Arigo vs Swift

Case Digest GR 206510 Sept 14, 2014

Facts: In 2013, the USS Guardian of the US Navy ran aground on an area near the Tubbataha Reefs, a marine habitat of
which entry and certain human activities are prevented and afforded protection by a Philippine law. The grounding incident
prompted the petitioners to seek for issuance of Writ of Kalikasan with TEPO from the SC.
Among those impleaded are US officials in their capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy. As petitioners argued, they
were impleaded because there was a waiver of immunity from suit between US and PH pursuant to the VFA terms.
Petitioners claimed that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian violated their
constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology since these events caused and continue to cause environmental
damage of such magnitude as to affect other provinces surrounding the Tubbataha Reefs. Aside from damages, they sought
a directive from the SC for the institution of civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of
environmental laws and regulations in connection with the grounding incident. They also prayed for the annulment of some
VFA provisions for being unconstitutional.
Issue 1: W/N the US Government has given its consent to be sued through the VFA
No. The general rule on states immunity from suit applies in this case.
First, any waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as
for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan. Hence, contrary to petitioners claim, the US government could not be deemed to
have waived its immunity from suit.
Second, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who have control and
supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. Since the satisfaction of any judgment against these officials would require
remedial actions and the appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself.
Thus, the principle of State Immunity from suit bars the exercise of jurisdiction by the court over their persons.
Issue 2: W/N the US government may still be held liable for damages caused to the Tubbataha Reefs
Yes. The US government is liable for damages in relation to the grounding incident under the customary laws of navigation.
The conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of RA 10067 and caused damage to
the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the UNCLOS. While historically, warships enjoy
sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in
cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latters
internal waters and the territorial sea.
Although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy, the US considers itself bound by
customary international rules on the traditional uses of the oceans, which is codified in UNCLOS.
As to the non-ratification by the US, it must be noted that the US refusal to join the UNCLOS was centered on its disagreement
with UNCLOS regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by
mankind. Such has nothing to do with the acceptance by the US of customary international rules on navigation. (Justice
Carpio)
Hence, non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal
State over its internal waters and territorial sea. It is thus expected of the US to bear international responsibility under Art.
31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. ##
Other Issues
Claim for Damages Caused by Violation of Environmental Laws Must be Filed Separately
The invocation of US federal tort laws and even common law is improper considering that it is the VFA which governs disputes
involving US military ships and crew navigating Philippine waters in pursuance of the objectives of the agreement.
As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions. Since
jurisdiction cannot be had over the respondents for being immuned from suit, there is no way damages which resulted from
violation of environmental laws could be awarded to petitioners.
In any case, the Rules on Writ of Kalikasan provides that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an
environmental law is to be filed separately. Hence, a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction
provisions of the VFA to a US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be
premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.
Challenging the Constitutionality of a Treaty Via a Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Kalikasan is Not Proper
The VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the US as attested and
certified by the duly authorized representative of the US government. The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the

parties are required as a matter of international law to abide by its terms and provisions. A petition under the Rules on Writ
of Kalikasan is not the proper remedy to assail the constitutionality of its provisions.

Funa vs Agra
GR 191644 Feb 19 2013
Facts: Agra was then the Government Corporate Counsel when Pres Arroyo designated him as the Acting Solicitor General
in place of former Sol Gen Devanadera, who has been appointed as the Secretary of Justice. Again, Agra was designated
as the Acting Secretary in place of Secretary Devanadera when the latter resigned. Agra then relinquished his position as
Corporate Counsel and continued to perform the duties of an Acting Solicitor General.
Funa, a concerned citizen, questioned his appointment. Agra argued that his concurrent designations were merely in
atemporary capacity. Even assuming that he was holding multiple offices at the same time, his designation as an Acting Sol
Gen is merely akin to a hold-over, so that he never received salaries and emoluments for being the Acting Sol Gen when he
was appointed as the Acting Secretary of Justice.
Issue 1: W/N Agras designation as Acting Secretary of Justice is valid
No. The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General violates
the constitutional prohibition under Article VII, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution.
It is immaterial that Agras designation was in an acting or temporary capacity. Section 13 plainly indicates that the intent of
the Framers of the Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and the Cabinet Members in so far as
holding other offices or employments in the Government or in GOCCs is concerned. The prohibition against dual or multiple
offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or designations, whether permanent or
temporary, because the objective of Section 13 is to prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive Department
officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President, the Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants.
Issue 2: W/N Agra may concurrently hold the positions by virtue of the hold-over principle
No. Agras designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice was not in an ex officio capacity, by which he would have been validly
authorized to concurrently hold the two positions due to the holding of one office being the consequence of holding the other.
Being included in the stricter prohibition embodied in Section 13, Agra cannot liberally apply in his favor the broad exceptions
provided in Article IX-B, Sec 7 (2) of the Constitution to justify his designation as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with
his designation as Acting Solicitor General, or vice versa. It is not sufficient for Agra to show that his holding of the other
office was allowed by law or the primary functions of his position. To claim the exemption of his concurrent designations
from the coverage of the stricter prohibition under Section 13, he needed to establish that his concurrent designation
was expressly allowed by the Constitution.
Issue 3: W/N the offices of the Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice is in an ex officio capacity in relation to the other
No. The powers and functions of the Solicitor General are neither required by the primary functions nor included in the powers
of the DOJ, and vice versa. The OSG, while attached to the DOJ, is not a constituent of the latter, as in fact, the Administrative
Code of 1987 decrees that the OSG is independent and autonomous. With the enactment of RA 9417, the Solicitor General
is now vested with a cabinet rank, and has the same qualifications for appointment, rank, prerogatives, allowances, benefits
and privileges as those of Presiding Judges of the Court of Appeals.
Funa vs Villar
Case Digest GR 192791 April 24 2012
Facts: On February 15, 2001, Pres Arroyo appointed Carague as Chairman of the COA for a term of 7 years. Caragues term
of office started on February 2, 2001 to end on February 2, 2008. On February 7, 2004, Villar was appointed as the third
member of the COA for a term of 7 years starting February 2, 2004 until February 2, 2011.
Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was
designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was
nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter, the Commission on Appointments confirmed his
appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of
the original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011.
Issue 1: W/N a promotional appointment from the position of Commissioner to Chairman is constitutionally permissible and
does NOT constitute reappointment as barred by the Article IX (D), Sec 1 (2) of the Constitution
Yes. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an appointment to
the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered
by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired
period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed 7 years and provided further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman
resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment.

Reappointment found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner
or Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different position or office
(Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment
barred under the Constitution.
Issue 2: W/N the appointment of Villar to the position of COA Chairman which is made vacant by the expiration of term of the
predecessor is valid
No. The Constitution clearly provides that if the vacancy results from the expiration of the term of the predecessor, the
appointment of a COA member shall be for a fixed 7-year term.
Here, the vacancy in the position of COA chairman left by Carague in February 2, 2008 resulted from the expiration of his 7year term. Under that circumstance, there can be no unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor to speak of. Hence,
in light of the 7-year aggregate rule, Villars appointment to a full term is not valid as he will be allowed to serve more than
seven 7 years under the constitutional ban.
Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year term as COA Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to comply with the 7year aggregate rule would also be invalid as the corresponding appointment would effectively breach the clear purpose of
the Constitution of giving to every appointee so appointed subsequent to the first set of commissioners, a fixed term of office
of 7 years.
Notes:
A.
One of the doctrinal guidelines outlined in Matibag vs Benipayo has been effectively abandoned by the
Courts pronouncement in this case.
Cocofed vs Republic
GR 177857-58 Jan 24 2012

Facts: In 1971, RA 6260 created the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to administer the Coconut Investment Fund, a fund
to be sourced from levy on the sale of copra. The copra seller was, or ought to be, issued COCOFUND receipts. The fund
was placed at the disposition of COCOFED, the national association of coconut producers having the largest membership.
When martial law started in 1972, several presidential decrees were issued to improve the coconut industry through the
collection and use of the coconut levy fund:
PD 276 established the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF) and declared the proceeds of the CCSF levy as trust
fund, to be utilized to subsidize the sale of coconut-based products, thus stabilizing the price of edible oil.
PD 582 created the Coconut Industry Development Fund (CIDF) to finance the operation of a hybrid coconut seed farm.
In 1973, PD 232 created the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) to accelerate the growth and development of the coconut and
palm oil industry.
Then came P.D. No. 755 in July 1975, providing under its Section 1 the policy to provide readily available credit facilities to the
coconut farmers at preferential rates. Towards achieving this, Section 2 of PD 755 authorized PCA to utilize the CCSF and
the CIDF collections to acquire a commercial bank and deposit the CCSF levy collections in said bank, interest free, the
deposit withdrawable only when the bank has attained a certain level of sufficiency in its equity capital. It also decreed that all
levies PCA is authorized to collect shall not be considered as special and/or fiduciary funds or form part of the
general funds of the government.
Both P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 also provide that the CCSF shall not be construed by any law as a special and/or trust fund, the
stated intention being that actual ownership of the said fund shall pertain to coconut farmers in their private capacities.
Shortly before the issuance of PD 755 however, PCA had already bought from Peping Cojuangco 72.2% of the outstanding
capital stock of FUB / UCPB. In that contract, it was also stipulated that Danding Cojuanco shall receive equity in FUB
amounting to 10%, or 7.22 % of the 72.2%, as consideration for PCAs buy-out of what Danding Conjuanco claim as his
exclusive and personal option to buy the FUB shares.
The PCA appropriated, out of its own fund, an amount for the purchase of the said 72.2% equity. It later reimbursed itself from
the coconut levy fund.
While the 64.98% (72.2 % 7.22%) portion of the option shares ostensibly pertained to the farmers, the corresponding stock
certificates supposedly representing the farmers equity were in the name of and delivered to PCA. There were, however,
shares forming part of the 64.98% portion, which ended up in the hands of non-farmers. The remaining 27.8% of the FUB
capital stock were not covered by any of the agreements.
Through the years, a part of the coconut levy funds went directly or indirectly to various projects and/or was converted into
different assets or investments. Of particular relevance to this was their use to acquire the FUB / UCPB, and the acquisition
by UCPB, through the CIIF and holding companies, of a large block of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) shares.

