FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 209588, February 18, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ERIC ROSAURO Y
BONGCAWIL, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For the consideration of the Court is an appeal of the Decision1 dated 19
June 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00552-MIN,
which affirmed the Judgment2 dated 24 November 2006 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No.
2004-856, finding accused-appellant Eric Rosauro y Bongcawil (accusedappellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu under Sec.
5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (R. A. No. 9165) or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and ordering him to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
In an Amended Information dated 21 February 2005,3 accused-appellant
was charged with violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R. A. No. 9165, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on the 3rd day of July, 2004 at about 5:30 oclock in the afternoon,
more or less, at Purok 3, Barangay Poblacion, Municipality of Villanueva,
Province of Misamis Oriental, Republic of the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being
authorized by law to possess and to sell any dangerous drugs, knowingly,
willfully and feloniously, did then and there, sell and convey to a third
person, who acted as a decoy in a buy bust operation, one (1) sachet of
shabu, containing 0.04 grams (sic) of shabu, which when examined gave
POSITIVE result to test for the presence of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug.4
Upon re-arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.5 Thereafter, pre-trial and trial on the merits ensued.
Based on the records, the prosecutions version of the facts is as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On October 13, 2002, on the basis of unconfirmed reports that accusedappellant Eric Rosauro (Rosauro for brevity) was selling and distributing
drugs, the Provincial Drug Enforcement Unit of Misamis Oriental conducted
a test-buy operation in the Municipality of Villanueva, Misamis Oriental
using a confidential agent. The confidential agent bought shabu from
1

Rosauro at Purok 2, Barangay Katipunan, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental. The

substance bought from Rosauro was examined by the PNP crime laboratory
and yielded a positive result for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
(commonly known as shabu).
On July 3, 2004, the police authorities received information that again drugs
were being distributed at Purok 3, Barangay Poblacion, Villanueva, Misamis
Oriental. Thus, at 5:30 oclock in the afternoon, the Provincial Anti-Illegal
Drugs Special Operation Task Unit (PAID-SOTU) elements led by SPO4
Lorenzo Larot and PO3 Juancho Dizon positioned themselves in the house of
their confidential agent.
There, the PAID-SOTU elements saw Rosauro negotiate with the
confidential agent. In exchange for the one (1) sachet of shabu given by
Rosauro to the confidential agent, the latter gave him a marked 100-peso
bill with serial number YZ7 12579.
After the transaction, Larot and Dizon came out of their hiding place and
arrested Rosauro. Thereafter, the confidential agent handed the sachet to
Larot, who taped it, marked it with the marking Exhibit A, and placed it
inside his pocket. He also took pictures of Rosauro and the drugs. In the
police station, he prepared a Certificate of Inventory and a Request for
Laboratory Examination. Both the drugs and Rosauro were then turned over
to the Crime laboratory.
On the basis of the request made by Larot, Police Chief Inspector Ma. Leocy
Mag-abo, the Forensic Chemical Officer of PNP Crime Laboratory
conducted a laboratory examination on the contents of the sachet, on
accused-appellant, and the marked money. The examination of the seized
item yielded positive result for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu);
while the accused-appellant and the marked money tested positive for the
presence of ultra-violet fluorescent powder.6
For his part, accused-appellant claims that he was merely a victim of
instigation:chanRoblesvirtualLaw
library
Accused-appellant Rosauro, on the other hand, tells a different tale. He
testified that on July 3, 2004, the police asset went to his house four (4)
times and convinced him to do an errand for him. Rosauro refused to buy
shabu as he did not know where to buy one. It was the confidential
informant who told him to buy the prohibited drug from a certain Kael
and to deliver it to the formers house. It was also the informant who gave
the money to Rosauro to buy the shabu. But Rosauro was not able to meet
or buy directly from Kael because it was a young man who got and handed
to him the shabu on the road. When Rosauro went to the house of the
confidential informant as instructed, he was arrested by SPO4 Larot and
2

Dizon. The sachet of shabu was not even recovered from him but from the
confidential informant.7
Finding the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to establish the guilt of
accused-appellant, the RTC rendered a judgment of conviction, viz.:ch
anRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, this Court hereby renders
Judgment finding accused ERIC ROSAURO y BONGCAWIL, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the information for selling and
delivering a sachet of shabu to the poseur buyer a Violation of Section 5,
Article II of R.A. 9165 and imposes a penalty of life imprisonment and a fine
of Five Hundred Thousand (PhP 500,000.00) Pesos and to pay the cost.
The accused ERIC B. ROSAURO who has undergone preventive
imprisonment shall be credited in the service of his sentence consisting of
deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which he has undergone
preventive imprisonment if the detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in
writing to abide by the same disciplinary rule imposed upon convicted
prisoners, except those disqualified by law.
The sachet of shabu, Exh. A is confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
government to be destroyed in accordance with law.8

Accused-appellant appealed before the CA, assigning a lone

error:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT WHEN HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.9
After a review of the records, the CA affirmed the RTC Judgment. The
appellate court ruled that what transpired in the case at bar was an
entrapment and not an instigation;10 that all the elements of illegal sale of
regulated or prohibited drugs were duly proven;11 that the non-presentation
of the confidential agent in court is not fatal;12 that the inconsistencies in
the testimony of the lone witness of the prosecution do not affect the result
of the case;13 and that the apprehending team was able to preserve the
integrity of the subject drug and that the prosecution was able to present
the required unbroken chain in the custody of the subject drug.14 Thus, the
CA held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Judgment dated November 24, 2006 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City in Criminal Case No. 2004-856
is herebyAFFIRMED.15
3

Accused-appellant is now before the Court seeking a review of his

conviction.
After a thorough review of the records, however, we dismiss the appeal.
It is apropos to reiterate here that where there is no showing that the trial
court overlooked or misinterpreted some material facts or that it gravely
abused its discretion, the Court will not disturb the trial courts assessment
of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses since the RTC was in a
better position to assess and weigh the evidence presented during trial.
Settled too is the rule that the factual findings of the appellate court
sustaining those of the trial court are binding on this Court, unless there is
a clear showing that such findings are tainted with arbitrariness,
capriciousness or palpable error.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The RTC and the CA both found the arrest of accused-appellant to be the
result of a legitimate entrapment procedure, and we find nothing in the
records as to warrant a contrary finding. In People v. Bartolome,17 we had
the occasion to discuss the legitimacy of a decoy solicitation, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its
commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was
done at the decoy solicitation of persons seeking to expose the criminal,
or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and
apparently assisting its commission. Especially is this true in that class of
cases where the office is one habitually committed, and the solicitation
merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct.
As here, the solicitation of drugs from appellant by the informant utilized by
the police merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. The police
received an intelligence report that appellant has been habitually dealing in
illegal drugs. They duly acted on it by utilizing an informant to effect a drug
transaction with appellant. There was no showing that the informant
induced the appellant to sell illegal drugs to him.cralawred
Similarly, the presentation of an informant as witness is not regarded as
indispensable to the success of a prosecution of a drug-dealing accused. As
a rule, the informant is not presented in court for security reasons, in view
of the need to protect the informant from the retaliation of the culprit
arrested through his efforts. Thereby, the confidentiality of the informants
identity is protected in deference to his invaluable services to law
enforcement. Only when the testimony of the informant is considered
absolutely essential in obtaining the conviction of the culprit should the
need to protect his security be disregarded.18 In the present case, as the
buy-bust operation was duly witnessed by the Provincial Anti-Illegal Drugs
Special Operation Task Unit (PAID-SOTU) elements led by SPO4 Lorenzo
Larot (SPO4 Larot) and PO3 Juancho Dizon, their testimonies can take the
4

place of that of the confidential informant.

As to whether accused-appellants guilt was established beyond reasonable
doubt, we rule in the affirmative.
In a catena of cases, this Court laid down the essential elements to be duly
established for a successful prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale
of dangerous or prohibited drugs, likeshabu, under Section 5, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object
of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and
payment therefor. Briefly, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer
and the receipt of the marked money by the seller successfully consummate
the buy-bust transaction. What is material, therefore, is the proof that the
transaction or sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of
thecorpus delicti.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Verily, all the elements for a conviction of illegal sale of dangerous or
prohibited drugs were proven by the prosecution: the identity of accusedappellant as the seller, and that of the confidential informant as poseurbuyer were established, as well as the exchange of the sachet of shabu and
the marked money. It was also ascertained that the seized item was positive
for shabu, a dangerous drug, and that the same item was properly identified
in open court by SPO4 Larot. Moreover, the P100.00 bill with serial number
YZ712579, or the subject marked money, as well as the living body of the
accused-appellant revealed a positive result for ultraviolet fluorescent
powder.
Accused-appellant avers that the prosecution was not able to prove
the corpus delicti, and that the statutory safeguards provided for in Sec. 21
of R.A. No. 9165 were not followed.
Indeed, as we held in People v. Torres,20 equally important in every
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs is the
presentation of evidence of the seized drug as the corpus delicti. The
identity of the prohibited drug must be proved with moral certainty. It must
also be established with the same degree of certitude that the substance
bought or seized during the buy-bust operation is the same item offered in
court as exhibit. In this regard, paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R. A.
No. 9165 (the chain of custody rule) provides for safeguards for the
protection of the identity and integrity of dangerous drugs seized, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
5

controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as

instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated,
seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following
manner:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
However, this Court has, in many cases, held that while the chain of custody
should ideally be perfect, in reality it is almost always impossible to obtain
an unbroken chain. The most important factor is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used
to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. Hence, the prosecutions
failure to submit in evidence the physical inventory and photograph of the
seized drugs as required under Article 21 of R. A. No. 9165, will not render
the accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized from him
inadmissible.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The chain of custody is not established solely by compliance with the
prescribed physical inventory and photographing of the seized drugs in the
presence of the enumerated persons. The Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R. A. No. 9165 on the handling and disposition of seized
dangerous drugs states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall
not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items.22 (Italics, emphasis, undescoring omitted)
In the case at bar, after the sale was consummated, the confidential
informant gave the seized item to SPO4 Larot who placed tape on the
sachet and marked it Exhibit A. Upon reaching the police station, SPO4
Larot executed the Certificate of Inventory, as well as the request for
laboratory examination. The request, the specimen, as well as the marked
money and accused-appellant were then brought to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination. They were received by SPO2 Ricardo Maisog,
the Receiving Clerk of the PNP Crime Laboratory Office, who then
forwarded them to Police Inspector Ma. Leocy Jabonillo Mag-abo, the
Forensic Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory.23Moreover, the
seized item was duly identified by SPO4 Larot in open court as the same
item seized from accused-appellant.
Accused-appellants guilt having been established, we likewise affirm the
penalty imposed by the RTC and the CA. Under the law, the offense of illegal
6

sale of shabu carries with it the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a
fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten
Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00), regardless of the quantity and purity of the
substance.24 Thus, the RTC and CA were within bounds when they imposed
the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C. J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and PerlasBernabe, JJ., concur.cralawlawlibrary
Endnotes:
1

Rollo, pp. 3-17;Penned by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting with
Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Jhosep Y. Lopez concurring.
2

CA rollo, pp. 72-75; Penned by Judge Noli T. Catli.

Records, p. 1; The Original Information dated 21 September 2004

reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on the 3rd day of July, 2004 at about 5:30 oclock in the afternoon,
more or less, at Purok 3, Barangay Poblacion, Municipality of Villanueva,
Province of Misamis Oriental, Republic of the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being
authorized by law to possess and to sell any dangerous drugs, knowingly,
willfully and feloniously did then and there sell and convey to a third person
one (1) sachet of Shabu, containing 0.08 grams (sic) of shabu, which when
examined gave POSITIVE result to the test for the presence of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug.cralawred
4
Rollo, p. 6; CA Decision.
5

CA rollo, p. 72; RTC Judgment.

Rollo, p. 3-5; CA Decision.

Id. at 5.

CA rollo, pp. 74-75; RTC Judgment.

Id. at 49; Brief for the Accused-Appellant.

10

Rollo, p. 8; CA Decision.
7

11

Id. at 11-12.

12

Id. at 12.

13

Id. at 13.

14

Id. at 15.

15

Id. at 17.

16

People v. Vasquez, G. R. No. 200304, 15 January 2014, 714 SCRA 78, 101.

17

G. R. No. 191726, 6 February 2013, 690 SCRA 159, 172 citing People v.
Sta. Maria, 545 Phil. 520, 528-529 (2007).
18

19

20

Id. at 175.
People v. Torres, G. R. No. 191730, 5 June 2013, 697 SCRA 452, 462-463.
Id. at 464.

21

People v. Loks, G. R. No. 203433, 27 November 2013, 711 SCRA 187, 196197.
22

People v. Torres, supra note 19 at 465-466.

23

Rollo, p. 15; CA Decision.

24

People v. Torres, supra note 19 at 469.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 207988, March 11, 2015
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BRIAN
MERCADO Y SARMIENTO,Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 04942 affirming the Decision2 in Criminal Case
8

Nos. C-77992 and C-77993 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 120 of Caloocan City. The RTC Decision found accused-appellant
Brian Mercado y Sarmiento (accused-appellant) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
(R.A. No. 9165), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002.
The Facts
The accused-appellant was charged of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165, in two (2) Informations, both dated 31 July 2007, which
respectively read as follows:
Crim. Case No. 77992 (For violation of Section 5, R.A. No. 9165)
That on or about the 27th day of July, 2007 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously sell and deliver to PO3 RAMON GALVEZ, who posed, as
buyer, a plastic sachet containing METHYLAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu) weighing 0.02 gram, a dangerous drug, without
corresponding license or prescription therefore, knowing the same to be
such.3
Crim. Case No. 77993 (For violation of Section 11, R.A. No. 9165)
That on or about the 27th day of July, 2007 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control Two
(2) sachets containing METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu)
weighing 0.02 gram & 0.02 gram, respectively, when subjected for
laboratory examination gave positive result to the tests of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.4
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to said
charges.5 Trial thereafter proceeded.
Based on the evidence presented and on the stipulations and admitted facts
entered into by the parties, the summary of factual findings is stated as
follows:
The Version of the Prosecution
[A]t around 10:00 a.m. on July 27, 2007, acting on a tip from a confidential
informant that accused-appellant was selling shabu, the Station Anti-Illegal
9

Drugs Special Operation Unit (SAID-SOU) of the Philippine National Police

(PNP) organized a buy-bust operation [with] SPO2 Wilfredo Quillan as team
leader, PO3 [Ramon] Galvez as poseur-buyer, and SPO1 [Fernando] Moran,
PO2 Eugene Amaro, PO2 Celso Santos and PO3 Jose Martirez as members.
After SPO2 Quillan briefed the buy-bust team, a pre-operation report was
prepared. PO3 Galvez was provided with two (2) one hundred-peso bills
which he marked on the right portion with his initials RG. Then, the team
and the informant boarded a passenger jeepney and proceeded to Phase 3D, Camarin, Caloocan City. When the informant pointed to accusedappellant, PO3 Galvez approached him and said, [p]re, pa-iskor naman,
offering to buy P200.00 worth ofshabu. He then handed the buy-bust
money and accused-appellant brought out from his pocket three (3) pieces
of plastic sachets, chose one (1) sachet and gave it to PO3 Galvez. As the
sale was already consummated, PO3 Galvez introduced himself as a police
officer, arrested accused-appellant, and gave the pre-arranged signal to his
companions by scratching his nape. When SPO1 Moran rushed in, PO3
Galvez marked the plastic sachet with BMS/RG and told SPO1 Moran
about the remaining two (2) plastic sachets in accused-appellants pocket.
SPO1 Moran then frisked him and confiscated the items which he marked as
BMS/FM-1 and BMS/FM-2. Thereafter, they brought accused-appellant
and the confiscated items to the SAID-SOU office in Samson Road, Caloocan
City, and turned them over to the investigator, PO2 [Randulfo] Hipolito, who
prepared the corresponding evidence acknowledgment receipt and request
for laboratory examination.
Qualitative examination conducted on the confiscated three (3) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance, each
weighing 0.02 gram, yielded positive for methylampethamine hydrochloride
or shabu, a dangerous drug.6
The Version of the Defense
On July 26, 2007, at around 9:30 to 10:00 in the evening, accused-appellant
returned the jeepney he was driving to the garage of Phase 3-B, Camarin,
Caloocan City. He was walking home when a jeepney with police officers on
board suddenly stopped in front of him. PO3 Galvez asked accusedappellant where he came from. He answered that he just came from driving
his jeepney showing the police officers his drivers license. Accusedappellant was then forced to ride in the jeepney where he saw eight (8)
persons in handcuffs. He was brought to the police station and was told to
produce ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) in exchange for his liberty,
otherwise, a case would be filed against him. Unable to produce the money,
accused-appellant faced the present charges.7
The Ruling of the RTC

