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BILL OF RIGHTS- TOPIC by Professor Edwin Yan

ALBANO REVIEW CLASS IN POLITICAL LAW
I. THE DUE PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION AND CONTRACT CLAUSES AS
LIMITATIONS ON POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION
Art. III, Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws.
Art. III, Sec. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
LIMITATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY
Inherent in sovereignty, and therefore not even required to be conferred by the
Constitution, are the police, eminent domain, and taxation powers. The Bill of Rights,
notably the due process, equal protection and non-impairment clauses, is a means of limiting
the exercise of these powers by imposing on the State the obligation to protect individual
rights. The Bill of Rights is addressed to the State, notably the government, telling it what it
cannot do to the individual.
Equal Protection
Art. III, Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Art. XIII, Sec. 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of
measure that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce
social, economic, and political inequalities and remove cultural inequities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and
disposition of property and its increments.
1. Economic equality

Art. XIII, Sec. 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to
create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
Art. XIII, Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to
strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitle to security of tenure, humane
conditions of work, and living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decisionmaking process affecting the rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers
and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes including
conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial
peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers,
recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of
enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and growth.
Art. XII, Sec. 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and
planning agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines
or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by
such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of
investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and
operation enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its
national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.
Id., Sec. 2. xxx
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters,
territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment
exclusively to Filipino citizens.
Art. III, Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate
legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.
Art. VIII, Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

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xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall
be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rights of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

A. Due process - Procedural and Substantive

Civil Procedural Due Process
In civil cases, the SC laid down its elements in the case of Banco Espanol Filipino
v. Palanca:

There are areas of economic activity which can be limited to Filipinos. The Constitution itself
acknowledges this in various places - exploitation of marine wealth (Art. XII, Sec. 2 par. 2),
certain areas of investment (Art. XII, Sec. 10), to name a few.

a. Court with jurisdiction over the subject matter.

In Ichong v. Hernandez, 201 Phil. 1155 (1937), the SC upheld the validity of the law
which nationalized the retail trade. For the protection of the law can be observed by the
national interest.

c. Judgement rendered according to law.

b. Court with jurisdiction over the party-defendant

d. Defendant given the oppotunity to be heard (requirement on notice and hearing)

Criminal Due Process

2. Political equality
In criminal cases, the elements were laid down in Vera v. People:
Art. III, Sec. 18. (1)
beliefs and aspirations.

No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political

Art. IX, C, Sec. 10. Bona fide candidates to public office shall be free from any
form of harassment and discrimination.

3. Social equality

a. Accused is informed why he is proceeded against, and what charge he must

answer.
b. Judgment of conviction is based on evidence that is not tainted by falsity, and
after the defendant was heard.
If the prosecution produces the conviction based on untrue evidence, then it is
guilty of depriving the accused of due process. Thus false testimony can be questioned
by the accused regardless of the time that lapsed.
c. Judgment according to law

Art. XIII, Sec. 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of
measure that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce
social, economic, and political inequalities and remove cultural inequities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and
disposition of property and its increments.

d. Tribunal with jurisdiction

Administrative Due Process

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In administrative proceedings, the elements were laid down in the case of Ang
Tibay v. CIR as the "seven cardinal primary rights" in justiciable cases before
administrative tribunals:
a. There must be a hearing, where a party may present evidence in support of his
case.
b. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented by a party.
c. While the tribunal has no duty to decide the case correctly, its decision must be
supported by evidence.
d. The evidence supporting the decision must be substantial. Substantial evidence
is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
e. The evidence must have been presented at the hearing or at least contained in
the record and known to the parties affected.
f. The tribunal must rely on its own independent consideration of evidence, and
not rely on the recommendation of a subordinate.
g. The decision must state the facts and the law in such a way that the parties can
know the issues involved and the reasons for the decision.
LAO GI VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Although the deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, the
constitutional right of a person to due process shall not be denied. The Rules of Criminal
Procedure in the Rules of Court are applicable to deportation proceedings because it affects
freedom and liberty of the person
Minimum Standards:
1. Determine if theres sufficient cause to charge deportation
2. inform of the charges/ specific grounds for deportation
3. Hearing under the Rules of Procedure presented by the CID Commissioner
4. Order based on the determination of CID Commissioner
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS. LANTION
An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding, which will call
into operation all the rights of the accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
GUZMAN VS. NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

The proceedings in student discipline may be summary and cross examination is not an
essential part thereof. There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the
demands of procedural due process and these are that:
1. The students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation
against them
2. They shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of
counsel, if desired
3. They shall be informed of the evidence against them
4. They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf
5. The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
Note: The proceedings in student discipline may be summary and cross examination is not an
essential part thereof. (Guzman vs. N.U.). The contract between the school and student is not
an ordinary contract(Non vs. Dames). The school has the right to determine the continuance
of the schooling of a student applying their academic and disciplinary standards.(Garcia vs.
L.I.T.). However, penalties imposed by the schools must be commensurate to the offenses
committees (Malabanan vs. Ramento).
Substantive Due Process
Substantive due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with
the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or property. (Cruz, Constitutional Law)
The requirement of substantive due process is not a rigid concept. The heart to of
substantive due process is the requirement of reasonableness or absence of exercise
of arbitrary power. These are necessarily relative concepts which depend on the
circumstances of every case.
Requirements to pass substantive due process:
(1) Lawful subject or purpose- the law must be a valid governmental objective- the interest
of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class.
(2) Lawful means- means employed must be reasonably related to the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive.
Other requirements:
(1) must not contravene the constitution or a higher statute
(2) must not be partial or discriminatory
(3) must not prohibit but may regulate trade
(4) must not be unfair or oppressive
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy
(6) must not be unreasonable
_________________

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G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA, Petitioner, v. CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A.
SERENO, THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.

FACTS:
The present case finds its genesis from the compulsory retirement of Associate
Justice Roberto Abad (Associate Justice Abad) last May 22, 2014. Before his
retirement, on March 6, 2014, in accordance with its rules, 3 the JBC announced the
opening for application or recommendation for the said vacated position.
On March 14, 2014, the JBC received a letter from Dean Danilo Concepcion of the
University of the Philippines nominating petitioner Francis H. Jardeleza (Jardeleza),
incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic, for the said position. Upon acceptance
of the nomination, Jardeleza was included in the names of candidates, as well as in
the schedule of public interviews. On May 29, 2014, Jardeleza was interviewed by
the JBC.
It appears from the averments in the petition that on June 16 and 17, 2014,
Jardeleza received telephone calls from former Court of Appeals Associate Justice
and incumbent JBC member, Aurora Santiago Lagman (Justice Lagman), who
informed him that during the meetings held on June 5 and 16, 2014, Chief Justice
and JBC ex-officio Chairperson, Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno),
manifested that she would be invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 4 against him.
Jardeleza was then directed to make himself available before the JBC on June 30,
2014, during which he would be informed of the objections to his integrity.
Perceptibly based on the aforementioned resolutions declaration as to his
availment of a remedy in law, Jardeleza filed the present petition for certiorari and
mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), seeking to compel the JBC to include him in
the list of nominees for Supreme Court Associate Justice vice Associate Justice
Abad, on the grounds that the JBC and Chief Justice Sereno acted in grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in excluding him, despite
having garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.
Chief Justice Sereno and the JBC violated Jardelezas right to due process
in the events leading up to and during the vote on the shortlist last June
30, 2014. When accusations against his integrity were made twice, ex parte, by

Chief Justice Sereno, without informing him of the nature and cause thereof and
without affording him an opportunity to be heard, Jardeleza was deprived of his
right to due process. In turn, the JBC violated his right to due process when he was
simply ordered to make himself available on the June 30, 2014 meeting and was
told that the objections to his integrity would be made known to him on the same
day. Apart from mere verbal notice (by way of a telephone call) of the invocation of
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 against his application and not on the accusations
against him per se, he was deprived of an opportunity to mount a proper defense
against it.
His lack of knowledge as to the identity of his accusers (except for yet again, the
verbal information conveyed to him that Associate Justice Carpio testified against
him) and as to the nature of the very accusations against him caused him to suffer
from the arbitrary action by the JBC and Chief Justice Sereno. The latter gravely
abused her discretion when she acted as prosecutor, witness and judge, thereby
violating the very essence of fair play and the Constitution itself. In his words: the
sui generis nature of JBC proceedings does not authorize the Chief Justice to
assume these roles, nor does it dispense with the need to honor petitioners right
to due process.
The unlawful exclusion of the petitioner from the subject shortlist impairs
the Presidents constitutional power to appoint.
ISSUES: I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT CAN ASSUME JURISDICTION AND GIVE DUE
COURSE TO THE SUBJECT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS
(WITH APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER).
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUES RAISED AGAINST JARDELEZA BEFIT
QUESTIONS OR CHALLENGES ON INTEGRITY AS CONTEMPLATED UNDER
SECTION 2, RULE 10 OF JBC-009.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IS AVAILABLE IN THE
COURSE OF JBC PROCEEDINGS IN CASES WHERE AN OBJECTION OR
OPPOSITION TO AN APPLICATION IS RAISED.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER JARDELEZA MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE
SHORTLIST OF NOMINEES SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT.
The Courts Ruling

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not be compelled to do something.
I Procedural Issue: The Court
has constitutional bases to assume
jurisdiction over the case

C- Availability of the Remedy of Certiorari

A - The Courts Power of Supervision

over the JBC
Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides for the creation of the JBC. The
Court was given supervisory authority over it. Section 8 reads:
C hanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Section8.
A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme
Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice,
and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector. [Emphasis supplied]
As a meaningful guidepost, jurisprudence provides the definition and scope of
supervision. It is the power of oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties. It ensures that the laws and the rules governing the
conduct of a government entity are observed and complied with. Supervising officials
see to it that rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor
do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed,
they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may
not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this
matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.
re d

Based on this, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC covers the
overseeing of compliance with its rules. In this case, Jardelezas principal allegations in
his petition merit the exercise of this supervisory authority.
B- Availability of the Remedy of Mandamus
The Court agrees with the JBC that a writ of mandamus is not available.
Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not
to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to control
or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon said
public officer the right and duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any matter in
which he is required to act. It is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the
court. There is no question that the JBCs duty to nominate is discretionary and it may

Respondent JBC opposed the petition for certiorari on the ground that it does not
exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Under Section 1 of Rule 65, a writ
of certiorari is directed against a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function.
Judicial functions are exercised by a body or officer clothed with authority to determine
what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are with respect to the matter in
controversy. Quasi-judicial function is a term that applies to the action or discretion of
public administrative officers or bodies given the authority to investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a
basis for their official action using discretion of a judicial nature. It asserts that in the
performance of its function of recommending appointees for the judiciary, the JBC does
not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Hence, the resort to such remedy to
question its actions is improper.
In this case, Jardeleza cries that although he earned a qualifying number of votes in the
JBC, it was negated by the invocation of the unanimity rule on integrity in violation of
his right to due process guaranteed not only by the Constitution but by the Councils
own rules. For said reason, the Court is of the position that it can exercise the
expanded judicial power of review vested upon it by the 1987 Constitution. Thus:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Article VIII.
Section 1. The judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as
may
be
established
by
law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
It has been judicially settled that a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to question
the act of any branch or instrumentality of the government on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
wred

In a case like this, where constitutional bearings are too blatant to ignore, the Court
does not find passivity as an alternative. The impasse must be overcome.
II Substantial Issues

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Examining the Unanimity Rule of the

JBC in cases where an applicants
integrity is challenged
The purpose of the JBCs existence is indubitably rooted in the categorical constitutional
declaration that [a] member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence,
integrity, probity, and independence. To ensure the fulfillment of these standards in
every member of the Judiciary, the JBC has been tasked to screen aspiring judges and
justices, among others, making certain that the nominees submitted to the President
are all qualified and suitably best for appointment. In this way, the appointing process
itself is shielded from the possibility of extending judicial appointment to the
undeserving and mediocre and, more importantly, to the ineligible or disqualified.
In the performance of this sacred duty, the JBC itself admits, as stated in the whereas
clauses of JBC-009, that qualifications such as competence, integrity, probity and
independence are not easily determinable as they are developed and nurtured through
the years. Additionally, it is not possible or advisable to lay down iron-clad rules to
determine the fitness of those who aspire to become a Justice, Judge, Ombudsman or
Deputy Ombudsman. Given this realistic situation, there is a need to promote stability
and uniformity in JBCs guiding precepts and principles. A set of uniform criteria had to
be established in the ascertainment of whether one meets the minimum constitutional
qualifications and possesses qualities of mind and heart expected of him and his office.
Likewise for the sake of transparency of its proceedings, the JBC had put these criteria
in writing, now in the form of JBC-009. True enough, guidelines have been set in the
determination of competence, probity and independence, soundness of physical and
mental condition, and integrity.
red

As disclosed by the guidelines and lists of recognized evidence of qualification laid down
in JBC-009, integrity is closely related to, or if not, approximately equated to an
applicants good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and
fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards. That is why proof of an applicants
reputation may be shown in certifications or testimonials from reputable government
officials and non-governmental organizations and clearances from the courts, National
Bureau of Investigation, and the police, among others. In fact, the JBC may even
conduct a discreet background check and receive feedback from the public on the
integrity, reputation and character of the applicant, the merits of which shall be verified
and checked. As a qualification, the term is taken to refer to a virtue, such that,
integrity is the quality of persons character.
awred

The foregoing premise then begets the question: Does Rule 2, Section 10 of JBC009, in imposing the unanimity rule, contemplate a doubt on the moral
character of an applicant?
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 provides:

SEC. 2. Votes required when integrity of a qualified applicant is challenged. - In every

case where the integrity of an applicant who is not otherwise disqualified for nomination
is raised or challenged, the affirmative vote of all the Members of the Council must be
obtained for the favorable consideration of his nomination.
A simple reading of the above provision undoubtedly elicits the rule that a higher voting
requirement is absolute in cases where the integrity of an applicant is questioned.
Simply put, when an integrity question arises, the voting requirement for his or her
inclusion as a nominee to a judicial post becomes unanimous instead of the majority
vote required in the preceding section. Considering that JBC-009 employs the term
integrity as an essential qualification for appointment, and its doubtful existence in a
person merits a higher hurdle to surpass, that is, the unanimous vote of all the
members of the JBC, the Court is of the safe conclusion that integrity as used in the
rules must be interpreted uniformly. Hence, Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 envisions
only a situation where an applicants moral fitness is challenged. It follows then that the
unanimity rule only comes into operation when the moral character of a person is put
in issue. It finds no application where the question is essentially unrelated to
an applicants moral uprightness.
Examining the questions of integrity made against Jardeleza
The Court will now examine the propriety of applying Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 to
Jardelezas case.
The minutes of the JBC meetings, attached to the Supplemental Comment-Reply, reveal
that during the June 30, 2014 meeting, not only the question on his actuations in the
handling of a case was called for explanation by the Chief Justice, but two other
grounds as well tending to show his lack of integrity: a supposed extra-marital
affair in the past and alleged acts of insider trading.
red

Against this factual backdrop, the Court notes that the initial or original invocation of
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 was grounded on Jardelezas inability to discharge the
duties of his office as shown in a legal memorandum related to Jardelezas manner of
representing the government in a legal dispute. The records bear that the unanimity
rule was initially invoked by Chief Justice Sereno during the JBC meeting held on June
5, 2014, where she expressed her position that Jardeleza did not possess the integrity
required to be a member of the Court. In the same meeting, the Chief Justice shared
with the other JBC members the details of Jardelezas chosen manner of framing the
governments position in a case and how this could have been detrimental to the
national interest.
In the JBCs original comment, the details of the Chief Justices claim against

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

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Jardelezas integrity were couched in general terms. The particulars thereof were only
supplied to the Court in the JBCs Supplemental Comment-Reply. Apparently, the JBC
acceded to Jardelezas demand to make the accusations against him public. At the
outset, the JBC declined to raise the fine points of the integrity question in its original
Comment due to its significant bearing on the countrys foreign relations and national
security. At any rate, the Court restrains itself from delving into the details thereof in
this disposition. The confidential nature of the document cited therein, which requires
the observance of utmost prudence, preclude a discussion that may possibly affect the
countrys position in a pending dispute.
Be that as it may, the Court has to resolve the standing questions: Does the original
invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 involve a question on Jardelezas
integrity? Does his adoption of a specific legal strategy in the handling of a case bring
forth a relevant and logical challenge against his moral character? Does the
unanimity rule apply in cases where the main point of contention is the
professional judgment sans charges or implications of immoral or corrupt
behavior?
The Court answers these questions in the negative.
While Chief Justice Sereno claims that the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009
was not borne out of a mere variance of legal opinion but by an act of disloyalty
committed by Jardeleza in the handling of a case, the fact remains that the basis for
her invocation of the rule was the disagreement in legal strategy as expressed by a
group of international lawyers. The approach taken by Jardeleza in that case was
opposed to that preferred by the legal team. For said reason, criticism was hurled
against his integrity. The invocation of the unanimity rule on integrity traces its
roots to the exercise of his discretion as a lawyer and nothing else. No connection was
established linking his choice of a legal strategy to a treacherous intent to trounce upon
the countrys interests or to betray the Constitution.
Verily, disagreement in legal opinion is but a normal, if not an essential form of,
interaction among members of the legal community. A lawyer has complete discretion
on what legal strategy to employ in a case entrusted to him provided that he lives up to
his duty to serve his client with competence and diligence, and that he exert his best
efforts to protect the interests of his client within the bounds of the law. Consonantly, a
lawyer is not an insurer of victory for clients he represents. An infallible grasp of legal
principles and technique by a lawyer is a utopian ideal. Stripped of a clear showing of
gross neglect, iniquity, or immoral purpose, a strategy of a legal mind remains a legal
tactic acceptable to some and deplorable to others. It has no direct bearing on his
moral choices.
As shown in the minutes, the other JBC members expressed their reservations on
whether the ground invoked by Chief Justice Sereno could be classified as a question
of integrity under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009.These reservations were evidently

sourced from the fact that there was no clear indication that the tactic was a
brainchild of Jardeleza, as it might have been a collective idea by the legal team
which initially sought a different manner of presenting the countrys arguments, and
there was no showing either of a corrupt purpose on his part. Even Chief Justice Sereno
was not certain that Jardelezas acts were urged by politicking or lured by extraneous
promises. Besides, the President, who has the final say on the conduct of the countrys
advocacy in the case, has given no signs that Jardelezas action constituted disloyalty or
a betrayal of the countrys trust and interest. While this point does not entail that only
the President may challenge Jardelezas doubtful integrity, it is commonsensical to
assume that he is in the best position to suspect a treacherous agenda. The records are
bereft of any information that indicates this suspicion. In fact, the Comment of the
Executive Secretary expressly prayed for Jardelezas inclusion in the disputed shortlist.
The Court notes the zeal shown by the Chief Justice regarding international cases,
given her participation in the PIATCO case and the Belgian Dredging case. Her efforts in
the determination of Jardelezas professional background, while commendable, have
not produced a patent demonstration of a connection between the act complained of
and his integrity as a person. Nonetheless, the Court cannot consider her invocation of
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 as conformably within the contemplation of the rule. To
fall under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, there must be a showing that the act
complained of is, at the least, linked to the moral character of the person and
not to his judgment as a professional. What this disposition perceives,
therefore, is the inapplicability of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 to the original
ground of its invocation.
As previously mentioned, Chief Justice Sereno raised the issues of Jardelezas alleged
extra-marital affair and acts of insider-trading for the first time only during the June 30,
2014 meeting of the JBC. As can be gleaned from the minutes of the June 30, 2014
meeting, the inclusion of these issues had its origin from newspaper reports that the
Chief Justice might raise issues of immorality against Jardeleza. The Chief Justice
then deduced that the immorality issue referred to by the media might have been the
incidents that could have transpired when Jardeleza was still the General Counsel of
San Miguel Corporation. She stated that inasmuch as the JBC had the duty to take
every possible step to verify the qualification of the applicants, it might as well be
clarified.
Do these issues fall within the purview of questions on integrity under Section 2, Rule
10 of JBC-009? The Court nods in assent. These are valid issues.
This acquiescence is consistent with the Courts discussion supra. Unlike the first
ground which centered on Jardelezas stance on the tactical approach in pursuing the
case for the government, the claims of an illicit relationship and acts of insider
trading bear a candid relation to his moral character. Jurisprudence is replete
with cases where a lawyers deliberate participation in extra-marital affairs was
considered as a disgraceful stain on ones ethical and moral principles. The bottom line