Issue 1: W/N the mandate provided under PD 755, 961 and 1468 that the CCSF shall not be construed by any law as a special
and/or trust fund is valid
No. The coconut levy funds can only be used for the special purpose and the balance thereof should revert back to the general
fund.
Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the Constitution provides that all money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose
shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only, and if the purpose for which a special fund was
created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government.
Here, the CCSF were sourced from forced exactions with the end-goal of developing the entire coconut industry. Therefore,
the subsequent reclassification of the CCSF as a private fund to be owned by private individuals in their private capacities
under P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 is unconstitutional.
Not only is it unconstitutional, but the mandate is contrary to the purpose or policy for which the coco levy fund was created.
Issue 2:
W/N the coco levy fund may be owned by the coconut farmers in their private capacities
No. The coconut levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can only be used for public purpose. They cannot be used to
purchase shares of stocks to be given for free to private individuals. Even if the money is allocated for a special purpose and
raised by special means, it is still public in character.
Accordingly, the presidential issuances which authorized the PCA to distribute, for free, the shares of stock of the bank it
acquired to the coconut farmers under such rules and regulations the PCA may promulgate is unconstitutional.
It is unconstitutional because first, it have unduly delegated legislative power to the PCA, and second, it allowed the use of the
CCSF to benefit directly private interest by the outright and unconditional grant of absolute ownership of the FUB/UCPB
shares paid for by PCA entirely with the CCSF to the undefined coconut farmers, which negated or circumvented the
national policy or public purpose declared by P.D. No. 755.
Hence, the so-called Farmers shares do not belong to the coconut farmers in their private capacities, but to the Government.
The coconut levy funds are special public funds and any property purchased by means of the coconut levy funds should
likewise be treated as public funds or public property, subject to burdens and restrictions attached by law to such property.
Curata vs Philippine Ports Authority
GR 154211-12 June 22 2009
Facts: EO 385 and EO 431 Series of 1990 delineated the Batangas Port Zone and placed it under the Philippine Ports Authority
for administrative jurisdiction of its proper zoning, planning, development, and utilization. Pursuant thereto, the PPA instituted
a complaint for expropriation of 185 lots before the RTC. Owned by some 231 individuals or entities, the 185 lots, with a total
area of about 1,298,340 sqm, were intended for the development of Phase II of the BPZ. The PPA alleged that, per evaluation
of the Land Acquisition Committee for Phase II of the BPZ project, the lots had a fair market value of P 336.83 per sqm. Prior
to the filing of the complaint, PPA offered PhP 336.40 per sqm as just compensation, but the lot owners rejected the offer.
PPA prayed to be placed in possession upon its deposit of the amount equivalent to the assessed value for real estate
taxation of the lots in question.
After proceedings, the RTC issued a compensation order directing PPA to pay the lot owners the amount of P 5,500 per sqm
as just compensation. Upon motion, the RTC granted the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal and issued the writ
of execution thereafter. Subsequently, the sheriff served the Notice of Garnishment to the LBP Batangas City Branch.
Issue 1: W/N execution pending appeal is applicable to expropriation proceedings
No. Discretionary execution of judgments pending appeal under Sec. 2(a) of Rule 39 simply does not apply to eminent domain
proceedings. Since PPAs monies, facilities and assets are government properties, they are exempt from execution whether
by virtue of a final judgment or pending appeal.
It is a universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may
limit the claimants action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the power of
the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of
execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments. This is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements
of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate
and specific objects, as appropriated by law. (Commissioner of Public Highways vs San Diego, 1970)
Issue 2: W/N RA 8974 is a substantial law that cannot be reapplied retroactively
Yes. The appropriate standard of just compensation inclusive of the manner of payment thereof and the initial compensation
to the lot owners is a substantive, not merely a procedural, matter. This is because the right of the owner to receive just
compensation prior to acquisition of possession by the State of the property is a proprietary right. RA 8974, which specifically
prescribes the new standards in determining the amount of just compensation in expropriation cases relating to national

government infrastructure projects, as well as the payment of the provisional value as a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ
of possession, is a substantive law.
Further, there is nothing in RA No. 8974 which expressly provides that it should have retroactive effect. Neither is retroactivity
necessarily implied from RA No. 8974 or in any of its provisions. Hence, it cannot be applied retroactively in relation to this
case.
Note:
RA 8974 amended Rule 67 effective November 26, 2000, but only with regard to the expropriation of right-of-way sites and
locations for national government infrastructure projects. On the other hand, in all other expropriation cases outside of rightof-way sites or locations for national government infrastructure projects, the provisions of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court shall
still govern.
Hacienda Luisita vs PARC
GR 171101 July 5 2011 Nov 22 2011
Facts: In 1988, RA 6657 or the CARP law was passed. It is a program aimed at redistributing public and private agricultural
lands to farmers and farmworkers who are landless. One of the lands covered by this law is the Hacienda Luisita, a 6,443hectare mixed agricultural-industrial-residential expanse straddling several municipalities of Tarlac. Hacienda Luisita was
bought in 1958 from the Spanish owners by the Tarlac Development Corporation (TADECO), which is owned and/or
controlled by Jose Cojuanco Sr., Group. Back in 1980, the Martial Law administration filed an expropriation suit against
TADECO to surrender the Hacienda to the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (now DAR) so that the land can be distributed
to the farmers at cost. The RTC rendered judgment ordering TADECO to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR.
In 1988, the OSG moved to dismiss the governments case against TADECO. The CA dismissed it, but the dismissal was
subject to the condition that TADECO shall obtain the approval of FWB (farm worker beneficiaries) to the SDP (Stock
Distribution Plan) and to ensure its implementation.
Sec 31 of the CARP Law allows either land transfer or stock transfer as two alternative modes in distributing land ownership
to the FWBs. Since the stock distribution scheme is the preferred option of TADECO, it organized a spin-off corporation, the
Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI), as vehicle to facilitate stock acquisition by the farmers.
After conducting a follow-up referendum and revision of terms of the Stock Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA) proposed
by TADECO, the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), led by then DAR Secretary Miriam Santiago, approved the
SDP of TADECO/HLI through Resolution 89-12-2 dated Nov 21, 1989.
From 1989 to 2005, the HLI claimed to have extended those benefits to the farmworkers. Such claim was subsequently
contested by two groups representing the interests of the farmers the HLI Supervisory Group and the AMBALA. In 2003,
each of them wrote letter petitions before the DAR asking for the renegotiation of terms and/or revocation of the SDOA. They
claimed that they havent actually received those benefits in full, that HLI violated the terms, and that their lives havent really
improved contrary to the promise and rationale of the SDOA.
The DAR created a Special Task Force to attend to the issues and to review the terms of the SDOA and the Resolution 8912-2. Adopting the report and the recommendations of the Task Force, the DAR Sec recommended to the PARC (1)
therevocation of Resolution 89-12-2 and (2) the acquisition of Hacienda Luisita through compulsory
acquisition scheme. Consequently, the PARC revoked the SDP of TADECO/HLI and subjected those lands covered by the
SDP to the mandatedland acquisition scheme under the CARP law. These acts of the PARC was assailed by HLI via Rule
65.
On the other hand, FARM, an intervenor, asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, insofar as it affords the corporation,
as a mode of CARP compliance, to resort to stock transfer in lieu of outright agricultural land transfer. For FARM, this modality
of distribution is an anomaly to be annulled for being inconsistent with the basic concept of agrarian reform ingrained in Sec.
4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.
Administrative Law
Issue
1:
W/N
PARC
Constitutional Law

has

the

authority

to

revoke

the

Stock

Distribution

Plan

or

SDP

Issue 2: W/N the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the constitutionality of Sec 31 of RA 6657
Statutory Construction
Issue 3: W/N Sec 31 of RA 6657 is consistent with the Constitutions concept of agrarian reform
* The SC, through a resolution dated Nov 21 2011 of the motion for reconsideration filed by HLI, affirmed the revocation of
HLIs SDP and the placing of Hacienda Luisita under the compulsory land distribution scheme of the CARP law. It was also
held that the date of taking was Nov 21 1989, when the PARC, by Resolution 89-12-2, approved the SDP of HLI.
Saguisag vs Executive Secretary
Case Digest: GR 212426 Jan 12, 2016
Facts:

Petitioners, as citizens, taxpayers and former legislators, questioned before the SC the constitutionality of EDCA (Enhanced
Defense Cooperation Agreement), an agreement entered into by the executive department with the US and ratified on June
6, 2014. Under the EDCA, the PH shall provide the US forces the access and use of portions of PH territory, which are called
Agreed Locations. Aside from the right to access and to use the Agreed Locations, the US may undertake the following types
of activities within the Agreed Locations: security cooperation exercises; joint and combined training activities; humanitarian
and disaster relief activities; and such other activities that as may be agreed upon by the parties.
Mainly, petitioners posit that the use of executive agreement as medium of agreement with US violated the constitutional
requirement of Art XVIII, Sec 25 since the EDCA involves foreign military bases, troops and facilities whose entry into the
country should be covered by a treaty concurred in by the Senate. The Senate, through Senate Resolution 105, also
expressed its position that EDCA needs congressional ratification.
Issue 1: W/N the petitions as citizens suit satisfy the requirements of legal standing in assailing the constitutionality of EDCA
No. In assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act, petitioners suing as citizens may dodge the requirement of having
to establish a direct and personal interest if they show that the act affects a public right. But here, aside from general
statements that the petitions involve the protection of a public right, and that their constitutional rights as citizens would be
violated, the petitioners failed to make any specific assertion of a particular public right that would be violated by the
enforcement of EDCA. For their failure to do so, the present petitions cannot be considered by the Court as citizens suits
that would justify a disregard of the aforementioned requirements.
Issue 2: W/N the petitioners have legal standing as taxpayers
No. Petitioners cannot sue as taxpayers because EDCA is neither meant to be a tax measure, nor is it directed at the
disbursement of public funds.
A taxpayers suit concerns a case in which the official act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public
funds derived from taxation. Here, those challenging the act must specifically show that they have sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of public money, and that they will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of
the assailed act. Applying that principle to this case, they must establish that EDCA involves the exercise by Congress of its
taxing or spending powers. A reading of the EDCA, however, would show that there has been neither an appropriation nor
an authorization of disbursement.
Issue 3: W/N the petitions qualify as legislators suit
No. The power to concur in a treaty or an international agreement is an institutional prerogative granted by the Constitution to
the Senate. In a legislators suit, the injured party would be the Senate as an institution or any of its incumbent members, as
it is the Senates constitutional function that is allegedly being violated. Here, none of the petitioners, who are former
senators, have the legal standing to maintain the suit.
Issue 4: W/N the SC may exercise its Power of Judicial Review over the case
Yes. Although petitioners lack legal standing, they raise matters of transcendental importance which justify setting aside the
rule on procedural technicalities. The challenge raised here is rooted in the very Constitution itself, particularly Art XVIII, Sec
25 thereof, which provides for a stricter mechanism required before any foreign military bases, troops or facilities may be
allowed in the country. Such is of paramount public interest that the Court is behooved to determine whether there was grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Executive Department.
Brion Dissent
Yes, but on a different line of reasoning. The petitioners satisfied the requirement of legal standing in asserting that a public
right has been violated through the commission of an act with grave abuse of discretion. The court may exercise its power of
judicial review over the act of the Executive Department in not submitting the EDCA agreement for Senate
concurrence notbecause of the transcendental importance of the issue, but because the petitioners satisfy the requirements
in invoking the courts expanded jurisdiction. Read more
Issue 5: W/N the non-submission of the EDCA agreement for concurrence by the Senate violates the Constitution
No. The EDCA need not be submitted to the Senate for concurrence because it is in the form of a mere executive agreement,
not a treaty. Under the Constitution, the President is empowered to enter into executive agreements on foreign military
bases, troops or facilities if (1) such agreement is not the instrument that allows the entry of such and (2) if it merely aims to
implement an existing law or treaty.
EDCA is in the form of an executive agreement since it merely involves adjustments in detail in the implementation of the
MTD and the VFA. These are existing treaties between the Philippines and the U.S. that have already been concurred in by
the Philippine Senate and have thereby met the requirements of the Constitution under Art XVIII, Sec 25. Because of the
status of these prior agreements, EDCA need not be transmitted to the Senate.
De Castro Dissent: No. The EDCA is entirely a new treaty, separate and distinct from the VFA and the MDT. Whether the
stay of the foreign troops in the country is permanent or temporary is immaterial because the Constitution does not

distinguish. The EDCA clearly involves the entry of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the country. Hence, the
absence of Senate concurrence to the agreement makes it an invalid treaty.

Saguisag vs Executive Secretary

GR 212426 Jan 12 2016
Dissent Opinion by Justice Brion
Facts: Petitioners, as citizens, taxpayers and former legislators, questioned before the SC the constitutionality of EDCA
(Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement), an agreement entered into by the executive department with the US and
ratified on June 6, 2014. Under the EDCA, the PH shall provide the US forces the access and use of portions of PH territory,
which are called Agreed Locations. Aside from the right to access and to use the Agreed Locations, the US may undertake
the following types of activities within the Agreed Locations: security cooperation exercises; joint and combined training
activities; humanitarian and disaster relief activities; and such other activities that as may be agreed upon by the parties.
Mainly, petitioners posit that the use of executive agreement as medium of agreement with US violated the constitutional
requirement of Art XVIII, Sec 25 since the EDCA involves foreign military bases, troops and facilities whose entry into the
country should be covered by a treaty concurred in by the Senate. The Senate, through Senate Resolution 105, also
expressed its position that EDCA needs congressional ratification.
Issue 1: W/N the SC may exercise its power of judicial review over the case
(Please note this is a digest of Brions Dissent Opinion)
Yes. The petitioners satisfied the requirement of legal standing in asserting that a public right has been violated through
thecommission of an act with grave abuse of discretion. The court may exercise its power of judicial review over the act of
the Executive Department in not submitting the EDCA agreement for Senate concurrence not because of the transcendental
importance of the issue, but because the petitioners satisfy the requirements in invoking the courts expanded jurisdiction.
Issue 2: W/N the issue on the invalidity of EDCA for lacking Senate concurrence falls under the political question doctrine
(Please note this is a digest of Brions Dissent Opinion)
No. The constitutional status of the EDCA as an executive agreement in light of the mandate of Article XVIII, Section 25 of the
Constitution is not a political question outside the judiciarys competence and authority to resolve. This is because there is a
standard set by the Constitution in delineating when an international agreement should be a treaty subject to Senate
concurrence an issue which is within the Courts authority to settle in their role as the guardians of the Constitution.
Issue 3: W/N the EDCA is a valid agreement entered into by the President
No. The EDCA, as a mere executive agreement entered by the President with the US, is constitutionally deficient. The EDCA
should be in the form of a treaty as it brings back to the Philippines the modern equivalent of the foreign military bases whose
term expired in 1991 and which Art XVIII, Sec 25 of the Constitution directly addresses; foreign troops under arrangements
outside of the contemplation of the visiting forces that the 1998 VFA allows; and military facilities that, under modern military
strategy, likewise can be brought in only through a treaty. ##
SC Decision: EDCA is Merely an Executive Agreement Not Needing Senate Concurrence
Saguisag vs Executive Secretary
GR 212426 Jan 12 2016
Dissent Opinion by Justice Leonardo De Castro
Facts: Petitioners, as citizens, taxpayers and former legislators, questioned before the SC the constitutionality of EDCA
(Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement), an agreement entered into by the executive department with the US and
ratified on June 6, 2014. Under the EDCA, the PH shall provide the US forces the access and use of portions of PH territory,
which are called Agreed Locations. Aside from the right to access and to use the Agreed Locations, the US may undertake
the following types of activities within the Agreed Locations: security cooperation exercises; joint and combined training
activities; humanitarian and disaster relief activities; and such other activities that as may be agreed upon by the parties.
Mainly, petitioners posit that the use of executive agreement as medium of agreement with US violated the constitutional
requirement of Art XVIII, Sec 25 since the EDCA involves foreign military bases, troops or facilities whose entry into the
country should be covered by a treaty concurred in by the Senate. The Senate, through Senate Resolution 105, also
expressed its position that EDCA needs congressional ratification.
Issue 1: W/N EDCA is a valid agreement entered into by the President
No. EDCA is not a valid executive agreement entered into by the President because it falls under those treaties and
international agreements which need the concurrence of the Philippine Senate.
Article XVIII, Sec 25 of the 1987 Constitution is a special provision that prohibits the entry of foreign military bases, troops or
facilities in the Philippines. As an exception, such would be allowed only if: first, the stay of foreign military bases, troops, or

facilities is allowed by a treaty; second, such treaty is with the concurrence of the Senate, and when Congress so requires,
such treaty should be ratified by majority of the votes cast by the Filipino people in a national referendum held for the purpose;
and third, such treaty is recognized as a treaty by the other contracting party.
Whether the stay of the foreign troops in the country is permanent or temporary is immaterial because the Constitution does
not distinguish. In the case of EDCA, it clearly involves the entry of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the country.
Hence, the absence of Senate concurrence to the agreement makes it an invalid treaty.
Issue 2: W/N the EDCA is merely an implementation of the VFA and the MDT
No. The EDCA is entirely a new treaty, separate and distinct from the VFA and the MDT.
First, while the VFA allows only the presence of US military troops, the EDCA on the other hand contemplates the presence
of not just the troops but also military bases and facilities in the so-called Agreed Locations.
Second, the MDT covers defensive measures to counter an armed attack against either of the parties territories or armed
forces but there is nothing in the MDT that specifically authorizes the presence, whether temporary or permanent, of a partys
bases, troops, or facilities in the other partys territory even during peace time or in mere anticipation of an armed attack. The
presence of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities provided under the EDCA cannot be traced to the MDT. Moreover, the
general provisions of the MDT cannot prevail over the categorical and specific provision of Section 25, Article XVIII of the
Constitution.
Hence, the EDCA as an agreement creating new rights and obligations must satisfy the requirements under Sec 25, Art XIII of
the Constitution.
SC Decision: EDCA is Merely an Executive Agreement Not Needing Senate Concurrence

Resident Marine Mammals vs Secretary of Department of Energy

GR 180771 April 21 2015
Facts: In 2002, the Department of Energy entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract with JAPEX, a 100%
Japanese corporation, which was later converted to a service contract, known as SC-46, for the exploration, development
and utilization of petroleum resources in an area that basically affects the Tanon Strait. The President at that time was not a
signatory to the SC-46 and such contract was not submitted to the Congress for review.
Tanon Strait is a narrow passage of water in Cebu which harbors a biodiversity of marine life and is declared by laws as a
protected seascape. When JAPEX started its seismic surveys and drilling activities over the area, petitions were filed assailing
the constitutionality of SC-46. One petition protesting the activities for its ecological impact was in the name of Resident
Marine Mammals which are literally toothed whales, turtles and such, joined in by human petitioners referred to as
Stewards, in their representative as well as personal capacity. Pres. Arroyo was also impleaded as an unwilling copetitioner, purportedly because of her express declaration and undertaking under the ASEAN Charter to protect habitats and
other environmental concerns.
FIDEC, an organization committed to the welfare of marginal fisherfolk in the area, also questioned the SC-46 on the ground
that service contracts are no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution, and that if it were, SC-46 is still null and void
because it did not comply with the Constitution, most especially the safeguards that the Court laid down in La Bugal
Blaan case.
Remedial Law
Issue 1: W/N the Resident Marine Mammals, or animals in general, have standing as the real party-in-interests in this suit
Yes. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows filing of a citizens suit. A citizens suit under this rule allows any
Filipino citizen to file an action for the enforcement of environmental law on behalf of minors or generations yet unborn. It is
essentially a representative suit that allows persons who are not real parties in interest to institute actions on behalf of the real
party in interest.
Dissent
Issue 2: W/N the name of former President Arroyo impleaded in the petition as an unwilling co-plaintiff is proper
No. The name of Pres Arroyo as an unwilling plaintiff impleaded in the petition should be stricken from the title of the case.
First, under Rule 3, Sec 10 of the ROC, when the consent of a party who should be joined as plaintiff cannot be obtained, he
or she may be made a party defendant. This will put the unwilling party under the jurisdiction of the court, which may properly
implead him or her through its processes. The unwilling partys name cannot be simply included in the petition without her
knowledge or consent, as this would be a denial of due process.
Second, impleading the former President for an act she made in performance of the functions of her office is contrary to the
public policy against embroiling Presidents in suits.