10

After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision8 finding the accusedappellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The dispositive portion of which is hereunder
quoted, to wit:
Premises considered, this court finds and so holds that:
(1) The accused Brian Mercado y Sarmiento GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 and
imposes upon him the following:
(a) In Crim. Case No. C-77992, the penalty of Life Imprisonment and a
fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00); and
(b) In Crim. Case No. C-77993, the penalty of Imprisonment of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to Fourteen (14) years and a fine of Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).
The drugs subject matter of these cases are hereby confiscated and
forfeited in favor of the government to be dealt with in accordance with
law.9
The trial court concluded that the evidence presented by the prosecution
sufficiently satisfied the quantum required for accused-appellants
conviction. It declared that the fact of sale was sufficiently established
upon showing the complete detailed manner of negotiation of said sale,
exchange of consideration, and handing of the subject of the sale. The court
a quo ruled that, as long as the police officer went through the operation as
a buyer and his offer was accepted by the accused-appellant, and the
dangerous drugs delivered to the former, the crime is considered
consummated by the delivery of goods.10 Likewise, the testimonies of the
police officers who participated in the buy-bust operation appear credible
and reliable since absence of any showing of ill-motive on their part to
concoct trumped charges, they enjoy the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their duties.11 On the other hand, the denial of the accusedappellant and his mere allegation of extortion were found to be
unsubstantiated by any convincing and credible evidence. Hence, being
considered as negative, weak, and self-serving evidence, accusedappellants bare denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of the
prosecutions witnesses and the physical evidence which supported said
judgment of conviction.12
The Ruling of the CA

11

On intermediate appellate review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision in

convicting the accused-appellant. It ruled that failure to comply with
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 will not render the arrest of the accused illegal,
nor will it result to the inadmissibility in evidence against the accused of the
illegal drugs seized in the course of the entrapment operation. What is of
utmost relevance is the preservation of the integrity and maintenance of the
evidentiary value of the confiscated illegal drugs, for in the end, the same
shall necessarily be the thrust that shall determine the guilt or innocence of
the accused. The prosecution therefore must simply show that the seized
item recovered from appellant was the same item presented in court and
found to be an illegal/prohibited drug. These were all established and
proven beyond reasonable doubt in the instant case.13 Accordingly, the
prosecution was able to sufficiently bear out the statutory elements of the
crime of illegal sale and illegal possession of such drugs committed by
accused-appellant. The disposal on appeal reads:
It is well-settled that objection to the admissibility of evidence cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desire the court to reject
the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Thus, as the
trial was already concluded, [w]e can no longer turn back to find out the
justifiable grounds for the omission of the legal requisites.
In any case, the procedural lapse did not render accused-appellants arrest
illegal or the evidence adduced inadmissible. If there is non-compliance
with Section 21, the issue is not of admissibility, but of weight evidentiary
merit or probative value to be given the evidence. After a scrutiny of the
records, [w]e find the evidence adduced more than sufficient to prove the
charges against accused-appellant. Therefore, considering that no
circumstance exists to put the trial courts findings in error, [w]e apply the
time-honored precept that findings of the trial courts which are factual in
nature and which involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring
errors, gross misapprehension of facts and speculative, arbitrary and
unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings.
FOR THESE REASONS, [w]e DENY the appeal and AFFIRM the assailed
February 23, 2011 Decision of the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court,
Branch 120.14
Moreover, the appellate court emphasized that, during trial, accusedappellant neither suggested that there were lapses in the safekeeping of the
suspected drugs that could affect their integrity and evidentiary value nor
objected to their admissibility. Accused-appellant was then precluded from
raising such issue which must be timely raised during trial.15
Upon elevation of this case before this Court, the Office of the Solicitor
12

General manifested that it will no longer file its supplemental brief and,
instead, will adopt all the arguments in its brief filed before the CA.16 On
the other hand, accused-appellant raised the issue that the court a
quo gravely erred in convicting him notwithstanding the police operatives
patent non-compliance with the strict and mandatory requirements of R.A.
No. 9165.
The Issue
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in finding that the evidence of the
prosecution was sufficient to convict the accused of the alleged sale and
possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, in violation of
Sections 5 and 11, respectively, of R.A. No. 9165.
Our Ruling
We sustain the judgment of conviction.
The Court finds no valid reason to depart from the time-honored doctrine
that where the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, and in this case their
testimonies as well, the findings of the trial court are not to be disturbed
unless the consideration of certain facts of substance and value, which have
been plainly overlooked, might affect the result of the case.17
Upon perusal of the records of the case, we see no reason to reverse or
modify the findings of the RTC on the credibility of the testimony of
prosecutions witnesses, more so in the present case, in which its findings
were affirmed by the CA. It is worthy to mention that, in addition to the
legal presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duty, the
court a quo was in the best position to weigh the evidence presented during
trial and ascertain the credibility of the police officers who testified as to
the conduct of the buy-bust operation and in preserving the integrity of the
seized illegal drug.
This Court has consistently ruled that for the successful prosecution of
offenses involving the illegal sale of drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165, the following elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the
buyer and seller, the object and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor.18 In other words, there is a need to
establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused actually sold and
delivered a prohibited drug to another, and that the former indeed knew
that what he had sold and delivered to the latter was a prohibited drug.19
To reiterate, what is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, plus the
presentation in court of corpus delicti as evidence.20 On the other hand, we
have adhered to the time-honored principle that for illegal possession of
13

regulated or prohibited drugs under Section 11 of the same law, the

prosecution must establish the following elements: (1) the accused is in
possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited or
regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the
accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.21
Undoubtedly, the prosecution had indeed established that there was a buybust operation22 showing that accused-appellant sold and delivered
the shabu for value to PO3 Ramon Galvez (PO3 Galvez), the poseur-buyer.
PO3 Galvez himself testified that there was an actual exchange of the
marked-money and the prohibited drug. Likewise, accused-appellant was
fully aware that what he was selling was illegal and prohibited considering
that when PO3 Galvez told him, pre, pa-iskor naman, the former
immediately answered, magkano?, then when the poseur-buyer replied,
dos lang, it resulted to the production of three (3) pieces of plastic sachets
from accused-appellants pocket. Thereafter, the corpus delicti or the
subject drug was seized, marked, and subsequently identified as a
prohibited drug. Note that there was nothing in the records showing that
he had authority to possess them. Jurisprudence had pronounced
repeatedly that mere possession of a prohibited drug constitutes prima
facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an
accused in the absence of any satisfactory explanation.23 Above all,
accused-appellant likewise failed to present contrary evidence to rebut his
possession of the shabu. Taken collectively, the illegal sale and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs by accused-appellant were indeed
established beyond reasonable doubt.
By way of emphasis, in cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act,
credence should be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution
witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to
have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to
the contrary.24 In this regard, the defense failed to show any ill motive or
odious intent on the part of the police operatives to impute such a serious
crime that would put in jeopardy the life and liberty of an innocent person,
such as in the case of accused-appellant. As a matter of fact, aside from
accused-appellants mere denial and alleged extortion against him, no
evidence was ever presented to prove the truthfulness of the same.
Incidentally, if these were simply trumped-up charges against him, it
remains a question why no administrative charges were brought against the
police officers. Moreover, in weighing the testimonies of the prosecutions
witnesses vis--vis that of the defense, it is a well-settled rule that in the
absence of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial judge, the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses will not
be disturbed on appeal.25
To reiterate, in the absence of any showing that substantial or relevant facts
14

bearing on the elements of the crime have been misapplied or overlooked,

this Court can only accord full credence to such factual assessment of the
trial court which had the distinct advantage of observing the demeanor and
conduct of the witnesses during the trial. Absent any proof of motive to
falsely charge an accused of such a grave offense, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty and the findings of the trial
court with respect to the credibility of witnesses shall prevail over his/her
bare allegation.26
Furthermore, this Court has time and again adopted the chain of custody
rule,27 a method of authenticating evidence which requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be.
This would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such
a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and
from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in
the witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there
had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for
someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.28
It is essential for the prosecution to prove that the prohibited drug
confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance
offered in court as exhibit. Its identity must be established with unwavering
exactitude for it to lead to a finding of guilt.29
Alongside these rulings are our pronouncements, just as consistent, that
failure to strictly comply with the prescribed procedures in the inventory of
seized drugs does not render an arrest of the accused illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is essential is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items,
as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence
of the accused. 30 Thus:
From the point of view of jurisprudence, we are not beating any new path
by holding that the failure to undertake the required photography and
immediate marking of seized items may be excused by the unique
circumstances of a case. In People v. Resurreccion, we already stated that
marking upon immediate confiscation does not exclude the possibility that
marking can be at the police station or office of the apprehending team. In
the cases of People v. Rusiana, People v. Hernandez, andPeople v. GumOyen, the apprehending team marked the confiscated items at the police
station and not at the place of seizure. Nevertheless, we sustained the
conviction because the evidence showed that the integrity and evidentiary
15

value of the items seized had been preserved. To reiterate what we have
held in past cases, we are not always looking for the strict step-by-step
adherence to the procedural requirements; what is important is to ensure
the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items, as these would determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. We
succinctly explained this in People v. Del Monte when we held:
We would like to add that non-compliance with Section 21 of said
law, particularly the making of the inventory and the photographing
of the drugs confiscated and/or seized, will not render the drugs
inadmissible in evidence. Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of
Court, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not
excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to be inadmissible, there
should be a law or rule which forbids its reception. If there is no such law
or rule, the evidence must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary
weight that will [be] accorded it by the courts. x x x
We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule
that will bring about the non-admissibility of the confiscated and/or
seized drugs due to non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act
No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is non-compliance with said
section, is not of admissibility, but of weight evidentiary merit or
probative value to be given the evidence.The weight to be given by
the courts on said evidence depends on the circumstances obtaining in each
case.31 (Emphases supplied and citations omitted)
From the testimonies of the police officers in the case at bench, the
prosecution established that they had custody of the drug seized from the
accused from the moment he was arrested, during the time he was
transported to the police station, and up to the time the drug was submitted
to the crime laboratory for examination. The same witnesses also identified
the seized drug with certainty when this was presented in court. With
regard to the handling of the seized drugs, there are no conflicting
testimonies or glaring inconsistencies that would cast doubt on the integrity
thereof as evidence presented and scrutinized in court. It is therefore safe
to conclude that, to the unprejudiced mind, the testimonies show without a
doubt that the evidence seized from the accused-appellant at the time of the
buy-bust operation was the same one tested, introduced, and testified to in
court. This fact was further bolstered by the stipulations entered into
between the parties as to the testimony of Forensic Chemical Officer of the
Northern Police District Crime Laboratory Office, Caloocan City, Police
Chief Inspector Albert S. Arturo.32 In other words, there is no question as to
the integrity of the evidence against accused-appellant.
Accordingly, we hereby affirm the position taken by the CA when it
expounded on the matter:
16

It is well-settled that objection to the admissibility of evidence cannot be

raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject
the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Thus, as the
trial was already concluded, [w]e can no longer turn back to find out the
justifiable grounds for the omission of the legal requisites.
In any case, the procedural lapse did not render accused-appellants arrest
illegal or the evidence adduced inadmissible. If there is non-compliance
with Section 21, the issue is not of admissibility, but of weight evidentiary
merit or probative value to be given the evidence. After scrutiny of the
records, [w]e find the evidence adduced more than sufficient to prove the
charges against accused-appellant. Therefore, considering that no
circumstance exists to put the trial courts findings in error, [w]e apply the
time-honored precept that findings of the trial courts which are factual in
nature and which involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring
errors, gross misapprehensions of facts and speculative, arbitrary and
unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings.33
Again, although this Court finds that the police officers did not strictly
comply with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165,
such noncompliance did not affect the evidentiary weight of the drug seized
from the accused-appellant, because the chain of custody of the evidence
was shown to be unbroken under the circumstances of the case. As
correctly found by the appellate court:
The following links must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust
operation:first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the
turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the
illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth,
the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the
forensic chemist to the court. A circumspect study of the evidence
movements reveal the integrity and the evidentiary value of the suspected
drugs were safeguarded. PO3 Galvez and SPO1 Moran testified that they
marked the suspected drugs with BMS/RG, BMS/FM-1 and BMS/FM-2
in the presence of accused-appellant immediately upon confiscation. Then,
they brought accused-appellant and the confiscated items to their office,
entrusting custody to investigator PO2 Hipolito. Contrary to accusedappellants claim, there is no hiatus in the third and fourth link in the chain
of custody. The defense admitted that, upon receipt of the items, PO2
Hipolito prepared the corresponding evidence acknowledgment receipt and
request for laboratory examination. The request for laboratory
examination, which the prosecution offered as part of its documentary
evidence, bears a stamp stating PO2 Hipolito was the one who delivered the
marked confiscated items to PNP Crime Laboratory, with forensic chemist
17

PSI Arturo as the receiving officer. PSI Arturo then conducted the
examination which yielded positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu.When the prosecution presented the marked plastic sachets in
court, PO3 Galvez and SPO1 Moran positively identified them as those
recovered from accused-appellant in the buy-bust operation. Considering
that every link was adequately established by the prosecution, the chain of
custody was unbroken.34
In fine, considering the pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution, the
denial and allegation of extortion of the accused-appellant fails. Courts
generally view the defense of denial with disfavor due to the facility with
which an accused can concoct it to suit his or her defense. As evidence that
is both negative and self-serving, this defense cannot attain more credibility
than the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses who testify clearly,
providing thereby positive evidence on the various aspects of the crime
committed.35 Consequently, we find no cogent reason to disturb the
decisions of the RTC and the CA. Accused-appellant Bryan Mercado y
Sarmiento is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and
11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR HC
No. 04942 dated 26 September 2012, is AFFIRMED in all respects.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and PerlasBernabe, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 202687, January 14, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JERIC PAVIA Y
PALIZA @ JERIC AND JUAN BUENDIA Y DELOS REYES @
JUNE, Accused-Appellants.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
For resolution of the Court is the appeal filed by Jeric Pavia and Juan
Buendia (appellants) from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
7 February 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04020. The CA affirmed the
Judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, San Pedro, Laguna
which found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
18

illegal possession of dangerous drugs punishable under Section 13, Article

II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165. Appellants were sentenced to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.cralawred
The Antecedents
On 29 March 2005, at around 6:00 in the evening, a confidential informant
reported to SPO3 Melchor dela Pea (SPO3 Dela Pea) of the San Pedro
Municipal Police Station, San Pedro, Laguna, that a pot session was taking
place at the house of a certain Obet located at Barangay Cuyab, San
Pedro, Laguna. Upon receipt of the information, SPO3 Dela Pea formed a
team to conduct police operations against the suspect. The team was
composed of the confidential informant, PO2 Rommel Bautista (PO2
Bautista), PO3 Jay Parunggao (PO3 Parunggao), PO1 Jifford Signap and
SPO3 Dela Pea as team leader.3chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
At around 9:00 in the evening of the same date, the team proceeded to the
target area. When the team arrived, the members saw that Obets house
was closed. Since the house was not surrounded by a fence, PO2 Bautista
approached the house and peeped through a small opening in a window
where he saw four persons in a circle having a pot session in the living
room. PO3 Parunggao then tried to find a way to enter the house and found
an unlocked door. He entered the house, followed by PO2 Bautista and they
caught the four persons engaged in a pot session by surprise. After they
introduced themselves as police officers, they arrested the four suspects
and seized the drug paraphernalia found at the scene.4 Among those
arrested were herein appellants, from each of whom a plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance were confiscated by PO3 Parunggao
after he conducted a body search on their persons.5 PO3 Parunggao marked
the plastic sachet he seized from appellant Pavia with JP, representing the
initials of Jeric Pavia while that taken from appellant Buendia was marked,
also by PO3 Parunggao, with JB, representing the initials of Juan
Buendia.6 These plastic sachets were transmitted to the crime laboratory for
qualitative examination where they tested positive
forshabu.7chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Consequently, appellants were charged with violation of Section 13, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165 in two separate but identically worded informations
which read:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That on or about 29 March 2005, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province
of Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court
accused without authority of the law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody [of]
METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE, commonly known as shabu, a