8 | Page
is that a lawyer who engages in extra-marital affairs is deemed to have failed to adhere
to the exacting standards of morality and decency which every member of the Judiciary
is expected to observe. In fact, even relationships which have never gone physical or
intimate could still be subject to charges of immorality, when a lawyer, who is married,
admits to having a relationship which was more than professional, more than
acquaintanceship, more than friendly. As the Court has held: Immorality has not been
confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or
indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or
shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of
the community and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.
Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective
reality. To have a good moral character, a person must have the personal characteristic
of being good. It is not enough that he or she has a good reputation, that is, the
opinion generally entertained about a person or the estimate in which he or she is held
by the public in the place where she is known. Hence, lawyers are at all times subject
to the watchful public eye and community approbation.
re d

The element of willingness to linger in indelicate relationships imputes a weakness in

ones values, self-control and on the whole, sense of honor, not only because it is a bold
disregard of the sanctity of marriage and of the law, but because it erodes the publics
confidence in the Judiciary. This is no longer a matter of an honest lapse in judgment
but a dissolute exhibition of disrespect toward sacred vows taken before God and the
law.
On the other hand, insider trading is an offense that assaults the integrity of our vital
securities market. Manipulative devices and deceptive practices, including insider
trading, throw a monkey wrench right into the heart of the securities industry. When
someone trades in the market with unfair advantage in the form of highly valuable
secret inside information, all other participants are defrauded. All of the mechanisms
become worthless. Given enough of stock market scandals coupled with the related loss
of faith in the market, such abuses could presage a severe drain of capital. And
investors would eventually feel more secure with their money invested elsewhere. In its
barest essence, insider trading involves the trading of securities based on knowledge of
material information not disclosed to the public at the time. Clearly, an allegation of
insider trading involves the propensity of a person to engage in fraudulent activities
that may speak of his moral character.
These two issues can be properly categorized as questions on integrity
under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009. They fall within the ambit of questions
on integrity. Hence, the unanimity rule may come into operation as the
subject provision is worded.
The Availability of Due Process
in the Proceedings of the JBC

In advocacy of his position, Jardeleza argues that: 1] he should have been informed of
the accusations against him in writing; 2] he was not furnished the basis of the
accusations, that is, a very confidential legal memorandum that clarifies the integrity
objection; 3] instead of heeding his request for an opportunity to defend himself, the
JBC considered his refusal to explain, during the June 30, 2014 meeting, as a waiver of
his right to answer the unspecified allegations; 4] the voting of the JBC was railroaded;
and 5] the alleged discretionary nature of Sections 3 and 4 of JBC-009 is negated by
the subsequent effectivity of JBC-010, Section 1(2) of which provides for a 10-day
period from the publication of the list of candidates within which any complaint or
opposition against a candidate may be filed with the JBC Secretary; 6] Section 2 of
JBC-010 requires complaints and oppositions to be in writing and under oath, copies of
which shall be furnished the candidate in order for him to file his comment within five
(5) days from receipt thereof; and 7] Sections 3 to 6 of JBC-010 prescribe a logical,
reasonable and sequential series of steps in securing a candidates right to due process.
The JBC counters these by insisting that it is not obliged to afford Jardeleza the right to
a hearing in the fulfillment of its duty to recommend. The JBC, as a body, is not
required by law to hold hearings on the qualifications of the nominees. The process by
which an objection is made based on Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 is not judicial,
quasi-judicial, or fact-finding, for it does not aim to determine guilt or innocence akin to
a criminal or administrative offense but to ascertain the fitness of an applicant vis--vis
the requirements for the position. Being sui generis, the proceedings of the JBC do not
confer the rights insisted upon by Jardeleza. He may not exact the application of rules
of procedure which are, at the most, discretionary or optional. Finally, Jardeleza refused
to shed light on the objections against him. During the June 30, 2014 meeting, he did
not address the issues, but instead chose to tread on his view that the Chief Justice had
unjustifiably become his accuser, prosecutor and judge.
The crux of the issue is on the availability of the right to due process in JBC
proceedings. After a tedious review of the parties respective arguments, the Court
concludes that the right to due process is available and thereby demandable as a
matter of right.
The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings.
Indeed, they are distinct from criminal proceedings where the finding of guilt or
innocence of the accused is sine qua non. The JBCs constitutional duty to recommend
qualified nominees to the President cannot be compared to the duty of the courts of law
to determine the commission of an offense and ascribe the same to an accused,
consistent with established rules on evidence. Even the quantum of evidence required
in criminal cases is far from the discretion accorded to the JBC.
The Court, however, could not accept, lock, stock and barrel, the argument that an
applicants access to the rights afforded under the due process clause is discretionary
on the part of the JBC. While the facets of criminal and administrative due process are
not strictly applicable to JBC proceedings, their peculiarity is insufficient to justify the

9 | Page
conclusion that due process is not demandable.
In JBC proceedings, an aspiring judge or justice justifies his qualifications for the office
when he presents proof of his scholastic records, work experience and laudable
citations. His goal is to establish that he is qualified for the office applied for. The JBC
then takes every possible step to verify an applicant's track record for the purpose of
determining whether or not he is qualified for nomination. It ascertains the factors
which entitle an applicant to become a part of the roster from which the President
appoints.

SECTION 1. Evidence of integrity. - The Council shall take every possible step to verify
the applicant's record of and reputation for honesty, integrity, incorruptibility,
irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards. For this
purpose, the applicant shall submit to the Council certifications or testimonials thereof
from reputable government officials and non-governmental organizations, and
clearances from the courts, National Bureau of Investigation, police, and from such
other
agencies
as
the
Council
may
require.

The fact that a proceeding is sui generis and is impressed with discretion,
however, does not automatically denigrate an applicants entitlement to due
process. It is well-established in jurisprudence that disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers are sui generis in that they are neither purely civil nor purely
criminal; they involve investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers, not the trial of an action or a suit. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the
legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who, by their misconduct, have proved themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney. In such posture, there can be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a
prosecutor. On the whole, disciplinary proceedings are actually aimed to verify and
finally determine, if a lawyer charged is still qualified to benefit from the rights and
privileges that membership in the legal profession evoke.

SECTION 2. Background check. - The Council may order a discreet background check
on the integrity, reputation and character of the applicant, and receive feedback
thereon from the public, which it shall check or verify to validate the merits thereof.

Notwithstanding being a class of its own, the right to be heard and to

explain ones self is availing. The Court subscribes to the view that in cases where
an objection to an applicants qualifications is raised, the observance of due process
neither negates nor renders illusory the fulfillment of the duty of JBC to recommend.
This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process.
Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due process supports and enriches the
exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the
objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer
understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an
unsound and capricious assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not
expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against
an applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the person challenged complies with
the dictates of fairness for the only test that an exercise of discretion must surmount is
that of soundness.

While the unanimity rule invoked against him is found in JBC-009, Jardeleza urges the
Court to hold that the subsequent rule, JBC-010, squarely applies to his case. Entitled
as a Rule to Further Promote Public Awareness of and Accessibility to the Proceedings
of the Judicial and Bar Council, JBC-010 recognizes the need for transparency and
public awareness of JBC proceedings. In pursuance thereof, JBC-010 was crafted in this
wise:

A more pragmatic take on the matter of due process in JBC proceedings also compels
the Court to examine its current rules. The pleadings of the parties mentioned two: 1]
JBC-009 and 2] JBC-010. The former provides the following provisions pertinent to this
case:
C hanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SECTION 3. Testimony of parties.- The Council may receive written opposition to an

applicant on ground of his moral fitness and, at its discretion, the Council may receive
the testimony of the oppositor at a hearing conducted for the purpose, with due notice
to the applicant who shall be allowed to cross-examine the oppositor and to offer
countervailing
evidence.
SECTION 4. Anonymous complaints. - Anonymous complaints against an applicant
shall not be given due course, unless there appears on its face a probable cause
sufficient to engender belief that the allegations may be true. In the latter case, the
Council may either direct a discreet investigation or require the applicant to comment
thereon in writing or during the interview. [Emphases Supplied]

ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

SECTION 1. The Judicial and Bar Council shall deliberate to determine who of the
candidates meet prima facie the qualifications for the position under consideration. For
this purpose, it shall prepare a long list of candidates who prima facie appear to have
all
the
qualifications.
The Secretary of the Council shall then cause to be published in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation a notice of the long list of candidates in alphabetical order.
The notice shall inform the public that any complaint or opposition against a candidate
may
be
filed
with
the
Secretary
within
ten
(10)
days
thereof.

10 | P a g e

SECTION 2. The complaint or opposition shall be in writing, under oath and in ten
(10) legible copies, together with its supporting annexes. It shall strictly relate to the
qualifications of the candidate or lack thereof, as provided for in the Constitution,
statutes, and the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council, as well as resolutions or
regulations
promulgated
by
it.
The Secretary of the Council shall furnish the candidate a copy of the complaint or
opposition against him. The candidate shall have five (5) days from receipt thereof
within which to file his comment to the complaint or opposition, if he so desires.
SECTION 3. The Judicial and Bar Council shall fix a date when it shall meet in
executive session to consider the qualification of the long list of candidates and the
complaint or opposition against them, if any. The Council may, on its own, conduct a
discreet
investigation
of
the
background
of
the
candidates.
On the basis of its evaluation of the qualification of the candidates, the Council shall
prepare the shorter list of candidates whom it desires to interview for its further
consideration.
SECTION 4. The Secretary of the Council shall again cause to be published the dates
of the interview of candidates in the shorter list in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation. It shall likewise be posted in the websites of the Supreme Court and the
Judicial
and
Bar
Council.
The candidates, as well as their oppositors, shall be separately notified of the date and
place
of
the
interview.
SECTION 5. The interviews shall be conducted in public. During the interview, only
the members of the Council can ask questions to the candidate. Among other things,
the candidate can be made to explain the complaint or opposition against him.
SECTION 6. After the interviews, the Judicial and Bar Council shall again meet in
executive session for the final deliberation on the short list of candidates which shall be
sent to the Office of the President as a basis for the exercise of the Presidential power
of appointment. [Emphases supplied]
Anent the interpretation of these existing rules, the JBC contends that Sections 3 and
4, Rule 10 of JBC-009 are merely directory in nature as can be gleaned from the use
of the word may. Thus, the conduct of a hearing under Rule 4 of JBC-009 is
permissive and/or discretionary on the part of the JBC. Even the conduct of a hearing
to determine the veracity of an opposition is discretionary for there are ways, besides a
hearing, to ascertain the truth or falsity of allegations. Succinctly, this argument
suggests that the JBC has the discretion to hold or not to hold a hearing when an
objection to an applicants integrity is raised and that it may resort to other means to

accomplish its objective. Nevertheless, JBC adds, what is mandatory, however, is

that if the JBC, in its discretion, receives a testimony of an oppositor in a
hearing, due notice shall be given to the applicant and that shall be allowed
to cross-examine the oppositor.
red

Again, the Court neither intends to strip the JBC of its discretion to recommend
nominees nor proposes that the JBC conduct a full-blown trial when objections to an
application are submitted. Still, it is unsound to say that, all together, the observance of
due process is a part of JBCs discretion when an opposition to an application is made of
record. While it may so rely on other means such as character clearances,
testimonials, and discreet investigation to aid it in forming a judgment of an applicants
qualifications, the Court cannot accept a situation where JBC is given a full rein on the
application of a fundamental right whenever a persons integrity is put to question. In
such cases, an attack on the person of the applicant necessitates his right to
explain himself.
The JBCs own rules convince the Court to arrive at this conclusion. The subsequent
issuance of JBC-010 unmistakably projects the JBCs deference to the grave import of
the right of the applicant to be informed and corollary thereto, the right to be heard.
The provisions of JBC-010, per se, provide that: any complaint or opposition against a
candidate may be filed with the Secretary within ten (10) days thereof; the complaint
or opposition shall be in writing, under oath and in ten (10) legible copies; the
Secretary of the Council shall furnish the candidate a copy of the complaint or
opposition against him; the candidate shall have five (5) days from receipt thereof
within which to file his comment to the complaint or opposition, if he so desires; and
the candidate can be made to explain the complaint or opposition against him.
The Court may not close its eyes to the existence of JBC-010 which, under the rules of
statutory construction, bears great weight in that: 1] it covers any complaint or
opposition; 2] it employs the mandatory term, shall; and 3] most importantly, it
speaks of the very essence of due process. While JBC-010 does not articulate a
procedure that entails a trial-type hearing, it affords an applicant, who faces any
complaint or opposition, the right to answer the accusations against him. This
constitutes the minimum requirements of due process.
Application to Jardelezas Case
Nearing the ultimate conclusion of this case, the Court is behooved to rule on whether
Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process in the events leading up to, and
during, the vote on the shortlist last June 30, 2014.
The JBC gives great weight and substance to the fact that it gave Jardeleza the
opportunity to answer the allegations against him. It underscores the fact that
Jardeleza was asked to attend the June 30, 2014 meeting so that he could shed light on
the issues thrown at him. During the said meeting, Chief Justice Sereno informed him

11 | P a g e
that in connection with his candidacy for the position of Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court, the Council would like to propound questions on the following issues
raised against him: 1] his actuations in handling an international arbitration case not
compatible with public interest; 2] reports on his extra-marital affair in SMC; and 3]
alleged insider trading which led to the show cause order from the Philippine Stock
Exchange.
cralawre d

As Jardeleza himself admitted, he declined to answer or to explain his side, as he would

not want to be lulled into waiving his rights. Instead, he manifested that his
statement be put on record and informed the Council of the then pendency of his letterpetition with the Court en banc. When Chief Justice Sereno informed Jardeleza that the
Council would want to hear from him on the three (3) issues against him, Jardeleza
reasoned out that this was precisely the issue. He found it irregular that he was not
being given the opportunity to be heard per the JBC rules. He asserted that a candidate
must be given the opportunity to respond to the charges against him. He urged the
Chief Justice to step down from her pedestal and translate the objections in writing.
Towards the end of the meeting, the Chief Justice said that both Jardelezas written and
oral statements would be made part of the record. After Jardeleza was excused from
the conference, Justice Lagman suggested that the voting be deferred, but the Chief
Justice ruled that the Council had already completed the process required for the voting
to proceed.
After careful calibration of the case, the Court has reached the determination that the
application of the unanimity rule on integrity resulted in Jardelezas
deprivation of his right to due process.
As threshed out beforehand, due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always
and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a
person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to
explain or defend himself.Even as Jardeleza was verbally informed of the invocation
of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 against him and was later asked to explain himself
during the meeting, these circumstances still cannot expunge an immense perplexity
that lingers in the mind of the Court. What is to become of the procedure laid down in
JBC-010 if the same would be treated with indifference and disregard? To repeat, as its
wording provides, any complaint or opposition against a candidate may be filed with the
Secretary within ten (10) days from the publication of the notice and a list of
candidates. Surely, this notice is all the more conspicuous to JBC members. Granting ex
argumenti, that the 10-day period is only applicable to the public, excluding the JBC
members themselves, this does not discount the fact that the invocation of the first
ground in the June 5, 2014 meeting would have raised procedural issues. To be fair,
several members of the Council expressed their concern and desire to hear out
Jardeleza but the application of JBC-010 did not form part of the agenda then. It was
only during the next meeting on June 16, 2014, that the Council agreed to invite
Jardeleza, by telephone, to a meeting that would be held on the same day when a
resource person would shed light on the matter.

Assuming again that the classified nature of the ground impelled the Council to resort
to oral notice instead of furnishing Jardeleza a written opposition, why did the JBC not
take into account its authority to summon Jardeleza in confidence at an earlier
time? Is not the Council empowered to take every possible step to verify the
qualification of the applicants? It would not be amiss to state, at this point, that the
confidential legal memorandum used in the invocation of the unanimity rule was
actually addressed to Jardeleza, in his capacity as Solicitor General. Safe to assume is
his knowledge of the privileged nature thereof and the consequences of its
indiscriminate release to the public. Had he been privately informed of the allegations
against him based on the document and had he been ordered to respond thereto in the
same manner, Jardelezas right to be informed and to explain himself would have been
satisfied.
What precisely set off the protest of lack of due process was the circumstance of
requiring Jardeleza to appear before the Council and to instantaneously provide those
who are willing to listen an intelligent defense. Was he given the opportunity to do
so? The answer is yes, in the context of his physical presence during the meeting. Was
he given a reasonable chance to muster a defense? No, because he was merely
asked to appear in a meeting where he would be, right then and there, subjected to an
inquiry. It would all be too well to remember that the allegations of his extra-marital
affair and acts of insider trading sprung up only during the June 30, 2014 meeting.
While the said issues became the object of the JBC discussion on June 16, 2014,
Jardeleza was not given the idea that he should prepare to affirm or deny his past
behavior. These circumstances preclude the very idea of due process in which the right
to explain oneself is given, not to ensnare by surprise, but to provide the person a
reasonable opportunity and sufficient time to intelligently muster his response.
Otherwise, the occasion becomes an idle and futile exercise.
Needless to state, Jardelezas grievance is not an imagined slight but a real rebuff of his
right to be informed of the charges against him and his right to answer the same with
vigorous contention and active participation in the proceedings which would ultimately
decide his aspiration to become a magistrate of this Court.
Consequences
To write finis to this controversy and in view of the realistic and practical fruition of the
Courts findings, the Court now declares its position on whether or not Jardeleza may
be included in the shortlist, just in time when the period to appoint a member of the
Court is about to end.
The conclusion of the Court is hinged on the following pivotal points

12 | P a g e
1.

There was a misapplication of the unanimity rule under Section 2, Rule 10 of

JBC-009 as to Jardelezas legal strategy in handling a case for the government.

2.

While Jardelezas alleged extra-marital affair and acts of insider trading fall
within the contemplation of a question on integrity and would have warranted
the application of the unanimity rule, he was not afforded due process in its
application.
The JBC, as the sole body empowered to evaluate applications for judicial
posts, exercises full discretion on its power to recommend nominees to the
President. The sui generis character of JBC proceedings, however, is not a
blanket authority to disregard the due process under JBC-010.
Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process when, contrary to the JBC
rules, he was neither formally informed of the questions on his integrity nor
was provided a reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense.

3.

4.

