VIVARES

V. STC

WRIT OF HABEAS
DATA


NEXUS BETWEEN

A, B, & C were barred from attending their graduation ceremony by STC

after C uploaded indecent pictures of A & B on facebook. These photos were
presented to their teachers by one of their classmates. Parents of A, B & C
filed for a TRO, which was later on granted but STC did not comply. This
prompted the parents to file before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a
Writ of Habeas Data, requesting STC to surrender and deposit all soft and
printed copies of the photographs, and to declare they have been illegally
RIGHT TO
obtained in violation of the childrens right to privacy. They further argue
PRIVACY V. LIFE, that the privacy setting of their childrens Facebook accounts was set at
LIBERTY AND
Friends Only. RTC denied the petition. Is the RTC correct in not issuing the
PROPERTY
writ of habeas data based on the allleged unauthorized access to online

information of A, B & C?


PRIVACY
RTC IS CORRECT. UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO ONLINE INFORMATION REQUIRES THAT
SETTINGS ON
THE UPLOADER INTENDED LIMITED ACCESS TO THE ONLINE POST. BEFORE ONE CAN
FACEBOOK
HAVE AN EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN HER FACEBOOK INFORMATION, HE OR SHE
DETERMINES

MUST MANIFEST AN INTENTION TO KEEP THAT INFORMATION PRIVATE BY UTILIZING

EXPECTATION PRIVACY TOOLS.

OF PRIVACY
ABSENCE OF A NEXUS: The availment of the writ of habeas data

requires the existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on

the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the
THREE STRANDS
other.
OF COMMON
Even if writ of habeas data protects ones right to privacy, an
RIGHT TO
expectation of privacy actually intended by the uploader must be
PRIVACY
definitely established.

Although habeas data has been defined as a procedure designed

to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information
INFORMATIONAL
age; the writ will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged
PRIVACY
unauthorized access to information about a person.

FRIENDS ONLY V. ONLY ME: Here, there is no reasonable

expectation of privacy because if even if visibility of a post is set at

Friends Only; said privacy setting is not very private. The post
can still be shared and be viewed by the public.
Unlike if the privacy setting is set at only me
If the setting was only me; then there is an definite
expectation of privacy.
If access to the pictures posted were limited to the original
uploader, through the "Me Only" privacy setting, or that the
users contact list has been screened to limit access to a select
few, through the "Custom" setting, the result may have been
different because the intention to limit access to the
particular post becomes more manifest and palpable.

THREE STRANDS OF THE COMMON RIGHT TO PRIVACY: (1) locational or
situational privacy; (2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy.
Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the right to
informational privacy
INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY: is usually defined as the right of
individuals to control information about themselves.

CYBER RESPONSIBILITY: It is incumbent upon internet users to exercise due
diligence in their online dealings and activities and must not be negligent
in protecting their rights.

DISINI V. SEC. OF
JUSTICE











SPAMMING












WARRANTLESS
COLLECTION OF
ONLINE DATA













AUTHORITY OF
THE DOJ TO
RESTRICT ACCESS
TO COMPUTER
DATA

Among 21 challenged sections of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, SC

declared Sections 4(c)(3), 12, and 19 of the Act as unconstitutional.
PROHIBITION ON SPAMMING: Section 4(c)(3) violated the right to
freedom of expression by prohibiting the electronic transmission of
unsolicited commercial communications.
COLLECTION OF DATA WITHOUT WARRANT: Section 12 was held in
violation of the right to privacy because it lacked sufficient
specificity and definiteness in collecting real-time computer data.
GOVT AUTHORITY TO RESTRICT ACCESS TO COMPUTER DATA: Section
19 of the Act for giving the government the authority to restrict or
block access to computer data without any judicial warrant.
SC RATIONALE
(1) SPAMMING IS STILL PROTECTED COMMERCIAL SPEECH: The government
argued that unsolicited commercial communications amount to both
nuisance and trespass because they tend to interfere with the enjoyment
of using online services and that they enter the recipients domain without
prior permission.
Although spams are a category of commercial speech, which does
not receive the same level of protection as other constitutionally
guaranteed forms of expression, they are nonetheless entitled to
protection.
The
prohibition
on
transmitting
unsolicited
communications would deny a person the right to read his
emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to
him. Accordingly, the Court declared Section4(c)(3) as
unconstitutional.
(2) COLLECTION OF ONLINE DATA WITHOUT WARRANT BY LAW ENFORCERS
VIOLATES RIGHT TO PRIVACY: Section 12 of the Act authorizes the law
enforcement without a court warrant to collect or record traffic data in
real-time associated with specified communications transmitted by means
of a computer system.
TWO TIER TEST IN RIGHT TO PRIVACY CASES: In determining whether
a communication is entitled to the right of privacy, the Court
applied a two-part test: (1) Whether the person claiming the right
has a legitimate expectation of privacy over the communication,
and (2) whether his expectation of privacy can be regarded as
objectively reasonable in the society.
LACK OF SUFFICIENT SAFEGUARDS: SC said that although the 2nd test
was not present because the data sent online does not reveal their
actual names and addresses, only their IP addresses; Sec. 12 is still
unconstitutional because of the absence of sufficient safeguards
against the risks of exposing their personal information.
(3) GOVT AUTHORITY TO RESTRICT ACCESS TO COMPUTER DATA: Section 19
authorizes the DOJ to restrict or block access to a computer data found to
be in violation of the Act. Petitioners argued that this section also violated
the right to freedom of expression, as well as the constitutional protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Computer data constitutes a personal property, thus entitled to
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Thus, the
government must secure a valid judicial warrant when it seeks to
seize a personal property or to block a form of expression.
Because Section 19 precluded any judicial intervention, the Court
found it unconstitutional.