19

dangerous drug, weighing zero point zero two (0.02) gram, in the company
of two persons. 8
When arraigned, both appellants pleaded not guilty to the
offense.9chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A joint trial of the cases ensued.
In defense, appellants provided a different version of the incident.
According to them, on the questioned date and time, they were roaming the
streets of Baranggay Cuyab, selling star apples. A prospective buyer of the
fruits called them over to his house and requested them to go inside, to
which they acceded. When they were about to leave the house, several
persons who introduced themselves as policemen arrived and invited
appellants to go with them to the precinct. There, they were incarcerated
and falsely charged with violation of the Comprehensive Drugs Act of
2002.10chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Ruling of the RTC
The trial court found that the prosecution was able to prove the offense
charged through the spontaneous, positive and credible testimony of its
witness. The trial court noted that the police officers carried out a lawful
arrest before they proceeded with the bodily search of appellants.
Moreover, there was no clear and convincing evidence that the team of PO3
Parunggao was inspired by any improper motive when they carried out their
operation. Thus, the testimony of PO2 Bautista on the witness stand,
narrating the events leading to the apprehension of appellants, deserves full
faith and credit.11chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, upon a finding that the
evidence on record support the trial courts conclusion that a lawful arrest,
search and seizure took place, and that the prosecution fully discharged its
burden of establishing, beyond reasonable doubt, all the elements necessary
for the conviction of the offense charged.12chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On the contention of appellants that their warrantless arrest was illegal
and, therefore, the items seized from them as a result of that arrest were
inadmissible in evidence against them, the CA held that this argument
totally lacks merit. According to the CA:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We stress at the outset that the [appellants] failed to question the legality of
their warrantless arrest. The established rule is that an accused [is]
estopped from assailing the legality of [his] arrest if [he] failed to move for
20

the quashing of the Informationagainst [him] before [his] arraignment. Any

objection involving the arrest or the procedure in the courts acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before [he]
enter[s] [his] plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.
In any event, we carefully examined the records and now hold that the
warrantless arrests conducted on [appellants] were valid. Section 5, Rule
113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure lists the situations when a person
may be arrested without a warrant x x x.
xxxx
Paragraph (a) of Section 5 is commonly known as an in flagrante
delicto arrest. For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante
delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
After a careful evaluation of the evidence in its totality, we hold that the
prosecution successfully established that the petitioner was arrested in
flagrante delicto.
We emphasize that the series of events that led the police to the house
where the pot session was conducted and to their arrest were triggered by
a tip from a concerned citizen that a pot session was in progress at the
house of a certain Obet at Baranggay Cuyab, San Pedro, Laguna. Under
the circumstances, the police did not have enough time to secure a search
warrant considering the time element involved in the process (i.e., a pot
session may not be an extended period of time and it was then 9:00 p.m.). In
view of the urgency, SPO3 Melchor dela Pea immediately dispatched his
men to proceed to the identified place to verify the report. At the place, the
responding police officers verified through a small opening in the window
and saw the accused-appellants and their other two (2) companions sniffing
shabu to use the words of PO2 Bautista. There was therefore sufficient
probable cause for the police officers to believe that the accused-appellants
were then and there committing a crime. As it turned out, the accusedappellants indeed possessed and were even using a prohibited drug,
contrary to law. When an accused is caught in flagrante delicto, the police
officers are not only authorized but are duty-bound to arrest him even
without a warrant.
In the course of the arrest and in accordance with police procedures, the
[appellants] were frisked, which search yielded the prohibited drug in their
possession. These circumstances were sufficient to justify the warrantless
search x x x that yielded two (2) heat-sealed plastic sachets of shabu. x x x
21

xxxx
All the x x x requirements for a lawful search and seizure are present in this
case. The police officers had prior justification to be at a certain Obets
place as they were dispatched by their desk officer; they arrested the
[appellants] as they had reason to believe that they were illegally using and
possessing a prohibited drug and drug paraphernalia. The search of the
[appellants] incident to their arrest yielded the confiscated crystalline
substance which later proved to be shabu. In the course of their lawful
intrusion, they inadvertently saw the various drug paraphernalia scattered
in the living room. As these items were plainly visible, the police officers
were justified in seizing them.
xxxx
As correctly found by the trial court, the [appellants'] story is unworthy of
belief. Their denial must fail in the light of the positive identification and
declarations made by the prosecution witness. As stated earlier, PO2
Bautista testified in a straightforward and categorical manner regarding the
identities of the malefactors. He did not waver despite the defense counsel's
rigid questioning.
Courts generally view the defense of denial with disfavor due to the facility
with which an accused can concoct it to suit his or her defense. As evidence
that is both negative and self-serving, this defense cannot attain more
credibility than the testimony of the prosecution witness who testified
clearly, providing thereby positive evidence on the various aspects of the
crime committed. One such positive evidence is the result of the laboratory
examination conducted by the PNP crime Laboratory on the drugs
recovered from the [appellants] which revealed that the confiscated plastic
sachets tested positive for the presence of "shabu: two (2) heated
transparent plastic sachet with markings JB and JP containing 0.02
gram of white crystalline substance each both yielded positive results.13
With respect to appellants claim that the prosecution failed to establish the
chain of custody because the police operatives failed to strictly comply with
Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, the CA has this to
say:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what the proponent claims it to be.
Contrary to what the [appellants] want to portray, the chain of custody of
the seized prohibited drug was shown not to have been broken. After the
22

seizure of the plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance from

the [appellants'] possession and of the various drug paraphernalia in the
living room, the police immediately brought the [appellants] to the police
station, together with the seized items. PO3 Parunggao himself brought
these items to the police station and marked them. The plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance was marked "JB" and "JP". These
confiscated items were immediately turned over by PO2 Bautista to the PNP
Regional Crime Laboratory Office Calabarzon, Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba
City for examination to determine the presence of dangerous drugs. After a
qualitative examination conducted on the specimens, Forensic Chemist
Lorna Ravelas Tria concluded that the plastic sachets recovered from the
accused-appellants tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a
prohibited drug, per Chemistry Report Nos. D-0381-05 and D-0382-05.
When the prosecution presented these marked specimens in court, PO2
Baustista positively identified them to be the same items they seized from
the [appellants] and which PO3 Parunggao later marked at the police
station, from where the seized items were turned over to the laboratory for
examination based on a duly prepared request.
Thus, the prosecution established the crucial link in the chain of custody of
the seized items from the time they were first discovered until they were
brought for examination. Besides, as earlier stated, the [appellants] did not
contest the admissibility of the seized items during the tria1. The integrity
and the evidentiary value of the drugs seized from the accused-appellants
were therefore duly proven not to have been compromised.
Jurisprudence teems with pronouncements that failure to strictly comply,
with Section 2l (1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 does not necessarily render
an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him
inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the
present case, we see substantial compliance by the police with the required
procedure on the custody and control of the confiscated items, thus showing
that the integrity of the seized evidence was not compromised. We refer
particularly to the succession of events established by evidence, to the
overall handling of the seized items by specified individuals, to the test
results obtained, under a situation where no objection to admissibility was
ever raised by the defense. All these, to the unprejudiced mind, show that
the evidence seized were the same evidence tested and subsequently
identified and testified to in court.14 x x x
Our Ruling
We deny the appeal.
23

Appellants are charged under Section 13, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 13. Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social
Gatherings or Meetings. Any person found possessing any dangerous drug
during a party, or at a social gathering or meeting, or in the proximate
company of at least two (2) persons, shall suffer the maximum penalties
provided for in Section 11 of this Act, regardless of the quantity and purity
of such dangerous drugs.
The elements for the illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 13
of R.A. No. 9165 are the same as those for the violation of Section 11 of the
law: (1) possession by the accused of an item or object identified to be a
prohibited or dangerous drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law;
(3) the free and conscious possession of the drug by the accused,15 with the
additional element that (4) the accused possessed the prohibited or
dangerous drug during a social gathering or meeting, or in the company of
at least two persons.
As correctly found by the CA, the evidence for the prosecution showed the
presence of all these elements. The testimony of PO2 Bautista on this point
is determinative:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
q.

When you said PO3 Parunggao saw that the door of the house was not
locked, what did you do?
He entered the house and we followed him, maam [sic].

a.
xx
xx
q. In what part of the house where [sic] this [sic] people engaged in a pot
session?
a. At the sala, maam [sic].
q. And what was their reaction when PO3 Parunggao and the rest of the
team barged in?
a. They were surprised, maam [sic].
xx
xx
q. And what did you do after that?
a. PO3 Parunggao introduced ourselves as police officers, maam [sic].
q. What happened after that?
a. We confiscated the drug paraphernalias [sic] and then PO3 Parunggao
conducted body search and was able to confiscate shabu from the two
of the people there maam [sic].
q. Where were you when PO3 Parunggao conducted a search?
a. I was behind him, maam [sic].
24

q.
a.
q.
a.
q.
a.
q.
a.
q.
a.
q.

Did you see him conducting a search?

Yes, maam [sic].
What did you see him doing?
I saw that he was able to confiscate small plastic sachet containing
shabu, maam [sic].
From whom?
From Jeric Pavia and Juan Buendia, maam [sic].
If this Jeric Pavia is in court right now, will you be able to point to him?
Yes, maam [sic].
Please point to him?
That man in the first row wearing yellow shirt, maam [sic] (pointed to a
person inside the courtroom who, when asked answered by the name of
Jeric Pavia).
You said that you saw PO3 Parunggao confiscated plastic sachet
containing shabu from Jeric Pavia, from what part of his body was he
able to confiscate the same?
From the pocket of Jeric Pavia, maam [sic].

a.
xx
xx
q. You said that PO3 Parunggao confiscated plastic sachet with white
crystalline substance from two person [sic], one was identified as Jeric
Pavia, who was the other one?
a. It was Juan Buendia, maam [sic]
q. Please identify him if he is in court?
a. That man also in the first row, at the right portion, wearing yellow shirt
(pointed to a person who, when asked answered by the name of Juan
Buendia).
q. Where were you when PO3 Parunggao confiscated from Juan Buendia
the plastic sachet of shabu?
a. I was behind him, maam [sic].
xx
xx
q. On [sic] what part of the body of Juan Buendia was the item taken by
Officer Parunggao?
a. Also in [sic] his pocket, maam [sic].16

The same testimony of PO2 Bautista also established the chain of custody of
the prohibited drugs taken from appellants.
Thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
q.

You said that you saw PO3 Parunggao confiscated [sic] plastic sachet
containing shabu from Jeric Pavia, from what part of his body was he
able to confiscate the same?
25

a.
q.
a.
q.
a.
q.
a.
q.
a.
q.
a.
q.
a.
q.

From the pocket of Jeric Pavia, maam [sic].

And do you know what PO3 Parunggao do with the item?
He placed marking on it, maam [sic].
In what place did he put the marking?
At the police station maam [sic].
What markings did he place?
It was marked JP representing the initials of accused Jeric Pavia, maam
[sic].
Where were you when Officer Parunggao placed that marking on the
item?
I was beside him, maam [sic].
Can you describe the plastic sachet?
It is a small transparent plastic sachet which contains white crystalline
substance otherwise known as shabu, maam [sic].
Who was in possession of the plastic sachet from the time PO3
Parunggao took it from the possession of Jeric Pavia up to the police
station?
It was P03 Parunggao, maam [sic].
I am showing to you a plastic sachet with white crystalline substance
with markings JP, please identify the same?
This is the same item confiscated from Jeric Pavia, maam [sic].

a.
xx
xx
q. Did you come to know what Officer Parunggao do with the plastic
sachet confiscated from Juan Buendia?
a. He brought it to the police station, maam [sic].
q. And what did he do with it?
a. He placed the markings JB, maam [sic].
q. Who was in possession of the plastic sachet with markings JB from
Aplaya [where the pot session took place] to the police station?
a. It was PO3 Parunggao, maam.
q. I am showing to you a plastic sachet with white crystalline substance
with markings JB, please identify the same?
a. This is the same item confiscated from Juan Buendia by PO3 Parunggao,
maam [sic].17
It is likewise important to note that it was PO2 Bautista himself who
brought the request18 for laboratory examination of the substance taken
from appellants from the San Pedro Police Station to the PNP Crime
Laboratory in Calamba City, thereby ensuring that the integrity of the
confiscated items are preserved. Thus, the fact that the apprehending team
did not strictly comply with the procedural requirements of Section 21(1),
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 does not necessarily render appellants arrest
26

illegal or the items seized from them inadmissible in evidence.

As held by this Court in the case of People v.
Llanita:19chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RA 9165 and its subsequent Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) do
not require strict compliance as to the chain of custody rule. x x x. We have
emphasized that what is essential is the preservation of the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in
the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Briefly stated, non-compliance with the procedural requirements under RA
9165 and its IRR relative to the custody, photographing, and drug-testing of
the apprehended persons, is not a serious flaw that can render void the
seizures and custody of drugs in a buy-bust operation.
xxxx
x x x. We recognize that the strict compliance with the requirements of
Section 21 may not always be possible under field conditions; the police
operates under varied conditions, and cannot at all times attend to all the
niceties of the procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence.
Finally, both the trial court and the CA rejected appellants defense of denial
and frame-up for failure to substantiate the same.
Indeed, the defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by
this Court with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and
standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violations of the Dangerous Drugs
Act. In order to prosper, the defenses of denial and frame-up must be
proved with strong and convincing evidence. In the case before us,
appellants failed to present sufficient evidence in support of their claims.
Aside from their self-serving assertions, no plausible proof was presented to
bolster their allegations.20 Consequently, in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence that the police officers were inspired by any improper
motive, this Court will not appreciate the defense of denial or frame-up and
instead apply the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty by law enforcement agents.21chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In view of the foregoing, we see no reason to deviate from the welldiscussed decision of the CA, its findings and conclusions having been
supported by both law and applicable jurisprudence.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 7 February 2012
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04020 is AFFIRMED.

27

SO ORDERED.
G. R. No. 171601, April 08, 2015
SPOUSES BONIFACIO AND LUCIA PARAS, Petitioners, v. KIMWA
CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure praying that the assailed Decision2 dated July
4, 2005 and Resolution3 dated February 9, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
Special 20th Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 74682 be reversed and set aside,
and that the Decision4 of Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court, Mandaue
City dated May 16, 2001 in Civil Case No. MAN-2412 be reinstated.5
The trial court's May 16, 2001 Decision ruled in favor of petitioners Spouses
Bonifacio and Lucia Paras (plaintiffs before the Regional Trial Court) in
their action for breach of contract with damages against respondent Kimwa
Construction and Development Corporation (Kimwa).6
The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
trial court's May 16, 2001 Decision and dismissed Spouses Paras'
Complaint.7 The Court of Appeals' assailed Resolution denied Spouses
Paras' Motion for Reconsideration.8
Lucia Paras (Lucia) was a "concessionaire of a sand and gravel permit at
Kabulihan, Toledo City[.]"9Kimwa is a "construction firm that sells concrete
aggregates to contractors and haulers in Cebu."10
On December 6, 1994, Lucia and Kimwa entered into a contract
denominated "Agreement for Supply of Aggregates" (Agreement) where
40,000 cubic meters of aggregates were "allotted"11 by Lucia as supplier to
Kimwa.12 Kimwa was to pick up the allotted aggregates at Lucia's permitted
area in Toledo City13 at P240.00 per truckload.14
The entirety of this Agreement reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
AGREEMENT FOR SUPPLY OF AGGREGATES
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
28

This Agreement made and entered into by and between:

LUCIA PARAS, of legal age, Filipino, married and resident of Poblacion,
Toledo City, Province of Cebu, hereinafter referred to as the SUPPLIER:
-andKIMWA CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., a corporation
duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines with office
address at Subangdaku, Mandaue City, hereinafter represented by its
President MRS. CORAZON Y. LUA, of legal age, Filipino and a resident of
Subangdaku, Mandaue City[,] hereinafter referred to as the CONTRACTOR;
WITNESSETH:
That the SUPPLIER is [sic] Special Permittee of (Rechanelling Block # VI of
Sapang Daco River along Barangay Ilihan) located at Toledo City under the
terms and conditions:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. That the aggregates is [sic] to be picked-up by the
CONTRACTOR at the SUPPLIER [sic] permitted area at the rate
of TWO HUNDRED FORTY (P240.00) PESOS per truck load;
2. That the volume allotted by the SUPPLIER to the CONTRACTOR
is limited to 40,000 cu.m.;
3. That the said Aggregates is [sic] for the exclusive use of the
Contractor;
4. That the terms of payment is Fifteen (15) days after the receipt
of billing;
5. That there is [sic] no modification, amendment, assignment or
transfer of this Agreement after acceptance shall be binding
upon the SUPPLIER unless agreed to in writing by and between
the CONTRACTOR and SUPPLIER.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto affixed our signatures this
6th day of December, 1994 at Mandaue City, Cebu, Philippines.
LUCIA PARAS (sgd.)
CORAZON Y. LUA (sgd.)
Supplier
Contractor15
(Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to the Agreement, Kimwa hauled 10,000 cubic meters of
aggregates. Sometime after this, however, Kimwa stopped hauling
aggregates.16
29

