FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 147145. January 31, 2005]

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA, BELINDA CAPONONG-NOBLE,
petitioner, vs. ALIPIO ABAJA and NOEL ABELLAR, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals of 12
January 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 47644. The Court of Appeals sustained the Resolution[3] of the
Regional Trial Court of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, Branch 61 (RTC-Kabankalan),
admitting to probate the last will and testament of Alipio Abada (Abada).
The Antecedent Facts
Abada died sometime in May 1940.[4] His widow Paula Toray (Toray) died sometime in
September 1943. Both died without legitimate children.
On 13 September 1968, Alipio C. Abaja (Alipio) filed with the then Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental (now RTC-Kabankalan) a petition,[5] docketed as SP No. 070 (313-8668), for
the probate of the last will and testament (will) of Abada. Abada allegedly named as his
testamentary heirs his natural children Eulogio Abaja (Eulogio) and Rosario Cordova. Alipio is
the son of Eulogio.
Nicanor Caponong (Caponong) opposed the petition on the ground that Abada left no will when
he died in 1940. Caponong further alleged that the will, if Abada really executed it, should be
disallowed for the following reasons: (1) it was not executed and attested as required by law; (2)
it was not intended as the last will of the testator; and (3) it was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries. Citing the same grounds invoked by
Caponong, the alleged intestate heirs of Abada, namely, Joel, Julian, Paz, Evangeline, Geronimo,
Humberto, Teodora and Elena Abada (Joel Abada, et al.), and Levi, Leandro, Antonio, Florian,
Hernani and Carmela Tronco (Levi Tronco, et al.), also opposed the petition. The oppositors are
the nephews, nieces and grandchildren of Abada and Toray.
On 13 September 1968, Alipio filed another petition[6] before the RTC-Kabankalan, docketed as
SP No. 071 (312-8669), for the probate of the last will and testament of Toray. Caponong, Joel
Abada, et al., and Levi Tronco, et al. opposed the petition on the same grounds they cited in SP
No. 070 (313-8668).

On 20 September 1968, Caponong filed a petition[7] before the RTC-Kabankalan, docketed as SP

No. 069 (309), praying for the issuance in his name of letters of administration of the intestate
estate of Abada and Toray.
In an Order dated 14 August 1981, the RTC-Kabankalan admitted to probate the will of Toray.
Since the oppositors did not file any motion for reconsideration, the order allowing the probate of
Torays will became final and executory.[8]
In an order dated 23 November 1990, the RTC-Kabankalan designated Belinda Caponong-Noble
(Caponong-Noble) Special Administratrix of the estate of Abada and Toray.[9] Caponong-Noble
moved for the dismissal of the petition for probate of the will of Abada. The RTC-Kabankalan
denied the motion in an Order dated 20 August 1991.[10]
Sometime in 1993, during the proceedings, Presiding Judge Rodolfo S. Layumas discovered that
in an Order dated 16 March 1992, former Presiding Judge Edgardo Catilo had already submitted
the case for decision. Thus, the RTC-Kabankalan rendered a Resolution dated 22 June 1994, as
follows:
There having been sufficient notice to the heirs as required by law; that there is substantial
compliance with the formalities of a Will as the law directs and that the petitioner through his
testimony and the deposition of Felix Gallinero was able to establish the regularity of the
execution of the said Will and further, there being no evidence of bad faith and fraud, or
substitution of the said Will, the Last Will and Testament of Alipio Abada dated June 4, 1932 is
admitted and allowed probate.
As prayed for by counsel, Noel Abbellar[11] is appointed administrator of the estate of Paula
Toray who shall discharge his duties as such after letters of administration shall have been issued
in his favor and after taking his oath and filing a bond in the amount of Ten Thousand
(P10,000.00) Pesos.
Mrs. Belinda C. Noble, the present administratrix of the estate of Alipio Abada shall continue
discharging her duties as such until further orders from this Court.
SO ORDERED.[12]
The RTC-Kabankalan ruled on the only issue raised by the oppositors in their motions to dismiss
the petition for probate, that is, whether the will of Abada has an attestation clause as required by
law. The RTC-Kabankalan further held that the failure of the oppositors to raise any other matter
forecloses all other issues.
Not satisfied with the Resolution, Caponong-Noble filed a notice of appeal.
In a Decision promulgated on 12 January 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Resolution of
the RTC-Kabankalan. The appellate court found that the RTC-Kabankalan properly admitted to
probate the will of Abada.

Hence, the present recourse by Caponong-Noble.

The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:
1. What laws apply to the probate of the last will of Abada;
2. Whether the will of Abada requires acknowledgment before a notary public;[13]
3. Whether the will must expressly state that it is written in a language or dialect known to the
testator;
4. Whether the will of Abada has an attestation clause, and if so, whether the attestation clause
complies with the requirements of the applicable laws;
5. Whether Caponong-Noble is precluded from raising the issue of whether the will of Abada is
written in a language known to Abada;
6. Whether evidence aliunde may be resorted to in the probate of the will of Abada.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the RTC-Kabankalan in admitting to probate the
will of Abada.
The Applicable Law
Abada executed his will on 4 June 1932. The laws in force at that time are the Civil Code of
1889 or the Old Civil Code, and Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil Procedure[14] which governed
the execution of wills before the enactment of the New Civil Code.
The matter in dispute in the present case is the attestation clause in the will of Abada. Section
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645,[15] governs the form of the
attestation clause of Abadas will.[16] Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended,
provides:
SEC. 618. Requisites of will. No will, except as provided in the preceding section,[17] shall be
valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written in the
language or dialect known by the testator and signed by him, or by the testators name written by
some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by
three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. The testator or
the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall
also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages shall be
numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each sheet. The attestation shall
state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the

testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name,
under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and
signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other.
Requisites of a Will under the Code of Civil Procedure
Under Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the requisites of a will are the following:
(1) The will must be written in the language or dialect known by the testator;
(2) The will must be signed by the testator, or by the testators name written by some other
person in his presence, and by his express direction;
(3) The will must be attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of each other;
(4) The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will must sign each and every page of the will on the left margin;
(5) The pages of the will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part
of each sheet;
(6) The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is
written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page of the will, or
caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence
of three witnesses, and the witnesses witnessed and signed the will and all pages of the
will in the presence of the testator and of each other.
Caponong-Noble asserts that the will of Abada does not indicate that it is written in a language or
dialect known to the testator. Further, she maintains that the will is not acknowledged before a
notary public. She cites in particular Articles 804 and 805 of the Old Civil Code, thus:
Art. 804. Every will must be in writing and executed in [a] language or dialect known to the
testator.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. xxx[18]
Caponong-Noble actually cited Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code.[19] Article 804 of the
Old Civil Code is about the rights and obligations of administrators of the property of an
absentee, while Article 806 of the Old Civil Code defines a legitime.
Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code are new provisions. Article 804 of the New Civil
Code is taken from Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.[20] Article 806 of the New Civil
Code is taken from Article 685 of the Old Civil Code[21] which provides:

Art. 685. The notary and two of the witnesses who authenticate the will must be acquainted with
the testator, or, should they not know him, he shall be identified by two witnesses who are
acquainted with him and are known to the notary and to the attesting witnesses. The notary and
the witnesses shall also endeavor to assure themselves that the testator has, in their judgment, the
legal capacity required to make a will.
Witnesses authenticating a will without the attendance of a notary, in cases falling under Articles
700 and 701, are also required to know the testator.
However, the Code of Civil Procedure[22] repealed Article 685 of the Old Civil Code. Under the
Code of Civil Procedure, the intervention of a notary is not necessary in the execution of any
will.[23] Therefore, Abadas will does not require acknowledgment before a notary public.
Caponong-Noble points out that nowhere in the will can one discern that Abada knew the
Spanish language. She alleges that such defect is fatal and must result in the disallowance of the
will. On this issue, the Court of Appeals held that the matter was not raised in the motion to
dismiss, and that it is now too late to raise the issue on appeal. We agree with Caponong-Noble
that the doctrine of estoppel does not apply in probate proceedings.[24] In addition, the language
used in the will is part of the requisites under Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the
Court deems it proper to pass upon this issue.
Nevertheless, Caponong-Nobles contention must still fail. There is no statutory requirement to
state in the will itself that the testator knew the language or dialect used in the will.[25] This is a
matter that a party may establish by proof aliunde.[26] Caponong-Noble further argues that Alipio,
in his testimony, has failed, among others, to show that Abada knew or understood the contents
of the will and the Spanish language used in the will. However, Alipio testified that Abada used
to gather Spanish-speaking people in their place. In these gatherings, Abada and his companions
would talk in the Spanish language.[27] This sufficiently proves that Abada speaks the Spanish
language.
The Attestation Clause of Abadas Will
A scrutiny of Abadas will shows that it has an attestation clause. The attestation clause of Abadas
will reads:
Suscrito y declarado por el testador Alipio Abada como su ultima voluntad y testamento en
presencia de nosotros, habiendo tambien el testador firmado en nuestra presencia en el margen
izquierdo de todas y cada una de las hojas del mismo. Y en testimonio de ello, cada uno de
nosotros lo firmamos en presencia de nosotros y del testador al pie de este documento y en el
margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las dos hojas de que esta compuesto el mismo, las
cuales estan paginadas correlativamente con las letras UNO y DOS en la parte superior de la
carrilla.[28]
Caponong-Noble proceeds to point out several defects in the attestation clause. Caponong-Noble
alleges that the attestation clause fails to state the number of pages on which the will is written.

The allegation has no merit. The phrase en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las dos
hojas de que esta compuesto el mismo which means in the left margin of each and every one of
the two pages consisting of the same shows that the will consists of two pages. The pages are
numbered correlatively with the letters ONE and TWO as can be gleaned from the phrase las
cuales estan paginadas correlativamente con las letras UNO y DOS.
Caponong-Noble further alleges that the attestation clause fails to state expressly that the testator
signed the will and its every page in the presence of three witnesses. She then faults the Court of
Appeals for applying to the present case the rule on substantial compliance found in Article 809
of the New Civil Code.[29]
The first sentence of the attestation clause reads: Suscrito y declarado por el testador Alipio
Abada como su ultima voluntad y testamento en presencia de nosotros, habiendo tambien el
testador firmado en nuestra presencia en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las hojas
del mismo. The English translation is: Subscribed and professed by the testator Alipio Abada as
his last will and testament in our presence, the testator having also signed it in our presence on
the left margin of each and every one of the pages of the same. The attestation clause clearly
states that Abada signed the will and its every page in the presence of the witnesses.
However, Caponong-Noble is correct in saying that the attestation clause does not indicate the
number of witnesses. On this point, the Court agrees with the appellate court in applying the rule
on substantial compliance in determining the number of witnesses. While the attestation clause
does not state the number of witnesses, a close inspection of the will shows that three witnesses
signed it.
This Court has applied the rule on substantial compliance even before the effectivity of the New
Civil Code. In Dichoso de Ticson v. De Gorostiza,[30] the Court recognized that there are two
divergent tendencies in the law on wills, one being based on strict construction and the other on
liberal construction. In Dichoso, the Court noted that Abangan v. Abangan,[31] the basic case on
the liberal construction, is cited with approval in later decisions of the Court.
In Adeva vda. De Leynez v. Leynez,[32] the petitioner, arguing for liberal construction of
applicable laws, enumerated a long line of cases to support her argument while the respondent,
contending that the rule on strict construction should apply, also cited a long series of cases to
support his view. The Court, after examining the cases invoked by the parties, held:
x x x It is, of course, not possible to lay down a general rule, rigid and inflexible, which would be
applicable to all cases. More than anything else, the facts and circumstances of record are to be
considered in the application of any given rule. If the surrounding circumstances point to a
regular execution of the will, and the instrument appears to have been executed substantially in
accordance with the requirements of the law, the inclination should, in the absence of any
suggestion of bad faith, forgery or fraud, lean towards its admission to probate, although the
document may suffer from some imperfection of language, or other non-essential defect. x x x.
An attestation clause is made for the purpose of preserving, in permanent form, a record of the
facts attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the

subscribing witnesses, or other casualty, they may still be proved. (Thompson on Wills, 2d ed.,
sec. 132.) A will, therefore, should not be rejected where its attestation clause serves the purpose
of the law. x x x [33]
We rule to apply the liberal construction in the probate of Abadas will. Abadas will clearly shows
four signatures: that of Abada and of three other persons. It is reasonable to conclude that there
are three witnesses to the will. The question on the number of the witnesses is answered by an
examination of the will itself and without the need for presentation of evidence aliunde. The
Court explained the extent and limits of the rule on liberal construction, thus:
[T]he so-called liberal rule does not offer any puzzle or difficulty, nor does it open the door to
serious consequences. The later decisions do tell us when and where to stop; they draw the
dividing line with precision. They do not allow evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of
the document or supply missing details that should appear in the will itself. They only
permit a probe into the will, an exploration within its confines, to ascertain its meaning or
to determine the existence or absence of the requisite formalities of law. This clear, sharp
limitation eliminates uncertainty and ought to banish any fear of dire results.[34] (Emphasis
supplied)
The phrase en presencia de nosotros or in our presence coupled with the signatures appearing on
the will itself and after the attestation clause could only mean that: (1) Abada subscribed to and
professed before the three witnesses that the document was his last will, and (2) Abada signed
the will and the left margin of each page of the will in the presence of these three witnesses.
Finally, Caponong-Noble alleges that the attestation clause does not expressly state the
circumstances that the witnesses witnessed and signed the will and all its pages in the presence
of the testator and of each other. This Court has ruled:
Precision of language in the drafting of an attestation clause is desirable. However, it is not
imperative that a parrot-like copy of the words of the statute be made. It is sufficient if from the
language employed it can reasonably be deduced that the attestation clause fulfills what the law
expects of it.[35]
The last part of the attestation clause states en testimonio de ello, cada uno de nosotros lo
firmamos en presencia de nosotros y del testador. In English, this means in its witness, every one
of us also signed in our presence and of the testator. This clearly shows that the attesting
witnesses witnessed the signing of the will of the testator, and that each witness signed the will in
the presence of one another and of the testator.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals of 12 January 2001 in CAG.R. CV No. 47644.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 149926. February 23, 2005]
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EDMUND SANTIBAEZ and
FLORENCE SANTIBAEZ ARIOLA, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
which seeks the reversal of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated May 30, 2001 in CAG.R. CV No. 48831 affirming the dismissal[2] of the petitioners complaint in Civil Case No.
18909 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibaez
entered into a loan agreement[3] in the amount of P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the
payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor.
In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC,
the principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations of P43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981
and every May 31st thereafter up to May 31, 1985.
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement,[4] this time
in the amount of P123,156.00. It was intended to pay the balance of the purchase price of another
unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit
Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory
note for the said amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such promissory note, they also
signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement[5] for the loan dated December 13, 1980.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will.[6] Subsequently in March
1981, testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 7, docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 2706. On April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as
the special administrator of the estate of the decedent.[7] During the pendency of the testate
proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence Santibaez Ariola, executed a
Joint Agreement[8] dated July 22, 1981, wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and
take possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor
for Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC,
corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them.
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities[9] was executed by
and between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor,
among others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.

Demand letters[10] for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner Union Bank of the
Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay. Thus, on
February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a Complaint[11] for sum of money against the heirs of
Efraim Santibaez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 150, docketed
as Civil Case No. 18909. Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund
was not served since he was in the United States and there was no information on his address or
the date of his return to the Philippines.[12] Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to
respondent Florence S. Ariola.
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her Answer[13] and alleged that the
loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint
agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was
null and void; hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under the joint agreement.
On January 29, 1990, the case was unloaded and re-raffled to the RTC of Makati City, Branch
63.[14] Consequently, trial on the merits ensued and a decision was subsequently rendered by the
court dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of merit.[15]
The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed with the probate court
before which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibaez was pending, as the sum of money
being claimed was an obligation incurred by the said decedent. The trial court also found that the
Joint Agreement apparently executed by his heirs, Edmund and Florence, on July 22, 1981, was,
in effect, a partition of the estate of the decedent. However, the said agreement was void,
considering that it had not been approved by the probate court, and that there can be no valid
partition until after the will has been probated. The trial court further declared that petitioner
failed to prove that it was the now defunct Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the
FCCC had assigned its assets and liabilities. The court also agreed to the contention of
respondent Florence S. Ariola that the list of assets and liabilities of the FCCC assigned to Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank did not clearly refer to the decedents account. Ruling that the joint
agreement executed by the heirs was null and void, the trial court held that the petitioners cause
of action against respondent Florence S. Ariola must necessarily fail.
The petitioner appealed from the RTC decision and elevated its case to the Court of Appeals
(CA), assigning the following as errors of the trial court:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT (EXHIBIT
A) SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID
PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD WAIVED
HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING.[16]

The petitioner asserted before the CA that the obligation of the deceased had passed to his
legitimate children and heirs, in this case, Edmund and Florence; the unconditional signing of the
joint agreement marked as Exhibit A estopped respondent Florence S. Ariola, and that she cannot
deny her liability under the said document; as the agreement had been signed by both heirs in
their personal capacity, it was no longer necessary to present the same before the probate court
for approval; the property partitioned in the agreement was not one of those enumerated in the
holographic will made by the deceased; and the active participation of the heirs, particularly
respondent Florence S. Ariola, in the present ordinary civil action was tantamount to a waiver to
re-litigate the claim in the estate proceedings.
On the other hand, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintained that the money claim of the
petitioner should have been presented before the probate court.[17]
The appellate court found that the appeal was not meritorious and held that the petitioner should
have filed its claim with the probate court as provided under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court. It further held that the partition made in the agreement was null and void, since
no valid partition may be had until after the will has been probated. According to the CA, page 2,
paragraph (e) of the holographic will covered the subject properties (tractors) in generic terms
when the deceased referred to them as all other properties. Moreover, the active participation of
respondent Florence S. Ariola in the case did not amount to a waiver. Thus, the CA affirmed the
RTC decision, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 63, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[18]
In the present recourse, the petitioner ascribes the following errors to the CA:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT
AGREEMENT SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID
PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS OF THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ UNTIL AFTER
THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD
WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE
PROCEEDING.

IV.
RESPONDENTS CAN, IN FACT, BE HELD JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH
THE PRINCIPAL DEBTOR THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ ON THE STRENGTH OF
THE CONTINUING GUARANTY AGREEMENT EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF PETITIONERAPPELLANT UNION BANK.
V.
THE PROMISSORY NOTES DATED MAY 31, 1980 IN THE SUM OF P128,000.00 AND
DECEMBER 13, 1980 IN THE AMOUNT OF P123,000.00 CATEGORICALLY
ESTABLISHED THE FACT THAT THE RESPONDENTS BOUND THEMSELVES JOINTLY
AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE LATE DEBTOR EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ IN FAVOR
OF PETITIONER UNION BANK.[19]
The petitioner claims that the obligations of the deceased were transmitted to the heirs as
provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; there was thus no need for the probate court to
approve the joint agreement where the heirs partitioned the tractors owned by the deceased and
assumed the obligations related thereto. Since respondent Florence S. Ariola signed the joint
agreement without any condition, she is now estopped from asserting any position contrary
thereto. The petitioner also points out that the holographic will of the deceased did not include
nor mention any of the tractors subject of the complaint, and, as such was beyond the ambit of
the said will. The active participation and resistance of respondent Florence S. Ariola in the
ordinary civil action against the petitioners claim amounts to a waiver of the right to have the
claim presented in the probate proceedings, and to allow any one of the heirs who executed the
joint agreement to escape liability to pay the value of the tractors under consideration would be
equivalent to allowing the said heirs to enrich themselves to the damage and prejudice of the
petitioner.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the decisions of both the trial and appellate courts failed to
consider the fact that respondent Florence S. Ariola and her brother Edmund executed loan
documents, all establishing the vinculum juris or the legal bond between the late Efraim
Santibaez and his heirs to be in the nature of a solidary obligation. Furthermore, the Promissory
Notes dated May 31, 1980 and December 13, 1980 executed by the late Efraim Santibaez,
together with his heirs, Edmund and respondent Florence, made the obligation solidary as far as
the said heirs are concerned. The petitioner also proffers that, considering the express provisions
of the continuing guaranty agreement and the promissory notes executed by the named
respondents, the latter must be held liable jointly and severally liable thereon. Thus, there was no
need for the petitioner to file its money claim before the probate court. Finally, the petitioner
stresses that both surviving heirs are being sued in their respective personal capacities, not as
heirs of the deceased.
In her comment to the petition, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintains that the petitioner is
trying to recover a sum of money from the deceased Efraim Santibaez; thus the claim should
have been filed with the probate court. She points out that at the time of the execution of the joint
agreement there was already an existing probate proceedings of which the petitioner knew about.

However, to avoid a claim in the probate court which might delay payment of the obligation, the
petitioner opted to require them to execute the said agreement.
According to the respondent, the trial court and the CA did not err in declaring that the
agreement was null and void. She asserts that even if the agreement was voluntarily executed by
her and her brother Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the approval of the court as it
may prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties. Furthermore, she had not waived any rights, as
she even stated in her answer in the court a quo that the claim should be filed with the probate
court. Thus, the petitioner could not invoke or claim that she is in estoppel.
Respondent Florence S. Ariola further asserts that she had not signed any continuing guaranty
agreement, nor was there any document presented as evidence to show that she had caused
herself to be bound by the obligation of her late father.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether or not the partition in the
Agreement executed by the heirs is valid; b) whether or not the heirs assumption of the
indebtedness of the deceased is valid; and c) whether the petitioner can hold the heirs liable on
the obligation of the deceased.
At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the
properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered.[20] The said court is primarily concerned with
the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.[21]
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the
will has been probated:
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is
probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his
property by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other
question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those
requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will.[22]
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties
embraced in the will.[23] In the present case, the deceased, Efraim Santibaez, left a holographic
will[24] which contained, inter alia, the provision which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my
demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph
in favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.
We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision
embracing all the properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his mind at that time

he was making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the
three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs
is not valid. The joint agreement[25] executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors
among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a
pending proceeding for the probate of their late fathers holographic will covering the said
tractors.
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction over all the
properties of the deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them in any way
without the probate courts approval is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the
Court cannot allow.[26] Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and
legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an
exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.[27] Thus, in executing any joint agreement
which appears to be in the nature of an extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court
approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part
of the estate. Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to determine the identity
of the heirs of the decedent.[28] In the instant case, there is no showing that the signatories in the
joint agreement were the only heirs of the decedent. When it was executed, the probate of the
will was still pending before the court and the latter had yet to determine who the heirs of the
decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and respondent Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto
themselves the three (3) tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to the other possible heirs
and creditors who may have a valid claim against the estate of the deceased.
The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs assumption of the indebtedness of the
decedent is binding. We rule in the negative. Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the
heirs as parties thereto have agreed to divide between themselves and take possession and use
the above-described chattel and each of them to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the
chattel taken as herein after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp.[29] The
assumption of liability was conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir
shall take possession and use of their respective share under the agreement. It was made
dependent on the validity of the partition, and that they were to assume the indebtedness
corresponding to the chattel that they were each to receive. The partition being invalid as earlier
discussed, the heirs in effect did not receive any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption
of liability cannot be given any force and effect.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The petitioner, purportedly a
creditor of the late Efraim Santibaez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate
court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed barred; exceptions. All claims
for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be
due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses for the last sickness of the decedent,
and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice;
otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any
action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or
administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased

in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead
of presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set
off against each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant,
the amount so determined shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as though the
claim had been presented directly before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not
yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their present value.
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is mandatory.[30]
As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:[31]
This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the
executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and
to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design
of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the
property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly requires the prompt presentation
and disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the
estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.[32]
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private respondent Florence S. Ariola
accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence presented,
particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and
signed only by the late Efraim Santibaez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its
money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the
decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of course, subject to any
defenses Edmund may have as against the petitioner. As the court had not acquired jurisdiction
over the person of Edmund, we find it unnecessary to delve into the matter further.
We agree with the finding of the trial court that the petitioner had not sufficiently shown that it is
the successor-in-interest of the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC assigned
its assets and liabilities.[33] The petitioner in its complaint alleged that by virtue of the Deed of
Assignment dated August 20, 1981 executed by and between First Countryside Credit
Corporation and Union Bank of the Philippines[34] However, the documentary evidence[35]
clearly reflects that the parties in the deed of assignment with assumption of liabilities were the
FCCC, and the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, with the conformity of Bancom Philippine
Holdings, Inc. Nowhere can the petitioners participation therein as a party be found.
Furthermore, no documentary or testimonial evidence was presented during trial to show that
Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now, in fact, petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines. As
the trial court declared in its decision:
[T]he court also finds merit to the contention of defendant that plaintiff failed to prove or did not
present evidence to prove that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now the Union Bank of the
Philippines. Judicial notice does not apply here. The power to take judicial notice is to [be]
exercised by the courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and
every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative. (Republic
vs. Court of Appeals, 107 SCRA 504).[36]

This being the case, the petitioners personality to file the complaint is wanting. Consequently, it
failed to establish its cause of action. Thus, the trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint,
and the CA in affirming the same.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Court
of Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
----------

THIRD DIVISION

LETICIA VALMONTE ORTEGA, G.R. No. 157451

Petitioner,
Present:
Panganiban, J.,
Chairman,
- versus - Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Corona,
Carpio Morales, and Garcia, JJ
JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, Promulgated:

Respondent.
December 16, 2005
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

T
he law favors the probate of a will. Upon those who oppose it rests the burden of showing why it
should not be allowed. In the present case, petitioner has failed to discharge this burden
satisfactorily. For this reason, the Court cannot attribute any reversible error on the part of the
appellate tribunal that allowed the probate of the will.

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review [1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to reverse and set aside the December 12, 2002 Decision [2] and the March 7, 2003
Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 44296. The assailed Decision
disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED, and the Decision

appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In its place judgment
is rendered approving and allowing probate to the said last will and
testament of Placido Valmonte and ordering the issuance of letters
testamentary to the petitioner Josefina Valmonte. Let this case be
remanded to the court a quo for further and concomitant
proceedings.[4]

The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The facts were summarized in the assailed Decision of the CA, as follows:

x x x: Like so many others before him, Placido toiled and lived

for a long time in the United States until he finally reached
retirement. In 1980, Placido finally came home to stay in the
Philippines, and he lived in the house and lot located at #9200
Catmon St., San Antonio Village, Makati, which he owned in
common with his sister Ciriaca Valmonte and titled in their names in
TCT 123468. Two years after his arrival from the United States and
at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old, in a
ceremony solemnized by Judge Perfecto Laguio, Jr. on February 5,
1982. But in a little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido
died on October 8, 1984 of a cause written down as COR
PULMONALE.
Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in
English and consisting of two (2) pages, and dated June 15, 1983
but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The first page contains
the entire testamentary dispositions and a part of the attestation
clause, and was signed at the end or bottom of that page by the
testator and on the left hand margin by the three instrumental
witnesses. The second page contains the continuation of the
attestation clause and the acknowledgment, and was signed by the
witnesses at the end of the attestation clause and again on the left
hand margin. It provides in the body that:
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF PLACIDO
VALMONTE IN THE NAME OF THE LORD AMEN:
I, PLACIDO VALMONTE, of legal age, married to
Josefina Cabansag Valmonte, and a resident of 9200
Catmon Street, Makati, Metro Manila, 83 years of age and
being of sound and disposing mind and memory, do hereby
declare this to be my last will and testament:
1. It is my will that I be buried in the Catholic
Cemetery, under the auspices of the Catholic Church in
accordance with the rites and said Church and that a
suitable monument to be erected and provided my by
executrix (wife) to perpetuate my memory in the minds of my
family and friends;
2. I give, devise and bequeath unto my loving wife,
JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, one half (1/2) portion of the
follow-described properties, which belongs to me as [coowner]:

a.