IMBONG V.
OCHOA

Note: Boxes
with
black
background
are the aspects
of RH law
rendered
UNCONSTITU
TIONAL

RIGHT TO LIFE
OF THE UNBORN

RE: ABORTION

RIGHT TO
HEALTH

RE: UNSAFE
CONTRACEPT-
IVES

Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law and its IRR on the
violations of:
(1)
CERTAIN PROVISIONS BILL OF RIGHTS (discussed in detail through the
tables below)
(2)
UNDUE DELEGATION: Petitioners are attacking the delegation of
authority to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to determine a
supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is valid
RULING: There is no undue delegation of powers
The delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine
whether or not a supply or product is to be included in the
Essential Drugs List is valid, as the FDA not only has the power but
also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health
services and methods (under RA 3720 as amended by RA 9711 or
the FDA Act of 2009).
(3)
LOCAL AUTONOMY: Petitioners argue that the RH Law infringes
upon the powers devolved to Local Governments and the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
RULING: Local autonomy is not violated
LGUs are merely encouraged to provide RH services. Provision of
these services are not mandatory. Therefore, the RH Law does not
amount to an undue encroachment by the national government
upon the autonomy enjoyed by LGUs.
Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 or the Organic Act of
the ARMM merely delineates the powers that may be exercised by
the regional government. These provisions cannot be seen as an
abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would
benefit the general welfare.
RH LAW IS CONSTITUTIONAL BUT THE IRR IS NOT
The RH Law is in line with intent THE IRR IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
of framers of the Constitution to BECAUSE
IT
REDEFINED
prohibits abortion.
ABORTIFICIENTS.

The RH Law prohibits not only This redefinition paves the way for
drugs or devices that prevent the approval of contraceptives that
implantation but also those that may harm or destroy the life of the
induce abortion and induce the unborn
from
destruction of a fetus inside the conception/fertilization.
mothers womb. Thus, the RH Law
recognizes that the fertilized ovum
already has life and that the State
has a bounded duty to protect it.
Petitioners cite risks of getting diseases gained by using e.g. oral
contraceptive pills.
Adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives
are made available to the public under RA 4729:
MEDICALLY PRESCRIBED: contraceptives it will procure shall be
from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and
that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and
devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner.
FDA tested: Under Sec. 9, these devices and materials to be used
must have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA.

RELIGIOUS
FREEDOMS

FAMILY
RIGHTS/
CONSENT OF
SPOUSE OR
PARENTS

RH LAW
EDUCATION

RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS

NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
To allow religious sects to dictate
policy
or
restrict
other
groups would violate Article III,
Section 5 of the Constitution or the
Establishment Clause. This would
cause the State to adhere to a
particular religion, and thus,
establishes a state religion.
The State may pursue its legitimate
secular objectives without being
dictated upon the policies of any one
religion.

MANDATORY FAMILY PLANNING:
reasonable exercise of police power
by the government. Those who
attend the seminar are free to
accept or reject information they
receive and they retain the freedom
to decide on matters of family life
without the intervention of the
State.
MARITAL PRIVACY AND AUTONOMY

FREEDOM OF EXERCISE CLAUSE

Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH
Law obliges a hospital or medical
practitioner to immediately refer
a person seeking health care and
services under the law to another
accessible healthcare provider
despite
their
conscientious
objections based on religious or
ethical beliefs. These provisions
violate the religious belief and
conviction of a conscientious
objector. They are contrary
to Section 29(2), Article VI of the
Constitution or the Free Exercise
Clause, whose basis is the respect
for the inviolability of the human
conscience.
Moreover, there is no compelling
State interest to limit the free
exercise
of
conscientious
objectors.
EXCLUSION OF PARENTAL CONSENT
OVER MINORS
The exclusion of parental consent
in cases where a minor undergoing
a procedure is already a parent or
has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of
the RH Law) is also anti-family and
violates Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution, which states: The
natural and primary right and duty
of parents in the rearing of the
youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character
shall receive the support of the
Government.

Section
23
(a)
(2
)(i)
permitting RH procedures
even
with only the consent of the spouse
undergoing the provision (thus,
disregarding spousal content)
intrudes into martial privacy and
autonomy and goes against the
constitutional safeguards for the
family as the basic social
institution.
DECISION MUST BE MUTUAL: RH Law
cannot infringe upon the mutual
decision-making mandated under
the Constitution.
The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH
Law, which mandates the State to provide Age-and DevelopmentAppropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might
raise their objection to their participation in the RH education program,
the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
PREMATURE: Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the
Department of Education has not yet formulated a curriculum on ageappropriate reproductive health education.
DEFINITIONS ARE NOT VAGUE: The RH Law does not violate the due process
clause of the Constitution as the definitions of several terms as
observed by the petitioners are not vague.
The definition of private health care service provider must be
seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a
public health service provider. The private health care

EQUAL
PROTECTION
CLAUSE

INVOLUNTARY
SERVITUDE

institution cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous

to private health care service provider.
The terms service and methods are also broad enough to
include providing of information and rendering of medical
procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are
exempted from rendering RH service and modern family planning
methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as
from giving RH information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines incorrect information. Used together in
relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms incorrect and
knowingly connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or
misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs
and services on reproductive health.
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the governments
RH program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it
is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states
that the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick
elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to
provide medical care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their
number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and
marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and
desire to have children.
In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children
a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples
who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide
priority to the poor.
The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and nongovernment health care service providers to render 48 hours of pro
bono RH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two
reasons.
First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public
interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control
and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.
Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government
RH service providers to render pro bono service. Besides the Phil
Health accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do
otherwise.