Claiming that in so doing, Kimwa violated the Agreement, Lucia, oined by

her husband, Bonifacio, filed the Complaint17 for breach of contract with
damages that is now subject of this Petition.
In their Complaint, Spouses Paras alleged that sometime in December 1994,
Lucia was approached by Kimwa expressing its interest to purchase gravel
and sand from her.18 Kimwa allegedly asked that it be "assured"19 of 40,000
cubic meters worth of aggregates.20 Lucia countered that her concession
area was due to be rechanneled on May 15, 1995, when her Special Permit
expires.21Thus, she emphasized that she would be willing to enter into a
contract with Kimwa "provided the forty thousand cubic meter[s] w[ould] be
withdrawn or completely extracted and hauled before 15 May
1995[.]"22 Kimwa then assured Lucia that it would take only two to three
months for it to completely haul the 40,000 cubic meters of
aggregates.23 Convinced of Kimwa's assurances, Lucia and Kimwa entered
into the Agreement.24
Spouses Paras added that within a few days, Kimwa was able to extract and
haul 10,000 cubic meters of aggregates. However, after extracting and
hauling this quantity, Kimwa allegedly transferred to the concession area of
a certain Mrs. Remedios dela Torre in violation of their Agreement. They
then addressed demand letters to Kimwa. As these went unheeded, Spouses
Paras filed their Complaint.25
In its Answer,26 Kimwa alleged that it never committed to obtain 40,000
cubic meters of aggregates from Lucia. It argued that the controversial
quantity of 40,000 cubic meters represented only an upper limit or the
maximum quantity that it could haul.27 It likewise claimed that it neither
made any commitment to haul 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates before
May 15, 1995 nor represented that the hauling of this quantity could be
completed in two to three months.28 It denied that the hauling of 10,000
cubic meters of aggregates was completed in a matter of days and
countered that it took weeks to do so. It also denied transferring to the
concession area of a certain Mrs. Remedios dela Torre.29
Kimwa asserted that the Agreement articulated the parties' true intent that
40,000 cubic meters was a maximum limit and that May 15, 1995 was never
set as a deadline. Invoking the Parol Evidence Rule, it insisted that Spouses
Paras were barred from introducing evidence which would show that the
parties had agreed differently.30
On May 16, 2001, the Regional Trial Court rendered the Decision in favor of
Spouses Paras. The trial court noted that the Agreement stipulated that the
allotted aggregates were set aside exclusively for Kimwa. It reasoned that it
was contrary to human experience for Kimwa to have entered into an
Agreement with Lucia without verifying the latter's authority as a
30

concessionaire.31 Considering that the Special Permit32 granted to Lucia

(petitioners' Exhibit "A" before the trial court) clearly indicated that her
authority was good for only six (6) months from November 14, 1994, the
trial court noted that Kimwa must have been aware that the 40,000 cubic
meters of aggregates allotted to it must necessarily be hauled by May 15,
1995. As it failed to do so, it was liable to Spouses Paras for the total sum of
P720,000.00, the value of the 30,000 cubic-meters of aggregates that
Kimwa did not haul, in addition to attorney's fees and costs of suit.33
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the Regional Trial Court's
Decision. It faulted the trial court for basing its findings on evidence
presented which were supposedly in violation of the Parol Evidence Rule. It
noted that the Agreement was clear that Kimwa was under no obligation to
haul 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates by May 15, 1995.34
In a subsequent Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied reconsideration to
Spouses Paras.35
Hence, this Petition was filed.
The issue for resolution is whether respondent Kimwa Construction and
Development Corporation is liable to petitioners Spouses Paras for
(admittedly) failing to haul 30,000 cubic meters of aggregates from
petitioner Lucia Paras' permitted area by May 15, 1995.
To resolve this, it is necessary to determine whether petitioners Spouses
Paras were able to establish that respondent Kimwa was obliged to haul a
total of 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates on or before May 15, 1995.
We reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate that of the
Regional Trial Court. Respondent Kimwa is liable for failing to haul the
remainder of the quantity which it was obliged to acquire from petitioner
Lucia Paras.
Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides for the Parol
Evidence Rule, the rule on admissibility of documentary evidence when the
terms of an agreement have been reduced into
writing:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of an
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all
the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of
the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the
31

terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in his

pleading:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written
agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors
in interest after the execution of the written agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills.
Per this rule, reduction to written form, regardless of the formalities
observed,36 "forbids any addition to, or contradiction of, the terms of a
written agreement by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that
different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the
written contract."37
This rule is animated by a perceived wisdom in deferring to the contracting
parties' articulated intent. In choosing to reduce their agreement into
writing, they are deemed to have done so meticulously and carefully,
employing specific frequently, even technical language as are
appropriate to their context. From an evidentiary standpoint, this is also
because "oral testimony . . . coming' from a party who has an interest in the
outcome of the case, depending exclusively on human memory, is not as
reliable as written or documentary evidence. Spoken words could be
notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which speaks of a uniform
language."38 As illustrated in Abella v. Court of
Appeals:39ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Without any doubt, oral testimony as to a certain fact, depending as it does
exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary
evidence. "I would sooner trust the smallest slip of paper for truth," said
Judge Limpkin of Georgia, "than the strongest and most retentive memory
ever bestowed on mortal man." This is especially true in this case where
such oral testimony is given by a party to the case who has an interest in its
outcome, and by a witness who claimed to have received a commission from
the petitioner.40cralawlawlibrary
This, however, is merely a general rule. Provided that a party puts in issue
in its pleading any of the four (4) items enumerated in the second
paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9, "a party may present evidence to modify,
explain or add to the terms of the agreement[.]"41 Raising any of these items
as an issue in a pleading such that it falls under the exception is not limited
to the party initiating an action. In Philippine National Railways v. Court of
First Instance of Albay,42 this court noted that "if the defendant set up the
affirmative defense that the contract mentioned in the complaint does not
32

express the true agreement of the parties, then parol evidence is admissible
to prove the true agreement of the parties[.]"43 Moreover, as with all
possible objections to the admission of evidence, a party's failure to timely
object is deemed a waiver, and parol evidence may then be entertained.
Apart from pleading these exceptions, it is equally imperative that the parol
evidence sought to be introduced points to the conclusion proposed by the
party presenting it. That is, it must be relevant, tending to "induce belief in
[the] existence"44 of the flaw, true intent, or subsequent extraneous terms
averred by the party seeking to introduce parol evidence.
In sum, two (2) things must be established for parol evidence to be
admitted: first, that the existence of any of the four (4) exceptions has been
put in issue in a party's pleading or has not been objected to by the adverse
party; and second, that the parol evidence sought to be presented serves to
form the basis of the conclusion proposed by the presenting
party.cralawlawlibrary
II
Here, the Court of Appeals found fault in the Regional Trial Court for basing
its findings "on the basis of evidence presented in violation of the parol
evidence rule."45 It proceeded to fault petitioners Spouses Paras for showing
"no proof of [respondent Kimwa's] obligation."46 Then, it stated that "[t]he
stipulations in the agreement between the parties leave no room for
interpretation."47
The Court of Appeals is in serious error.
At the onset, two (2) flaws in the the Court of Appeals' reasoning must be
emphasized. First, it is inconsistent to say, on one hand, that the trial court
erred on the basis of "evidence presented"48(albeit supposedly in violation of
the Parol Evidence Rule), and, on the other, that petitioners Spouses Paras
showed "no proof."49 Second, without even accounting for the exceptions
provided by Rule 130, Section 9, the Court of Appeals immediately
concluded that whatever evidence petitioners Spouses Paras presented was
in violation of the Parol Evidence Rule.
Contrary to the Court of Appeal's conclusion, petitioners Spouses Paras
pleaded in the Complaint they filed before the trial court a mistake or
imperfection in the Agreement, as well as the Agreement's failure to
express the true intent of the parties. Further, respondent Kimwa, through
its Answer, also responded to petitioners Spouses Paras' pleading of these
issues. This is, thus, an exceptional case allowing admission of parol
evidence.

33

Paragraphs 6 to 10 of petitioners' Complaint

read:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
6. Sensing that the buyers-contractqrs and haulers alike could easily
consumed [sic] the deposits defendant proposed to the plaintiff-wife
that it be assured of a forty thousand (40,000) cubic meter [sic];
7. Plaintiff countered that the area is scheduled to be rechanneled on 15
May 1995 and by that time she will be prohibited to sell the
aggregates;
8. She further told the defendant that she would be willing to enter into
a contract provided the forty thousand cubic meter [sic] will be
withdrawn or completely extracted and hauled before 15 May 1995,
the scheduled rechanneling:
9. Defendant assured her that it will take them only two to three months
to haul completely the desired volume as defendant has all the trucks
needed;
10.
Convinced of the assurances, plaintiff-wife and the defendant
entered into a contract for the supply of the aggregates sometime on
6 December 1994 or thereabouts, at a cost of Two Hundred Forty
(P240.00) Pesos per truckload[.]50
It is true that petitioners Spouses Paras' Complaint does not specifically
state words and phrases such as "mistake," "imperfection," or "failure to
express the true intent of the parties." Nevertheless, it is evident that the
crux of petitioners Spouses Paras' Complaint is their assertion that the
Agreement "entered into on 6 December 1994 or thereabouts"51 was
founded on the parties' supposed understanding that the quantity of
aggregates allotted in favor of respondent Kimwa must be hauled by May
15, 1995, lest such hauling be rendered impossible by the rechanneling of
petitioner Lucia Paras' permitted area. This assertion is the very foundation
of petitioners' having come to court for relief.
Proof of how petitioners Spouses Paras successfully pleaded and put this in
issue in their Complaint is how respondent Kimwa felt it necessary to
respond to it or address it in its Answer. Paragraphs 2 to 5 of respondent
Kimwa's Answer read:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
2. The allegation in paragraph six of the complaint is admitted subject to
the qualification that when defendant offered to buy aggregates from
the concession of the plaintiffs, it simply asked the plaintiffconcessionaire if she could sell a sufficient supply of aggregates to be
used in defendant's construction business and plaintiff-concessionaire
34

agreed to sell to the defendant aggregates from her concession up to

a limit of 40,000 cubic meters at the price of P240.00 per cubic meter.
3. The allegations in paragraph seven and eight of the complaint are
vehemently denied by the defendant. The contract which was entered
into by the plaintiffs and the defendant provides only that the former
supply the latter the volume of 40,000.00 cubic meters of aggregates.
There is no truth to the allegation that the plaintiff wife entered into
the contract under the condition that the aggregates must be quarried
and hauled by defendant completely before May 15, 1995, otherwise
this would have been unequivocally stipulated in the contract.
4. The allegation in paragraph nine of the complaint is hereby denied.
The defendant never made any assurance to the plaintiff wife that it
will take only two to three months to haul the aforesaid volume of
aggregates. Likewise, the contract is silent on this aspect for in fact
there is no definite time frame agreed upon by the parties within
which defendant is to quarry and haul aggregates from the concession
of the plaintiffs.
5. The allegation in paragraph ten of the complaint is admitted insofar as
the execution of the contract is concerned. However, the contract was
executed, not by reason of the alleged assurances of the defendant to
the plaintiffs, as claimed by the latter, but because of the intent and
willingness of the plaintiffs to supply and sell aggregates to it. It was
upon the instance of the plaintiff that the defendant sign the subject
contract to express in writing their agreement that the latter would
haul aggregates from plaintiffs' concession up to such point in time
that the maximum limit of 40,000 cubic meters would be quarried and
hauled without a definite deadline being set. Moreover, the contract
does not obligate the defendant to consume the allotted volume of
40,000 cubic meters.52
Considering how the Agreement's mistake, imperfection, or supposed
failure to express the parties' true intent was successfully put in issue in
petitioners Spouses Paras' Complaint (and even responded to by respondent
Kimwa in its Answer), this case falls under the exceptions provided by Rule
130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Accordingly, the
testimonial and documentary parol evidence sought to be introduced by
petitioners Spouses Paras, which attest to these supposed flaws and what
they aver to have been the parties' true intent, may be admitted and
considered.cralawlawlibrary
III
Of course, this admission and availability for consideration is no guarantee
35

of how exactly the parol evidence adduced shall be appreciated by a court.

That is, they do not guarantee the probative value, if any, that shall be
attached to them. In any case, we find that petitioners have established that
respondent Kimwa was obliged to haul 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates
on or before May 15, 1995. Considering its admission that it did not haul
30,000 cubic meters of aggregates, respondent Kimwa is liable to
petitioners.
The Pre-Trial Order issued by the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No.
MAN-2412 attests to respondent Kimwa's admission
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
6) Prior to or during the execution of the contract[,] the Plaintiffs furnished
the Defendant all the documents and requisite papers in connection
with the contract, one of which was a copy of the Plaintiff's [sic] special
permit indicating that the Plaintiff's [sic] authority was only good for (6)
months from November 14, 1994.53
This Special Permit was, in turn, introduced by petitioners in evidence as
their Exhibit "A,"54 with its date of issuance and effectivity being specifically
identified as their Exhibit "A-1."55 Relevant portions of this Special Permit
read:
To All Whom It May Concern:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
PERMISSION is hereby granted to:
Name
Address
LUCIA PARAS

Poblacion, Toledo City

to undertake the rechannelling of Block No. VI of Sapang Daco River along

Barangay Ilihan, Toledo City, subject to following terms and
conditions:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. That the volume to be extracted from the area is approximately 40,000
cubic meters;
This permit which is valid for six (6) months from the date hereof is
revocable anytime upon violation of any of the foregoing conditions or in the
interest of public peace and order.
Cebu Capitol, Cebu City, November 14, 1994.56cralawlawlibrary
Having been admittedly furnished a copy of this Special Permit, respondent
Kimwa was well aware that a total of only about 40,000 cubic meters of
aggregates may be extracted by petitioner Lucia from the permitted area,
and that petitioner Lucia Paras' operations cannot extend beyond May 15,
1995, when the Special Permit expires.
The Special Permit's condition that a total of only about 40,000 cubic
meters of aggregates may be extracted by petitioner Lucia Paras from the
permitted area lends credence to the position that the aggregates "allotted"
to respondent Kimwa was in consideration of its corresponding commitment
36

to haul all 40,000 cubic meters. This is so, especially in light of the
Agreement's own statement that "the said Aggregates is for the exclusive
use of [respondent Kimwa.]"57 By allotting the entire 40,000 cubic meters,
petitioner Lucia Paras bound her entire business to respondent Kimwa.
Rational human behavior dictates that she must have done so with the
corresponding assurances from it. It would have been irrational, if not
ridiculous, of her to oblige herself to make this allotment without
respondent Kimwa's concomitant undertaking that it would obtain the
entire amount allotted.
Likewise, the condition that the Special Permit shall be valid for only six (6)
months from November 14, 1994 lends credence to petitioners Spouses
Paras' assertion that, in entering into the Agreement with respondent
Kimwa, petitioner Lucia Paras did so because of respondent Kimwa's
promise that hauling can be completed by May 15, 1995. Bound as she was
by the Special Permit, petitioner Lucia Paras needed to make it eminently
clear to any party she was transacting with that she could supply
aggregates only up to May 15, 1995 and that the other party's hauling must
be completed by May 15, 1995. She was merely acting with due diligence,
for otherwise, any contract she would enter into would be negated; any
commitment she would make beyond May 15, 1995 would make her guilty
of misrepresentation, and any prospective income for her would be
rendered illusory.
Our evidentiary rules impel us to proceed from the position (unless
convincingly shown otherwise) that individuals act as rational human
beings, i.e, "[t]hat a person takes ordinary care of his concerns[.]"58 This
basic evidentiary stance, taken with the- supporting evidence petitioners
Spouses Paras adduced, respondent Kimwa's awareness of the conditions
under which petitioner Lucia Paras was bound, and the Agreement's own
text specifying exclusive allotment for respondent Kimwa, supports
petitioners Spouses Paras' position that respondent Kimwa was obliged to
haul 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates on or before May 15, 1995. As it
admittedly hauled only 10,000 cubic meters, respondent Kimwa is liable for
breach of contract in respect of the remaining 30,000 cubic
meters.cralawred
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated July
4, 2005 and Resolution dated February 9, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
Special 20th Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 74682 areREVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of Branch 55 of the Regional Trial Court, Mandaue
City dated May 16, 2001 in Civil Case No. MAN-2412 is REINSTATED.
A legal interest of 6% per annum shall likewise be imposed on the total
judgment award from the finality of this Decision until full satisfaction.
37

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
G.R. No. 184762, February 25, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DOMINGO
GALLANO y JARANILLA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
To convict an accused charged with qualified rape instead of rape in its
simple form not only condemns him to a more serious offense but also
exposes him to an even greater liability. As such, the State is mandated to
sufficiently allege in the information and to competently prove during trial
the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship with the same
certainty as the crime itself.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Case
This appeal assails the decision promulgated on December 14,
2007,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the
judgment2 rendered on March 22, 2004 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 69, in Silay City, Negros Occidental finding appellant Domingo
Gallano y Jaranilla guilty of the crime of rape, qualified by minority and
relationship, and sentencing him to the supreme penalty of death
therefor.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Antecedents
Gallano was arraigned and tried under the following
information, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about 2 January 2003, in Silay City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, with lewd design,
and with force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with his niece, AAA,3 a 12-year-old
minor, against the latter's will.
The aggravating circumstance of minority and relationship is present, the
victim being 12 years old, and the accused being the victim's relative by
affinity within the third civil degree.