Lot 4-A, Block 13 described on plan Psd-28575,

LRC, (GLRO), situated in Makati, Metro Manila,
described and covered by TCT No. 123468 of the
Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro-Manila
registered jointly as co-owners with my deceased
sister (Ciriaca Valmonte), having share and share
alike;

b. 2-storey building standing on the above-described

property, made of strong and mixed materials used
as my residence and my wife and located at No.
9200 Catmon Street, Makati, Metro Manila also
covered by Tax Declaration No. A-025-00482,
Makati, Metro-Manila, jointly in the name of my
deceased sister, Ciriaca Valmonte and myself as
co-owners, share and share alike or equal coowners thereof;
3. All the rest, residue and remainder of my real and
personal properties, including my savings account bank
book in USA which is in the possession of my nephew, and
all others whatsoever and wherever found, I give, devise and
bequeath to my said wife, Josefina C. Valmonte;
4. I hereby appoint my wife, Josefina C. Valmonte as
sole executrix of my last will and testament, and it is my will
that said executrix be exempt from filing a bond;
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my
hand this 15th day of June 1983 in Quezon City, Philippines.

The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia

on the grounds that:
1.

Petitioner failed to allege all assets of the

testator, especially those found in the USA;

2.

Petitioner failed to state the names, ages, and

residences of the heirs of the testator; or to give them
proper notice pursuant to law;

3.

Will was not executed and attested as required by law

and legal solemnities and formalities were not complied
with;

4.

Testator was mentally incapable to make a will at the

time of the alleged execution he being in an advance
sate of senility;

5. Will was executed under duress, or the influence of fear

or threats;

6. Will was procured by undue and improper influence and

pressure on the part of the petitioner and/or her agents
and/or assistants; and/or

7. Signature of testator was procured by fraud, or trick, and

he did not intend that the instrument should be his will at
the time of affixing his signature thereto;

and she also opposed the appointment as Executrix of Josefina

alleging her want of understanding and integrity.
At the hearing, the petitioner Josefina testified and called as
witnesses the notary public Atty. Floro Sarmiento who prepared and
notarized the will, and the instrumental witnesses spouses Eugenio
Gomez, Jr. and Feliza Gomez and Josie Collado. For the opposition,
the oppositor Leticia and her daughter Mary Jane Ortega testified.
According to Josefina after her marriage with the testator they
lived in her parents house at Salingcob, Bacnotan, La Union but they
came to Manila every month to get his $366.00 monthly pension and
stayed at the said Makati residence. There were times though when
to shave off on expenses, the testator would travel alone. And it was
in one of his travels by his lonesome self when the notarial will was
made. The will was witnessed by the spouses Eugenio and Feliza
Gomez, who were their wedding sponsors, and by Josie Collado.
Josefina said she had no knowledge of the existence of the last will
and testament of her husband, but just serendipitously found it in his

attache case after his death. It was only then that she learned that
the testator bequeathed to her his properties and she was named
the executrix in the said will. To her estimate, the value of property
both real and personal left by the testator is worth more or less
P100,000.00. Josefina declared too that the testator never suffered
mental infirmity because despite his old age he went alone to the
market which is two to three kilometers from their home cooked and
cleaned the kitchen and sometimes if she could not accompany him,
even traveled to Manila alone to claim his monthly pension. Josefina
also asserts that her husband was in good health and that he was
hospitalized only because of a cold but which eventually resulted in
his death.
Notary Public Floro Sarmiento, the notary public who
notarized the testators will, testified that it was in the first week of
June 1983 when the testator together with the three witnesses of the
will went to his house cum law office and requested him to prepare
his last will and testament. After the testator instructed him on the
terms and dispositions he wanted on the will, the notary public told
them to come back on June 15, 1983 to give him time to prepare it.
After he had prepared the will the notary public kept it safely hidden
and locked in his drawer. The testator and his witnesses returned on
the appointed date but the notary public was out of town so they
were instructed by his wife to come back on August 9, 1983, and
which they did. Before the testator and his witnesses signed the
prepared will, the notary public explained to them each and every
term thereof in Ilocano, a dialect which the testator spoke and
understood. He likewise explained that though it appears that the will
was signed by the testator and his witnesses on June 15, 1983, the
day when it should have been executed had he not gone out of
town, the formal execution was actually on August 9, 1983. He
reasoned that he no longer changed the typewritten date of June 15,
1983 because he did not like the document to appear dirty. The
notary public also testified that to his observation the testator was
physically and mentally capable at the time he affixed his signature
on the will.
The attesting witnesses to the will corroborated the testimony
of the notary public, and testified that the testator went alone to the
house of spouses Eugenio and Feliza Gomez at GSIS Village,
Quezon City and requested them to accompany him to the house of
Atty. Floro Sarmiento purposely for his intended will; that after giving
his instructions to Atty. Floro Sarmiento, they were told to return on

June 15, 1983; that they returned on June 15, 1983 for the execution
of the will but were asked to come back instead on August 9, 1983
because of the absence of the notary public; that the testator
executed the will in question in their presence while he was of sound
and disposing mind and that he was strong and in good health; that
the contents of the will was explained by the notary public in the
Ilocano and Tagalog dialect and that all of them as witnesses
attested and signed the will in the presence of the testator and of
each other. And that during the execution, the testators wife,
Josefina was not with them.
The oppositor Leticia declared that Josefina should not inherit
alone because aside from her there are other children from the
siblings of Placido who are just as entitled to inherit from him. She
attacked the mental capacity of the testator, declaring that at the
time of the execution of the notarial will the testator was already 83
years old and was no longer of sound mind. She knew whereof she
spoke because in 1983 Placido lived in the Makati residence and
asked Leticias family to live with him and they took care of him.
During that time, the testators physical and mental condition showed
deterioration, aberrations and senility. This was corroborated by her
daughter Mary Jane Ortega for whom Placido took a fancy and
wanted to marry.
Sifting through the evidence, the court a quo held that [t]he
evidence adduced, reduces the opposition to two grounds, namely:
1. Non-compliance with the legal solemnities and formalities
in the execution and attestation of the will; and
2.

Mental incapacity of the testator at the time of the

execution of the will as he was then in an advanced state
of senility

It then found these grounds extant and proven, and accordingly

disallowed probate.[5]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Reversing the trial court, the appellate court admitted the will of Placido Valmonte to probate.
The CA upheld the credibility of the notary public and the subscribing witnesses who had
acknowledged the due execution of the will. Moreover, it held that the testator had testamentary
capacity at the time of the execution of the will. It added that his sexual exhibitionism and
unhygienic, crude and impolite ways[6] did not make him a person of unsound mind.

Hence, this Petition.[7]

Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:

I.
Whether or not the findings of the probate court are entitled to great
respect.
II.
Whether or not the signature of Placido Valmonte in the subject will
was procured by fraud or trickery, and that Placido Valmonte never
intended that the instrument should be his last will and testament.

III.
Whether or not Placido Valmonte has testamentary capacity at the
time he allegedly executed the subject will.[8]

In short, petitioner assails the CAs allowance of the probate of the will of Placido
Valmonte.

This Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Main Issue:
Probate of a Will

At the outset, we stress that only questions of law may be raised in a Petition for Review
under Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As an exception, however, the evidence
presented during the trial may be examined and the factual matters resolved by this Court when,
as in the instant case, the findings of fact of the appellate court differ from those of the trial court.

[9]
The fact that public policy favors the probate of a will does not necessarily mean that
every will presented for probate should be allowed. The law lays down the procedures and
requisites that must be satisfied for the probate of a will. [10] Verily, Article 839 of the Civil
Code states the instances when a will may be disallowed, as follows:

Article 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following

cases:
(1)

If the formalities required by law have not been complied

with;
(2)
If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally
incapable of making a will, at the time of its execution;

(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the

influence of fear, or threats;

(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and

influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person;

(5)

If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;

(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the
instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing his
signature thereto.

In the present case, petitioner assails the validity of Placido Valmontes will by imputing fraud in
its execution and challenging the testators state of mind at the time.

Existence of Fraud in the

Execution of a Will

Petitioner does not dispute the due observance of the formalities in the execution of the will, but
maintains that the circumstances surrounding it are indicative of the existence of fraud.
Particularly, she alleges that respondent, who is the testators wife and sole beneficiary, conspired
with the notary public and the three attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception
is allegedly reflected in the varying dates of the execution and the attestation of the will.

Petitioner contends that it was highly dubious for a woman at the prime of her young life
[to] almost immediately plunge into marriage with a man who [was] thrice her age x x x and who
happened to be [a] Fil-American pensionado, [11] thus casting doubt on the intention of
respondent in seeking the probate of the will. Moreover, it supposedly defies human reason, logic
and common experience[12] for an old man with a severe psychological condition to have
willingly signed a last will and testament.

We are not convinced. Fraud is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretense, by which the
subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to
the nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact,
in consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which,
but for the fraud, he would not have made.[13]

We stress that the party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of
fraud at the time of its execution. [14] The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of
the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud. [15] Unfortunately in this case,
other than the self-serving allegations of petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever presented.

It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution
of a will.[16] That the testator was tricked into signing it was not sufficiently established by the
fact that he had instituted his wife, who was more than fifty years his junior, as the sole
beneficiary; and disregarded petitioner and her family, who were the ones who had taken the
cudgels of taking care of [the testator] in his twilight years.[17]

Moreover, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict between the dates
appearing on the will does not invalidate the document, because the law does not even require
that a [notarial] will x x x be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion. [18] More
important, the will must be subscribed by the testator, as well as by three or more credible
witnesses who must also attest to it in the presence of the testator and of one another. [19]
Furthermore, the testator and the witnesses must acknowledge the will before a notary public.

[20] In any event, we agree with the CA that the variance in the dates of the will as to its
supposed execution and attestation was satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary
public and the instrumental witnesses.[21]

The pertinent transcript of stenographic notes taken on June 11, 1985, November 25,
1985, October 13, 1986, and October 21, 1987 -- as quoted by the CA -- are reproduced
respectively as follows:

Atty. Floro Sarmiento:

Q You typed this document exhibit C, specifying the date June 15
when the testator and his witnesses were supposed to be in
your office?
A Yes sir.
Q On June 15, 1983, did the testator and his witnesses come to your
house?
A They did as of agreement but unfortunately, I was out of town.
xxxxxxxxx
Q The document has been acknowledged on August 9, 1983 as per
acknowledgement appearing therein. Was this the actual date
when the document was acknowledged?
A Yes sir.
Q What about the date when the testator and the three witnesses
affixed their respective signature on the first and second
pages of exhibit C?
A On that particular date when it was acknowledged, August 9,
1983.

Q Why did you not make the necessary correction on the date
appearing on the body of the document as well as the
attestation clause?
A Because I do not like anymore to make some alterations so I put it
in my own handwriting August 9, 1983 on the
acknowledgement. (tsn, June 11, 1985, pp. 8-10)
Eugenio Gomez:
Q It appears on the first page Mr. Witness that it is dated June 15,
1983, whereas in the acknowledgement it is dated August 9,
1983, will you look at this document and tell us this
discrepancy in the date?
A We went to Atty. Sarmiento together with Placido Valmonte and
the two witnesses; that was first week of June and Atty.
Sarmiento told us to return on the 15th of June but when we
returned, Atty. Sarmiento was not there.
Q When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento on June 15, 1983, did you
again go back?
A We returned on the 9th of August and there we signed.
Q This August 9, 1983 where you said it is there where you signed,
who were your companions?
A The two witnesses, me and Placido Valmonte. (tsn, November 25,
1985, pp. 7-8)
Felisa Gomez on cross-examination:
Q Why did you have to go to the office of Atty. Floro Sarmiento, three
times?
xxxxxxxxx
A The reason why we went there three times is that, the first week of
June was out first time. We went there to talk to Atty.
Sarmiento and Placido Valmonte about the last will and
testament. After that what they have talked what will be placed
in the testament, what Atty. Sarmiento said was that he will go
back on the 15th of June. When we returned on June 15, Atty.
Sarmiento was not there so we were not able to sign it, the
will. That is why, for the third time we went there on August 9

and that was the time we affixed our signature. (tsn, October
13, 1986, pp. 4-6)
Josie Collado:
Q When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento in his house on June 15,
1983, what transpired?
A The wife of Atty. Sarmiento told us that we will be back on August
9, 1983.
Q And on August 9, 1983 did you go back to the house of Atty.
Sarmiento?
A Yes, Sir.
Q For what purpose?
A Our purpose is just to sign the will.
Q Were you able to sign the will you mentioned?
A Yes sir. (tsn, October 21, 1987, pp. 4-5)[22]
Notably, petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of a grand conspiracy in the
commission of a fraud. There was no showing that the witnesses of the proponent stood to
receive any benefit from the allowance of the will. The testimonies of the three subscribing
witnesses and the notary are credible evidence of its due execution. [23] Their testimony
favoring it and the finding that it was executed in accordance with the formalities required by
law should be affirmed, absent any showing of ill motives.[24]

Capacity to Make a Will

In determining the capacity of the testator to make a will, the Civil Code gives the following
guidelines:

Article 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the

testator be of sound mind at the time of its execution.
Article 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the
testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his
mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or shattered by disease,
injury or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of
making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of,
the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the
testamentary act.
Article 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound
mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.
The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at
the time of making his dispositions is on the person who opposes
the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before
making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who
maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it
during a lucid interval.

According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know
to be considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2)
the proper objects of the testators bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act. Applying
this test to the present case, we find that the appellate court was correct in holding that Placido
had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of his will.

It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the
kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their locations. As regards
the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary.
As we have stated earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal
validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes
irrelevant.
Worth reiterating in determining soundness of mind is Alsua-Betts v. CA,[25] which
held thus:

"Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and

memory which unquestionably carries with it full testamentary
capacity, and that degrees of mental aberration generally known as
insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity
or incapacity and while on one hand it has been held that mere
weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from
age, will not render a person incapable of making a will; a weak or
feebleminded person may make a valid will, provided he has
understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know what he
is about to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his property. To
constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the
mind be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by disease or
otherwise. It has been held that testamentary incapacity does not
necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of
unsound mind."[26]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 155733

January 27, 2006

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA

DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA
and other HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF CONCHA VDA. DE
AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO VDA. DE DANAO, ANGELA DELGADO
ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO PERLAS, CAROLINA DELGADOARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO DELGADO, BENJAMIN DELGADO, GLICERIA
DELGADO and CLEOFAS DELGADO; and HEIRS OF GORGONIO DELGADO,
namely, RAMON DELGADO CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO CAMPO, CLARITA
DELGADO CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA DELGADO
CAMPO-ENCINAS and MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-MADARANG, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, namely, GUILLERMO R.
DAMIAN and JOSE R. DAMIAN; HEIRS OF HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, namely,
TERESITA CRUZ-SISON, HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA
CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN RUSTIA, SR.,
namely, JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIA RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN
RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO RUSTIA, FRANCISCO RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA;
and GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as Oppositors;1 and GUILLERMA RUSTIA, as
Intervenor,2 Respondents.3
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55,4 in SP Case No. 97668, which was
reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals in its decision5 dated October 24, 2002.
FACTS OF THE CASE
This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado.6 The main issue in this case is relatively simple: who, between petitioners and

respondents, are the lawful heirs of the decedents. However, it is attended by several collateral
issues that complicate its resolution.
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided into two
groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings,
nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo
Rustia, particularly, his sisters,7 his nephews and nieces,8 his illegitimate child,9 and the de facto
adopted child10 (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.
The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado
The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa11 Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside
from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose,
Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio
Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado.
However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgados life. Before him was
Ramon Osorio12 with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her relationship with
Lucio Campo which was admittedly one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status of
Ramon Osorios and Felisa Delgados union is in dispute.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to the
claimants because the answer will determine whether their successional rights fall within the
ambit of the rule against reciprocal intestate succession between legitimate and illegitimate
relatives.13 If Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been validly married, then their only child
Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded from
the latters intestate estate. He and his heirs would be barred by the principle of absolute
separation between the legitimate and illegitimate families. Conversely, if the couple were never
married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgados intestate
estate, as they would all be within the illegitimate line.
Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. In support thereof,
they assert that no evidence was ever presented to establish it, not even so much as an allegation
of the date or place of the alleged marriage. What is clear, however, is that Felisa retained the
surname Delgado. So did Luis, her son with Ramon Osorio. Later on, when Luis got married, his
Partida de Casamiento14 stated that he was "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of
Felisa Delgado),15 significantly omitting any mention of the name and other circumstances of his
father.16 Nevertheless, oppositors (now respondents) insist that the absence of a record of the
alleged marriage did not necessarily mean that no marriage ever took place.

Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived by Guillermo Rustia
and some collateral relatives, the petitioners herein. Several months later, on June 15, 1973,
Guillermo Rustia executed an affidavit of selfadjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado17 but whether a
marriage in fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually lived
together as husband and wife but were never married. To prove their assertion, petitioners point
out that no record of the contested marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal
certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as "Seorita" or
unmarried woman.
The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of a marriage
certificate did not of necessity mean that no marriage transpired. They maintain that Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived together as
husband and wife until the death of Josefa on September 8, 1972. During this period spanning
more than half a century, they were known among their relatives and friends to have in fact been
married. To support their proposition, oppositors presented the following pieces of evidence:
1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued to Mrs. Guillermo J.
Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to the United States of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines;
2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947;
3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability Resulting from
Service in the Active Military or Naval Forces of the United States- Claim No. C-4, 004,
503 (VA Form 526) filed with the Veterans Administration of the United States of
America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself [swore] to
his marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919;18
4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was married
to Josefa Delgado.
The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children of their own, they
took into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children,

never legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local dialect as ampunampunan.
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate
child,19 the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria. According to
Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as his daughter, his own flesh and blood, and she
enjoyed open and continuous possession of that status from her birth in 1920 until her fathers
demise. In fact, Josefa Delgados obituary which was prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named the
intervenor-respondent as one of their children. Also, her report card from the University of Santo
Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia as her parent/guardian.20
Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has no interest in the
intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate child.
They contend that her right to compulsory acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo died in
1974 and that she cannot claim voluntary acknowledgement since the documents she presented
were not the authentic writings prescribed by the new Civil Code.21
On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a
petition for the adoption22 of their ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia. He stated under oath
"[t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or natural children by
legal fiction."23 The petition was overtaken by his death on February 28, 1974.
Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by his sisters
Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by the children of his
predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso,
Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia Miranda.24
ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original
petition for letters of administration of the intestate estates of the "spouses Josefa Delgado and
Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of Manila, Branch 55.25 This petition was opposed by the
following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia, namely, Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and
Hortencia Rustia-Cruz;26 (2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustias late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and
(3) the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia. The opposition was grounded on the theory
that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the other claimants were barred under the law from
inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa Delgado.
In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings, claiming
she was the only surviving descendant in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia. Despite the
objections of the oppositors (respondents herein), the motion was granted.

On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was amended to state that
Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia were never married but had merely lived together as
husband and wife.
On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismiss the petition in the
RTC insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The motion was denied on the
ground that the interests of the petitioners and the other claimants remained in issue and should
be properly threshed out upon submission of evidence.
On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her sister, Luisa Delgado
vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987.
On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as administratrix of
both estates.27 The dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-claimants to the estate of the
late Josefa Delgado listed in the Petitions, and enumerated elsewhere in this Decision, are hereby
declared as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado who died intestate in the City of
Manila on September 8, 1972, and entitled to partition the same among themselves in accordance
with the proportions referred to in this Decision.
Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and only surviving
heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire estate of the said decedent, to
the exclusion of the oppositors and the other parties hereto.
The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado executed by the late
Guillermo J. Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared of no force and effect.
As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled, and their settlement [is]
considered consolidated in this proceeding in accordance with law, a single administrator
therefor is both proper and necessary, and, as the petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa
has established her right to the appointment as administratrix of the estates, the Court hereby
APPOINTS her as the ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate of the decedent JOSEFA
DELGADO in relation to the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.
Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue to the petitioner
CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of the requisite bond in the sum
of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease and desist from
her acts of administration of the subject estates, and is likewise ordered to turn over to the
appointed administratix all her collections of the rentals and income due on the assets of the

estates in question, including all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates
to the petitioner and appointed administratix CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA,
immediately upon receipt of this Decision. The same oppositor is hereby required to render an
accounting of her actual administration of the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60)
days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.28
On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground that the record on
appeal was not filed on time.29 They then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus30 which
was dismissed by the Court of Appeals.31 However, on motion for reconsideration and after
hearing the parties oral arguments, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and gave due course to
oppositors appeal in the interest of substantial justice.32
In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution of the Court of Appeals,
on the ground that oppositors failure to file the record on appeal within the reglementary period
was a jurisdictional defect which nullified the appeal. On October 10, 1997, this Court allowed
the continuance of the appeal. The pertinent portion of our decision33 read:
As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed. However, under exceptional
circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial
justice.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial courts pronouncements as to certain matters
of substance, relating to the determination of the heirs of the decedents and the party entitled to
the administration of their estate, which were to be raised in the appeal, but were barred
absolutely by the denial of the record on appeal upon too technical ground of late filing.
xxx xxx xxx
In this instance, private respondents intention to raise valid issues in the appeal is apparent and
should not have been construed as an attempt to delay or prolong the administration proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
A review of the trial courts decision is needed.
xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the
Resolution dated November 27, 1991 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for the
APPROVAL of the private respondents Record on Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the
appeal from the Manila, Branch LV Regional Trial Courts May 11, 1990 decision.
SO ORDERED.
Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals34 partially set aside the trial courts decision. Upon
motion for reconsideration,35 the Court of Appeals amended its earlier decision.36 The dispositive
portion of the amended decision read:
With the further modification, our assailed decision is RECONSIDERED and VACATED.
Consequently, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is
hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have
been legally married; 2.) the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas
and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to partition among themselves the
intestate estate of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion referred to in this decision;
3.) the oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia and thereby
entitled to partition his estate in accordance with the proportion referred to herein; and 4.) the
intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as ineligible to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo
Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as administratrix of his estate.
The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in relation to the
intestate estate of Josefa Delgado shall issue to the nominee of the oppositors-appellants upon his
or her qualification and filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her
acts of administration of the subject estates and to turn over to the appointed administrator all her
collections of the rentals and incomes due on the assets of the estates in question, including all
documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to the appointed administrator,
immediately upon notice of his qualification and posting of the requisite bond, and to render an
accounting of her (Guillermina Rustia Rustia) actual administration of the estates in controversy
within a period of sixty (60) days from notice of the administrators qualification and posting of
the bond.
The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Dr. Guillermo Rustia on
June 15, 1973 is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings to determine the extent
of the shares of Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected
by the said adjudication.

Hence, this recourse.

The issues for our resolution are:
1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado;
2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado are;
3. who should be issued letters of administration.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are
permitted to draw from proof of other facts. Presumptions are classified into presumptions of law
and presumptions of fact. Presumptions of law are, in turn, either conclusive or disputable.37
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage;
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed
between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot
be doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as husband
and wife was such that even the original petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa
Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to them as "spouses."
Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply lived together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They make much of the absence of a record of
the contested marriage, the testimony of a witness38 attesting that they were not married, and a
baptismal certificate which referred to Josefa Delgado as "Seorita" or unmarried woman.39
We are not persuaded.

First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence is
not always proof that no marriage in fact took place.40 Once the presumption of marriage arises,
other evidence may be presented in support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or
directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of
marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia,41
the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia,42 the declaration under oath of no less than
Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado43 and the titles to the properties in the
name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more than adequately support the
presumption of marriage. These are public documents which are prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein.44 No clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption
of the truth of the recitals therein was presented by petitioners.
Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners own witness whose testimony they primarily relied
upon to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa
Delgado and that eventually, the two had "lived together as husband and wife." This again could
not but strengthen the presumption of marriage.
Third, the baptismal certificate45 was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered by the
priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations and statements
contained therein,46 such as the alleged single or unmarried ("Seorita") civil status of Josefa
Delgado who had no hand in its preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.
In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons
dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual
order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they
would be living in constant violation of the common rules of law and propriety. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.47
The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado
To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status of the
cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first be addressed.
As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive
presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that no contrary proof, no
matter how strong, may overturn them.48 On the other hand, disputable presumptions, one of
which is the presumption of marriage, can be relied on only in the absence of sufficient evidence
to the contrary.

Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The
oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable presumption of marriage
even in the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and Luis (her
son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgados and Caridad
Concepcions Partida de Casamiento49 identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the
natural child of Felisa Delgado).50
All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption
of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born
to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and
his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all
surnamed Delgado,51 were her natural children.52
Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:
Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C; then X and Y would
be natural brothers and sisters, but of half-blood relationship. Can they succeed each other
reciprocally?
The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate children of
the same parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It seems that
to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from) another illegitimate child begotten
with a parent different from that of the former, would be allowing the illegitimate child greater
rights than a legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that
succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the
half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions between legitimate
and illegitimate families does not apply to the case under consideration. That prohibition has for
its basis the difference in category between illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no such
difference when all the children are illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten
with different persons. They all stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate
children of half-blood relation. We submit, therefore, that the rules regarding succession of
legitimate brothers and sisters should be applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and
sisters should receive double the portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and if all are either of
the full blood or of the half-blood, they shall share equally.53
Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis
Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from
each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.

We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews
and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of
representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and
sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and
grandnieces.54 Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to
partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive
at the time of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate in the
inheritance.55 The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine
who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of
her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia,56 they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in
accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:57
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the
latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children
to the other one-half.
Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have validly
adjudicated Josefas estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear.
Adjudication by an heir of the decedents entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is
allowed only if he is the sole heir to the estate:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If the decedent left no will
and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public
instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in
an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the
estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. x x x (emphasis
supplied)
The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia
Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child58 of Guillermo Rustia.
As such, she may be entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or
recognition of paternity.59 She, however, claimed the status of an acknowledged illegitimate child
of Guillermo Rustia only after the death of the latter on February 28, 1974 at which time it was
already the new Civil Code that was in effect.
Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate children
absolutely had no hereditary rights. This draconian edict was, however, later relaxed in the new

Civil Code which granted certain successional rights to illegitimate children but only on
condition that they were first recognized or acknowledged by the parent.
Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary.60 Recognition is compulsory in
any of the following cases:
(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides
more or less with that of the conception;
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father (or
mother)61 by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the
supposed father;
(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.
62

On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record or in any authentic writing.63
Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory recognition through
the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child and second, voluntary
recognition through authentic writing.
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from her
birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute
acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have compelled acknowledgment
through the courts.64 Furthermore, any (judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment has a
dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative parent.65 On the death of
either, the action for compulsory recognition can no longer be filed.66 In this case, intervenor
Guillermas right to claim compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo
Rustia on February 28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillermas second ground) must likewise fail. An authentic
writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing
of the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public instrument or a private
writing admitted by the father to be his.67 Did intervenors report card from the University of
Santo Tomas and Josefa Delgados obituary prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic
writings under the new Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card of intervenor Guillerma
did not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as
intervenors parent/guardian holds no weight since he had no participation in its preparation.

Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the notice
of death of Josefa Delgado which was published in the Sunday Times on September 10, 1972,
that published obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could have
been admitted as an authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in the
handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the
obituary. The failure to present the original signed manuscript was fatal to intervenors claim.
The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was never
adopted in accordance with law. Although a petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo
Rustia, it never came to fruition and was dismissed upon the latters death. We affirm the ruling
of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the deceased
spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato. We quote:
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created] between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption
made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules
of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely
artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out,
otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must
be affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming its existence.68
Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo Rustia, namely,
intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful
heirs of the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the
entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining
claimants, consisting of his sisters,69 nieces and nephews.70
Entitlement To Letters Of Administration
An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of the
decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference in the
appointment of an administrator:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the
will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of
kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to
request that the administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one
or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of
the one to be appointed.71 The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of coadministrators, specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of
the estates,72 a situation which obtains here.
It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota Delgado
vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the
next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the RTC
Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
1. Guillermo Rustias June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is hereby
ANNULLED.
2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa
Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa
Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgados full- or halfsiblings who may have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her death. Josefa
Delgados grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In this
connection, the trial court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of
Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate.
3. Guillermo Rustias estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgados estate) shall
be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose
respective shares shall be per capita) and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who
survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall be per stirpes). Considering
that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their
respective shares shall pertain to their estates.

4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia
and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a nominee
from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their
qualification and filing of the requisite bond in such amount as may be determined by the
trial court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

SPOUSES ILUMINADA CAPITLE and

CIRILO CAPITLE,

G.R. No. 169193

Petitioners,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,

- versus -

TINGA, and
FORTUNATA ELBAMBUENA

VELASCO, JR., JJ.

and ROSALINDA C. OLAR,

Respondents.
Promulgated:
November 30, 2006
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The parcel of agricultural land subject of the present controversy contains

1.8144 hectares, identified as Lot 1849 (the lot), and situated in Barangay Valle,
Talavera, Nueva Ecija.

A Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) was issued to Cristobal

Olar (Olar) covering the lot on account of which he was issued Transfer Certificate
of Title No. CLOA-0-3514.

Respondents Fortunata Elbambuena (Fortunata) and Rosalinda Olar

(Rosalinda), spouse and daughter-in-law, respectively, of Olar, now deceased,
claim that Olar relinquished one-half or 0.9072 hectare of the lot to Rosalinda by a
Kasunduan1[1] dated July 17, 1992 the execution of which was witnessed by
petitioner Cirilo Capitle; and that the remaining portion of the lot was surrendered
to Fortunata by an undated document.2[2]

1
2

Respondents, alleged that on petitioners request, petitioners were allowed to

occupy the lot to pursue a means of livelihood. Since 1990, however, petitioners
did not pay rentals despite demand therefor, and neither did they heed the demand
to return the possession of the lot, drawing respondents to file a Petition for
Recovery of Possession and Payment of Back Rentals3[3] against petitioners before
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Regional
Office in Talavera, Nueva Ecija, docketed as DARAB Case No. 5987NNE96.

Petitioners, on the other hand, claiming that they have been in possession of
the lot since 1960, presented a Waiver of Rights 4[4] executed by Olar wherein he
renounced in their favor his rights and participation over the lot; a Sinumpaang
Salaysay5[5] wherein Olar acknowledged that he co-possessed the lot with
petitioner Capitle since 1960; and a Pinagsamang Patunay6[6] from the Barangay
Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) Chairman and barangay chairman of Valle
certifying that they (petitioners) are the actual tillers and possessors of the lot.

Petitioners further claim that since 1959, respondent Fortunata was already
separated from Olar and she even remarried, thus giving her no right to inherit
from Olar.
3
4
5
6

While respondents petition in DARAB Case No. 5987'NNE'96 was pending before
the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), petitioners filed before the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Talavera, Nueva Ecija a petition
for cancellation of the CLOA issued to Olar, docketed as DARAB Case No.
6261'NNE'97, claiming that they are the new farmer-beneficiaries as shown by,
among other things, the Waiver of Rights executed by Olar.

By Decision7[7] dated August 20, 1997 which jointly resolved DARAB Case
Nos. 5987'NNE'96 and 6261NNE97, the PARAD ruled in favor of petitioners, the
decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered: ORDERING

AND DECLARING
1. DARAB Case No. 5987NNE96 DISMISSED for lack of merit;
2. The recall/cancellation of TCT No. CLOA-0-3514 previously issued
to the late Cristobal Olar;
3.

The PARO, DAR-North, Talavera, Nueva Ecija thru the Chief,

Landed Estate Section to cause the issuance of a new CLOA in the
name of Iluminada Capitle married to Cirilo Capitle;

4. The Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel TCT No. CLOA-03514 adverted to if the same is already registered and cause the
registration of a new CLOA in the name of Iluminada Capitle married
to C[i]rilo Capitle; and

5.

Other claims and counterclaims likewise DISMISSED for lack of

legal basis.8[8]

Respondents appealed the decision to the DARAB, arguing that the PARAD
erred in holding that:

I.
. . . PETITIONERS FORTUNATA ELBAMBUENA AND ROSALINDA OLAR
CAN NO LONGER RECOVER POSSESSION OVER THE SUBJECT FARM
LOT, MUCH LESS DEMAND PAYMENT OF LEASE RENTALS FROM THE
RESPONDENTS.
II.
. . . THE PETITION FOR RECALL/CANCELLATION OF TCT NO. CLOA-03514 PREVIOUSLY ISSUED TO THE LATE CRISTOBAL OLAR WOULD
PROSPER.9[9]

By Decision10[10] of December 29, 2003, the DARAB set aside the PARADs
decision, disposing as follows:

8
9
10

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is SET ASIDE and a

new judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering Spouses Capitle and any or all persons acting in their behalf
to immediately vacate the subject landholding and deliver the same to
Fortunata Elbambuena and Rosalinda C. Olar;
2.

Ordering the issuance of CLOA in favor of Fortunata Elbambuena

and Rosalinda C. Olar as legal heirs of Cristobal Olar.

3.

Setting aside the decision of the Adjudicator a quo in DARAB

Regional Case No. 6261NNE97 for lack of jurisdiction over the
persons of the Heirs of Cristobal Olar;

4. The demand for back lease rentals by [respondents] is denied for lack
of merit.11[11]

Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via petition for review,
arguing that the DARAB erred:

11

1.

IN CONCLUDING THAT THE POSSESSION OF LOT NO. 1849 since

1960 DESERVES NO MERIT THERE BEING NO BASIS BOTH IN FACT
AND IN LAW;

2.

THAT THE PRESUMPTION, THE CLOA WAS ISSUED TO CRISTOBAL

OLAR IN THE REGULAR COURSE [OF] OFFICIAL FUNCTION WAS
NEVER OVERCOME BY CONTRARY EVIDENCE;

3.

THAT THE WAIVER EXECUTED BY CRISTOBAL OLAR IN FAVOR

OF SPS. CAPITLE IS VOID FOR BEING CONTRARY TO LAW AND
PUBLIC POLICY;

4.

IN CONCLUDING THAT THE TRANSFER ACTION CONDUCTED BY

THE SAMAHANG NAYON OF VALLE, TALAVERA, NUEVA ECIJA
CONTAINS SUBSTANTIAL AND MATERIAL DEFECTS; [and]

5. IN CONCLUDING THAT THE CANCELLATION OF TCT No. CLOA-03514 DOES NOT BIND FORTUNATA ELBAMBUENA AND
ROSALINDA OLAR BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT MADE PARTY TO
DARAB CASE NO. 6261NNE97.12[12]

By the challenged Decision of November 23, 2004,13[13] the appellate court

affirmed in toto the DARAB decision, ratiocinating as follows:

The DARAB correctly found that petitioners-appellants possession of the

questioned property since 1960 is of dubious legality. No amount of possession
under whatever claim (actual tilling and actual possession) can clothe petitionerappellants with any lawful right over the questioned property. Reason: It can be
gleaned from the factual antecedents that petitioners-appellants stay in Cristobal
Olars property was, or had been , by mere tolerance of respondents-appellees.
Indeed, so much is clear from the averments on page 5 of their petition: xxx; that
Cristobal Olar beginning 1959 up to the time of his death in 1995 lived all alone
by himself and his companions in his house are the Spouses Iluminada and
Cirilo Capitle xxx. These averments, being in the nature of judicial admissions,
are conclusive and binding on petitioners-appellants and can no longer be
controverted. This simply meant that no title of ownership as farmer beneficiary
was passed unto the Capitles, thereby rendering ineffective the certification issued
by the MARO of Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Even the Board Resolution of the
Samahang Nayon of Valle, Talavera, Nueva Ecija, naming the Capitles as new
allocatees of the landholding, had no binding effect, as the said samahang nayon
is not the proper authority under the law with power to pass upon the legal issue
as to who rightfully deserves to own Cristobal Olars landholding after him.
Besides which, there was nothing amiss with the DARABs ruling relative to the
issuance of the Certificate of Land Ownership Award to Cristobal Olar, as this
was done in the regular course of an official function. It simply established the
fact that petitioners-appellants claim could in no way legally stand against
Cristobal Olar, whose title under the CLOA cannot be overthrown or supplanted
by some organizational resolution and/or barangay attestations/certifications. On
the other hand, Cristobal Olars death substantially passed all his rights and
12
13

interest in and over the subject property to his legal heirs by operation of law. In
the case at bench, to herein respondents-appellees: to Fortunata Elbambuena,
being his surviving wife, and to Rosalinda Olar, his sons surviving spouse, acting
for and in behalf of her children with Nemesio Olar. This is as it should,
considering that rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death
of the decedent. And since Fortunata Elbambuena and Rosalinda Olars
relationship with Cristobal Olar was in this case never put in issue, their being
legal heirs of the deceased gave them unqualified right to participate in all
proceedings affecting the subject property.
What is more, as shown in the records, the respondent in DARAB Case
No. 6261NN[]97 was the MARO OF TALAVERA, N.E. Private respondentsappellees were not impleaded therein. But as heirs of Cristobal Olar, private
respondents-appellees ought to have been so impleaded. The Rules mandate that
the full names of all the real parties in interest whether natural or juridical persons
or entities authorized by law shall be stated in the caption of the complaint or
petition. Who is a real party in interest? He is that party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit. Tested by this criterion, Fortunata Elbambuenas legitime and
Rosalinda Olar stood to be injured by the glaringly erroneous decision of the
PARAD, Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Hence, that decision must be vacated, it having
transgressed substantive rights protected by law.14[14] (Emphasis and italics in the
original; underscoring supplied)

Hence, the present petition which reiterates the above-enumerated errors

petitioners proffered before the appellate court.

Petitioners maintain that their possession since 1960 was satisfactorily

established by evidence including Olars Waiver of Rights, Board Resolution of the
Samahang Nayon of Valle naming petitioners as new allocatee, Joint Certification
of the BARC Chairman and barangay chairman, and MARO Certification that they
have been in actual possession of the lot.
14

Although the CLOA was issued to Olar, petitioners contend that their
preferential right over the lot should be recognized, they being the transferees
pursuant to the Waiver of Rights and the actual tillers thereof.

Petitioners concede that although Olars death passed all his rights and interest
over the lot to his legal heirs, his intent of not bequeathing them to his estranged
wife but to a relative, who helped him in tilling the lot and who took care of him,
should be accorded respect over the intent of the law on hereditary succession.

Finally, petitioners claim that respondents are not qualified to become farmerbeneficiaries under the CARP as they did not till or cultivate the property nor help
Olar in his farming activities.

The petition fails.

Petitioners argument that [i]t would be absurd for [Olar] to bequeath his
property to his estranged wife not to a relative who had indeed helped him in tilling
the property and [took] good care of his needs,15[15] is a virtual admission that their

15

possession was not in the concept of owners, they having merely helped in tilling
the lot, thereby acknowledging that Olar was the actual possessor and tiller.

Absent evidence to the contrary, the presumption that the public officers who issued
the CLOA to Olar regularly performed their duties, including adhering to the
provisions of Section 22 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)
which provides:

SECTION 22. Qualified Beneficiaries. The lands covered by the CARP

shall be distributed as much as possible to landless residents of the same
barangay, or in the absence thereof, landless residents of the same municipality in
the following order of priority:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)

agricultural lessees and share tenants;

regular farmworkers;
seasonal farmworkers;
other farmworkers;
actual tillers or occupants of public lands;
collectives or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries; and
others directly working on the land.

Provided, however, That the children of landowners who are qualified

under Section 6 of this Act shall be given preference in the distribution of the land
of their parents; And provided further, That actual tenant-tillers in the landholding
shall not be ejected or removed therefrom.
Beneficiaries under Presidential Decree No. 27 who have culpably sold,
disposed of, or abandoned their land are disqualified to become beneficiaries
under this Program.
A basic qualification of a beneficiary shall be his willingness, aptitude and
ability to cultivate and make the land as productive as possible. The DAR shall
adopt a system of monitoring the record of performance of each beneficiary, so
that any beneficiary guilty of negligence or misuse of the land or any support
extended to him shall forfeit his right to continue as such beneficiary. The DAR
shall submit reports on the performance of the beneficiaries to the PARC.

x x x x,

thus stands.

Even assuming arguendo that petitioners were indeed the actual tillers of the
lot, their petition for the cancellation of the CLOA issued in favor of Olar would not
bind respondents as they were not impleaded.

Although estranged from Olar, respondent Fortunata remained his wife and
legal heir, mere estrangement not being a legal ground for the disqualification of a
surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse. 16[16] Rosalinda, on the other
hand, is the surviving spouse of Olars son. The two are thus real parties-in-interest
who stand to be injured or benefited by the judgment on the cancellation of the
CLOA issued in Olars name.17[17]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Costs against petitioners.

16
17

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 140371-72

November 27, 2006

DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO,

Petitioners,
vs.
HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO,
ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO,
ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS
and JAMES D. SEANGIO, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari1 with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeking the nullification of the orders, dated
August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 (the
RTC), dismissing the petition for probate on the ground of preterition, in the consolidated cases,
docketed as SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99-93396, and entitled, "In the Matter of
the Intestate Estate of Segundo C. Seangio v. Alfredo D. Seangio, et al." and "In the Matter of the
Probate of the Will of Segundo C. Seangio v. Dy Yieng Seangio, Barbara D. Seangio and
Virginia Seangio."
The facts of the cases are as follows:
On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate
estate of the late Segundo Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 9890870 of the RTC, and praying
for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D. SeangioSantos as special administrator and
guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.

Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They
contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her faculties; 2) the
deceased Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power
to manage and exercise control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia
is the most competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate of Segundo
because she is a certified public accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated
September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In
view of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found
to have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by
the proceedings for the probate of the will.
On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo, docketed as SP.
Proc. No. 9993396, was filed by petitioners before the RTC. They likewise reiterated that the
probate proceedings should take precedence over SP. Proc. No. 9890870 because testate
proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.2
The document that petitioners refer to as Segundos holographic will is quoted, as follows:
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana
Tantunin ng sinuman
Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila at
nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng lahat
at anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging lapastangan
sa akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si Virginia
Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw
gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa ibabaw.
Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para makapagutang na
kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China Bangking Corporation na millon
pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa
mga may-ari at stockholders ng China Banking.
At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga custome[r] ng Travel
Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Virginia.
Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong
inaalisan ng lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at
hindi siya makoha mana.

Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng tatlong

saksi. 3
(signed)
Segundo Seangio
Nilagdaan sa harap namin
(signed)
Dy Yieng Seangio (signed)
Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi
(signed)
ikatlong saksi
On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners motion, SP. Proc. No. 9890870 and SP. Proc. No. 9993396
were consolidated.4
On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings5
primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does
not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of
a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will only shows
an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that
all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there
is preterition which would result to intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents
maintained that while procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity
of the will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the
dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face of the will it is clear that it contains no
testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: 1) generally, the
authority of the probate court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the
will; 2) private respondents question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the will; 3)
disinheritance constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent; and, 4) the rule on preterition
does not apply because Segundos will does not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the
exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs.6

On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order, dismissing the petition for probate
proceedings:
A perusal of the document termed as "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, et al.,
clearly shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned thereat are Alfredo and
Virginia. [T]he other heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus applies.
However, insofar as the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not apply, she
not being a compulsory heir in the direct line.
As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition, for to do otherwise would amount to an
abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court in the case of Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court [155
SCRA 100 (1987)] has made its position clear: "for respondents to have tolerated the probate
of the will and allowed the case to progress when, on its face, the will appears to be intrinsically
void would have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort,
expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have
passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of
the will was resolved (underscoring supplied).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit. Special Proceedings No. 9993396 is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its order dated October 14,
1999.
Petitioners contend that:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF HER JURISDICTION OR WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF LAW NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED ORDERS, DATED 10 AUGUST
1999 AND 14 OCTOBER 1999 (ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B" HEREOF) CONSIDERING
THAT:
I
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS 3 AND 4
OF RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR SETTING
THE CASE FOR INITIAL HEARING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
JURISDICTIONAL FACTS, DISMISSED THE TESTATE CASE ON THE ALLEGED

GROUND THAT THE TESTATORS WILL IS VOID ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF THE

EXISTENCE OF PRETERITION, WHICH GOES INTO THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
WILL, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT THE AUTHORITY OF
PROBATE COURTS IS LIMITED ONLY TO A DETERMINATION OF THE EXTRINSIC
VALIDITY OF THE WILL, I.E., THE DUE EXECUTION THEREOF, THE TESTATORS
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND THE COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OR
SOLEMNITIES PRESCRIBED BY LAW;
II
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS THE
AUTHORITY TO RULE UPON THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL OF THE
TESTATOR, IT IS INDUBITABLE FROM THE FACE OF THE TESTATORS WILL THAT
NO PRETERITON EXISTS AND THAT THE WILL IS BOTH INTRINSICALLY AND
EXTRINSICALLY VALID; AND,
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE
INTESTATE CASE CONSIDERING THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT TESTATE
PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.
Petitioners argue, as follows:
First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court
which respectively mandate the court to: a) fix the time and place for proving the will when all
concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and cause notice of such time and place
to be published three weeks successively previous to the appointed time in a newspaper of
general circulation; and, b) cause the mailing of said notice to the heirs, legatees and devisees of
the testator Segundo;
Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather, as its title
clearly states, Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a
compulsory heir. Thus, there is no preterition in the decedents will and the holographic will on
its face is not intrinsically void;
Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private respondents alike,
with the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the compulsory heirs in the
direct line of Segundo were preterited in the holographic will since there was no institution of an
heir;

Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it is both
intrinsically and extrinsically valid, respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the hearing
of the testate case; and,
Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work injustice to petitioners,
and will render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.
The purported holographic will of Segundo that was presented by petitioners was dated, signed
and written by him in his own handwriting. Except on the ground of preterition, private
respondents did not raise any issue as regards the authenticity of the document.
The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed Segundos
intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that he cited
therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo.
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be
effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard to the
reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes
that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his
son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or
descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code:
Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children and
descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:
(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of the
testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law
prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found
groundless;
(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the
spouse of the testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence
causes the testator to make a will or to change one already made;
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parents or ascendant who disinherit
such child or descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant;8

(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life;

(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction.
Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by Segundo can be
considered as a holographic will.
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written,
dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be
made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
Segundos document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument,
conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and
signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa[9] can be clearly
deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition
of the latters property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in
itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator
Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.10
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the
form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in
succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It
is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot
be given effect.11
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as
illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an
expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the
intention of the testator.12 In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if
captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last
testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic
will. Unless the will is probated,13 the disinheritance cannot be given effect.14
With regard to the issue on preterition,15 the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct
line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Courts opinion, Segundos last expression to
bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo
did not institute an heir16 to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the
name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the
universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo
and his son, Alfredo.1wphi1

Considering that the questioned document is Segundos holographic will, and that the law favors
testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil
Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a
person to dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory.17
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic will to be
probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take
precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.18
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 21, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, are set aside. Respondent judge is
directed to reinstate and hear SP Proc. No. 99-93396 for the allowance of the holographic will of
Segundo Seangio. The intestate case or SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 is hereby suspended until the
termination of the aforesaid testate proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 122880

April 12, 2006

FELIX AZUELA, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO substituted by ERNESTO G.
CASTILLO, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:

The core of this petition is a highly defective notarial will, purportedly executed by Eugenia E.
Igsolo (decedent), who died on 16 December 1982 at the age of 80. In refusing to give legal
recognition to the due execution of this document, the Court is provided the opportunity to assert
a few important doctrinal rules in the execution of notarial wills, all self-evident in view of
Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code.
A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is
written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental
witnesses is fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain
an acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is
sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects is just aching for judicial
rejection.
There is a distinct and consequential reason the Civil Code provides a comprehensive catalog of
imperatives for the proper execution of a notarial will. Full and faithful compliance with all the
detailed requisites under Article 805 of the Code leave little room for doubt as to the validity in
the due execution of the notarial will. Article 806 likewise imposes another safeguard to the
validity of notarial wills that they be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and
the witnesses. A notarial will executed with indifference to these two codal provisions opens
itself to nagging questions as to its legitimacy.
The case stems from a petition for probate filed on 10 April 1984 with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila. The petition filed by petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the
notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo, which was notarized on 10 June 1981. Petitioner is the son of
the cousin of the decedent.
The will, consisting of two (2) pages and written in the vernacular Pilipino, read in full:
HULING HABILIN NI EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
SA NGALAN NG MAYKAPAL, AMEN:
AKO, si EUGENIA E. IGSOLO, nakatira sa 500 San Diego St., Sampaloc, Manila, pitongput
siyam (79) na gulang, nasa hustong pagi-isip, pag-unawa at memoria ay nag-hahayag na ito na
ang aking huling habilin at testamento, at binabali wala ko lahat ang naunang ginawang habilin o
testamento:
Una-Hinihiling ko na ako ay mailibing sa Sementerio del Norte, La Loma sang-ayong sa
kaugalian at patakaran ng simbahang katoliko at ang taga-pag-ingat (Executor) ng habiling ito ay
magtatayo ng bantayog upang silbing ala-ala sa akin ng aking pamilya at kaibigan;

Pangalawa-Aking ipinagkakaloob at isinasalin ang lahat ng karapatan sa aking pamangkin na si

Felix Azuela, na siyang nag-alaga sa akin sa mahabang panahon, yaong mga bahay na nakatirik
sa lote numero 28, Block 24 at nakapangalan sa Pechaten Korporasyon, ganoon din ibinibigay ko
ang lahat ng karapatan sa bahay na nakatirik sa inoopahan kong lote, numero 43, Block 24 na
pag-aari ng Pechaten Corporation. Ipinagkakaloob kong buong buo ang lahat ng karapatan sa
bahay at lupa na nasa 500 San Diego St., Lot 42, Block 24, Sampaloc, Manila kay Felix Azuela
at ang pagkakaloob kong ito ay walang pasubalit at kondiciones;
Pangatlo- Na ninunumbrahan ko si VART PAGUE na siyang nagpapatupad ng huling habiling ito
at kagustuhan ko rin na hindi na kailanman siyang mag-lagak ng piyansiya.
Aking nilagdaan ang Huling Habilin na ito dito sa Maynila ika 10 ng Hunyo, 1981.
(Sgd.)
EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
(Tagapagmana)
PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI
Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng ____ dahon pati ang huling dahong ito, na ipinahayag sa amin
ni Eugenia E. Igsolo, tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling Habilin, ngayon ika-10 ng Hunyo
1981, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng kasulatang nabanggit at sa kaliwang
panig ng lahat at bawat dahon, sa harap ng lahat at bawat sa amin, at kami namang mga saksi
ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing tagapagmana at sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, sa
ilalim ng nasabing kasulatan at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon ng kasulatan ito.
EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
address: 500 San Diego St.
Sampaloc, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-7717-37
Issued at Manila on March 10, 1981.
QUIRINO AGRAVA
address: 1228-Int. 3, Kahilum
Pandacan, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-458365
Issued at Manila on Jan. 21, 1981
LAMBERTO C. LEAO
address: Avenue 2, Blcok 7,
Lot 61, San Gabriel, G.MA., Cavite Res.
Cert. No. A-768277 issued at Carmona, Cavite on Feb. 7, 1981

JUANITO ESTRERA
address: City Court Compound,
City of Manila Res. Cert. No. A574829
Issued at Manila on March 2, 1981.
Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10, 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.
(Sgd.)
PETRONIO Y. BAUTISTA
Doc. No. 1232 ; NOTARIO PUBLIKO
Page No. 86 ; Until Dec. 31, 1981
Book No. 43 ; PTR-152041-1/2/81-Manila
Series of 1981 TAN # 1437-977-81
The three named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of both
pages of the will, but not at the bottom of the attestation clause.
The probate petition adverted to only two (2) heirs, legatees and devisees of the decedent,
namely: petitioner himself, and one Irene Lynn Igsolo, who was alleged to have resided abroad.
Petitioner prayed that the will be allowed, and that letters testamentary be issued to the
designated executor, Vart Prague.
The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo (Geralda Castillo), who represented herself as
the attorney-in-fact of "the 12 legitimate heirs" of the decedent.2 Geralda Castillo claimed that
the will is a forgery, and that the true purpose of its emergence was so it could be utilized as a
defense in several court cases filed by oppositor against petitioner, particularly for forcible entry
and usurpation of real property, all centering on petitioners right to occupy the properties of the
decedent.3 It also asserted that contrary to the representations of petitioner, the decedent was
actually survived by 12 legitimate heirs, namely her grandchildren, who were then residing
abroad. Per records, it was subsequently alleged that decedent was the widow of Bonifacio
Igsolo, who died in 1965,4 and the mother of a legitimate child, Asuncion E. Igsolo, who
predeceased her mother by three (3) months.5
Oppositor Geralda Castillo also argued that the will was not executed and attested to in
accordance with law. She pointed out that decedents signature did not appear on the second page
of the will, and the will was not properly acknowledged. These twin arguments are among the
central matters to this petition.
After due trial, the RTC admitted the will to probate, in an Order dated 10 August 1992.6 The
RTC favorably took into account the testimony of the three (3) witnesses to the will, Quirino

Agrava, Lamberto Leano, and Juanito Estrada. The RTC also called to fore "the modern
tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will x x x with the end in view of
giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes;"7 and from this perspective,
rebutted oppositors arguments that the will was not properly executed and attested to in
accordance with law.
After a careful examination of the will and consideration of the testimonies of the subscribing
and attesting witnesses, and having in mind the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in
the execution of a will, i.e., the liberalization of the interpretation of the law on the formal
requirements of a will with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his
last wishes, this Court is persuaded to rule that the will in question is authentic and had been
executed by the testatrix in accordance with law.
On the issue of lack of acknowledgement, this Court has noted that at the end of the will after the
signature of the testatrix, the following statement is made under the sub-title, "Patunay Ng Mga
Saksi":
"Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng _____ dahon pati ang huling dahong ito, na ipinahayag sa
amin ni Eugenia N. Igsolo, tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling Habilin, ngayong ika-10 ng
Hunyo 1981, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng kasulatang nabanggit at sa
kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon, sa harap ng lahat at bawat sa amin, at kami namang
mga saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing tagapagmana at sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa
amin, sa ilalim ng nasabing kasulatan at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon ng kasulatan
ito."
The aforequoted declaration comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgement and is
considered by this Court as a substantial compliance with the requirements of the law.
On the oppositors contention that the attestation clause was not signed by the subscribing
witnesses at the bottom thereof, this Court is of the view that the signing by the subscribing
witnesses on the left margin of the second page of the will containing the attestation clause and
acknowledgment, instead of at the bottom thereof, substantially satisfies the purpose of
identification and attestation of the will.
With regard to the oppositors argument that the will was not numbered correlatively in letters
placed on upper part of each page and that the attestation did not state the number of pages
thereof, it is worthy to note that the will is composed of only two pages. The first page contains
the entire text of the testamentary dispositions, and the second page contains the last portion of
the attestation clause and acknowledgement. Such being so, the defects are not of a serious
nature as to invalidate the will. For the same reason, the failure of the testatrix to affix her

signature on the left margin of the second page, which contains only the last portion of the
attestation clause and acknowledgment is not a fatal defect.
As regards the oppositors assertion that the signature of the testatrix on the will is a forgery, the
testimonies of the three subscribing witnesses to the will are convincing enough to establish the
genuineness of the signature of the testatrix and the due execution of the will.8
The Order was appealed to the Court of Appeals by Ernesto Castillo, who had substituted his
since deceased mother-in-law, Geralda Castillo. In a Decision dated 17 August 1995, the Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered the dismissal of the petition for probate.9 The Court
of Appeals noted that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will,
thus rendering the will void and undeserving of probate.10
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code that "the number of
pages used in a notarial will be stated in the attestation clause" is merely directory, rather than
mandatory, and thus susceptible to what he termed as "the substantial compliance rule."11
The solution to this case calls for the application of Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code,
which we replicate in full.
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the
testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his
express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence
of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of
the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left
margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of
each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact
that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his
name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the
latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of
one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to
them.

Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with
the office of the Clerk of Court.
The appellate court, in its Decision, considered only one defect, the failure of the attestation
clause to state the number of pages of the will. But an examination of the will itself reveals
several more deficiencies.
As admitted by petitioner himself, the attestation clause fails to state the number of pages of the
will.12 There was an incomplete attempt to comply with this requisite, a space having been
allotted for the insertion of the number of pages in the attestation clause. Yet the blank was never
filled in; hence, the requisite was left uncomplied with.
The Court of Appeals pounced on this defect in reversing the trial court, citing in the process Uy
Coque v. Navas L. Sioca13 and In re: Will of Andrada.14 In Uy Coque, the Court noted that among
the defects of the will in question was the failure of the attestation clause to state the number of
pages contained in the will.15 In ruling that the will could not be admitted to probate, the Court
made the following consideration which remains highly relevant to this day: "The purpose of
requiring the number of sheets to be stated in the attestation clause is obvious; the document
might easily be so prepared that the removal of a sheet would completely change the
testamentary dispositions of the will and in the absence of a statement of the total number
of sheets such removal might be effected by taking out the sheet and changing the numbers
at the top of the following sheets or pages. If, on the other hand, the total number of sheets is
stated in the attestation clause the falsification of the document will involve the inserting of new
pages and the forging of the signatures of the testator and witnesses in the margin, a matter
attended with much greater difficulty."16
The case of In re Will of Andrada concerned a will the attestation clause of which failed to state
the number of sheets or pages used. This consideration alone was sufficient for the Court to
declare "unanim[ity] upon the point that the defect pointed out in the attesting clause is fatal."17 It
was further observed that "it cannot be denied that the x x x requirement affords additional
security against the danger that the will may be tampered with; and as the Legislature has seen fit
to prescribe this requirement, it must be considered material."18
Against these cited cases, petitioner cites Singson v. Florentino19 and Taboada v. Hon. Rosal,20
wherein the Court allowed probate to the wills concerned therein despite the fact that the
attestation clause did not state the number of pages of the will. Yet the appellate court itself
considered the import of these two cases, and made the following distinction which petitioner is
unable to rebut, and which we adopt with approval:

Even a cursory examination of the Will (Exhibit "D"), will readily show that the attestation does
not state the number of pages used upon which the will is written. Hence, the Will is void and
undeserving of probate.
We are not impervious of the Decisions of the Supreme Court in "Manuel Singson versus Emilia
Florentino, et al., 92 Phil. 161 and Apolonio [Taboada] versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et al., 118
SCRA 195," to the effect that a will may still be valid even if the attestation does not contain the
number of pages used upon which the Will is written. However, the Decisions of the Supreme
Court are not applicable in the aforementioned appeal at bench. This is so because, in the case of
"Manuel Singson versus Emilia Florentino, et al., supra," although the attestation in the subject
Will did not state the number of pages used in the will, however, the same was found in the last
part of the body of the Will:
"x x x
The law referred to is article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645,
which requires that the attestation clause shall state the number of pages or sheets upon which
the will is written, which requirement has been held to be mandatory as an effective safeguard
against the possibility of interpolation or omission of some of the pages of the will to the
prejudice of the heirs to whom the property is intended to be bequeathed (In re Will of Andrada,
42 Phil. 180; Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405; Gumban vs. Gorcho, 50 Phil. 30;
Quinto vs. Morata, 54 Phil. 481; Echevarria vs. Sarmiento, 66 Phil. 611). The ratio decidendi of
these cases seems to be that the attestation clause must contain a statement of the number of
sheets or pages composing the will and that if this is missing or is omitted, it will have the effect
of invalidating the will if the deficiency cannot be supplied, not by evidence aliunde, but by a
consideration or examination of the will itself. But here the situation is different. While the
attestation clause does not state the number of sheets or pages upon which the will is written,
however, the last part of the body of the will contains a statement that it is composed of eight
pages, which circumstance in our opinion takes this case out of the rigid rule of construction and
places it within the realm of similar cases where a broad and more liberal view has been adopted
to prevent the will of the testator from being defeated by purely technical considerations." (page
165-165, supra) (Underscoring supplied)
In "Apolonio Tabaoda versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et al." supra, the notarial acknowledgement in
the Will states the number of pages used in the:
"x x x
We have examined the will in question and noticed that the attestation clause failed to state the
number of pages used in writing the will. This would have been a fatal defect were it not for the
fact that, in this case, it is discernible from the entire will that it is really and actually composed

of only two pages duly signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses. As earlier stated,
the first page which contains the entirety of the testamentary dispositions is signed by the
testatrix at the end or at the bottom while the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin.
The other page which is marked as "Pagina dos" comprises the attestation clause and the
acknowledgment. The acknowledgment itself states that "this Last Will and Testament consists of
two pages including this page" (pages 200-201, supra) (Underscoring supplied).
However, in the appeal at bench, the number of pages used in the will is not stated in any part of
the Will. The will does not even contain any notarial acknowledgment wherein the number of
pages of the will should be stated.21
Both Uy Coque and Andrada were decided prior to the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, at a
time when the statutory provision governing the formal requirement of wills was Section
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.22 Reliance on these cases remains apropos, considering that
the requirement that the attestation state the number of pages of the will is extant from Section
618.23 However, the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950 did put in force a rule of interpretation
of the requirements of wills, at least insofar as the attestation clause is concerned, that may vary
from the philosophy that governed these two cases. Article 809 of the Civil Code states: "In the
absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and
imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will
invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance
with all the requirements of article 805."
In the same vein, petitioner cites the report of the Civil Code Commission, which stated that "the
underlying and fundamental objective permeating the provisions on the [law] on [wills] in this
project consists in the [liberalization] of the manner of their execution with the end in view of
giving the testator more [freedom] in [expressing] his last wishes. This objective is in accord
with the [modern tendency] in respect to the formalities in the execution of wills."24 However,
petitioner conveniently omits the qualification offered by the Code Commission in the very same
paragraph he cites from their report, that such liberalization be "but with sufficient safeguards
and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper
pressure and influence upon the testator."25
Caneda v. Court of Appeals26 features an extensive discussion made by Justice Regalado,
speaking for the Court on the conflicting views on the manner of interpretation of the legal
formalities required in the execution of the attestation clause in wills.27 Uy Coque and Andrada
are cited therein, along with several other cases, as examples of the application of the rule of
strict construction.28 However, the Code Commission opted to recommend a more liberal
construction through the "substantial compliance rule" under Article 809. A cautionary note was
struck though by Justice J.B.L. Reyes as to how Article 809 should be applied:

x x x The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an
examination of the will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the
signatures appear in each and every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will
was notarized. All these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions
concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total number of
pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other must
substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the
probate proceedings.29 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court of Appeals did cite these comments by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in its assailed decision,
considering that the failure to state the number of pages of the will in the attestation clause is one
of the defects which cannot be simply disregarded. In Caneda itself, the Court refused to allow
the probate of a will whose attestation clause failed to state that the witnesses subscribed their
respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other,30 the other
omission cited by Justice J.B.L. Reyes which to his estimation cannot be lightly disregarded.
Caneda suggested: "[I]t may thus be stated that the rule, as it now stands, is that omission which
can be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic
evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to probate of
the will being assailed. However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence
aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will
itself."31 Thus, a failure by the attestation clause to state that the testator signed every page can be
liberally construed, since that fact can be checked by a visual examination; while a failure by the
attestation clause to state that the witnesses signed in one anothers presence should be
considered a fatal flaw since the attestation is the only textual guarantee of compliance.32
The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the will was written
remains a fatal flaw, despite Article 809. The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state
the number of pages on which the will is written is to safeguard against possible interpolation or
omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.33 The
failure to state the number of pages equates with the absence of an averment on the part of the
instrumental witnesses as to how many pages consisted the will, the execution of which they had
ostensibly just witnessed and subscribed to. Following Caneda, there is substantial compliance
with this requirement if the will states elsewhere in it how many pages it is comprised of, as was
the situation in Singson and Taboada. However, in this case, there could have been no substantial
compliance with the requirements under Article 805 since there is no statement in the attestation
clause or anywhere in the will itself as to the number of pages which comprise the will.
At the same time, Article 809 should not deviate from the need to comply with the formal
requirements as enumerated under Article 805. Whatever the inclinations of the members of the
Code Commission in incorporating Article 805, the fact remains that they saw fit to prescribe

substantially the same formal requisites as enumerated in Section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, convinced that these remained effective safeguards against the forgery or
intercalation of notarial wills.34 Compliance with these requirements, however picayune in
impression, affords the public a high degree of comfort that the testator himself or herself had
decided to convey property post mortem in the manner established in the will.35 The
transcendent legislative intent, even as expressed in the cited comments of the Code
Commission, is for the fruition of the testators incontestable desires, and not for the
indulgent admission of wills to probate.
The Court could thus end here and affirm the Court of Appeals. However, an examination of the
will itself reveals a couple of even more critical defects that should necessarily lead to its
rejection.
For one, the attestation clause was not signed by the instrumental witnesses. While the
signatures of the instrumental witnesses appear on the left-hand margin of the will, they do not
appear at the bottom of the attestation clause which after all consists of their averments before
the notary public.
Cagro v. Cagro36 is material on this point. As in this case, "the signatures of the three witnesses
to the will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the
same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin."37 While three (3) Justices38 considered
the signature requirement had been substantially complied with, a majority of six (6), speaking
through Chief Justice Paras, ruled that the attestation clause had not been duly signed, rendering
the will fatally defective.
There is no question that the signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at the
bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses
on the left-hand margin.
We are of the opinion that the position taken by the appellant is correct. The attestation clause is
"a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will" required by law to be made by
the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned attestation
clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at
the bottom thereof negatives their participation.
The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the three witnesses on the left-hand
margin conform substantially to the law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation
clause. This is untenable, because said signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate that
the will be signed on the left-hand margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause not signed by
the three witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such

clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the
witnesses.39
The Court today reiterates the continued efficacy of Cagro. Article 805 particularly segregates
the requirement that the instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will, from the requisite that
the will be "attested and subscribed by [the instrumental witnesses]." The respective intents
behind these two classes of signature are distinct from each other. The signatures on the left-hand
corner of every page signify, among others, that the witnesses are aware that the page they are
signing forms part of the will. On the other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish
that the witnesses are referring to the statements contained in the attestation clause itself. Indeed,
the attestation clause is separate and apart from the disposition of the will. An unsigned
attestation clause results in an unattested will. Even if the instrumental witnesses signed the lefthand margin of the page containing the unsigned attestation clause, such signatures cannot
demonstrate these witnesses undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that do appear on
the page were directed towards a wholly different avowal.
The Court may be more charitably disposed had the witnesses in this case signed the attestation
clause itself, but not the left-hand margin of the page containing such clause. Without
diminishing the value of the instrumental witnesses signatures on each and every page, the fact
must be noted that it is the attestation clause which contains the utterances reduced into writing
of the testamentary witnesses themselves. It is the witnesses, and not the testator, who are
required under Article 805 to state the number of pages used upon which the will is written; the
fact that the testator had signed the will and every page thereof; and that they witnessed and
signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. The
only proof in the will that the witnesses have stated these elemental facts would be their
signatures on the attestation clause.
Thus, the subject will cannot be considered to have been validly attested to by the instrumental
witnesses, as they failed to sign the attestation clause.
Yet, there is another fatal defect to the will on which the denial of this petition should also hinge.
The requirement under Article 806 that "every will must be acknowledged before a notary public
by the testator and the witnesses" has also not been complied with. The importance of this
requirement is highlighted by the fact that it had been segregated from the other requirements
under Article 805 and entrusted into a separate provision, Article 806. The non-observance of
Article 806 in this case is equally as critical as the other cited flaws in compliance with Article
805, and should be treated as of equivalent import.
In lieu of an acknowledgment, the notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista, wrote "Nilagdaan ko at
ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila."40 By no manner
of contemplation can those words be construed as an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is

the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and
declaring it to be his act or deed.41 It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signor
actually declares to the notary that the executor of a document has attested to the notary that the
same is his/her own free act and deed.
It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not hew to the usual
language thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that before him/her,
the document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor.42 Ordinarily, the language of the
jurat should avow that the document was subscribed and sworn before the notary public, while in
this case, the notary public averred that he himself "signed and notarized" the document.
Possibly though, the word "ninotario" or "notarized" encompasses the signing of and swearing in
of the executors of the document, which in this case would involve the decedent and the
instrumental witnesses.
Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat, the will would
nonetheless remain invalid, as the express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be
"acknowledged", and not merely subscribed and sworn to. The will does not present any textual
proof, much less one under oath, that the decedent and the instrumental witnesses executed or
signed the will as their own free act or deed. The acknowledgment made in a will provides for
another all-important legal safeguard against spurious wills or those made beyond the free
consent of the testator. An acknowledgement is not an empty meaningless act.43 The
acknowledgment coerces the testator and the instrumental witnesses to declare before an officer
of the law that they had executed and subscribed to the will as their own free act or deed. Such
declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury, thus allowing for the criminal prosecution of
persons who participate in the execution of spurious wills, or those executed without the free
consent of the testator. It also provides a further degree of assurance that the testator is of certain
mindset in making the testamentary dispositions to those persons he/she had designated in the
will.
It may not have been said before, but we can assert the rule, self-evident as it is under Article
806. A notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn to before a notary public.
There are two other requirements under Article 805 which were not fully satisfied by the will in
question. We need not discuss them at length, as they are no longer material to the
disposition of this case. The provision requires that the testator and the instrumental witnesses
sign each and every page of the will on the left margin, except the last; and that all the pages
shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page. In this case, the
decedent, unlike the witnesses, failed to sign both pages of the will on the left margin, her only
signature appearing at the so-called "logical end"44 of the will on its first page. Also, the will

itself is not numbered correlatively in letters on each page, but instead numbered with Arabic
numerals. There is a line of thought that has disabused the notion that these two requirements be
construed as mandatory.45 Taken in isolation, these omissions, by themselves, may not be
sufficient to deny probate to a will. Yet even as these omissions are not decisive to the
adjudication of this case, they need not be dwelt on, though indicative as they may be of a
general lack of due regard for the requirements under Article 805 by whoever executed the will.
All told, the string of mortal defects which the will in question suffers from makes the probate
denial inexorable.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

FIRST DIVISION

ARNELITO ADLAWAN, G.R. No. 161916

Petitioner,
Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairman),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
EMETERIO M. ADLAWAN and

NARCISA M. ADLAWAN, Promulgated:

Respondents.
January 20, 2006

x
x

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review is the September 23, 2003

Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74921 which
set aside the September 13, 2002 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 7, in Civil Case No. CEB-27806,
and reinstated the February 12, 2002 Judgment[3] of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Minglanilla, Metro Cebu, in Civil
Case No. 392, dismissing petitioner Arnelito Adlawans unlawful
detainer suit against respondents Emeterio and Narcisa Adlawan.
Likewise questioned is the January 8, 2004 Resolution[4] of the

Court

of

Appeals

which

denied

petitioners

motion

for

reconsideration.

The instant ejectment suit stemmed from the parties dispute over
Lot 7226 and the house built thereon, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 8842,[5] registered in the name of the late
Dominador Adlawan and located at Barrio Lipata, Municipality of
Minglanilla, Cebu. In his complaint, petitioner claimed that he is
an acknowledged illegitimate child[6] of Dominador who died on
May 28, 1987 without any other issue. Claiming to be the sole heir
of Dominador, he executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself Lot
7226 and the house built thereon.[7] Out of respect and
generosity to respondents who are the siblings of his father, he
granted their plea to occupy the subject property provided they
would vacate the same should his need for the property arise.
Sometime in January 1999, he verbally requested respondents to
vacate the house and lot, but they refused and filed instead an
action for quieting of title[8] with the RTC. Finally, upon
respondents refusal to heed the last demand letter to vacate
dated August 2, 2000, petitioner filed the instant case on August
9, 2000.[9]

On the other hand, respondents Narcisa and Emeterio, 70

and 59 years of age, respectively,[10] denied that they begged

petitioner to allow them to stay on the questioned property and

stressed that they have been occupying Lot 7226 and the house
standing thereon since birth. They alleged that Lot 7226 was
originally registered in the name of their deceased father, Ramon
Adlawan[11] and the ancestral house standing thereon was
owned by Ramon and their mother, Oligia Maacap Adlawan. The
spouses had nine[12] children including the late Dominador and
herein surviving respondents Emeterio and Narcisa. During the
lifetime of their parents and deceased siblings, all of them lived
on the said property. Dominador and his wife, Graciana Ramas
Adlawan, who died without issue, also occupied the same.[13]
Petitioner, on the other hand, is a stranger who never had
possession of Lot 7226.

Sometime in 1961, spouses Ramon and Oligia needed

money to finance the renovation of their house. Since they were
not qualified to obtain a loan, they transferred ownership of Lot
7226 in the name of their son Dominador who was the only one in
the family who had a college education. By virtue of a January 31,
1962 simulated deed of sale,[14] a title was issued to Dominador
which enabled him to secure a loan with Lot 7226 as collateral.
Notwithstanding the execution of the simulated deed, Dominador,
then single, never disputed his parents ownership of the lot. He
and his wife, Graciana, did not disturb respondents possession of

the property until they died on May 28, 1987 and May 6, 1997,
respectively.

Respondents also contended that Dominadors signature at the

back of petitioners birth certificate was forged, hence, the latter is
not an heir of Dominador and has no right to claim ownership of
Lot 7226.[15] They argued that even if petitioner is indeed
Dominadors acknowledged illegitimate son, his right to succeed is
doubtful because Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana.
[16]
On February 12, 2002, the MTC dismissed the complaint holding
that the establishment of petitioners filiation and the settlement
of the estate of Dominador are conditions precedent to the
accrual of petitioners action for ejectment. It added that since
Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana, who died 10 years
thereafter, her legal heirs are also entitled to their share in Lot
7226. The dispositive portion thereof, reads:

In View of the foregoing, for failure to prove by preponderance of

evidence, the plaintiffs cause of action, the above-entitled case is
hereby Ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[17]

On appeal by petitioner, the RTC reversed the decision of the

MTC holding that the title of Dominador over Lot 7226 cannot be
collaterally attacked. It thus ordered respondents to turn over
possession of the controverted lot to petitioner and to pay
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises. The
decretal portion thereof, provides:

Wherefore, the Judgment, dated February 12, 2002, of the

Municipal Trial Court of Minglanilla, Cebu, in Civil Case No. 392, is
reversed. Defendants-appellees are directed to restore to plaintiffappellant possession of Lot 7226 and the house thereon, and to pay
plaintiff-appellant, beginning in August 2000, compensation for their
use and occupation of the property in the amount of P500.00 a month.

So ordered.[18]

Meanwhile, the RTC granted petitioners motion for execution

pending appeal[19] which was opposed by the alleged nephew
and nieces of Graciana in their motion for leave to intervene and
to file an answer in intervention.[20] They contended that as heirs
of Graciana, they have a share in Lot 7226 and that intervention
is necessary to protect their right over the property. In addition,
they declared that as co-owners of the property, they are allowing
respondents to stay in Lot 7226 until a formal partition of the
property is made.

The RTC denied the motion for leave to intervene.[21] It,

however, recalled the order granting the execution pending
appeal having lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the petition
filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals.[22]

On September 23, 2003, the Court of Appeals set aside the

decision of the RTC and reinstated the judgment of the MTC. It
ratiocinated that petitioner and the heirs of Graciana are coowners of Lot 7226. As such, petitioner cannot eject respondents
from the property via an unlawful detainer suit filed in his own
name and as the sole owner of the property. Thus

WHEEFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated

September 13, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7,
in Civil Case No. CEB-27806 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
Judgment dated February 12, 2002 of the Municipal Trial Court of
Minglanilla, Metro Cebu, in Civil Case No. 392 is REINSTATED. Costs
against the respondent.

SO ORDERED.[23]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence,

the instant petition.

The decisive issue to be resolved is whether or not petitioner

can validly maintain the instant case for ejectment.

Petitioner averred that he is an acknowledged illegitimate

son and the sole heir of Dominador. He in fact executed an
affidavit adjudicating to himself the controverted property. In
ruling for the petitioner, the RTC held that the questioned January
31, 1962 deed of sale validly transferred title to Dominador and
that petitioner is his acknowledged illegitimate son who inherited
ownership of the questioned lot. The Court notes, however, that
the RTC lost sight of the fact that the theory of succession invoked
by petitioner would end up proving that he is not the sole owner
of Lot 7226. This is so because Dominador was survived not only
by petitioner but also by his legal wife, Graciana, who died 10
years after the demise of Dominador on May 28, 1987.[24] By
intestate succession, Graciana and petitioner became co-owners
of Lot 7226.[25] The death of Graciana on May 6, 1997, did not
make petitioner the absolute owner of Lot 7226 because the
share of Graciana passed to her relatives by consanguinity and
not to petitioner with whom she had no blood relations. The Court
of Appeals thus correctly held that petitioner has no authority to
institute the instant action as the sole owner of Lot 7226.

Petitioner contends that even granting that he has coowners over Lot 7226, he can on his own file the instant case
pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code which provides:

ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in

ejectment.

This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of

possession. Article 487 includes forcible entry and unlawful
detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion
publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion).
[26] A co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity of
joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is
presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-owners. It should be
stressed, however, that where the suit is for the benefit of the
plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the
possession of the litigated property, the action should be
dismissed.[27]

The
explained

renowned

civilist,

Professor

Arturo

M.

Tolentino,

A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining

all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to
be instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for the benefit of
the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself
and not for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper.
(Emphasis added)[28]

In Baloloy v. Hular,[29] respondent filed a complaint for

quieting of title claiming exclusive ownership of the property, but
the evidence showed that respondent has co-owners over the
property. In dismissing the complaint for want of respondents
authority to file the case, the Court held that
Under Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-owners
may bring an action in ejectment. This article covers all kinds of
actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana
and a reinvidicatory action. A co-owner may bring such an action
without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs
because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. Any
judgment of the court in favor of the co-owner will benefit the others
but if such judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights
of the unimpleaded co-owners. If the action is for the benefit of the
plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the
possession thereof, the action will not prosper unless he impleads the
other co-owners who are indispensable parties.

In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming

sole ownership over the subject property and praying that he be
declared the sole owner thereof. There is no proof that the other coowners had waived their rights over the subject property or conveyed
the same to the respondent or such co-owners were aware of the case
in the trial court. The trial court rendered judgment declaring the
respondent as the sole owner of the property and entitled to its
possession, to the prejudice of the latters siblings. Patently then, the
decision of the trial court is erroneous.

Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the respondent

was mandated to implead his siblings, being co-owners of the property,
as parties. The respondent failed to comply with the rule. It must,
likewise, be stressed that the Republic of the Philippines is also an
indispensable party as defendant because the respondent sought the
nullification of OCT No. P-16540 which was issued based on Free Patent
No. 384019. Unless the State is impleaded as party-defendant, any
decision of the Court would not be binding on it. It has been held that
the absence of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffective all
the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the
judgment. The absence of the respondents siblings, as parties,
rendered all proceedings subsequent to the filing thereof, including the
judgment of the court, ineffective for want of authority to act, not only
as to the absent parties but even as to those present.[30]

In the instant case, it is not disputed that petitioner brought

the suit for unlawful detainer in his name alone and for his own
benefit to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana as he even
executed an affidavit of self- adjudication over the disputed
property. It is clear therefore that petitioner cannot validly
maintain the instant action considering that he does not recognize
the co-ownership that necessarily flows from his theory of
succession to the property of his father, Dominador.

In the same vein, there is no merit in petitioners claim that

he has the legal personality to file the present unlawful detainer
suit because the ejectment of respondents would benefit not only
him but also his alleged co-owners. However, petitioner forgets
that he filed the instant case to acquire possession of the property
and to recover damages. If granted, he alone will gain possession

of the lot and benefit from the proceeds of the award of damages
to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana. Hence, petitioner cannot
successfully capitalize on the alleged benefit to his co-owners.
Incidentally, it should be pointed out that in default of the said
heirs of Graciana, whom petitioner labeled as fictitious heirs, the
State will inherit her share[31] and will thus be petitioners coowner entitled to possession and enjoyment of the property.

The present controversy should be differentiated from the

cases where the Court upheld the right of a co-owner to file a suit
pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code. In Resuena v. Court of
Appeals,[32] and Sering v. Plazo,[33] the co-owners who filed the
ejectment case did not represent themselves as the exclusive
owner of the property. In Celino v. Heirs of Alejo and Teresa
Santiago,[34] the complaint for quieting of title was brought in
behalf of the co-owners precisely to recover lots owned in
common.[35]

Similarly

in

Vencilao

v.

Camarenta,[36]

the

amended complaint specified that the plaintiff is one of the heirs

who co-owns the controverted properties.

In the foregoing cases, the plaintiff never disputed the

existence of a co-ownership nor claimed to be the sole or
exclusive owner of the litigated lot. A favorable decision therein
would of course inure to the benefit not only of the plaintiff but to

his co-owners as well. The instant case, however, presents an

entirely different backdrop as petitioner vigorously asserted
absolute and sole ownership of the questioned lot. In his
complaint, petitioner made the following allegations, to wit:

3. The plaintiff was the only son (illegitimate) and sole heir of
the late DOMINADOR ADLAWAN who died intestate on 28 May 1987
without any other descendant nor ascendant x x x.

xxxx

5. Being the only child/descendant and, therefore, sole heir of

the deceased Dominador Adlawan, the plaintiff became the
absolute owner, and automatically took POSSESSION, of the
aforementioned house and lot x x x. (Emphasis added)[37]

Clearly, the said cases find no application here because

petitioners action operates as a complete repudiation of the
existence

of

co-ownership

and

not

in

representation

or

recognition thereof. Dismissal of the complaint is therefore proper.

As noted by Former Supreme Court Associate Justice Edgrado L.
Paras [i]t is understood, of course, that the action [under Article
487 of the Civil Code] is being instituted for all. Hence, if the coowner expressly states that he is bringing the case only for
himself, the action should not be allowed to prosper.[38]

Indeed, respondents not less than four decade actual

physical possession of the questioned ancestral house and lot
deserves to be respected especially so that petitioner failed to
show that he has the requisite personality and authority as coowner to file the instant case. Justice dictates that respondents
who are now in the twilight years of their life be granted
possession of their ancestral property where their parents and
siblings lived during their lifetime, and where they, will probably
spend the remaining days of their life.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 23,

2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74921
which reinstated the February 12, 2002 Judgment of the Municipal
Trial Court of Minglanilla, Metro Cebu, dismissing petitioners
complaint in Civil Case No. 392, and its January 8, 2004
Resolution, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
Today is Tuesday, October 25, 2016

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 163707

September 15, 2006

MICHAEL C. GUY, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 138, Makati City and
minors, KAREN DANES WEI and KAMILLE DANES WEI, represented by their mother, REMEDIOS OANES,
respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the January 22, 2004 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
79742, which affirmed the Orders dated July 21, 20002 and July 17, 20033 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 138 in SP Proc. Case No. 4549 denying petitioner's motion to dismiss; and its May 25, 2004 Resolution 4 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei, represented by their mother
Remedios Oanes (Remedios), filed a petition for letters of administration5 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 138. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4549 and entitled Intestate Estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufino Guy

Susim).
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died intestate in
Makati City on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate valued at P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and personal properties. His
known heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all surnamed
Guy. Private respondents prayed for the appointment of a regular administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Wei's
estate. They likewise prayed that, in the meantime, petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the decedent, be appointed as Special
Administrator of the estate. Attached to private respondents' petition was a Certification Against Forum Shopping6 signed by
their counsel, Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoez.
In his Comment/Opposition,7 petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He asserted that his deceased father left no
debts and that his estate can be settled without securing letters of administration pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules
of Court. He further argued that private respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children during the
lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.
The other heirs of Sima Wei filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss8 on the ground that the certification against forum shopping
should have been signed by private respondents and not their counsel. They contended that Remedios should have executed
the certification on behalf of her minor daughters as mandated by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
In a Manifestation/Motion as Supplement to the Joint Motion to Dismiss,9 petitioner and his co-heirs alleged that private
respondents' claim had been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of Remedios' June 7, 1993
Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and educational assistance received from petitioner,
Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.
The Regional Trial Court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss as well as the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. It ruled that
while the Release and Waiver of Claim was signed by Remedios, it had not been established that she was the duly
constituted guardian of her minor daughters. Thus, no renunciation of right occurred. Applying a liberal application of the
rules, the trial court also rejected petitioner's objections on the certification against forum shopping.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. He filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the orders of the Regional Trial Court in its assailed Decision dated January 22, 2004, the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly
DISMISSED, for lack of merit. Consequently, the assailed Orders dated July 21, 2000 and July 17, 2003 are
hereby both AFFIRMED. Respondent Judge is hereby DIRECTED to resolve the controversy over the
illegitimate filiation of the private respondents (sic) minors [-] Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei who
are claiming successional rights in the intestate estate of the deceased Sima Wei, a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim.
SO ORDERED.10

The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, hence, this petition.
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals disregarded existing rules on certification against forum shopping; that the
Release and Waiver of Claim executed by Remedios released and discharged the Guy family and the estate of Sima Wei
from any claims or liabilities; and that private respondents do not have the legal personality to institute the petition for letters
of administration as they failed to prove their filiation during the lifetime of Sima Wei in accordance with Article 175 of the
Family Code.
Private respondents contend that their counsel's certification can be considered substantial compliance with the rules on
certification of non-forum shopping, and that the petition raises no new issues to warrant the reversal of the decisions of the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.
The issues for resolution are: 1) whether private respondents' petition should be dismissed for failure to comply with the
rules on certification of non-forum shopping; 2) whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents
from claiming their successional rights; and 3) whether private respondents are barred by prescription from proving their
filiation.
The petition lacks merit.
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides that the certification of non-forum shopping should be executed by the
plaintiff or the principal party. Failure to comply with the requirement shall be cause for dismissal of the case. However, a
liberal application of the rules is proper where the higher interest of justice would be served. In Sy Chin v. Court of
Appeals,11 we ruled that while a petition may have been flawed where the certificate of non-forum shopping was signed only
by counsel and not by the party, this procedural lapse may be overlooked in the interest of substantial justice.12 So it is in the
present controversy where the merits13 of the case and the absence of an intention to violate the rules with impunity should

be considered as compelling reasons to temper the strict application of the rules.