Political Law
Issue 3: W/N service contracts are no longer allowed by the 1987 Constitution
No. As settled in the La Bugal case, the deletion of the words service contracts in the 1987 Constitution did not amount to a
ban on them per se. In fact, the deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission show that in deliberating on
Art XII Sec 2(4), they were actually referring to service contracts as understood in the 1973 Constitution. The framers, in
short, used the term service contracts in referring to agreements involving technical or financial assistance.
Issue 4: W/N SC-46 is valid
No. The SC-46 is not valid because it did not comply with the Art XII, Sec 2 (4) of the Constitution. First, it was not crafted in
accordance with a general law that provides standards, terms and conditions; second, it was not signed by the President for
and on behalf of the Philippine government; and third, it was not reported by the President to the Congress within 30 days of
execution.
Jacomille vs Secretary of DOTC
GR 212381 Apr 22 2015
Facts:
The LTO formulated the Motor Vehicle License Plate Standardization Program (MVPSP) to supply the new license plates for
both old and new vehicle registrants. The DOTC, in its invitation for bidders on Feb 20, 2013, announced that it intends to
apply the sum of 3.8 billion for the contract. The award was granted to JKG Power Plates on July 22, 2013. The contract
signing, however, was halted. It was made only on February 2014 when sufficient funds from the GAA 2014 were already
made available for the project.
Jacomille instituted a taxpayer suit questioning the procurement process on the ground that it did not comply with the
requirements of RA 9184 and its implementing laws, and that when DOTC commenced the MVPSP, there was no sufficient
funding as reflected in the GAA 2013. Jacomille saw this as a clear misrepresentation or even a deception by the said DOTC
against the government and the general public as a whole.
JKG Power Plates averred that the case was not a proper subject of taxpayer suit because no taxes would be spent for this
project. The money to be paid for the plates would not come from taxes, but from payments of vehicle owners, who would
pay P450.00 for every pair of motor vehicle license plate, and P120.00 for every motorcycle license plate. Out of the P450.00,
the cost of the motor vehicle plate would only be P380.00. In effect, the government would even earn P70.00 from every
pair of plate.
Issue: W/N Jacomillo has legal standing to maintain the suit
Held:
Yes. Jacomillo as a taxpaying citzen is a proper party because the MVPSP involves the expenditure of public funds. While the
motor vehicle registrants will pay for the license plates, the bid documents and contract for MVPSP indicate that the
government shall bear the burden of paying for the project.
As a rule, a person suing as a taxpayer must show that the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public
funds derived from taxation. Jacomillo satisfies this requirement when he alleges that public funds in the amount of P3 .851
billion shall be used in a project that has undergone an improper procurement process. ##
Note:
Because of irregularities in the procurement, the MVPSP was rendered null and void, but was also made moot and academic
by the appropriation for the full amount of the project fund in GAA 2014. Said appropriation cured whatever defect the process
had.
Province of Aurora vs Marco
GR 202331 Apr 22 2015
Facts:
Marco was permanently appointed as Corporate Development Specialist II by Gov. Ong 5 days before the end of her term in
June 30, 2004. His appointment, along with 25 other appointments, was accompanied by a certification stating that funds
were available for the position. When the new Gov took over, the appointments made by Gov Ong were revoked based on
the recall made by Budget Officer regarding the availability of funds for the position. Marcos sought reconsideration from the
CSC Regional Office but was denied. On appeal, the CSC through a resolution dated Apr 14 held the validity of the
appointment on the ground that it complied with the CSC rules and that the recall of the certification did not affect its validity
because evidence was not presented.
Instead of filing an MR, the Province filed a petition for relief. It was denied by the CSC because it was not allowed by the rules.
Meanwhile, Marco filed a motion to implement the Apr 14 Resolution, which was granted. The Province filed an MR of the
Apr 14 Resolution but was again denied because it was not filed within the 15-day reglementary period. Finally, the Province
filed before the CA a petition for certiorari via Rule 43 against the CSCs second order implementing the Apr 14 resolution,

invoking the constitutional prohibition against midnight appointments. The CA denied the petition and upheld the CSC
decision.
Political Law
Issue: W/N the prohibition on midnight appointments apply to appointments made by local executives
No. The prohibition under Article VII, Sec 15 applies only to presidential appointments, and not to those made by local
executives. In this case, the appointment is valid because there is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making
appointments during the last days of his/her tenure.
Remedial Law
Issue: W/N the CA is correct in taking cognizance over the case
No. The court should have dismissed the petition outright because no appeal may be taken over an order of execution.
Under Rule 50, Sec 1 of the Rules of Court, the CA is allowed to dismiss an appeal where the order appealed from is not
appealable. This rule is based on the doctrine of immutability of judgment, which states that a final and executory removes
from the court which renders it the power and jurisdiction to further alter or amend it, much less revoked it. Thus, even if a
judgment is later on discovered to be erroneous, it remains immutable.
Secretary of DPWH vs Heracleo
GR 179334 Apr 21 2015
Facts:
Spouses Heracleo are the co-owners of a land which is among the private properties traversed by MacArthur Highway in
Bulacan, a government project undertaken sometime in 1940. The taking was taken without the requisite expropriation
proceedings and without their consent. In 1994, Heracleo demanded the payment of the fair market value of the property.
The DPWH offered to pay 0.70 centavos per sqm., as recommended by the appraiser committee of Bulacan. Unsatisfied,
Heracleo filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages. Favorable decisions were rendered by the RTC and the
CA, with valuation of P 1,500 per sqm and 6% interest per annum from the time of filing of the until full payment. The SC
Division reversed the CA ruling and held that computation should be based at the time the property was taken in 1940, which
is 0.70 per sqm. But because of the contrasting opinions of the members of the Division and transcendental importance of
the issue, the case was referred to the En Banc for resolution.
Issue 1: W/N the taking of private property without due process should be nullified
No. The governments failure to initiate the necessary expropriation proceedings prior to actual taking cannot simply invalidate
the States exercise of its eminent domain power, given that the property subject of expropriation is indubitably devoted
for public use, and public policy imposes upon the public utility the obligation to continue its services to the public. To hastily
nullify said expropriation in the guise of lack of due process would certainly diminish or weaken one of the States inherent
powers, the ultimate objective of which is to serve the greater good.
Thus, the non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the return of the property to the landowner. What
is left to the landowner is the right of compensation.
Issue 2: W/N compensation is based on the market value of the property at the time of taking
Yes. While it may appear inequitable to the private owners to receive an outdated valuation, the long-established rule is that
the fair equivalent of a property should be computed not at the time of payment, but at the time of taking. This is because the
purpose of just compensation is not to reward the owner for the property taken but to compensate him for the loss thereof.
The owner should be compensated only for what he actually loses, and what he loses is the actual value of the property at
the time it is taken.
Issue 3: W/N the principle of equity should be applied in this case
No. The Court must adhere to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the application of the law according to its
express terms, interpretation being called for only when such literal application is impossible. To entertain other formula for
computing just compensation, contrary to those established by law and jurisprudence, would open varying interpretation of
economic policies a matter which this Court has no competence to take cognizance of. Equity and equitable principles
only come into full play when a gap exists in the law and jurisprudence.
Velasco Dissent:
The States power of eminent domain is not absolute; the Constitution is clear that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty
and property without due process of law. As such, failure of the government to institute the necessary proceedings should
lead to failure of taking an individuals property. In this case, since the property was already taken, the complainants must be
equitably compensated for the loss thereof.
For purposes of just compensation, the value of the land should be determined from the time the property owners filed the
initiatory complaint, earning interest therefrom. To hold otherwise would validate the States act as one of expropriation in
spite of procedural infirmities which, in turn, would amount to unjust enrichment on its part. To continue condoning such
acts would be licensing the government to continue dispensing with constitutional requirements in taking private property.