38

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.4cralawred

cralawlawlibrary
The facts presented by the Prosecution were summed up
thusly:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Private complainant, AAA, and her brother lived with their maternal aunt,
BBB, BBB's husband, herein appellant, their children and BBB's brother in
Baranggay Guimbala-on, Silay City (TSN, October 6, 2003, pp. 3-4).
On January 2, 2003, BBB went to the hospital to take care of her father and
stayed there for days. AAA was home and was about to make her brother go
to sleep. She went inside the bedroom to a mat when appellant took her
aside, undressed her and laid her down on the bed. Standing over her,
appellant pointed his penis at her and warned her not to tell her mother,
otherwise, he would kill her. When appellant's penis touched AAA's vagina,
she felt pain and instinctively kicked him away. Feeling distraught, AAA ran
outside and cried (TSN, October 20, 2003, pp. 5-7).
On January 8, 2003, BBB's brother went to the hospital, he told BBB that he
saw AAA and appellant inside the room, standing and facing each other.
This prompted BBB to ask AAA about the incident. At first, AAA hesitated
and refused to talk but later admitted that she was raped. BBB brought AAA
to the city health officer for examination on January 9, 2003 (TSN, October
6, 2003, pp. 4-5).5cralawlawlibrary
The City Health Officer who examined AAA found hymenal lacerations on
AAA's private part.6cralawred
Gallano denied the charge, and asserted alibi, insisting that on the day the
rape was committed he had been working in the sugarcane field, having left
home for that purpose at 5:00 a.m. and returning only at 5:00 p.m.; that he
had brought his lunch then because he would take an hour to walk from the
sugarcane field to his house; and that he had learned of the charge of rape
against him only after his arrest and detention.7cralawred
Decision of the RTC
In its judgment, the RTC convicted Gallano of rape, qualified by minority
and relationship, disposing:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court finds accused
DOMINGO GALLANO Y JARANILLA, Guilty (sic.) of the crime of Rape,
defined in Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B, paragraph 5, subparagraph 1, of Republic Act No. 8353, as his guilt had been established by
the prosecution beyond any reasonable doubt.
39

Accordingly, this Court sentences accused, DOMINGO

GALLANO y JARANILLA, to suffer the Supreme Penalty of Death (sic.)
Accused, Domingo Gallano y Jaranilla, is, further, ordered by this Court to
pay minor, [AAA], the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as
Moral Damages, and the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), all
in Philippine Currency, as Exemplary Damages.
Accused, Domingo Gallano y Jaranilla, is ordered remitted to the National
Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City, Rizal.
NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.8cralawred
cralawlawlibrary
The RTC found AAA's testimony as credible, observing as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Though a child, [AAA], demonstrated to this Court her capacity of
observation, recollection and communication. She showed that she can
perceive and perceiving, can make known her perception to this Court as
she clearly and capably related the details of her sad and horrible
experience at the hands of the accused. She withstood a thorough and
exhaustive cross-examination, x x x It was a positive and credible account
she presented before this Court. There was not a motive ascribed and/or, in
the very least, suggested by the defense that might have raised doubt on
her credibility and the credibility of the statements she made before this
Court.9cralawlawlibrary
Anent Gallano's alibi, the RTC stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The sugarcane field where accused, Domingo Gallano y Jaranilla, claimed he
was at the time of the occurrence of the incident subject of the present
criminal action was, likewise, located at Hda. Bias, Barangay Guimbala-on,
a submitted distance of only four (4) kilometers away from the house where
the submitted offense was committed easily accessible to the accused even
by foot. Accused's statement was not corroborated nor substantiated by
other evidence, oral or otherwise. Under the given circumstances, the
physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime, had not
been established sufficiently and convincingly. The burden of proof in
setting in evidence the factual circumstance/circumstances of the defense of
alibi lies on the one who claims said defense, the accused in the present
criminal action, which failed to do miserably.10cralawred
cralawlawlibrary
40

In characterizing the offense as qualified rape, the RTC ruled that AAA was
definitely below 18 years old on January 2, 2003; and that such fact was not
contested by Gallano.11 As to the fact that AAA was Gallano's relative by
affinity within the third civil degree, the RTC declared that such relationship
had been sufficiently established.12cralawred
Judgment of the CA
On appeal, Gallano challenged his conviction, contending that the RTC
committed the following errors, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF
RAPE
II.
GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS GUILTY OF
RAPING [AAA], THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE
DEATH PENALTY.13cralawred
cralawlawlibrary
The CA affirmed Gallano's conviction for rape nonetheless because the
State had established all the elements of rape, including the force and
intimidation employed by Gallano.14 It opined that there was no reason
advanced by Gallano to warrant disturbing the RTC's appreciation of AAA's
testimony; and agreed with the RTC that his alibi and denial were
worthless. Anent the second error, the CA said that the records were "bereft
of any independent evidence which would accurately show AAA's
age,"15 pointing out that even AAA had been uncertain about her own
age;16 and that contrary to the State's theory, as advanced by the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), AAA's testimony to prove her age had been
insufficient because Gallano's admission of it had not been express and
clear.17Prescinding from these observations, the CA sustained the RTC's
finding of AAA's minority because:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Be that as it may, the minority age of the victim was not questioned by the
defense. Although this Court held that the age of the victim is not certain,
her still being a minor below eighteen (18) years old is not contested. This
Court has to rely on the observation as stated in the assailed decision that
the Court a quo is quite certain that the victim is definitely below 18 years
of age on January 2, 2003.18cralawlawlibrary

41

The CA modified the penalty because of the intervening passage of Republic

Act No. 9346,19 whereby the death penalty was prohibited from being
imposed in case of conviction, and instead imposedreclusion perpetua on
Gallano.20 The CA awarded civil indemnity of P75,000.00, moral damages
awarded to P75,000.00, and exemplary damages to P25,000.00. 21cralawred
Issues
Hence, this appeal, with Gallano reiterating the alleged errors by the CA,
arguing that he should not be convicted of rape upon the sole testimony of
AAA that had been tainted with improbabilities and contrariness to human
experience. Hence, his guilt had not been established beyond reasonable
doubt.22cralawred
Ruling
The conviction of Gallano is affirmed, but the characterization of the crime
as qualified rape is set aside. He could be held guilty only of simple rape.
Rape is a crime that is almost always committed in isolation or in secret,
usually leaving only the victim to testify about the commission of the
crime.23 As such, the accused may be convicted of rape on the basis of the
victim's sole testimony provided such testimony is logical, credible,
consistent and convincing.24 Moreover, the testimony of a young rape victim
is given full weight and credence considering that her denunciation against
him for rape would necessarily expose herself and her family to shame and
perhaps ridicule.25 Indeed, it is more consistent with human experience to
hold that a rape victim of tender age will truthfully testify as to all matters
necessary to show that she was raped.26cralawred
After reviewing the records, the Court concludes that the trial court was not
arbitrary in its appreciation of the proof of rape, and, therefore, the CA
correctly ruled that the crime of rape was established beyond reasonable
doubt even upon the lone testimony of the victim herself. With the lower
courts not being shown by Gallano to have overlooked any matter or
circumstance of weight that could alter the result in his favour, their
appreciation must be viewed with respect. It is settled that the findings of
fact by the trial court are accorded great weight, and are even held to be
conclusive and binding unless they were tainted with arbitrariness or
oversight.27 This respect is but a recognition that the trial court is better
situated to assess the testimonies and evidence laid out before it during the
trial.28cralawred
Nonetheless, Gallano was guilty only of simple rape, not of qualified rape. In
order that the accused is convicted of qualified rape under Article 266-B (1)
42

of the Revised Penal Code, two requisites must be met, namely: (1) the
victim must be a less than 18 years old; and (2) the offender must either be
related to the victim by consanguinity of by affinity within the third civil
degree, or is the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. These two
requisites must be both alleged and proved with absolute
certainty.29 Otherwise, the accused could only be held guilty of simple rape.
The qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority remain to be
relevant in the crime of rape despite the abolition of the death penalty
under R.A. No. 9346. The accused's civil liability depends on the mode of
rape he committed.30cralawred
Although Gallano's relationship with AAA went uncontroverted because
both he and BBB had testified that they were legally married,31 AAA's
minority was not thereby competently established.
People v. Pruna32 states the controlling guidelines in evaluating evidence
presented to prove a rape victim's minority, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxx [W]e hereby set the following guidelines in appreciating age, either as
an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or
certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents
such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of
birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to
have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the
testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member
of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to
testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date
of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the
Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to
be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to
be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to
be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
43

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic

document, or the testimony of the victim's mother or relatives
concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will suffice
provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the
offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial
evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. (Emphasis
supplied)"33cralawlawlibrary
The testimonies relevant to AAA's age were given as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. BBB testified that AAA was 13 years old at the time when her
testimony was taken but there was no birth certificate to prove AAA's
age.34cralawred
2. BBB declared that she took AAA when the latter was only nine months
old.35cralawred
3. AAA attested that she was 13 years old at the time of the taking of her
testimony but she did not know when she was born.36cralawred
4. AAA said that she had been staying with BBB for about four years
prior to the time her testimony was taken.37cralawred
5. Gallano mentioned that he did not know AAA's age,38 but he answered
on cross-examination that AAA was from 12 to 13 years old when
asked if he knew AAA's age in 2003.39cralawred
6. Gallano stated on cross-examination that AAA had been living with
them since she was seven years old.40
cralawlawlibrary
It is clear that the Prosecution failed to adduce AAA's certificate of live
birth, the best evidence to prove AAA's age in the context of Pruna. The
Prosecution did not also present any acceptable substitutionary
documentary evidence to prove the same. Instead, the Prosecution relied on
the testimonies of AAA and BBB to establish AAA's minority.
Did the testimonies of AAA and BBB suffice to prove AAA's minority even if
coupled with Gallano's supposed admission of the same?
We answer in the negative.
44

BBB, who was AAA's aunt, was qualified to testify on AAA's pedigree, like
her age and her date of birth. Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
expressly stated so.41 Conformably with Pruna,42BBB's testimony would have
sufficed considering that the information alleged that AAA was 12 years old
at the time of the commission of the crime, and the Prosecution was trying
to prove that AAA was below 18 years old for the purpose of qualifying the
rape committed by the accused. Yet, Prunadictated that BBB's testimony
must be clear and credible.43 BBB's testimony failed this test. Although BBB
recalled that she had taken AAA under her wing when the latter had been
nine months old,44BBB was apparently contradicted by AAA's declaration
that she had been staying with BBB and her family for about four years
reckoned from the time she gave her testimony in court.45 Gallano
complicated the contradiction between BBB and AAA by attesting that AAA
had started staying with them when she had been only seven years
old.46 The effect of the contradictions was to cast doubt on BBB's personal
knowledge of AAA's age and date of birth, rendering BBB's testimony on
AAA's minority unreliable.
Nevertheless, the OSG submits that AAA's testimony was enough to prove
her age because Gallano admitted to the same during crossexamination.47cralawred
We disagree with the State. The guidelines under Pruna require that the
accused's admission of the age of the victim must be express and
clear.48 That was not the case herein, for not only did Gallano declare that
he did not know how old AAA was at the time of the commission of the
crime, but also that he had been vague and indefinite on the matter as
borne out by his tentative response of "12 or 13 years old" when asked
during cross-examination if he knew AAA's age in 2003.49 In other words,
Gallano's admission was not express and clear enough to establish AAA's
minority beyond moral certainty.
With the State not having established AAA's minority with absolute
certainty, the Court rules out qualified rape as the crime committed by
Gallano. We reiterate that in the prosecution of rape in its qualified form,
the victim's minority must be averred and established "with equal certainty
and clearness as the crime itself."50 As a consequence, Gallano committed
only simple rape, thus precluding the application of R.A. No. 9346. Pursuant
to Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, the proper penalty is reclusion
perpetua.
It further appears that despite already entertaining doubt about AAA's
minority, the CA still affirmed Gallano's conviction for qualified rape by
depending on the "certainty" of the RTC's findings on AAA's minority.51 Such
affirmance by the CA was unwarranted because it was contrary to the
45

guidelines defined by the Court in Pruna.52 The affirmance should be treated

as another reversible error on the part of the CA, considering that all
doubts in a criminal prosecution should be resolved in favor of the accused.
The modification of Gallano's civil liabilities is another consequence of the
Prosecution's failure to establish AAA's minority. To conform to prevailing
jurisprudence, the award of civil indemnity must be reduced to
P50,000.00.53 The award of moral damages is similarly reduced to
P50,000.00 in view of prevailing jurisprudence.54 Meanwhile, the award for
exemplary damages is increased to P30,000.00 to conform to recent
jurisprudence.55 The amounts of damages awarded should earn interest at
the rate of 6% per annum from the finality of this judgment until said
amounts are fully paid.56
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on
December 14, 2007 with theMODIFICATION that appellant DOMINGO
GALLANO y JARANILLA is pronounced GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of SIMPLE RAPE and is sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua, and to pay
the victim AAA P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages, and
P30,000 as exemplary damages, with all such amounts to earn interest of
6% per annum from the finality of this decision until full payment. The
petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvir
G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VERGEL ANCAJAS
AND ALLAIN* ANCAJAS,Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Appellants Vergel Ancajas and Allain Ancajas are before us seeking a review
of the Decision1 dated April 27, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) Cebu City,
issued in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-HC No. 00857.
On October 19, 1998, appellants were charged before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 61, Bogo, Cebu City with the crime of Rape under the
following Information,2 the accusatory portion of which
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on the 16th day of July 1998, between the hours of 8:00 to 9:00 o'clock
in the evening, at the house of the victim at Taytayan, Municipality of Bogo,
46

Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable

Court, the said accused, confederating and conspiring with one another,
with deliberate intent, by means of force and violence by boxing her on the
stomach thereby rendering her unconscious, with intimidation and lewd
design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal
knowledge with AAA,3 while she was in a state of unconsciousness.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On their arraignment on February 23, 1999, appellants pleaded NOT
GUILTY5 to the crime charged.
Trial thereafter ensued.
AAA, nineteen (19) years old, is a household help of the spouses Constantino
and Elvira Cueva. At around 8 o'clock in the evening of July 16, 1998, she
asked permission from her employers to go to her parents' house.6 AAA's
house is located in Barangay Taytayan, Bogo, Cebu,7 the same barangay
where her employers' house is situated. On her way to her parents' house,
she met appellants Vergel and Allain who wanted to go with her but she
refused.8 They suddenly held her hands but she was able to get free from
their hold. She then decided to return to her employers' house9 but when
she thought about her parents' need for the money,10 she just stayed and
waited at the side of the road hoping that the appellants would go away.11
Thinking that appellants had already left, she continued walking to her
parents' house but appellants reappeared and held her hands again.12 She
shouted for help and struggled to be freed from their hold but appellant
Allain covered her mouth with a handkerchief13 and appellant Vergel
punched her in the stomach which caused her to lose consciousness.14
At about 1 o'clock in the morning of July 17, 1998, AAA regained her
consciousness and she noticed that she was only wearing her t-shirt as her
bra, panty and maong pants were on her side.15 She felt'pain all over her
body.16 Her vagina hurt17 and it was covered with blood. Her panty and
maong pants were also stained with blood.18 She went back to her
employers' house and told them that she was raped by appellants.19
At around 9 o'clock in the morning of the same day, AAA was accompanied
by the Spouses Cuevas to the police station in Bogo, Cebu to report the rape
incident.20 The rape incident was contained in a police blotter and AAA was
later instructed to undergo a physical examination which she did.21
Dr. Mary Ann Jabat (Dr. Jabat) of the Severo Verallo Memorial District
Hospital, Bogo, Cebu, conducted an examination on AAA and issued a
Medical Certificate22 dated July 17, 1998. The medical findings and
47

testimony of Dr. Jabat revealed that AAA had lacerations in the perineum
and hymen (at 3 o'clock and 10 o'clock positions); her labia majora had
erythema and slight edema; and the vaginal swab indicated the presence of
spermatozoa. She said that the lacerations in the perineum and the hymen
were due to the insertion of a foreign object or the male organ23 and that
the presence of spermatozoa signifies recent sexual intercourse.24
On the other hand, appellants strongly denied the accusation and
interposed the defense of alibi. They both claimed that they were not at the
crime scene where AAA's alleged rape happened as they were somewhere
else. Appellant Allain claimed that at around 7:00 p.m., he went to fetch her
sister Lucille Reichards who was talking with friends at Kit Prisilla's house;
and that he and his sister went home at around 9:00 p.m. and never went
out again.25 While appellant Vergel claimed that at around 8:00 p.m., he
bought barbeque and passed by Kit's house where he saw co-appellant
Allain and their sister Lucille talking;26 that when he went back home a little
later, he already saw appellant Allain in their house. Appellant Vergel left
their house again at 9:00 p.m. as he was called by Kit to tally the,collection
of the masiao tips; and that he went home at around 10:00 p.m.27 They both
testified that Kit's house is 100 meters from their house28 and that AAA's
house is also 100 meters from their house.29 Appellants' sister Lucille and
their mother Amparo Ancajas corroborated their alibis.
The defense also presented Dr. Jesus Cerna, a medico legal expert, who
gave a different explanation on Dr. Jabat's medical findings,30 and Doroteo
Booc, appellants' brother-in-law, to show that he saw AAA walking with a
male companion on that fateful night.31 Appellant Allain's birth certificate
was presented to show that he was still seventeen (17) years old at the time
the alleged rape of AAA was committed.32 Also presented was the police
blotter.which contained four (4) names as suspects on AAA's rape but
the.same police blotter also contained in the progress report that AAA only
suspected accused-appellants as her rapists arid refused to acknowledge
the other two.
On March 28, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision,33 the dispositive portion
of which states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Vergel Ancajas and Allain
Ancajas are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape and they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua.
Further, each accused is hereby ordered to pay the private complainant the
amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Pursuant to Circular No. 4-92, as amended by Circular No. 63-97 of the
Court Administrator, the Jail Warden of the Cebu Provincial Detention and
48

Rehabilitation Center (CPDRC), Cebu City, is hereby directed to

immediately transfer the two (2) accused to the custody of the National
Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Jail Warden, CPDRC for his
information, guidance and compliance.
SO ORDERED.34ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The RTC ratiocinated that the elements of the crime of rape were duly
proven by the prosecution and the fact of rape had been corroborated in its
material details by the medical findings of Dr. Jabat. It found that AAA had
positively identified appellants whom she was familiar with being her
neighbors and childhood friends.
Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied in its
Resolution35 dated July 25, 2007. The RTC ruled on the issue of appellant
Aliain's minority by saying that the penalty imposed upon the two accused
is reclusion perpetua which is a single indivisible penalty; and pursuant to
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the said penalty should be applied and
imposed regardless of the presence of the mitigating circumstance of
minority. The RTC further said that the benefits of a suspended sentence
shall not apply to appellant Allain because he is convicted of an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua, citing Section 32, A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC,
the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal which the CA gave due course. The
parties were required to submit their respective briefs and upon their
compliance, the case was submitted for decision.
On April 27, 2011, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the RTC decision.
Dissatisfied, appellants filed this appeal for a final review of their
conviction. In our Resolution36dated January 18, 2012, we notified the
parties that they may file their respective supplemental briefs if they so
desire within thirty (30) days from notice. Both parties manifested37 that
they are adopting the briefs they filed before the CA.
Appellants claim that based on AAA's testimony, the element of carnal
knowledge was not established since she claimed to be unconscious, hence,
she would not know the act allegedly done to her; that she only believed
that they had carnal knowledge of her because she felt pain on her vagina.
They claim that there were inconsistencies in her testimony and that her
conduct after the alleged rape negate the commission thereof.
The issue for resolution is whether the prosecution was able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt appellants' guilt for the crime of rape.
49