As regards Remedios' Release and Waiver of Claim, the same does not bar private respondents from claiming successional
rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the
intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person
when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right.14
In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver of Claim does not state with
clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her
minor daughters "by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x
x x against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim."15 Considering that the document did not specifically mention private
respondents' hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights.
Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of private respondents, such waiver will not bar

the latter's claim. Article 1044 of the Civil Code, provides:

ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may accept or repudiate an inheritance.
Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents or guardians.
Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial authorization.
The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to the persons designated by the testator to
determine the beneficiaries and distribute the property, or in their default, to those mentioned in Article 1030.
(Emphasis supplied)
Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. This is because

repudiation amounts to an alienation of property16 which must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the
ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar
private respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased.
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks
knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and
waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.17
In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their successional rights because they are yet to
prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased. Petitioner himself has consistently denied that

private respondents are his co-heirs. It would thus be inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary rights when
petitioner claims that they do not have such right. Hence, petitioner's invocation of waiver on the part of private respondents
must fail.
Anent the issue on private respondents' filiation, we agree with the Court of Appeals that a ruling on the same would be
premature considering that private respondents have yet to present evidence. Before the Family Code took effect, the
governing law on actions for recognition of illegitimate children was Article 285 of the Civil Code, to wit:
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the

presumed parents, except in the following cases:

(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the
action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been
heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document. (Emphasis

supplied)
We ruled in Bernabe v. Alejo18 that illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect and
whose putative parent died during their minority are given the right to seek recognition for a period of up to four years from
attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.19
On the other hand, Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, which superseded Article 285 of the Civil Code, provide:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be
transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs
shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the
parties.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same,

evidence as legitimate children.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based
on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent.
Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is established by a record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by
the parent concerned, the action for recognition may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime. However, if the

action is based upon open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the
rules or special laws, it may only be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription depends on the type of evidence to be adduced by private
respondents in proving their filiation. However, it would be impossible to determine the same in this case as there has been
no reception of evidence yet. This Court is not a trier of facts. Such matters may be resolved only by the Regional Trial
Court after a full-blown trial.
While the original action filed by private respondents was a petition for letters of administration, the trial court is not
precluded from receiving evidence on private respondents' filiation. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental and

collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate, including the determination of the
status of each heir.20 That the two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be
joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.21 As held in Briz v. Briz:22
The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in any event maintain a complex
action to compel recognition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of
heir, is one which in the opinion of this court must be answered in the affirmative, provided always that the
conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of action are present in the particular case. In other
words, there is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should have been

instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks
additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel
acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied different from that generally applicable in
other cases. x x x
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to
some extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine must
be considered well settled, that a natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not
been in fact acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his
coheirs (Siguiong vs. Siguiong, 8 Phil., 5; Tiamson vs. Tiamson, 32 Phil., 62); and the same person may

intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother (Capistrano
vs. Fabella, 8 Phil., 135; Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil., 249; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855). In neither of these
situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment.
The obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who might take by
inheritance are before the court; and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 22, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 79742 affirming the denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss; and its Resolution dated May 25, 2004 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Let the records be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 138 for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Chairperson, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario, J.J., concur.

Footnotes
1

Rollo, pp. 19-26. Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and concurred in by Associate
Justices Mario L. Guaria III and Jose C. Reyes, Jr.
2

Id. at 48-49. Penned by Judge Sixto Marella, Jr.

Id. at 53.

Id. at 28.

Id. at 29-31.

Id. at 31.

Id. at 35-36.

Id. at 37-41.

Id. at 42-44.

10

Id. at 25.

11

399 Phil. 442 (2000).

12

Id. at 454.

13

Twin Towers Condominium Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123552, February 27, 2003, 398

SCRA 203, 212.

14

Thomson v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 761, 778 (1998).

15

Rollo, p. 44.

16

Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, p. 554.

17

D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001, 357 SCRA 249, 266.

18

424 Phil. 933 (2002).

19

Id. at 944.

20

Borromeo-Herrera v. Borromeo, G.R. Nos. L-41171, L-55000, L-62895, L-63818 and L-65995, July 23,
1987, 152 SCRA 171, 182-183.
21

Tayag v.Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95229, June 9, 1992, 209 SCRA 665, 672.

22

43 Phil. 763, 768-769 (1922).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FIRST DIVISION

REYNALDO RODRIGUEZ

G.R. No. 135817

and NANCY A. RODRIGUEZ,

Petitioners,

Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,

- versus -

YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

CONCORDIA ONG LIM,

EURESTES LIM AND
ELMER LIM,

Promulgated:

Respondents.
November 30, 2006
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by

the spouses Reynaldo and Nancy Rodriguez seeking the reversal
of the Decision18[1] dated July 18, 1995 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 27440. The assailed decision affirmed that of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City, Branch 58, declaring,
inter alia, Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. T-128607 in the
names of petitioners Reynaldo and Nancy Rodriguez null and void
and directing them to vacate the lots subject of litigation.
Likewise sought to be reversed is the appellate courts Resolution

18[1] Penned by Associate Justice Emeterio C. Cui (retired), with Associate Justices
Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez (now a member of this Court) and Conrado M. Vasquez,
Jr., concurring, rollo, pp. 32-44.

dated

October

5,

1998

denying

petitioners

motion

for

reconsideration.

As culled from the respective decisions of the RTC of Lucena City,

Branch 58 (court a quo) and the appellate court, the factual and
procedural antecedents are as follows:

Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. filed with the court a quo a complaint
for cancellation of certificate of title and injunction against the
spouses Rodriguez. In his complaint, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. alleged
that his mother, Dominga Goyma,19[2] was the owner of two
parcels of land (subject lots). The first parcel, 20[3] containing an
area of 28,051 square meters, more or less, is situated in the Sitio
of Tulay-Buhangin, Barrio Ilayang Palo, Municipality of Pagbilao,
Province of Quezon. The second parcel,21[4] containing an area of
260,590 sq m, more or less, is situated in the Sitio of Tulay19[2] Also spelled as Dominga Go Ymco Ima or Go Imco Ima.

20[3] It is more particularly described as follows:A parcel of land (Parcel 1, Lot No. 3,
Plan II-5626-C) with improvements thereon, situated in the Sitio of Tulay-Buhangin,
Barrio Ilayang Palo, Municipality of Pagbilao. Bounded on the N., by property of
Fermin Macariola; on the NE., by properties of Fermin Macariola and Zoilo Porio and
the China Sea; on the SE., by property of Evaristo Zoleta; on the SW., by properties of
Ciriaco Aguja and Demetrio Orjalisa; on the NW., by property of Demetrio Orjalisa. x x
x Containing an area of TWENTY-EIGHT THOUSAND AND FIFTY-ONE SQUARE
METERS (28,051), more or less.

Buhangin, Barrio of Laguimanoc, Municipality of Atimonan (now

Padre Burgos), Province of Quezon. The subject lots were
registered in the name of Dominga Goyma on February 6, 1948
under TCT No. T-2857.

Dominga Goyma died on July 19, 1971 and was survived by her
only son, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr., a spurious son acknowledged and
recognized by her.

The complaint also alleged that during her lifetime, Dominga

Goyma exclusively possessed the subject lots and upon her
death, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. succeeded to all her rights of
ownership and possession. However, the spouses Rodriguez,
despite their knowledge that Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr., was now the
owner and possessor of the subject lots, allegedly unlawfully and
fraudulently made it appear that they had purchased the subject
lots from persons who were not the owners thereof.
21[4] It is more particularly described as follows:A parcel of land (Parcel 2, Lot No. 4,
Plan II-5626-D) with improvements thereon, situated in the Sitio of Tulay-Buhangin,
Barrio of Laguimanoc, Municipality of Atimonan (now Padre Burgos). Bounded on the
N., by the China Sea and the Mangrove Swamp; on the NE., E., and SE., by the
property of Manuel Salazar, on the S., by property of the Heirs of Juan Villaseor, on the
SW., by the China Sea; and on the NW., by property of Evaristo Zoleta and the China
Sea. x x x Containing an area of TWO HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED AND NINETY SQUARE METERS (260,590), more or less.

The spouses Rodriguez allegedly caused the cancellation of

TCT No. T-2857 despite the fact that the owners duplicate copy
thereof was in the possession of Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. On February
10, 1975, TCT No. T-128605 was issued in the name of Frisco 22[5]
Gudani, estranged husband of Dominga Goyma. This title was
cancelled by TCT No. T-128606 issued in the name of Eduardo
Victa also on February 10, 1975. The latter certificate of title, in
turn, was cancelled by TCT No. T-128607 issued in the name of
the spouses Rodriguez also on February 10, 1975.

Since May 1975, the spouses Rodriguez allegedly tried to

enter and occupy the subject lots by force and intimidation. Pablo
Goyma Lim, Jr. thus prayed in his complaint that the spouses
Rodriguez be permanently enjoined from entering and occupying
the subject lots; TCT No. 128607 be declared null and void and
TCT No. T-2857 in the name of Dominga Goyma be reinstated;
and the spouses Rodriguez be ordered to pay Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr.
damages, attorneys fees and the costs of suit.

In their Answer, the spouses Rodriguez denied the material

allegations in the complaint. They alleged that Dominga Goyma
was not the mother of Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. They averred that the
22[5] Also spelled as Prisco.

subject lots were the conjugal property of Frisco Gudani and his
wife Dominga Goyma. When the latter died, Frisco Gudani was her
sole surviving heir.

According to the spouses Rodriguez, Frisco Gudani and

Dominga Goyma, as husband and wife, jointly exercised acts of
ownership and possession over the subject lots. When Dominga
Goyma passed away, Frisco Gudani executed an instrument of
extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased. By virtue
of the said document, Dominga Goymas share in the subject lots
was adjudicated in favor of Frisco Gudani as her sole surviving
heir. The extra-judicial settlement allegedly complied with the
requirements of publication under the Rules of Court.

Thereafter, Frisco Gudani allegedly sold the subject lots to

Eduardo Victa who, in turn, sold the same to the spouses
Rodriguez. The latter claimed that they were purchasers in good
faith and for value. Further, they denied that they had tried to
enter the subject lots by means of force and intimidation. On the
contrary, the spouses Rodriguez claimed that they have been in
possession

of

the

subject

lots

by

themselves

and

their

predecessors-in-interest.

At the pre-trial, the parties stipulated on the following facts:

1. that plaintiff Pablo Goyma [Lim], Jr., the plaintiff in this case, is the same person mentioned in
the birth certificate as Pablo Go Yma, xerox copy of which was submitted during the previous
preliminary hearing, marked as Exhibit A;

2. that Pablito Goyma Lim mentioned in the Individual Income Tax Returns of the deceased
Dominga Goyma, xerox copies of which were submitted during the previous preliminary hearing
and marked as Exhibits B, C and D and in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of the deceased
Dominga Goyma marked as Exhibit E, refers to the plaintiff Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr.;

3. that according to plaintiff Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr., he is an illegitimate child other than natural
of the deceased Dominga Goyma;

4. that the deceased Dominga Goyma died on July 19, 1971 and that at the time of her death, she
was then the registered owner of the two parcels of land mentioned in paragraph 2 of the
complaint covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2857; that under the aforesaid Transfer
Certificate of Title, said lands are registered in the name of Dominga Goyma, wife of Frisco
Gudani;

5. that at the time of the death of Dominga Goyma, plaintiff Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr., was then
more than thirty-five (35) years of age;

6. that previous to the instant case, there has been no judicial inquiry as to the maternity or
filiation of plaintiff Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr.

x x x x23[6]

23[6] RTC Decision, dated May 17, 1990, pp. 7-8; rollo, pp. 67-68.

Efforts of the parties to enter into an amicable settlement of

the case fell through. Consequently, trial on the merits ensued. In
the meantime, in the course of the trial, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. died
on September 8, 1988. He was duly substituted by his surviving
spouse, Concordia Ong Lim, and children Eurestes and Elmer Lim.

During trial, both parties adduced their respective evidence.

Among those presented to support the allegations of Pablo Goyma
Lim, Jr. were the following: Deed of Absolute Sale dated December
13, 1945 (Exhibit I) covering four parcels of land, including the
subject lots, purchased by Dominga Goyma from Marciano and
Marina Rodriguez; Marital Consent dated March 19, 1932 (Exhibit
K) executed by Frisco Gudani and Dominga Goyma; TCT No. T2857 (Exhibit A) covering the subject lots issued in the name of
Dominga Goyma; Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr.s Certificate of Birth
(Exhibit B) indicating that his mother was Dominga Goyma;
Statement of Assets, Income and Liabilities for 1958 (Exhibit C) of
Dominga Goyma indicating Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. as her son;
Income Tax Returns for calendar years 1953 up to 1955 (Exhibit D
to F) of Dominga Goyma, where she invariably claimed personal
exemption as head of the family and stated therein that she was
separated from her husband and claimed an exemption for her

son Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr.; and Real Property Tax Receipts from
1955, 1957 up to 1975 (Exhibits H, H-1 up to H-22) covering the
subject property paid by Pablito Goyma Lim, Jr.

For their part, the spouses Rodriguez presented the following

documentary evidence: Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 3,
1975 (Exhibit I) covering the subject lots showing that the
spouses Rodriguez acquired them from Eduardo Victa; TCT No. T128607 (Exhibit II) covering the subject lots issued in the name of
the spouses Rodriguez on February 10, 1975; TCT No. T-128606
(Exhibit V) covering the subject lots issued in the name of
Eduardo Victa on February 10, 1975; TCT No. T-128605 (Exhibit IV)
covering the subject lots issued in the name of Frisco Gudani on
February 10, 1975; and TCT No. T-2857 (Exhibit III) covering the
subject lots in the name of Dominga Goyma.

Also admitted in evidence by the court a quo was the

deposition of Frisco Gudani taken on October 22, 1977. The court
a quo summarized the contents of his deposition as follows:

x x x From the deposition, it appears that Prisco M. Gudani, a 77 yearold laborer resident of Barrio Binahaan, Pagbilao, Quezon, was married
to Dominga Goyma on March 22, 1922. They lived together for eleven
(11) months and they were separated when Prisco Gudani left the
conjugal dwelling one night without the knowledge of Dominga Goyma,
never returning to the conjugal dwelling since then. He knows that

Dominga Goyma is now dead. He knows too that Pablo Goyma Lim is
the son of the late Dominga Goyma. His statement in his Affidavit,
dated June 25, 1976 (Exhibit C-Deposition) that Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. is
not the son of Dominga Goyma is not correct. He said that it was Atty.
Alejandro B. Aguilan who prepared said affidavit and told him to sign it
otherwise what property he will receive will be forfeited in favor of the
government. He does not know anything about the two parcels of land
subject of this case. On the affidavit, dated March 15, 1973 (Exhibit DDeposition) adjudicating unto himself the property stated therein,
including the two parcels of land subject of this case, he explained that
said affidavit was prepared by Atty. Alejandro B. Aguilan, who must
have known about the properties left by Dominga Goyma and made
him understand that he is inheriting the three (3) parcels of land left by
Dominga Goyma, the truth being that he had never set foot on these
properties and he does not know anything about these properties.
When he arrived, the prepared affidavit was read to him and he was
told to sign. Atty. Aguilan explained to him that if he will not sign the
document, the properties will go to the government and, because he
did not want these properties to go to the government, he signed the
affidavit in order to get the properties. Had it been explained to him
that these properties will not be forfeited in favor of the government,
he will not sign the affidavit. The first time Atty. Aguilan told him about
the properties of Dominga Goyma was about two years after her death.
Atty. Aguilan went to him in his residence in Pagbilao, Quezon and told
him that if he will not agree to get the property of Dominga Goyma,
those properties will go to the government. Atty. Aguilan told him that
because he had not contributed anything in the acquisition of said
properties, his share is one-fourth. On March 15, 1973, Atty. Aguilan
made him sign a prepared petition for the issuance of a second owners
duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2857 (Exhibit EDeposition). On the same date, he was also made to sign an Affidavit
of Loss prepared by Atty. Aguilan (Exhibit E-1, Deposition). He had not
at any time been in possession of the owners copy of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-2857. He signed both the foregoing documents
on the explanation of Atty. Aguilan that he will use them in order to
look for the title. He does not know Eduardo Victa and had never met
him personally. When shown the DEED OF CONDITIONAL SALE OF REAL
PROPERTY, dated September 10, 1974 (Exhibit F-Deposition), he
admitted he sold the property. Said document was prepared by Atty.
Aguilan who told him that the P20,000.00 constitute his one-fourth
share of the properties of Dominga Goyma, but Atty. Aguilan told him
to receive only P10,000.00 because the P10,000.00 will be used to
cover the expenses of litigation. Of the P10,000.00 left, P5,000.00 was
given to him and the other P5,000.00 was taken by Atty. Aguilan, as

they are share and share alike in the P10,000.00. He explained that
when he signed the deed of sale, he was made to understand that he
was selling only the one-fourth share of the property that he owns and
the price for the one-fourth share is P20,000.00. On the document
entitled DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF REAL PROPERTY, dated January
17, 1975 (Exhibit G-Deposition) he claims not to have received the
P60,000.00. Atty. Aguilan, who prepared the document, told him to sign
it and he (Atty. Aguilan) will deliver the money later. Atty. Aguilan did
not mention the P60,000.00, but only P20,000.00. It was only Atty.
Aguilan who was present when he signed the document. He met
defendant Reynaldo Rodriguez once when he went to the office of Atty.
Magadia and Atty. Uy at the Baas Building, Rizal Avenue, Manila, in the
company of Atty. Aguilan. He was invited to a restaurant and told by
Reynaldo Rodriguez that he purchased the properties for a very low
price and he would give Gudani an additional amount of P1,500.00
upon the termination of the case that may be filed by Pablo Goyma
Lim, that is why he was holding the P10,000.00 to be spent for the
expected litigation. After eating, Reynaldo Rodriguez gave him P50.00
for him to buy betel leaves. He said that Atty. Alejandro B. Aguilan is a
lawyer in Pagbilao, Quezon, who persuaded him to agree to recover his
share from the properties of Domingo Goyma. x x x24[7]

Based on the evidence presented by both parties, the court a quo

rendered judgment in favor of Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. and against
the spouses Rodriguez. In support of its conclusions, the court a
quo made the following factual findings:

Dominga Goyma married Frisco Gudani on March 22, 1922.

However, after living together for only eleven (11) months, Frisco
Gudani left the conjugal abode and never returned. They never
had any children. On March 19, 1932, Frisco Gudani and Dominga

24[7] RTC Decision, pp. 22-26; rollo, pp. 82-86.

Goyma executed a public instrument denominated as MARITAL

CONSENT,25[8] the contents of which are quoted below in full:

MARITAL CONSENT

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

That I, Prisco Gudani, Filipino, of legal age, married and a resident of

Pagbilao, Tayabas, declares:

That I am the husband of Dominga Go Imco Ima, Filipina, of legal

age, and also a resident of Pagbilao, Tayabas, for whom I make this
marital consent.
That since the year 1924, for certain reasons which are delicate
to state or mention herein, my wife and I have been living separately.

It was agreed by and between us from the time we separated

that each could then live the life of a single person as if we did not take
each other as husband and wife, and that each could then make his or
her own living without the intervention and responsibility of the other.

Under this state of life that we have, living separately, and upon
request that I grant her a marital consent, by these presents I do
hereby give and grant unto my wife, Dominga Go Imco Ima, full power
and authority and consent to do and perform any and every act and
thing whatsoever requisite, necessary or proper to be done in
whatever she may undertake to do in which under the law in force and
in these Island my presence and personal intervention is necessary, as
fully to all intents and purposes as I might or could do if present and
intervening in person, and specially the following acts:

25[8] Id. at 27-30; id. at 87-90.

To buy or sell, hire, lease or mortgage, lands or buildings, and

other forms of real property, upon such terms and conditions, and
under such covenants as my wife may deem proper;

To purchase and sell, hire or pledge, goods, wares, merchandise,

chattels, choses in action, and other forms of personal property that
are or may come into her possession as owner or otherwise;

To borrow or lend moneys, with or without security, upon such

terms and conditions as she may approve; and to transact any and all
business, operations and affairs with any institution as may be deemed
proper and convenient by her;

To make, sign, execute and deliver contracts, documents,

agreements, deeds and other writings of whatsoever nature, kind and
description, with any and all persons, concerns, and entities, upon
terms and conditions acceptable to her;

To prosecute and defend any and all suits, actions and other
proceedings in the courts, tribunals, departments and offices of the
Government of the Philippine Islands, and to terminate compromise,
settle and adjust the same.

I do hereby renounce any and all rights, title, interest and

participation, rights of actions, if any I have, in connection with the
properties, real or personal, that my wife might have acquired by
purchase, exchange, or otherwise, from any person from the time we
were separated, in 1924, and to all that she may acquire in the future.

In consideration of all that is provided above in this marital

consent, and in consideration of the renunciation made by my
husband, I, Dominga Go Imco Ima, hereby agree also to renounce any
and all rights, title, interest and participation, and also any right of
action, that I may have in connection with any property, real or
personal, acquired or which may be acquired by my husband since we
were separated in 1924, and that any debts or obligations incurred or

which may be incurred by me since we were separated in 1924, and in

the future pursuant to this marital consent, are my sole debts and
obligations in which my husband can have no responsibility.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we together have hereunto signed our

names below as signs of our conformity with the things mentioned
above, at Pagbilao, Tayabas, P.I., on this 19th day of March, 1932.

(SGD) PRISCO M. GUDANI

PRISCO GUDANI
Husband

(SGD) DOMINGA GO YMCO YMA

DOMINGA GO IMCO IMA
Wife

SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:

(SGD) SEVERINO F. MARTINEZ

(SGD) Illegible

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

Municipality of Pagbilao)
Province of Tayabas ) S.S.

Before me, a Notary Public in and for the Province of Tayabas,

Philippine Islands, personally appeared Prisco Gudani, exhibiting to me
his cedula personal No. G-4219255 issued at Pagbilao, Tayabas, and
dated December 15, 1931 AND Dominga Go Ymco Ima, without a
personal cedula by reason of her sex, personally known to me and
known to me to be the same persons who executed the foregoing
instrument, and they acknowledge to me that they executed the same
freely and voluntarily for the uses and purposes therein stated.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed

my notarial seal at Pagbilao, Tayabas, on this 19 th day of March 1932.

(SGD) MARIANO P. DULDULAO

NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission will expire on
December 31, 1933

Doc. No. 15
Book No. 11
Page No. 5
Series of 1932.

After Frisco Gudani had left the conjugal abode, Dominga

Goyma and Pablo Lim cohabited with each other as common law
husband and wife. They had a son, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. who was
born on March 28, 1935.

On December 13, 1945, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute

Sale (Exhibit I), Dominga Goyma purchased from the spouses

Marciano and Marina Rodriguez four (4) parcels of land, including

the subject lots. As a result of the said sale, the certificate of title
(TCT No. 11473) covering the said lots were canceled and, in lieu,
thereof TCT No. T-2857 was issued in favor of Dominga Goyma,
wife of Frisco Gudani, by the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Quezon.

The subject lots were purchased by Dominga Goyma from

her personal funds when she and Frisco Gudani were already
separated

and

after

they

had

executed

the

instrument

denominated as Marital Consent dated March 19, 1932. He did

not contribute anything in the purchase of the subject lots nor did
he know about their existence.

The owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-2857 was in

Dominga Goymas custody and during her lifetime, she took
possession of the subject lots and instituted therein as tenants
Dominador Torres, Loreto Estopace and Simeon Estopace. Before
she passed away on July 19, 1971, Dominga Goyma gave TCT No.
T-2857 to her son, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr., who immediately took
possession of the subject lots.

Two (2) years after Dominga Goymas death, Atty. Alejandro

D. Aguilan went to see Frisco Gudani in Pagbilao, Quezon, and

informed the latter about the properties, including the subject

lots, left by the deceased. Atty. Aguilan falsely made Frisco Gudani
to believe that if he would not acquire the properties for himself,
the same would be forfeited in favor of the government. Frisco
Gudani was then persuaded by Atty. Aguilan to affix his signature
on the following documents: (a) an Affidavit dated March 15, 1973
adjudicating

to

himself

the

properties

mentioned

therein,

including the subject lots; (b) a Petition dated March 15, 1973
filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon for the issuance of
a second owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-2857; (c) an Affidavit
of Loss dated March 15, 1973 for the loss of the owners duplicate
copy of TCT No. T-2857; and (d) an Affidavit dated June 27, 1976
stating that Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. was not the son of Dominga
Goyma.

After the subject lots were adjudicated in favor of Frisco

Gudani and the second owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-2857
was obtained, Atty. Aguilan likewise made the former sign the
Deed of Conditional Sale of Property dated September 10, 1974
covering the subject lots in favor of Eduardo Victa. The two
parties to the instrument never met each other and it was only
Atty. Aguilan who was present when Frisco Gudani signed the
same.

The

notary

public

before

whom

acknowledged the same was not present.

they

supposedly

For

the

said

purported

sale,

Frisco

Gudani

received

P5,000.00 only because, according to Atty. Aguilan, he did not

contribute anything to the acquisition of the subject lots.
Thereafter, Frisco Gudani was made to sign by Atty. Aguilan a
Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 17, 1975 transferring the
subject lots to Eduardo Victa.

For a time, the subject lots continued to be covered by TCT

No. T-2857 in the name of Dominga Goyma. On February 3, 1975,
as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit I), Eduardo
Victa sold the subject lots to the spouses Rodriguez. Aside from
the said instrument, the following documents were given to the
spouses Rodriguez: (a) the second duplicate owners copy of TCT
No. T-2857; (b) Affidavit dated March 15, 1973 of Frisco Gudani
adjudicating to himself the properties of Dominga Goyma,
including the subject lots; and (c) Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Property dated January 17, 1975 executed by Frisco Gudani in
favor of Eduardo Victa.

All these documents were presented by a certain Atty.

Magadia to the Register of Deeds of the Province of Quezon on
February 10, 1975. On the basis of these documents, TCT No. T2857 was canceled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-128605 was
issued in the name of Frisco Gudani on February 10, 1975.
Thereafter, TCT No. T-128605 was cancelled and, in lieu thereof,

TCT No. T-128606 was issued by the same Register of Deeds in

the name of Eduardo Victa also on February 10, 1975. Finally, TCT
No. T-128606 was canceled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-128607
was issued by the same Register of Deeds in the name of the
spouses Rodriguez also on February 10, 1975.

Based on its factual findings, the court a quo concluded that

the evidence showed that the transactions involving the subject
lots, particularly the transfers thereof from the deceased Dominga
Goyma to Frisco Gudani and from him to Eduardo Victa were
fraudulent and made through the machinations of Atty. Aguilan.
The latter, according to the court a quo, took advantage of his
legal training in making Frisco Gudani, a simple- minded laborer,
an unsuspecting and nave tool in a grand scheme to dispossess
plaintiff Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. of the property rightfully his by
inheritance from his mother, the deceased Dominga Goyma. 26[9]

Given the fraudulent character of the transactions, the court

a quo held that the spouses Rodriguez could not avail of the
protective mantle of the law protecting purchasers for value in
good faith. The spouses Rodriguez were declared to be purchasers
in bad faith because they had prior knowledge of the claim of

26[9] RTC Decision, p. 38; rollo, p. 97.

Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. over the subject lots and even anticipated
his filing of the case against them.

The court a quo also stated that even granting arguendo

that fraud attendant to the transactions were not sufficient to
vitiate consent as to nullify the transactions, still the transactions
entered into by Frisco Gudani relative to the subject lots were void
for want of authority to sell them.

The court a quo explained that since Dominga Goyma died

on July 19, 1971 without a will, legal or intestate succession takes
place following paragraph (1) of Article 960 27[10] of the Civil
Code. Under the law on intestacy, particularly Article 998 28[11]
thereof, the widower or widow who survives with illegitimate
children shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
illegitimate children to the other half.

However, in Frisco Gudanis case, he did not contribute any

amount in the purchase of the subject lots. Moreover, these were
acquired by Dominga Goyma after her de facto separation from
Frisco Gudani. The estate left by the deceased, including the
subject lots, should have first been partitioned in an appropriate
estate proceeding to determine those entitled thereto. Without
27[10] The provision reads in part:ART. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:
(1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has subsequently
lost its validity;
xxx

28[11] The provision reads:ART. 998. If a widow or widower survives with illegitimate
children, such widow or widower shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the
illegitimate children or their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, to the other
half.

the said proceeding or prior thereto, Frisco Gudani could not lay
valid claim, if he had any, over the subject lots as sole heir and he
could not have been the owner thereof who could legally transfer
ownership by means of sale.

The decretal portion of the Decision dated May 17, 1990 of

the court a quo reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in

favor of the substituted plaintiffs, CONCORDIA ONG LIM, EURESTES LIM
and ELMER LIM and against the defendants, the spouses REYNALDO
RODRIGUEZ and NANCY A. RODRIGUEZ, as follows:

a)

Declaring as null and void all transactions relative to the

properties in question submitted to the Register of Deeds for
the Province of Quezon on February 10, 1975;

b)

Declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-128607 in the name

of defendants as null and void and ordering the reinstatement
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2857 in the name of
DOMINGA GOYMA, of age, the wife of Frisco Gudani, plaintiffs
predecessor-in-interest;

c)

Ordering the defendants to immediately vacate the premises

of the properties subject of this litigation;

d)

Ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs the amount of

P24,000.00 as attorneys fees; and

e)

Ordering the defendants to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.29[12]

Aggrieved, the spouses Rodriguez filed an appeal with the

Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed Decision dated July
18, 1995 affirming in toto the decision of the court a quo. The
appellate court substantially affirmed the factual findings and
conclusion of the court a quo. It stressed that Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr.
was the son of the decedent Dominga Goyma as evidenced by a
voluntary acknowledgment made in his record of birth (Exhibit C)
and in the other documentary evidence presented during trial. His
right to succession was transmitted when Dominga Goyma
passed away on July 19, 1971 following Article 777 30[13] of the
Civil Code. On the other hand, Frisco Gudani could not dispose of
the subject lots before partition of the estate of Dominga Goyma
and without authority given by Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr.

On the matter of whether the spouses Rodriguez purchased

the subject lots in good faith and for value, the appellate court
29[12] Rollo, pp. 100-101.

30[13] The provision reads:ART. 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from
the moment of the death of the decedent.

ruled in the negative, as record was replete with evidence

disproving their claim of good faith. Rejecting the argument
proffered by the spouses Rodriguez, the appellate court held that
Frisco Gudani and Eduardo Victa were not indispensable parties
because they were not in possession of the subject lots and their
interests therein were inferior and irrelevant to, and could not
affect, the right of Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. to a designated portion of
the subject lots by inheritance from his mother Dominga Goyma.

The decretal portion of the appellate courts decision reads:

PREMISES CONSIDERED,
AFFIRMED.

the

decision

appealed

from is hereby

SO ORDERED.31[14]

The spouses Rodriguez filed a motion for reconsideration

which the appellate court denied in the assailed Resolution dated
October 5, 1998.

31[14] Rollo, p. 44.

Forthwith, the spouses Rodriguez (petitioners) filed the

present petition for review on certiorari and in support thereof
allege the following:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

RESPONDENTS PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST, PABLO GO IMA LIM, WAS A COOWNER OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES AND ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF OF THE
SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND DESPITE THE FACT THAT SAID PABLO GO IMA LIM
WAS NOT RECOGNIZED BY HER [SIC] PARENTS AS AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD AND
THE ALLEGED DOCUMENTS PROVING HIS VOLUNTARY ACKNOWLEDGMENT DO
NOT SUFFICE TO PROVE HIS FILIATION TO HIS PARENTS.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

VENDEE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES, PRISCO GUDANI, COULD NOT VALIDLY
DISPOSE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES BEFORE PARTITION AND WITHOUT THE
LEGAL AUTHORITY GIVEN BY THE ILLEGITIMATE CHILD, PABLO GO IMA LIM.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT

PETITIONERS WERE PURCHASERS OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES IN GOOD FAITH
AND FOR VALUE.

IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE VENDEES OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES, PRISCO GUDANI
AND EDUARDO VICTA, NOT BEING INDISPENSABLE PARTIES, THEY
WERE PROPERLY NOT IMPLEADED AS DEFENDANTS IN THE
COMPLAINT.32[15]

32[15] Id. at 16-17.

The petition is bereft of merit.

Petitioners assail the filiation of Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. stating that he was not
duly acknowledged or recognized by either of his parents. This contention is
erroneous. It is axiomatic that factual findings of the trial court, especially when
affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive and binding on the Court. 33[16] In
this case, the court a quo and the appellate court are in agreement that, based on
the evidence presented, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. was the illegitimate and
acknowledged son of Dominga Goyma.

The Court has laid down the manner of establishing the filiation of children,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, as follows:

The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is

established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by
(1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record, or in, any authentic writing
is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no
further action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not
just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial
approval.34[17]

Various documentary evidence were proffered by Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. to prove that
he was the illegitimate and acknowledged son of Dominga Goyma. Among them
were his certificate of birth (Exhibit B) indicating that his mother was Dominga
Goyma; statement of assets, income and liabilities for 1958 (Exhibit C) of Dominga
Goyma indicating him as her son and; income tax returns for calendar years 1953
33[16] Santos v. Alana, G.R. No. 154942, August 16, 2005, 467 SCRA 176, 181.
34[17] Eceta v. Eceta, G.R. No. 157037, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 782, 785-786.

up to 1955 (Exhibits D to F)) of Dominga Goyma where she invariably claimed

personal exemption as head of the family and stated therein that she was separated
from her husband and claimed an exemption for her son, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr.
These pieces of documentary evidence, whose authenticity were not refuted by
petitioners, were properly considered by the court a quo and the appellate court to
establish that Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. was acknowledged by Dominga Goyma to be her
illegitimate son.

The court a quo, as affirmed by the appellate court, likewise correctly nullified
TCT No. T-128607 in the name of petitioners. In fact, all the transactions relative
to TCT No. T-2857, i.e., affidavit of Frisco Gudani adjudicating to himself the
subject lots and their purported sale by him to Eduardo Victa and by the latter to
petitioners, were declared null and void by the court a quo on the ground that,
as established by evidence, these were all made through the fraudulent
machinations of Atty. Aguilan.
It should be recalled that Atty. Aguilan made Frisco Gudani affix his signature on,
among other documents, a Petition dated March 15, 1973 filed with the Court of
First Instance of the Province of Quezon for the issuance of a second owners
duplicate copy of TCT No. T-2857 and an Affidavit of Loss dated March 15, 1973
for the loss of the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-2857. Obviously, these
documents contained falsehoods because TCT No. T-2857 was never lost and, in
fact, had been in the possession of Dominga Goyma during her lifetime and,
when she passed away on July 19, 1971, in the possession of Pablo Goyma Lim,
Jr.

It has been consistently ruled that when the owners duplicate certificate of title
has not been lost, but is in fact in the possession of another person, then the
reconstituted certificate is void, because the court that rendered the decision
had no jurisdiction. Reconstitution can validly be made only in case of loss of the
original certificate.35[18] In such a case, the decision authorizing the issuance of
a new owners duplicate certificate of title may be attacked any time. 36[19]

Applying this rule, it is apparent that the second owners duplicate copy of TCT
No. T-2857 issued upon the petition of Frisco Gudani was void. Further, the
certificates of title (TCT No. T-128605 in the name of Frisco Gudani, TCT No. T35[18] Eastworld Motor Industries Corp. v. Skunac Corporation, G.R. No. 163994,
December 16, 2005, 478 SCRA 420, 426-427.
36[19] New Durawood Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 324 Phil. 109 (1996), citing
Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 482 (1991).

128606 in the name of Eduardo Victa and TCT No. T-128607 in the names of
petitioners) that were subsequently issued covering the subject lots may be
nullified because they all emanated from a void document, i.e., the second
owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-2857 that was procured by Frisco Gudani, or
more particularly by Atty. Aguilan, in behalf of Frisco Gudani, through fraud.
Transfer certificates of title may be annulled if issued based on void
documents.37[20]

Petitioners cannot raise the defense of indefeasibility of a Torrens title with

respect to TCT No. T-168607 because the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title
does not apply where fraud attended the issuance of the title. The Torrens title does
not furnish a shield for fraud.38[21] They cannot deny any knowledge of the fraud
that attended the transactions involving the subject lots, including their acquisition
thereof. Stated differently, petitioners cannot claim that they were purchasers in
good faith and for value because the transactions involving the subject lots were so
replete with badges of fraud and irregularities that should have put them on guard
about the defects in the respective titles of Frisco Gudani and Eduardo Victa.

To recall, TCT No. T-2857 was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-128605
was issued in the name of Frisco Gudani, on February 10, 1975. The latter was
thereafter cancelled by TCT No. T-128606 issued in the name of Eduardo Victa also
on February 10, 1975. The latter certificate of title, in turn, was cancelled by TCT
No. T-128607 issued in the name of the spouses Rodriguez also on February 10,
1975. These highly irregular transfers of ownership, i.e., cancellation and/or
issuance of certificates of title, involving the subject lots all transpiring on the
same date eloquently betray the fraud that attended the transactions, including

37[20] Bongalon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142441, November 10, 2004, 441
SCRA 553, 572.
38[21] Sacdalan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128967, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 586,
600.

petitioners acquisition thereof. It is certainly unlikely that petitioners had no

knowledge of these fraudulent transactions.

Petitioners claim of being purchasers in good faith and for value was
debunked by the court a quo, thus:
Defendant spouses, under the premises, cannot avail of the protective
mantle of law protecting a purchaser for value and in good faith, as
they are not purchasers for value and neither have they acted in good
faith. Defendants cannot successfully put up a picture of innocence as
to the fraud that characterized the transactions relative to their
ultimate acquisition of the properties subject of this litigation.
Defendant Reynaldo Rodriguez was well aware that on his acquisition
of the properties, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. will file suit against him that is
why he retained P10,000.00 of the purchase price, which amount is
intended to be used in the expected litigation. In fact, defendant
Reynaldo Rodriguez admitted to Frisco Gudani that he purchased the
properties at a very low price because of which he promised to give
Frisco Gudani an additional amount of P1,500.00 upon the termination
of the case.39[22]

On this point, the appellate court succinctly stated that as to the contention
that appellants (referring to petitioners) purchased the properties in good faith and
for value, the record is replete with evidence negating such contention and the
issue had been thoroughly discussed in the appealed decision which would render
any further discussion a superfluity. 40[23]

Contrary to the petitioners contention, Eduardo Victa and Frisco Gudani are
not indispensable parties. The complaint filed by Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. was for the
cancellation of TCT No. T-128607 in the name of petitioners and to enjoin them from

39[22] RTC Decision, p. 39; rollo, 98.

40[23] Rollo, p. 44.

entering the subject lots. The following discussion on who is or is not an

indispensable party is apropos:

An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the

courts action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination
of the case can be had. The partys interest in the subject matter of the
suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the
other parties that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an
absolute necessity. In his absence there cannot be a resolution of the
dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or
equitable.
Conversely, a party is not indispensable to the suit if his interest in the
controversy or subject matter is distinct and divisible from the interest
of the other parties and will not necessarily be prejudiced by a
judgment which does complete justice to the parties in court. He is not
indispensable if his presence would merely permit complete relief
between him and those already parties to the action or will simply
avoid multiple litigation.41[24]

A final determination could be had in the complaint for cancellation of TCT

No. T-128607 and injunction even without Eduardo Victa and Frisco Gudani. Only the
petitioners are indispensable parties therein and their insistence that Eduardo Victa
and Frisco Gudani should likewise be impleaded deserves scant consideration.

Having established that petitioners TCT No. T-128607 emanated from a void
document, i.e. the second owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-2857 procured by
Frisco Gudani and/or Atty. Aguilan through fraud and when Domingas owners
duplicate certificate of title had not been lost, and that petitioners were not
purchasers in good faith and for value, the Court concludes that the nullification of
petitioners TCT No. T-128607 is warranted under the circumstances. The appellate
court therefore committed no reversible error in affirming the decision of the court a
quo which, among others, declared as null and void TCT No. T-128607 in the name
41[24] Philippine National Bank v. Heirs of Estanislao Militar and Deogracias Militar,
G.R. No. 164801, August 18, 2005, 467 SCRA 377, 384.

of petitioners and, instead, reinstated TCT No. T-2857 in the name of Dominga
Goyma, mother of Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. (now substituted by his spouse and children)
respondents Concordia Ong Lim, Eurestes and Elmer Lim.

The Court finds it unnecessary, at this point, to determine the successional

rights, if any, of Frisco Gudani to the properties left by Dominga Goyma. Such
matter is better threshed out in the proper special proceedings for the settlement of
the intestate estate of Dominga Goyma. As held by this Court, matters which
involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the
exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction. 42

[25]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 18, 1995 and
Resolution dated October 5, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 27440
are AFFIRMED in toto.

42[25] Natcher v. Court of Appeals, 418 Phil. 669, 677 (2001).

SO ORDERED.

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Chief Justice
Chairperson

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is

hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

Today is Tuesday, October 25, 2016

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 168156

December 6, 2006

HEIRS OF ROSENDO LASAM, Represented by Rogelio Lasam and Atty. Edward P. Llonillo, petitioners,
vs.
VICENTA UMENGAN, respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari filed by the Heirs of Rosendo Lasam, represented by Rogelio M.
Lasam and Atty. Edward P. Llonillo, seeking the reversal of the Decision1 dated February 16, 2005 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 80032. The assailed decision reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan and dismissed, for lack of merit, the complaint for unlawful detainer file by the said heirs

against respondent Vicenta Umengan.

The RTC decision affirmed that of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of the same city, Branch III, which had
rendered judgment in favor of the heirs of Rosendo Lasam and directed the ejectment of respondent Vicenta Umengan from
the lot subject of litigation.
The present petition likewise seeks the reversal of the CA Resolution dated May 17, 2005 denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by the heirs of Rosendo Lasam.
As culled from the records, the backdrop of the present case is as follows
The lot subject of the unlawful detainer case is situated in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan. It is the eastern half portion of Lot No.
5427 and Lot No. 990. The first lot, Lot No. 5427 containing an area of 1,037 square meters, is covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 196. The second lot, Lot No. 990 containing an area of 118 sq m, is covered by OCT No.
1032. These lots are registered in the names of the original owners, spouses Pedro Cuntapay and Leona Bunagan.
In an instrument denominated as Deed of Confirmation and acknowledged before a notary public on June 14, 1979, the heirs
of the said spouses conveyed the ownership of Lots Nos. 990 and 5427 in favor of their two children, Irene Cuntapay and
Isabel Cuntapay. In another instrument entitled Partition Agreement and acknowledged before a notary public on December
28, 1979, it was agreed that the eastern half portion (subject lot) of Lots Nos. 990 and 5427 shall belong to the heirs of
Isabel Cuntapay. On the other hand, the remaining portion thereof (the west portion) shall belong to the heirs of Irene
Cuntapay. The subject lot (eastern half portion) has an area of 554 sq m.
Isabel Cuntapay had four children by her first husband, Domingo Turingan, namely: Abdon, Sado (deceased), Rufo and
Maria. When Domingo Turingan passed away, Isabel Cuntapay remarried Mariano Lasam. She had two other children by
him, namely: Trinidad and Rosendo.
Sometime in January 2001, the heirs of Rosendo Lasam (son of Isabel Cuntapay by her second husband) filed with the
MTCC a complaint for unlawful detainer against Vicenta Umengan, who was then occupying the subject lot. Vicenta
Umengan is the daughter of Abdon Turingan (son of Isabel Cuntapay by her first husband).
In their complaint, the heirs of Rosendo Lasam alleged that they are the owners of the subject lot, having inherited it from
their father. Rosendo Lasam was allegedly the sole heir of the deceased Pedro Cuntapay through Isabel Cuntapay. During his
lifetime, Rosendo Lasam allegedly temporarily allowed Vicenta Umengan to occupy the subject lot sometime in 1955. The
latter and her husband allegedly promised that they would vacate the subject lot upon demand. However, despite written
notice and demand by the heirs of Rosendo Lasam, Vicenta Umengan allegedly unlawfully refused to vacate the subject lot
and continued to possess the same. Accordingly, the heirs of Rosendo Lasam were constrained to institute the action for
ejectment.
In her Answer with Counterclaim, Vicenta Umengan specifically denied the material allegations in the complaint. She
countered that when Isabel Cuntapay passed away, the subject lot was inherited by her six children by her first and second
marriages through intestate succession. Each of the six children allegedly had a pro indiviso share of 1/6 of the subject lot.
It was further alleged by Vicenta Umengan that her father, Abdon Turingan, purchased the respective 1/6 shares in the
subject lot of his siblings Maria and Sado. These conveyances were allegedly evidenced by the Deed of Sale dated March 3,

1975, appearing as Doc. No. 88, Page No. 36, Book No. XIV, series of 1975 of the notarial book of Atty. Pedro Lagui.
Prior thereto, Rufo already sold his 1/6 share in the subject lot to Vicenta Umengan and her husband as evidenced by the
Deed of Sale dated June 14, 1961, appearing as Doc. No. 539, Page No. 41, Book No. V, series of 1961 of the notarial book
of Atty. Pedro Lagui. Also on June 14, 1961, Abdon donated his 1/6 share in the subject lot to her daughter Vicenta
Umengan as evidenced by the Deed of Donation appearing as Doc. No. 538, Page No. 41, Book No. V, series of 1961 of the
notarial book of the same notary public.
According to Vicenta Umengan, the children of Isabel Cuntapay by her second husband (Rosendo and Trinidad Lasam) own
only 2/6 portion of the subject lot. She thus prayed that the complaint for ejectment be dismissed and that the heirs of
Rosendo Lasam be ordered to pay her damages.
The MTCC rendered judgment in favor of the heirs of Rosendo Lasam and directed the ejectment of Vicenta Umengan. In
so ruling, the MTCC gave credence to the newly discovered last will and testament (entitled Testamento Abierto)
purportedly executed by Isabel Cuntapay where she bequeathed the subject lot to her son, Rosendo Lasam, thus:
x x x my share 1/5th (one-fifth) of the Cuntapay heirs, bordered on the North by Sr. Elia Canapi; to the South,
by Calle Aguinaldo; to the East, by Calle P. Burgos and the West, by the late Don Luis Alonso; on the
property which is my share stands a house of light materials where I presently reside; this 1/5th (one-fifth)
share of my inheritance from the Cuntapays I leave to my son Rosendo Lasam and also the aforementioned
house of light material x x x2
The MTCC reasoned that the heirs of Rosendo Lasam anchored their claim over the subject lot on the last will and testament
of Isabel Cuntapay while Vicenta Umengan hinged hers on intestate succession and legal conveyances. Citing jurisprudence3
and Article 10804 of the Civil Code, the MTCC opined that testacy was favored and that intestacy should be avoided and the
wishes of the testator should prevail. It observed that the last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay was not yet probated as
required by law; nonetheless, the institution of a probate proceeding was not barred by prescription.
With the finding that the subject lot was already bequeathed by Isabel Cuntapay to Rosendo Lasam, the MTCC held that the
siblings Abdon, Sado, Rufo and Maria Turingan no longer had any share therein. Consequently, they could not convey to
Vicenta Umengan what they did not own. On the issue then of who was entitled to possession of the subject lot, the MTCC
ruled in favor of the heirs of Rosendo Lasam as it found that Vicenta Umengans possession thereof was by mere tolerance.
The dispositive portion of the MTCC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, this Court Resolve[d] to order the EJECTMENT
of VICENTA T. UMENGAN and in her place INSTITUTE THE HEIRS OF ROSENDO LASAM.
It is further ordered the defendant shall pay the Heirs of Rosendo Lasam the sum of P500.00 pesos
representing the monthly rental of the land from August 2000 to the time this case shall have been terminated.
Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P20,000.00 attorneys fees plus cost of this
litigation.
So Ordered.5
On appeal, the RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTCC. The RTC echoed the reasoning of the MTCC that the

FIRST DIVISION

SERGIO BARBOSA and

G.R. No. 133564

JOVITA BARBOSA,
Petitioners,

Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,*
-versus-

CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.

PILAR HERNANDEZ, LETICIA

HUGHES, FELIX VILLANUEVA
and NATIVIDAD SANGALANG,
Respondents.

Promulgated:

July 10, 2007

** On leave.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

On August 11, 1983, Pilar Hernandez bought a 100 sq. m. lot in Capitol
Hills, Barangay Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City from subdivision owner Felix
Villanueva through his wife and attorney-in-fact, Leticia Hughes. Hernandez,
however, did not take physical possession of the property immediately as she was
working overseas in Saudi Arabia at the time. When she visited her property in
November 1987 with plans of building a house thereon, she discovered it in the
possession of petitioners, the spouses Sergio and Jovita Barbosa, who were using it
as the site of their motor repair shop.

Apparently, petitioners had been occupying an area of over 300 square

meters of Villanuevas land since 1962 as his lessees under an oral contract of lease.

The 100 sq. m. lot in question, however, came into their possession only in or after
1979, when they were requested by the subdivision developer, Natividad
Sangalang, to transfer their motor repair shop there to give way to the paving of a
subdivision road that would cut across the shops original location. On November
16, 1983, Hughes sold petitioners a 200 sq. m. portion of the land they were
occupying. This portion did not include the 100 sq. m. lot on which their shop
stood, which Hernandez had bought some three months earlier.

Hernandez demanded that petitioners vacate her lot but they refused. Efforts
to resolve the dispute at the barangay level failed. Thus, on February 14, 1988,
Hernandez filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages43[1] against
petitioners in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City. This was
superseded by an amended complaint44[2] in which Hernandez alleged, in
substance, that she was the owner of the lot and petitioners were unlawfully
depriving her of its possession.

43[1] Docketed as Civil Case No. 2900 and raffled to Branch II, RTC, Batangas City.
Records, pp. 1-3.
44[2] Dated September 26, 1988. Id., pp. 12-14.

In their answer,45[3] petitioners questioned the trial courts jurisdiction over

the subject matter of the action and alleged that they had been in possession of the
land for more than 20 years with the knowledge and consent of its real owner; that
Hernandez had acted in bad faith in allegedly acquiring the land in question and
that they had preferential and prior rights over the premises. Soon thereafter,
petitioners filed a third party complaint46[4] against respondents Leticia Hughes,
Felix Villanueva and Natividad Sangalang. Alleging that the latter had given
petitioners the subject lot in lieu of the original site of their motor repair shop with
a promise that, should Villanueva ever be minded to sell the lot, they would have
the priority and preferential right to purchase47[5] it; that, relying on good faith on
this alleged promise, petitioners made permanent improvements on the lot; and that
without their knowledge, the lot had been sold to Hernandez instead, petitioners
prayed that Villanueva, Hughes and Sangalang be made to pay them damages for
reneging on their obligations. Petitioners also prayed that they be declared as
having the right to acquire the land in litigation, that the sale to Hernandez be
declared null and void, and that she be ordered to reconvey the lot to them.

45[3] Id., pp. 18-19.

46[4] Id., pp. 45-47.
47[5] Id., p. 46.

Villanueva, Hughes and Sangalang denied all the material averments in

petitioners third-party complaint and asserted that the alleged verbal promise to sell
was unenforceable under the statute of frauds.

In a decision48[6] dated February 24, 1993, the RTC ruled that petitioners
failed to prove that there was a definite and complete agreement between them and
Villanueva, Hughes or Sangalang with respect to the disputed lot. It dismissed the
third-party complaint and ordered petitioners to: (1) vacate the lot and restore
possession thereof to Hernandez; (2) remove at their own expense the
improvements they erected on the lot; (3) pay Hernandez P200 a month until
possession of the lot would have been returned to her and (4) pay the costs of suit
and P10,000 in attorneys fees.

Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). In their appeal,
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 41492, petitioners argued that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to try the case inasmuch as it was really an unlawful detainer case
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and
that, since the lot had been promised to be sold to them, Hernandez should have
48[6] Penned by Judge Irineo V. Mendoza. Rollo, pp. 36- 40.

been ordered to reconvey it or, in the alternative, to reimburse them for the
improvements they made on the property.

In a decision49[7] dated September 4, 1997, the CA affirmed the RTC

judgment but deleted the award of attorneys fees. On the issue of jurisdiction, the
CA ruled that the case was an accion publiciana and therefore within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the RTC. The appellate court found petitioners other
arguments to be equally without merit. It held that the alleged promise to sell was
unenforceable under the statute of frauds and, in any event, had not been
established by the evidence on record. As for petitioners alternative prayer for
reimbursement of the improvements they made on the lot, the CA found no legal
basis for granting such relief.

After an unsuccessful motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed the

present appeal by certiorari.50[8]

49[7] Penned by Associate Justice Eduardo G. Montenegro with the concurrence of

Associate Justices Gloria C. Paras and Omar U. Amin (retired) of the Special Third
Division of the Court of Appeals. Id., pp. 17-29.
50[8] Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

NATURE OF THE ACTION

AND JURISDICTION OVER IT

Petitioners contend that the action for recovery of possession, which the
evidence showed to have been initiated within less than a year from the demand to
vacate, was actually an unlawful detainer case which should have been filed in the
MTC.

Petitioners argument runs counter to one of the most fundamental and oftrepeated doctrines of remedial law. The nature of the action on which depends the
question of whether a suit is within the jurisdiction of the court is determined
solely by the allegations in the complaint.51[9] Only facts alleged in the complaint
can be the basis for determining the nature of the action and the courts competence
to take cognizance of it.52[10] One cannot advert to anything not set forth in the

51[9] Dimo Realty & Development, Inc. v. Dimaculangan, G.R. No. 130991, 11 March
2004, 425 SCRA 376; Ching v. Malaya, No. L-56449, 31 August 1987, 153 SCRA 413.
52[10] D.C. Crystal v. Laya, G.R. No. 53597, 28 February 1989, 170 SCRA 734.

complaint, such as evidence adduced at the trial, to determine the nature of the
action thereby initiated.

To make out a case of unlawful detainer under Section 1, Rule 70 of the

Rules of Court,53[11] the complaint must set forth allegations to the effect that the
defendant is unlawfully withholding from the plaintiff the possession of certain
real property after the expiration or termination of the formers right to hold
possession by virtue of a contract, express or implied and that the action is being
brought within one year from the time the defendants possession became unlawful.
A complaint for recovery of possession of real estate will not be considered an
action for unlawful detainer under Section 1, Rule 70 if it omits any of these
special jurisdictional facts.54[12]

53[11] Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides, in part, that a lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or
building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person,
may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding
of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person
or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together
with damages and costs.
54[12] Melliza v. Towle and Mueller, 34 Phil. 345 (1916).

In this case, the only material allegations in the amended complaint were
that the plaintiff (Hernandez) was the registered owner of the lot in dispute and that
the defendants (petitioners) were unlawfully depriving her of its possession. It
contained no averment that possession of the lot was unlawfully withheld under the
circumstances contemplated in Section 1, Rule 70 and that the action to eject the
defendants was being brought within a year from the time their possession became
unlawful. Clearly, the allegations in the complaint were nowhere near enough to
make out a case of unlawful detainer and we are certain that, had it been filed in
the MTC, it would have been dismissed for having been filed in a court which, at
the time, had no jurisdiction over cases involving possession of real property other

than those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer.55[13] Thus, we find no
difficulty in ruling that it was but proper for the RTC to assume jurisdiction over
the case and the CA committed no error in upholding it.

