
Upon further inquiry, it was asked:
Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually, that is one of the
questions I was going to raise during the period of interpellations but it has been expressed already. The
provision, as proposed right now states:

The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of
conception.
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the sperm?
Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.
Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain
contraceptives that we know today are abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of the so-called
contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovum in the uterus. If fertilization has already occurred, the next
process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take root. What happens with some
contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the fertilized ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we
take the provision as it is proposed, these so called contraceptives should be banned.
Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called abortifacient and, therefore,
would be unconstitutional and should be banned under this provision.
Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether or not these certain
contraceptives are abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the provision as it is now proposed, they are
already considered abortifacient.154
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that
the State shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest
opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It
is also apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting
measures that would allow it determine when life begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives
for being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a
constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized that the determination of whether a contraceptive
device is an abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on based on
established evidence.155
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an
abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm
and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed nonabortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.
As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:
xxx
xxx
xxx
Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I would like
not only to protect the life of the unborn, but also the lives of the millions of people in the world by fighting
for a nuclear-free world. I would just like to be assured of the legal and pragmatic implications of the term
"protection of the life of the unborn from the moment of conception." I raised some of these implications
this afternoon when I interjected in the interpellation of Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask that
question again for a categorical answer.
I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of conception" we
are also actually saying "no," not "maybe," to certain contraceptives which are already being encouraged
at this point in time. Is that the sense of the committee or does it disagree with me?
Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is no unborn yet.
That is yet unshaped.
Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives, such as the
intra-uterine device which actually stops the egg which has already been fertilized from taking route to the
uterus. So if we say "from the moment of conception," what really occurs is that some of these
contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized.
Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.
Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156
The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by petitioners
during the oral arguments. There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even condoms are not
classified as abortifacients.157
Atty. Noche:
Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.
Justice Bersamin:
There is no life.
Atty. Noche:
So, there is no life to be protected.
Justice Bersamin:
To be protected.
Atty. Noche:
Under Section 12, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
So you have no objection to condoms?
Atty. Noche:
Not under Section 12, Article II.
Justice Bersamin:
Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?
Atty. Noche:
Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I am discussing here
Section 12, Article II, Your Honor, yes.

Justice Bersamin:
Alright.
Atty. Noche:
And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor.158
Medical Meaning
That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and
Allied Health Dictionary defines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant
a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable zygote."159
It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which the
embryo develops."160
The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics),161 used by medical schools in the
Philippines, also concludes that human life (human person) begins at the moment of fertilization with the
union of the egg and the sperm resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic
composition that dictates all developmental stages that ensue.
Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development begins after the
union of male and female gametes or germ cells during a process known as fertilization (conception).
Fertilization is a sequence of events that begins with the contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a
secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the sperm and
ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to form a new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote,
is a large diploid cell that is the beginning, or primordium, of a human being."162
The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the same position. They wrote: "Although life is
a continuous process, fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new,
genetically distinct human organism is thereby formed.... The combination of 23 chromosomes present in
each pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the diploid number is restored and the
embryonic genome is formed. The embryo now exists as a genetic unity."
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on the Reproductive
Health Bill (Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:
CONCLUSION
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA maintains its strong
position that fertilization is sacred because it is at this stage that conception, and thus human life, begins.
Human lives are sacred from the moment of conception, and that destroying those new lives is never licit,
no matter what the purported good outcome would be. In terms of biology and human embryology, a
human being begins immediately at fertilization and after that, there is no point along the continuous line
of human embryogenesis where only a "potential" human being can be posited. Any philosophical, legal, or
political conclusion cannot escape this objective scientific fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a
new human being commences at a scientifically well defined "moment of conception." This conclusion is
objective, consistent with the factual evidence, and independent of any specific ethical, moral, political, or
religious view of human life or of human embryos.164
Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from
Fertilization
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more
importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a
zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically welldefined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life
begins at implantation.165 According to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive
stages in the reproductive process. They are not identical and synonymous."166 Citing a letter of the WHO,
he wrote that "medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the
commencement of conception and it is only after implantation that pregnancy can be medically
detected."167
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not
pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an
inanimate object - it is a living human being complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes.168 Implantation
has been conceptualized only for convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it
would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution.
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.
If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or device that
would prevent the implantation of the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be provocative and further
aggravate religious-based divisiveness.
It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.
The RH Law and Abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the
unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was
so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the Framers was captured in the
record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, the
principal proponent of the protection of the unborn from conception, explained:
The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by Congress or any
pro-abortion decision passed by the Supreme Court.169

A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While
the Court has opted not to make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law
itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization. As pointed out by
Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with provisions that embody the policy of the law to protect to the
fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to the uterus for implantation.170
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code,
which penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus:
1] xx x.
Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
xxx.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services and supplies
that contribute to reproductive health and well-being by addressing reproductive health-related problems.
It also includes sexual health, the purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal relations. The
elements of reproductive health care include the following:
xxx.
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;
xxx.
2] xx x.
Section 4. x x x.
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and
responsibly whether or not to have children; the number, spacing and timing of their children; to make
other decisions concerning reproduction, free of discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the
information and means to do so; and to attain the highest standard of sexual health and reproductive
health: Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do not include abortion, and access to
abortifacients.
3] xx x.
SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law, presidential decree or
issuance, executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or is
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act including Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise known as the
Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.
The RH Law and Abortifacients
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear,
Section 4(a) of the RH Law defines an abortifacient as:
Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb
upon determination of the FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of fertilization.
By using the word " or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation, but also
those that induce abortion and those that induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb.
Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or device that either:
(a) Induces abortion; or
(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, upon determination of
the FDA.
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the
Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounden duty to
protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that
induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the
killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted
in the mother's womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at all that life
only begins only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not declare either that protection
will only be given upon implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest. Rather, it recognizes that: one,
there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum must be
protected the moment it becomes existent - all the way until it reaches and implants in the mother's
womb. After all, if life is only recognized and afforded protection from the moment the fertilized ovum
implants - there is nothing to prevent any drug or device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior
to implantation.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH
Law does not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at fertilization, not at
implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall , its viability is sustained but that
instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It started earlier. And as defined by the RH
Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or
prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, is an abortifacient.
Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any product or
supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and
supply is made available on the condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient" as empty as it is

absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or device will not all be used as an
abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every instance when the contraceptive product or
supply will be used.171
Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient contraceptives,
however, the Court finds that the proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend to the legislative intent and
mean that "any product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the
FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it cannot be used as
abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with the proviso under the second paragraph of the same
section that provides:
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means emergency
contraceptive pills, postcoital pills, abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their other forms
or equivalent.
Abortifacients under the RH-IRR
At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their office when
they redefined the meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as follows:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb
upon determination of the FDA.
Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:
Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb upon determination of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]
Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family planning
method, device, or health product, whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not
primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother's
womb in doses of its approved indication as determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient" only
those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb.172
This cannot be done.
In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they pointed out,
with the insertion of the word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR173 must be struck down for
being ultra vires.
Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra
vires. It contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger
that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which
may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12
of the Constitution. With such qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will
only be considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the
prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum.
For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of contraceptives which
are actually abortifacients because of their fail-safe mechanism.174
Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these contraceptives cannot
act as abortive. With this, together with the definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law
and its declared policy against abortion, the undeniable conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in
the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those contraceptives that do not have the primary action of
causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, but also those that do not have the secondary
action of acting the same way.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that
laws should be construed in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its
implementing rules must be consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word " primarily"
in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the validity of Section 3.0l(a) and
G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that have the primary effect of being an abortive
would effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the
life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution."175
To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the constitutional
protection of life must be upheld.
2-The Right to Health
The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the inclusion of
hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and supplies in the National
Drug Formulary and the inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies
of all national hospitals.176 Citing various studies on the matter, the petitioners posit that the risk of
developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly increased in women who use oral contraceptives as
compared to women who never use them. They point out that the risk is decreased when the use of
contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is contended that the use of combined oral contraceptive pills is
associated with a threefold increased risk of venous thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of

ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial infarction.177 Given the definition of
"reproductive health" and "sexual health" under Sections 4(p)178 and (w)179 of the RH Law, the
petitioners assert that the assailed legislation only seeks to ensure that women have pleasurable and
satisfying sex lives.180
The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory, it being a
mere statement of the administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits
that medical authorities refute the claim that contraceptive pose a danger to the health of women.181
The Court's Position
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is
replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the
Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of the people,
viz:
HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which
shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at
affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women,
and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and
undertake appropriate health, manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's health
needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, selfdevelopment, and self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardous
products.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions
clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory. There
is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions.182 In Manila Prince Hotel v.
GSIS,183 it was stated:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would
have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that
... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing. . . .
Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered selfexecuting, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they
shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could
make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. (Emphases
supplied)
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question
contraception and contraceptives per se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921
and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when they are dispensed
by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician - be maintained.185
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A.
No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in
to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity
of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution
and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the prescription of a licensed
physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only
contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public. As aptly explained by respondent Lagman:
D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription
108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed and used
without prescription.
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice of
Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines and for Other Purposes"
are not repealed by the RH Law and the provisions of said Acts are not inconsistent with the RH Law.
110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices are
particularly governed by RA No. 4729 which provides in full:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise
distribute whether for or without consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless such sale,
dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:

"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used exclusively for the
purpose of preventing fertilization of the female ovum: and
"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced into the female
reproductive system for the primary purpose of preventing conception.
"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be punished with a
fine of not more than five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six months or more than one
year or both in the discretion of the Court.
"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
"Approved: June 18, 1966"
111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:
"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug
of whatever nature and kind or device shall be compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise be
made available to the consuming public except through a prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy,
duly established in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other relevant statutes, the
pretension of the petitioners that the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives,
whether harmful or not, is completely unwarranted and baseless.186 [Emphases in the Original.
Underlining supplied.]
In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:
The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which provides:
SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure, distribute to
LGUs and monitor the usage of family planning supplies for the whole country. The DOH shall coordinate
with all appropriate local government bodies to plan and implement this procurement and distribution
program. The supply and budget allotments shall be based on, among others, the current levels and
projections of the following:
(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their children;
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and
(c) Cost of family planning supplies.
Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring program consistent
with the overall provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of
R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a
duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of these
contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The
distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be indiscriminately done. The public health must
be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden
are assumed by the government in supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held
accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use.187
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA
pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are
declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines available to the
public are safe for public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack on the
RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up
to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as the case presents itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives
and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their
inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as
operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress,
has the expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe
and non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or
removal of a particular family planning supply from the EDL supports this construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products
and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a
determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning
products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives
are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific examination.
3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech
Position of the Petitioners:
1. On Contraception
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by the
constitutional proscription, there are those who, because of their religious education and background,
sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of these are medical
practitioners who essentially claim that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of contraceptives but also the
willing participation and cooperation in all things dealing with contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX explained
that "contraception is gravely opposed to marital chastity, it is contrary to the good of the transmission of
life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of the spouses; it harms true love and denies the sovereign rule of
God in the transmission of Human life."188

The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the expenditure
of their taxes on contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedom since contraceptives
contravene their religious beliefs.189
2. On Religious Accommodation and
The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious sentiments by
making provisions for a conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated
because the law also imposes upon the conscientious objector the duty to refer the patient seeking
reproductive health services to another medical practitioner who would be able to provide for the patient's
needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring the conscientious objector to cooperate with the very
thing he refuses to do without violating his/her religious beliefs.190
They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the recognition is
unduly limited, because although it allows a conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer
a patient seeking reproductive health services and information - no escape is afforded the conscientious
objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a patient seeking reproductive health procedures. They
claim that the right of other individuals to conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in public health
facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public officers involved in the implementation of the law referred to in
Section 23(b ); and c) teachers in public schools referred to in Section 14 of the RH Law, are also not
recognize.191
Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the requirement to refer
the matter to another health care service provider is still considered a compulsion on those objecting
healthcare service providers. They add that compelling them to do the act against their will violates the
Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of the law are too secular that they tend to
disregard the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use of contraceptives with abortive effects, mandatory
sex education, mandatory pro-bono reproductive health services to indigents encroach upon the religious
freedom of those upon whom they are required.192
Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the person seeking
reproductive health care services to another provider infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces the
objector to become an unwilling participant in the commission of a serious sin under Catholic teachings.
While the right to act on one's belief may be regulated by the State, the acts prohibited by the RH Law are
passive acts which produce neither harm nor injury to the public.193
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify regulation of
religious freedom because it mentions no emergency, risk or threat that endangers state interests. It does
not explain how the rights of the people (to equality, non-discrimination of rights, sustainable human
development, health, education, information, choice and to make decisions according to religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of responsible parenthood) are being threatened or
are not being met as to justify the impairment of religious freedom.194
Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to attend family
planning and responsible parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of compliance. They claim that
the provision forces individuals to participate in the implementation of the RH Law even if it contravenes
their religious beliefs.195 As the assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of fine and/or imprisonment in
case of non-compliance with its provisions, the petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to provide,
support and facilitate access and information to contraception against their beliefs must be struck down as
it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
The Respondents' Positions
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a specific mode or
type of contraceptives be used, be it natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any religion or
belief.196 They point out that the RH Law only seeks to serve the public interest by providing accessible,
effective and quality reproductive health services to ensure maternal and child health, in line with the
State's duty to bring to reality the social justice health guarantees of the Constitution,197 and that what
the law only prohibits are those acts or practices, which deprive others of their right to reproductive
health.198 They assert that the assailed law only seeks to guarantee informed choice, which is an
assurance that no one will be compelled to violate his religion against his free will.199
The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be allowed, the petitioners
are effectively going against the constitutional right to religious freedom, the same right they invoked to
assail the constitutionality of the RH Law.200 In other words, by seeking the declaration that the RH Law is
unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that the Court recognize only the Catholic Church's sanctioned
natural family planning methods and impose this on the entire citizenry.201
With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom, it being a carefully balanced compromise between the interests of the
religious objector, on one hand, who is allowed to keep silent but is required to refer -and that of the citizen
who needs access to information and who has the right to expect that the health care professional in front
of her will act professionally. For the respondents, the concession given by the State under Section 7 and
23(a)(3) is sufficient accommodation to the right to freely exercise one's religion without unnecessarily
infringing on the rights of others.202
Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited in
duration, location and impact.203
Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the respondents claim that it is a
reasonable regulation providing an opportunity for would-be couples to have access to information
regarding parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is argued that those who