Secretary of DPWH vs Heracleo

Velasco Dissent GR 179334 Apr 21 2015
Summary
The States power of eminent domain is not absolute; the Constitution is clear that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty
and property without due process of law. As such, failure of the government to institute the necessary proceedings should
lead to failure of taking an individuals property. In this case, since the property was already taken, the complainants must be
equitably compensated for the loss thereof.
For purposes of just compensation, the value of the land should be determined from the time the property owners filed the
initiatory complaint, earning interest therefrom. To hold otherwise would validate the States act as one of expropriation in
spite of procedural infirmities which, in turn, would amount to unjust enrichment on its part. To continue condoning such
acts would be licensing the government to continue dispensing with constitutional requirements in taking private property.
1
Utak
vs
CoMELEC
Case
Digest:
GR
206020
April
14
2015
Full Text
Facts:
In 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution 9615 providing rules that would implement Sec 9 of RA 9006 or the Fair
Elections Act. One of the provisions of the Resolution provide that the posting of any election propaganda or materials during
the campaign period shall be prohibited in public utility vehicles (PUV) and within the premises of public transport terminals.
1 UTAK, a party-list organization, questioned the prohibition as it impedes the right to free speech of the private owners of
PUVs and transport terminals.
Issue 1: W/N the COMELEC may impose the prohibition on PUVs and public transport terminals during the election pursuant
to its regulatory powers delegated under Art IX-C, Sec 4 of the Constitution
No. The COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or permit to operate and not the ownership per se of PUVs and
transport terminals. The posting of election campaign material on vehicles used for public transport or on transport
terminals is not only a form of political expression, but also an act of ownership it has nothing to do with the
franchise or permit to operate the PUV or transport terminal.
Read more
Issue 2: W/N the regulation is justified by the captive audience doctrine
No. A government regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine may not be justified if the supposed captive audience
may avoid exposure to the otherwise intrusive speech. Here, the commuters are not forced or compelled to read the election
campaign materials posted on PUVs and transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of declining to receive the messages
contained in the posted election campaign materials since they may simply avert their eyes if they find the same unbearably
intrusive. Hence, the doctrine is not applicable.
Read more
Issue 3: W/N the regulation constitutes prior restraints on free speech
Yes. It unduly infringes on the fundamental right of the people to freedom of speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom
of individuals such as the owners of PUVs and private transport terminals to express their preference, through the posting of
election campaign material in their property, and convince others to agree with them.
Issue 4: W/N the regulation is a valid content-neutral regulation
No. The prohibition under the certain provisions of RA 9615 are content-neutral regulations since they merely control the
place where election campaign materials may be posted, but the prohibition is repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails
to satisfy all of the requisites for a valid content-neutral regulation.
The restriction on free speech of owners of PUVs and transport terminals is not necessary to a stated governmental
interest. First, while Resolution 9615 was promulgated by the COMELEC to implement the provisions of Fair Elections Act,
the prohibition on posting of election campaign materials on PUVs and transport terminals was not provided for therein.
Second, there are more than sufficient provisions in our present election laws that would ensure equal time, space, and
opportunity to candidates in elections. Hence, one of the requisites of a valid content-neutral regulation was not satisfied
Jardeleza vs Sereno
GR 213181 August 19, 2014
Facts:
Following Justice Abads compulsory retirement, the JBC announced the application or recommendations for the position left
by the Associate Justice. Jardeleza, the incumbent Sol-Gen at the time, was included in the list of candidates. However, he
was informed through telephone call from some Justices that the Chief Justice herself CJ Sereno, will be invoking Sec 2,
Rule 10 of JBC-009 or the so-called unanimity rule against him. Generally, the rule is that an applicant is included in the
shortlist when s/he obtains affirmative vote of at least a majority of all the members of the JBC. When Section 2, Rule 10 of
JBC-009, however, is invoked because an applicants integrity is challenged, a unanimous vote is required. Jardeleza was

then directed to make himself available on June 30, 2014 before the JBC during which he would be informed of the objections
to his integrity.
Jardeleza wrote a letter-petition asking the SC to exercise its supervisory power and direct the JBC to, among others, give
Jardeleza a written notice and sworn written statements of his oppositors or any documents in the JBC hearings, and to
disallow CJ Sereno from participating in the voting process for nominees on June 30, 2014.
During the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC, Justice Carpio appeared and disclosed a confidential information which, to CJ
Sereno, characterized Jardelezas integrity as dubious. Jardeleza demanded that CJ Sereno execute a sworn statement
specifying her objections and that he be afforded the right to cross-examine her in a public hearing. He also requested
deferment of the JBC proceedings, as the SC en banc has yet to decide in his letter-petition.
However, the JBC continued its deliberations and proceeded to vote for the nominees to be included in the shortlist. Thereafter,
the JBC released the shortlist of 4 nominees. It was revealed later that there were actually 5 nominees who made it to the
JBC shortlist, but 1 nominee could not be included because of the invocation of the unanimity rule..
Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus via Rule 65 with prayer for TRO to compel the JBC to include him in the list of
nominees on the grounds that the JBC and CJ Sereno acted with grave abuse of discretion in excluding him, despite having
garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.
Political Law
Issue: W/N the right to due process is demandable as a matter of right in JBC proceedings
Yes. While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not mean that an applicants access to the rights afforded
under the due process clause is discretionary on the part of JBC.
The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings. Notwithstanding being a class of its own,
the right to be heard and to explain ones self is availing. In cases where an objection to an applicants qualifications is raised,
the observance of due process neither contradicts the fulfillment of the JBCs duty to recommend. This holding is not an
encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due process supports
and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded
the chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body
from making an unsound and capricious assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly
apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the
person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness because the only test that an exercise of discretion must surmount
is that of soundness.
Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in the shortlist submitted to the
President for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose not from the unconstitutionality of
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 per se, but from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of
due process. By no means does the Court intend to strike down the unanimity rule as it reflects the JBCs policy and,
therefore, wisdom in its selection of nominees. Even so, the Court refuses to turn a blind eye on the palpable defects in its
implementation and the ensuing treatment that Jardeleza received before the Council. True, Jardeleza has no vested right
to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due
process. ##
Remedial Law
Issue 1: W/N the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the case
Yes. Jardelezas allegations in his petitions merits the exercise of the Courts supervisory authority over the JBC. Under Sec
8, Art VIII of the Constitution, the JBC shall function under the supervision of the SC. It follows that such supervisory authority
covers the overseeing of whether the JBC complies with its own rules or not.
Issue 2: W/N a writ of mandamus is available against the JBC
No. The JBCs duty to nominate is discretionary and it may not be compelled to do something.
Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a
discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law
imposes upon said public officer the right and duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any matter in which he is required
to act. It is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.
Issue 3: W/N a writ of certiorari under Sec 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is available against the JBC (which is not exercising
quasi-judicial functions)
Yes. Under the expanded jurisdiction or expanded power of judicial review vested to the SC by the 1987 Constitution, a petition
for certiorari is a proper remedy to question the act of any branch or instrumentality of the government on the ground of grave

abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the government, even if the
latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
Villanueva vs JBC
GR 211833 April 7, 2015
Facts:
After about a year from being appointed as a MCTC judge, Judge Villanueva applied for the vacant position of presiding judge
in some RTC branches. The JBC however informed him that he was not included in the list of candidates for such position
because the JBCs long-standing policy requires 5 years of service as judge of first-level courts before one can apply as
judge for second-level courts. Before the SC, he assailed via Rule 65 and Rule 63 with prayer for TRO and preliminary
injunction the policy of JBC on the ground that it is unconstitutional and was issued with grave abuse of discretion. Allegedly,
the policy also violates procedural due process for lack of publication and non-submission to the UP Law Center Office of the
National Administrative Register (ONAR), adding that the policy should have been published because it will affect all applying
judges.
On the other hand, one of the JBCs arguments was that the writ of certiorari and prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC
from performing its principal function under the Constitution to recommend appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC
is nota tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function.
Issue 1: W/N the policy of JBC requiring 5-year service is constitutional
Yes. As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to recommend appointees to the judiciary and only those
nominated by the JBC in a list officially transmitted to the President may be appointed by the latter as justice or judge in the
judiciary. Thus, the JBC is burdened with a great responsibility that is imbued with public interest as it determines the men
and women who will sit on the judicial bench. While the 1987 Constitution has provided the qualifications of members of the
judiciary, this does not preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and procedures and providing policies to effectively
ensure its mandate.
Issue 2: W/N JBC committed grave abuse of discretion in laying down such policy
No. The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and incidental to the JBCs principal function of
choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies in the judiciary for appointment by the President. However, the
Constitution did not lay down in precise terms the process that the JBC shall follow in determining applicants qualifications.
In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every
vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and law for every position.
The search for these long held qualities necessarily requires a degree of flexibility in order to determine who is most fit among
the applicants. Thus, the JBC has sufficient but not unbridled license to act in performing its duties.
Issue 3: W/N the violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution
No. The equal protection clause is not violated because the classification created by the challenged policy satisfies the rational
basis test.
Substantial distinctions do exist between lower court judges with five year experience and those with less than five years of
experience, like the petitioner, and the classification enshrined in the assailed policy is reasonable and relevant to its
legitimate purpose. The assailed criterion or consideration for promotion to a second-level court, which is five years
experience as judge of a first-level court, is a direct adherence to the qualities prescribed by the Constitution. Placing a
premium on many years of judicial experience, the JBC is merely applying one of the stringent constitutional standards
requiring that a member of the judiciary be of proven competence. In determining competence, the JBC considers, among
other qualifications, experience and performance.
Civil Law
Issue 1: W/N the policy of JBC should have been published in the ONAR
No. The JBC policy need not be filed in the ONAR because the publication requirement in the ONAR is confined to issuances
of administrative agencies under the Executive branch of the government. Since the JBC is a body under the supervision of
the Supreme Court, it is not covered by the publication requirements of the Administrative Code.
Issue 2: W/N the policy of JBC should have been published
Yes. As a general rule, publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, including administrative rules that are intended
to enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding force and effect. Exempted from requirement of publication are
interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, which regulate only the personnel of the administrative agency
and not the public, and the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Here, the assailed JBC policy does not fall within the administrative rules and regulations exempted from the publication
requirement. It involves a qualification standard by which the JBC shall determine proven competence of an applicant. It is
not an internal regulation, because if it were, it would regulate and affect only the members of the JBC and their staff. Notably,