Article 266-A38 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the elements of the
crime of rape as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 266-A- Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed: 1) By a
man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;cralawlawlibrary
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious;cralawlawlibrary
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The prosecution must prove that (1) the accused had carnal knowledge of
the complainant; and, (2) that the same was accomplished under any of the
above-enumerated circumstances. Inasmuch as the crime of rape is
essentially committed in relative isolation or even secrecy, it is usually only
the victim who can testily with regard to the fact of the forced sexual
intercourse.39 Therefore, in a prosecution for rape, the credibility of the
victim is almost always the single and most important issue to deal with.
Thus, if the victim's testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused can
justifiably be convicted on the basis of this testimony; otherwise, the
accused should be acquitted of the crime.40
Appellants' claim that rape was not was established as AAA had been
unconscious during its alleged commission is not persuasive.
While it is true that there was no direct evidence to establish that
appellants had carnal knowledge of AAA as the latter was unconscious,
however, proof of the commission of the crime need not always be by direct
evidence, for circumstantial evidence could also sufficiently and
competently establish the crime beyond reasonable doubt.41 Indeed, the
Court had affirmed convictions for rape based on circumstantial evidence. 42
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if (1) there is more than
one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; (3) and the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.43 A judgment of conviction
based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances
proved form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the
perpetrator.44
50

Here, AAA was on her way to her parents' house when appellants, her
neighbors since childhood, appeared and held her hands. She struggled and
shouted but appellant Allain covered her mouth with a handkerchief to
prevent her from shouting, while appellant Vergel punched her in the
stomach which caused her to lose consciousness. When she regained
consciousness, she felt pain all over her body and her vagina. She found her
bra, bloodied parity and maong pants beside her. She went back to her
employers' house and told them that appellants raped her. AAA's testimony
was corroborated by Dr. Jabat's declaration that the lacerations in AAA's
perineum and hymen were due to the insertion of a foreign object or the
male organ and the presence of spermatozoa signified recent sexual
intercourse. It is well settled that when the victim's testimony is
corroborated by the physician's finding of penetration, there is sufficient
foundation to conclude the existence of the essential requisites of carnal
knowledge.45 The lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best physical
evidence of forcible defloration.46
We find no error committed by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, in giving
credence to AAA's testimony. In fact, it was put down in record that AAA
was crying while she was testifying before the trial court.47 It has been held
in several cases that the crying of a victim during her testimony is evidence
of the truth of the rape charges, for the display of such emotion indicates
the pain the victim feels when she recounts the detail of her traumatic
experience.48
We find the presence of conspiracy in this case between the appellants.
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and decide to
commit it. It may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during or
after the commission of the crime which, when taken together, would be
enough to reveal a community of criminal design, as the proof of conspiracy
is frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances.49
The prosecution had established that appellants held AAA's hands, and
when she tried to shout, appellant Allain covered her mouth with a
handkerchief and appellant Vergel punched her in the abdomen which
caused her to lose consciousness. It is fundamental for conspiracy to exist
that there must be unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the
unlawful objective which were present in this case.50
We find that the RTC correctly rejected appellants' defense of denial and
alibi. AAA positively identified appellants as the persons who raped her. She
knew them as they were neighbors since childhood. Denial fails in the light
of AAA's positive declaration.
51

Appellants' alibi is also unavailing. For alibi to prosper, it does not suffice to
prove that the accused was at another place when the crime was
committed, but it must also be shown that there was physical impossibility
for him to have been at the scene of the crime.51 Physical impossibility
refers to the distance between the place where the appellant was when the
crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the
facility of access between the two places.52 Appellant Allain testified that at
around 7:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. of July 16, 1998, he was at Kit's house, which
was located around 100 meters away from their own house. On the other
hand, appellant Vergel testified that he passed by Kit's house at past 8:00
p.m. and saw Allain thereat. Notably, appellant Allain testified that AAA's
house is also 100 meters away from their house. Thus, it would show that
Kit's house is also in the same vicinity where the crime was committed.
Hence, it was not physically impossible for the appellants to be at the locus
criminis at the time of the incident.
Appellants' argument that AAA's conduct after the alleged sexual
assault, i.e., washing her bloodied panty and maong pants, and washing her
private part, are not the normal behavior of a woman who had just been
raped deserves scant consideration.
It is not accurate to say that there is a typical reaction or norm of behavior
among rape victims.53 On the contrary, people react differently to emotional
stress and no standard form of behavior can be anticipated of a rape victim
following her defilement.54 What is notable in the records was the fact that
after she had regained consciousness at 1 o'clock in the morning of July 17,
1998, she immediately went back to her employers' house and narrated to
them what appellants had done to her, later reported the rape incident to
the police and underwent a physical examination of her private parts. Her
actions indeed showed her desire to obtain justice for what appellants did to
her.
Appellants' contention that if AAA was positive as to their identification as
the perpetrators of the crime charged, why were there two other names
included in the police blotter, is also unmeritorious.
The same police blotter stated a notation that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Progress Report on Rape Alarm (Entry Nr. 98-257). As per sworn statement
of offended party AAA that the alleged suspects were Allain Ancajas and
Vergel Ancajas and she refused (sic) the other
suspects.55ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The inclusion of the two additional names was cured by the sworn
statement of AAA and her categorical declaration56 in open, court that
appellants were the perpetrators of the crime charged and no other. It is
well entrenched that entries in a police blotter, although regularly done in
the course of the performance of official duty, are not conclusive proof of
52

the truth of such entries, for these are often incomplete and inaccurate.
These, therefore, should not be given undue significance or probative value
as to the facts stated therein.57
Appellants' claim that a DNA test on the spermatozoa found on AAA's
vagina should have been submitted for DNA testing to know whether the
sperm indeed came from both appellants or from AAA's boyfriend.
It has already been established that appellants were the ones who raped
AAA. The DNA test is not essential, while there exists other evidence
pinning down appellants as the perpetrators.58 Moreover, if the prosecution
had not conducted such DNA test, appellants should have moved for such
test during the trial to prove their innocence.
All told, we find that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving
the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.
Under Article 266-B, in relation to Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, simple rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua.
However, when rape is committed by 2 or more persons, the penalty
is reclusion perpetua to death. The RTC imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua on both appellants notwithstanding that appellant Allain was only
17 years old, a minor, at the time of the commission of the crime on July 16,
1998. His birth certificate59 showed that he was born on December 19,
1980. The RTC did not consider such minority saying that the penalty
imposed upon the two accused is reclusion perpetua which is a single
indivisible penalty; and pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code,
the said penalty should be applied and imposed regardless of the presence
of the mitigating circumstance of minority.
We beg to differ.
To begin with; on May 20, 2006, Republic Act (RA) No. 9344, otherwise
known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, took effect, RA No.
9344 provides for its retroactive application, as held inPeople v.
Sarcia,60 which stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[Sec. 68 of Republic Act No. 9344] allows the retroactive application of the
Act to those who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time
of the effectivity of this said Act, and who were below the age of 18 years at
the time of the commission of the offense. With more reason, the Act should
apply to this case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under
review.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Hence, RA No. 9344 should be considered in determining the imposable
penalty on appellant Allain even if the crime was committed seven years
earlier. Section 6 of RA No. 9344 provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
53

SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen (15) years

of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt
from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an
intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) yours but below eighteen (18) years of age shall
likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an
intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which
case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in
accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with
existing laws.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Madali, et al. v. People,61 we held that discernment is that mental
capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act.
Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in
each case.
In this case, it was established that appellant Allain acted with discernment
as shown by his act of covering AAA's mouth with a handkerchief to prevent
her from shouting and conspired with appellant Vergel in raping AAA.
As the crime of rape was committed by two persons, the penalty imposable
under Article 266 (B) of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to
death. Pursuant to Article 6362 of the Revised Penal Code, if the penalty
prescribed by law is composed of two indivisible penalties, the lesser
penalty shall be imposed if neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances are present in the commission of the crime. Since no
aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the crime, the lesser
penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposable. Appellant Allain was only 17
years old when he committed the crime; he is, therefore, entitled to the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 68(2) of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that the penalty to be imposed upon a
person under 18 but above 15 shall be the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by law, but always in the proper period.
Hence, the imposable penalty must be reduced by one degree, i.e.,
from reclusion perpetua, which isreclusion temporal. Being a divisible
penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable.63 To determine the
minimum of the indeterminate penalty, reclusion temporal should be
reduced by one degree, prision mayor, which has a range of from six (6)
years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being no modifying
circumstances attendant to the crime, the maximum of the indeterminate
penalty should be imposed in its medium period. The minimum of the
54

indeterminate penalty should be taken from the full range of prision

mayor.64
Section 38 of RA No. 9344 provides that when the child below 18 years of
age who committed a crime and was found guilty, the court shall place the
child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence even if such child
has reached 18 years or more at the time of judgment.
Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is
found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain
any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall
place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without
need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall
still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or
more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and alter considering the various
circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate
disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in
Conflict with the Law.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Notwithstanding, the RTC did not apply the law saying that the benefits of a
suspended sentence shall not apply to appellant Allain because he is
convicted of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetuamaking reference
to Section 32, A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC,65 Rule, on Juveniles in Conflict with the
law.
We do not agree.
In People v. Sarcia,66 we ruled on the applicability of Section 38, RA No.
8344 even if the minor therein was convicted of reclusion perpetua and we
ratiocinated as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The above-quoted (Section 38 of RA No. 9344) provision makes no
distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the child in conflict
with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D. and
Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence
would not apply to a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she
has been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is
guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that when the law
does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does
not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense
and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should
also not distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension of sentence
to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous
55

crime.
Moreover, the legislative intent, to apply to heinous crimes the automatic
suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law can be gleaned
from the Senate deliberations on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005), the pertinent portion of which is
quoted below:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged,
accused with, or may have committed a serious offense, and may have acted
with discernment, then the child could be recommended by the Department
of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the Local Council for the
Protection of Children (LCPC), or by my proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare
and Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best
interests, and restoration of the child should still be a primordial or primary
consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the intention should still be the
child's restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. x x
x67ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In fact, the Court En Bane promulgated on November 24, 2009, the Revised
Rule on Children in Conflict with the Law, which echoed such legislative
intent.68
Although suspension of sentence still applies even if the child in conflict
with the law is already 18 years of age or more at the time the judgment of
conviction was rendered, however, such suspension is only until the minor
reaches the maximum age of 21 as provided under Section 40 of RA No.
9344, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. If the
court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the
child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict
with the law has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her
disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall
be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age
while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to
discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of
sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period
or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The RTC did not suspend the sentence of appellant Allain pursuant to
Section 38 of RA No. 9344. Appellant is now 34 years old, thus, Section 40
is also no longer applicable. Nonetheless, we have extended the application
of RA No. 9344 beyond the age of 21 years old to give meaning to the
legislative intent of the said law.
In People v. Jacinto,69 we ruled:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
56

These developments notwithstanding, we find that the benefits of a

suspended sentence can no longer apply to appellant. The suspension of
sentence lasts only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the
maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. Section 40 of the law and Section
48 of the Rule are clear on the matter. Unfortunately, appellant is now
twenty-five (25) years old.
Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the
promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law should extend
even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so
long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The
offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and
reintegration in accordance with the Act in order that he/she is given the
chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of the
community. The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is
that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age.
Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other
training facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and
Other Training Facilities. - A child in conflict with the law may, after
conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence,
in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp
and other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised
and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
Following the pronouncement in Sarcia, the case shall be remanded to the
court of origin to effect appellant's confinement in an agricultural camp or
other training facility.70ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Thus, appellant Allain shall be confined in an agricultural camp or other
training facility pursuant to Section 51 of RA No. 9344.
The civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and moral damages of P50,000.00
ordered by the RTC to be paid by each appellant are hereby affirmed. We,
however, find that exemplary damages should also be awarded to set a
public example and to protect hapless individuals, from sexual
molestation.71 We, therefore, award the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.72
The damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum to be reckoned from the date of finality of this judgment
until fully paid.73
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated April 27, 2011 of
57

the Court of Appeals Cebu City, issued in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-HC No. 00857
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Vergel Ancajas is imposed
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In view of the privileged mitigating
circumstance appreciated in favor of appellant Allain Ancajas, and the
absence of other modifying circumstances attendant to the crime, he is
sentenced to suffer the penalty often (10) years and one day of prision
mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
ofreclusion temporal medium, as maximum. Both appellants are
each ORDERED to pay P30,000.00 exemplary damages. The award of civil
indemnity and moral damages, both in the amount of P50,000.00 to be paid
by each appellant, are maintained. The award of damages shall earn legal
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this
judgment until fully paid.
The case against appellant Allain Ancajas shall be REMANDED to the trial
court for appropriate disposition in accordance with Section 51 of Republic
Act No. 9344.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
G.R. No. 212196, January 12, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAMIL DORIA
DAHIL AND ROMMEL CASTRO Y CARLOS, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the September 27, 2013 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05707, which affirmed the July 17, 2012
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Angeles City (RTC) in
Criminal Case Nos. DC 02-376, DC 02-377 and DC 02-378, finding accused
Ramil Doria Dahil (Dahil) and Rommel Castro (Castro) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violating Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
On October 1, 2002, Dahil and Castro were charged in three (3) separate
Informations before the RTC. In Criminal Case No. DC 02-376, Dahil and
Castro were charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
for the sale of 26.8098 grams of marijuana in the Information which
reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
58

That on or about the 29th day of September, 2002, in the City of Angeles,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring and confederating and mutually helping one
another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and/or
deliver to a poseur buyer six (6) tea bags of dried marijuana fruiting tops
weighing TWENTY SIX GRAMS AND EIGHT THOUSAND NINETY EIGHT
TEN THOUSANDTHS OF A GRAM (26.8098), which is a dangerous drug,
without authority whatsoever.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
In Criminal Case No. DC 02-377, Dahil was charged with possession of
20.6642 grams of marijuana in violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No.
9165, in the Information which reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That on or about the 29th day of September, 2002, in the City of Angeles,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession and custody and control Five (5) tea bags of dried
marijuana fruiting tops weighing TWENTY GRAMS AND SIX THOUSAND
SIX HUNDRED FORTY TWO TEN THOUSANDTHS OF A GRAM (20.6642),
which is a dangerous drug, without authority whatsoever.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
In Criminal Case No. DC 02-378, Castro was charged with possession of
130.8286 grams of marijuana in violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No.
9165, in the Information which reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That on or about the 29th day of September, 2002, in the City of Angeles,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession and custody and control One (1) brick in form
wrapped in masking tape of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY GRAMS and EIGHT THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
EIGHTY SIX TEN THOUSANDTHS OF A GRAM (130.8286), which is a
dangerous drug, without authority whatsoever.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
On November 14, 2002, Castro was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty.
Dahil, on the other hand, filed a motion for reinvestigation and his
arraignment was deferred. Trial ensued and the prosecution presented PO2
Arieltino Corpuz (PO2 Corpuz) and SPO1 Eliseo Licu (SPO1 Licu), as
witnesses.