With the foregoing, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been
included in the shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position of Associate
Justice Abad. This consequence arose not from the unconstitutionality of Section 2,
Rule 10 of JBC-009, per se, but from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of
procedure and the basic tenets of due process. By no means does the Court
intend to strike down the unanimity rule as it reflects the JBCs policy and, therefore,
wisdom in its selection of nominees. Even so, the Court refuses to turn a blind eye on
the palpable defects in its implementation and the ensuing treatment that Jardeleza
received before the Council. True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination,
but this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC failed to observe the
minimum requirements of due process.
In criminal and administrative cases, the violation of a partys right to due process
raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will.
Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision
rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction.This rule may well be
applied to the current situation for an opposing view submits to an undue relaxation of
the Bill of Rights. To this, the Court shall not concede. As the branch of government
tasked to guarantee that the protection of due process is available to an individual in
proper cases, the Court finds the subject shortlist as tainted with a vice that it is
assigned to guard against. Indeed, the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009
must be deemed to have never come into operation in light of its erroneous application
on the original ground against Jardelezas integrity. At the risk of being repetitive, the
Court upholds the JBCs discretion in the selection of nominees, but its application of
the unanimity rule must be applied in conjunction with Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-010
being invoked by Jardeleza. Having been able to secure four (4) out of six (6) votes,
the only conclusion left to propound is that a majority of the members of the JBC,
nonetheless, found Jardeleza to be qualified for the position of Associate Justice and

this grants him a rightful spot in the shortlist submitted to the President.
Need to Revisit JBCs
Internal Rules
In the Courts study of the petition, the comments and the applicable rules of the JBC,
the Court is of the view that the rules leave much to be desired and should be reviewed
and revised. It appears that the provision on the unanimity rule is vague and unfair
and, therefore, can be misused or abused resulting in the deprivation of an applicants
right to due process.
Primarily, the invocation of the unanimity rule on integrity is effectively a veto power
over the collective will of a majority. This should be clarified. Any assertion by a
member after voting seems to be unfair because it effectively gives him or her veto
power over the collective votes of the other members in view of the unanimous
requirement. While an oppositor-member can recuse himself or herself, still the
probability of annulling the majority vote of the Council is quite high.
Second, integrity as a ground has not been defined. While the initial impression is that
it refers to the moral fiber of a candidate, it can be, as it has been, used to mean other
things. In fact, the minutes of the JBC meetings in this case reflect the lack of
consensus among the members as to its precise definition. Not having been defined or
described, it is vague, nebulous and confusing. It must be distinctly specified and
delineated.
Third, it should explicitly provide who can invoke it as a ground against a candidate.
Should it be invoked only by an outsider as construed by the respondent Executive
Secretary or also by a member?
Fourth, while the JBC vetting proceedings is sui generis and need not be formal or
trial type, they must meet the minimum requirements of due process. As always, an
applicant should be given a reasonable opportunity and time to be heard on the
charges against him or her, if there are any.
At any rate, it is up to the JBC to fine-tune the rules considering the peculiar nature of
its function. It need not be stressed that the rules to be adopted should be fair,
reasonable, unambiguous and consistent with the minimum requirements of due
process.
One final note.
The Court disclaims that Jardelezas inclusion in the shortlist is an endorsement of his
appointment as a member of the Court. In deference to the Constitution and his
wisdom in the exercise of his appointing power, the President remains the ultimate
judge of a candidates worthiness.

13 | P a g e

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, it is hereby declared that

Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza is deemed INCLUDED in the shortlist submitted
to the President for consideration as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court vice
Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad.
The Court further DIRECTS that the Judicial and Bar Council REVIEW,
and ADOPT, rules relevant to the observance of due process in its proceedings,
particularly JBC-009 and JBC-010, subject to the approval of the Court.
This Decision is immediately EXECUTORY. Immediately notify the Office of the
President of this Decision.
__________________
ON SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: Determine first the intrinsic validity of the
law.

(DTI) through the Bureau of Trade Regulation and Consumer Protection (BTRCP), in
the exercise of its consumer regulation functions. Such authority is now transferred
to the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) through the Professional
Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service (PRBRES) created under the new law.
Petitioners sought to declare as void and unconstitutional the following provisions
of R.A. No. 9646:
SEC. 28. Exemptions from the Acts Constituting the Practice of Real Estate Service.
The provisions of this Act and its rules and regulations shall not apply to the
following:
(a) Any person, natural or juridical, who shall directly perform by himself/herself
the acts mentioned in Section 3 hereof with reference to his/her or its own
property, except real estate developers;
xxxx

G.R. No. 197676

February 4, 2014
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. and CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND
BUILDERS'ASSOCIATION, Petitioners,
vs.
PROFESSIONAL REGULATORY BOARD OF REAL ESTATE SERVICE and
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION

FACTS:
Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 is the Decision 1 dated July 12,
2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42 denying the petition to
declare as unconstitutional Sections 28(a), 29 and 32 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9646.
R.A. No. 9646, otherwise known as the "Real Estate Service Act of the
Philippines" was signed into law on June 29, 2009 by President Gloria MacapagalArroyo. It aims to professionalize the real estate service sector under a regulatory
scheme of licensing, registration and supervision of real estate service
practitioners (real estate brokers, appraisers, assessors, consultants and
salespersons) in the country. Prior to its enactment, real estate service
practitioners were under the supervision of the Department of Trade and Industry

SEC. 29. Prohibition Against the Unauthorized Practice of Real Estate Service. No
person shall practice or offer to practice real estate service in the Philippines or
offer himself/herself as real estate service practitioner, or use the title, word, letter,
figure or any sign tending to convey the impression that one is a real estate
service practitioner, or advertise or indicate in any manner whatsoever that one is
qualified to practice the profession, or be appointed as real property appraiser or
assessor in any national government entity or local government unit, unless he/she
has satisfactorily passed the licensure examination given by the Board, except as
otherwise provided in this Act, a holder of a valid certificate of registration, and
professional identification card or a valid special/temporary permit duly issued to
him/her by the Board and the Commission, and in the case of real estate brokers
and private appraisers, they have paid the required bond as hereto provided.
xxxx
SEC. 32. Corporate Practice of the Real Estate Service. (a) No partnership or
corporation shall engage in the business of real estate service unless it is duly
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the persons
authorized to act for the partnership or corporation are all duly registered and
licensed real estate brokers, appraisers or consultants, as the case may be. The
partnership or corporation shall regularly submit a list of its real estate service
practitioners to the Commission and to the SEC as part of its annual reportorial
requirements. There shall at least be one (1) licensed real estate broker for every
twenty (20) accredited salespersons.

14 | P a g e
(b) Divisions or departments of partnerships and corporations engaged in
marketing or selling any real estate development project in the regular course of
business must be headed by full-time registered and licensed real estate brokers.

and billions in revenues that the real estate industry generates for the government
will be a thing of the past.
ISSUES:

(c) Branch offices of real estate brokers, appraisers or consultants must be manned
by a duly licensed real estate broker, appraiser or consultant as the case may be.
In case of resignation or termination from employment of a real estate service
practitioner, the same shall be reported by the employer to the Board within a
period not to exceed fifteen (15) days from the date of effectivity of the resignation
or termination.
Subject to the provisions of the Labor Code, a corporation or partnership may hire
the services of registered and licensed real estate brokers, appraisers or
consultants on commission basis to perform real estate services and the latter
shall be deemed independent contractors and not employees of such corporations.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
According to petitioners, the new law is constitutionally infirm because (1) it
violates Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which
mandates that "[e]very bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof"; (2) it is in direct conflict with
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 648 which transferred the exclusive jurisdiction of the
National Housing Authority (NHA) to regulate the real estate trade and business to
the Human Settlements Commission, now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB), which authority includes the issuance of license to sell of
subdivision owners and developers pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957;
(3) it violates the due process clause as it impinges on the real estate developers
most basic ownership rights, the right to use and dispose property, which is
enshrined in Article 428 of the Civil Code; and (4) Section 28(a) of R.A. No. 9646
violates the equal protection clause as no substantial distinctions exist between
real estate developers and the exempted group mentioned since both are property
owners dealing with their own property.
Additionally, petitioners contended that the lofty goal of nurturing and developing
a "corps of technically competent, reasonable and respected professional real
estate service practitioners" is not served by curtailing the right of real estate
developers to conduct their business of selling properties. On the contrary, these
restrictions would have disastrous effects on the real estate industry as the
additional cost of commissions would affect the pricing and affordability of real
estate packages. When that happens, petitioners claimed that the millions of jobs

1. Whether there is a justiciable controversy for this Honorable Court to adjudicate;

2. Whether [R.A. No. 9646] is unconstitutional for violating the "one title-one
subject" rule under Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the Philippine Constitution;
3. Whether [R.A. No. 9646] is in conflict with PD 957, as amended by EO 648, with
respect to the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate real estate
developers;
4. Whether Sections 28(a), 29, and 32 of [R.A. No. 9646], insofar as they affect the
rights of real estate developers, are unconstitutional for violating substantive due
process; and
5. Whether Section 28(a), which treats real estate developers differently from other
natural or juridical persons who directly perform acts of real estate service with
reference to their own property, is unconstitutional for violating the equal
protection clause
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Justiciable Controversy
The Constitution requires as a condition precedent for the exercise of judicial
power the existence of an actual controversy between litigants. An actual case or
controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite
legal claims susceptible to judicial resolution. In other words, the pleadings
must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a
denial thereof on the other; that is, it must concern a real and not a merely
theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical
state of facts.An actual case is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged
has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.

15 | P a g e
There is no question here that petitioners who are real estate developers are
entities directly affected by the prohibition on performing acts constituting practice
of real estate service without first complying with the registration and licensing
requirements for brokers and agents under R.A. No. 9646. The possibility of
criminal sanctions for disobeying the mandate of the new law is likewise real.
Asserting that the prohibition violates their rights as property owners to dispose of
their properties, petitioners challenged on constitutional grounds the
implementation of R.A. No. 9646 which the respondents defended as a valid
legislation pursuant to the States police power. The Court thus finds a justiciable
controversy that calls for immediate resolution.
No Violation of One-Title One-Subject Rule

with or foreign to the general subject and title.An act having a single general
subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter
how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to
the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by
providing for the method and means of carrying out the general object.
It is also well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the
Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to
mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The
rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include
the general object which the statute seeks to effect.Indeed, this Court has
invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule "so as not
to cripple or impede legislation.

Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution states:

SEC. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
In Farias v. The Executive Secretary, 9 the Court explained the provision as follows:
The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and logrolling legislation as well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The
provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding
expression in its title.
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional
requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid
down the rule that
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should
not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The
requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive
a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be
comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute
seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or
convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth.
The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court has previously ruled that the one-subject requirement under the
Constitution is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane
to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent

R.A. No. 9646 is entitled "An Act Regulating the Practice of Real Estate Service in
the Philippines, Creating for the Purpose a Professional Regulatory Board of Real
Estate Service, Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes." Aside from
provisions establishing a regulatory system for the professionalization of the real
estate service sector, the new law extended its coverage to real estate developers
with respect to their own properties. Henceforth, real estate developers are
prohibited from performing acts or transactions constituting real estate service
practice without first complying with registration and licensing requirements for
their business, brokers or agents, appraisers, consultants and salespersons.
Petitioners point out that since partnerships or corporations engaged in marketing
or selling any real estate development project in the regular course of business are
now required to be headed by full-time, registered and licensed real estate brokers,
this requirement constitutes limitations on the property rights and business
prerogatives of real estate developers which are not all reflected in the title of R.A.
No. 9646. Neither are real estate developers, who are already regulated under a
different law, P.D. No. 957, included in the definition of real estate service
practitioners.
We hold that R.A. No. 9646 does not violate the one-title, one-subject
rule.
The primary objective of R.A. No. 9646 is expressed as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State recognizes the vital role of real estate
service practitioners in the social, political, economic development and progress of
the country by promoting the real estate market, stimulating economic activity and
enhancing government income from real property-based transactions. Hence, it

16 | P a g e
shall develop and nurture through proper and effective regulation and
supervision a corps of technically competent, responsible and respected
professional real estate service practitioners whose standards of practice
and service shall be globally competitive and will promote the growth of
the real estate industry.
We find that the inclusion of real estate developers is germane to the laws primary
goal of developing "a corps of technically competent, responsible and respected
professional real estate service practitioners whose standards of practice and
service shall be globally competitive and will promote the growth of the real estate
industry." Since the marketing aspect of real estate development projects entails
the performance of those acts and transactions defined as real estate service
practices under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9646, it is logically covered by the
regulatory scheme to professionalize the entire real estate service sector.
No Conflict Between R.A. No. 9646 and P.D. No. 957, as amended by E.O.
No. 648
Petitioners argue that the assailed provisions still cannot be sustained because
they conflict with P.D. No. 957 which decreed that the NHA shall have "exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business." Such jurisdiction
includes the authority to issue a license to sell to real estate developers and to
register real estate dealers, brokers or salesmen upon their fulfillment of certain
requirements under the law. By imposing limitations on real estate developers
property rights, petitioners contend that R.A. No. 9646 undermines the licenses to
sell issued by the NHA (now the HLURB) to real estate developers allowing them to
sell subdivision lots or condominium units directly to the public. Because the
HLURB has been divested of its exclusive jurisdiction over real estate developers,
the result is an implied repeal of P.D. No. 957 as amended by E.O. No. 648, which is
not favored in law.
It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not
favored. In order to effect a repeal by implication, the later statute must be so
irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant with the existing law that they cannot be
made to reconcile and stand together. The clearest case possible must be made
before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn, for inconsistency is never
presumed. There must be a showing of repugnance clear and convincing in
character. The language used in the later statute must be such as to render it
irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls
short of that standard does not suffice. Moreover, the failure to add a specific
repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless
an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and
old laws.

There is nothing in R.A. No. 9646 that repeals any provision of P.D. No. 957, as
amended by E.O. No. 648. P.D. No. 957, otherwise known as "The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers Protective Decree," vested the NHA with exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with its
provisions. It empowered the NHA to register, approve and monitor real estate
development projects and issue licenses to sell to real estate owners and
developers. It further granted the NHA the authority to register and issue/revoke
licenses of brokers, dealers and salesmen engaged in the selling of subdivision lots
and condominium units.
E.O. No. 648, issued on February 7, 1981, reorganized the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission (HSRC) and transferred the regulatory functions of
the NHA under P.D. 957 to the HSRC. Among these regulatory functions were
the (1) regulation of the real estate trade and business; (2) registration of
subdivision lots and condominium projects; (3) issuance of license to sell
subdivision lots and condominium units in the registered units; (4) approval of
performance bond and the suspension of license to sell; (5) registration of dealers,
brokers and salesman engaged in the business of selling subdivision lots or
condominium units; and (6) revocation of registration of dealers, brokers and
salesmen.
E.O. No. 90, issued on December 17, 1986, renamed the HSRC as the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and was designated as the regulatory body for
housing and land development under the Housing and Urban Development
Coordinating Council (HUDCC). To date, HLURB continues to carry out its mandate
to register real estate brokers and salesmen dealing in condominium, memorial
parks and subdivision projects pursuant to Section 11 of P.D. No. 957, which reads:
SECTION 11. Registration of Dealers, Brokers and Salesmen. No real estate
dealer, broker or salesman shall engage in the business of selling subdivision lots
or condominium units unless he has registered himself with the Authority in
accordance with the provisions of this section.
If the Authority shall find that the applicant is of good repute and has complied
with the applicable rules of the Authority, including the payment of the prescribed
fee, he shall register such applicant as a dealer, broker or salesman upon filing a
bond, or other security in lieu thereof, in such sum as may be fixed by the
Authority conditioned upon his faithful compliance with the provisions of this
Decree: Provided, that the registration of a salesman shall cease upon the
termination of his employment with a dealer or broker.

17 | P a g e
Every registration under this section shall expire on the thirty-first day of
December of each year. Renewal of registration for the succeeding year shall be
granted upon written application therefore made not less than thirty nor more than
sixty days before the first day of the ensuing year and upon payment of the
prescribed fee, without the necessity of filing further statements or information,
unless specifically required by the Authority. All applications filed beyond said
period shall be treated as original applications.
The names and addresses of all persons registered as dealers, brokers, or
salesmen shall be recorded in a Register of Brokers, Dealers and Salesmen kept in
the Authority which shall be open to public inspection.
On the other hand, Section 29 of R.A. No. 9646 requires as a condition precedent
for all persons who will engage in acts constituting real estate service, including
advertising in any manner ones qualifications as a real estate service practitioner,
compliance with licensure examination and other registration requirements
including the filing of a bond for real estate brokers and private appraisers. While
Section 11 of P.D. No. 957 imposes registration requirements for dealers, brokers
and salespersons engaged in the selling of subdivision lots and condominium units,
Section 29 of R.A. No. 9646 regulates all real estate service practitioners whether
private or government. While P.D. No. 957 seeks to supervise brokers and dealers
who are engaged in the sale of subdivision lots and condominium units, R.A. No.
9646 aims to regulate the real estate service sector in general by professionalizing
their ranks and raising the level of ethical standards for licensed real estate
professionals.
There is no conflict of jurisdiction because the HLURB supervises only those real
estate service practitioners engaged in the sale of subdivision lots and
condominium projects, specifically for violations of the provisions of P.D. No. 957,
and not the entire real estate service sector which is now under the regulatory
powers of the PRBRES. HLURBs supervision of brokers and dealers to effectively
implement the provisions of P.D. No. 957 does not foreclose regulation of the real
estate service as a profession. Real estate developers already regulated by the
HLURB are now further required to comply with the professional licensure
requirements under R.A. No. 9646, as provided in Sections 28, 29 and 32. Plainly,
there is no inconsistency or contradiction in the assailed provisions of R.A. No.
9646 and P.D. No. 957, as amended.
The rule is that every statute must be interpreted and brought into accord with
other laws in a way that will form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The
legislature is presumed to have known existing laws on the subject and not to have
enacted conflicting laws. Congress, therefore, could not be presumed to have
intended Sections 28, 29 and 32 of R.A. No. 9646 to run counter to P.D. No. 957.

No Violation of Due Process

Petitioners contend that the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9646 are unduly
oppressive and infringe the constitutional rule against deprivation of property
without due process of law. They stress that real estate developers are now
burdened by law to employ licensed real estate brokers to sell, market and dispose
of their properties. Despite having invested a lot of money, time and resources in
their projects, petitioners aver that real estate developers will still have less control
in managing their business and will be burdened with additional expenses.
The contention has no basis. There is no deprivation of property as no restriction
on their use and enjoyment of property is caused by the implementation of R.A.
No. 9646. If petitioners as property owners feel burdened by the new requirement
of engaging the services of only licensed real estate professionals in the sale and
marketing of their properties, such is an unavoidable consequence of a reasonable
regulatory measure.
Indeed, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling,
business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid
exercise of the police power of the State particularly when their conduct affects the
execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State,
public health and welfare and public morals. In any case, where the liberty
curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory
measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation
requirements violate the due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under
the mantle of police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or
professions.
Here, the legislature recognized the importance of professionalizing the ranks of
real estate practitioners by increasing their competence and raising ethical
standards as real property transactions are "susceptible to manipulation and
corruption, especially if they are in the hands of unqualified persons working
under an ineffective regulatory system." The new regulatory regime aimed to fully
tap the vast potential of the real estate sector for greater contribution to our gross
domestic income, and real estate practitioners "serve a vital role in spearheading
the continuous flow of capital, in boosting investor confidence, and in promoting
overall national progress."
We thus find R.A. No. 9646 a valid exercise of the States police power.
No Violation of Equal Protection Clause

18 | P a g e
Section 28 of R.A. No. 9646 exempts from its coverage natural and juridical
persons dealing with their own property, and other persons such as receivers,
trustees or assignees in insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings. However, real
estate developers are specifically mentioned as an exception from those
enumerated therein. Petitioners argue that this provision violates the equal
protection clause because it unjustifiably treats real estate developers differently
from those exempted persons who also own properties and desire to sell them.
They insist that no substantial distinctions exist between ordinary property owners
and real estate developers as the latter, in fact, are more capable of entering into
real estate transactions and do not need the services of licensed real estate
brokers.1wphi1 They assail the RTC decision in citing the reported fraudulent
practices as basis for the exclusion of real estate developers from the exempted
group of persons under Section 28.
We sustain the trial courts ruling that R.A. No. 9646 does not violate the
equal protection clause.

importantly, those real estate service practitioners working for real estate
developers. Unlike individuals or entities having isolated transactions over their
own property, real estate developers sell lots, houses and condominium units in
the ordinary course of business, a business which is highly regulated by the State
to ensure the health and safety of home and lot buyers.
The foregoing shows that substantial distinctions do exist between
ordinary property owners exempted under Section 28(a) and real estate
developers like petitioners, and the classification enshrined in R.A. No.
9646 is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate purpose. The Court thus
rules that R.A. No. 9646 is valid and constitutional.
Since every law is presumed valid, the presumption of constitutionality can be
overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the
Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority
may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the
challenged act must be struck down.