object to any information received on account of their attendance in the required seminars are not
compelled to accept information given to them. They are completely free to reject any information they do
not agree with and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without intervention of the
State.204
For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family planning is the only
method acceptable to Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys on the
matter, they highlight the changing stand of the Catholic Church on contraception throughout the years
and note the general acceptance of the benefits of contraceptives by its followers in planning their
families.
The Church and The State
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of
diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our government,
in law and in practice, has allowed these various religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a
single society together. It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards all - the religious people of
different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in a deity,
whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for guidance and enlightenment in crafting our
fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present Constitution reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane
society, and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common
good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of
independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality,
and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their spirituality innate in our nature
and consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the
preamble, it means that the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into
the mind the purest principles of morality.205 Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of religion to
society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain benevolent and accommodating provisions towards
religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary of religious officers in government institutions,
and optional religious instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not encroach into
the affairs of the church, and vice-versa. The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus,
enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect.1wphi1 Generally, the
State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or
dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand, the
church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot
demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the
Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to a
temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious
organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect the State
from the pursuit of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article III,
Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:
Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.
Section 29.
xxx.
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for
the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion,
or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government
orphanage or leprosarium.
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any
religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups."206
Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources for the support
or prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human
conscience.207 Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly
interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and faith.208 Explaining the concept of religious
freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union209 wrote:
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the
modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the
practice of any form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the free
exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the

religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience,
to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he
ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. Any legislation whose effect
or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the
religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. (Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates conduct by enacting, within
its power, a general law which has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the
statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its
purpose without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144;
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes. They have
a single goal-to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free
exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and
practice, while the establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards
for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny
government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and
practices.210
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee of religious
freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first
part is absolute. As explained in Gerona v. Secretary of Education:211
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is
the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most
anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when
weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief and the
exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel.212
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed
only with proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief is translated into
external acts that affect the public welfare."213
Legislative Acts and the
Free Exercise Clause
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine
of benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor)214
where it was stated "that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the
spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution."215 In the same case, it was further
explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions,
accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of religion, but
to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. "The purpose of
accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's
religion."216 "What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality
of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its 'burdensome effect,' whether by the
legislature or the courts."217
In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is
proper.218 Underlying the compelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental
right and that laws burdening it should be subject to strict scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it was written:
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the first case on
the Free Exercise Clause, American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and present danger" test
but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in subsequent cases on religious liberty.
The Gerona case then pronounced that the test of permissibility of religious freedom is whether it violates
the established institutions of society and law. The Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave
danger" test as well as the doctrine that a law of general applicability may burden religious exercise
provided the law is the least restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the law. The case also used, albeit
inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano , German went back to the Gerona
rule. Ebralinag then employed the "grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the Gerona test. The
fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and present danger" test in the maiden case
of A merican Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which employed the "clear and present danger"
or "grave and immediate danger" test involved, in one form or another, religious speech as this test is
often used in cases on freedom of expression. On the other hand, the Gerona and German cases set the
rule that religious freedom will not prevail over established institutions of society and law. Gerona,
however, which was the authority cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag which employed the
"grave and immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the only case that employed the "compelling state
interest" test, but as explained previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to the facts of the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo
where the "clear and present danger" and "grave and immediate danger" tests were appropriate as speech
has easily discernible or immediate effects. The Gerona and German doctrine, aside from having been
overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent neutrality approach, thus not appropriate in this
jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case involves purely conduct arising from religious belief. The
"compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct
has different effects on the state's interests: some effects may be immediate and short-term while others

delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a substantive
evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the state would
suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred
position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the words of
Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher
sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of limited government is premised upon an acknowledgment of
such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build a just and
humane society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests which balances a right
with just a colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of the
state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to carry a heavy
burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state to batter religion, especially the less
powerful ones until they are destroyed. In determining which shall prevail between the state's interest and
religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The "compelling state interest" serves the purpose of
revering religious liberty while at the same time affording protection to the paramount interests of the
state. This was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the
end, the "compelling state interest" test, by upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks to
protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in the original.
Underlining supplied.]
The Court's Position
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of
contraceptives or one's participation in the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from
a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or belief. For the
Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law,
custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of
the civil courts."220 The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever
pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be understood only in this realm where it has
authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as
vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the
guarantee of religious freedom.
At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs and
convictions. It is replete with assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the tenets of his religion
or defy his religious convictions against his free will. Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious freedom
are the following:
1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality
and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health
which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and
make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and
the demands of responsible parenthood. [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family which
in turn is the foundation of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:
(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands
of responsible parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family
planning, including effective natural and modern methods which have been proven medically safe, legal,
non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research
standards such as those registered and approved by the FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified
through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying marginalization: Provided, That the
State shall also provide funding support to promote modern natural methods of family planning, especially
the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and their religious convictions.
[Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]
4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number of
children they desire with due consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources
available and affordable to them and in accordance with existing laws, public morals and their religious
convictions. [Section 3CDJ
5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that are in
accordance with their religious convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's
obligations under various human rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and people's organizations, civil
society, faith-based organizations, the religious sector and communities is crucial to ensure that
reproductive health and population and development policies, plans, and programs will address the priority
needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]
7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and aspirations
of the family and children. It is likewise a shared responsibility between parents to determine and achieve
the desired number of children, spacing and timing of their children according to their own family life
aspirations, taking into account psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and economic
concerns consistent with their religious convictions. [Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some
medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the
principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.

The Establishment Clause

and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it
also limits what religious sects can or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the
government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the
government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a
particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its
population control program through the RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is
contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular
objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his
taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between Church and State
demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are
God's.221
The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly respects diverse
religious beliefs in line with the Non-Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with
respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said provisions commonly mandate that a hospital or a
medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to
another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical
beliefs.
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation or
practice, the compelling state interest test in line with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent
Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case, the conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom
would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in
demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an important secular objective.
Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than
strict scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has
been burdened. As in Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious
objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to the law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs,
while the other entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an
illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose religious beliefs are incongruent with what
the RH Law promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and
conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient
seeking information on modem reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his
conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As
Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis of the free exercise
clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.222
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise
because it makes pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally
repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may
not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech, it
being an externalization of one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent. With
the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection that should be afforded to
individuals in communicating their beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being silent. The
Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter
what is not in his mind.223 While the RH Law seeks to provide freedom of choice through informed
consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and prohibits any degree of
compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion.224
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the
interest of the State, on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive health products,
services, procedures and methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number and spacing of
the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers,
whether public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be
exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his
religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the
constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the case of
Doogan and Wood v. NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board,225 that the midwives claiming to be
conscientious objectors under the provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act of 1967, could not be required to
delegate, supervise or support staff on their labor ward who were involved in abortions.226 The Inner
House stated "that if 'participation' were defined according to whether the person was taking part 'directly'
or ' indirectly' this would actually mean more complexity and uncertainty."227
While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same - they could not
be forced to assist abortions if it would be against their conscience or will.
Institutional Health Providers

The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated
by a religious group and health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes
such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section
23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down for being violative of the freedom of religion. The
same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24, considering that in the dissemination
of information regarding programs and services and in the performance of reproductive health procedures,
the religious freedom of health care service providers should be respected.
In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary228 it was
stressed:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court
has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest
possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs,
and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common
good."10
The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure compliance.
Without set consequences for either an active violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless and
ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an effective implementation of a law is a
constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a
healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to another, or who declines to
perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear
inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)
The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:
Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of
hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically
charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered
as conscientious objectors.
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection clause
should be equally protective of the religious belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible
distinction why they should not be considered exempt from the mandates of the law. The protection
accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical practitioners without
distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. After all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic
in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not taken off even if one
acquires employment in the government.
It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of human
values. The mind must be free to think what it wills, whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give
expression to its beliefs by oral discourse or through the media and, thus, seek other candid views in
occasions or gatherings or in more permanent aggrupation. Embraced in such concept then are freedom of
religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and petition, and freedom of association.229
The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH Law itself but
also because it is violative of the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman,
if there is any conflict between the RH-IRR and the RH Law, the law must prevail.
Justice Mendoza:
I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page 52, you mentioned RH Law
is replete with provisions in upholding the freedom of religion and respecting religious convictions. Earlier,
you affirmed this with qualifications. Now, you have read, I presumed you have read the IRR-Implementing
Rules and Regulations of the RH Bill?
Congressman Lagman:
Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not thoroughly dissected the
nuances of the provisions.
Justice Mendoza:
I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But in the IRR it says:
" .... skilled health professionals such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head
nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the
duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious
objectors." Do you agree with this?
Congressman Lagman:
I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.
Justice Mendoza:
In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can be conscientious
objectors, skilled health professionals cannot be considered conscientious objectors. Do you agree with
this? Is this not against the constitutional right to the religious belief?
Congressman Lagman:
Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must prevail.230
Compelling State Interest
The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense of the subject
provisions, were able to: 1] demonstrate a more compelling state interest to restrain conscientious
objectors in their choice of services to render; and 2] discharge the burden of proof that the obligatory
character of the law is the least intrusive means to achieve the objectives of the law.

Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG was
curiously silent in the establishment of a more compelling state interest that would rationalize the curbing
of a conscientious objector's right not to adhere to an action contrary to his religious convictions. During
the oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same silence and evasion. The Transcripts of the
Stenographic Notes disclose the following:
Justice De Castro:
Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Yes, Justice.
Justice De Castro:
... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling State interest in imposing
this duty to refer to a conscientious objector which refuses to do so because of his religious belief?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Ahh, Your Honor, ..
Justice De Castro:
What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State interest, this is an
ordinary health legislation involving professionals. This is not a free speech matter or a pure free exercise
matter. This is a regulation by the State of the relationship between medical doctors and their patients.231
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise clause of the
conscientious objectors, however few in number. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to
the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the
government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally
unacceptable.232
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act or not
to act according to what one believes. And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against
one's belief or is prevented from acting according to one's belief.233
Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the
perceived scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing, number and spacing
of the birth of their children refers to a future event that is contingent on whether or not the mother
decides to adopt or use the information, product, method or supply given to her or whether she even
decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon those who object to
contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks consultation on reproductive
health matters.
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the conscientious
objector's religious freedom, the respondents have failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override a person's fundamental right to religious
freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented any government effort exerted to show that the means
it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means.234 Other than the assertion
that the act of referring would only be momentary, considering that the act of referral by a conscientious
objector is the very action being contested as violative of religious freedom, it behooves the respondents
to demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State to achieve its objective without
violating the rights of the conscientious objector. The health concerns of women may still be addressed by
other practitioners who may perform reproductive health-related procedures with open willingness and
motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves the
protection of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional freedoms.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the right to
health is protected. Considering other legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive
Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The
Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of women in relation to health services and programs.
The pertinent provision of Magna Carta on comprehensive health services and programs for women, in
fact, reads:
Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall, at all times,
provide for a comprehensive, culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and programs
covering all stages of a woman's life cycle and which addresses the major causes of women's mortality and
morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for comprehensive health services, due respect shall be accorded
to women's religious convictions, the rights of the spouses to found a family in accordance with their
religious convictions, and the demands of responsible parenthood, and the right of women to protection
from hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and substances.
Access to the following services shall be ensured:
(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address pregnancy and infant health and
nutrition;
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family planning;
(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health services without prejudice to the
primary right and duty of parents to educate their children;
(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including sexually transmitted diseases,
HIV, and AIDS;

(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast and cervical cancers, and other
gynecological conditions and disorders;
(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related complications;
(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children victims and survivors shall be
provided with comprehensive health services that include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and legal
interventions and assistance towards healing, recovery, and empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms and medical
standards;
(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and
(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of women and girls. In addition,
healthy lifestyle activities are encouraged and promoted through programs and projects as strategies in
the prevention of diseases.
(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide women in all sectors with
appropriate, timely, complete, and accurate information and education on all the above-stated aspects of
women's health in government education and training programs, with due regard to the following:
(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth and the development of
moral character and the right of children to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for
the enrichment and strengthening of character;
(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and
(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including fertility awareness.
As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling state interest was
"Fifteen maternal deaths per day, hundreds of thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives changed, x x
x."235 He, however, failed to substantiate this point by concrete facts and figures from reputable sources.
The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the Filipino maternal
mortality rate dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to 2008, 236 although there was still no RH Law at that
time. Despite such revelation, the proponents still insist that such number of maternal deaths constitute a
compelling state interest.
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare programs for Filipino
women, they could not be solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious
beliefs in exchange for blind conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law. While
generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care procedures if
doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that
require the performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the mother
should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial
of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave danger. Thus, during the oral
arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC, manifested: "the forced referral clause that we are objecting on
grounds of violation of freedom of religion does not contemplate an emergency."237
In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged
always to try to save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one should not be
deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:
Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the House of
Representatives of the principle of double-effect wherein intentional harm on the life of either the mother
of the child is never justified to bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict situation between the life of the
child and the life of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. However, he
can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it is medically impossible to save both, provided
that no direct harm is intended to the other. If the above principles are observed, the loss of the child's life
or the mother's life is not intentional and, therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of
abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted against the child because both their lives are equally
valuable.238
Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the child may
be resorted to even if is against the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted above,
whatever burden imposed upon a medical practitioner in this case would have been more than justified
considering the life he would be able to save.
Family Planning Seminars
Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15239 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license,
the Court finds the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A cursory reading
of the assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of the petitioners is not at all violated. All the law
requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and
infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the
seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those who receive any
information during their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept the information
given to them, are completely free to reject the information they find unacceptable, and retain the freedom
to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.
4-The Family and the Right to Privacy
Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the
Constitution by intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and fosters
animosity in the family rather than promote its solidarity and total development.240
The Court cannot but agree.