the selection process involves a call to lawyers who meet the qualifications in the Constitution and are willing to serve in the
Judiciary to apply to these vacant positions. Thus, naturally it follows that potential applicants be informed of the requirements
to the judicial positions, so that they would be able to prepare for and comply with them.
Jurisprudence has held that rules implementing a statute should be published. Thus, by analogy, publication is also required
for the five-year requirement because it seeks to implement a constitutional provision requiring proven competence from
members of the judiciary.
Remedial Law
Issue 1: W/N the petitions for certiorari and prohibition are applicable to JBC (Remedial)
Yes. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach. Under Rule 65, Sec 1(par 1), the
writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation,
board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government,
even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. Consequently, petitions for certiorari and
prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative
and executive officials.
Here, the JBC indeed does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
In the process of selecting and screening applicants, the JBC neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor
assumed unto itself any performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. However, since the formulation of guidelines
and criteria is necessary and incidental to the exercise of the JBCs constitutional mandate, a determination must be made
on whether the JBC has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and
enforcing the said policy.
Issue 2: W/N the remedy of mandamus is proper in assailing the policy of the JBC
No. First, to be included as an applicant to second-level judge is not properly compellable by mandamus inasmuch as it
involves the exercise of sound discretion by the JBC. Second, petitioner has no clear legal right since there is no law that
grants him the right of promotion to second-level courts.
Issue 3: W/N the remedy of declaratory relief is proper
No. First, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound policy. Rather, the petition specifically sought a judicial
declaration that the petitioner has the right to be included in the list of applicants although he failed to meet JBCs five-year
requirement policy. Again, no person possesses a legal right under the Constitution to be included in the list of nominees for
vacant judicial positions. The opportunity of appointment to judicial office is a mere privilege, and not a judicially enforceable
right that may be properly claimed by any person. The inclusion in the list of candidates, which is one of the incidents of such
appointment, is not a right either. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim any right that could have been affected by the assailed
policy.
Second, the SC does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are
involved. The special civil action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate RTC pursuant
to BP 129, Sec 19, as amended by R.A. No. 7691.
The SC assumes jurisdiction over the petition only because of the Courts supervisory duty over the JBC and in the
exercise of its expanded judicial power. But in any event, even if the Court will set aside procedural infirmities, the
instant petition should still be dismissed.

Grace Poe vs COMELEC

(Case Digest: GR 221697, GR 221698-700 March 8, 2016)
Facts:
In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that
her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from 24
May 2005.
May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay in the PH for good. Before that however,
and even afterwards, she has been going to and fro between US and Philippines. She was born in 1968, found as
newborn infant in Iloilo, and was legally adopted. She immigrated to the US in 1991 and was naturalized as
American citizen in 2001. On July 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino
citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine passport. In 2010, before
assuming her post as an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the
RA 9225 requirement . From then on, she stopped using her American passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly, among others,
that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her biological parents or
either of them were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of
citizenship and residence requirements, and that she committed material misrepresentations in her COC.
On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as a candidate for
Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote on the natural-born citizenship issue.
Issue 1: W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of qualifications of candidates (Read Dissent)
Held:
No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the powers and functions of the COMELEC, and deciding on
the qualifications or lack thereof of a candidate is not one among them.
In contrast, the Constitution provides that only the SET and HRET tribunals have sole jurisdiction over the election
contests, returns, and qualifications of their respective members, whereas over the President and Vice President,
only the SC en banc has sole jurisdiction. As for the qualifications of candidates for such positions, the Constitution is
silent. There is simply no authorized proceeding in determining the ineligibility of candidates before elections. Such
lack of provision cannot be supplied by a mere rule, and for the COMELEC to assimilate grounds for ineligibility into
grounds for disqualification in Rule 25 in its rules of procedures would be contrary to the intent of the Constitution.
Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided on the qualification issue of Grace as a
candidate in the same case for cancellation of her COC.
Issue 2: W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen (Read Dissent)
Held:
Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For that, she satisfies one of the constitutional
requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may run for presidency.
First, there is a high probability that Grace Poes parents are Filipinos. Her physical features are typical of Filipinos.
The fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is
overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than 99% chance that a child born in such province is a
Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of her parents nationality. That probability and the evidence on which it is
based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. To assume otherwise is to
accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm.
Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. This is based on the
finding that the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be
covered by the enumeration. While the 1935 Constitutions enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive
language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with
respect to foundlings, the SC felt the need to examine the intent of the framers.
Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship is supported by treaties and the general
principles of international law. Although the Philippines is not a signatory to some of these treaties, it adheres to the
customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in which the foundling is found.
Issue 3: W/N Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement
Held:
Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi coupled with animus revertendi in acquiring a new
domicile.
Grace Poes domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and not on July 18, 2006 when her application
under RA 9225 was approved by the BI. COMELECs reliance on cases which decree that an aliens stay in the
country cannot be counted unless she acquires a permanent resident visa or reacquires her Filipino citizenship is
without merit. Such cases are different from the circumstances in this case, in which Grace Poe presented an
overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US. Coupled with
her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her familys actual continuous stay in the Philippines
over the years, it is clear that when Grace Poe returned on May 24, 2005, it was for good.
Issue 4: W/N the Grace Poes candidacy should be denied or cancelled for committing material misrepresentations in her COC
Held:
No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the ground that she misrepresented facts as to her citizenship and
residency because such facts refer to grounds for ineligibility in which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to decide

upon. Only when there is a prior authority finding that a candidate is suffering from a disqualification provided by law
or the Constitution that the COMELEC may deny due course or cancel her candidacy on ground of false
representations regarding her qualifications.
In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace Poe is now pronounced qualified as a candidate for the
presidency. Hence, there cannot be any false representations in her COC regarding her citizenship and residency.
Grace Poe vs COMELEC (Summary)
Carpio Dissent: GR 221697 March 8, 2016
Emotional pleas invoking the sad plight of foundlings conveniently forgets the express language of the Constitution reserving
those high positions, particularly the Presidency, exclusively to natural-born Filipino citizens. Even naturalized Filipino
citizens, whose numbers are far more than foundlings, are not qualified to run for President. The natural-born citizenship
requirement under the Constitution to qualify as a candidate for President must be complied with strictly. To rule otherwise
amounts to a patent violation of the Constitution.
A Mockery of National Election Process
There is no majority of the Supreme Court that holds Grace Poe is a natural-born Filipino citizen since 7 5 justices voted
that Grace Poe is a natural-born, while the three others withheld their opinion.
1.
Allowing a presidential candidate with uncertain citizenship status to be potentially elected to the Office of the
President, an office expressly reserved by the Constitution exclusively for natural-born Filipino citizens, will lead to absurd
results.
2.
This ruling implies that the majority of this Court wants to resolve the citizenship status of petitioner after the elections,
and only if petitioner wins the elections, despite petitioner having already presented before the COMELEC all the evidence
she wanted to present to prove her citizenship status.
3.
If petitioner wins the elections but is later disqualified by this Court (acting as PET) for not possessing a basic
qualification for the Office of the President that of being a natural-born Filipino citizen those who voted for petitioner would
have utterly wasted their votes.
On Comelecs All-Encompassing Jurisdiction
The initial determination of who are qualified to file COC with the Comelec clearly falls within the all-encompassing
constitutional mandate of the Comelec to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.
1.
The Constitution also empower the Comelec to decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
elections. The power to decide all questions affecting elections necessarily includes the power to decide whether a
candidate possesses the qualifications required by law for election to public office. This broad constitutional power and
function vested in the Comelec is designed precisely to avoid any situation where a dispute affecting elections is left without
any legal remedy.
If one who is obviously not a natural-born Philippine citizen, like Arnold Schwarzenneger, runs for President, the Comelec
is certainly not powerless to cancel the certificate of candidacy of such candidate. There is no need to wait until after the
elections before such candidate may be disqualified.
2.
In fact, the COMELEC is empowered to motu proprio cancel COCs of nuisance candidates.
It cannot be disputed that a person, not a natural-born Filipino citizen, who files a certificate of candidacy for President puts
the election process in mockery and is therefore a nuisance candidate. Such persons certificate of candidacy can motu
proprio be cancelled by the COMELEC under Section 69 of the OEC, which empowers the COMELEC to cancel motu proprio
the COC if it has been filed to put the election process in mockery. (Timbol vs Comelec, 2015)
Who are Natural-Born Filipino Citizens
The following are deemed natural-born Filipino citizens: (1) those whose fathers or mothers are Filipino citizens, and (2) those
whose mothers are Filipino citizens and were born before 17 January 1973 and who elected Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority.
1.
The 1987 constitutional provision treating as natural-born Filipino citizens those born before 17 January 1973
of Filipino mothers and alien fathers, and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, has
a retroactive effect. (Co vs HRET, 1991)
The Court declared that this constitutional provision was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a
Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino
mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. Under earlier laws, if one so elected, he was not
conferred the status of a natural-born.
2.
Those whose fathers or mothers are neither Filipino citizens are not natural-born Filipino citizens. If they are not
natural-born Filipino citizens, they can acquire Philippine citizenship only under Article IV, Sec 1 (5) of the 1935 Constitution
which refers to Filipino citizens who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Intent of the Framers of 1935 Constitution
There is no silence of the Constitution on foundlings because the majority of the delegates to the 1934 Constitutional
Convention expressly rejected the proposed amendment of Delegate Rafols to classify children of unknown parentage as
Filipino citizens.