In Ichong v. Hernandez, the concept of equal protection was explained as follows:

Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid
classification, it is imperative that the classification should be based on real and
substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular
legislation. If classification is germane to the purpose of the law, concerns all
members of the class, and applies equally to present and future conditions, the
classification does not violate the equal protection guarantee. 27
R.A. No. 9646 was intended to provide institutionalized government
support for the development of "a corps of highly respected, technically
competent, and disciplined real estate service practitioners,
knowledgeable of internationally accepted standards and practice of the
profession." Real estate developers at present constitute a sector that hires or
employs the largest number of brokers, salespersons, appraisers and consultants
due to the sheer number of products (lots, houses and condominium units) they
advertise and sell nationwide. As early as in the 70s, there has been a proliferation
of errant developers, operators or sellers who have reneged on their
representation and obligations to comply with government regulations such as the
provision and maintenance of subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water system
and other basic requirements. To protect the interest of home and lot buyers from
fraudulent acts and manipulations perpetrated by these unscrupulous subdivision
and condominium sellers and operators, P.D. No. 957 was issued to strictly regulate
housing and real estate development projects. Hence, in approving R.A. No. 9646,
the legislature rightfully recognized the necessity of imposing the new licensure
requirements to all real estate service practitioners, including and more

Indeed, "all presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who

attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a
reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not render it
unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the
statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must negate all possible bases; that
the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a
statute; and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the
constitutionality of legislation should be adopted.
The petition is DENIED.
____________
ON PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Hierarchy of rights
Human Rights and Right to life are superior to right to property. (Philippine
Blooming Mills
Civil Rights vs. Civil Liberties

19 | P a g e
It is important to note the difference between "civil rights" and "civil liberties." The
legal area known as "civil rights" has traditionally revolved around the basic right
to be free from unequal treatment based on certain protected characteristics (race,
gender, disability, etc.) in settings such as employment and housing. "Civil
liberties" concern basic rights and freedoms that are guaranteed -- either explicitly
identified in the Bill of Rights and the Constitution, or interpreted through the years
by courts and lawmakers. Civil liberties include:

Freedom of speech
The right to privacy
The right to be free from unreasonable searches of your home
The right to a fair court trial
The right to marry
The right to vote
______________________
ESTRADA VS Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 148560 November 19,2001
Lessons Applicable:

Consti Overbreadth doctrine, void-for-vagueness doctrine

Crim Law 1- mala in se

Crim pro proof beyond reasonable doubt

Laws Applicable: Art. 3 RPC
FACTS:

An information is filed against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada

a.k.a. 'Asiong Salonga' and 'Jose Velarde,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy'
Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma
Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane
Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas and John Does & Jane Does of the crime of Plunder
under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder)
June, 1998 to January 2001: Estrada himself and/or in
connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused, who are members of
his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates and/or other persons, by taking undue
advantage of his official position, authority, relationship,
connection, or influence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire by himself, directly
or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth of P4,097,804,173.17 thereby
unjustly enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the

damage of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines,

through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts,
or similar schemes or means
Received P545,000,000.00 in the form of gift, share, percentage,
kickback or any form of pecuniary benefit, by himself and/or in
connection with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Jose 'Jinggoy'
Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, and John Does and
Jane Does, in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal
gambling
Diverting, receiving, misappropriating, converting or misusing
directly or indirectly, for his or their personal gain and benefit,
public funds of P130,000,000.00, more or less, representing a
portion of P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for
the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself
and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma
Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe
a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and other John Does & Jane Does
For His Personal Gain And Benefit, The Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) To Purchase 351,878,000 Shares Of
Stocks, More Or Less, And The Social Security System (SSS),
329,855,000 Shares Of Stock, More Or Less, Of The Belle
Corporation worth P1,102,965,607.50 and P744,612,450.00
respectively and by collecting or receiving, directly or indirectly,
by himself and/or in connivance with John Does and Jane Does,
commissions or percentages by reason of said purchases which
became part of the deposit in the equitable-pci bank under the
account name Jose Velarde
by unjustly enriching himself from commissions, gifts, shares,
percentages, kickbacks, or any form of pecuniary benefits, in
connivance with John Does and Jane Does, P3,233,104,173.17 and
depositing the same under his account name Jose Velarde at the
Equitable-Pci Bank
Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law since for him:
1. it suffers from the vice of vagueness
2. it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions
3. it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The
Revised Penal Code

April 4, 2001: Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8

separate Informations, docketed as:
1. Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659
2. Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3,
par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act), respectively

20 | P a g e
3. Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees)
4. Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code)
5. Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by
RA 6085)

April 11, 2001: Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the grounds of lack of
preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses and
opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. - Denied

April 25, 2001: Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558
finding that a probable cause for the offense of plunder exists to justify the
issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused

June 14, 2001: Estrada moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No.
26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein did NOT constitute an indictable
offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness
and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than 1 offense
Denied
Estrada filed a petition for certiorari are:
1. The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague
2. The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of
plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process
3. Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so,
whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it
ISSUES:
1. W/N the Plunder Law is constitutional (consti1)
2. W/N the Plunder Law dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in
criminal prosecutions (crim pro)
3. W/N the Plunder Law is a malum prohibitum (crim law 1)
HELD: Petition is dismissed. Plunder Law is constitutional.
1. YES

Miserably failed in the instant case to discharge his burden and overcome
the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law

Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters

which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation.

Combination- at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of

enumeration

series - must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same
category of enumeration

pattern - at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts

enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d)

Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine - a statute which either forbids or requires the

doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must

necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process of law
o The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is
whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed
conduct when measured by common understanding and practice
o can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on
its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by
construction
o a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ in its application.
o the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in 2 respects:
a. it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid
b. it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle
o As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute
on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications

Overbreadth Doctrine - a governmental purpose may NOT be achieved by

means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms
o overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked
against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which

is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech.

Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very
existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may
well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area
of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only
to free speech cases.

2. NO.

The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command

the respect and confidence of the community in the application of criminal law.
o has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives
life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute
the crime with which he is charged

What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a

number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a

21 | P a g e
pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to
prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed
by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth
o Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This
conclusion is consistent with reason and common sense. There would be no other
explanation for a combination or series of overt or criminal acts to stash
P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill gotten wealth."
3. NO

plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent (mens rea)

o Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of
an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such
offense.
o In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code,
shall be considered by the court.
indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree
of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent
o The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense
implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral
or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are
punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate
crimes are mainly mala in se.
________
OCAMPO VS ABANDO, 2014
SUBJECTS: PROBABLE CAUSE; ISSUANCE OF WARRANT OF ARREST; DUE
PROCESS IN PRELIM INVESTIGATION; POLITICAL OFFENSE DOCTRINE (11
FEBRUARY 2014, SERENO, CJ)
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the instant consolidated petitions are DISMISSED. The RTC
of Manila, Branch 32, is hereby ORDERED to proceed with dispatch with
the hearing of Criminal Case No. 08-262163. Petitioner Saturnino C.
Ocampo shall remain on temporary liberty under the same bail granted
by this Court until the termination of the proceedings before the RTC
Manila. Petitioners Randall B. Echanis, Rafael G. Baylosis and Vicente P.
Ladlad shall remain on temporary liberty under the same bail granted by
this Court until their actual participation as CPP-NDF consultants in the
peace negotiations with the government are concluded or terminated, or
until the termination of the proceedings before the RTC Manila,
whichever is sooner.

SO ORDERED.
SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION?
TO PROTECT THE INNOCENT FROM THE EMBARRASSMENT, EXPENSE AND ANXIETY
OF A PUBLIC TRIAL.
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS ONLY STATUTORY NOT CONSTITUTIONAL.
THUS, IS IT NOT A PROCEDURAL RIGHT ONLY?
IT IS A SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT AND A COMPONENT OF DUE PROCESS IN THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
A preliminary investigation is not a casual affair. It is conducted to protect the
innocent from the embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a public trial. While the
right to have a preliminary investigation before trial is statutory rather than
constitutional, it is a substantive right and a component of due process in the
administration of criminal justice.
WHAT IS THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IN PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION?
IT MEANS TO ACCORD AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE PRESENTATION OF
RESPONDENTS SIDE WITH REGARD TO THE ACCUSATION.
In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law entails
the opportunity to be heard. It serves to accord an opportunity for the presentation
of the respondents side with regard to the accusation. Afterwards, the
investigating officer shall decide whether the allegations and defenses lead to a
reasonable belief that a crime has been committed, and that it was the respondent
who committed it. Otherwise, the investigating officer is bound to dismiss the
complaint.
WHAT IS THE ESSENCE OF DUE PROCESS?
IT IS REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD AND SUBMIT EVIDENCE IN
SUPPORT OF ONES DEFENSE.
WHAT IS PROSCRIBED IN DUE PROCESS?
THE LACK OF OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD.

22 | P a g e
The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit
evidence in support of ones defense.88 What is proscribed is lack of opportunity
to be heard.89 Thus, one who has been afforded a chance to present ones own
side of the story cannot claim denial of dueprocess.
CERTAIN RESPONDENTS CLAIMED THEY WERE DENIED DUE PROCESS
BECAUSE HEY WERE NOT FURNISHED DOCUMENTS. IS THEIR CONTENTION
CORRECT?
NO, BECAUSE THEY COULD NO LONGER BE FOUND IN THEIR LAST KNOWN
ADDRESSES.
WHAT IS THE RULE UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES?
AS LONG AS EFFORTS TO REACH A RESPONDENT WERE MADE, AND HE WAS GIVEN
AN OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE, THE PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION REMAINS VALID. THE RULE WAS PUT IN PLACE IN ORDER TO FOIL
UNDERHANDED ATTEMPTS OF A RESPONDENT TO DELAY THE PROSECUTION OF
OFFENSES.
Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the
complaint based on the evidence before him if a respondent could not be
subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a respondent were made, and he was
given an opportunity to present countervailing evidence, the preliminary
investigation remains valid.100 The rule was put in place in order to foil
underhanded attempts of a respondent to delay the prosecution of offenses.
OCAMPO CONTENDS THAT HE WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS BECAUSE HE
WAS NOT FURNISHED COPY OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT. IS HIS
CONTENTION CORRECT?
NO. HIS INDICTMENT WAS BASED NOT ON THE SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT ALONE
BUT ON THE COLLECTIVE AFFIDAVITS OF SEVERAL OTHER WITNESSES.
Neither can we uphold petitioner Ocampos contention that he was denied the
right to be heard. For him to claim that he was denied due process by not being
furnished a copy of the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad would imply that
the entire case of the prosecution rested on the Supplemental Affidavit. The OSG
has asserted that the indictment of petitioner Ocampo was based on the collective
affidavits of several other witnesses attesting to the allegation that he was a
member of the CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee, which had ordered the launch of
Operation VD.

OCAMPO ALLEGED THAT JUDGE ABANDO DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE
CONSTITUTION WHICH PROVIDES THAT NO SEARCH WARRANT OR
WARRANT OF ARREST SHALL ISSUE EXCEPT UPON PROBABLE CAUSE TO
BE DETERMINED PERSONALLY BY THE JUDGE AFTER EXAMINATION UNDER
OATH OR AFFIRMATION OF THE COMPLAINANT AND THE WITNESSES HE
MAY PRODUCE. THE JUDGE DID NOT CONDUCT ANY EXAMINATION OF
COMPLAINANT AND WITNESSES. IS HIS CONTENTION CORRECT?
NO. SC HAS RULED THAT A HEARING IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE
DETERMINATION THEREOF. IN FACT, THE JUDGES PERSONAL EXAMINATION OF THE
COMPLAINANT AND THE WITNESSES IS NOT MANDATORY AND INDISPENSABLE FOR
DETERMINING THE APTNESS OF ISSUING A WARRANT OF ARREST. IT IS ENOUGH
THAT THE JUDGE PERSONALLY EVALUATES THE PROSECUTORS REPORT AND
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS SHOWING THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR
THE INDICTMENT AND, ON THE BASIS THEREOF, ISSUE A WARRANT OF ARREST; OR
IF, ON THE BASIS OF HIS EVALUATION, HE FINDS NO PROBABLE CAUSE, TO
DISREGARD THE PROSECUTORS RESOLUTION AND REQUIRE THE SUBMISSION OF
ADDITIONAL AFFIDAVITS OF WITNESSES TO AID HIM IN DETERMINING
ITS EXISTENCE.113
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce.
Petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not comply with the requirements
of the Constitution in finding the existence of probable cause for the issuance of
warrants of arrest against petitioners.
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested. Although the Constitution provides that probable cause shall be
determined by the judge after an examination under oath or an affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses, we have ruled that a hearing is not necessary for
the determination thereof. In fact, the judges personal examination of the
complainant and the witnesses is not mandatory and indispensable for determining
the aptness of issuing a warrant of arrest.
It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutors report and
supporting documents showing the existence of probable cause for the indictment
and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or if, on the basis of his
evaluation, he finds no probable cause, to disregard the prosecutors resolution

23 | P a g e
and require the submission of additional affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
determining its existence.
ECHANIS AND BAYLOSIS CLAIM THAT IF JUDGE ABANDO HAVE
PAINSTAKINGLY EXAMINED THE RECORDS THE JUDGE WOULD HAVE
DISMISSED THE INDICTMENT. BY NOT DISMISSING THE INDICTMENT HE
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION? ARE THEIR CONTENTION
CORRECT?
NO.
THE DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ISSUANCE OF WARRANTS OF
ARREST AGAINST PETITIONERS IS ADDRESSED TO THE SOUND DISCRETION OF
JUDGE ABANDO. JUDGES ARE GIVEN WIDE LATITUDE IN ISSUANCE OF WARRANTS
OF ARREST. THE TRIAL COURTS EXERCISE OF ITS JUDICIAL DISCRETION SHOULD
NOT, AS A GENERAL RULE, BE INTERFERED WITH IN THE ABSENCE OF GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION. INDEED, CERTIORARI WILL NOT LIE TO CURE ERRORS IN
THE TRIAL COURTS APPRECIATION OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE PARTIES, THE
CONCLUSION OF FACTS IT REACHED BASED ON THE SAID FINDINGS, AS WELL AS
THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis claim that, had Judge Abando painstakingly
examined the records submitted by Prosecutor Vivero, the judge would have
inevitably dismissed the charge against them. Additionally, petitioner Ocampo
alleges that Judge Abando did not point out facts and evidence in the record
that were used as bases for his finding of probable cause to issue a warrant of
arrest.
The determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against
petitioners is addressed to the sound discretion of Judge Abando as the
trial judge.116 Further elucidating on the wide latitude given to trial judges in the
issuance of warrants of arrest, this Court stated in Sarigumba v.
Sandiganbayan117 as follows:
x x x. The trial courts exercise of its judicial discretion should not, as a general
rule, be interfered with in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. Indeed,
certiorari will not lie to cure errors in the trial courts appreciation of the evidence
of the parties, the conclusion of facts it reached based on the said findings, as well
as the conclusions of law. x x x. Whether or not there is probable cause for the
issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused is a question of fact based on the
allegations.
WHAT IS THE POLITICAL OFFENSE DOCTRINE?

UNDER THE POLITICAL OFFENSE DOCTRINE, COMMON CRIMES,

PERPETRATED IN FURTHERANCE OF A POLITICAL OFFENSE, ARE DIVESTED
OF THEIR CHARACTER AS COMMON OFFENSES AND ASSUME THE
POLITICAL COMPLEXION OF THE MAIN CRIME.
The political offense doctrine is not a ground to dismiss the charge against
petitioners prior to a determination by the trial court that the murders were
committed in furtherance of rebellion.
Under the political offense doctrine, common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance
of a political offense, are divested of their character as common offenses and
assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere
ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal
offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty.
Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime of
rebellion. Thus, when a killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing is
not homicide or murder. Rather, the killing assumes the political complexion of
rebellion as its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and punished as rebellion
alone.
WHO HAS THE BURDEN TO PROVE POLITICAL MOTIVATION?
THE BURDEN MUST BE DISCHARGED BY THE DEFENSE SINCE MOTIVE IS A STATE OF
MIND WHICH ONLY THE ACCUSED KNOWS.
We had already ruled that the burden of demonstrating political motivation must
be discharged by the defense, since motive is a state of mind which only the
accused knows.The proof showing political motivation is adduced during trial
where the accused is assured an opportunity to present evidence supporting his
defense. It is not for this Court to determine this factual matter in the instant
petitions.
___________
G.R. No. 168539
March 25, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HENRY T. GO,
FACTS:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution 1 of
the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan (SB) dated June 2, 2005 which quashed
the Information filed against herein respondent for alleged violation of Section 3 (g)
of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.

24 | P a g e

The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision in

Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various
contracts awarded by the Government, through the Department of Transportation
and Communications (DOTC), to Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the
construction, operation and maintenance of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). Subsequent to the above
Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among
those charged was herein respondent, who was then the Chairman and President
of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile
(Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.
On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found
probable cause to indict, among others, herein respondent for violation of Section
3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was likewise a finding of probable cause against
Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of
the resolution finding probable cause.
On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit:
The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from today within which to show
cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the accused considering that the accused is a private person and the public
official Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an
accused in this case.5
The prosecution complied with the above Order contending that the SB has already
acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent by reason of his voluntary
appearance, when he filed a motion for consolidation and when he posted bail. The
prosecution also argued that the SB has exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's
case, even if he is a private person, because he was alleged to have conspired with
a public officer.6
On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash7 the Information filed against
him on the ground that the operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an
offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the show cause order
of the SB, also contended that, independently of the deceased Secretary Enrile, the
public officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired, respondent, who is not
a public officer nor was capacitated by any official authority as a government
agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
The prosecution filed its Opposition.
On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed Resolution, pertinent portions of which
read thus:
Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T. Go dated April 22, 2005,
and it appearing that Henry T. Go, the lone accused in this case is a private person
and his alleged co-conspirator-public official was already deceased long before this

case was filed in court, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the
Court grants the Motion to Quash and the Information filed in this case is hereby
ordered quashed and dismissed.
ISSUES:
1) Whether herein respondent, a private person, may be indicted for
conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer,
with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filing
of the Information.
HELD:
NO.
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public
officer profited or will profit thereby.
The elements of the above provision are:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to
the government.
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when
acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held
liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance with
the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and
private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead
thereto.
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public
officer with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not
mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be
proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing
extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did
not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy
between him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary

25 | P a g e
Enrile does not mean that there was no public officer who allegedly violated
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e)
and (g) of R.A. 3019.14 Were it not for his death, he should have been charged.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section
3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person must be alleged to
have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does not require
that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together with the public officer.
If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be charged in court,
as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the private person
may be indicted alone.
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for
conspiracy.1If two or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of
them pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of
them and they are jointly responsible therefore.. This means that everything said,
written or done by any of the conspirators in execution or furtherance of the
common purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or written by each of them
and it makes no difference whether the actual actor is alive or dead, sane or insane
at the time of trial. The death of one of two or more conspirators does not prevent
the conviction of the survivor or survivors.
This is not to say, however, that private respondent should be found guilty of
conspiring with Secretary Enrile. It is settled that the absence or presence of
conspiracy is factual in nature and involves evidentiary matters.Hence, the
allegation of conspiracy against respondent is better left ventilated before the trial
court during trial, where respondent can adduce evidence to prove or disprove its
presence.
2. WHETHER SB HAS JURISDICTION OVER HIS PERSON?
Respondent should be reminded that prior to this Court's ruling in G.R. No. 168919,
he already posted bail for his provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion for
Consolidation in Criminal Case No. 28091. The Court agrees with petitioner's
contention that private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for
Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled
that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative
relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
"[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either
expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to
have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive
this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to

the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted

himself to that jurisdiction."
Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate
purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other purpose,
the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
Such an appearance gives the court jurisdiction over the person."
Verily, petitioners participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was
not confined to his opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also
covered other matters which called for respondent courts exercise of its
jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now to deny said courts jurisdiction over
him.
The SB is a special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public officers, as
enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private
individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the
said public officers. In the instant case, respondent is being charged for violation of
Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under
the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been charged before
and tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the
latter, this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it
does not follow that the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the person of
and the case involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise would mean that the
power of a court to decide a case would no longer be based on the law defining its
jurisdiction but on other factors, such as the death of one of the alleged offenders.
______________
G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015
FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY
ACADEMY, REPRESENTED BY HIS FATHER RENATO P. CUDIA, WHO ALSO
ACTS ON HIS OWN BEHALF, AND BERTENI CATALUA
CAUSING, Petitioners, v. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE
MILITARY ACADEMY (PMA), THE HONOR COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF THE
PMA AND HC MEMBERS, AND THE CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD
(CRAB), Respondents
The true test of a cadets character as a leader rests on his personal commitment
to uphold what is morally and ethically righteous at the most critical and trying
times, and at the most challenging circumstances. When a cadet must face a
dilemma between what is true and right as against his security, well-being,
pleasures and comfort, or dignity, what is at stake is his honor and those that
[define] his values. A man of an honorable character does not think twice and
chooses the fore. This is the essence of and the Spirit of the Honor Code it is

26 | P a g e
championing truth and righteousness even if it may mean the surrender of ones
basic rights and privileges.
The Facts
Cadet 1CL Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the PMA, the
countrys premiere military academy located at Fort Gregorio del Pilar in Baguio
City. He belonged to the A Company and was the Deputy Baron of his class. As
claimed by petitioners and petitioner-intervenor (hereinafter collectively called
petitioners, unless otherwise indicated), he was supposed to graduate with
honors as the class salutatorian, receive the Philippine Navy Saber as the top Navy
cadet graduate, and be commissioned as an ensign of the Philippine Navy.