ALLEGED PROMISE TO SELL

55

When the case was filed in 1988, jurisdiction over actions involving title to or
possession of real property, except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, was by
law (BP 129, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) vested exclusively in the RTCs.
Thus, to decide whether an action involving possession of real property had been filed in
the proper court, all that had to be done was to determine the type of action filed: if the
action was for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the MTC was the proper court in which
to file it; any suit for recovery of possession of real property other than forcible entry and
unlawful detainer, however, had to be filed in the RTC. On March 25, 1994, however,
Congress approved RA 7691 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for
the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 129) which expanded the MTCs jurisdiction to include
other actions involving title to or possession of real property where the assessed value of
the property does not exceed P20,000 (or P50,000, for actions filed in Metro Manila).
Because of this amendment, the test of whether an action involving possession of real
property has been filed in the proper court now no longer depends solely on the type of
action filed, i.e., forcible entry and unlawful detainer, accion publiciana, or accion
reinvindicatoria, but also on the assessed value of the property involved. More
specifically, since MTCs now have jurisdiction over accion publiciana and accion
reinvindicatoria (depending, of course, on the assessed value of the property involved,
jurisdiction over such actions has to be determined on the basis of the assessed value of
the property.
[13]

Petitioners insist that, since Villanueva and Sangalang promised to sell them
the lot, Hernandez should either allow them to keep it in exchange for the price she
paid when she bought it from Villanueva or reimburse them for the improvements
they put up on the property. They take issue with the CAs ruling that the alleged
promise to sell was unenforceable under the statute of frauds and was not, in any
event, supported by the evidence on record.

What petitioners have been referring to as a promise to sell was actually a

right of first refusal allegedly given them when they transferred their motor repair
shop to the lot in dispute. This is evident from their third-party complaint which
stated:

x x x the parcel of land under litigation was given by the third party defendants
[Villanueva, Hughes, and Sangalang] to the third party plaintiffs [petitioners] in
lieu of the portion of the land originally being occupied under lease by the latter
in order to give way to the development of the said big portion of the tract of land
being undertaken by the third party defendant Natividad Sangalang with the
understanding that in the event the third party defendant Villanueva should
sell the subdivided lots being developed by the defendant Sanggalang, as
developer, the third party plaintiffs shall have the priority and preferential
right to purchase the same; x x x (emphasis supplied)56[14]

56[14] Records, p. 46.

This Court has held that a right of first refusal is different and distinct from a
contract of sale of real property. 57[15] As such, it is not among those listed as
unenforceable under the statute of frauds.58[16] Thus, the CAs ruling that the
alleged promise was covered by the statute of frauds was erroneous. Nonetheless,
in view of its finding one with which we are in complete accord that petitioners
57

Rosencor Development Corporation v. Inquing, G.R. No. 140479, 8 March 2001, 354
SCRA 119. The statute of frauds is contained in Article 1403 (2) of the Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they
are ratified:
[15]

xxx

xxx

xxx

(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this
number. In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by
action, unless the same, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing, and
subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement
cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents:
a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the
making thereof;
b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another;
c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise
to marry;
d) An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, at a price not
less than five hundred pesos, unless the buyer accept and receive part of such goods and
chattels, or the evidences, or some of them, or such things in action, or pay at the time
some part of the purchase money; but when a sale is made by auction and entry is made
by the auctioneer in his sales book, at the time of the sale, of the amount and kind of
property sold, terms of sale, price, names of purchasers and person on whose account the
sale is made, it is a sufficient memorandum;
e) An agreement for the leasing of a longer period than one year, or for the sale of
real property or of an interest therein;

failed to present preponderant evidence that such a promise or right had in fact
been given, it was a harmless error that would not warrant a reversal of the
judgment appealed from.

RIGHT TO REIMBURSEMENT

In support of their alternative prayer that Hernandez be ordered to reimburse

them the value of the improvements they made on the property, petitioners invoke
Article 448 of the Civil Code, the pertinent part of which reads:

The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting,
after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige
the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed,
the proper rent. x x x

f) A representation to the credit of a third person.

58[16] Id.

Unfortunately for petitioners, Article 448 applies only to a possessor in good

faith, that is, one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof.59
[17] Petitioners cannot be considered builders in good faith as they never had any
pretension to be owners of the disputed lot. Thus, they cannot avail of the benefits
of Article 448.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41492 is AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

59[17] Geminiano v. Court of Appeals, 328 Phil. 682 (1996).

WE

CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

(On Leave)
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

THIRD DIVISION

ERMINDA F. FLORENTINO,

G.R. No. 172384

Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Chairperson,
- versus -

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

SUPERVALUE, INC.,
Respondent.

Promulgated:

September 12, 2007

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under

Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, filed by petitioner Erminda
F. Florentino, seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision, 60[1]
dated 10 October 2003 and the Resolution,61[2] dated 19 April
2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73853. The
appellate court, in its assailed Decision and Resolution, modified
the Decision dated 30 April 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati, Branch 57, in Civil Case No. 00-1015, finding the
respondent Supervalue, Inc., liable for the sum of P192,000.00,
representing the security deposits made by the petitioner upon
the commencement of their Contract of Lease. The dispositive
portion of the assailed appellate courts Decision thus reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is PARTLY

GRANTED. The April 30, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
60[1] Penned by Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion with Associate Justices Godardo A.
Jacinto and Lucas P. Bersamin, concurring. Rollo, pp. 8-17.

61[2] Id. at 9.

Makati, Branch 57 is therefore MODIFIED to wit: (a) the portion ordering

the [herein respondent] to pay the amount of P192,000.00
representing the security deposits and P50,000.00 as attorneys fees in
favor of the [herein petitioner] as well as giving [respondent] the
option to reimburse [petitioner] of the value of the improvements
introduced by the [petitioner] on the leased [premises] should
[respondent] choose to appropriate itself or require the [petitioner] to
remove the improvements, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and
(b) the portion ordering the return to [petitioner] the properties seized
by [respondent] after the former settled her obligation with the latter is
however MAINTAINED.62[3]

The factual and procedural antecedents of the instant

petition are as follows:

Petitioner is doing business under the business name

Empanada Royale, a sole proprietorship engaged in the retail of
empanada

with

outlets

in

different

malls

and

business

establishments within Metro Manila.63[4]

Respondent, on the other hand, is a domestic corporation

engaged in the business of leasing stalls and commercial store

62[3] Id. at 16-17.

63[4] Records, p. 1.

spaces located inside SM Malls found all throughout the country. 64

[5]

On 8 March 1999, petitioner and respondent executed three

Contracts of Lease containing similar terms and conditions over
the cart-type stalls at SM North Edsa and SM Southmall and a
store space at SM Megamall. The term of each contract is for a
period of four months and may be renewed upon agreement of
the parties.65[6]

Upon the expiration of the original Contracts of Lease, the

parties agreed to renew the same by extending their terms until
31 March 2000.66[7]
Before the expiration of said Contracts of Lease, or on 4
February

2000,

petitioner

received

two

letters

from

the

respondent, both dated 14 January 2000, transmitted through

facsimile transmissions.67[8]

64[5] Id.
65[6] Id. at 55-56.
66[7] Id. at 58.
67[8] Id.

In the first letter, petitioner was charged with violating

Section 8 of the Contracts of Lease by not opening on 16
December 1999 and 26 December 1999.68[9]

Respondent also charged petitioner with selling a new

variety of empanada called mini-embutido and of increasing the
price of her merchandise from P20.00 to P22.00, without the prior
approval of the respondent.69[10]

Respondent observed that petitioner was frequently closing

earlier than the usual mall hours, either because of non-delivery
or delay in the delivery of stocks to her outlets, again in violation
of the terms of the contract. A stern warning was thus given to
petitioner to refrain from committing similar infractions in the
future in order to avoid the termination of the lease contract. 70
[11]

68[9] Id.
69[10] Id.
70[11] Id.

In the second letter, respondent informed the petitioner that

it will no longer renew the Contracts of Lease for the three outlets,
upon their expiration on 31 March 2000.71[12]

In a letter-reply dated 11 February 2000, petitioner explained

that the mini-embutido is not a new variety of empanada but had
similar fillings, taste and ingredients as those of pork empanada;
only, its size was reduced in order to make it more affordable to
the buyers.72[13]

Such explanation notwithstanding, respondent still refused to

renew its Contracts of Lease with the petitioner. To the contrary,
respondent took possession of the store space in SM Megamall
and confiscated the equipment and personal belongings of the
petitioner found therein after the expiration of the lease
contract.73[14]

In a letter dated 8 May 2000, petitioner demanded that the

respondent release the equipment and personal belongings it
71[12] Id. at 13.
72[13] Rollo, p. 39.
73[14] Id.

seized from the SM Megamall store space and return the security
deposits, in the sum of P192,000.00, turned over by the petitioner
upon signing of the Contracts of Lease. On 15 June 2000,
petitioner sent respondent another letter reiterating her previous
demands, but the latter failed or refused to comply therewith.
[15]

74

On 17 August 2000, an action for Specific Performance, Sum

of Money and Damages was filed by the petitioner against the
respondent before the RTC of Makati, Branch 57.75[16]

In her Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 00-1015,

petitioner

alleged

that

the

respondent

made

verbal

representations that the Contracts of Lease will be renewed from

time to time and, through the said representations, the petitioner
was induced to introduce improvements upon the store space at
SM Megamall in the sum of P200,000.00, only to find out a year
later that the respondent will no longer renew her lease contracts
for all three outlets.76[17]

74[15] Id. at 14-15.

75[16] Records, pp. 1-5.
76[17] Id.

In addition, petitioner alleged that the respondent, without

justifiable cause and without previous demand, refused to return
the security deposits in the amount of P192,000.00.77[18]

Further, petitioner claimed that the respondent seized her

equipment and personal belongings found inside the store space
in SM Megamall after the lease contract for the said outlet expired
and despite repeated written demands from the petitioner,
respondent continuously refused to return the seized items. 78[19]

Petitioner thus prayed for the award of actual damages in

the sum of P472,000.00, representing the sum of security
deposits, cost of improvements and the value of the personal
properties seized.
P300,000.00

as

Petitioner

also

moral damages;

asked for

the award of

P50,000.00 as

exemplary

damages; and P80,000.00 as attorneys fees and expenses of

litigation.79[20]

77[18] Id.
78[19] Id.
79[20] Id.

For its part, respondent countered that petitioner committed

several violations of the terms of their Contracts of Lease by not
opening from 16 December 1999 to 26 December 1999, and by
introducing a new variety of empanada without the prior consent
of the respondent, as mandated by the provision of Section 2 of
the Contract of Lease. Respondent also alleged that petitioner
infringed the lease contract by frequently closing earlier than the
agreed closing hours. Respondent finally averred that petitioner is
liable for the amount P106,474.09, representing the penalty for
selling a new variety of empanada, electricity and water bills, and
rental adjustment, among other charges incidental to the lease
agreements. Respondent claimed that the seizure of petitioners
personal belongings and equipment was in the exercise of its
retaining lien, considering that the petitioner failed to settle the
said obligations up to the time the complaint was filed. 80[21]

Considering

that

petitioner

already

committed

several

breaches of contract, the respondent thus opted not to renew its

Contracts of Lease with her anymore. The security deposits were
made in order to ensure faithful compliance with the terms of
their lease agreements; and since petitioner committed several
infractions thereof, respondent was justified in forfeiting the
security deposits in the latters favor.

80[21] Id. at 20-28.

On 30 April 2001, the RTC rendered a Judgment 81[22] in favor

of the petitioner and found that the physical takeover by the
respondent of the leased premises and the seizure of petitioners
equipment and personal belongings without prior notice were
illegal. The decretal part of the RTC Judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, judgment is hereby

rendered ordering the [herein respondent] to pay [herein petitioner]
the amount of P192,000.00 representing the security deposits made by
the [petitioner] and P50,000.00 as and for attorneys fees.

The [respondent] is likewise ordered to return to the [petitioner]

the various properties seized by the former after settling her account
with the [respondent].

Lastly, the [respondent] may choose either to reimburse the

[petitioner] one half (1/2) of the value of the improvements introduced
by the plaintiff at SM Megamall should [respondent] choose to
appropriate the improvements to itself or require the [petitioner] to
remove the improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer
damage thereby. [Petitioner] shall not, however, cause anymore
impairment upon the said leased premises than is necessary.

The other damages claimed by the plaintiff are denied for lack of
merit.

81[22] Rollo, pp. 38-43.

Aggrieved, the respondent appealed the adverse RTC

Judgment to the Court of Appeals.

In a Decision82[23] dated 10 October 2003, the Court of

Appeals

modified

the

RTC

Judgment

and

found

that

the

respondent was justified in forfeiting the security deposits and

was not liable to reimburse the petitioner for the value of the
improvements introduced in the leased premises and to pay for
attorneys fees. In modifying the findings of the lower court, the
appellate court declared that in view of the breaches of contract
committed by the petitioner, the respondent is justified in
forfeiting the security deposits. Moreover, since the petitioner did
not obtain the consent of the respondent before she introduced
improvements on the SM Megamall store space, the respondent
has therefore no obligation to reimburse the petitioner for the
amount expended in connection with the said improvements. 83
[24] The Court of Appeals, however, maintained the order of the
trial court for respondent to return to petitioner her properties
after she has settled her obligations to the respondent. The
appellate court denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in a
Resolution84[25] dated 19 April 2006.
82[23] Id. at 8-17.
83[24] Id.
84[25] Id. at 19.

Hence, this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari85[26]

filed by the petitioner assailing the Court of Appeals Decision. For
the resolution of this Court are the following issues:

I.

Whether or not the respondent is liable to return the security

deposits to the petitions.

II.

Whether or not the respondent is liable to reimburse the

petitioner for the sum of the improvements she introduced in the

leased premises.

III.

Whether or not the respondent is liable for attorneys fees. 86

[27]

The appellate court, in finding that the respondent is

authorized to forfeit the security deposits, relied on the provisions
of Sections 5 and 18 of the Contract of Lease, to wit:
85[26] Id. at 22-37.
86[27] Id. at 27-28.

Section 5. DEPOSIT. The LESSEE shall make a cash deposit

in the sum of SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P60 ,000.00) equivalent
to three (3) months rent as security for the full and faithful
performance to each and every term, provision, covenant and
condition of this lease and not as a pre-payment of rent. If at
any time during the term of this lease the rent is increased[,] the
LESSEE on demand shall make an additional deposit equal to the
increase in rent. The LESSOR shall not be required to keep the deposit
separate from its general funds and the deposit shall not be entitled to
interest. The deposit shall remain intact during the entire term and
shall not be applied as payment for any monetary obligations of the
LESSEE under this contract. If the LESSEE shall faithfully perform every
provision of this lease[,] the deposit shall be refunded to the LESSEE
upon the expiration of this Lease and upon satisfaction of all monetary
obligation to the LESSOR.

xxxx

Section 18. TERMINATION. Any breach, non-performance or

non-observance of the terms and conditions herein provided
shall constitute default which shall be sufficient ground to
terminate this lease, its extension or renewal. In which event, the
LESSOR shall demand that LESSEE immediately vacate the premises,
and LESSOR shall forfeit in its favor the deposit tendered
without prejudice to any such other appropriate action as may
be legally authorized.87[28]

Since it was already established by the trial court that the

petitioner was guilty of committing several breaches of contract,
the Court of Appeals decreed that she cannot therefore rightfully
87[28] Records, pp. 9-10.

demand the return of the security deposits for the same are
deemed forfeited by reason of evident contractual violations.

It is undisputed that the above-quoted provision found in all

Contracts of Lease is in the nature of a penal clause to ensure
petitioners faithful compliance with the terms and conditions of
the said contracts.

A penal clause is an accessory undertaking to assume

greater liability in case of breach. It is attached to an obligation in
order to insure performance and has a double function: (1) to
provide for liquidated damages, and (2) to strengthen the
coercive force of the obligation by the threat of greater
responsibility in the event of breach. 88[29] The obligor would then
be bound to pay the stipulated indemnity without the necessity of
proof of the existence and the measure of damages caused by the
breach.89[30] Article 1226 of the Civil Code states:

Art. 1226. In obligations with a penal clause, the penalty shall

substitute the indemnity for damages and the payment of interests in
case of noncompliance, if there is no stipulation to the contrary.
88[29] Filinvest Land, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138980, 20 September 2005, 470
SCRA 260, 269.

89[30] Ligutan v. Court of Appeals, 427 Phil. 42, 51 (2002).

Nevertheless, damages shall be paid if the obligor refuses to pay the

penalty or is guilty of fraud in the fulfillment of the obligation.

The penalty may be enforced only when it is demandable in

accordance with the provisions of this Code.

As a general rule, courts are not at liberty to ignore the

freedoms of the parties to agree on such terms and conditions as
they see fit as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy. Nevertheless, courts may
equitably reduce a stipulated penalty in the contracts in two
instances: (1) if the principal obligation has been partly or
irregularly complied with; and (2) even if there has been no
compliance if the penalty is iniquitous or unconscionable in
accordance with Article 1229 of the Civil Code which clearly
provides:

Art. 1229. The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the
principal obligation has been partly or irregularly complied with by the
debtor. Even if there has been no performance, the penalty may also
be reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or unconscionable. 90[31]

90[31] Filinvest Land, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 29 at 269-270.

In ascertaining whether the penalty is unconscionable or not,

this court set out the following standard in Ligutan v. Court of
Appeals,91[32] to wit:

The question of whether a penalty is reasonable or iniquitous

can be partly subjective and partly objective. Its resolution would
depend on such factor as, but not necessarily confined to, the type,
extent and purpose of the penalty, the nature of the obligation, the
mode of breach and its consequences, the supervening realities, the
standing and relationship of the parties, and the like, the application of
which, by and large, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
xxx.

In the instant case, the forfeiture of the entire amount of the

security deposits in the sum of P192,000.00 was excessive and
unconscionable considering that the gravity of the breaches
committed by the petitioner is not of such degree that the
respondent was unduly prejudiced thereby. It is but equitable
therefore to reduce the penalty of the petitioner to 50% of the
total amount of security deposits.

It is in the exercise of its sound discretion that this court

tempered the penalty for the breaches committed by the
petitioner to 50% of the amount of the security deposits. The
forfeiture of the entire sum of P192,000.00 is clearly a usurious
91[32] Supra note 30 at 52.

and iniquitous penalty for the transgressions committed by the

petitioner. The respondent is therefore under the obligation to
return the 50% of P192,000.00 to the petitioner.

Turning now to the liability of the respondent to reimburse

the petitioner for one-half of the expenses incurred for the
improvements on the leased store space at SM Megamall, the
following provision in the Contracts of Lease will enlighten us in
resolving this issue:

Section 11. ALTERATIONS, ADDITIONS, IMPROVEMENTS, ETC. The

LESSEE shall not make any alterations, additions, or improvements
without the prior written consent of LESSOR; and all alterations,
additions or improvements made on the leased premises, except
movable or fixtures put in at LESSEEs expense and which are
removable, without defacing the buildings or damaging its floorings,
shall become LESSORs property without compensation/reimbursement
but the LESSOR reserves the right to require the removal of the said
alterations, additions or improvements upon expiration of the lease.

The foregoing provision in the Contract of Lease mandates

that before the petitioner can introduce any improvement on the
leased premises, she should first obtain respondents consent. In
the case at bar, it was not shown that petitioner previously
secured the consent of the respondent before she made the
improvements on the leased space in SM Megamall. It was not

even alleged by the petitioner that she obtained such consent or

she at least attempted to secure the same. On the other hand,
the petitioner asserted that respondent allegedly misrepresented
to her that it would renew the terms of the contracts from time to
time after their expirations, and that the petitioner was so
induced thereby that she expended the sum of P200,000.00 for
the improvement of the store space leased.

This argument was squarely addressed by this court in

Fernandez v. Court of Appeals,92[33] thus:

The Court ruled that the stipulation of the parties in their lease
contract to be renewable at the option of both parties stresses that the
faculty to renew was given not to the lessee alone nor to the lessor by
himself but to the two simultaneously; hence, both must agree to
renew if a new contract is to come about.

Petitioners contention that respondents had verbally agreed to

extend the lease indefinitely is inadmissible to qualify the terms of the
written contract under the parole evidence rule, and unenforceable
under the statute of frauds.93[34]

92[33] G.R. No. L-80231, 18 October 1988, 166 SCRA 577, 587-588.
93[34]Josefa v. San Buenaventura, G.R. No. 163429, 3 March 2006, 484 SCRA 49, 60.

Moreover, it is consonant with human experience that

lessees, before occupying the leased premises, especially store
spaces located inside malls and big commercial establishments,
would renovate the place and introduce improvements thereon
according to the needs and nature of their business and in
harmony with their trademark designs as part of their marketing
ploy

to

attract

customers.

Certainly,

no

inducement

or

misrepresentation from the lessor is necessary for this purpose,

for it is not only a matter of necessity that a lessee should redesign its place of business but a business strategy as well.

In ruling that the respondent is liable to reimburse petitioner

one half of the amount of improvements made on the leased store
space should it choose to appropriate the same, the RTC relied on
the provision of Article 1678 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1678. If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful
improvements which are suitable to the use for which the lease is
intended, without altering the form or substance of the property
leased, the lessor upon the termination of the lease shall pay the
lessee one-half of the value of the improvements at that time. Should
the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove the
improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer damage
thereby. He shall not, however, cause any more impairment upon the
property leased than is necessary.

While it is true that under the above-quoted provision of the

Civil Code, the lessor is under the obligation to pay the lessee
one-half of the value of the improvements made should the lessor
choose to appropriate the improvements, Article 1678 however

should be read together with Article 448 and Article 546 of the
same statute, which provide:

Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been
built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate
as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the
indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one
who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who
sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be
obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of
the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the
owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees
after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the
lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.

xxxx

Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every

possessor; but only possessor in good faith may retain the thing until
he has been reimbursed therefor.

Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good

faith with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated
him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the
expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have
acquired by reason thereof.

Thus, to be entitled to reimbursement for improvements

introduced on the property, the petitioner must be considered a
builder in good faith. Further, Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil
Code, which allow full reimbursement of useful improvements and

retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, apply only

to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the
belief that he is the owner thereof. A builder in good faith is one
who is unaware of any flaw in his title to the land at the time he
builds on it.94[35] In this case, the petitioner cannot claim that she
was not aware of any flaw in her title or was under the belief that
she is the owner of the subject premises for it is a settled fact that
she is merely a lessee thereof.

In Geminiano v. Court of Appeals, 95[36] this Court was

emphatic in declaring that lessees are not possessors or builders
in good faith, thus:

Being mere lessees, the private respondents knew that

their occupation of the premises would continue only for the
life of the lease. Plainly, they cannot be considered as
possessors nor builders in good faith.

In a plethora of cases, this Court has held that Article 448 of the
Civil Code, in relation to Article 546 of the same Code, which allows full
reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises
until reimbursement is made, applies only to a possessor in good faith,
i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof.
It does not apply where one's only interest is that of a lessee
under a rental contract; otherwise, it would always be in the
94[35] Lopez v. Sarabia, G.R. No. 140357, 24 September 2004, 439 SCRA 35, 49.
95[36] 328 Phil. 682, 689-690 (1996).

power of the tenant to "improve" his landlord out of his

property.

Since petitioners interest in the store space is merely that of

the lessee under the lease contract, she cannot therefore be
considered a builder in good faith. Consequently, respondent may
appropriate the improvements introduced on the leased premises
without any obligation to reimburse the petitioner for the sum
expended.

Anent the claim for attorneys fees, we resolve to likewise

deny the award of the same. Attorneys fees may be awarded
when a party is compelled to litigate or to incur expenses to
protect its interest by reason of unjustified act of the other. 96[37]

In the instant petition, it was not shown that the respondent

unjustifiably refused to grant the demands of the petitioner so as
to compel the latter to initiate legal action to enforce her right. As
we have found herein, there is basis for respondents refusal to
return to petitioner the security deposits and to reimburse the
costs of the improvements in the leased premises. The award of
attorneys fees is therefore not proper in the instant case.
96[37] Philippine Air Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 193 Phil. 560, 580 (1981).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is

PARTLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 10
October 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 73853 is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the respondent may forfeit only 50% of
the total amount of the security deposits in the sum of
P192,000.00, and must return the remaining 50% to the
petitioner. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were

reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and

the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Today is Tuesday, October 25, 2016