1. Three delegates voiced their objections to Rafolss amendment, namely Delegates Buslon, Montinola, and Roxas. Delegate
Teofilo Buslon suggested that the subject matter be left in the hands of the legislature, which meant that Congress would
decide whether to categorize as Filipinos ( 1) natural or illegitimate children of Filipino mothers and alien fathers who do not
recognize them; and (2) children of unknown parentage / foundlings.
If that were the case, foundlings were not and could not validly be considered as natural-born Filipino citizens as defined in
the Constitution since Congress would then provide the enabling law for them to be regarded as Filipino citizens.
Foundlings would be naturalized citizens since they acquire Filipino citizenship in accordance with law under paragraph
(5), Section 1 of Article IV of the 193 5 Constitution.
Significantly, petitioner and the Solicitor General, conveniently left out Delegate Buslons opinion.
2. None of the framers of the 1935 Constitution mentioned the term natural-born in relation to the citizenship of foundlings.
Again, under the 1935 Constitution, only those whose fathers were Filipino citizens were considered natural-born Filipino
citizens. Those who were born of Filipino mothers and alien fathers were still required to elect Philippine citizenship,
preventing them from being natural-born Filipino citizens.
If the framers intended that foundlings be considered natural-born Filipino citizens, this would have created an absurd
situation where a child with unknown parentage would be placed in a better position than a child whose mother is actually
known to be a Filipino citizen. The framers of the 1935 Constitution could not have intended to create such an absurdity.
3. Delegate Rafolss amendment, when put to a vote, was clearly rejected by the majority of the delegates to the 1934
Constitutional Convention.
The rejection of the Rafols amendment not only meant the non-inclusion in the text of the Constitution of a provision that
children with unknown parentage are Filipino citizens, but also signified the rejection by the delegates of the idea or
proposition that foundlings are Filipino citizens at birth just like natural-born citizens. While the framers discussed the matter
of foundlings because of Delegate Rafolss amendment, they not only rejected the Rafols proposal but also clearly manifested
that foundlings could not be citizens of the Philippines at birth like children of Filipino fathers.
4. Only the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, which articulated the
presumption on the place of birth of foundlings, existed during the deliberations on the 1935 Constitution. The 1930 Hague
Convention does not guarantee a nationality to a foundling at birth. Therefore, there was no prevailing customary international
law at that time, as there is still none today, conferring automatically a nationality to foundlings at birth.
International Laws Applicable to Foundlings
1.
There is no conventional or customary international law automatically conferring nationality to foundlings at birth
2.
There are only two general principles of international law applicable to foundlings.
First is that a foundling is deemed domiciled in the country where the foundling is found. A foundling is merely considered
to have a domicile at birth, not a nationality at birth. Stated otherwise, a foundling receives at birth a domicile of origin which
is the country in which the foundling is found.
Second, in the absence of proof to the contrary, a foundling is deemed born in the country where the foundling is
found. These two general principles of international law have nothing to do with conferment of nationality.
3.
There is a difference between citizenship at birth because of jus soli, and citizenship at birth because of jus sanguinis.
The former may be granted to foundlings under Philippine statutory law pursuant to Art IV, Sec 1 (5) of the 1935 Constitution
but the Philippine citizenship thus granted is not that of a natural-born citizen but that of a naturalized citizen. Only those
citizens at birth because of jus sanguinis, which requires blood relation to a parent, are natural-born Filipino citizens under
the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
4.
Any treaty, customary international law, or generally accepted international law principle has the status of municipal
statutory law. As such, it must conform to our Constitution in order to be valid in the Philippines.
Foundlings are Deemed Naturalized Filipino Citizens
If a childs parents are neither Filipino citizens, the only way that the child may be considered a Filipino citizen is through the
process of naturalization in accordance with statutory law under Art IV, Sec 1 (5) of the 193 5 Constitution.
If a childs parents are unknown, as in the case of a foundling, there is no basis to consider the child as a natural-born Filipino
citizen since there is no proof that either the childs father or mother is a Filipino citizen. Thus, the only way that a foundling
can be considered a Filipino citizen under the 1935 Constitution, as well as under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is for the
foundling to be naturalized in accordance with law.
On the Ruling that Grace Poe Might be a Filipino Citizen

There is no law or jurisprudence which supports the contention that natural-born citizenship can be conferred on a foundling
based alone on statistical probability.
On Adoption Laws
Philippine laws and jurisprudence on adoption is simply not determinative of natural-born citizenship.
On Burden of Proof
Since the Constitution requires that the President of the Philippines shall be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, it is
imperative that petitioner prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen, despite the fact that she is a foundling. The burden
of evidence shifted to her when she admitted her status as a foundling with no known biological parents. At that moment, it
became her duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Grace Poe is NOT a Natural-born Filipino Citizen
1. There is no Philippine law automatically conferring Philippine citizenship to a foundling at birth. Even if there were, such a
law would only result in the foundling being a naturalized Filipino citizen, not a natural-born Filipino citizen.
2. Second, there is no legal presumption in favor of Philippine citizenship, whether natural-born or naturalized. Citizenship
must be established as a matter of fact and any doubt is resolved against the person claiming Philippine citizenship.
3. Third, the letter and intent of the 1935 Constitution clearly excluded foundlings from being considered natural-born Filipino
citizens. The Constitution adopts the jus sanguinis principle, and identifies natural-born Filipino citizens as only those whose
fathers or mothers are Filipino citizens. Petitioner failed to prove that either her father or mother is a Filipino citizen.
4. Fourth, there is no treaty, customary international law or a general principle of international law granting automatically
Philippine citizenship to a foundling at birth. Petitioner failed to prove that there is such a customary international law. At best,
there exists a presumption that a foundling is domiciled, and born, in the country where the foundling is found.
5. Fifth, even assuming that there is a customary international law presuming that a foundling is a citizen of the country where
the foundling is found, or is born to parents possessing the nationality of that country, such presumption cannot prevail over
our Constitution since customary international law has the status merely of municipal statutory law. This means that
customary international law is inferior to the Constitution, and must yield to the Constitution in case of conflict. Since the
Constitution adopts the jus sanguinis principle, and identifies natural-born Filipino citizens as only those whose fathers or
mothers are Filipino citizens, then petitioner must prove that either her father or mother is a Filipino citizen for her to be
considered a natural-born Filipino citizen. Any international law which contravenes the jus sanguinis principle in the
Constitution must of course be rejected.
6. Sixth, petitioner failed to discharge her burden to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Being a foundling, she
admitted that she does not know her biological parents, and therefore she cannot trace blood relation to a Filipino father or
mother. Without credible and convincing evidence that petitioners biological father or mother is a Filipino citizen, petitioner
cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen.
7. Seventh, a foundling has to perform an act, that is, prove his or her status as a foundling, to acquire Philippine citizenship.
This being so, a foundling can only be deemed a naturalized Filipino citizen because the foundling has to perform an act to
acquire Philippine citizenship. Since there is no Philippine law specifically governing the citizenship of foundlings, their
citizenship is addressed by customary international law, namely: the right of every human being to a nationality, and the
States obligations to avoid statelessness and to facilitate the naturalization of foundlings.
Grace Poe vs COMELEC
Brion Dissent: GR 221697 March 8, 2016
Summary
On COMELECs Jurisdiction
COMELECs quasi-judicial power in resolving a Section 78 proceeding includes the determination of whether a candidate has
made a false material representation in his CoC, and the determination of whether the eligibility he represented in his CoC is
true.
1. In Tecson v. COMELEC, the Court has recognized the COMELECs jurisdiction in a Section 78 proceeding over a
presidential candidate.
2. The Courts conclusion in this case would wreak havoc on existing jurisprudence recognizing the COMELECs jurisdiction
to determine a candidates eligibility in the course of deciding a Section 78 proceeding before it. The ponencia disregarded
the cases involving Section 78 since the year 2012 (when 2012 COMELEC Rules was published) where it recognized the
COMELECs jurisdiction to determine eligibility as part of determining false material representation in a candidates CoC.
In Ongsiako-Reyes v. COMELEC, the Court affirmed the COMELECs cancellation of Ongsiako-Reyes CoC and affirmed its
determination that Ongsiako-Reyes is neither a Philippine citizen nor a resident of Marinduque.

 The Court even affirmed the COMELECs capability to liberally construe its own rules of procedure in response to OngsiakoReyes allegation that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in admitting newly-discovered evidence that had not been
testified on, offered and admitted in evidence.
In Cerafica, the Court held that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in holding that Kimberly Cerafica (a candidate
for councilor) did not file a valid CoC and subsequently cannot be substituted by Olivia Cerafica. Kimberlys CoC is
considered valid unless the contents therein (including her eligibility) is impugned through a Section 78 proceeding.
2. The ponencias reliance on Fermins is out of context.
Fermin clarified that Section 78 of the OEC is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications
or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the
COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate.
A proceeding under Section 78 is likened to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal
with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a Section 78 petition is filed before
proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate.
3. Rules 23 of the 2012 COMELEC Rules of Procedure does not limit the COMELECs jurisdiction in determining the eligibility
of a candidate in the course of ruling on a Section 78 proceeding.
The second paragraph in Rule 23 delineates the distinction between a Section 78 cancellation proceeding and a Section
68 disqualification proceeding; to avoid the muddling or mixing of the grounds for each remedy, the COMELEC opted to
provide that petitions that combine or substitute one remedy for the other shall be dismissed summarily. Naturally, the text
of this second paragraph also appears in Rule 25, which provides for the grounds for a petition for disqualification.
The only difference between the two proceedings is that, under section 78, the qualifications for elective office are
misrepresented in the certificate of candidacy and the proceedings must be initiated before the elections, whereas a petition
for quo warranto under section 253 may be brought on the basis of two grounds (1) ineligibility or (2) disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines, and must be initiated within 10 days after the proclamation of the election results.
Under section 253, a candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to office, and he is disqualified if he lacks any of
the qualifications for elective office.
4. If we were to follow the ponencias limitation on the COMELECs function to determine Poes eligibility to become President
in a Section 78 proceeding, the logical result would be that even this Court itself cannot rule on Poes citizenship and
residence eligibilities in the course of reviewing a Section 78 COMELEC ruling; any declaration regarding these issues would
be obiter dictum.
The effect would be that any pronouncements outside the COMELECs limited jurisdiction in Section 78 would only be
expressions of the COMELECs opinion and would have no effect in the determination of the merits of the Section 78 case
before it. Findings of ineligibility outside of the limits do not need to be resolved or even be touched by this Court. Thus, in
the present case, Poe can simply be a candidate for the presidency, with her eligibilities open to post-election questions, if
still necessary at that point.
On the Citizenship of Foundlings
It was never the intent of the framers of 1935 Constitution to presume that foundlings are natural born citizens.
1. Ironically, the ponencia s citation of Jose M. Aruegos recounting of the deliberations even reinforces the position that th e
framers never intended to include foundlings within the terms of the 1935 Constitutions parentage provisions.
Aruego said that the Rafols amendment was defeated primarily because the Convention believed that the cases, being too
few to warrant the inclusion of a provision in the Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by statutory legislation.
2. The ponencias ruling thus does not only disregard the distinction of citizenship based on the father or the mother under the
1935 Constitution; it also misreads what the records signify and thereby unfairly treats the children of Filipino mothers under
the 1935 Constitution who, although able to trace their Filipino parentage, must yield to the higher categorization accorded
to foundlings who .do not enjoy similar roots.
On Burden of Proof
Procedural Aspect of the Burden of Proof
1. The original petitioners before the COMELEC (the respondents in the present petitions) from the perspective of procedure
carried the burden under its Section 78 cancellation of CoC petition, to prove that Poe made false material representations.