NO.
The issue on Mandamus cannot lie because there are standards that must be met.
There are policies to be pursued. Discretion appears to be of the essence. In terms
of Hohfeld's terminology, what a student in the position of petitioner possesses is a
privilege rather than a right. She [in this case, Cadet 1CL Cudia] cannot therefore
satisfy the prime and indispensable requisite of amandamus proceeding.65
Certainly, mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases. It cannot be availed
against an official or government agency whose duty requires the exercise of
discretion or judgment. For a writ to issue, petitioners should have a clear legal
right to the thing demanded, and there should be an imperative duty on the part of
respondents to perform the act sought to be mandated.

On November 14, 2013, the combined classes of the Navy and Air Force 1CL
cadets had a lesson examination (LE) on Operations Research (OR432) under Dr.
Maria Monica C. Costales (Dr. Costales.

Furthermore the petition for mandamus is unavailing for the simple fact that it was
rendered moot and academic when the graduation ceremonies pushed through on
March 16, 2014 without including Cadet 1CL Cudia in the roll of graduates.

Five days after, Professor Juanita Berong (Prof. Berong) of the 5th period class
issued a Delinquency Report (DR) against Cadet 1CL Cudia because he was
[l]ate for two (2) minutes in his Eng 412 class x x x.17 Cadets 1CL Narciso,
Arcangel, Miranda, Pontillas, Diaz, Otila, and Dela Cruz were also reported late for
five minutes.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies

On December 4, 2013, the DRs reached the Department of Tactical Officers. They
were logged and transmitted to the Company Tactical Officers (CTO) for
explanation of the concerned cadets. Two days later, Cadet 1CL Cudia received his
DR.
In his Explanation of Report dated December 8, 2013, Cadet 1CL Cudia reasoned
out that: I came directly from OR432 Class. We were dismissed a bit late
by our instructor Sir.
But it was found out that after investigating that his reasons stipulated were not
true.
Cudia was dismissed.

2) WON the Court must decline jurisdiction over the petition pending
President Aquinos resolution of Cadet 1CL Cudia appeal?
In general, no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury
until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted. The rationale
behind the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is that courts, for
reasons of law, comity, and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the
available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper
authorities, who are competent to act upon the matter complained of, have been
given the appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any,
committed in the administrative forum.
Nonetheless, there are exceptions to the rule. In this jurisdiction, a party may
directly resort to judicial remedies if any of the following is
present:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

ISSUES:

1.
2.
3.

1) WHETHER MANDAMUS WILL LIE?

4.

HELD:

5.

when there is a violation of due process;

when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction;
when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency
concerned;
when there is irreparable injury;

27 | P a g e
6.

when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego

of the President bear the implied and assumed approval of the latter;
7. when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable;
8. when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
9. when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;
10. when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and
11. when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention.

enjoined petitioners from testifying before the Congress without her consent. We
ruled that petitioners may be subjected to military discipline for their defiance of a
direct order of the AFP Chief of Staff. On the other hand, in Kapunan, Jr., this
Court upheld the restriction imposed on petitioner since the conditions for his
house arrest (particularly, that he may not issue any press statements or give
any press conference during the period of his detention) are justified by the
requirements of military discipline. In these two cases, the constitutional
rights to information, transparency in matters of public concern, and to
free speech not to due process clause were restricted to better serve
the greater military purpose.

Petitioners essentially raise the lack of due process in the dismissal of Cadet 1CL
Cudia from the PMA. Thus, it may be a ground to give due course to the petition
despite the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Yet more significant is the
fact that during the pendency of this case, particularly on June 11, 2014, the Office
of the President finally issued its ruling, which sustained the findings of the AFP
Chief and the CRAB. Hence, the occurrence of this supervening event bars
any objection to the petition based on failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.

In De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:149

3)
WHETHER THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY, THE HONOR COMMITTEE
AND THE CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING CADET FIRST CLASS ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA
FROM THE ACADEMY IN UTTER DISREGARD OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS

A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to
due process it is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present
supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based. To be heard does not
only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court one may also be heard
through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is
accorded, there is no denial of due process

No.
A cadet facing dismissal from the military academy for misconduct has constitutionally
protected private interests (life, liberty, or property); hence, disciplinary proceedings
conducted within the bounds of procedural due process are a must. For that reason, the
PMA is not immune from the strictures of due process. Where a person's good name,
reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to
him, the minimal requirements of the due process clause must be satisfied. Likewise,
the cadet faces far more severe sanctions of being expelled from a course of college
instruction which he or she has pursued with a view to becoming a career officer and of
probably being forever denied that career.

The cases of Gudani and Kapunan, Jr. are inapplicable as they do not
specifically pertain to dismissal proceedings of a cadet in a military
academy due to honor violation. In Gudani, the Court denied the petition that
sought to annul the directive from then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, which

Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to
which is among the primary rights that must be respected even in administrative
proceedings. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or
as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or
an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. So
long as the party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her
interest in due course, it cannot be said that there was denial of due process.

The PMA Honor Code explicitly recognizes that an administrative

proceeding conducted to investigate a cadets honor violation need not
be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding.
In this case, the investigation of Cadet 1CL Cudias Honor Code violation followed
the prescribed procedure and existing practices in the PMA. He was notified of the
Honor Report from Maj. Hindang. He was then given the opportunity to explain the
report against him. He was informed about his options and the entire process that
the case would undergo. The preliminary investigation immediately followed after
he replied and submitted a written explanation. Upon its completion, the
investigating team submitted a written report together with its recommendation to
the HC Chairman. The HC thereafter reviewed the findings and recommendations.
When the honor case was submitted for formal investigation, a new team was
assigned to conduct the hearing. During the formal investigation/hearing, he was
informed of the charge against him and given the right to enter his plea. He had

28 | P a g e
the chance to explain his side, confront the witnesses against him, and present
evidence in his behalf. After a thorough discussion of the HC voting members, he
was found to have violated the Honor Code. Thereafter, the guilty verdict
underwent the review process at the Academy level from the OIC of the HC, to
the SJA, to the Commandant of Cadets, and to the PMA Superintendent. A separate
investigation was also conducted by the HTG. Then, upon the directive of the AFPGHQ to reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB. Further, a
Fact-Finding Board/Investigation Body composed of the CRAB members and the
PMA senior officers was constituted to conduct a deliberate investigation of the
case. Finally, he had the opportunity to appeal to the President. Sadly for
him, all had issued unfavorable rulings.
There was no violation also of his right to counsel as the assistance of a
lawyer, while desirable, is not indispensable in administrative
proceedings.
While there is a constitutional mandate stating that [no] decision shall
be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, such provision does
not apply in Cadet 1CL Cudias case. Neither Guzman nor Andrews require
a specific form and content of a decision issued in disciplinary
proceedings.
The findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the CHR are merely
recommendatory and, therefore, not binding to this Court. The reason is
that the CHRs constitutional mandate extends only to the investigation
of all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights
and hence Cudia cannot rely on its recommendation.
All told, petitioners are not entitled to moral and exemplary damages in
accordance with Articles 19, 2217, 2219 and 2229 of the Civil Code. The
dismissal of Cadet 1CL Cudia from the PMA did not effectively deprive him of a
future. Clich though it may sound, being a PMA graduate is not the be-all and
end-all of his existence. A cadet separated from the PMA may still continue to
pursue military or civilian career elsewhere without suffering the stigma attached
to his or her dismissal. For one, as suggested by respondents, DND-AFP Circular
No. 13, dated July 15, 1991, on the enlistment and reenlistment in the AFP Regular
Force, provides under Section 14 (b) thereof that priority shall be given to, among
others, the ex-PMA or PAFFFS cadets. If the positions open does not appeal to
his interest for being way below the rank he could have achieved as a
PMA graduate, Cadet 1CL Cudia could still practice other equally noble
profession or calling that is best suited to his credentials, competence,
and potential. Definitely, nobody can deprive him of that choice.
___________

EQUAL PROTECTION:
G.R. No. 179669
June 4, 2014
SR METALS, INC., SAN R MINING AND CONSTRUCTION CORP. and GALEO
EQUIPMENT AND MINING COMP ANY, INC., Petitioners,
vs. THE HONORABLE ANGELO T. REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR)
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, SR Metals, Inc., SAN R Mining and
Construction Corp., and Galeo Equipment and Mining Co., Inc. (hereinafter referred
to as 'mining corporations') assail the Decision 1 and Resolution2 dated July 4, 2007
and September 14, 2007, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP
No. 97127. The mining corporations fault the CA for (a) upholding the validity of
the provision of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 18993 which limits the annual
production/extraction of mineral ore in small-scale mining to 50,000 metric tons
(MT) despite its being violative of the equal protection clause, and (b) adopting the
Mines and Geosciences Bureau's (MGB) definition of 'ore,' which led the said court
to conclude that the mining corporations had exceeded the aforesaid 50,000-MT
limit.
Factual Antecedents
On March 9, 2006, each of the petitioners was awarded a 2-year SmallScale Mining
Permit4 (SSMP) by the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board of Agusan del Norte; they
were allowed to extract Nickel and Cobalt (Ni-Co) in a 20-hectare mining site in
Sitio Bugnang, Brgy. La Fraternidad, Tubay, Agusan del Norte. These permits were
granted after the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB), Region XIII of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) issued on March 2,
2006 Environmental Compliance Certificates 5 (ECCs) with a validity period of one
year.
The mining corporations ECCs contain a restriction that the amount of NiCo ore
they are allowed to extract annually should not exceed 50,000 MTs.
pursuant to Section 1 of PD 1899 which provides:
Section 1. Small-scale mining refers to any single unit mining operation having an
annual production of not more than 50,000 metric tons of ore x x x.
Subsequently, however, Agusan del Norte Governor, Erlpe John M. Amante
(Governor Amante), questioned the quantity of ore that had been mined and
shipped by the mining corporations. In reply, the mining corporations denied
having exceeded the extraction limit of 50,000 MTs.

29 | P a g e
On November 26, 2004, DENR Secretary Angelo T. Reyes issued a Cease and Desist
Order10 (CDO) against the mining corporations suspending their operations for the
following reasons:
1. The excess in 1) annual production of SR Metals, Inc., 2) maximum
capitalization, and, 3) labor cost to equipment utilization of 1:1 is, by itself, a
violation of existing laws.
2. The ECCs issued in favor of San R Construction Corporation and Galeo
Equipment Corporation have no legal basis and [are] therefore considered null and
void from the beginning. Similarly, the small scale mining permits that were issued
by reason of such ECCs are likewise null and void. 11
A few days later or on November30, 2006, DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez replied
to Governor Amante citing DOJ Opinion No. 74, Series of 2006. 12 By comparing PD
1899 to Republic Act (RA) No. 7076,13 a subsequent law that likewise defines smallscale mining, the DOJ opined that Section 1 of PD 1899 is deemed to have been
impliedly repealed by RA 7076 as nothing from the provisions of the latter law
mentions anything pertaining to an annual production quota for small-scale
mining. It explained:
The definition of "small scale mining" under R.A. No. 7076 is clear and categorical.
Any mining activity that relies heavily on manual labor without use of explosives or
heavy mining equipment falls under said definition. It does not mention any annual
production quota or limitation. On the contrary, Section 12 thereof is explicit that
the contractor, or, specifically, in this case, the permit holders or permitees, are
entitled not only to the right to [mine], but also to "extract and dispose of mineral
ores (found therein) for commercial purposes" without specific limitation as to the
nature of the mineral extracted or the quantity thereof.
Moreover, while Section 13 of the law imposes certain duties and obligations upon
the contractor or permitee, nothing therein refers directly or otherwise to
production quota limitation. Additionally, even Section 10 thereof, which provides
for the extent [of] the mining area, does not limit production but only the mining
area and depth of the tunnel or adit which, as stated in the law shall "not (exceed)
that recommended by the (EMB) director taking into account the "quantity of
mineral deposits", among others. It is, however, silent on the extent of the
minings annual quota production. Thus, anything that is not in the law cannot be
interpreted as included in the law x x x1
Even assuming that the 50,000-MT ore limit in PD 1899 is still in force, the DOJ
categorically concluded that the term ore should be confined only to Ni-Co, that
is, excluding soil and other materials that are of no economic value to the mining
corporations. This is considering that their ECCs explicitly specified 50,000 MTs of
Ni-Co ore.
The mining corporations then filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari with
prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, imputing

grave abuse of discretion on the part of DENR in issuing the CDO. Relying on the
rationalizations made by the DOJ in its November 30, 2006 Opinion, they
vehemently denied having over-extracted Ni-Co.
ISSUE:
WON Section 1, PD 1899 violates the equal protection clause?
They argue that there is no substantial distinction between the miners covered
under RA 7076, who can extract as much ore as they can, and those covered under
PD1899 who were imposed an extraction limit.
HELD:
Petitioners are governed by the annual production limit under PD 1899.
Two different laws governing small-scale mining co-exist: PD 1899 and RA 7076.
The controversy lies in the apparent conflicting provisions on the
definition of small-scale mining under the two laws. Section 1 of PD 1899
defines small-scale mining in this wise:
Small-scale mining refers to any single unit mining operation having an annual
production of not more than 50,000 metric tons of ore and satisfying the following
requisites:
1. The working is artisanal, whether open cast or shallow underground mining,
without the use of sophisticated mining equipment;
2. Minimal investment on infrastructures and processing plant;
3. Heavy reliance on manual labor; and
4. Owned, managed or controlled by an individual or entity qualified under existing
mining laws, rules and regulations.
On the other hand, under Section 3(b) of RA 7076, small-scale mining refers to
mining activities which rely heavily on manual labor using simple implements and
methods and do not use explosives or heavy mining equipment. Significantly, this
definition does not provide for an annual extraction limit unlike in PD 1899.
DENR already harmonized the two laws. The issue raised on the violation
of the equal protection clause is moot. The fact is, the DENR treats all smallscale miners equally as the production limit applies to all of them. There is
therefore no more reason for the mining corporations to not recognize and comply
with the said limitation. It must be stressed that the DENR is the government
agency tasked with the duty of managing and conserving the countrys resources;
it is also the agency vested with the authority to promulgate rules and regulations
for the implementation of mining laws.

30 | P a g e
The DENR, being the agency mandated to protect the environment and the
countrys natural resources, is authoritative on interpreting the 50,000-MT limit.
______________

the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City (RTC) in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB,
which dismissed their habeas data petition.

II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE

The Facts

A. Arrests, Searches and Seizures

Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person
or things to be seized.

Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors, were,
during the period material, graduating high school students at St. Theresas
College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their
swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along
with several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their
undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan
(Angela) on her Facebook3 profile.
Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher at
STCs high school department, learned from her students that some seniors at STC
posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only in
brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if they knew who the girls in the
photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes
Taboada (Chloe), among others.

G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014

RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES AND SPS. MARGARITA AND DAVID
SUZARA, Petitioners, v. ST. THERESAS COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T.
ESCUDERO, AND JOHN DOES, Respondents.

Using STCs computers, Escuderos students logged in to their respective personal

Facebook accounts and showed her photos of the identified students, which
include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a
bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing
that show virtually the entirety of their black brassieres. What is more, Escuderos
students claimed that there were times when access to or the availability of the
identified students photos was not confined to the girls Facebook friends, 4 but
were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user. 5cralawlawlibrary

The individuals desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society is
an equally powerful desire. Thus each individual is continually engaged in a
personal adjustment process in which he balances the desire for privacy with the
desire for disclosure and communication of himself to others, in light of the
environmental conditions and social norms set by the society in which he lives.

Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her students
Facebook page, showed the photos to Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STCs Disciplinein-Charge, for appropriate action. Thereafter, following an investigation, STC found
the identified students to have deported themselves in a manner proscribed by the
schools Student Handbook, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

~ Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)

The Case
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
in relation to Section 19 of A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC,1 otherwise known as the Rule on
the Writ of Habeas Data. Petitioners herein assail the July 27, 2012 Decision 2 of

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;

Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;
Smoking and drinking alcoholic beverages in public places;
Apparel that exposes the underwear;
Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity; contains
sexually suggestive messages, language or symbols; and

31 | P a g e
6.

Posing and uploading pictures on the Internet that entail ample body
exposure.

A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angelas mother, Dr. Armenia M.
Tan (Tan), filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Cebu City
against STC, et al., docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-38594. In it, Tan prayed that
defendants therein be enjoined from implementing the sanction that precluded
Angela from joining the commencement exercises. On March 25, 2012, petitioner
Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the mother of Julia, joined the fray as an intervenor.

5.
6.

The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of

information, data, and digital images happened at STCs Computer
Laboratory; and
All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly
broadcasted by respondents through their memorandum submitted to the
RTC in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594

That same day, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) allowing the
students to attend the graduation ceremony, to which STC filed a motion for
reconsideration.

To petitioners, the interplay of the foregoing constitutes an invasion of their

childrens privacy and, thus, prayed that: (a) a writ of habeas data be issued; (b)
respondents be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed
copies of the subject data before or at the preliminary hearing; and (c) after trial,
judgment be rendered declaring all information, data, and digital images accessed,
saved or stored, reproduced, spread and used, to have been illegally obtained in
violation of the childrens right to privacy.

Despite the issuance of the TRO, STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned
students from participating in the graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of the
commencement exercises, its adverted motion for reconsideration on the issuance
of the TRO remained unresolved.

ISSUES: whether or not a writ of habeas data should be issued given the factual
milieu. Crucial in resolving the controversy, however, is the pivotal point of
whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to
privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case.

Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Habeas Data, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB8 on the basis of the following
considerations:

Our Ruling

1.
2.
3.

4.

The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were taken
for posterity before they changed into their swimsuits on the occasion of a
birthday beach party;
The privacy setting of their childrens Facebook accounts was set at
Friends Only. They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which
must be respected.
Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or ought to
have known of laws that safeguard the right to privacy. Corollarily,
respondents knew or ought to have known that the girls, whose privacy
has been invaded, are the victims in this case, and not the offenders.
Worse, after viewing the photos, the minors were called immoral and
were punished outright;
The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and
reproduced without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights
by saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing them
to STCs officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of petitioners children were
intruded upon;

We find no merit in the petition.

Procedural issues concerning the
availability of the Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy
in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of
a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. 11 It is an independent and
summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce ones
right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a persons right to
control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful
ends.
Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational
privacy, a habeas datapetition will not prosper. Viewed from the perspective of the
case at bar, this requisite begs this question: given the nature of an online social
network (OSN)(1) that it facilitates and promotes real-time interaction among
millions, if not billions, of users, sans the spatial barriers, 16 bridging the gap

32 | P a g e
created by physical space; and (2) that any information uploaded in OSNs leaves
an indelible trace in the providers databases, which are outside the control of the
end-usersis there a right to informational privacy in OSN activities of its
users? Before addressing this point, We must first resolve the procedural issues in
this case.