The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic social institution.
In fact, one article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to the family.
ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of
responsible parenthood;
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all
forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development;
The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and implementation of policies
and programs that affect them.
In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains provisions which
tend to wreck the family as a solid social institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from
participating in the decision making process regarding their common future progeny. It likewise deprives
the parents of their authority over their minor daughter simply because she is already a parent or had
suffered a miscarriage.
The Family and Spousal Consent
Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:
The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...
(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person of legal age
on the ground of lack of consent or authorization of the following persons in the following instances:
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of disagreement, the decision of the
one undergoing the procedures shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]
The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by
their very nature, should require mutual consent and decision between the husband and the wife as they
affect issues intimately related to the founding of a family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses
that the State shall defend the "right of the spouses to found a family." One person cannot found a family.
The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the same Section 3, their right "to participate in the
planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them " is equally recognized.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority
to the spouse who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the
decision would drive a wedge between the husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and
endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing the population. This would be a marked
departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution.241
Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the couple,
not just one of them. Any decision they would reach would affect their future as a family because the size
of the family or the number of their children significantly matters. The decision whether or not to undergo
the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their
own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not
shown any compelling interest, the State should see to it that they chart their destiny together as one
family.
As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the
"Magna Carta for Women," provides that women shall have equal rights in all matters relating to marriage
and family relations, including the joint decision on the number and spacing of their children. Indeed,
responsible parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law states, is a shared responsibility between parents.
Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not be allowed to betray the constitutional mandate to protect
and strengthen the family by giving to only one spouse the absolute authority to decide whether to
undergo reproductive health procedure.242
The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and such
state intervention would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In our
jurisdiction, the right to privacy was first recognized in Marje v. Mutuc,243 where the Court, speaking
through Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection."244
Marje adopted the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,245 where Justice William O.
Douglas wrote:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political parties, older than our
school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to
the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living,
not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble
a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.
Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal
offense on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married
persons. Nevertheless, it recognized the zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed by couples. Justice Douglas in

Grisworld wrote that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from
those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy."246
At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.
The Family and Parental Consent
Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be undergoing
a procedure, is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides:
SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. x x x.
No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural or artificial:
Provided, That minors will not be allowed access to modern methods of family planning without written
consent from their parents or guardian/s except when the minor is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage.
There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a parent or has
had a miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the decision making process of the minor with regard to
family planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off just because
there is a need to tame population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her
own parents. The State cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to providing her needs
and comfort. To say that their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity
in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family as an
inviolable social institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and primary right
and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character
shall receive the support of the Government."247 In this regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:
The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents. It imports the
assertion that the right of parents is superior to that of the State.248 [Emphases supplied]
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their minor-child
or the right of the spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose of
marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of one's
privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and strongly-held Filipino tradition of
maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition that the State affords couples entering into
the special contract of marriage to as one unit in forming the foundation of the family and society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and custody
of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling
state interest can justify a state substitution of their parental authority.
First Exception: Access to Information
Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second paragraph of
Section 7 or with respect to the consenting spouse under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made.
There must be a differentiation between access to information about family planning services, on one
hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures and modern family planning methods themselves,
on the other. Insofar as access to information is concerned, the Court finds no constitutional objection to
the acquisition of information by the minor referred to under the exception in the second paragraph of
Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of her own body and that of her unborn child. After all,
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the State to protect both the life of the mother as that of
the unborn child. Considering that information to enable a person to make informed decisions is essential
in the protection and maintenance of ones' health, access to such information with respect to reproductive
health must be allowed. In this situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of their parental control
is unfounded because they are not prohibited to exercise parental guidance and control over their minor
child and assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received.
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that
require the performance of emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has already
suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It
should be emphasized that no person should be denied the appropriate medical care urgently needed to
preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii)249 should be struck down. By effectively
limiting the requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents
their right of parental authority in cases where what is involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save for the
two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an abused child as provided in the first sentence of
Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority. To
deny them of this right would be an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the
family.
5 - Academic Freedom
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching of
Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine and/or
imprisonment violates the principle of academic freedom . According to the petitioners, these provisions
effectively force educational institutions to teach reproductive health education even if they believe that
the same is not suitable to be taught to their students.250 Citing various studies conducted in the United
States and statistical data gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that the prevalence of
contraceptives has led to an increase of out-of-wedlock births; divorce and breakdown of families; the

acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging of society; and promotion
of promiscuity among the youth.251
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature
because the Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on ageappropriate reproductive health education. One can only speculate on the content, manner and medium of
instruction that will be used to educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious
beliefs of the petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this
particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right and
duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987
Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to
become productive members of society. Notably, it places more importance on the role of parents in the
development of their children by recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that is, that the right of
parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State.252
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral development of
the youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing the youth and their
important role in nation building.253 Considering that Section 14 provides not only for the ageappropriate-reproductive health education, but also for values formation; the development of knowledge
and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual abuse and violence against women and children
and other forms of gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and emotional changes in
adolescents; women's rights and children's rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and development;
and responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4(t) of the RH Law
itself provides for the teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and physical and
emotional changes among adolescents - the Court finds that the legal mandate provided under the
assailed provision supplements, rather than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral
development of their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education program shall
be developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-community associations, school officials and other
interest groups, it could very well be said that it will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.
By imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention that Section 14 violates
Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit.254
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their participation in the
reproductive health education program provided under Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the
same violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before
it.
6 - Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause
of the Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service provider"
among those who may be held punishable but does not define who is a "private health care service
provider." They argue that confusion further results since Section 7 only makes reference to a "private
health care institution."
The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals operated by
religious groups from rendering reproductive health service and modern family planning methods. It is
unclear, however, if these institutions are also exempt from giving reproductive health information under
Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering reproductive health procedures under Section 23(a)(2).
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect
information, but at the same time fails to define "incorrect information."
The arguments fail to persuade.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to
the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the
parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.255
Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must not only be taken in
accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that
every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be
construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.256
As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service provider,"
reference must be made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health service provider," viz:
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly licensed
and accredited and devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion,
disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury,
disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and nursing care; (2) public health care
professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3) public health worker engaged in the
delivery of health care services; or (4) barangay health worker who has undergone training programs
under any accredited government and NGO and who voluntarily renders primarily health care services in
the community after having been accredited to function as such by the local health board in accordance
with the guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .

Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private
health care service provider," should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason that they are used
synonymously.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated to render
reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, includes exemption from being obligated
to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to
the qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from being obligated to render
reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, necessarily includes exemption from
being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health procedures. The
terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to include the providing of information and the rendering
of medical procedures.
The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care service
providers who intentionally withhold, restrict and provide incorrect information regarding reproductive
health programs and services. For ready reference, the assailed provision is hereby quoted as follows:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally provide
incorrect information regarding programs and services on reproductive health including the right to
informed choice and access to a full range of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective family
planning methods;
From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or with
established rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty, morality or propriety;
and failing to coincide with the truth. 257 On the other hand, the word "knowingly" means with awareness
or deliberateness that is intentional.258 Used together in relation to Section 23(a)(l), they connote a sense
of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and
services on reproductive health. Public health and safety demand that health care service providers give
their honest and correct medical information in accordance with what is acceptable in medical practice.
While health care service providers are not barred from expressing their own personal opinions regarding
the programs and services on reproductive health, their right must be tempered with the need to provide
public health and safety. The public deserves no less.
7-Egual Protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution as it
discriminates against the poor because it makes them the primary target of the government program that
promotes contraceptive use . They argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor,
the RH Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor. Their bases
are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with the poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding
principles259 and definition of terms260 of the law.
They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health
education program imposed by the RH Law renders it unconstitutional.
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to expound on the concept of
equal protection. Thus:
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is
embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in
the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play.
It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any
form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on
the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality
or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires
public bodies and inst itutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of
the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution
through the state's duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the concept of equal justice under the
law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on
differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its
inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive departments,
and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or
whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be
valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not
make for a valid classification."
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons
who naturally belong to the class. "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the
class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that

the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should
possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is
achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual
belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable
from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him."
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude
addition to the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may
thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that
should otherwise fall into a certain classification. [Emphases supplied; citations excluded]
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program is
not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the
Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by
providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development of the people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which
shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at
affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women,
and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering
from fertility issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH
Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the use of
contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the
"promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the advancement of
reproductive health."
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose
conditions upon couples who intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law
seeks to charge couples with the duty to have children only if they would raise them in a truly humane
way, a deeper look into its provisions shows that what the law seeks to do is to simply provide priority to
the poor in the implementation of government programs to promote basic reproductive health care.
With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health
education program under Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children of those who
are less fortunate attend public educational institutions does not amount to substantial distinction
sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the other hand, substantial distinction rests between public
educational institutions and private educational institutions, particularly because there is a need to
recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious
instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.
8-Involuntary Servitude
The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional
prohibition against involuntary servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring
private and non-government health care service providers to render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono
reproductive health services, actually amounts to involuntary servitude because it requires medical
practitioners to perform acts against their will.262
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be
considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have the
discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the
imposition is within the powers of the government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with
PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.
The point of the OSG is well-taken.
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it
is both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with
conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the power of
Congress263 to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of professions or trades which affect the public
welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or control such
professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such right altogether.264
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force,
threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion.265 A reading of the assailed
provision, however, reveals that it only encourages private and non- government reproductive healthcare
service providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is
imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service
providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where
and how to provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made
upon them to render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was made a
prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an unreasonable
burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived
legitimate state interest.
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that conscientious
objectors are exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow
them to render reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.
9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA

The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine
whether or not a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL).266
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also the
competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is the only government entity
empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that health
services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily understood
as "health products."
In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the
Office of the Secretary and shall have the following functions, powers and duties:
"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and regulations issued pursuant
to the same;
"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;
"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of this Act;
"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products standards, and to
recommend standards of identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;
"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of
appropriate authorization and spot-check for compliance with regulations regarding operation of
manufacturers, importers, exporters, distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and other establishments and
facilities of health products, as determined by the FDA;
"x x x
"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance of appropriate
authorizations to ensure safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;
"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers, retailers,
consumers, and non-consumer users of health products to report to the FDA any incident that reasonably
indicates that said product has caused or contributed to the death, serious illness or serious injury to a
consumer, a patient, or any person;
"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for health products, whether or
not registered with the FDA Provided, That for registered health products, the cease and desist order is
valid for thirty (30) days and may be extended for sixty ( 60) days only after due process has been
observed;
"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product found to have
caused death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently
injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to require all concerned to implement the risk
management plan which is a requirement for the issuance of the appropriate authorization;
x x x.
As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the
agency to carry out the mandates of the law. Being the country's premiere and sole agency that ensures
the safety of food and medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary powers
and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary implication, the mandate by
Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting only food and medicines that are
safe includes "service" and "methods." From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress
intended that the public be given only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, nonabortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards.
The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice,267 as
follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has
ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of
the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence, let
alone the interest and the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.
10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the powers
devolved to local government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local Government Code. Said Section
17 vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities,
as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities.
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and
discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions
and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local
government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic
services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that
have already been devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic
services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a

categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services.268
Thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and
other facilities, programs and services funded by the National Government under the annual General
Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded
from foreign sources, are not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local
government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities,
programs and services. [Emphases supplied]
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is
particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has
been provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the
program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.269 A complete
relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and services
cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it.270
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health
care facilities,271 the hiring of skilled health professionals,272 or the training of barangay health
workers,273 it will be the national government that will provide for the funding of its implementation. Local
autonomy is not absolute. The national government still has the say when it comes to national priority
programs which the local government is called upon to implement like the RH Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide these
services. There is nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as making the availability of
these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to an
undue encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.
The ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally applied to
the ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of
R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the
operation of the RH Law in the autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for the guidance of the
regional government. These provisions relied upon by the petitioners simply delineate the powers that may
be exercised by the regional government, which can, in no manner, be characterized as an abdication by
the State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the general welfare. After all, despite the
veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now
stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the relationship between the national and the regional
governments.274 Except for the express and implied limitations imposed on it by the Constitution,
Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which
extends to all matters of general concern or common interest.275
11 - Natural Law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law,276 suffice it to say that the Court does
not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the
Constitution. While every law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law, the Court
is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it is
not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on
inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school
are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or present.277 Unless,
a natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law. In
Republic v. Sandiganbayan,278 the very case cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is
not duty-bound to examine every law or action and whether it conforms with both the Constitution and
natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving
rights inherent to man where no law is applicable.279
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow
abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population control program of the government
by providing information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to the public,
especially to the poor.
Facts and Fallacies
and the Wisdom of the Law
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to
medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services,
methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of
society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional
safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher than
the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to
impose its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough room for diversity
and pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may
continue to reign as we exist alongside each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that what it seeks
to address is the problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause
of these perennial issues is not the large population but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if
population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as the country's wealth remains in the hands of
the very few.