59

On August 6, 2009, the RTC discovered that Dahil was never arraigned
through inadvertence.6 The RTC informed the parties of the situation and
the defense counsel did not interpose any objection to the reopening of the
case and the arraignment of Dahil. The latter was then arraigned and he
pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, the public prosecutor manifested that he was
adopting all the evidence already adduced.
Version of the Prosecution
Evidence of the prosecution tended to show that, for a couple of weeks, the
agents of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), Region 3,
conducted surveillance and casing operations relative to the information
they received that a certain alias Buddy and alias Mel were trafficking
dried marijuana in TB Pavilion, Marisol Subdivision, Barangay Ninoy
Aquino, Angeles City. On September 29, 2002, the Chief of PDEA formed a
team to conduct a buy-bust operation. The team was composed of four (4)
police officers, namely, Sergeant Juanito dela Cruz (Sergeant dela Cruz), as
team leader; and PO2 Corpuz, SPO1 Licu and PO2 Javiar, as members. PO2
Corpuz was designated as the poseur-buyer while SPO1 Licu was assigned
as his back-up.
The team proceeded to the target place at around 8:00 oclock in the
evening. Upon arriving, PO2 Corpuz together with the informant went to
the house of Dahil which was within the TB Pavillon compound. When PO2
Corpuz and the informant were in front of the house, they met Dahil and
Castro. The informant then introduced PO2 Corpuz as the buyer of
marijuana. Dahil asked PO2 Corpuz how much would he be buying and the
latter answered that he would buy P200.00 worth of marijuana. At this
juncture, Dahil took out from his pocket six (6) plastic sachets of marijuana
and handed them to PO2 Corpuz. After checking the items, PO2 Corpuz
handed two (2) P100.00 marked bills to Castro.
Immediately thereafter, PO2 Cruz took off his cap to signal that the sale had
been consummated. The rest of the buy-bust team then rushed to their
location and arrested Castro and Dahil. PO2 Corpuz frisked Dahil and
recovered from his possession another five (5) plastic sachets containing
marijuana while SPO1 Licu searched the person of Castro and confiscated
from him one (1) brick of suspected marijuana.
Both Castro and Dahil, together with the confiscated drugs, were then
brought by the buy-bust team to the PDEA office. There, the seized items
were marked by PO2 Corpuz and SPO1 Licu. First, the six (6) plastic
sachets of marijuana which were sold by Dahil to PO2 Corpuz were marked
with A-1 to A-6 and with letters RDRC, ADGC and EML. Second,
the five (5) plastic sachets recovered from Dahil were marked with B-1 to
B-5 and with letters RDRC, ADGC and EML. Finally, the marijuana
60

brick confiscated from Castro was marked C-RDRC. Sergeant dela Cruz
then prepared the request for laboratory examination, affidavits of arrest
and other pertinent documents. An inventory of the seized items7 was also
prepared which was signed by Kagawad Pamintuan. Thereafter, PO2 Corpuz
brought the confiscated drugs to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory for examination, which subsequently yielded positive results for
marijuana.
The prosecution and defense entered into stipulation as to the essential
contents of the prospective testimony of the forensic chemist, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. That a laboratory examination request was prepared by PO3 Dela
Cruz;
2. That said letter request for laboratory examination was sent to the
PNP Crime Laboratory, Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga;
3. That Engr. Ma. Luisa Gundran David is a forensic chemist;
4. That said forensic chemist conducted an examination on the
substance subject of the letter request with qualification that said
request was not subscribed or under oath and that the forensic
chemist has no personal knowledge as from whom and where said
substance was taken;
5. That the result of the laboratory examination is embodied in
Chemistry Report No. D-0518-2002; and
6. The findings and conclusion thereof.8
The prosecution was ordered to formally offer its evidence on March 7,
2007.9 After much delay, the public prosecutor was finally able to orally
submit his formal offer of exhibits after almost two years,or on January 6,
2009.10 He offered the following documentary evidence: (1) Joint Affidavit of
Arrest, (2) Custodial Investigation Report, (3) Photocopy of the marked
money, (4) Brown envelope containing the subject illegal drugs, (5)
Inventory of Property Seized, (6) Laboratory Examination Request, and (7)
Chemistry Report No. D-0518-2002.
Version of the Defense
In his defense, Dahil claimed that on September 29, 2002, a tricycle driver
came looking for him after he had arrived home. He saw the tricycle driver
with another man already waiting for him. He was then asked by the
61

unknown man whether he knew a certain Buddy in their place. He answered

that there were many persons named Buddy. Suddenly, persons alighted
from the vehicles parked in front of his house and dragged him into one of
the vehicles. He was brought to Clark Air Base and was charged with illegal
selling and possession of marijuana.
For his part, Castro testified that on September 29, 2002, he was on 4th
Street of Marisol, Barangay Ninoy Aquino, Angeles City, watching a game of
chess when he was approached by some men who asked if he knew a
certain Boy residing at Hardian Extension. He then replied that he did not
know the said person and then the men ordered him to board a vehicle and
brought him to Clark Air Base where he was charged with illegal possession
of marijuana.
RTC Ruling
In its Decision,11 dated July 17, 2012, the RTC found both accused liable for
violating Sections 5 and 11 of R.A. No. 9165, and imposed upon them the
penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00 each for the crime of
illegal sale of marijuana; Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day, as minimum, to
Fourteen (14) Years of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, and a fine of
P300,000.00 each for the crime of illegal possession of marijuana.
The RTC was convinced that the prosecution was able to prove the case of
selling and possession of illegal drugs against the accused. All the elements
of the crimes were established. To the trial court, the evidence proved that
PO2 Corpuz bought marijuana from Dahil. The latter examined the
marijuana purchased and then handed the marked money to Castro.
The marked money was lost in the custody of the police officers, but the
RTC ruled that the same was not fatal considering that a photocopy of the
marked money was presented and identified by the arresting officers.12 It
did not give credence to the defense of frame-up by Dahil and Castro
explaining that it could easily be concocted with no supporting proof.
CA Ruling
The accused then appealed to the CA. In their Brief for the AccusedAppellants,13 they argued that there were irregularities on the preservation
of the integrity and evidentiary value of the illegal items seized from them.
The prosecution witnesses exhibited gross disregard of the procedural
safeguards which generated clouds of doubts as to the identity of the seized
items presented in evidence. 14chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In its Brief for the Appellee,15 the OSG contended that the prosecution was
able to prove all the elements of the crime of illegal sale and possession of
62

marijuana. As to the chain of custody procedure, it insists that the

prosecution witnesses were able to account for the series of events that
transpired, from the time the buy-bust operation was conducted until the
time the items were presented in court.
The CA denied the appeal in its Decision, dated September 27, 2013. In its
view, the prosecution was able to establish that the illegal sale of marijuana
actually took place. As could be gleaned from the testimony of PO2 Corpuz,
there was an actual exchange as Dahil took out from his pocket six (6)
sachets containing marijuana, while PO2 Corpuz handled out the two (2)
P100.00 marked bills, after they agreed to transact P200.00 worth of the
illegal drug.16 The charge of illegal possession of marijuana, was also thus
established by the prosecution.17 Another five (5) plastic sachets of
marijuana were recovered from Dahils possession while one (1) brick of
marijuana from Castros possession.18chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It was likewise proven that the illicit drugs confiscated from the accused
during the buy-bust operation were the same drugs presented before the
RTC. As testified to by PO2 Corpuz, the six (6) plastic sachets of marijuana,
which were sold by Dahil to PO2 Corpuz were marked A-1 to A-6 and
with letters RDRC, ADGC and EML, the five (5) plastic sachets
recovered in the possession of Dahil were marked B-1 to B-5 and with
the initials ADGC and EML, while the marijuana brick confiscated from
Castro was marked C-RDRC.19chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It was also held that the prosecution was able to establish the chain of
custody. PO2 Corpuz and SPO1 Licu testified that the said drugs were
marked at the police station. An inventory of the seized items was made as
shown by the Inventory Report of Property Seized, duly signed by Kagawad
Pamintuan. The Request for Laboratory Examination revealed that the
confiscated drugs were the same items submitted to the PNP crime
laboratory for examination. On the other hand, Chemistry Report No. D0518-2002 showed that the specimen gave positive results to the test of
marijuana. The accused failed to show that the confiscated marijuana items
were tampered with, or switched, before they were delivered to the crime
laboratory for examination.20chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Hence, this appeal.
This appeal involves the sole issue of whether or not the law enforcement
officers substantially complied with the chain of custody procedure required
by R.A. No. 9165.cralawred
The Courts Ruling
Let it be underscored that appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case
63

open for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and
appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or
unassigned.21 Considering that what is at stake here is no less than the
liberty of the accused, this Court has meticulously and thoroughly reviewed
and examined the records of the case and finds that there is merit in the
appeal. The Court holds that that there was no unbroken chain of custody
and that the prosecution failed to establish the very corpus delicti of the
crime charged.
A buy-bust operation gave rise to the present case. While this kind of
operation has been proven to be an effective way to flush out illegal
transactions that are otherwise conducted covertly and in secrecy, a buybust operation has a significant downside that has not escaped the attention
of the framers of the law. It is susceptible to police abuse, the most
notorious of which is its use as a tool for
extortion.22chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The presentation of the dangerous drugs as evidence in court is material if
not indispensable in every prosecution for the illegal sale and possession of
dangerous drugs. As such, the identity of the dangerous drugs should be
established beyond doubt by showing that the items offered in court were
the same substances bought during the buy-bust operation. This rigorous
requirement, known under R.A. No. 9165 as the chain of custody, performs
the function of ensuring that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of
the evidence are removed.23 In People v. Catalan,24 the Court
said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
To discharge its duty of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, therefore, the Prosecution must prove the corpus delicti.
That proof is vital to a judgment of conviction. On the other hand, the
Prosecution does not comply with the indispensable requirement of proving
the violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 when the dangerous
drugs are missing but also when there are substantial gaps in the chain of
custody of the seized dangerous drugs that raise doubts about the
authenticity of the evidence presented in court.
Although R.A. No. 9165 does not define the meaning of chain of custody,
Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002,
which implements R.A. No. 9165, explains the said term as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and
custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of
dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and
64

custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person
who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when
such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in
court as evidence, and the final disposition.
As a means of ensuring the establishment of the chain of custody, Section
21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165 specifies that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Specifically, Article II, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 enumerates the procedures to be
observed by the apprehending officers to confirm the chain of custody, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxx
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof:
Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at
the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever
is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items;
xxx
The strict procedure
under Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165 was not
complied with.

65

Although the prosecution offered in evidence the Inventory of the Property

Seized signed by the arresting officers and Kagawad Pamintuan, the
procedures provided in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not observed. The
said provision requires the apprehending team, after seizure and
confiscation, to immediately (1) conduct a physically inventory; and (2)
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof.
First, the inventory of the property was not immediately conducted after
seizure and confiscation as it was only done at the police station. Notably,
Article II, Section 21(a) of the IRR allows the inventory to be done at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending team
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures. In this case,
however, the prosecution did not even claim that the PDEA Office Region 3
was the nearest office from TB Pavilion where the drugs were seized. The
prosecution also failed to give sufficient justification for the delayed conduct
of the inventory. PO2 Corpuz testified, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Q: What documents did you ask Kgd. Abel Pamintuan to sign?
A: The inventory of the property seized, sir.
Q: And did he sign that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where was he when he signed that?
A: In our office, sir.
Q: Already in your office?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who prepared the inventory of the property seized?
A: Our investigator, sir.
Q: And that was prepared while you were already at your office?
A: Yes, sir, because we did not bring with us the material or equipment for
the preparation of the documents so, we invited him to our office.25
PO2 Corpuz gave the flimsy excuse that they failed to immediately conduct
an inventory because they did not bring with them the material or
equipment for the preparation of the documents. Such explanation is
unacceptable considering that they conducted a surveillance on the target
for a couple of weeks.26 They should have been prepared with their
equipment even before the buy-bust operation took place.
Second, there is doubt as to the identity of the person who prepared the
Inventory of Property Seized. According to the CA decision, it was Sergeant
dela Cruz who prepared the said document.27 PO2 Cruz on the other hand,
66

testified that it was their investigator who prepared the document while
SPO1 Licus testimony was that a certain SPO4 Jamisolamin was their
investigator.28chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Third, there were conflicting claims on whether the seized items were
photographed in the presence of the accused or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected
public official. During the cross-examination, PO2 Corpuz
testified:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Q: After you arrested Ramil Dahil, did you conduct the inventory of the
alleged seized items?
A: Yes, sir (sic).
Q: Where did you conduct the inventory?
A: In our office, maam
Q: Were pictures taken on the alleged seized items together with Ramil
Dahil?
A: No, maam.29chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[Emphases supplied]
SPO1 Licu when cross-examined on the same point, testified this
was:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Q: After you conducted the alleged buy-bust operation, did you conduct an
inventory of the alleged seized items?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Were the accused assisted by counsel at the time you conduct the
inventory?
A: No, maam.
Q: Were pictures taken on them including the alleged seized items?
A: Pictures were taken on the accused, maam.
[Emphasis supplied]
In other words, when questioned on the conduct of the inventory, PO2
Corpuz testified that no pictures of the seized items were taken while SPO1
Licu said that pictures of the accused were taken. From the vague
statements of the police officers, the Court doubts that photographs of the
alleged drugs were indeed taken. The records are bereft of any document
showing the photos of the seized items. The Court notes that SPO1 Licu
could have misunderstood the question because he answered that pictures
were taken on the accused when the question referred to photographs of
the drugs and not of the accused.
67

The prosecution failed to

establish that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized
items were preserved.
Notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to establish the rigorous
requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, jurisprudence dictates that
substantial compliance is sufficient. Failure to strictly comply with the law
does not necessarily render the arrest of the accused illegal or the items
seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. 30 The issue of non-compliance
with the said section is not of admissibility, but of weight to be given on the
evidence.31 Moreover, Section 21 of the IRR requires "substantial" and not
necessarily "perfect adherence," as long as it can be proven that the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved as the
same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.32chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
To ensure that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are preserved, the proper chain of custody of the seized items must be
shown. The Court explained in People v. Malillin33 how the chain of custody
or movement of the seized evidence should be maintained and why this
must be shown by evidence, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires
that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it
to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in
such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how
and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while
in the witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there
had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for
someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
In People v. Kamad,34 the Court identified the links that the prosecution
must establish in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation to be as
follows: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the
turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the
illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination;
andfourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by
the forensic chemist to the court.

68

First link: Marking of the

Drugs Recovered from the
Accused by the Apprehending
Officer
Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or
other related items immediately after they have been seized from the
accused. "Marking" means the placing by the apprehending officer or the
poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the items seized. Marking
after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link; hence, it is vital that
the seized contraband be immediately marked because succeeding handlers
of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the
evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all
other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the
accused until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings,
thus, preventing switching, planting or contamination of
evidence.35chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It must be noted that marking is not found in R.A. No. 9165 and is different
from the inventory-taking and photography under Section 21 of the said law.
Long before Congress passed R.A. No. 9165, however, this Court had
consistently held that failure of the authorities to immediately mark the
seized drugs would cast reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus
delicti.36chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In the present case, PO2 Corpuz and SPO1 Licu claimed that they had
placed their initials on the seized items. They, however, gave little
information on how they actually did the marking. It is clear, nonetheless,
that the marking was not immediately done at the place of seizure, and the
markings were only placed at the police station based on the testimony of
PO2 Corpuz, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Q: So, after recovering all those marijuana bricks and plastic sachets of
marijuana and the marked money from the accused, what else did you
do?
A: We brought the two (2) suspects and the evidence and marked money to
our office, sir.
Q: So, in your office, what happened there?
A: Our investigator prepared the necessary documents, sir, the request for
crime lab examination, joint affidavit of arrest, booking sheet, and all
other documents necessary for the filing of the case against the two (2),
sir.
xxx
Q: What about the marijuana, subject of the deal, and the one which you
confiscated from the accused, what did you do with those?
69

A: Before sending them to Olivas, we placed our markings, sir.37

Hence, from the place of the seizure to the PDEA Office Region 3, the seized
items were not marked. It could not, therefore, be determined how the
unmarked drugs were handled. The Court must conduct guesswork on how
the seized drugs were transported and who took custody of them while in
transit. Evidently, the alteration of the seized items was a possibility absent
their immediate marking thereof.
Still, there are cases when the chain of a custody rule is relaxed such as
when the marking of the seized items is allowed to be undertaken at the
police station rather than at the place of arrest for as long as it is done in
the presence of the accused in illegal drugs cases.38 Even a less stringent
application of the requirement, however, will not suffice to sustain the
conviction of the accused in this case. Aside from the fact that the police
officers did not immediately place their markings on the seized marijuana
upon their arrival at the PDEA Office, there was also no showing that the
markings were made in the presence of the accused.
PO2 Corpuz testified that they only placed their markings on the drugs
when they were about to send them to Camp Olivas for forensic
examination. This damaging testimony was corroborated by the
documentary evidence offered by the prosecution. The following documents
were made at the PDEA Office: (1) Joint Affidavit of Arrest, (2) Custodial
Investigation Report, (3) Inventory of Property Seized, and (4) Laboratory
Examination Request. Glaringly, only the Laboratory Examination Request
cited the markings on the seized drugs. Thus, it could only mean that when
the other documents were being prepared, the seized drugs had not been
marked and the police officers did not have basis for identifying them.
Considering that the seized drugs were to be used for different criminal
charges, it was imperative for the police officers to properly mark them at
the earliest possible opportunity. Here, they failed in such a simple and
critical task. The seized drugs were prone to mix-up at the PDEA Office
itself because of the delayed markings.
Worse, not all of the seized drugs were properly marked. As noted by the
RTC, Exhibit B-3 RC RD,39Exhibit A-5 RC RD and Exhibit A-6 RD RC40 did not
have the initials of the apprehending officers on the back. Bearing in mind
the importance of marking the seized items, these lapses in the procedure
are too conspicuous and cannot be ignored. They placed uncertainty as to
the identity of the corpus delictifrom the moment of seizure until it was
belatedly marked at the PDEA Office.
Similarly, in People v. Garcia,41 the Court considered the belated marking of
the seized drug by the apprehending officer in acquitting the accused in the
case. The officer testified that he marked the confiscated items only after he
70

had returned to the police station. Such admission showed that the marking
was not done immediately after the seizure of the items, but after the lapse
of a significant intervening time.
Second Link: Turnover of the
Seized Drugs by the Apprehending
Officer to the Investigating Officer
The second link in the chain of custody is the transfer of the seized drugs by
the apprehending officer to the investigating officer. Usually, the police
officer who seizes the suspected substance turns it over to a supervising
officer, who will then send it by courier to the police crime laboratory for
testing.42This is a necessary step in the chain of custody because it will be
the investigating officer who shall conduct the proper investigation and
prepare the necessary documents for the developing criminal case.
Certainly, the investigating officer must have possession of the illegal drugs
to properly prepare the required documents.
The investigator in this case was a certain SPO4 Jamisolamin.43 Surprisingly,
there was no testimony from the witnesses as to the turnover of the seized
items to SPO4 Jamisolamin. It is highly improbable for an investigator in a
drug-related case to effectively perform his work without having custody of
the seized items. Again, the case of the prosecution is forcing this Court to
resort to guesswork as to whether PO2 Corpuz and SPO1 Licu gave the
seized drugs to SPO4 Jamisolamin as the investigating officer or they had
custody of the marijuana all night while SPO4 Jamisolamin was conducting
his investigation on the same items.
In People v. Remigio,44 the Court noted the failure of the police officers to
establish the chain of custody as the apprehending officer did not transfer
the seized items to the investigating officer. The apprehending officer kept
the alleged shabu from the time of confiscation until the time he transferred
them to the forensic chemist. The deviation from the links in the chain of
custody led to the acquittal of the accused in the said case.
Third Link: Turnover by the
Investigating Officer of the Illegal
Drugs to the Forensic Chemist
From the investigating officer, the illegal drug is delivered to the forensic
chemist. Once the seized drugs arrive at the forensic laboratory, it will be
the laboratory technician who will test and verify the nature of the
substance. In this case, it was only during his cross-examination that PO2
Corpuz provided some information on the delivery of the seized drugs to
Camp Olivas, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
71