Meaning of engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or

information Respondents contention that the habeas data writ may not issue
against STC, it not being an entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is, nonetheless, erroneous.

The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal

killings and enforced disappearances. Contrary to respondents submission,
the Writ of Habeas Data was not enacted solely for the purpose of complementing
the Writ ofAmparo in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall
be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of
gathering, storing, and collecting of data. As provided under Section 1 of the Rule:

Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any
person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data
or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of
the aggrieved party. (emphasis Ours)

Sec. 2. Who May File. Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ
of habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, the petition may be filed by:
(a)
Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the
spouse, children and parents; or
(b)
Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party
within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of
those mentioned in the preceding paragraph. (emphasis supplied)
Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to
cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, the above underscored
portion of Section 2, reflecting a variance of habeas data situations, would not
have been made.
Habeas data, to stress, was designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse
in the information age. As such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability to
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances only. In fact, the annotations to the
Rule prepared by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, after
explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data complements the Writ of Amparo, pointed
out that:

The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the
idea that habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public
officials and of private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or
storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about
his or her family. Such individual or entity need not be in the business of collecting
or storing data.
To engage in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To
engage means to do or take part in something. It does not necessarily mean
that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the
person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or information
about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries
the element of regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the nature of
a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is
immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity.
The right to informational privacy on Facebook

The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent

remedy to enforce ones right to privacy, more specifically the right to
informational privacy. The remedies against the violation of such right can
include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or
information or files in possession or in control of respondents. 18 (emphasis Ours)
Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data may also be availed of in
cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

The Right to Informational Privacy

The concept of privacy has, through time, greatly evolved, with technological
advancements having an influential part therein. This evolution was briefly
recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Punos speech, The Common Right
to Privacy, where he explained the three strands of the right to privacy,
viz:
(1) locational or situational privacy;(2) informational privacy; and (3)
decisional privacy. Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is

33 | P a g e
the right to informational privacyusually defined as the right of
individuals to control information about themselves.
With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data
sharing nowadays, not to mention each systems inherent vulnerability to attacks
and intrusions, there is more reason that every individuals right to control said
flow of information should be protected and that each individual should have
at least a reasonable expectation of privacy in cyberspace.
The question now though is up to what extent is the right to privacy
protected in OSNs?
Bear in mind that informational privacy involves personal information. At the same
time, the very purpose of OSNs is socializingsharing a myriad of information,
some of which would have otherwise remained personal.
Facebooks Privacy Tools: a response to the clamor for privacy in OSN
activities
Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact and
to stay connected to other members of the same or different social media platform
through the sharing of statuses, photos, videos, among others, depending on the
services provided by the site. It is akin to having a room filled with millions of
personal bulletin boards or walls, the contents of which are under the control of
each and every user. In his or her bulletin board, a user/owner can post anything
from text, to pictures, to music and videosaccess to which would depend on
whether he or she allows one, some or all of the other users to see his or her posts.
Since gaining popularity, the OSN phenomenon has paved the way to the creation
of various social networking sites, including the one involved in the case at bar,
www.facebook.com (Facebook), which, according to its developers, people use to
stay connected with friends and family, to discover whats going on in the world,
and to share and express what matters to them.

was armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a
users profile31 as well as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W,32 the South
Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users to customize their privacy
settings, but did so with this caveat: Facebook states in its policies that,
although it makes every effort to protect a users information, these
privacy settings are not fool-proof.
For instance, a Facebook user can regulate the visibility and accessibility
of digital images (photos), posted on his or her personal bulletin or
wall, except for the users profile picture and ID, by selecting his or her
desired privacy setting:

(a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends - only the users Facebook friends and their friends can view
the photo;
(b) Friends - only the users Facebook friends can view the photo;
(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of
the Facebook user; and
(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up
barriers to broaden or limit the visibility of his or her specific profile content,
statuses, and photos, among others, from another users point of view. In other
words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the availability of their
Facebook activities reflect their choice as to when and to what extent to disclose
facts about [themselves] and to put others in the position of receiving such
confidences.34 Ideally, the selected setting will be based on ones desire to
interact with others, coupled with the opposing need to withhold certain
information as well as to regulate the spreading of his or her personal information.
Needless to say, as the privacy setting becomes more limiting, fewer Facebook
users can view that users particular post.
STC did not violate petitioners daughters right to privacy

Facebook connections are established through the process of friending another

user. By sending a friend request, the user invites another to connect their
accounts so that they can view any and all Public and Friends Only posts of the
other. Once the request is accepted, the link is established and both users are
permitted to view the other users Public or Friends Only posts, among others.
Friending, therefore, allows the user to form or maintain one-to-one relationships
with other users, whereby the user gives his or her Facebook friend access to his
or her profile and shares certain information to the latter.
To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook

Without these privacy settings, respondents contention that there is no reasonable

expectation of privacy in Facebook would, in context, be correct. However, such
is not the case. It is through the availability of said privacy tools that many OSN
users are said to have a subjective expectation that only those to whom they grant
access to their profile will view the information they post or upload thereto.
This, however, does not mean that any Facebook user automatically has a
protected expectation of privacy in all of his or her Facebook activities.

34 | P a g e
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN
activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this case the children of
petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain posts private, through
the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its
visibility.And this intention can materialize in cyberspace through
the utilization of the OSNs privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy
tools is the manifestation, in cyber world, of the users invocation of his or her right
to informational privacy.
Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to
grant or deny access to his or her post or profile detail should not be
denied the informational privacy right which necessarily accompanies
said choice. Otherwise, using these privacy tools would be a feckless exercise,
such that if, for instance, a user uploads a photo or any personal information to his
or her Facebook page and sets its privacy level at Only Me or a custom list so
that only the user or a chosen few can view it, said photo would still be deemed
public by the courts as if the user never chose to limit the photos visibility and
accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools of
their function but it would also disregard the very intention of the user to keep said
photo or information within the confines of his or her private space.
We must now determine the extent that the images in question were
visible to other Facebook users and whether the disclosure was
confidential in nature. In other words, did the minors limit the disclosure
of the photos such that the images were kept within their zones of
privacy? This determination is necessary in resolving the issue of whether the
minors carved out a zone of privacy when the photos were uploaded to Facebook
so that the images will be protected against unauthorized access and disclosure.
Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their childrens privacy right
being violated, insist that Escudero intruded upon their childrens
Facebook accounts, downloaded copies of the pictures and showed said
photos to Tigol. To them, this was a breach of the minors privacy since
their Facebook accounts, allegedly, were under very private or Only
Friends setting safeguarded with a password. Ultimately, they posit that
their childrens disclosure was only limited since their profiles were not open to
public viewing. Therefore, according to them, people who are not their Facebook
friends, including respondents, are barred from accessing said post without their
knowledge and consent. As petitioners children testified, it was Angela who
uploaded the subject photos which were only viewable by the five of
them,40 although who these five are do not appear on the records.
In this regard, We cannot give much weight to the minors testimonies for
one key reason: failure to question the students act of showing the

photos to Tigol disproves their allegation that the photos were viewable
only by the five of them. Without any evidence to corroborate their statement
that the images were visible only to the five of them, and without their challenging
Escuderos claim that the other students were able to view the photos, their
statements are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escuderos sworn
account that her students, who are the minors Facebook friends, showed her
the photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no
special means to be able to view the allegedly private posts were ever resorted to
by Escuderos students, and that it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the
photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by the
public at large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is Public, it can
be surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone
on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners children positively
limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case, they
cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational
privacy. The ensuing pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez44 is most
instructive:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake
and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances
such as here, where the Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices
that would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.
Also, United States v. Maxwell46 held that [t]he more open the method of
transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the
public at large in the chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to
correspondent loses any semblance of privacy.
That the photos are viewable by friends only does not necessarily
bolster the petitioners contention. In this regard, the cyber community is
agreed that the digital images under this setting still remain to be outside the
confines of the zones of privacy in view of the following:

(1) Facebook allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users
the tools to interact and share in any conceivable way;
(2) A good number of Facebook users befriend other users who are total
strangers;48
(3) The sheer number of Friends one user has, usually by the hundreds; and

35 | P a g e
(4) A users Facebook friend can share49 the formers post, or tag others who
are not Facebook friends with the former, despite its being visible only to his or
her own Facebook friends.
It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a posts or profile details
privacy to Friends is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by
another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content.
The users own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her
own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by
the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post
is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of
the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post,
the privacy setting of which was set at Friends.
As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the
sanctioned students Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to task
for the perceived privacy invasion since it was the minors Facebook friends who
showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of what were
posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the
information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had
legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the
friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the minors nor
their parents imputed any violation of privacy against the students who
showed the images to Escudero.
Without proof that they placed the photographs subject of this case within the
ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an
expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question.
Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were limited to the
original uploader, through the Me Only privacy setting, or that the users
contact list has been screened to limit access to a select few, through the
Custom setting, the result may have been different, for in such instances, the
intention to limit access to the particular post, instead of being broadcasted to the
public at large or all the users friends en masse, becomes more manifest and
palpable.

On Cyber Responsibility
It has been said that the best filter is the one between your childrens ears.This
means that self-regulation on the part of OSN users and internet consumers in
general is the best means of avoiding privacy rights violations. As a cyberspace

community member, one has to be proactive in protecting his or her own privacy. It
is in this regard that many OSN users, especially minors, fail. Responsible social
networking or observance of the netiquettes 56 on the part of teenagers has been
the concern of many due to the widespread notion that teenagers can sometimes
go too far since they generally lack the people skills or general wisdom to conduct
themselves sensibly in a public forum.
Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating lessons on good cyber
citizenship in its curriculum to educate its students on proper online conduct may
be most timely. Too, it is not only STC but a number of schools and organizations
have already deemed it important to include digital literacy and good cyber
citizenship in their respective programs and curricula in view of the risks that the
children are exposed to every time they participate in online
activities. Furthermore, considering the complexity of the cyber world and its
pervasiveness, as well as the dangers that these children are wittingly or
unwittingly exposed to in view of their unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the
participation of the parents in disciplining and educating their children about being
a good digital citizen is encouraged by these institutions and organizations. In fact,
it is believed that to limit such risks, theres no substitute for parental
involvement and supervision.
As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching
its students to be responsible in their dealings and activities in
cyberspace, particularly in OSNs, when it enforced the disciplinary
actions specified in the Student Handbook, absent a showing that, in the
process, it violated the students rights.
OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves to whenever
they engage in cyberspace activities. Accordingly, they should be cautious enough
to control their privacy and to exercise sound discretion regarding how much
information about themselves they are willing to give up. Internet consumers
ought to be aware that, by entering or uploading any kind of data or information
online, they are automatically and inevitably making it permanently available
online, the perpetuation of which is outside the ambit of their control.
Furthermore, and more importantly, information, otherwise private,
voluntarily surrendered by them can be opened, read, or copied by third
parties who may or may not be allowed access to such.
It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in
their online dealings and activities and must not be negligent in
protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant. Demanding relief from
the courts, as here, requires that claimants themselves take utmost care
in safeguarding a right which they allege to have been violated. These
are indispensable. We cannot afford protection to persons if they

36 | P a g e
themselves did nothing to place the matter within the confines of their
private zone. OSN users must be mindful enough to learn the use of
privacy tools, to use them if they desire to keep the information private,
and to keep track of changes in the available privacy settings, such as
those of Facebook, especially because Facebook is notorious for changing
these settings and the sites layout often.
In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors
privacy rights, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and case
disposition of the court a quo..
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision
dated July 27, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in SP. Proc.
No. 19251-CEB is hereby AFFIRMED.
ON SEARCH WARRANT:
Search Warrant

It is
(1) an order in writing
(2) issued in the name of the Republic of the Phils.
(3) issued by a judge
(4) directed to a peace officer
(5) commanding him to search for personal property described therein and
(6) to bring it before the court

Objects of the search warrant

(1) for subject of the offense
(2) for stolen or embezzled and/or proceeds or fruits of the offense
(3) used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

Proper procedure for search warrants:

1) police submits affidavits before a judge
2) judge should be stationed in RTC with jurisdiction over the property to be
searched
3) judge interviews the applicant for the warrant and if the judge determines
probable cause, the warrant is issued.
4) Object seized is deposited in court
5) fiscal files a case in court
_______
A. M. NO. 99-20-09-SC
JANUARY 25, 2000

RESOLUTION CLARIFYING GUIDELINES ON THE APPLICATION FOR

AND ENFORCEABILITY OF SEARCH WARRANTS
In the interest of an effective administration of justice and pursuant to the powers
vested in the Supreme Court by the Constitution, the following are authorized to
act on all applications for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal
gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal possession of firearms:
The Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of Regional Trial Courts, Manila and
Quezon City, filed by the Philippine National Police (PNP), the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), The Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOC-TF)
and the Reaction Against Crime Task Force (REACT-TF) with the Regional Trial
Courts of Manila and Quezon City.
The applications shall be personally endorsed by the Heads of the said agencies,
for the search of places to be particularly described therein, and the seizure of
property or things as prescribed in the Rules of Court, and to issue the warrants, if
justified, which may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of said
courts.
The authorized judges shall keep a special docket book listing the details of the
applications and the result of the searches and seizures made pursuant to the
warrants issued
_________
G. R. No. 197788. February 29, 2012
Rodel Luz y Ong, petitioner, vs. People of the Philippines, respondent.
FACTS:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga
City Police Station as a traffic enforcer, saw the accused, who was coming from the
direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a
motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the accused for
violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear
helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle\ that while he and SPO1 Rayford
Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he
noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his
jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of

37 | P a g e
the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused
obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a
nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including
two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon
seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it; that after the accused
opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and
that upon his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the container on
the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were
empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.[3]
Petitioner was convicted for violation of The Dangerous Drugs law
Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was
no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was
erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation
of the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he
had never consented to the search conducted upon him.
Issue
Whether or not there was no lawful search and seizure, because there
was no lawful arrest.
Held
We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular
reasons alleged. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for
review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the
appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial courts decision based on grounds
other than those that the parties raised as errors.
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for
committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason,
arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound
to answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of
the person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to the custody
of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual
touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is
required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to
arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit,
under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general
procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the
offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter;

Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that
the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police. To be sure, the aura of
authority surrounding an armed, uniformed officer and the knowledge that the
officer has some discretion in deciding whether to issue a citation, in combination,
exert some pressure on the detainee to respond to questions. But other aspects of
the situation substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most importantly, the
typical traffic stop is public, at least to some degree. x x x
In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called
Terry stop,than to a formal arrest
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed
arrested upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the
issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not complied
with.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the
arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that
person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional
rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make
could be used against them. It may also be noted that in this case, these
constitutional requirements were complied with by the police officers
only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed arrested when he was
flagged down for a traffic violation and while he waiting for his ticket, then there
would have been no need for him to be arrested for a second timeafter
the police officers allegedly discovered the drugsas he was already in their
custody.
Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it
was likewise illegal.
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in plain
view; (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v)
customs search; (vi) a stop and frisk search; and (vii) exigent and emergency
circumstances.[ None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search
incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be
inadvertently discovered, was not in plain view. It was actually concealed inside
a metal container inside petitioners pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not
immediately apparent.
Neither was there a consented warrantless search.
Neither does the search qualify under the stop and frisk rule. While the
rule normally applies when a police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct,

38 | P a g e
which may lead him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk
is merely a limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons.
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have
failed to object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of
an illegal warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Any
evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to
the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law implemented without
contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no statute
is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
government.
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are
the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus,
their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused
_____________
G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT-APPELLEE, VS. VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA, ACCUSEDAPPELLANT.
FACTS:
Senior Inspector Bayan received a text message from an informant that one Marvin
will be transporting marijuana from Bgy. San Lun-oy, San Gabriel to Poblacion, San
Gabriel. Hence, he established several checkpoints to apprehend the suspect. SPOI
Jaime was ordered to establish a checkpoint at the waiting area of passengers from
San Gabriel bound to San Fernando. One passenger jeepney arrived at the
checkpoint manned by Jaime, and the jeepney driver pointed to two male
passengers allegedly carrying marijuana. When asked by Jaime the contents of
their bags, the two answered they did not know since they were only requested by
Marvin to carry the bags. One of the men, Victor, opened the bags, revealing
marijuana bricks. He and his companion were then arrested by Jaime and brought
to the police station. In his defense, Victor said he only helped his companion, a
minor to carry his things. Upon arrival at Poblacion, San Gabriel, they were
approached by Jaime, who conversed with the minor. Jaime then brought them to
the police station, where he hit Victor on the head. He only came to know that the
bags they were carrying contained majiruana when he was charged with
possession of dangerous drugs before the Regional Trial Court. His companion was
not charged because he was only 14 years old at the time of his arrest.

After trial, the RTC convicted Victor for violation of Section 11 of Republic Act 9165,
and sentenced him to life imprisonment. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, hence he elevated his case to the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Was there a valid warrantless arrest on Victor?
HELD: The search involved in this case was initially a stop and frisk
search, but it did not comply with all the requirements of reasonability
required by the Constitution.
Stop and frisk searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches[ are necessary
for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to
prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the
need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of
the Constitution.
The balance lies in the concept of suspiciousness present in the situation
where the police officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based
on the experience of the police officer. Experienced police officers have personal
experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should have
the ability to discern based on facts that they themselves observe whether an
individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be
that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe
the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.
xxx
The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a passenger carrying a bag and
traveling aboard a jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal,
about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion was
not made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver
who signalled to the police that Cogaed was suspicious.
xxx
It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable
degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion
initiated by another person. This is necessary to justify that the person suspected
be stopped and reasonably searched. Anything less than this would be an
infringement upon ones basic right to security of ones person and effects.
Normally, stop and frisk searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity
to confer with a judge to determine probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of
Appeals, one of the earliest cases adopting the stop and frisk doctrine in
Philippine jurisprudence, this court approximated the suspicious circumstances as
probable cause:
The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and
attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he
was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty
of the police officers to inspect the same.(Emphasis supplied)

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For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant
a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged.
xxx
Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded by this exception,
unless there is compliance with the genuine reason requirement and that the
search serves the purpose of protecting the public. As stated in Malacat:
[A] stop-and-frisk serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective
crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police
officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even
without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and selfpreservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the
person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.[99] (Emphasis
supplied)
The stop and frisk search was originally limited to outer clothing and for the
purpose of detecting dangerous weapons. As in Manalili, jurisprudence also allows
stop and frisk for cases involving dangerous drugs.
xxx
The Constitution provides:
Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures] shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine, this constitutional provision originated from Stonehill v. Diokno. This
rule prohibits the issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go
on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be
excluded as evidence because it is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.[137] It
ensures that the fundamental rights to ones person, houses, papers, and effects
are not lightly infringed upon and are upheld.
Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the
search of his bags, a pronouncement of the illegality of that search means that
there is no evidence left to convict Cogaed.
Drugs and its illegal traffic are a scourge to our society. In the fight to eradicate
this menace, law enforcers should be equipped with the resources to be able to
perform their duties better. However, we cannot, in any way, compromise our
societys fundamental values enshrined in our Constitution. Otherwise, we will be
seen as slowly dismantling the very foundations of the society that we seek to
protect.
Accused acquitted.
_________

G.R. No. 200748

July 23, 2014
JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
Accused denied the charges and testified that while eating at the said Jollibee
branch, he was arrested allegedly for extortion by NBI agents. When he was
at the NBI Office, he was required to extract urine for drug examination, but he
refused saying he wanted it to be done by the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Crime Laboratory and not by the NBI. His request was, however, denied. He also
requested to be allowed to call his lawyer prior to the taking of his urine sample, to
no avail.
THE ISSUE
We deem it proper to give due course to this Petition by confronting head-on the
issue of whether or not the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal.
OUR RULING
We declare that the drug test conducted upon petitioner is not grounded upon any
existing law or jurisprudence.
We gloss over petitioners non-compliance with the Resolution ordering him to
submit clearly legible duplicate originals or certified true copies of the assailed
Decision and Resolution. Petitioner was charged with use of dangerous drugs in
violation of the law, the pertinent provision of which reads:
Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. A person apprehended or arrested, who
is found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test,
shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6) months rehabilitation in a
government center for the first offense, subject to the provisions of Article VIII of
this Act. If apprehended using any dangerous drug for the second time, he/she
shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day
to twelve (12) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to
Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00): Provided, That this Section shall not
be applicable where the person tested is also found to have in his/her possession
such quantity of any dangerous drug provided for under Section 11 of this Act, in
which case the provisions stated therein shall apply.
The RTC subsequently convicted petitioner, ruling that the following elements of
Section 15 were established: (1) the accused was arrested; (2) the accused was
subjected to drug test; and (3) the confirmatory test shows that he used a
dangerous drug.