At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The European and
Asian countries, which embarked on such a program generations ago , are now burdened with ageing
populations. The number of their young workers is dwindling with adverse effects on their economy. These
young workers represent a significant human capital which could have helped them invigorate, innovate
and fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to reverse their programs, but they are still
struggling. For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.
And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas Filipino Workers.
This is because we have an ample supply of young able-bodied workers. What would happen if the country
would be weighed down by an ageing population and the fewer younger generation would not be able to
support them? This would be the situation when our total fertility rate would go down below the
replacement level of two (2) children per woman.280
Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use coercive
measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless,
the policy of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a law.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the law is
as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying what the law should be or what is the
correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of
the law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the business of this Tribunal
to remedy every unjust situation that may arise from the application of a particular law. It is for the
legislature to enact remedial legislation if that would be necessary in the premises. But as always, with apt
judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the delicate function of interpreting the law,
guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The Court's
function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the law
is, as enacted by the lawmaking body.281
Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement of the prior
existing contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees
the RH Law as entirely unconstitutional, there will still be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the
Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the reproductive health for women or The Magna Carta of Women
(R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the assailed legislation. All the same, the principle of "noabortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption of any family planning method should be maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health
facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to
refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have
suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from their
parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar
as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information
regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married
individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement
of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar
as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service
provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious
beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar
as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act
that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious
beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona
reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth
accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining
abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening
Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16,
2013 , is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as
constitutional.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 116437 March 3, 1997

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PABLITO ANDAN y HERNANDEZ @ BOBBY, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
Accused-appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias "Bobby" was accused of the crime of rape with
homicide committed as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of February 1994, in the municipality of Baliuag, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
design, by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of one Marianne Guevarra y Reyes against her will and without her consent; and the
above-named accused in order to suppress evidence against him and delay (sic) the identity of the victim,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill the said Marianne Guevarra y
Reyes, attack, assault and hit said victim with concrete hollow blocks in her face and in different parts of
her body, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds which directly caused her death.
Contrary to Law. 1
The prosecution established that on February 19, 1994 at about 4:00 P.M., in Concepcion Subdivision,
Baliuag, Bulacan, Marianne Guevarra, twenty years of age and a second-year student at the Fatima School
of Nursing, left her home for her school dormitory in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. She was to prepare for her
final examinations on February 21, 1994. Marianne wore a striped blouse and faded denim pants and
brought with her two bags containing her school uniforms, some personal effects and more than P2,000.00
in cash.
Marianne was walking along the subdivision when appellant invited her inside his house. He used the
pretext that the blood pressure of his wife's grandmother should be taken. Marianne agreed to take her
blood pressure as the old woman was her distant relative. She did not know that nobody was inside the
house. Appellant then punched her in the abdomen, brought her to the kitchen and raped her. His lust
sated, appellant dragged the unconscious girl to an old toilet at the back of the house and left her there
until dark. Night came and appellant pulled Marianne, who was still unconscious, to their backyard. The
yard had a pigpen bordered on one side by a six-foot high concrete fence. On the other side was a vacant
lot. Appellant stood on a bench beside the pigpen and then lifted and draped the girl's body over the fence
to transfer it to the vacant lot. When the girl moved, he hit her head with a piece of concrete block. He
heard her moan and hit her again on the face. After silence reigned, he pulled her body to the other side of
the fence, dragged it towards a shallow portion of the lot and abandoned it. 2

At 11:00 A.M. of the following day, February 20, 1994, the body of Marianne was discovered. She was
naked from the chest down with her brassiere and T-shirt pulled toward her neck. Nearby was found a
panty with a sanitary napkin.
The autopsy conducted by Dr. Alberto Bondoc revealed that Marianne died of "traumatic injuries" sustained
as follows:
1. Abrasions:
1.1 chest and abdomen, multiple, superficial, linear, generally oblique from right to left.
2. Abrasions/contusions:
2.1 temple, right.
2.2 cheek, right.
2.3 upper and lower jaws, right.
2.4 breast, upper inner quadrant, right.
2.5 breast, upper outer quadrant, left.
2.6 abdomen, just above the umbilicus, rectangular, approximate 3 inches in width, from right MCL to left
AAL.
2.7 elbow joint, posterior, bilateral.
3. Hematoma:
3.1 upper and lower eyelids, bilateral.
3.2 temple, lateral to the outer edge of eyebrow, right.
3.3 upper and lower jaws, right.
4. Lacerated wounds:
4.1 eyebrow, lateral border, right, 1/2 inch.
4.2 face, from right cheek below the zygoma to midline lower jaw, 4 inches.
5. Fractures:
5.1 maxillary bone, right.
5.2 mandible, multiple, complete, right, with avulsion of 1st and 2nd incisors.
6. Cerebral contusions, inferior surface, temporal and frontal lobes, right.
7. External genitalia
7.1 minimal blood present.
7.2 no signs of recent physical injuries noted on both labia, introitus and exposed vaginal wall.
8. Laboratory examination of smear samples from the vaginal cavity showed negative for spermatozoa
(Bulacan Provincial Hospital, February 22, 1994, by Dr. Wilfredo S. de Vera).
CAUSE OF DEATH: Cardiorespiratory Arrest due to Cerebral Contusions due to Traumatic Injuries, Face. 3
Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Mayor Cornelio Trinidad of Baliuag to form
a crack team of police officers to look for the criminal. Searching the place where Marianne's body was
found, the policemen recovered a broken piece of concrete block stained with what appeared to be blood.
They also found a pair of denim pants and a pair of shoes which were identified as Marianne's. 4
Appellant's nearby house was also searched by the police who found bloodstains on the wall of the pigpen
in the backyard. They interviewed the occupants of the house and learned from Romano Calma, the
stepbrother of appellant's wife, that accused-appellant also lived there but that he, his wife and son left
without a word. Calma surrendered to the police several articles consisting of pornographic pictures, a pair
of wet short pants with some reddish brown stain, a towel also with the stain, and a wet T-shirt. The clothes
were found in the laundry hamper inside the house and allegedly belonged to appellant. 5
The police tried to locate appellant and learned that his parents live in Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan.
On February 24 at 11:00 P.M., a police team led by Mayor Trinidad traced appellant in his parents' house.
They took him aboard the patrol jeep and brought him to the police headquarters where he was
interrogated. Initially, appellant denied any knowledge of Marianne's death. However, when the police
confronted him with the concrete block, the victim's clothes and the bloodstains found in the pigpen,
appellant relented and said that his neighbors, Gilbert Larin and Reynaldo Dizon, killed Marianne and that
he was merely a lookout. He also said that he knew where Larin and Dizon hid the two bags of Marianne. 6
Immediately, the police took appellant to his house. Larin and Dizon, who were rounded up earlier, were
likewise brought there by the police. Appellant went to an old toilet at the back of the house, leaned over a
flower pot and retrieved from a canal under the pot, two bags which were later identified as belonging to
Marianne. Thereafter, photographs were taken of appellant and the two other suspects holding the bags. 7
Appellant and the two suspects were brought back to the police headquarters. The following day, February
25, a physical examination was conducted on the suspects by the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Orpha
Patawaran. 8 Appellant was found to sustain:
HEENT: with multiple scratches on the neck Rt side. Chest and back: with abrasions (scratches at the
back). Extremities: freshly-healed wound along index finger 1.5 cm. in size Lt. 9
By this time, people and media representatives were already gathered at the police headquarters awaiting
the results of the investigation. Mayor Trinidad arrived and proceeded to the investigation room. Upon
seeing the mayor, appellant approached him and whispered a request that they talk privately. The mayor
led appellant to the office of the Chief of Police and there, appellant broke down and said "Mayor,
patawarin mo ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." The mayor opened the door
of the room to let the public and media representatives witness the confession. The mayor first asked for a
lawyer to assist appellant but since no lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings photographed and
videotaped. 10 In the presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media and appellant's own
wife and son, appellant confessed his guilt. He disclosed how he killed Marianne and volunteered to show
them the place where he hid her bags. He asked for forgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom he falsely
implicated saying he did it because of ill-feelings against them. 11 He also said that the devil entered his

mind because of the pornographic magazines and tabloid he read almost everyday. 12 After his confession,
appellant hugged his wife and son and asked the mayor to help
him. 13 His confession was captured on videotape and covered by the media nationwide. 14
Appellant was detained at the police headquarters. The next two days, February 26 and 27, more
newspaper, radio and television reporters came. Appellant was again interviewed and he affirmed his
confession to the mayor and reenacted the crime. 15
On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty." He testified that in the afternoon of
February 19, 1994 he was at his parent's house in Barangay Tangos attending the birthday party of his
nephew. He, his wife and son went home after 5:00 P.M. His wife cooked dinner while he watched their oneyear old son. They all slept at 8:00 P.M. and woke up the next day at 6:00 in the morning. His wife went to
Manila to collect some debts while he and his son went to his parents' house where he helped his father
cement the floor of the house. His wife joined them in the afternoon and they stayed there until February
24, 1994 when he was picked up by the police. 16
Appellant was brought by the police to a hotel at Bagong Nayon, Baliuag. In one of the rooms, the
policemen covered his face with a bedsheet and kicked him repeatedly. They coerced him to confess that
he raped and killed Marianne. When he refused, they pushed his head into a toilet bowl and injected
something into his buttocks. Weakened, appellant confessed to the crime. Thereafter, appellant was taken
to his house where he saw two of his neighbors, Larin and Dizon. He was ordered by the police to go to the
old toilet at the back of the house and get two bags from under the flower pot. Fearing for his life,
appellant did as he was told. 17
In a decision dated August 4, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant and sentenced him to death
pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659. The trial court also ordered appellant to pay the victim's heirs
P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P71,000.00 as actual burial expenses and P100,000.00 as moral damages,
thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias "Bobby is found guilty by proof
beyond a scintilla of doubt of the crime charged in the Information (Rape with Homicide) and penalized in
accordance with R.A. No. 7659 (Death Penalty Law) Sec. 11, Par. 8, classifying this offense as one of the
heinous crimes and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the family of
Marianne Guevarra the amount of P50,000. 00 for the death of Marianne Guevarra and P71,000.00 as
actual burial and incidental expenses and P100,000.00 as moral damages. After automatic review of this
case and the decision becomes final and executory, the sentence be carried out.
SO ORDERED. 18
This case is before us on automatic review in accordance with Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659
amending Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant contends that:
I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND USING AS BASIS OF JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION THE
TESTIMONIES OF THE POLICE INVESTIGATORS, REPORTERS AND THE MAYOR ON THE ALLEGED ADMISSION
OF THE ACCUSED DURING THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION, THE ACCUSED NOT BEING ASSISTED BY
COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION;
II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS RAPE WHEN THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY
KIND TO SUPPORT IT;
III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MAKING A FINDING OF CONVICTION WHEN THE EVIDENCE IN ITS TOTALITY
SHOWS THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED. 19
The trial court based its decision convicting appellant on the testimonies of the three policemen of the
investigating team, the mayor of Baliuag and four news reporters to whom appellant gave his extrajudicial
oral confessions. It was also based on photographs and video footages of appellant's confessions and
reenactments of the commission of the crime.
Accused-appellant assails the admission of the testimonies of the policemen, the mayor and the news
reporters because they were made during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel.
Section 12, paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) . . .
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
(4) . . .
Plainly, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right (1) to remain
silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be
informed of such
rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. 20 Any confession or
admission obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible in evidence against him. 21 The
exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar
atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for
compulsion physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. 22 The incommunicado character of custodial
interrogation or investigation also obscures a later judicial determination of what really transpired. 23
It should be stressed that the rights under Section 12 are accorded to "[a]ny person under investigation for
the commission of an offense." An investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry into an

unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator
starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense. 24 As
intended by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, this covers "investigation conducted by police authorities
which will include investigations conducted by the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such other
police agencies in our government." 25
When the police arrested appellant, they were no longer engaged in a general inquiry about the death of
Marianne. Indeed, appellant was already a prime suspect even before the police found him at his parents'
house. This is clear from the testimony of SPO4 Danilo S. Bugay, the police chief investigator of the crime,
viz:
COURT How did you come about in concluding that it was accused who did this act?
WITNESS: First, the place where Marianne was last found is at the backyard of the house of the accused.
Second, there were blood stains at the pigpen, and third, when we asked Romano Calma who were his
other companions in the house, he said that, it was Pablito Andan who cannot be found at that time and
whose whereabouts were unknown, sir.
Q: So you had a possible suspect?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You went looking for Pablito Andan?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And then, what else did you do?
A: We tried to find out where we can find him and from information we learned that his parents live in
Barangay Tangos in Baliuag. We went there, found him there and investigated him and in fact during the
investigation he admitted that he was the culprit. 26
Appellant was already under custodial investigation when he confessed to the police. It is admitted that
the police failed to inform appellant of his constitutional rights when he was investigated and interrogated.
27
His confession is therefore inadmissible in evidence. So too were the two bags recovered from
appellant's house. SPO2 Cesar Canoza, a member of the investigating team testified:
Atty. Valmores: You told the court that you were able to recover these bags marked as Exhs. B and B-1
because accused pointed to them, where did he point these bags?
A: At the police station, sir, he told us that he hid the two (2) bags beneath the canal of the toilet.
Q: In other words, you were given the information where these two (2) bags were located?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And upon being informed where the two (2) bags could be located what did you do?
A: We proceeded to the place together with the accused so that we would know where the two (2) bags
were hidden, sir.
Q: And did you see actually those two (2) bags before the accused pointed to the place where the bags
were located?
A: After he removed the broken pots with which he covered the canal, he really showed where the bags
were hidden underneath the canal, sir. 28
The victim's bags were the fruits of appellant's uncounselled confession to the police. They are tainted
evidence, hence also inadmissible. 29
The police detained appellant after his initial confession. The following day, Mayor Trinidad visited the
appellant. Appellant approached the mayor and requested for a private talk. They went inside a room and
appellant confessed that he alone committed the crime. He pleaded for forgiveness. Mayor Trinidad
testified, viz:
Mayor Trinidad: . . . . During the investigation when there were already many people from the media,
Andan whispered something to me and requested that he be able to talk to me alone, so what I did was
that, I brought him inside the office of the chief of police.
Private Prosecutor Principe: And so what happened inside the office of the Chief of Police, mayor?
A: While inside the office of the headquarters he told me "Mayor patawarin mo ako,! I will tell you the truth.
I am the one who killed Marianne." So when he was telling this to me, I told him to wait a while, then I
opened the door to allow the media to hear what he was going to say and I asked him again whether he
was the one who did it, he admitted it, sir. This was even covered by a television camera. 30
xxx xxx xxx
Q: During that time that Pablito Andan whispered to you that he will tell you something and then you
responded by bringing him inside the office of the Chief of Police and you stated that he admitted that he
killed Marianne . . .
Court: He said to you the following words . . .
Atty. Principe: He said to you the following words "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! Ako ang pumatay kay
Marianne," was that the only admission that he told you?
A: The admission was made twice. The first one was, when we were alone and the second one was before
the media people, sir.
Q: What else did he tell you when you were inside the room of the Chief of Police?
A: These were the only things that he told me, sir. I stopped him from making further admissions because I
wanted the media people to hear what he was going to say, sir. 31
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before the mayor
is inadmissible. It is true that
a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local
police 32 and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1)
and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in
response to any interrogation by the latter. 33 In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police

authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and
voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to
confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law
enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. 34 Thus, it
has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous
statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby
appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. 35 What the Constitution bars is the compulsory
disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude
the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to
prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. 36 Hence, we hold that appellant's confession to
the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.
Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions were made in
response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. We have held
that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed
voluntary an are admissible in evidence. 37
The records show that Alex Marcelino, a television reporter for "Eye to Eye" on Channel 7, interviewed
appellant on February 27, 1994. The interview was recorded on video and showed that appellant made his
confession willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of his wife, child and other relatives. 38 Orlan
Mauricio, a reporter for "Tell the People" on Channel 9 also interviewed appellant on February 25, 1994. He
testified that:
Atty. Principe: You mentioned awhile ago that you were able to reach the place where the body of Marianne
was found, where did you start your interview, in what particular place?
Mr. Mauricio: Actually, I started my newsgathering and interview inside the police station of Baliuag and I
identified myself to the accused as I have mentioned earlier, sir. At first, I asked him whether he was the
one who raped and killed the victim and I also learned from him that the victim was his cousin.
Q: And what was the response of Pablito Andan?
A: His response was he is a cousin of the victim and that he was responsible for raping and killing the
victim, sir. And then I asked him whether his admission was voluntary or that there was a threat,
intimidation or violence that was committed on his person because I knew that there were five other
suspects in this case and he said that he was admitting it voluntarily to the policemen. I asked him
whether he was under the influence of drugs but he said no, and "nakainom lang," sir.
Q: You mentioned earlier that the uncle of the accused was present, was the uncle beside him at the time
that you asked the question?
A: The uncle was there including the barangay captain whose name I cannot recall anymore. A barangay
captain of the place, I don't know if it is the place of the crime scene or in the place where Marianne
Guevarra resides but . . . All throughout the scene inside the office of the Station Commander, there was
no air of any force or any threatening nature of investigation that was being done on the suspect, that is
why, I was able to talk to him freely and in a voluntary manner he admitted to me that he was the one who
raped and killed, so we went to the next stage of accompanying me to the scene of the crime where the
reenactment and everything that transpired during the killing of Marianne Guevarra.
Q: Before you started that interview, did you inform or ask permission from the accused Pablito Andan that
you were going to interview him?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You mentioned that after interviewing the accused at the office of the Baliuag PNP, you also went to the
scene of the crime?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who accompanied you?
A: I was accompanied by some Baliuag policemen including Mayor Trinidad and some of the relatives of the
accused.
Q: At this time, did you see the wife of the accused, Pablito Andan?
A: Yes, sir, I saw her at the place where the body of Guevarra was recovered.
Q: How many relatives of accused Pablito Andan were present, more or less?
A: There were many, sir, because there were many wailing, weeping and crying at that time when he was
already taken in the patrol jeep of the Baliuag police, sir.
Q: Now, Mr. Mauricio, upon reaching the scene of the crime in Concepcion, Baliuag, Bulacan, what
transpired?
A: I started my work as a reporter by trying to dig deeper on how the crime was committed by the
accused, so we started inside the pigpen of that old house where I tried to accompany the accused and
asked him to narrate to me and show me how he carried out the rape and killing of Marianne Guevarra, sir.
Q: Did he voluntarily comply?
A: Yes, sir, in fact, I have it on my videotape.
Q: It is clear, Mr. Mauricio, that from the start of your interview at the PNP Baliuag up to the scene of the
crime, all the stages were videotaped by you?
A: Yes, sir. 39
Journalist Berteni Causing of "People's Journal Tonite" likewise covered the proceedings for three successive
days. 40 His testimony is as follows:
Atty. Principe: You mentioned that you had your own inquiries?
A: We asked first permission from the mayor to interrupt their own investigation so that we can have a
direct interview with the suspect.

Q: Were there people?

A: The people present before the crowd that included the mayor, the deputy chief of police, several of the
policemen, the group of Inday Badiday and several other persons. I asked the suspect after the mayor
presented the suspect to us and after the suspect admitted that he was the one who killed Marianne. I
reiterated the question to the suspect. Are you aware that this offense which is murder with . . . rape with
murder is a capital offense? And you could be sentenced to death of this? And he said, Yes. So do you
really admit that you were the one who did it and he repeated it, I mean, say the affirmative answer.
Q: And that was in the presence of the crowd that you mentioned a while ago?
A: Yes, yes, sir. And if I remember it right, as I took my camera to take some pictures of the suspect, the
mayor, the policemen and several others, I heard the group of Inday Badiday asking the same questions
from the suspect and the suspect answered the same.
Q: Also in the presence of so many people that you mentioned?
A: The same group of people who were there, sir.
Q: You mentioned that the answer was just the same as the accused answered you affirmatively, what was
the answer, please be definite?
Court: Use the vernacular.
A: I asked him the question, after asking him the question," Ikaw ba talaga and gumawa ng pagpatay at
pag-rape sa kay Marianne? Ang sagot nya, "Oo." Alam mo ba itong kasalanang ito, kamatayan ang hatol,
inaamin mo pa ba na ikaw and gumawa sa pagpatay at pag-rape kay Marianne?" Sagot pa rin siya ng "Oo."
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Did you ask him, why did you kill Marianne?
A: I asked him, your Honor and the reason he told me was because a devil gripped his mind and because of
that according to him, your Honor, were the pornographic magazines, pornographic tabloids which he,
according to him, reads almost everyday before the crime.
Atty. Principe: At the time of your interview, Mr. Reporter, will you tell the court and the public what was
the physical condition of accused Pablito Andan?
A: As I observed him that time, there was no sign on his body that he was really down physically and I
think he was in good condition.
Court: So he was not happy about the incident?
A: He even admitted it, your Honor.
Court: He was happy?
A: He admitted it. He was not happy after doing it.
Court: Was he crying?
A: As I observed, your Honor, the tears were only apparent but there was no tear that fell on his face.
Court: Was he feeling remorseful?
A: As I observed it, it was only slightly, your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx 41
Another journalist, Rey Domingo, of "Bandera" interviewed appellant on February 26, 1994. 42 He also
testified that:
Atty. Principe: Now, Mr. Witness, did the accused Pablito Andan give you the permission that you asked
from him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when he allowed you to interview him, who were present?
A: The first person that I saw there was Mayor Trinidad, policemen from Baliuag, the chief investigator,
SPO4 Bugay, and since Katipunan, the chief of police was suspended, it was the deputy who was there, sir.
Q: Were they the only persons who were present when you interviewed the accused?
A: There were many people there, sir. The place was crowded with people. There were people from the PNP
and people from Baliuag, sir.
Q: How about the other representatives from the media?
A: Roy Reyes, Orlan Mauricio arrived but he arrived late and there were people from the radio and from TV
Channel 9.
Q: How about Channel 7?
A: They came late. I was the one who got the scoop first, sir.
Q: You stated that the accused allowed you to interview him, was his wife also present?
A: Yes, sir, and even the son was there but I am not very sure if she was really the wife but they were
hugging each other and she was crying and from the questions that I asked from the people there they told
me that she is the wife, sir.
Q: How about the other members of the family of the accused, were they around?
A: I do not know the others, sir. but there were many people there, sir.
Q: Now, according to you, you made a news item about the interview. May we know what question did you
ask and the answer.
A: My first question was, is he Pablito Andan and his answer was "Yes."
Q: What was the next question?
A: I asked him how he did the crime and he said that, he saw the victim aboard a tricycle. He called her up.
She entered the house and he boxed her on the stomach.
Q: What was the next question that you asked him?
A: He also said that he raped her and he said that the reason why he killed the victim was because he was
afraid that the incident might be discovered, sir.
Q: Now, after the interview, are we correct to say that you made a news item on that?
A: Yes, sir, based on what he told me. That's what I did.

Q: Were there other questions propounded by you?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: "Ano iyon?"
A: He said that he threw the cadaver to the other side of the fence, sir.
Q: Did he mention how he threw the cadaver of Marianne to the other side of the fence?
A: I cannot remember the others, sir.
Q: But can you produce the news item based on that interview?
A: I have a xerox copy here, sir.
xxx xxx xxx 43
Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from the
police authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed appellant. 44 They
were not acting under the direction and control of the police. They were there to check appellant's
confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant to grant them an interview and reenact the
commission of the crime. 45 In fact, they asked his permission before interviewing him. They interviewed
him on separate days not once did appellant protest his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly confessed his
guilt to them. He even supplied all the details in the commission of the crime, and consented to its
reenactment. All his confessions to the news reporters were witnessed by his family and other relatives.
There was no coercive atmosphere in the interview of appellant by the news reporters.
We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of
Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private
individual and another individual. 46 It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The
prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents. They confirm that certain rights of
the individual exist without need of any governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away by
government, rights that government has the duty to protect. 47 Governmental power is not unlimited and
the Bill of Rights lays down these limitations to protect the individual against aggression and unwarranted
interference by any department of government and its agencies. 48
In his second assigned error, appellant questions the sufficiency of the medical evidence against him. Dr.
Alberto Bondoc, a Medical Specialist with the Provincial Health Office, conducted the first autopsy and
found no spermatozoa and no recent physical injuries in the hymen. 49 Allegedly,
the minimal blood found in her vagina could have been caused by her menstruation. 50
We are unpersuaded. A second autopsy was conducted on March 1, 1994 by Dr. Dominic L. Aguda, a
medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation. His findings affirmed the absence of
spermatozoa but revealed that the victim's hymen had lacerations, thus:
Hymen contracted, tall, thin with fresh lacerations with clotted blood at 6 and 3 o'clock positions
corresponding to the walls of the
clock. 51
Dr. Aguda testified that the lacerations were fresh and that they may have been caused by an object
forcibly inserted into the vagina when the victim was still alive, indicating the possibility of penetration. 52
His testimony is as follows:
Witness: When I exposed the hymen, I found lacerations in this 3 o'clock and 6 o'clock position
corresponding to the walls of the clock. . . . .
Court: Include the descriptive word, fresh.
Witness: I put it in writing that this is fresh because within the edges of the lacerations, I found blood clot,
that is why I put it into writing as fresh.
Atty. Valmonte: Now, Doctor, you told the Court that what you did on the cadaver was merely a re-autopsy,
that means, doctor the body was autopsied first before you did you re-autopsy?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Could it not be, doctor, that these injuries you found in the vagina could have been sustained on
account of the dilation of the previous autopsy?
A: Well, we presumed that if the first doctor conducted the autopsy on the victim which was already dead,
no amount of injury or no amount of lacerated wounds could produce blood because there is no more
circulation, the circulation had already stopped. So, I presumed that when the doctor examined the victim
with the use of forceps or retractor, vaginal retractor, then I assumed that the victim was already dead. So
it is impossible that the lacerated wounds on the hymen were caused by those instruments because the
victim was already dead and usually in a dead person we do not produce any bleeding.
Q: What you would like to tell the Court is this: that the lacerations with clotted blood at 6 and 3 o'clock
positions corresponding to the walls of the clock could have been inflicted or could have been sustained
while the victim was alive?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: This clotted blood, according to you, found at the edges of the lacerated wounds, now will you kindly go
over the sketch you have just drawn and indicate the edges of the lacerated wounds where you found the
clotted blood?
A: This is the lacerated wound at 3 o'clock and this is the lacerated wound at 6 o'clock. I found the blood
clot at this stage. The clotted blood are found on the edges of the lacerated wounds, sir.
Q: What could have caused those lacerations?
A: Well, it could have been caused by an object that is forcibly inserted into that small opening of the
hymen causing lacerations on the edges of the hymen, sir.
Q: If the victim had sexual intercourse, could she sustain those lacerations?
A: It is possible, sir. 53