2. Since Poe could not factually show that either of her parents is a Philippine citizen, the COMELEC concluded that the
original petitioners are correct in their position that they have discharged their original burden to prove that Poe is not a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. To arrive at its conclusion, the COMELEC considered and relied on the terms of the
1935 Constitution.
3. With this original burden discharged, the burden of evidence then shifted to Poe to prove that despite her admission that
she is a foundling, she is in fact a natural-born Filipino, either by evidence (not necessarily or solely DNA in character) and
by legal arguments supporting the view that a foundling found in the Philippines is a natural-born citizen.
Substantive Aspect: Citizenship Cannot be Presumed
4. From the substantive perspective, too, a sovereign State has the right to determine who its citizens are.
5. The list of Filipino citizens under the Constitution must be read as exclusive and exhaustive.
In Paa v. Chan, this Court categorically ruled that it is incumbent upon the person who claims Philippine citizenship, to prove
to the satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. This should be true particularly after proof that the claimant has not
proven (and even admits the lack of proven) Filipino parentage.
6. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must
be resolved in favor of the State.
7. The exercise by a person of the rights and/or privileges that are granted to Philippine citizens is not conclusive proof that
he or she is a Philippine citizen.
8. Based on these considerations, the Court majoritys ruling on burden of proof at the COMELEC level appears to be
misplaced. On both counts, procedural and substantive (based on settled jurisprudence), the COMELEC closely hewed to
the legal requirements. Thus, the Court majoritys positions on where and how the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion are truly puzzling. With no grave abuse at the COMELEC level, the present petitioners own burden of proof in the
present certiorari proceedings before this Court must necessarily fail.
Wigberto Tanada vs HRET
Case Digest: GR 217012 March 1, 2016
Facts: Wigberto Tanada filed twin petitions before the COMELEC to cancel the COC of Alvin John Tanada for false
representations and to declare him as a nuisance candidate. They were both candidates for the position of Congress
Representative. A COMELEC division denied both his petitions, but on reconsideration, the COMELEC en banc on April 13,
2013 granted to cancel the COC of Alvin John for false representations. The petition to declare him as nuisance candidate
however was denied. Wigberto again sought reconsideration of the denial of his petition on the basis of a newly discovered
evidence. Comes election day and the name of Alvin John remained in the ballots, whichafter Angelica Tan was the winning
candidate, and Wigberto only second.
Wigberto filed before the PBOC a petition to correct manifest mistakes concerning the cancelled candidacy of Alvin John and
a motion to consolidate Alvin Johns votes with the votes he garnered. The PBOC denied the motion to consolidate the votes
because Alvin John was not a nuisance candidate. PBOC then proclaimed Angelica as the winner.
On May 21, 2013, Wigberto filed a supplemental petition before the COMELEC to annul the proclamation of Tan, which was
granted and affirmed by the COMELEC en banc. However, Angelica had by then taken her oath and assumed office past
noon time of June 30, 2013, thereby rendering the adverse resolution on her proclamation moot.
On May 27, 2013, before the SC, Wigberto filed a certiorari assailing the April 25, 2013 COMELEC en bancs ruling declaring
Alvin John not a nuisance candidate and an election protest claiming that fraud has been perpetrated. The SC, noting that
the proclaimed candidate has already assumed office, dismissed the election protest and directed Wigberto to file the protest
before the proper tribunal which is the HRET. The certiorari was also dismissed for being filed beyond the 5-day reglementary
period.
Before the HRET, the election protest was dismissed for being insufficient in form and substance and for lack of jurisdiction
over John Alvin who was not a member of the House of Representatives.
Issue 1: W/N the votes for Alvin John should be credited in favor of Wigberto as a result of the cancellation of Alvin Johns
candidacy

Held: No, the votes cast for Alvin John whose COC was cancelled are stray votes only. A COC cancelled on ground of false
representations under Sec 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, unlike in being a nuisance candidate in Sec 69, does not have
the effect of crediting the votes in favor of another candidate.
Issue 2: W/N the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC en bancs ruling is proper
Held: No, the motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading. Rule 13 Sec 1(d) of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
specifically prohibits the filing of a motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except in
election offense cases. Consequently, when a COMELEC en banc ruling become final and executory, it precludes a party
from raising again in any other forum the nuisance candidacy as an issue.
Issue 3: W/N Wigbertos petition for certiorari of the COMELEC en bancs ruling was timely
Held: No, the petition assailing the COMELECs en banc ruling was filed beyond the 5-day period provided by COMELEC
Rules of Procedure. Rule 37, Sec 3 thereof provides that decisions in pre-proclamation cases and petitions to deny due
course to or cancel COC, to declare a candidate as nuisance candidate or to disqualify a candidate, and to postpone or
suspend elections shall become final and executory after the lapse of 5 days from their promulgation, unless restrained by
the SC.
The COMELEC en banc promulgated its resolution on Alvin Johns alleged nuisance candidacy on April 25 2013. When
Wigberto filed his petition for certiorari before the SC on May 27,2013, the COMELEC en bancs resolution was already final
and executory.
Issue 4: W/N the SC has jurisdiction to resolve issues on the conduct of canvassing after the proclamation of a winning
candidate
Held: No. The SC no longer has jurisdiction over questions involving the elections, returns and qualifications of candidates
who have already assumed their office as members of House of Representatives. Issues concerning the conduct of the
canvass and the resulting proclamation of candidates are matters which fall under the scope of the terms election and
returns and hence, properly fall under the HRETs sole jurisdiction.
Issue 5: W/N the HRET has jurisdiction over the election protest filed by Wigberto regarding the cancelled candidacy of John
Alvin
Held: No. Article VI, Sec 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 15 of the 2011 HRET Rules declare that HRETs power to
judge election contests is limited to Members of the House of Representatives. Alvin John is not a Member of the House of
Representatives.
Wigberto Tanada vs HRET
Perez Concurring: GR 217012 March 1, 2016
Summary of Justice Perez Concurring Opinion
1. HRET lacks the authority to rule whether a candidate is indeed a nuisance candidate.
2. Under the HRET Rules, the electoral tribunal only has jurisdiction over two types of election contests: election protests and
quo warranto cases.
3. An election protest is the proper remedy against acts or omissions constituting electoral frauds or anomalies in contested
polling precincts, and for the revision of ballots.
4. On the other hand, the eligibility of a member representative is impugned in a quo warranto case. But the HRET Rules do
not prescribe procedural guidelines on how the COC of a political aspirant can be cancelled on the ground that he or she is
a nuisance candidate. Rather, this remedial vehicle is instituted in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, particularly Rule 245
thereof, by virtue of Sec. 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.
5. HRET is not vested with appellate jurisdiction over rulings on cancellation cases promulgated by the COMELEC en banc. It
is the SC which has jurisdiction and the power to review such rulings from the Commission.
6. The the jurisdiction of the HRET, as circumscribed under Article VI, Section 1 7 of the Constitution, is limited to the election,
returns, and qualification of the members of the House of Representatives. Thus, it cannot rule over an election protest
involving a non-member.
7. To be considered a member of the Lower House, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid
proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.

Bagumbayan-VNP vs COMELEC
GR 222731, March 8 2016
Facts: Bagumbayan-VNP and former Senator Gordon filed before the SC a petition for mandamus to compel COMELEC to
implement the Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) which is a security feature provided under RA 8346, as amended by
RA 9369, to ensure the sanctity of the ballot. The VVPAT functionality is in the form of a printed receipt and a touch screen
reflecting the votes in the vote-counting machine. For the 2016 elections, the COMELEC opted to use vote-counting
machines instead of PCOS. The vote-counting machines are capable of providing the VVPAT functionality, and for that the
COMELEC is now being petitioned to have the vote-counting machines issue receipts once the person has voted. The
COMELEC, however, refused to enable this feature for reasons that the receipts might be used by candidates in vote-buying
and that it might increase the voting time in election precincts.
Issue: W/N the COMELEC must activate the VVPAT feature of the vote-counting machines
Held: Yes. The minimum functional capabilities enumerated under Section 6 of Republic Act 8436, as amended, are
mandatory.
The law is clear that a voter verified paper audit trail requires the following: (a) individual voters can verify whether the
machines have been able to count their votes; and (b) that the verification at minimum should be paper based. Under the
Constitution, the COMELEC is empowered to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
election, and one of the laws that it must implement is RA 8346 which requires the automated election system to have the
capability of providing a VVPAT. The COMELECs act of not enabling this feature runs contrary to why the law requires this
feature in the first place.