Q: How about the alleged marijuana, you stated that the same was brought
to the crime laboratory, who brought the same to the crime lab?
A: Me and my back-up, maam.
Q: When did you bring the marijuana to the crime lab for examination?
A: I think it was the following day, maam.45
As can be gleaned from the testimony of PO2 Corpuz, very little detail was
offered on how the seized marijuana was handled and transferred from the
PDEA Office in Angeles City to the crime laboratory in Camp Olivas, San
Fernando, Pampanga. PO2 Corpuz kept possession of the seized drugs
overnight without giving details on the safekeeping of the items. The most
palpable deficiency of the testimony would be the lack of information as to
who received the subject drugs in Camp Olivas.
Engr. Ma. Luisa Gundran, the forensic chemist who conducted the tests on
the subject drugs, did not appear in court despite the numerous subpoenas
sent to her.46 Instead, the prosecution and the defense agreed to stipulate
on the essential points of her proffered testimony. Regrettably, the
stipulated testimony of the forensic chemist failed to shed light as to who
received the subject drugs in Camp Olivas. One of the stipulations was that
said forensic chemist conducted an examination on the substance of the
letter-request with qualification that said request was not subscribed or
under oath and that forensic chemist has no personal knowledge as from
whom and where said substance was taken.47 This bolsters the fact that the
forensic chemist had no knowledge as to who received the seized marijuana
at the crime laboratory.
The recent case of People v. Beran48 involved irregularities in the third link.
The police officer, who both served as apprehending and investigating
officer, claimed that he personally took the drug to the laboratory for
testing, but there was no showing who received the drug from him. The
records also showed that he submitted the sachet to the laboratory only on
the next day, without explaining how he preserved his exclusive custody
thereof overnight. All those facts raised serious doubt that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized item have not been fatally compromised.
Hence, the accused in the said case was also acquitted.
Fourth Link: Turnover of the
Marked Illegal Drug Seized by the
Forensic Chemist to the Court.
The last link involves the submission of the seized drugs by the forensic
chemist to the court when presented as evidence in the criminal case. No
testimonial or documentary evidence was given whatsoever as to how the
drugs were kept while in the custody of the forensic chemist until it was
72

transferred to the court. The forensic chemist should have personally

testified on the safekeeping of the drugs but the parties resorted to a
general stipulation of her testimony. Although several subpoenae were sent
to the forensic chemist, only a brown envelope containing the seized drugs
arrived in court.49 Sadly, instead of focusing on the essential links in the
chain of custody, the prosecutor propounded questions concerning the
location of the misplaced marked money, which was not even indispensable
in the criminal case.
The case of People v. Gutierrez50 also had inadequate stipulations as to the
testimony of the forensic chemist. No explanation was given regarding the
custody of the seized drug in the interim - from the time it was turned over
to the investigator up to its turnover for laboratory examination. The
records of the said case did not show what happened to the allegedly seized
shabu between the turnover by the investigator to the chemist and its
presentation in court. Thus, since there was no showing that precautions
were taken to ensure that there was no change in the condition of that
object and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession
thereof, the accused therein was likewise acquitted.
In view of all the foregoing, the Court can only conclude that, indeed, there
was no compliance with the procedural requirements of Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165 because of the inadequate physical inventory and the lack of
photography of the marijuana allegedly confiscated from Dahil and Castro.
No explanation was offered for the non-observance of the rule. The
prosecution cannot apply the saving mechanism of Section 21 of the IRR of
R.A. No. 9165 because it miserably failed to prove that the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved. The four links
required to establish the proper chain of custody were breached with
irregularity and lapses.
The Court cannot either agree with the CA that the evidentiary rule
involving the presumption of regularity of the performance of official duties
could apply in favor of the police officers. The regularity of the performance
of duty could not be properly presumed in favor of the police officers
because the records were replete with indicia of their serious lapses.51 The
presumption stands when no reason exists in the records by which to doubt
the regularity of the performance of official duty. And even in that instance,
the presumption of regularity will never be stronger than the presumption
of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will
defeat the constitutionally enshrined right of an accused to be presumed
innocent.52chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Given the procedural lapses, serious uncertainty hangs over the identity of
the seized marijuana that the prosecution presented as evidence before the
Court. In effect, the prosecution failed to fully prove the elements of the
73

crime charged, creating a reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the

accused.53chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
For said reason, there is no need to discuss the specific defenses raised by
the accused.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The September 27, 2013 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05707
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellants, Ramil Doria Dahil
and Rommel Castro y Carlos, are ACQUITTED of the crime charged against
them and ordered immediately RELEASED from custody, unless they are
being held for some other lawful cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this
decision and to inform this Court of the date of the actual release from
confinement of the accused within five (5) days from receipt of copy.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 195245, February 16, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JIMMY GABUYA Y
ADLAWAN, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
In this appeal, Jimmy Gabuya y Adlawan (appellant) assails the May 19,
2010 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01795
which affirmed the December 8, 2005 Joint Decision2of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 127, Caloocan City in Criminal Cases Nos. C-68369
and C-68370, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Sections 5 (sale of dangerous drugs) and 11 (possession of dangerous
drugs), Article II of Republic Act No. 91653 (R.A. 9165) and sentencing him
to suffer the penalties of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00
for illegal sale, and twelve (12) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to
seventeen (17) years and eight (8) months and to pay a fine of P300,000.00
for illegal possession, with subsidiary imprisonment in the event of
insolvency in both cases.
Factual Antecedents
PO1 Joel Rosales (PO1 Rosales) relayed to Police Inspector Cesar Cruz
(P/Insp. Cruz) the information he received from a confidential informant
74

that appellant was selling illegal drugs on Second Avenue, Caloocan City.
Thus, P/Insp. Cruz formed a buy-bust team and dusted a P100.00 bill with
ultraviolet fluorescent powder to be used as marked money. He designated
PO1 Rosales as poseur-buyer while the other members, consisting of PO3
Manuel De Guzman (PO3 De Guzman), PO3 Rodrigo Antonio, PO3
Ferdinand Modina and PO2 Amadeo Tayag, would serve as back-ups. When
the team arrived at the designated area, PO1 Rosales and the confidential
informant went ahead while the rest of the buy-bust team positioned
themselves in strategic locations. The confidential informant left after
pointing appellant to PO1 Rosales. PO1 Rosales then approached appellant
and told him that he wanted to buy illegal drugs worth P100.00. He then
showed appellant the P100.00 marked money who took the same and placed
it in his pocket. Thereafter, appellant retrieved from another pocket three
plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance and gave one to PO1
Rosales, who thereupon scratched his head as the pre-arranged signal to
the buy-bust team that the illegal drug transaction had already been
consummated. When the back-ups arrived, PO1 Rosales informed appellant
that he is a police officer and immediately caused his arrest. He then
confiscated the other two plastic sachets from appellant while PO3 De
Guzman recovered the marked money after appellant emptied his
pocket.4cralawlawlibrary
Appellant, together with the marked money and the specimens recovered
from him, were turned-over to the police investigator, PO3 Randulfo
Hipolito, who marked each sachet with the letters JGA, the initials of
appellant.5 The seized items and appellant were thereafter brought to the
police crime laboratory for examination of the forensic chemist, P/Insp.
Jimmy Calabocal (P/Insp. Calabocal). The results revealed that: (1) the
contents of all the plastic sachets were positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu;6 (2) the contents of the two sachets recovered from
appellant weighed 0.09 gram while the other one subject of the sale
weighed 0.05 gram;7 and (3) appellants hand and the marked money were
positive for ultraviolet fluorescent powder.8cralawlawlibrary
During trial, PO1 Rosales identified appellant as the person who sold
him shabu for P100.00 during the buy-bust operation.9 He also identified
the sachets of shabu that were formally offered in evidence as the same
items that were seized from appellant.10cralawlawlibrary
For his part, appellant pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.11 He
testified that while waiting for a jeep to take him home, persons in civilian
clothes approached him and asked if he is a Muslim. When he answered in
the negative, they invited him to go with them to a barangay hall since a
complaint had allegedly been filed against him. When he refused, they
forced him to go with them. Appellant claimed that he was taken instead to
a house and told to produce P20,000.00 in exchange for his release.
75

Because he failed to comply, he was transferred to the police station where

he was given a cellphone to call someone to post bail for him. On his
second day in the police precinct, he was taken to a certain Fiscal Guiyab
who signed a document presented by PO1 Rosales. They then proceeded to
the hospital for a medical examination before returning to the city jail. As
to the result of the examination for the presence of fluorescent powder,
appellant explained that his hands tested positive because a certain Antonio
gave him a P100.00 bill purportedly to be spent for his dinner. He accepted
the bill but when he was about to be accompanied out of the detention cell,
Antonio took back the money.12cralawlawlibrary
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Joint Decision of December 8, 2005,13 the RTC ruled that the
prosecution was able to prove the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable
doubt for the offenses charged. It found the buy-bust operation to be valid,
the warrantless arrest and body search carried out against appellant as
justified, and the testimony of PO1 Rosales to be credible. The RTC likewise
held that the prosecution was able to establish the unbroken link in the
chain of custody of the illegal drugs in both cases. The dispositive portion
of its Joint Decision reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the prosecution having established to a moral
certainty the guilt of Accused JIMMY GABUYA Y ADLAWAN, this Court
hereby renders judgment as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. 68370 for Violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165, this
Court in the absence of any aggravating circumstance hereby sentences
aforenamed Accused to LIFE IMPRISONMENT, and to pay the fine of Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
2. In Crim. Case No. 68369 for Violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of [R.A.] 9165,
this Court in the absence of any aggravating circumstance hereby sentences
same Accused to twelve (12) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to
seventeen (17) years and eight (8) months and to pay the fine of Three
hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
Subject drugs in both cases are hereby declared confiscated and forfeited in
favor of the government to be dealt with in accordance with law.cralawred
x x x x14
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

76

In his appeal to the CA, appellant asserted that the RTC erred in finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt since the failure of the buy-bust team to
coordinate with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and to
mark the seized items at the place of seizure constituted gaps in the chain
of custody. These gaps, according to appellant, created doubts as to
whether the items allegedly seized from him were the same items presented
during the trial.
In its Decision15 dated May 19, 2010, the CA ruled that the prosecution ably
established the following elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs: (1) the
identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. This is considering that
PO1 Rosales positively identified appellant as the person who sold to him
the shabu in exchange for the marked money.
The CA also affirmed the RTCs ruling that appellant is guilty of possession
of dangerous drugs as characterized by the following requisites: (1) the
accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the
accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. The appellate
court took note that PO1 Rosales testified that other sachets of shabu were
recovered from appellant during the buy-bust operation and that his
testimony is corroborated by Physical Sciences Report No. D-630-03 and by
the testimony of P/Insp. Calabocal, which both show that the specimens
confiscated from appellant are indeed shabu.
The CA held that the RTC did not err in finding the warrantless arrest and
search effected upon appellant legally justified since he was apprehended
in flagrante delicto during a legitimate buy-bust operation. It likewise ruled
that aside from the fact that findings of the RTC are accorded high respect,
the failure of appellant to prove any ill motive on the part of the buy-bust
team justifies the RTCs application of the presumption that the police
officers performed their duties regularly.
Moreover, the CA did not find merit in appellants argument that the failure
of the police officers to mark the seized items at the scene of the crime, to
conduct an inventory of the subject specimen, and to take photograph
thereof are procedural lapses that created gaps in the chain of custody. It
held that non-compliance with the procedure for the custody of seized items
under paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165 does not invalidate
the buy-bust operation since the prosecution was nonetheless able to prove
that the police officers properly preserved the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized shabu as provided in Section 21(a), Article II of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law.

77

In view of the above, the CA ultimately ruled

thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby DENIED
and [the] challenged Decision of the Court a quo dated 08 December 2005
STANDS.
SO ORDERED.16
Insisting on his acquittal, appellant interposes this appeal where he raises
as additional issues in his Supplemental Brief17 the following: (1) the failure
of the police officers to mark the seized sachets ofshabu not only at the
scene of the crime but also in his presence; and (2) the lack of information
on the whereabouts of the shabu after it was examined by the Forensic
Chemist, P/Insp. Calabocal, whose testimony did not cover the manner in
which the specimens were handled after the examination.
Our Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
After a thorough review of the records of the case vis--vis the assailed
Decision, the Court finds the appellate courts resolution of the issues raised
in Accused-Appellants Brief, as well as the conclusions reached by it, to be
in order. Hence, there is no reason to dwell on them again.
The Court notes, however, that the CA did not touch upon appellants
assertion that the failure of the police officers to coordinate with the PDEA
is a serious procedural defect. Be that as it may, it must be made clear that
the resolution of the said issue will not result in appellants exoneration.
The omission of the CA to discuss and pass upon the same in its assailed
Decision is not a fatal flaw since coordination of the buy-bust operation with
the PDEA is not an indispensable element of the crimes of illegal sale and
possession of dangerous drugs such as shabu.18cralawlawlibrary
Going now to the issues raised by appellant in his Supplemental Brief,
appellant avers that the police officers did not comply with Section 21 of
R.A. 9165 and its Implementing Rules, particularly when they failed to mark
the seized items at the scene of the crime in his presence. He likewise
argues that the lack of information on the whereabouts of the shabu after
its examination by the forensic chemist and the absence of testimony
thereon revealed a gap in the chain of custody of the evidence.
It is well to note that the records of the case are bereft of evidence that
appellant, during trial, interposed any objection to the non-marking of the
seized items in his presence and the lack of information on the whereabouts
78

of the shabu after it was examined by P/Insp. Calabocal. While he

questioned the chain of custody before the CA, the alleged defects appellant
is now alluding to were not among those he raised on appeal. The defects
he raised before the CA were limited to the alleged lack of physical
inventory, non-taking of photographs of the seized items, and the supposed
failure of the police officers to mark the sachets of shabu at the crime
scene. But even then, it was already too late in the day for appellant to
have raised the same at that point since he should have done so early on
before the RTC.19 It bears stressing that the Court has already brushed
aside an accuseds belated contention that the illegal drugs confiscated
from his person is inadmissible for failure of the arresting officers to comply
with Section 21 of R.A. 9165.20 This is considering that [w]hatever
justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers from literally complying
with Section 21 will remain unknown, because [appellant] did not question
during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Objection to
evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires
the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of an
objection. Without such objection, he cannot raise the question for the first
time on appeal.21 Besides and as already mentioned, the CA has already
concluded that the identity of the seized drugs was established by the
prosecution and its integrity preserved, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Ultimately, We find that the prosecution convincingly proved that the police
operatives indeed complied with the required unbroken chain in the custody
of the subject illegal drugs, viz: a.) beginning from the lawful buy-bust
operation undertaken by the police operatives on 06 June 2003 and the
recovery of the subject illegal drugs as well as the marked money resulting
from the Appellants valid warrantless search and seizure; b.) upon seizure
of the one hundred (Php100) pesos with serial number #JK623663 used as
marked money and the subject drugs by PO1 ROSALES, said specimens
remained in his possession until they were turned over to the police
investigator PO2 HIPOLITO upon reaching the police headquarters; c.) upon
receipt of the subject drugs and buy-bust money, PO2 HIPOLITO marked
the specimens JGA-1 (0.05 gram),JGA-2(0.04 gram) and JGA-3(0.05
gram) which stands for the Appellants initials; d.) a Laboratory
Examination Request was then prepared by Chief Police Inspector CESAR
GONZALES CRUZ (Chief P/Insp. CRUZ) addressed to the Chief PNP, NPD
Crime Laboratory Office, Samson Road, Caloocan City, requesting for the
examination of the three (3) pieces of small plastic transparent [heat-sealed]
sachets containing white crystalline substance that were confiscated from
the Appellant; e.) upon receipt of the subject drugs, the same [were]
examined by forensic chemist P/Insp. CALABOCAL who found [them] to be
positive for shabu; f.) thereafter, Chief P/Insp. CRUZ prepared a Referral
Slip dated 06 June 2003 addressed to the City Prosecutor of Caloocan
presenting as evidence, inter alia, the three (3) plastic sachets confiscated
from the Appellant, the Laboratory Examination Report dated 06 June 2003
79

and the one hundred (Php100) pesos used as marked money; g.) the three
(3) plastic sachets were turned over to the custody of the prosecutor which
PO1 ROSALES identified on direct examination as the subject drugs sold
and confiscated from Appellant during the buy-bust operation; h.) the
subject specimens were then marked as Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3 for
the prosecution and was finally surrendered to the court a quo when
formally offered as evidence by the prosecution on 19 August 2004.22
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds appellants conviction for
violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. 9165 as well as the penalties
imposed upon him. It must be added, however, that he is not eligible for
parole with respect to the case of illegal sale of shabu.23cralawlawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the assailed May 19, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01795 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that appellant Jimmy Gabuya y Adlawan is not eligible for
parole with respect to the case of illegal sale of shabu.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

80