We have also ruled in the past that the absence of spermatozoa in the vagina does not negate the
commission of rape 54 nor does the lack of complete penetration or rupture of the hymen. 55 What is
essential is that there be penetration of the female organ no matter how slight. 56 Dr. Aguda testified that
the fact of penetration is proved by the lacerations found in the victim's vagina. The lacerations were fresh
and could not have been caused by any injury in the first autopsy.
Dr. Aguda's finding and the allegation that the victim was raped by appellant are supported by other
evidence, real and testimonial, obtained from an investigation of the witnesses and the crime scene, viz:
(1) The victim, Marianne, was last seen walking along the subdivision road near appellant's house; 57
(2) At that time, appellant's wife and her step brother and grandmother were not in their house; 58
(3) A bloodstained concrete block was found over the fence of appellant's house, a meter away from the
wall. Bloodstains were also found on the grass nearby and at the pigpen at the back of appellant's house;
59

(4) The victim sustained bruises and scars indicating that her body had been dragged over a flat rough
surface. 60 This supports the thesis that she was thrown over the fence and dragged to where her body was
found;
(5) Appellant's bloodstained clothes and towel were found in the laundry hamper in his house;
(6) The reddish brown stains in the towel and T-shirt of appellant were found positive for the presence of
blood type "B," the probable blood type of the victim. 61 Marianne 's exact blood type was not determined
but her parents had type "A" and type "AB." 62 The victim's pants had bloodstains which were found to be
type "O," appellant's blood type; 63
(7) Appellant had scratch marks and bruises in his body which he failed to explain; 64
(8) For no reason, appellant and his wife left their residence after the incident and were later found at his
parents' house in Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan; 65
In fine, appellant's extrajudicial confessions together with the other circumstantial evidence justify the
conviction of appellant.
Appellant 's defense of alibi cannot overcome the prosecution evidence. His alibi cannot even stand the
test of physical improbability at the time of the commission of the crime. Barangay Tangos is only a few
kilometers away from Concepcion Subdivision and can be traversed in less than half an hour. 66
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Case
No. 1109-M-94 is affirmed and accused-appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez is found guilty of the special
complex crime of rape with homicide under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to the penalty of death, with two (2) members of the Court,
however, voting to impose reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of
the victim, Marianne Guevarra, the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for her death and P71,000.00 as
actual damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code,
upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the
President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 81561

January 18, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reynaldo B. Tatoy and Abelardo E. Rogacion for accused-appellant.
BIDIN, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court,
Branch XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4,
Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as follows:
On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley
Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex,
Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no
relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the
packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction,
writing therein his name, passport number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the
consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland" (Decision, p. 6)
Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages. Appellant, however,
refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his
friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the
packages. The four (4) packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box one by two feet in size
(1' x 2'). Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top of the packages before the box was sealed with
masking tape, thus making the box ready for shipment (Decision, p. 8).
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes
(proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for
final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity
aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening
one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves.
He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof
(tsn, pp. 29-30, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory
examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp. 5-6, October 6, 1987).
He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that date, i.e., August 14, 1987. He was
interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was
still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes'
office at Ermita, Manila (tsn, p. 30, October 6, 1987).
Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the presence of the NBI
agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside
the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been contained inside the cellophane wrappers
(tsn, p. 38, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that the
package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained
tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked
underneath the cigars (tsn, p. 39, October 6, 1987).
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a
"Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects (tsn, pp. 2-3, October 7, 1987).
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's stated address in his
passport being the Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested assistance from the latter's Chief
Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by
the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same day the Narcotics
Section of the NBI submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory
examination. It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic
chemist. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132-134).
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.
In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following errors, to wit:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY SEARCHED AND SEIZED OBJECTS
CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT HIS RIGHTS
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER CUSTODIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE NOT OBSERVED.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE APPELLANT ON HOW
THE FOUR PARCELS CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION (Appellant's Brief, p. 1; Rollo, p. 55)
1. Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of
his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication (Sec. 2
and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore argues that the same should be held inadmissible in evidence
(Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).
Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order
of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure had its
origin in the 1935 Charter which, worded as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized. (Sec. 1 [3], Article III)
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment ** to the United States Constitution. As
such, the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme Court and State
Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.
Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio by the US Federal Supreme Court (367 US
643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 1081 [1961]), this Court, in Stonehill v. Diokno (20 SCRA 383 [1967]), declared
as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search and seizure warrant, abandoning in
the process the ruling earlier adopted in Moncado v. People's Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948]) wherein the
admissibility of evidence was not affected by the illegality of its seizure. The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2], Art.
IV) constitutionalized the Stonehill ruling and is carried over up to the present with the advent of the 1987
Constitution.
In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down the
admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable
searches and seizures. (Bache & Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 66
SCRA 299 [1975]; People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1987]; See also
Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso, et al., GR No. 81510, March 14, 1990).
It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained were invariably
procured by the State acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized government
agencies.
On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded
was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the
intervention and participation of State authorities. Under the circumstances, can accused/appellant validly
claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated? Stated
otherwise, may an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be
invoked against the State?
We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]:
1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the immunity of one's
person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government, included in which is his residence, his
papers, and other possessions. . . .
. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such have the access except under the circumstances
above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed
any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling
and to respect the privacies of his life. . . . (Cf. Schermerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966] and Boyd v.
United States, 116 US 616 [1886]; Emphasis supplied).
In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 547; 65 L.Ed. 1048), the Court there in construing the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures declared that:
(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures, and as shown in
previous cases, its protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and history clearly show that it was
intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation
upon other than governmental agencies; as against such authority it was the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of his dwelling and the possession
of his property, subject to the right of seizure by process duly served.
The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d 661 [1968]) where a parking attendant who
searched the automobile to ascertain the owner thereof found marijuana instead, without the knowledge
and participation of police authorities, was declared admissible in prosecution for illegal possession of
narcotics.

And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d 121), it was held that the search and seizure
clauses are restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon private individuals (citing People v.
Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d 621, 49 Cap. Rptr, 892 (1966); State v. Brown, Mo., 391 S.W.2d 903 (1965); State v.
Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938 (1957).
Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d 517 (1967). The Court there said:
The search of which appellant complains, however, was made by a private citizen the owner of a motel
in which appellant stayed overnight and in which he left behind a travel case containing the evidence***
complained of. The search was made on the motel owner's own initiative. Because of it, he became
suspicious, called the local police, informed them of the bag's contents, and made it available to the
authorities.
The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not require exclusion of evidence obtained through
a search by a private citizen. Rather, the amendment only proscribes governmental action."
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter
transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason
why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged.
Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of
the evidence later on used in prosecuting the case which resulted in his conviction.
The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be clarified in two days. In both instances, the
argument stands to fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents
conducted an illegal search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Records of the case clearly indicate
that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made search/inspection of the
packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as
a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts
(TSN, October 6 & 7, 1987, pp. 15-18; pp. 7-8; Original Records, pp. 119-122; 167-168).
It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took samples of the same
to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of business. Thereafter, he opened the parcel
containing the rest of the shipment and entrusted the care and custody thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly,
the NBI agents made no search and seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate of
accused/appellant.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into
a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which
is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been
committed in aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the contraband articles
are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is
prohibited by the constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559, 71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker v. State of California 374
US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122 [1968]).
In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise held that where the property was taken into
custody of the police at the specific request of the manager and where the search was initially made by
the owner there is no unreasonable search and seizure within the constitutional meaning of the term.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private
individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties
guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must always be subject to protection. But protection
against whom? Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights answers the query
which he himself posed, as follows:
First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional
democracy. Protection against whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the
relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals,
between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some
forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder. (Sponsorship Speech of
Commissioner Bernas , Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Emphasis
supplied)
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it
could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise
of power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to
pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor
of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the
intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for
only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to
bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935 Constitution has been modified by the
present phraseology found in the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as inadmissible any evidence obtained
in violation of the constitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it matters not whether the
evidence was procured by police authorities or private individuals (Appellant's Brief, p. 8, Rollo, p. 62).
The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the principles of the
government and fundamental liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between individuals.
Moreover, it must be emphasized that the modifications introduced in the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2,

Art. III) relate to the issuance of either a search warrant or warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of
the judge in the issuance thereof (See Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular No. 13 [October
1, 1985] and Circular No. 12 [June 30, 1987]. The modifications introduced deviate in no manner as to
whom the restriction or inhibition against unreasonable search and seizure is directed against. The
restraint stayed with the State and did not shift to anyone else.
Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the
State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that
an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State
would result in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution.
Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected through private seizure
equally applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental as it is, of appellant's
constitutional rights to privacy and communication.
2. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the lower court erred in convicting him
despite the undisputed fact that his rights under the constitution while under custodial investigation were
not observed.
Again, the contention is without merit, We have carefully examined the records of the case and found
nothing to indicate, as an "undisputed fact", that appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights or
that he gave statements without the assistance of counsel. The law enforcers testified that
accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional rights. It is presumed that they have regularly
performed their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies should be given full faith and credence,
there being no evidence to the contrary. What is clear from the records, on the other hand, is that
appellant refused to give any written statement while under investigation as testified by Atty. Lastimoso of
the NBI, Thus:
Fiscal Formoso:
You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job Reyes. What about the accused here, did you investigate
the accused together with the girl?
WITNESS:
Yes, we have interviewed the accused together with the girl but the accused availed of his constitutional
right not to give any written statement, sir. (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 62; Original Records, p. 240)
The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution was not contradicted by the defense on crossexamination. As borne out by the records, neither was there any proof by the defense that appellant gave
uncounselled confession while being investigated. What is more, we have examined the assailed judgment
of the trial court and nowhere is there any reference made to the testimony of appellant while under
custodial investigation which was utilized in the finding of conviction. Appellant's second assignment of
error is therefore misplaced.
3. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error, appellant would like us to believe that he was not
the owner of the packages which contained prohibited drugs but rather a certain Michael, a German
national, whom appellant met in a pub along Ermita, Manila: that in the course of their 30-minute
conversation, Michael requested him to ship the packages and gave him P2,000.00 for the cost of the
shipment since the German national was about to leave the country the next day (October 15, 1987, TSN,
pp. 2-10).
Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find appellant's disclaimer as incredulous, self-serving and
contrary to human experience. It can easily be fabricated. An acquaintance with a complete stranger
struck in half an hour could not have pushed a man to entrust the shipment of four (4) parcels and shell
out P2,000.00 for the purpose and for appellant to readily accede to comply with the undertaking without
first ascertaining its contents. As stated by the trial court, "(a) person would not simply entrust contraband
and of considerable value at that as the marijuana flowering tops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a
complete stranger like the Accused. The Accused, on the other hand, would not simply accept such
undertaking to take custody of the packages and ship the same from a complete stranger on his mere sayso" (Decision, p. 19, Rollo, p. 91). As to why he readily agreed to do the errand, appellant failed to explain.
Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative self-serving evidence which
deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989]; People vs. Sariol,
174 SCRA 237 [1989]).
Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect considering that, as per records of the Interpol, he was
previously convicted of possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in the Federal Republic of Germany on
January 1, 1982 and that the consignee of the frustrated shipment, Walter Fierz, also a Swiss national, was
likewise convicted for drug abuse and is just about an hour's drive from appellant's residence in Zurich,
Switzerland (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 66; Original Records, p. 244; Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 93).
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be
credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable
under the circumstances (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968], citing Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37 N.J. Eg. 130;
see also People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA 651 [1989]; People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327 [1983]); Castaares v. CA,
92 SCRA 567 [1979]). As records further show, appellant did not even bother to ask Michael's full name, his
complete address or passport number. Furthermore, if indeed, the German national was the owner of the
merchandise, appellant should have so indicated in the contract of shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records, p.
40). On the contrary, appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to
the presumption that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by
him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim otherwise.
Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial court in rendering the assailed judgment.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-45081

July 15, 1936
JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,
vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR,
respondents.
Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for respondent Electoral Commission.
Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf.
No appearance for other respondents.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ
of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from taking
further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against the election of said
petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas.
The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted by the respondents are as follows:
(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro
Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the
National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas;
(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect
of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of votes;
(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office;
(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled, passed the following
resolution:
[No. 8]
RESOLUCION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS CONTRA QUIENES NO SE HA
PRESENTADO PROTESTA.
Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados contra quienes no se hubiere presentado
debidamente una protesta antes de la adopcion de la presente resolucion sean, como por la presente, son
aprobadas y confirmadas.
Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935.
(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a
"Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed
after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-things, that said respondent
be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election
of said position be nullified;
(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of which
provides:
6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no se haya presentado en o antes de este dia.