40 | P a g e
Disregarding petitioners objection regarding the admissibility of the
evidence, the lower court also reasoned that "a suspect cannot invoke his
right to counsel when he is required to extract urine because, while he is
already in custody, he is not compelled to make a statement or testimony
against himself. Extracting urine from ones body is merely a mechanical act,
hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial investigation."
We find the ruling and reasoning of the trial court, as well as the
subsequent affirmation by the CA, erroneous on three counts.
The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for
any unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165.
First, "[a] person apprehended or arrested" cannot literally mean any person
apprehended or arrested for any crime. The phrase must be read in context and
understood in consonance with R.A. 9165. Section 15 comprehends persons
arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts listed under Article II of the law.
Hence, a drug test can be made upon persons who are apprehended or arrested
for, among others, the "importation, "sale, trading, administration, dispensation,
delivery, distribution and transportation","manufacture"and "possession" of
dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals; possession
thereof "during parties, social gatherings or meetings" ; being "employees and
visitors of a den, dive or resort"; "maintenance of a den, dive or resort"; "illegal
chemical diversion of controlled precursors and essential chemicals" 16 ;
"manufacture or delivery"17 or "possession"18 of equipment, instrument, apparatus,
and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and
essential chemicals; possession of dangerous drugs "during parties, social
gatherings or meetings"19 ; "unnecessary"20 or "unlawful"21 prescription thereof;
"cultivation or culture of plants classified as dangerous drugs or are sources
thereof";22 and "maintenance and keeping of original records of transactions on
dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals." 23 To make
the provision applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for any crime not
listed under Article II is tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning. Note that
accused appellant here was arrested in the alleged act of extortion.
In order to effectively fulfill the intent of the law to rehabilitate drug users, this
Court thus calls on law enforcers and prosecutors in dangerous drugs cases to
exercise proper discretion in filing charges when the presence of dangerous drugs
is only and solely in the form of residue and the confirmatory test required under
Sec. 15 is positive for use of dangerous drugs. In such cases, to afford the accused
a chance to be rehabilitated, the filing of charges for or involving possession of
dangerous drugs should only be done when another separate quantity of
dangerous drugs, other than mere residue, is found in the possession of the
accused as provided for in Sec. 15. (Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, making the phrase "a person apprehended or arrested" in Section 15

applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts, not only under
R.A. 9165 but for all other crimes, is tantamount to a mandatory drug testing of all
persons apprehended or arrested for any crime. To overextend the application of
thisprovision would run counter to our pronouncement in Social Justice Society
v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency,25 to
wit:
x x x [M]andatory drug testing can never be random and suspicion less. The ideas
of randomness and being suspicion less are antithetical to their being made
defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they
beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged,
they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus
charged, by the bare fact of being hailed before the prosecutors office and
peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not
necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To
impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a
medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of
RA 6195. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons right to privacy
guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused
persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves. (Emphasis supplied)
The drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial compulsion.
We find that petitioner never raisedthe alleged irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment and raises the issue only now before this tribunal; hence, he is
deemed to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest curing
whatever defect may have attended his arrest.2 However, "a waiver of an illegal
warrantless arrest does not mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized
during an illegal warrantless arrest."
We are aware of the prohibition against testimonial compulsion and the allowable
exceptions to such proscription. Cases where non-testimonial compulsion has been
allowed reveal, however, that the pieces of evidence obtained were all material to
the principal cause of the arrest.
The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use
of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and
not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely
mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not
thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not
required.
In the instant case, we fail to see howa urine sample could be material to the
charge of extortion.The RTC and the CA, therefore, both erred when they held that

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the extraction of petitioners urine for purposes of drug testing was "merely a
mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial investigation."
The drug test was a violation of petitioners right to privacy and right
against self-incrimination.
It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested
for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer prior to his urine test. He was adamant in
exercising his rights, but all of his efforts proved futile, because he was still
compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under those circumstances.
The pertinent provisions in Article III of the Constitution are clear:
Section 2. The right of the people to be securein their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone drug testing of
all arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is being
made.
While we express our commendation of law enforcement agents as they vigorously
track down offenders in their laudable effort to curb the pervasive and deleterious
effects of dangerous drugs on our society, they must, however, be constantly
mindful of the reasonable limits of their authority, because it is not unlikely that in
their clear intent to purge society of its lawless elements, they may be knowingly
or unknowingly transgressing the protected rights of its citizens including even
members of its own police force.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 22 June 2011
issued by the Twentieth Division, and the Resolution dated 2 February 2012 issued
by the former Twentieth Division of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 00670
are SET ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED.
__________________________

Section 3.

(1)The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable

except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Sec. 3 Privacy of Communication and Correspondence
The general rule is that the Privacy of Communication and correspondence shall be
inviolable. This is a constitutional guarantee. But this is not absolute because there
are exceptions. When can the state interfere with privacy, or when can privacy be
restricted? The provision says it can be restricted upon 1. ) lawful order of the
court. The court may issue an order for the seizure of a correspondent, a mail or
letter; and 2.) it can be restricted by law. The Congress may pass a law restricting
the privacy of communication. When what? The basis of the law should be public
safety and public order.
IN the case of Alejano vs Cabuay
AS TO RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION:
The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not
confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who
received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting
as the detainees personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the
letters for mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not confidential
communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP
Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential
communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials
should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the
presence of the detainees.
_______________
Contrast the following cases: In this case it says here that the right can be
invoked against the spouse (including Zulueta vs CA)
August 4, 1994, TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ, petitioner, vs.COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. ROMEO F. ZAMORA, Presiding Judge, Br. 94, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City and RAFAEL S. ORTANEZ, respondents.
Rafael, the husband, filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage against
the wife, Teresita. After presenting his evidence, Rafael orally offered his exhibits,
among them Exhibits A to M, three cassette tapes of alleged telephone

42 | P a g e
conversation between Teresita and unidentified persons, which were allegedly
obtained when Rafael allowed his friends from military intelligence to wire tap his
home telephone. Despite Comment/Objection from Teresita, the trial court
admitted all of the offered evidence. Her motion for reconsideration denied,
Teresita filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which denied her
petition, holding that tape recordings are not inadmissible per se, and denial of the
objection to the admission of evidence is not correctible by certiorari.
Teresita elevated her case to the Supreme Court, which declared the tape
recordings inadmissible in evidence for being violative of Republic Act 4200, the
Anti-Wiretapping Act.
In the present case, the trial court issued the assailed order admitting all of the
evidence offered by private respondent, including tape recordings of telephone
conversations of petitioner with unidentified persons. These tape recordings were
made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from the military
to wire tap his home telephone.
Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping
and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for
other purposes expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence.
The relevant provisions of Rep. Act No. 4200 are as follows:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to
any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using
any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or
however otherwise described. . . .
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance,
purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein
contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections
of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial,
legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the aforequoted provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in
question. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone
conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of
the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
Additionally, it should be mentioned that the above-mentioned Republic Act in
Section 2 thereof imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6)
months and up to six (6) years for violation of said Act. 5

We need not address the other arguments raised by the parties, involving the
applicability of American jurisprudence, having arrived at the conclusion that the
subject cassette tapes are inadmissible in evidence under Philippine law.
___________
General Rule: Bill of Rights can be invoked only against the State
Exception: It can be invoked against spouses
_________
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or expression,
or of the press, or of the right of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.
GMA VS COMELEC, 2014
GMA challenged the constitutionality of Comelecs regulation
HELD:
COMELEC is duty bound to come up
with reasonable basis for changing the
interpretation and implementation of
the airtime limits
There is no question that the COMELEC is the office constitutionally and statutorily
authorized to enforce election laws but it cannot exercise its powers without
limitations or reasonable basis. It could not simply adopt measures or regulations
just because it feels that it is the right thing to do, in so far as it might be
concerned. It does have discretion, but such discretion is something that must be
exercised within the bounds and intent of the law. The COMELEC is not free to
simply change the rules especially if it has consistently interpreted a legal
provision in a particular manner in the past. If ever it has to change the rules, the
same must be properly explained with sufficient basis.
The COMELEC went beyond the authority granted it by the law in
adopting aggregate basis in the determination of allowable airtime
The law, which is the basis of the regulation subject of these petitions, pertinently
provides:
6.2. (a) Each bona fide candidate or registered political party for a nationally
elective office shall be entitled to not more than one hundred twenty (120) minutes
of television advertisement and one hundred eighty (180) minutes of radio

43 | P a g e
advertisement whether by purchase or donation.
(b) Each bona fide candidate or registered political party for a locally elective office
shall be entitled to not more than sixty (60) minutes of television advertisement
and ninety (90) minutes of radio advertisement whether by purchase or donation;
Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution
No. 9615 on airtime limits also goes
against the constitutional guaranty of
freedom of expression, of speech
and of the press
The guaranty of freedom to speak is useless without the ability to communicate
and disseminate what is said. And where there is a need to reach a large audience,
the need to access the means and media for such dissemination becomes critical.
This is where the press and broadcast media come along. At the same time, the
right to speak and to reach out would not be meaningful if it is just a token ability
to be heard by a few. It must be coupled with substantially reasonable means by
which the communicator and the audience could effectively interact. Section 9 (a)
of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, with its adoption of the aggregate-based
airtime limits unreasonably restricts the guaranteed freedom of speech and of the
press.
Political speech is one of the most important expressions protected by the
Fundamental Law. [F]reedom of speech, of expression, and of the press are at the
core of civil liberties and have to be protected at all costs for the sake of
democracy. Accordingly, the same must remain unfettered unless otherwise
justified by a compelling state interest.
The Court agrees. The assailed rule on aggregate-based airtime limits is
unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of
candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people.
Here, the adverted reason for imposing the aggregate-based airtime limits
leveling the playing field does not constitute a compelling state interest which
would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and
political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs
of government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the
imposition of such a prohibitive measure.
Section 9 (a) of Resolution 9615 is
violative of the peoples
right to suffrage
Fundamental to the idea of a democratic and republican state is the right of the

people to determine their own destiny through the choice of leaders they may
have in government. Thus, the primordial importance of suffrage and the
concomitant right of the people to be adequately informed for the intelligent
exercise of such birthright.
Resolution No. 9615 needs
prior hearing before adoption
The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615 on January 15, 2013 then came up
with a public hearing on January 31, 2013 to explain what it had done, particularly
on the aggregate-based air time limits. This circumstance also renders the new
regulation, particularly on the adoption of theaggregate-based airtime limit,
questionable. It must not be overlooked that the new Resolution introduced a
radical change in the manner in which the rules on airtime for political
advertisements are to be reckoned. As such there is a need for adequate and
effective means by which they may be adopted, disseminated and implemented. In
this regard, it is not enough that they be published or explained after they have
been adopted.
While it is true that the COMELEC is an independent office and not a mere
administrative agency under the Executive Department, rules which apply to the
latter must also be deemed to similarly apply to the former, not as a matter of
administrative convenience but as a dictate of due process. And this assumes
greater significance considering the important and pivotal role that the COMELEC
plays in the life of the nation. Thus, whatever might have been said
in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, should also
apply mutatis mutandis to the COMELEC when it comes to promulgating rules and
regulations which adversely affect, or impose a heavy and substantial burden on,
the citizenry in a matter that implicates the very nature of government we have
adopted.
It should be understandable that when an administrative rule is merely
interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare
issuance for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already
prescribed. When, upon the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond
merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the
implementation of the law but substantially adds to or increases the burden
of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly
affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new
issuance is given the force and effect of law.
For failing to conduct prior hearing before coming up with Resolution No. 9615,
said Resolution, specifically in regard to the new rule on aggregate airtime is
declared defective and ineffectual.
_____________

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The Diocese of Bacolod, Represented by the Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M.
Navarra and the Bishop Himself in his Personal Capacity v. Commission
on Elections and the Election Officer of Bacolod City, Atty. Mavil V.
Majarucon GR No. 205728
G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015
SUMMARY OF THE PETITION FACTS:
Petitioner Diocese of Bacolod is a Roman Catholic diocese and is represented in
this petition by its Bishop, the Most Rev. Vicente M. Navarra. Petitioner Bishop
Navarra is also filing this petition in his individual and personal capacity as the
questioned orders are personally directed at him and also as a concerned citizen,
as the issues raised herein are matters of paramount and transcendental
importance to the public which must be settled early given the far-reaching
implications of the unconstitutional acts of the respondents. Named as
respondents are the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and its Election Officer of
Bacolod City Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon. On 21 February 2013, the petitioners have
caused to be placed on the front wall of the Bacolod Cathedral two sets of
Tarpaulin, each sized 6x10 feet, with the messageConscience Vote (Team
Buhay/Team Patay (Team Patay Tarpaulin). The Team Patay Tarpaulin contained the
names of both Antiand Pro-Reproductive Health Law senatorial candidates. In their
special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, petitioners sought the nullification of the 22 February 2013 order issued by
respondent Atty. Majarucon, which orders them to remove the supposed
oversizedTeam Patay Tarpaulin of the Diocese of Bacolod. They also sought to
nullify the 27 February 2013 order issued by the COMELEC, through its Law
Department, which orders the immediate removal of the Team Patay Tarpaulin and
threatening the petitioner Bishop of Bacolod with the filing of an election offense if
he fails to cause its immediate removal. On March 5, 2013, the Supreme Court En
Banc issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents COMELEC and
Atty. Majarucon from removing the Team Patay Tarpaulin.
ISSUES/GROUNDS:
1. Respondents orders directives to remove or cause the removal of the
subjectTeam Patay Tarpaulin are unconstitutional and void for infringing on
petitioners right to freedom of expression on their own private property.
2. Respondents orders/directives to remove or cause the removal of the
subjectTeam Patay Tarpaulin are unconstitutional and void for violating the
principle of separation of Church and State enshrined in Section 6 of Article II of
the 1987 Constitution.
ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSIONS:

1. The assailed Orders/Directives to remove or cause the removal of the

subjectTeam Patay Tarpaulin are not electoral campaign materials and that the
mention of the candidates in the infringes on the petitioners right to freedom of
expression on their own private property: o the subject Team Patay Tarpaulins are
not electoral campaign materials, stressing that the mentioning of candidates
name in the second tarpaulin was merely incidental to the petitioners campaign
against the RH Law, which they have firmly campaigned against even when it was
just a bill being deliberated in Congress; o subject Team Patay Tarpaulins are
covered by the broader constitutional guaranty of freedom of expression and of
conscience and not by the more narrow and limited election laws, rules, and
regulations; o petitioners have the constitutional right to communicate their
views and beliefs by posting the subject Team Patay Tarpaulins on the Bacolod
Cathedral, a private property owned by the Diocese of Bacolod; o the RH Law and
the candidates and party-lists running in the 2013 National Elections who
supported and who opposed its passage into a law are matters of public concern
and a legitimate subject of general interest and of discussion; o citing the Supreme
Courts jurisprudence in Chavez v. PCGG (G. R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998),
the petitioners argued that that public concern embraces a broad spectrum of
subjects which the public may want to know
citing the Supreme Courts jurisprudence in Adiong v. COMELEC ( G. R. No. 103956,
March 31, 1992), the petitioners further argued that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open. o the content and the message of
the subject Team Patay Tarpaulin plainly relates to broad issues of interest to the
community especially to the members of the Catholic community and that the
subject tarpaulin simply conveys the position of the petitioners on the RH bill and
the public officials who supported or opposed it as it gains relevance in the
exercise of the peoples right of suffrage in the advent of the 2013 polls; o
considering the petitioners message, through the Team Patay Tarpaulin, was a
matter of public concern, the message being conveyed and the mode used for its
communication and expression to the public is entitled to protection under the Free
Expression clause of the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution; o not being
candidates or political parties, the freedom of expression curtailed by the
questioned prohibition, using the logic of the Supreme Court in Adiong v.
COMELEC, is not so much that of the candidate or the political party; o there is no
compelling and substantial State interest that is endangered or which will be
endangered by the posting of the subject Team Patay Tarpaulin which would justify
the infringement of the preferred right of freedom of expression. 2. The assailed
orders/directives to remove or cause the removal of the subjectTeam Patay
Tarpaulin are unconstitutional and void for violating the principle of separation of
Church and State enshrined in Section 6 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution: o
petitioners petition against the RH Law is not only a matter of exercise of its
freedom of expression and of conscience but is also a matter of Catholic faith,

45 | P a g e
morals, belief, and of duty; o the Diocese of Bacolod has taken on the issue of the
RH Law as part of her mission as part of its continued advocacy and obedience to
the Catholic Churchs teachings; o in line with what they believe to be their duty in
the faith, the petitioners have declared the RH Law as being anti-life, anti-morals,
anti-family, anti-marriage, and contrary to the teachings of the Catholic Church.
Consequently, petitioners have called on its members and followers not to support
any candidate who is anti-life, and to support those who are pro-life; considering
that the views and position of the petitioners on the RH Bill is inextricably
connected to its Catholic dogma, faith, and moral teachings, the posting of the
subject Team Patay Tarpaulin has already gone beyond mere exercise of freedom of
expression and of conscience, but also of the right and privilege of the Church to
propagate and spread its teachings which should be insulated from any form of
encroachment and intrusion on the part of the State, and its agencies and officials;
section 6 of the Article II of the 1987 Constitution monumentalizes the principle of
separation of Church and State; at the core of its advocacy against the RH Bill is
the Gospel of Life which is a matter of Catholic doctrine, creed and dogma; the
petitioners believe, as a matter of faith, that in these times when there is a great
conflict between a culture of death and a culture of life, the Church should have
the courage to proclaim the culture of life for the common good of society; the
questioned orders are unpardonable intrusion into the affairs of the Church and
constitute serious violations of the principle of separation of Church and State
which the State and its officials, including the herein respondents, are bound to
respect, observe, and hold sacred.
PRAYER:
Petition be given due course; Issue a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction restraining respondents from further proceedings in
enforcing their orders for the removal of the subject Team Patay Tarpaulin; Declare
the questioned orders of respondents as unconstitutional and void and
permanently restrain the respondents from enforcing them or any other similar
orders; and Issue other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable under the
premises.
THE ISSUES TO BE ARGUED AS PER ADVISORY OF THE COURT EN BANC
DATED MARCH 12, 2013 1.
Whether or not the 22 February 2013 Notice/Order by Election Officer Majarucon
and the 27 February 2013 Order by the COMELEC Law Department are considered
judgments/final orders/resolutions of the COMELEC which would warrant a review
of this Court via a Rule 65 Petition.
(a) Whether or not petitioners violated the hierarchy of courts doctrine and
jurisprudential rules governing appeals from COMELEC decisions;

(b) Assuming arguendo that the aforementioned Orders are not considered
judgments/final orders/resolutions of the COMELEC, whether there are exceptional
circumstances which would allow this Court to take cognizance of the case.
2. Whether or not it is relevant to determine whether the tarpaulins are political
advertisement or election propaganda considering that petitioner is not a
political candidate.
3. Whether or not the tarpaulins are a form of expression (protected speech), or
election propaganda/political advertisement.
(a) Assuming arguendo that the tarpaulins are a form of expression, whether or not
the COMELEC possesses the authority to regulate the same.
(b) Whether or not this form of expression may be regulated. 4. Whether or not the
22 February 2013 Notice/Order by Election Officer Majarucon and the 27 February
2013 Order by the COMELEC Law Department violate the Constitutional principle of
separation of church and state. 5. Whether or not the action of the petitioners in
posting its tarpaulin violates the Constitutional principle of separation of church
and state.
OSG COMMENT: DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, et al. vs. COMELEC, et al.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioners availed of the proper remedy in assailing
respondents notice and letter ordering the removal of the subject tarpaulin.
2. Whether or not the assailed order and notice issued by respondents are valid
and constitutional considering that the same allegedly violate the petitioners right
to freedom of expression and the
principle of separation of Church and State enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.
ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSION:
1. A petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed
before this Honorable Court is not the proper remedy to question the subject notice
and letter of respondents. o Petitioners filed the petition before the Honorable
Court, claiming that they have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to
assail the notice and letter issued by the respondents.
Contrary to their claim, prior resort to the COMELEC constitutes a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy that bars the petitioners from directly asking relief from the
Honorable Court from the alleged injurious effects of the subject letter and notice.