(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in the
aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that
Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was
adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which
protests against the election of its members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for
its object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in question
was filed out of the prescribed period;
(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion of
Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest
against the election of a member of the National Assembly after confirmation;
(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply" to the aforesaid
"Answer to the Motion of Dismissal";
(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on
January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest."
The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for the issuance of the writ prayed for:
(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the electoral Commission solely as regards the
merits of contested elections to the National Assembly;
(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to regulate the proceedings of said
election contests, which power has been reserved to the Legislative Department of the Government or the
National Assembly;
(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in pursuance of the Constitution, whose exclusive
jurisdiction relates solely to deciding the merits of controversies submitted to them for decision and to
matters involving their internal organization, the Electoral Commission can regulate its proceedings only if
the National Assembly has not availed of its primary power to so regulate such proceedings;
(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is, therefore, valid and should be respected and obeyed;
(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the ordinance appended to the Constitution and paragraph 6 of
article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the United States) as well as under
section 1 and 3 (should be sections 1 and 2) of article VIII of the Constitution, this Supreme Court has
jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental question herein raised because it involves an interpretation of
the Constitution of the Philippines.
On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in behalf of the respondent
Electoral Commission interposing the following special defenses:
(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the
Legislative Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly"; that in adopting its resolution of
December 9, 1935, fixing this date as the last day for the presentation of protests against the election of
any member of the National Assembly, it acted within its jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the
implied powers granted it by the Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations essential to carry out the
power and functions conferred upon the same by the fundamental law; that in adopting its resolution of
January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the petitioner to dismiss the election protest in question, and
declaring itself with jurisdiction to take cognizance of said protest, it acted in the legitimate exercise of its
quasi-judicial functions a an instrumentality of the Legislative Department of the Commonwealth
Government, and hence said act is beyond the judicial cognizance or control of the Supreme Court;
(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the
members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed, could not and did not
deprive the electoral Commission of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of election protests filed within the
time that might be set by its own rules:
(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with quasi-judicial functions, created by the
Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department, and is not an "inferior tribunal, or
corporation, or board, or person" within the purview of section 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
against which prohibition would lie.
The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer in his own behalf on March 2, 1936,
setting forth the following as his special defense:
(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, there
was no existing law fixing the period within which protests against the election of members of the National
Assembly should be filed; that in fixing December 9, 1935, as the last day for the filing of protests against
the election of members of the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission was exercising a power
impliedly conferred upon it by the Constitution, by reason of its quasi-judicial attributes;
(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest before the Electoral Commission on December 9,
1935, the last day fixed by paragraph 6 of the rules of the said Electoral Commission;
(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired jurisdiction over the protest filed by said respondent
and over the parties thereto, and the resolution of the Electoral Commission of January 23, 1936, denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss said protest was an act within the jurisdiction of the said commission, and is
not reviewable by means of a writ of prohibition;
(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires confirmation by the National Assembly of the election
of its members, and that such confirmation does not operate to limit the period within which protests
should be filed as to deprive the Electoral Commission of jurisdiction over protest filed subsequent thereto;
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity created by the Constitution, endowed with
quasi-judicial functions, whose decision are final and unappealable;

( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is not an inferior tribunal, corporation,
board or person, within the terms of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that neither
under the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of article II (should be article VIII) of the Constitution and
paragraph 13 of section 1 of the Ordinance appended thereto could it be subject in the exercise of its
quasi-judicial functions to a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court;
(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the united
States) has no application to the case at bar.
The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was submitted for decision, the petitioner
prayed for the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction against the respondent Electoral Commission
which petition was denied "without passing upon the merits of the case" by resolution of this court of
March 21, 1936.
There was no appearance for the other respondents.
The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be reduced to the following two principal propositions:
1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the
cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?
We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon the merits of the controversy. However, the
question of jurisdiction having been presented, we do not feel justified in evading the issue. Being a case
prim impressionis, it would hardly be consistent with our sense of duty to overlook the broader aspect of
the question and leave it undecided. Neither would we be doing justice to the industry and vehemence of
counsel were we not to pass upon the question of jurisdiction squarely presented to our consideration.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does
not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided
for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government. For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a
check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is
subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to
approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The
President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other
hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its
Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of
a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to
determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and
to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain
extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn,
with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its
power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to
the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and
interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to
say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political
excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely
obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called
upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the
integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much
as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument
which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government
intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and
subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in
no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these
restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided
for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels, for then the
distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the
principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitation and restrictions
embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States
where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating
power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by
popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating
power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and
extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the
rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature,

but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is
involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the
Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be
exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional
question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and
barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this
manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More
than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because
the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination
of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through
their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the governments of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought not
the less to be remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief
palladium of constitutional liberty . . . the people who are authors of this blessing must also be its
guardians . . . their eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the
authority of their constitution." In the Last and ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our
government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in
consultation rooms and court chambers.
In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the
election of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by
resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, notwithstanding the previous
confirmation made by the National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the resolution
of the National Assembly has the effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to entertain
protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, submitted
after December 3, 1935, then the resolution of the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere
surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the respondents, the Electoral Commission has the
sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National Assembly, then the resolution of
December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last day for filing protests
against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature
between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. From the
very nature of the republican government established in our country in the light of American experience
and of our own, upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of
interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission, as we shall
have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to
determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the
limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism
adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is
not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the
fundamental law between department powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined
by the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other European types
of constitutional government, the framers of our constitution adopted the American type where the written
constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In some countries which have
declined to follow the American example, provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting
the courts from exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of
what otherwise would be the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition courts are bound to assume
what is logically their function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides that
courts shall have no power to examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, chap. IV). The former Austrian
Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries whose constitutions are silent in this respect,
courts have assumed this power. This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in
Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic,
February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitutional of the Republic of 1931) especial
constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of
the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of
authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of the
controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and undetermined,
would not a void be thus created in our constitutional system which may be in the long run prove
destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret,
so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are
clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission and the subject mater of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the
character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now proceed to pass upon the second proposition
and determine whether the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, and in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed

against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation thereof by the
National Assembly on December 3, 1935. As able counsel for the petitioner has pointed out, the issue
hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall
be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second
largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly." It is imperative, therefore, that we delve into the origin and history of
this constitutional provision and inquire into the intention of its framers and the people who adopted it so
that we may properly appreciate its full meaning, import and significance.
The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying
down the rule that "the assembly shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its
members", was taken from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the Constitution of the United States providing
that "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members, . . . ."
The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the insertion of the word
"sole" as follows: "That the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of
the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members . . ." apparently in order to emphasize
the exclusive the Legislative over the particular case s therein specified. This court has had occasion to
characterize this grant of power to the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, as
"full, clear and complete" (Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)
The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for the purpose of deciding contested
elections to the legislature was taken by the sub-committee of five appointed by the Committee on
Constitutional Guarantees of the Constitutional Convention, which sub-committee submitted a report on
August 30, 1934, recommending the creation of a Tribunal of Constitutional Security empowered to hear
legislature but also against the election of executive officers for whose election the vote of the whole
nation is required, as well as to initiate impeachment proceedings against specified executive and judicial
officer. For the purpose of hearing legislative protests, the tribunal was to be composed of three justices
designated by the Supreme Court and six members of the house of the legislature to which the contest
corresponds, three members to be designed by the majority party and three by the minority, to be
presided over by the Senior Justice unless the Chief Justice is also a member in which case the latter shall
preside. The foregoing proposal was submitted by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees to the
Convention on September 15, 1934, with slight modifications consisting in the reduction of the legislative
representation to four members, that is, two senators to be designated one each from the two major
parties in the Senate and two representatives to be designated one each from the two major parties in the
House of Representatives, and in awarding representation to the executive department in the persons of
two representatives to be designated by the President.
Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also preparing its report. As submitted to the
Convention on September 24, 1934 subsection 5, section 5, of the proposed Article on the Legislative
Department, reads as follows:
The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of either house and all cases contesting the
election of any of their members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, constituted, as to each
House, by three members elected by the members of the party having the largest number of votes therein,
three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and as to its
Chairman, one Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice.
The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with comprehensive jurisdiction as proposed by
the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees which was probably inspired by the Spanish plan (art. 121,
Constitution of the Spanish Republic of 1931), was soon abandoned in favor of the proposition of the
Committee on Legislative Power to create a similar body with reduced powers and with specific and limited
jurisdiction, to be designated as a Electoral Commission. The Sponsorship Committee modified the
proposal of the Committee on Legislative Power with respect to the composition of the Electoral
Commission and made further changes in phraseology to suit the project of adopting a unicameral instead
of a bicameral legislature. The draft as finally submitted to the Convention on October 26, 1934, reads as
follows:
(6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and all cases
contesting the election of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of
three members elected by the party having the largest number of votes in the National Assembly, three
elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and three justices of the
Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of said
justices.
During the discussion of the amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo, and others, proposing
to strike out the whole subsection of the foregoing draft and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "The
National Assembly shall be the soled and exclusive judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of the
Members", the following illuminating remarks were made on the floor of the Convention in its session of
December 4, 1934, as to the scope of the said draft:
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Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here as to the scope of the meaning of the first four lines,
paragraph 6, page 11 of the draft, reading: "The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the
National Assembly and all cases contesting the election of any of its Members shall be judged by an
Electoral Commission, . . ." I should like to ask from the gentleman from Capiz whether the election and

qualification of the member whose elections is not contested shall also be judged by the Electoral
Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of the members, there is nothing to be judged; that is
why the word "judge" is used to indicate a controversy. If there is no question about the election of a
member, there is nothing to be submitted to the Electoral Commission and there is nothing to be
determined.
Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also that the Electoral Commission shall confirm also the
election of those whose election is not contested?
Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the gentleman knows, the action of the House of
Representatives confirming the election of its members is just a matter of the rules of the assembly. It is
not constitutional. It is not necessary. After a man files his credentials that he has been elected, that is
sufficient, unless his election is contested.
Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is sufficient, as we have observed that for purposes of the
auditor, in the matter of election of a member to a legislative body, because he will not authorize his pay.
Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to the municipal president who is elected? What happens
with regards to the councilors of a municipality? Does anybody confirm their election? The municipal
council does this: it makes a canvass and proclaims in this case the municipal council proclaims who has
been elected, and it ends there, unless there is a contest. It is the same case; there is no need on the part
of the Electoral Commission unless there is a contest. The first clause refers to the case referred to by the
gentleman from Cavite where one person tries to be elected in place of another who was declared elected.
From example, in a case when the residence of the man who has been elected is in question, or in case the
citizenship of the man who has been elected is in question.
However, if the assembly desires to annul the power of the commission, it may do so by certain maneuvers
upon its first meeting when the returns are submitted to the assembly. The purpose is to give to the
Electoral Commission all the powers exercised by the assembly referring to the elections, returns and
qualifications of the members. When there is no contest, there is nothing to be judged.
Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated.
Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr. Delegate.
Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as that propounded by the gentleman from Ilocos Norte
when I arose a while ago. However I want to ask more questions from the delegate from Capiz. This
paragraph 6 on page 11 of the draft cites cases contesting the election as separate from the first part of
the sections which refers to elections, returns and qualifications.
Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact the cases of contested elections are already
included in the phrase "the elections, returns and qualifications." This phrase "and contested elections"
was inserted merely for the sake of clarity.
Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral Commission, at its own instance, refuse to confirm
the elections of the members."
Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a protest.
Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman yield?
THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he so desires.
Mr. ROXAS. Willingly.
Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz believe that unless this power is granted to the
assembly, the assembly on its own motion does not have the right to contest the election and qualification
of its members?
Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman is right. If this draft is retained as it is, even if twothirds of the assembly believe that a member has not the qualifications provided by law, they cannot
remove him for that reason.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only be retained by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.
Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the qualifications of the members.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of the assembly has the right to question the eligibility
of its members?
Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the eligibility, he must go to the Electoral Commission and
make the question before the Electoral Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall decide whether the election is contested or not
contested.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose.
Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be informed if the Electoral Commission has power and authority
to pass upon the qualifications of the members of the National Assembly even though that question has
not been raised.
Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no power, because they can only judge.
In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft reading "The election, returns and qualifications
of the members of the National Assembly and" was eliminated by the Sponsorship Committee in response
to an amendment introduced by Delegates Francisco, Ventura, Vinzons, Rafols, Lim, Mumar and others. In
explaining the difference between the original draft and the draft as amended, Delegate Roxas speaking
for the Sponsorship Committee said:
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Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, seor Presidente, consiste solamente en obviar la objecion apuntada por varios
Delegados al efecto de que la primera clausula del draft que dice: "The elections, returns and qualifications

of the members of the National Assembly" parece que da a la Comision Electoral la facultad de determinar
tambien la eleccion de los miembros que no ha sido protestados y para obviar esa dificultad, creemos que
la enmienda tien razon en ese sentido, si enmendamos el draft, de tal modo que se lea como sigue: "All
cases contesting the election", de modo que los jueces de la Comision Electoral se limitaran solamente a
los casos en que haya habido protesta contra las actas." Before the amendment of Delegate Labrador was
voted upon the following interpellation also took place:
El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera
El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el Comite?
El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.
El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres miembros a la mayoria, y otros tres a la minoria y tres a
la Corte Suprema, no cree Su Seoria que esto equivale practicamente a dejar el asunto a los miembros
del Tribunal Supremo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal o la Commission esta constituido en esa forma, tanto los
miembros de la mayoria como los de la minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Suprema consideraran
la cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que el partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunfo.
El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Seoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los de la mayoria
como los de la minoria prescindieran del partidismo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo.
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The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo and others seeking to restore the power to
decide contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly to
the National Assembly itself, was defeated by a vote of ninety-eight (98) against fifty-six (56).
In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft by reducing the
representation of the minority party and the Supreme Court in the Electoral Commission to two members
each, so as to accord more representation to the majority party. The Convention rejected this amendment
by a vote of seventy-six (76) against forty-six (46), thus maintaining the non-partisan character of the
commission.
As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to read as follows:
(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly
shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three members elected by the party having the
largest number of votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the members of the party having the
second largest number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice,
the Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.
The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted revised it as follows:
SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall
be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second
largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its chairman. The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the
National Assembly.
When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on February 8, 1935, the Style Committee, through
President Recto, to effectuate the original intention of the Convention, agreed to insert the phrase "All
contests relating to" between the phrase "judge of" and the words "the elections", which was accordingly
accepted by the Convention.
The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
legislature long lodged in the legislative body, to an independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is by
no means a mere experiment in the science of government.
Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies (ninth edition, chapter VI, pages 57, 58), gives a
vivid account of the "scandalously notorious" canvassing of votes by political parties in the disposition of
contests by the House of Commons in the following passages which are partly quoted by the petitioner in
his printed memorandum of March 14, 1936:
153. From the time when the commons established their right to be the exclusive judges of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of their members, until the year 1770, two modes of proceeding prevailed, in
the determination of controverted elections, and rights of membership. One of the standing committees
appointed at the commencement of each session, was denominated the committee of privileges and
elections, whose functions was to hear and investigate all questions of this description which might be
referred to them, and to report their proceedings, with their opinion thereupon, to the house, from time to
time. When an election petition was referred to this committee they heard the parties and their witnesses
and other evidence, and made a report of all the evidence, together with their opinion thereupon, in the
form of resolutions, which were considered and agreed or disagreed to by the house. The other mode of
proceeding was by a hearing at the bar of the house itself. When this court was adopted, the case was
heard and decided by the house, in substantially the same manner as by a committee. The committee of
privileges and elections although a select committee. The committee of privileges and elections although a
select committee was usually what is called an open one; that is to say, in order to constitute the
committee, a quorum of the members named was required to be present, but all the members of the
house were at liberty to attend the committee and vote if they pleased.
154. With the growth of political parties in parliament questions relating to the right of membership
gradually assumed a political character; so that for many years previous to the year 1770, controverted
elections had been tried and determined by the house of commons, as mere party questions, upon which
the strength of contending factions might be tested. Thus, for Example, in 1741, Sir Robert Walpole, after