46 | P a g e
o In filing the instant suit, the petitioners violated the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Before a party is allowed to seek intervention of the
court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him. Petitioners should have first brought the
matter to the COMELEC En Banc or to any of its Divisions before going directly to
the Supreme Court via petition for certiorari and prohibition.
o The letter and notice issued by the respondents are not subject to review by the
Supreme Court, as the power of the Court to review the decisions of the COMELEC
is limited only to final decisions, rulings and orders of the COMELEC en banc
rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power (citing Ambil Jr.
vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 143398 October 25, 2000). Considering that the assailed
letter and notice are not final orders of the COMELEC En Banc rendered in the
exercise of its adjudicatory and quasi-judicial functions but mere issuances of Atty.
Marjucom and the COMELEC Law Department, the same are not reviewable by the
Honorable Court but by the COMELEC itself.
o Granting that the assailed notice and letter are subject to review by the
Honorable Court, petitioners must be able to show that respondents committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
same. Petitioners have not shown facts essential to prove that the assailed notice
and letter were issued in a whimsical, arbitrary or capricious manner or the
abuse of discretion is so patent and gross to amount to grave abuse of
discretion. The respondents issued the notice and letter pursuant to the
COMELECs mandate to regulate and supervise the use of mass media during
election period as embodied in the 1987 Constitution.
2. The subject tarpaulin is an election propaganda subject to regulation by
respondent COMELEC pursuant to its mandate under Section 4, Article IX-C of the
1987 Constitution.
Hence, respondents notice and letter ordering its removal for being oversized are
valid and constitutional. o In furtherance of COMELECs mandate to supervise and
regulate elections, Congress enacted RA 9006 (the Fair Elections Act), giving the
COMELEC power to promulgate its own rules and regulations. Pursuant to this,
COMELEC promulgated Resolution 9615 (Rules and Regulations Implementing RA
9006, in connection to the 13 May 2013 National and Local Elections, and
Subsequent Elections). Resolution 9615 defines the following terms:
Election Campaign or Partisan Political Activity- an act designed to promote
the election of defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office, and
shall include, among others, the act of directly or indirectly soliciting votes,
pledges of support for or against any candidate Political Advertisement or
Election Propaganda- any matter broadcasted, published, printed, displayed or

exhibited, in any medium, which contain the name, image, logo, brand, insignia,
motif, initials, and other symbol or representation, that is capable of being
associated with a candidate or a party, and is intended to draw the attention of the
public or a segment thereof to promote or oppose, directly or indirectly, the
election of the said candidate or candidates to a public office From the definitions,
the subject tarpaulin is a form of election propaganda subject to regulation by the
COMELEC pursuant to its mandate under Section 4, Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution.
The subject tarpaulin contains the message CONSCIENCE VOTE and classifies the
candidates into two groups, Team Buhay (with a check mark) and Team Patay
(with a cross mark). The check mark on Team Buhay and the cross mark on
Team Patay convey to the public that those belonging to the Team Buhay
should be voted while those under Team Patay should be rejected. On its face, it
is obvious that the tarpaulin is petitioners way of endorsing those candidates who
voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for the said law. Petitioner
also admitted in their petition that they have called on its members and followers
not to support any candidate who is anti-life, and to support those who are prolife.
These declarations confirm that they put up the tarpaulin not merely to promote
the Churchs position on the RH Law but to express their support for or against the
candidates listed therein, depending on who they voted on the RH Law. Section 6
of Resolution 9615 sets the size limit for campaign posters to two feet by three
feet. This is also embodied in section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code.
The subject tarpaulin has the estimated size of six feet by ten feet, which is
beyond the maximum allowable size for campaign posters for private properties. In
ordering the removal of the tarpaulin, Atty. Marjucom, in her capacity as election
officer, merely enforced section 6 of Resolution 9615 and section 82 of the
Omnibus Election Code. Similarly, in issuing the assailed letter, the COMELEC Law
Department only acted pursuant to COMELECs regulatory and supervisory
functions under the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners cannot claim that their right to
freedom of expression has been violated. Petitioners are completely free to express
their support for or against any candidate through the use of campaign posters
and other forms of propaganda, provided they comply with the limitations provided
by law as regards their size. The assailed notice and letter are not forms of
censorship. The only reason that the respondents sought the removal of the
tarpaulin is that it failed to comply with the maximum allowable size provided by
law. Assuming that the assailed notice and letter amount to infringement of the
petitioners right to freedom of expression, such encroachment is authorized by the
Constitution itself. The supervisory and regulatory powers of the COMELEC under
the Constitution set to some extent a limit on the right to free speech during the
election period. By ordering the petitioners to comply with the size requirement,
the COMELEC was exercising its supervisory and regulatory authority for the
purpose of ensuring equal opportunity for candidates for political office. The

47 | P a g e
assailed notice and letter do not intrude into purely religious and ecclesiastical
matters. They do not seek to regulate the content the subject tarpaulin, but only
the size, which respondents found to be in violation of Resolution 9615 and the
Omnibus Election Code. On its face, the subject tarpaulin does not convey any
religious doctrine of the Catholic Church. Rather, it is an election propaganda. The
fact that the tarpaulin did not comply with Resolution 9615 and the Omnibus
Election Code gave respondents reason to order its removal, consistent with
COMELECs mandate to regulate and supervise all form of media communication
and information during election period. Thus, respondents did not violate the
principle of separation of Church and State provided in the Constitution.
PRAYER: The Petition should be dismissed for lack of merit.
_______________
WHAT IS HECLERs VETO?
A heckler's veto occurs when an acting party's right to freedom of speech is
curtailed or restricted by the government in order to prevent a reacting
party's behavior. The common example is that of demonstrators (reacting party)
causing a speech (given by the acting party) to be terminated in order to preserve
the peace. It is an alleged right to restrict freedom of speech where such
expression may create disorder or provoke violence."
A speaker may be restricted by the government if such speech would likely cause
chaos.
In the United States, case law regarding the heckler's veto is mixed. Most findings
say that the acting party's actions cannot be pre-emptively stopped due to fear of
heckling by the reacting party, but in the immediate face of violence, authorities
can ask the acting party to cease their action in order to satisfy the hecklers.
( kontra ng kontra then government sided with the opposing party)

48 | P a g e

Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public

concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well
as to government research data used as basis for policy development,
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
AQUINO SARMIENTO vs MORATO
One of the members in MTRCB asked for the voting slip but was refused to be
given because accordingly that is privileged as it is private and confidential.
SC ruled that voting slips are not confidential as they are made in public official
function
__________________
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public
and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

TAKE NOTE: Must be Legislative in character and not apply to court

decisions
___________
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and
in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means
which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention
places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this
section as well as compensation to the rehabilitation of victims of torture
or similar practices, and their families.

STA CLARA vs GASTON

Private respondents cannot be compelled to become members of the SCHA by the
simple expedient of including them in its Articles of Incorporation and By-laws
without their express or implied consent. True, it may be to the mutual advantage
of lot owners in a subdivision to band themselves together to promote their
common welfare. But that is possible only if the owners voluntarily agree, directly
or indirectly, to become members of the association. True also, memberships in
homeowners associations may be acquired in various ways -- often through deeds
of sale, Torrens certificates or other forms of evidence of property ownership. In the
present case, however, other than the said Articles of Incorporation and By-laws,
there is no showing that private respondents have agreed to be SCHA member.
TAKE NOTE:
GR: No right to compel to join
Exception: If there is an expressed condition that he should be a member
________
Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

PEOPLE (TRIPLE A) vs CA, Feb 25, 2015

FACTS: 16 yr old allged to have been raped by the accused. TC convicted.
On appeal reversed and acquitted. It was elevated to SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not violation to double jeopardy?
RULING:
As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a
judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. The reason is that
a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is
barred from appealing lest the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy
be violated.15 Section 21, Article III of the Constitution
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

49 | P a g e
following circumstances:
Despite acquittal, however, either the offended party or the accused may appeal,
but only with respect to the civil aspect of the decision. Or, said judgment of
acquittal may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court showing that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed
not merely reversible errors of judgment, but also exercised grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due process,
thereby rendering the assailed judgment null and void. 16 If there is grave abuse of
discretion, granting petitioners prayer is not tantamount to putting private
respondents in double jeopardy.

a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present;
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1
hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal
orifice of another person.

Private respondents further claim that even assuming, merely for the sake of
argument, that AAA can file the special civil action for certiorari without violating
their right against double jeopardy, still, it must be dismissed for petitioners
failure to previously file a motion for reconsideration.

Under the aforecited provision, the elements of rape are: (1) the offender had
carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force
or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
or when the victim is under twelve years of age.

True, a motion for reconsideration is a condicio sine qua non for the filing of a
petition for certiorari. Its purpose is for the court to have an opportunity to correct
any actual or perceived error attributed to it by re-examination of the legal and
factual circumstances of the case. This rule, however, is not absolute and admits
well-defined exceptions, such as: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as
where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in
the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower
court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c)
where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any
further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner
or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner
was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a
criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief
by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a
nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which
the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one
purely of law or where public interest is involved.

Here, the accused intentionally made AAA consume hard liquor more than she
could handle. They still forced her to drink even when she was already obviously
inebriated. They never denied having sexual intercourse with AAA, but the latter
was clearly deprived of reason or unconscious at the time the private respondents
ravished her. The CA, however, readily concluded that she agreed to the sexual
act simply because she did not shout or offer any physical resistance, disregarding
her testimony that she was rendered weak and dizzy by intoxication, thereby
facilitating the commission of the crime. 35 The appellate court never provided any
reason why AAAs testimony should deserve scant or no weight at all, or why it
cannot be accorded any credence. In reviewing rape cases, the lone testimony of
the victim is and should be, by itself, sufficient to warrant a judgment of conviction
if found to be credible. Also, it has been established that when a woman declares
that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to mean that she
has been raped, and where her testimony passes the test of credibility, the
accused can be convicted on that basis alone. This is because from the nature of
the offense, the sole evidence that can usually be offered to establish the guilt of
the accused is the complainants testimony itself. 36 The trial court correctly ruled
that if AAA was not truthful to her accusation, she would not have opened herself
to the rough and tumble of a public trial. AAA was certainly not enjoying the
prying eyes of those who were listening as she narrated her harrowing experience.
___________
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law.

CA seemed to forget that AAA was heavily intoxicated at the time of the assault.
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent

until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the

50 | P a g e
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding
the absence of the accused: Provided, that he has been duly notified and
his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

The Special Prosecutor asks this Court to address a number of legal

issues. After a thorough evaluation of the Petitions, however, we cull the
threshold issues needing to be addressed by this Court as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I.

G.R. No. 171222, February 18, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LTSG. DOMINADOR BAYABOS,
LTJG. MANNY G. FERRER, LTJG. RONALD G. MAGSINO, LTJG. GERRY P.
DOCTOR, ENS. DOMINADOR B. OPERIO, JR., AND THE HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN
While this Court has recently faced questions on the criminal liability of fraternity
members for hazing, this case presents novel questions on the extent of liability of
schools and school authorities under Republic Act No. 8049, or the Anti-Hazing
Law.
The responsibility given to an academic institution for the welfare of its students
has been characterized by law and judicial doctrine as a form of special parental
authority and responsibility.1This responsibility has been amplified by the
enactment of the Anti-Hazing Law, in that the failure by school authorities to take
any action to prevent the offenses as provided by the law exposes them to criminal
liability as accomplices in the criminal acts. Thus, the institution and its officers
cannot stand idly by in the face of patently criminal acts committed within their
sphere of responsibility. They bear the commensurate duty to ensure that the
crimes covered by the Anti-Hazing Law are not committed.
It was within this legal framework that the school authorities of the Philippine
Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA) were criminally charged before the
Sandiganbayan as accomplices to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law. Before they
were arraigned, the Sandiganbayan quashed the Information against
them on the basis of the dismissal of the criminal case against the
principal accused and, the failure to include in the Information the
material averments required by the Anti-Hazing Law.
Consequently, this Petition was filed before this Court questioning the
Sandiganbayans quashal of the Information.
The Issues

II.

Whether the prosecution of respondents for the crime of

accomplice to hazing can proceed in spite of the dismissal with
finality of the case against the principal accused
Whether the Information filed against respondents contains all the
material averments for the prosecution of the crime of accomplice
to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law
Our Ruling
With regard to the first issue, we agree with petitioner that the
Sandiganbayan erred when it dismissed outright the case against
respondents, on the sole ground that the case against the purported
principals had already been dismissed. It is a settled rule that the case
against those charged as accomplices is not ipso facto dismissed in the
absence of trial of the purported principals; the dismissal of the case
against the latter; or even the latters acquittal, especially when the
occurrence of the crime has in fact been established. In People v. Rafael,
the Supreme Court En Banc reasoned thus: The corresponding
responsibilities of the principal, accomplice, and accessory are distinct
from each other. As long as the commission of the offense can be duly
established in evidence, the determination of the liability of the accomplice
or accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal.
Accordingly, so long as the commission of the crime can be duly proven,
the trial of those charged as accomplices to determine their criminal
liability can proceed independently of that of the alleged principal.
Nonetheless, as will be discussed below, we affirm the quashal of
the Information against respondents.
Section 14, Article III of the Constitution, recognizes the right of
the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them. As a manifestation of this constitutional
right, the Rules of Court requires that the information charging
persons with an offense be sufficient. One of the key
components of a sufficient information is the statement of the
acts or omissions constituting the offense charged, subject of the
complaint.26 The information must also be crafted in a language
ordinary and concise enough to enable persons of common

51 | P a g e
understanding to know the offense being charged against
them.27 This approach is intended to allow them to suitably
prepare for their defense, as they are presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the facts constituting the offense they
have purportedly committed.28 The information need not be in the
same kind of language used in the law relied
upon.29chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
At any time before entering a plea, an accused may assail the
information filed with the court based on the grounds enumerated
in Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, one of which is the
claim that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. In
assessing whether an information must be quashed on that
ground, the basic test30 is to determine if the facts averred would
establish the presence of the essential elements of the crime as
defined in the law. The information is examined without
consideration of the truth or veracity of the claims therein, as
these are more properly proven or controverted during the trial. In
the appraisal of the information, matters aliunde are not taken
into account.
We quote the pertinent provision of the Anti-Hazing Law as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 1. Hazing, as used in this Act, is an initiation rite or practice as
aprerequisite for admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority
or organizationby placing the recruit, neophyte or applicant in some
embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial,
silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting
him to physical or psychological suffering or injury.
The term organization shall include any club or the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, Philippine National Police, Philippine Military Academy,
or officer and cadet corp of the Citizen's Military Training and Citizen's
Army Training. The physical, mental and psychological testing and training
procedure and practices to determine and enhance the physical, mental
and psychological fitness of prospective regular members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police as approved by
the Secretary of National Defense and the National Police Commission duly
recommended by the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines and
the Director General of the Philippine National Police shall not be
considered as hazing for the purposes of this Act.
Sec. 4. x x x x.

The school authorities including faculty members who consent to the

hazing or who have actual knowledge thereof, but failed to take any action
to prevent the same from occurring shall be punished as accomplices for
the acts of hazing committed by the perpetrators. (Emphasis supplied)
The crime of hazing is thus committed when the following essential
elements are established: (1) a person is placed in some embarrassing or
humiliating situation or subjected to physical or psychological suffering or
injury; and (2) these acts were employed as a prerequisite for the persons
admission or entry into an organization. In the crime of hazing, the crucial
ingredient distinguishing it from the crimes against persons defined under
Title Eight of the Revised Penal Code is the infliction by a person of physical
or psychological suffering on another in furtherance of the latters
admission or entry into an organization.
In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no
direct participation in the act, they may nonetheless be charged as
accomplices if it is shown that (1) hazing, as established by the above
elements, occurred; (2) the accused are school authorities or faculty
members; and (3) they consented to or failed to take preventive action
against hazing in spite actual knowledge thereof.
First, we reject the contention of respondents that PMMA should not be
considered an organization. Under the Anti-Hazing Law, the breadth of the
term organization includes but is not limited to groups, teams,
fraternities, sororities, citizen army training corps, educational institutions,
clubs, societies, cooperatives, companies, partnerships, corporations, the
PNP, and the AFP.31 Attached to the Department of Transportation and
Communications,32 the PMMA is a government-owned educational
institution33 established for the primary purpose of producing efficient and
well-trained merchant marine officers. 34 Clearly, it is included in the
term organization within the meaning of the law.
We also disagree with the Sandiganbayan ruling that the quashal of the
Information was warranted for failure to allege that the purported acts
were not covered by the exemption relating to the duly recommended and
approved testing and training procedure and practices for prospective
regular members of the AFP and the PNP. This exemption is an affirmative
defense in, not an essential element of, the crime of accomplice to hazing.
It is an assertion that must be properly claimed by the accused, not by the
prosecution. The reason for this rule is that the accused carry the burden
of proof in establishing by clear and convincing evidence that they have
satisfied the requirements thereof.35 Thus, the prosecutions failure to point
out in the Information that the exception is inapplicable would not justify

52 | P a g e
the quashal of that Information.
Nevertheless, we find albeit for a different reason that the Motion to
Quash must be granted, as the Information does not include all the
material facts constituting the crime of accomplice to hazing
As can be gleaned from the above, the indictment merely states that psychological
pain and physical injuries were inflicted on the victim. There is no allegation that
the purported acts were employed as a prerequisite for admission or entry into the
organization. Failure to aver this crucial ingredient would prevent the successful
prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the accused, either as principal or as
accomplice, for the crime of hazing. Plain reference to a technical term 37 in this
case, hazing is insufficient and incomplete, as it is but a characterization of the
acts allegedly committed and thus a mere conclusion of law. Section 6, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court, expressly states that the information must include, inter alia,
both the designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense. The Special Prosecutors
belated argument38 in his Petition before this Court that the successful completion
of the indoctrination and orientation program was used as a prerequisite for
continued admission to the academy i.e., attainment of active midshipman status
does not cure this defect in the Information. Thus, the Information must be
quashed, as the ultimate facts it presents do not constitute the crime
of accomplice to hazing.
Finally, we reject the Special Prosecutors claim that the Sandiganbayan should just
have ordered the filing of another information or the correction of the defect by
amendment, instead of dismissing the case outright. 39 Indeed, Section 4, Rule 117
of the Rules of Court, provides that if a motion to quash is based on the ground
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the court shall give the
prosecution a chance to correct the defect by amendment. However, the provision
also states that if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, the motion shall
be granted. Here, we point out that the Special Prosecutor insisted in his Comment
on the Motion to Quash40 that there was no defect in the Information. Neither has
he filed a new information after the motion was sustained, pursuant to Section 5,
Rule 117. Thus, the Sandiganbayan was correct in ordering the quashal of the
Information and the eventual dismissal of the case.
This does not mean, however, that the Special Prosecutor is now precluded from
filing another information. Section 6, Rule 117, specifically states that an order
sustaining a motion to quash would not bar another prosecution. That is, of course,
unless respondents are able to prove that the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished, or that double jeopardy has already attached.

Given the foregoing, the Court no longer sees the necessity to pass upon the other
issues raised by petitioner.
PETITION DENIED