repeated attacks upon his government, resigned his office in consequence of an adverse vote upon the
Chippenham election. Mr. Hatsell remarks, of the trial of election cases, as conducted under this system,
that "Every principle of decency and justice were notoriously and openly prostituted, from whence the
younger part of the house were insensibly, but too successfully, induced to adopt the same licentious
conduct in more serious matters, and in questions of higher importance to the public welfare." Mr. George
Grenville, a distinguished member of the house of commons, undertook to propose a remedy for the evil,
and, on the 7th of March, 1770, obtained the unanimous leave of the house to bring in a bill, "to regulate
the trial of controverted elections, or returns of members to serve in parliament." In his speech to explain
his plan, on the motion for leave, Mr. Grenville alluded to the existing practice in the following terms:
"Instead of trusting to the merits of their respective causes, the principal dependence of both parties is
their private interest among us; and it is scandalously notorious that we are as earnestly canvassed to
attend in favor of the opposite sides, as if we were wholly self-elective, and not bound to act by the
principles of justice, but by the discretionary impulse of our own inclinations; nay, it is well known, that in
every contested election, many members of this house, who are ultimately to judge in a kind of judicial
capacity between the competitors, enlist themselves as parties in the contention, and take upon
themselves the partial management of the very business, upon which they should determine with the
strictest impartiality."
155. It was to put an end to the practices thus described, that Mr. Grenville brought in a bill which met with
the approbation of both houses, and received the royal assent on the 12th of April, 1770. This was the
celebrated law since known by the name of the Grenville Act; of which Mr. Hatsell declares, that it "was
one of the nobles works, for the honor of the house of commons, and the security of the constitution, that
was ever devised by any minister or statesman." It is probable, that the magnitude of the evil, or the
apparent success of the remedy, may have led many of the contemporaries of the measure to the
information of a judgement, which was not acquiesced in by some of the leading statesmen of the day,
and has not been entirely confirmed by subsequent experience. The bill was objected to by Lord North, Mr.
De Grey, afterwards chief justice of the common pleas, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Dyson, who had been clerk of the
house, and Mr. Charles James Fox, chiefly on the ground, that the introduction of the new system was an
essential alteration of the constitution of parliament, and a total abrogation of one of the most important
rights and jurisdictions of the house of commons.
As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the problem of insuring the non-partisan
settlement of the controverted elections of its members by abdicating its prerogative to two judges of the
King's Bench of the High Court of Justice selected from a rota in accordance with rules of court made for
the purpose. Having proved successful, the practice has become imbedded in English jurisprudence
(Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as amended by Parliamentary Elections and
Corrupt Practices Act. 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2; Corrupt and Illegal Practices Preventions Act, 1883
[46 & 47 Vict. c. 51;, s. 70; Expiring Laws Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws of England,
vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of Canada, election contests which were originally heard
by the Committee of the House of Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts. Likewise, in the
Commonwealth of Australia, election contests which were originally determined by each house, are since
1922 tried in the High Court. In Hungary, the organic law provides that all protests against the election of
members of the Upper House of the Diet are to be resolved by the Supreme Administrative Court (Law 22
of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37, par. 6). The Constitution of Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the
Constitution of the Free City of Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest the authority to decide contested
elections to the Diet or National Assembly in the Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding legislative
contests, the Constitution of the German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the Constitution of the
Czechoslovak Republic of February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Grecian Republic of June
2, 1927 (art. 43), all provide for an Electoral Commission.
The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is recruited both from the legislature and the
judiciary is by no means unknown in the United States. In the presidential elections of 1876 there was a
dispute as to the number of electoral votes received by each of the two opposing candidates. As the
Constitution made no adequate provision for such a contingency, Congress passed a law on January 29,
1877 (United States Statutes at Large, vol. 19, chap. 37, pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral
Commission composed of five members elected by the Senate, five members elected by the House of
Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme Court, the fifth justice to be selected by the four
designated in the Act. The decision of the commission was to be binding unless rejected by the two houses
voting separately. Although there is not much of a moral lesson to be derived from the experience of
America in this regard, judging from the observations of Justice Field, who was a member of that body on
the part of the Supreme Court (Countryman, the Supreme Court of the United States and its Appellate
Power under the Constitution [Albany, 1913] Relentless Partisanship of Electoral Commission, p. 25 et
seq.), the experiment has at least abiding historical interest.
The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority
men mature in years and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and political
development of other countries of the world. When , therefore, they deemed it wise to create an Electoral
Commission as a constitutional organ and invested it with the exclusive function of passing upon and
determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must
have done so not only in the light of their own experience but also having in view the experience of other
enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy
certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous
opposition of some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was
approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the approval of

the constitutional the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom and "ultimate
justice of the people". (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)
From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its
totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections
of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and
appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need of determining
legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people, acting through their
delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in
view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set
partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including
in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the
performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although
it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting
within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative
department than to any other. The location of the provision (section 4) creating the Electoral Commission
under Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our Constitution is very indicative. Its compositions is
also significant in that it is constituted by a majority of members of the legislature. But it is a body
separate from and independent of the legislature.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it
had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is
an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a
restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex.
Crim. Rep., 1; State vs. Whisman, 36 S.D., 260; L.R.A., 1917B, 1). If we concede the power claimed in
behalf of the National Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission
and cut off the power of the commission to lay down the period within which protests should be filed, the
grant of power to the commission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such case would be
invested with the power to determine contested cases involving the election, returns and qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative power of the National
Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this
authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with the resultant
inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral
Commission retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without
the necessary means to render that authority effective whenever and whenever the National Assembly has
chosen to act, a situation worse than that intended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The
power to regulate on the part of the National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the
ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by
indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be
permitted.
We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the
importance and necessity of respecting the dignity and independence of the national Assembly as a
coordinate department of the government and of according validity to its acts, to avoid what he
characterized would be practically an unlimited power of the commission in the admission of protests
against members of the National Assembly. But as we have pointed out hereinabove, the creation of the
Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time
with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where
a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one
or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eight ed., vol. I, pp.
138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in
filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules
necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication
to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the Electoral Commission may abuse
its regulative authority by admitting protests beyond any reasonable time, to the disturbance of the
tranquillity and peace of mind of the members of the National Assembly. But the possibility of abuse is not
argument against the concession of the power as there is no power that is not susceptible of abuse. In the
second place, if any mistake has been committed in the creation of an Electoral Commission and in
investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, the remedy is political, not judicial, and must be sought through the
ordinary processes of democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are not intended to be
corrected by the judiciary. We believe, however, that the people in creating the Electoral Commission
reposed as much confidence in this body in the exclusive determination of the specified cases assigned to
it, as they have given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the
agencies of the government were designed by the Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and each
constitutional organ working within its own particular sphere of discretionary action must be deemed to be
animated with the same zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great ends for which they were created by
the sovereign will. That the actuations of these constitutional agencies might leave much to be desired in
given instances, is inherent in the perfection of human institutions. In the third place, from the fact that the

Electoral Commission may not be interfered with in the exercise of its legitimate power, it does not follow
that its acts, however illegal or unconstitutional, may not be challenge in appropriate cases over which the
courts may exercise jurisdiction.
But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the present case, there are considerations of
equitable character that should not be overlooked in the appreciation of the intrinsic merits of the
controversy. The Commonwealth Government was inaugurated on November 15, 1935, on which date the
Constitution, except as to the provisions mentioned in section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into effect. The
new National Assembly convened on November 25th of that year, and the resolution confirming the
election of the petitioner, Jose A. Angara was approved by that body on December 3, 1935. The protest by
the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the petitioner was filed on December 9 of the
same year. The pleadings do not show when the Electoral Commission was formally organized but it does
appear that on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a
resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protest. When, therefore, the National
Assembly passed its resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the
National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had
actually been organized. As a mater of fact, according to certified copies of official records on file in the
archives division of the National Assembly attached to the record of this case upon the petition of the
petitioner, the three justices of the Supreme Court the six members of the National Assembly constituting
the Electoral Commission were respectively designated only on December 4 and 6, 1935. If Resolution No.
8 of the National Assembly confirming non-protested elections of members of the National Assembly had
the effect of limiting or tolling the time for the presentation of protests, the result would be that the
National Assembly on the hypothesis that it still retained the incidental power of regulation in such
cases had already barred the presentation of protests before the Electoral Commission had had time to
organize itself and deliberate on the mode and method to be followed in a matter entrusted to its exclusive
jurisdiction by the Constitution. This result was not and could not have been contemplated, and should be
avoided.
From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members against
whom no protests had been filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not be construed as
a limitation upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While there might have been good reason
for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the time when
the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the
legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its
constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of the members of the National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests.
Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of its members against whose election no protests
have been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral Commission in its
resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by
the respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of the election of any member is not required by the
Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such member. As a matter of fact, certification by the
proper provincial board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat in the national
Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National
Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).
Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of Commons and in the Congress of the United
States, confirmation is neither necessary in order to entitle a member-elect to take his seat. The return of
the proper election officers is sufficient, and the member-elect presenting such return begins to enjoy the
privileges of a member from the time that he takes his oath of office (Laws of England, vol. 12, pp. 331.
332; vol. 21, pp. 694, 695; U. S. C. A., Title 2, secs. 21, 25, 26). Confirmation is in order only in cases of
contested elections where the decision is adverse to the claims of the protestant. In England, the judges'
decision or report in controverted elections is certified to the Speaker of the House of Commons, and the
House, upon being informed of such certificate or report by the Speaker, is required to enter the same
upon the Journals, and to give such directions for confirming or altering the return, or for the issue of a writ
for a new election, or for carrying into execution the determination as circumstances may require (31 & 32
Vict., c. 125, sec. 13). In the United States, it is believed, the order or decision of the particular house itself
is generally regarded as sufficient, without any actual alternation or amendment of the return (Cushing,
Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed., sec. 166).
Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still in force, each house of the Philippine Legislature
fixed the time when protests against the election of any of its members should be filed. This was expressly
authorized by section 18 of the Jones Law making each house the sole judge of the election, return and
qualifications of its members, as well as by a law (sec. 478, Act No. 3387) empowering each house to
respectively prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contest in the election of member of said
bodies. As a matter of formality, after the time fixed by its rules for the filing of protests had already
expired, each house passed a resolution confirming or approving the returns of such members against
whose election no protests had been filed within the prescribed time. This was interpreted as cutting off
the filing of further protests against the election of those members not theretofore contested (Amistad vs.
Claravall [Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, p. 89; Urguello vs. Rama [Third
District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero vs. Festin [Romblon], Sixth Philippine Legislature,
Record First Period, pp. 637-640; Kintanar vs. Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine
Legislature, Record First Period, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar vs. Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine
Legislature, Record First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). The Constitution has repealed section 18
of the Jones Law. Act No. 3387, section 478, must be deemed to have been impliedly abrogated also, for

the reason that with the power to determine all contest relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly, is inseparably linked the authority to prescribe regulations for the
exercise of that power. There was thus no law nor constitutional provisions which authorized the National
Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of contests
against the election of its members. And what the National Assembly could not do directly, it could not do
by indirection through the medium of confirmation.
Summarizing, we conclude:
(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of separation of
power into the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often makes
difficult the delimitation of the powers granted.
(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the
judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally
to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and
functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the
other two departments of the governments.
(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect, each house of
the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective
members.
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature with
respect to contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral
Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and
complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and
regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.
( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent
constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members
of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object would be frustrated if
the National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of
conducting said contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law making
each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and
qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to
prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contests against the election of its members, the time
and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs
and expenses of contest.
(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is not essential before
such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National
Assembly.
(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest
had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its
incidental power to prescribe the time within which protests against the election of any member of the
National Assembly should be filed.
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro
Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National
Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the elections,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within
such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the Electoral Commission as a
constitutional creation and as to the scope and extent of its authority under the facts of the present
controversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine whether the Electoral Commission is an inferior
tribunal, corporation, board or person within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with costs against
the petitioner. So ordered.