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 157285

February 16, 2007

WOODRIDGE SCHOOL, INC., and MIGUELA JIMENEZ-JAVIER, Petitioners,

vs.
ARB CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Petitioners Woodridge School, Inc. (Woodridge) and Miguela Jimenez-Javier come to us assailing the decision1 dated
September 30, 2002 and resolution2 dated February 14, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 515333 which, in
turn, modified the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite awarding P500,000 to respondent ARB
Construction Co., Inc. (ARB) as reasonable indemnity for the use of ARB's road lot.3
Woodridge is the usufructuary of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-363902 in the name

of spouses Ernesto T. Matugas and Filomena U. Matugas. Its co-petitioner, Miguela Jimenez-Javier, is the registered owner
of the adjacent lot under TCT No. T-330688.
On the other hand, ARB is the owner and developer of Soldiers Hills Subdivision in Bacoor, Cavite, which is composed of
four phases. Phase I of the subdivision was already accessible from the Marcos Alvarez Avenue. To provide the same
accessibility to the residents of Phase II of the subdivision, ARB constructed the disputed road to link the two phases.
As found by the appellate court, petitioners' properties sit right in the middle of several estates: Phase I of Soldiers Hills
Subdivision in the north, a creek in the east and Green Valley Subdivision the farther east, a road within Soldiers Hills
Subdivision IV which leads to the Marcos Alvarez Avenue in the west and Phase III of Soldiers Hills Subdivision in the
south.
Initially, petitioners offered to pay ARB P50,000 as indemnity for the use of the road. Adamant, ARB refused the offer and
fenced the perimeter of the road fronting the properties of petitioners. By doing so, ARB effectively cut off petitioners'
access to and from the public highway.
After failing to settle the matter amicably, petitioners jointly filed a complaint4 in the RTC of Imus, Cavite to enjoin ARB
from depriving them of the use of the disputed subdivision road and to seek a compulsory right of way after payment of
proper indemnity. On November 24, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners:
The reasons why this case is not one for a right of way as an easement are not difficult to discern.
The questioned road is part and parcel of the road network of Soldiers Hills IV, Phase II. This road was constructed pursuant
to the approved subdivision plan of Soldiers Hills IV, Phase II. As such, the road has already been withdrawn from the
commerce of men as the ownership of which was automatically vested in the government without need of any
compensation, although it is still registered in the name of the [ARB], the moment the subdivision plan was approved. While
it is not yet donated to the government [,] [it] is of no moment for donating this road to the government is a mere formality.
Differently stated, the government automatically becomes the owner of the subdivisions' roads the moment the subdivision
plan is approved. From that time on, the roads are withdrawn from the commerce of men even [if] the titles are still
registered in the name of the subdivision owners and the roads are not yet donated to the government. Thus, the subdivision
owner can no longer sell or alienate the roads for they are already owned by the government; thus, even if [petitioners] want
to buy this road, and the [ARB] wants to sell the same, this transaction cannot materialize for the above-stated reasons.
Accordingly, [ARB] cannot prevent/prohibit plaintiffs from using the road as the same belongs to the government.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, [ARB] is ordered to cease and desist from preventing [petitioners] in using the subject road or any other
road in the subdivision.
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED. 5 (citations omitted)
ARB elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.6 Finding merit in the appeal, the appellate court reversed the decision of the

lower court. It explained that the 1991 case of White Plains Subdivision[7] did not apply to the present case which was
decided under a different factual milieu:
In the assailed Decision, the Court below relied on the ruling of the Supreme Court in White Plains Association, Inc. vs.
Legaspi (193 SCRA 765). The ruling is not applicable. In the White Plains case, the disputed area was specifically set aside
by the Quezon City Government, with the concurrence of the owner and developer of the White Plains Subdivision in
Quezon City, for the purpose of constructing a major thoroughfare open to the general public. The case was filed by the
association of homeowners of White Plains in Quezon City when the owner-developer sought to convert the disputed lot
to residential lots. The Supreme Court initially held that the disputed lot was not longer within the commerce of men, it
having been segregated for a particular purpose, that of being used as "part of a mandatory open space reserved for public
use to be improved into the widened Katipunan Road". It was within this context that the Supreme Court held that
"ownership was automatically vested in the Quezon City government and/or the Republic of the Philippines, without need of
paying any compensation".8
The appellate court went on to rule that a compulsory right of way exists in favor of petitioners as "[t]here is no other
existing adequate outlet to and from [petitioners'] properties to the Marcos Alvarez Avenue other than the subject existing
road lot designated as Lot No. 5827-F-1 belonging to [ARB]."9 In addition, it awarded P500,000 to ARB as reasonable
indemnity for the use of the road lot.
Acting on petitioners' motion for reconsideration, the appellate court justified the monetary award in this manner:
In [o]ur Decision, [w]e awarded the amount of P500,000.00 merely as reasonable indemnity for the use of the road lot, not
the alienation thereof. The amount was based on equitable considerations foremost of which is that, while there is no
alienation to speak of, the easement is of long-standing, that is, until a shorter and adequate outlet is established. Moreover,
[ARB] should be compensated for the wear and tear that [petitioners'] use of the road would contribute to; it is [ARB] which
is solely to be credited for the completion of the road lot. Going by the conservative valuation of the Municipality of Bacoor,
Cavite presented by [petitioners], the 4,760 sq. m. road lot would cost P1,904,000 but as stated what is compensated is the
use of the road lot not its alienation.
[Petitioners'] original offer cannot be considered a reasonable indemnity, there being a knotty legal question involved and it
is not [ARB's] fault that the parties had to resort to the courts for a resolution.10
Unsatisfied with the ruling of the appellate court, petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari insisting that ARB is
not entitled to be paid any indemnity.
Petitioners argue that the contested road lot is a property of public dominion pursuant to Article 42011 of the Civil Code.
Specifically, petitioners point out that the disputed road lot falls under the category "others of similar character" which is the
last clause of Article 420 (1).12 Hence, it is a property of public dominion which can be used by the general public without
need for compensation. Consequently, it is wrong for ARB to exclude petitioners from using the road lot or to make them
pay for the use of the same.
We disagree.
In the case of Abellana, Sr. v. Court of Appeals,13 the Court held that "the road lots in a private subdivision are private
property, hence, the local government should first acquire them by donation, purchase, or expropriation, if they are to be

utilized as a public road."14 Otherwise, they remain to be private properties of the owner-developer.
Contrary to the position of petitioners, the use of the subdivision roads by the general public does not strip it of its private
character. The road is not converted into public property by mere tolerance of the subdivision owner of the public's passage
through it. To repeat, "the local government should first acquire them by donation, purchase, or expropriation, if they are to
be utilized as a public road."15
Likewise, we hold the trial court in error when it ruled that the subject road is public property pursuant to Section 2 of
Presidential Decree No. 1216.16 The pertinent portion of the provision reads:
Section 2. xxx xxx xxx
Upon their completion as certified to by the Authority, the roads, alleys, sidewalks and playgrounds shall be donated by the
owner or developer to the city or municipality and it shall be mandatory for the local governments to accept them provided,
however, that the parks and playgrounds may be donated to the Homeowners Association of the project with the consent of
the city or municipality concerned
The law is clear. The transfer of ownership from the subdivision owner-developer to the local government is not automatic
but requires a positive act from the owner-developer before the city or municipality can acquire dominion over the
subdivision roads. Therefore, until and unless the roads are donated,17 ownership remains with the owner-developer.18
Since no donation has been made in favor of any local government and the title to the road lot is still registered in the name
of ARB, the disputed property remains private.
This is not to say that ARB may readily exclude petitioners from passing through the property. As correctly pointed out by
the Court of Appeals, the circumstances clearly make out a case of legal easement of right of way. It is an easement which
has been imposed by law and not by the parties and it has "for (its) object either public use or the interest of private
persons."19
To be entitled to a legal easement of right of way, the following requisites must concur: (1) the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) payment of proper indemnity; (3) the
isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate and (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate.20
The appellate and trial courts found that the properties of petitioners are enclosed by other estates without any adequate
access to a public highway except the subject road lot which leads to Marcos Alvarez Avenue.21 Although it was shown that
the shortest distance from the properties to the highway is toward the east across a creek, this alternative route does not
provide an adequate outlet for the students of the proposed school. This route becomes marshy as the creek overflows during
the rainy season and will endanger the students attending the school.
All told, the only requisite left unsatisfied is the payment of proper indemnity.
Petitioners assert that their initial offer of P50,000 should be sufficient compensation for the right of way. Further, they
should not be held accountable for the increase in the value of the property since the delay was attributable to the stubborn

refusal of ARB to accept their offer.22

Again, we are not persuaded.
In the case of a legal easement, Article 649 of the Civil Code prescribes the parameters by which the proper indemnity may
be fixed. Since the intention of petitioners is to establish a permanent passage, the second paragraph of Article 649 of the
Civil Code particularly applies:
Art 649. xxx xxx xxx
Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate,
establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the
damage caused to the servient estate. xxx. (Emphasis supplied)
On that basis, we further hold that the appellate court erred in arbitrarily awarding indemnity for the use of the road lot.
The Civil Code categorically provides for the measure by which the proper indemnity may be computed: value of the land
occupied plus the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate. Settled is the rule in statutory construction that "when
the law is clear, the function of the courts is simple application."23 Thus, to award the indemnity using factors different from
that given by the law is a complete disregard of these clear statutory provisions and is evidently arbitrary. This the Court
cannot countenance. The Civil Code has clearly laid down the parameters and we cannot depart from them. Verba legis non
est recedendum.
Having settled the legal issues, we order the remand of this case to the trial court for reception of evidence and
determination of the limits of the property to be covered by the easement, the proper indemnity to be paid and the respective
contributions of petitioners.
For the guidance of the trial court, the fact that the disputed road lot is used by the general public may be taken in
consideration to mitigate the amount of damage that the servient estate is entitled to, in the sense that the wear and tear of
the subject road is not entirely attributable to petitioners.
WHEREFORE, this petition is partially GRANTED. The September 30, 2002 Decision and February 14, 2003 resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 515333 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE in so far as petitioners are ordered
to pay an indemnity of P500,000. The case is hereby remanded to the trial court for reception of evidence and determination
of the limits of the property to be covered by the easement, the proper indemnity to be paid and the respective contributions
of petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
(No Part)
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ *
Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Asscociate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
*

No part. Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez inhibited herself from participating in the deliberations of this case.

Penned by Associate Justice Portia Alio-Hormachuelos and concurred in by Associate Justices Elvi John S.
Asuncion and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. of the Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals; rollo, pp. 46-56.
2

Penned by Associate Justice Portia Alio-Hormachuelos and concurred in by Associate Justices Elvi John S.
Asuncion and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. of the Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals; id., pp. 58-60.
3

CA Decision supra note 1, at 55.

Docketed as Civil Case No. BCV-93-6.

RTC Decision dated November 24, 1995, rollo, pp. 73, 77-78.

Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 515333.

White Plains Association, Inc v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 95522, 7 February 1991, 193 SCRA 765.

CA Decision supra note 1, at 52.

Id., at 55.

10

CA Resolution supra note 2, at 59-60.

11

Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed
by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth.

12

Petition, rollo, pp. 12, 27.

13

G.R. No. 100749, 24 April 1992, 208 SCRA 316.

14

Id., at 319.

15

Id.

16

RTC Decision supra note 5.

17

Note that subdivision roads may also be purchased or expropriated by the local government unit, thereby
converting them into public property.
18

White Plains Association v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128131, 8 October 1998, 297 SCRA 547.

19

Article 634, Civil Code.

20

Costabella Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80511, 25 January 1991, 193 SCRA 333, 339.

21

CA Decision supra note 1, at 55; RTC Decision supra note 5, at 75.

22

Petitioner's Memorandum, rollo, pp. 87-88.

23

AB Leasing and Finance Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 453 Phil. 297 (2003).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Tuesday, October 25, 2016

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 150194

March 6, 2007

ROBERT TAYABAN y CALIPLIP, FRANCISCO MADDAWAT y TAYOBAN, ARTEMIO BALANGUE* y LANGA,

FRANCISCO MAYUMIS y BAHEL and QUIRINO PANA y CUYAHEN, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan dated June 25, 2001 in
Criminal Case No. 17856; and its Resolution2 of September 28, 2001, denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner Robert Tayaban (Tayaban) was the Municipal Mayor of Tinoc, Ifugao. His co-petitioners, namely: Francisco
Maddawat, Artemio Balangue, Francisco Mayumis, and Quirino Pana, were Municipal Councilors of the same municipality.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Sometime in 1988, then Mayor Tayaban submitted a project proposal to provincial governor Benjamin Cappleman for the
construction of the Tinoc Public Market. Subsequently, Tayaban was informed by the Governor that his proposal was
approved and that the project shall be funded by the Cordillera Executive Board (CEB).3 Subsequently, a bidding was
conducted and private complainant Lopez Pugong (Pugong) won the contract for the construction of the said public market.
On March 1, 1989, a formal contract4 was executed by and between Pugong, as the contractor, and the CEB, as the project
owner. Actual construction of the public market was commenced in June 1989. On August 15, 1989, the Sangguniang
Bayan of Tinoc adopted Resolution No. 20 which reads:
R E S O L U T I O N NO. 20
Series of 1989
WHEREAS, upon thorough discussion as regards the construction of the Public Market; it was found out that the

constructors despite the several instructions, memoranda issued by the Municipal Mayor and the negotiations made by this
body they insisted to erect the building pedestals on the site [that] pleases them and not on the site identified by this duly
constituted body who has direct administration of the municipal ground;
WHEREFORE, on motion duly seconded be it
RESOLVED, as it is hereby done to adopt this resolution manifesting this bodys decision to uphold and maintain the trust
and confidence of the people upon this body;
RESOLVED, finally that this body agrees, and decides to demolish the erected structures for the purpose of erecting the
Public Market building as identified and decided by this body; and further resolved as it is hereby done that this be a
precedent for other future leaders.5
On that same day, Tayaban and his co-petitioners, together with some men, proceeded to the construction site and
demolished the structures and improvements introduced thereon. As a result, Pugong filed an Affidavit-Complaint6 against
herein petitioners.
Subsequently, in an Information dated June 26, 1992, herein petitioners were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The accusatory portion of the
Information reads:
That on August 17, 1989 and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Tinoc, Ifugao, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Robert Tayaban, Municipal Mayor of Tinoc,
Francisco Maddawat, Artemio Balangue, Francisco Mayumis and Quirino Pana, are all public officers being Municipal
Councilors of Tinoc, Ifugao and in the performance of their official functions acting in evident bad faith and conspiring with
each other, did then and there, willfully and unlawfully pass and unanimously approve Resolution No. 20, thereby vesting
upon themselves powers and authority to demolish the half-finished Tinoc Public Market construction whereby respondents
themselves personally and actually demolish [sic] it, to the damage and prejudice of the government particularly the
Cordillera Executive Board, being the owner of the project.7
Upon arraignment on December 14, 1992, herein petitioners pleaded not guilty.8
After trial, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the presently assailed Decision,9 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered convicting all the accused ROBERT TAYABAN Y
CALIPLIP, FRANCISCO MADDAWAT Y TAYOBAN, ARTEMIO BALANGUE Y LANGA, FRANCISCO MAYUMIS Y
BAHEL and QUIRINO PANA Y CUYAHEN of the crime of Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 as
amended, and in the absence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
herein accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) month
as minimum to eight (8) years as maximum and are hereby ordered jointly and severally to pay the government the amount
of P134,632.80 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.10

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Sandiganbayan denied it in a Resolution11 dated September 28, 2001.
Hence, herein petition for review with the following assignment of errors:
I
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACTS
ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED BY THE ACCUSED CONSTITUTED A VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(E) OF R.A. NO.
3019 AS AMENDED, AND THEREFORE ACCUSED SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACQUITTED BY THE RESPONDENT
COURT.
II
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESOLUTION NO. 20 IS A VALID
LEGISLATION AND THAT THE DEMOLITION OF THE FIVE POSTS WAS AN IMPLEMENTATION OF LOI NO. 19
AND AN EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER VESTED IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT.
III
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, IN VIOLATION OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE, LAWS AND
JURISPRUDENCE ERRED IN CONSIDERING FACTS WITHOUT REFERRING TO THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD. 12
In their first assigned error, petitioners argue that one of the elements of the offense which constitutes a violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 is that the government or any private party suffers undue injury by reason of the prohibited acts
committed by the public officer being charged. Petitioners argue that this element was not proved because the CEB, which
was supposed to be the injured party as alleged in the Information, did not complain or participate in the trial of the case.
Petitioners go on to conclude that the existence of undue injury cannot be proven without the alleged injured party testifying.
Petitioners further contend that the itemized list of expenses submitted in evidence by Pugong should not have been made a
basis of the presently assailed Decision because such list is not supported by receipts and, therefore, self-serving. Moreover,
Pugong was never mentioned in the Information as one of the injured parties. Petitioners assert that undue injury could only
mean actual injury or damage which must be established by evidence.
Petitioners also contend that the element of bad faith on their part was not proved. On the contrary, they argue that their act
of exerting efforts to communicate with the contractor and his foreman, by sending three letters in order to remind them of
the proper site of construction, only shows that they were acting in good faith; that the eventual passage of Resolution No.
20 is also an additional evidence of good faith on their part because it was adopted by the Sangguniang Bayan as a collective
body acting within the scope of its authority. Petitioners further contend that the CEB saw the propriety of the Sangguniang
Bayans action to stop the construction of the market that was why it issued an order suspending the said construction; and
that the CEB, realizing its mistake in not coordinating with petitioners, did not pursue any action against them.
In their second assigned error, petitioners argue that the Sandiganbayan erred in applying Sections 5613 and 59(a)14 of the
Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, which provide, respectively, for the review by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
component city and municipal ordinances and resolutions approving local development plans and public investment
programs and for the posting in conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned of the said resolutions and
ordinances.

They argue that the applicable law at the time of the passage of Resolution No. 20 is Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 337
or the Local Government Code of 1983. Claiming that Pugong failed to obtain the requisite building permit pursuant to
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1096,15 petitioners assert that their act of demolishing the structures erected on the
construction site is an implementation of the provisions of the Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 1916 which empowers certain
public officials, like the municipal mayor, to remove illegal constructions which were built, either in public places or private
property, without permit. Petitioners further contend that the demolition is a valid exercise of police power and that their act
is justified by the general welfare clause under the LGC which empowers them to enact and implement measures for the
general well-being of their constituents.
In their third assigned error, petitioners argue that the Sandiganbayan erred in relying on the testimony of prosecution
witness Abe Belingan considering that he is not a disinterested witness because he is given the contract of cementing the
supposed second floor of the public market. Moreover, petitioners contend that the testimony of Belingan regarding the
reason why Mayor Tayaban demolished the structures is mere hearsay and as such should not be given any probative value.
Petitioners assert that the complaint was filed against them for purposes of political harassment considering that Pugongs
political allies who also signed Resolution No. 20 were not included in the said complaint.
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that, as properly held by the Sandiganbayan, undue
injury has been caused to the Government and that it is immaterial whether the CEB filed a complaint against herein
petitioners because the real party-in-interest is the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The OSG also argues that
private complainant Pugong also suffered undue injury because he already incurred expenses for labor, tools, equipment,
and materials for the construction project. As to the issue of credibility of witnesses, the OSG asserts that the matter of
assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is a function most competently performed by the trial judge who had
the opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess their credibility by the various indicia available but not reflected on
record.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) also filed its Comment, contending that it is not necessary for the CEB to initiate
a complaint against herein petitioners because the real party-in-interest is the Government of the Republic of the Philippines;
that there is actual injury on the part of the Government as shown by the fact that construction was commenced and that
petitioners did not deny that they demolished the structures which were erected; and that the list of expenses presented by
Pugong cannot be considered self-serving because the latter testified thereon.
The OSP further claims that petitioners were guilty of bad faith when they demolished the erected structures as evidenced by
various acts committed by herein petitioners prior to and during the construction of the public market; and that the fact that
witness Belingan has contracted the cementing of the second floor of the supposed public market is not sufficient evidence
of his bias against herein petitioners.
As to petitioners contention that the criminal complaint filed against them was merely a political harassment considering
that the other members of the Sangguniang Bayan who signed the questioned Resolution but who are allies of Pugong were
not included in the complaint, the OSP avers that, while the said members of the Sangguniang Bayan signed Resolution No.
20, they were not included in the complaint because they did not take part in the demolition of the public market.
The Court finds the petition without merit.
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 reads:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing
law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
The following indispensable elements must be established to constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended:
1. The accused is a public officer discharging administrative or official functions or private persons charged
in conspiracy with them;
2. The public officer committed the prohibited act during the performance of his official duty in relation to
his public position;
3. The public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and
4. His action caused undue injury to the government or any private party, or gave any party any unwarranted
benefit, advantage or preference to such parties.17
Herein petitioners contention that the Sandiganbayan erred in ruling that they are guilty of bad faith and that they caused
undue injury to the Government is not plausible.
With respect to the element of bad faith, the Court, in a number of cases, held:
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of
fraud. (Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, 8 NE 2nd Series, 895, 1007). It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will for ulterior purposes. (Air France v. Carrascoso,
18 SCRA 155, 166-167). Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or
cause damage.18
The Court agrees with the findings of the Sandiganbayan that petitioners were guilty of bad faith in causing the demolition.
Evidence of this is the fact that Resolution No. 20 was implemented on the same day that it was adopted without due notice
of the planned demolition given to the CEB and the private contractor. In fact, Raymundo Madani, one of the Municipal
Councilors who signed Resolution No. 20, testified that the said Resolution was passed only in the afternoon of August 15,
1989, after the subject demolition was conducted in the morning of the same day.19
Proof of petitioners bad faith is also shown by Pugongs testimony, which was given credence by the Sandiganbayan, that
the site where his laborers began construction of the demolished public market was pointed out by petitioner Tayaban

himself when the former asked the latter where they were going to erect the said market.20
Tayabans letter and memorandum dated July 31, 198921 and August 3, 1989,22 respectively, addressed to the laborers of
Pugong directing them to stop construction may not be considered as evidence of good faith on the part of petitioners
considering that they know fully well that it is the CEB which implements the said project and any grievance or complaint
on their part should have been addressed to the said Board. No evidence was presented to show that petitioners made their
objections known to the CEB. At the least, petitioners should have furnished the CEB or the Governor, in his capacity as a
regular member of the CEB,23 a copy of the above-mentioned letter and memorandum. But they never did. The letter and
memorandum were not even addressed to Pugong and there is no proof to show that he was informed of the contents thereof.
Moreover, even if Pugongs men had received the letter and memorandum, they may not be totally blamed for ignoring the
letter and the memorandum because under their contract, the owner of the project is the CEB and there is nothing therein
which requires them to comply with whatever directive the Mayor or the Sangguniang Bayan of Tinoc may issue. In fact,
the contract signed on March 1, 1989 specifically states that the contractor shall construct the Tinoc Public Market as per
plan and specification provided by the CEB technical staff.24 In consonance with the said provision in the contract, Pugong
testified that the CEB sent a representative to supervise the construction.25
The following admissions made by petitioners bolster Sandiganbayans finding of bad faith on their part:
First, petitioner Tayaban admitted that when he submitted the project proposal for the construction of the Tinoc Public
Market, he did not indicate the exact location where the market should be put up saying that he shall specify the location
when the budget for the project shall have been approved.26 However, despite meeting the Governor twice in 1989, and
being informed by the latter that the project had already been approved and funded, Tayaban still did not suggest to the
Governor nor mention to him the specific place where he and the Sangguniang Bayan desire to have the public market
erected.27 Worse, when the construction was commenced and petitioners discovered that the public market was being built
allegedly in a place where it should not be, petitioner Tayaban even admits that he still did not inform the Governor of such
fact.28
Second, Tayaban admits that they never bothered to check with the CEB where the latter intended to put up the public
market.29 There is no evidence to show that, when the construction was commenced, petitioners informed the CEB of the
alleged mistake in the location of the project. In fact, petitioner Tayaban testified that it was only in the first or second week
of August, 1989 that he informed the CEB regarding the supposed error,30 even when he came to know the exact site where
Pugong intended to build the market as early as April 1989.31 Moreover, when the Sangguniang Bayan convened on August
15, 1989 and passed Resolution No. 20, they did not invite any representative from the CEB.32
Third, while petitioners aver that they have come up with a Site Development Plan wherein the exact location of the public
market was specified, Tayaban admits that the blue print of the said development plan was completed only in August 1989.33
However, the construction of the public market was commenced as early as June 1989.
From the foregoing, it is evident that petitioners were moved by a manifest and deliberate intent to cause damage.
It is clear from the Information filed that the injured party in the instant case is the Government, as represented by the CEB.
The fact that the CEB did not initiate the filing of the instant criminal action is of no moment considering that a complaint
for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal need not be filed by the "offended party".34 The rule has been that,
unless the subject of the complaint is one that cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the same may be filed, for preliminary
investigation purposes, by any competent person.35 In the present case, it is sufficient that private contractor Pugong was the
one who filed an affidavit-complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the OSP. Moreover, the failure of the CEB

THIRD DIVISION

LORDITO ARROGANTE,
JOHNSTON ARROGANTE, ARME
ARROGANTE, and FE D.
ARROGANTE,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 152132

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus -

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.

BEETHOVEN DELIARTE, Joined

by SPOUSE LEONORA DUENAS,

Promulgated:

Respondents.
July 24, 2007

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision97[1]

dated August 28, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 58493 which affirmed the Decision98[2] dated February 18,
1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, of Cebu City in
an action for quieting of title and damages.

It appears that the lot in controversy, Lot No. 472-A (subject

lot), is situated in Poblacion Daanbantayan, Cebu, and was
originally conjugal property of the spouses Bernabe Deliarte, Sr.
and Gregoria Placencia who had nine children, including herein
respondent

Beethoven

Deliarte

and

petitioner

Fe

Deliarte

Arrogante. The other petitioners, Lordito, Johnston, and Arme, Jr.,

all surnamed Arrogante, are the children of Fe and, thus, nephews

97[1] Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., with Associate Justices Cancio C.
Garcia (now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) and Hilarion L. Aquino,
concurring; rollo, pp. 27-39.
98[2] Rollo, pp. 43-47.

of Beethoven. Respondent Leonora Duenas is the wife of

Beethoven.

A series of misfortunes struck the Deliarte family. The first

tragedy occurred when a brother of Beethoven and Fe was
hospitalized and eventually died in Davao. Beethoven shouldered
the hospitalization and other related expenses, including the
transport of the body from Davao to Cebu and then to
Daanbantayan.

The next occurrence took place a year after, when Gregoria

was likewise hospitalized and subsequently died on July 29, 1978.
Once again, Beethoven paid for all necessary expenses. Soon
thereafter, it was Bernabe, the parties ailing father, who died on
November 7, 1980. Not surprisingly, it was Beethoven who spent
for their fathers hospitalization and burial.

In between the deaths of Gregoria and Bernabe, on

November 16, 1978, the Deliarte siblings agreed to waive and
convey in favor of Beethoven all their rights, interests, and claims
to the subject lot in consideration of P15,000.00.99[3] At the
signing of the deed of absolute sale, the siblings who failed to
99[3] Annex A of the Complaint; records, p. 4.

attend the family gathering, either because they were dead or

were simply unable to, were represented by their respective
spouses who signed the document on their behalf. 100[4] Bernabe,
who was already blind at that time, was likewise present and
knew of the sale that took place among his children.

Thus, from then on, Beethoven occupied and possessed the

subject lot openly, peacefully, and in the concept of owner. He
exercised full ownership and control over the subject lot without
any objection from all his siblings, or their heirs, until 1993 when
the controversy arose.101[5] In fact, on March 26, 1986, all of
Beethovens siblings, except Fe, signed a deed of confirmation of
sale in favor of Beethoven to ratify the 1978 private deed of sale.

Sometime in August 1993, petitioner Lordito Arrogante

installed placards on the fence erected by respondents, claiming
that the subject lot was illegally acquired by the latter. 102[6] The
placards depicted Beethoven as a land grabber who had
unconscionably taken the subject lot from Lordito who claimed

100[4] TSN, September 8, 1995, pp. 7-9.

101[5] Payment of realty taxes, construction of hollow block fence.
102[6] Exhibit E-3, records, p. 144.

that the lot is a devise from his grandfather. 103[7] Allegedly, the
bequeathal was made in Bernabes last will and testament which
was, unfortunately, torn up and destroyed by Beethoven. 104[8]

Thus, on November 10, 1993, respondents filed an action for

quieting of title and damages against the petitioners.

In their answer, the petitioners averred that Beethoven does

not own the whole of the subject lot because Bernabe was still
alive in 1978 when Beethovens siblings sold to him all their rights
and claims to and interests in that lot. Thus, the siblings could sell
only their respective inheritance from one-half of the subject lot,
representing Gregorias share in the conjugal property. Corollarily,
the petitioners claimed that Fe continues to own 1/9 of one-half of
the subject lot, comprising Bernabes share of the property, which
allegedly was not contemplated in the conveyance in 1978.
According to petitioners, this contention is supported by Fes
failure to sign the deed of confirmation of sale in 1986.

103[7] Exhibits E to E-14, id. at 143-147; TSN, March 19, 1996, pp. 17-23.
104[8] TSN, March 19, 1996, pp. 17-19.

As

regards

the

damaging

placards,

the

petitioners

asseverated that Lordito acted on his own when he installed the

same, and that this was resorted to merely to air his grievance
against his uncle, Beethoven, for claiming ownership of the entire
lot.

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision quieting title on the

subject lot in favor of respondents and directing petitioners,
jointly and severally, to pay the respondents P150,000.00 as
moral damages, P25,000.00 as attorneys fees, and P10,000.00 as
litigation expenses.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial courts decision but

deleted the award of attorneys fees and litigation expenses. In
ruling for the respondents, both the trial and appellate courts
upheld the validity of the 1978 sale as between the parties.
Considering

that

petitioner

Fe

signed

the

document

and

consented to the transaction, she is now barred from repudiating

the terms thereof. In this regard, the RTC and the CA applied the
parole evidence rule and allowed the introduction of evidence on
the additional consideration for the conveyance, namely, the
expenses incurred by Beethoven during the three tragedies that
had befallen the Deliarte family. Both courts found that the sale

was already completely executed, thus removing it from the

ambit of the Statute of Frauds.105[9]

As for the award of moral damages, the trial and appellate

courts held that the other petitioners failure to prevent Lordito
from putting up, or at least, removing the placards, amounted to
the

defamation

and

opprobrium

of

Beethoven

with

their

knowledge and acquiescence. Thus, the assessment of moral

damages

was

appropriate,

given

the

humiliation

and

embarrassment suffered by Beethoven considering his stature

and reputation in the community as an electrical engineer
handling several big projects.

However, petitioners insist that the lower courts erred in

their

rulings.

They

maintain

that

the

1978

sale

did

not

contemplate the alienation of Bernabes share in the conjugal

partnership as he failed to sign the private document. As such,
the courts application of the parole evidence rule and the Statute
of Frauds were erroneous. In the same vein, the petitioners posit
that both courts ruling that they are jointly and severally liable for
moral damages is inconsistent with the evidence on record that
Lordito was the sole author of the damaging placards.

105[9] Rollo, pp. 36, 46.

In this appeal, the issues for the resolution of this Court are:

I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PRIVATE DEED OF SALE EXECUTED IN 1978 IS A
VALID CONVEYANCE OF THE ENTIRE LOT 472-A TO PETITIONER
BEETHOVEN DELIARTE.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE IS APPLICABLE TO

THIS CASE.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS APPLICABLE TO THIS

CASE.

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS ARE JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY

LIABLE FOR MORAL DAMAGES.

At the outset, we note that both the lower and the appellate
courts failed to identify the applicable law.

First.The 1978 private deed of sale, insofar as it disposed of

Bernabes share in the conjugal partnership prior to his death, is
void for being a conveyance of the Deliarte siblings future
inheritance.

Article 1347, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code characterizes a

contract entered into upon future inheritance as void. 106[10] The
law applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the
succession has not yet been opened; (2) the object of the contract
forms part of the inheritance; and (3) the promissor has, with
respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely
hereditary in nature.107[11]

106[10] Civil Code, Article 1347:All things which are not outside the commerce of men,
including future things, may be the object of a contract. All rights which are not intransmissible
may also be the object of contracts.
No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly
authorized by law.
All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy may likewise be the object of a contract.

107[11] Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines Commentaries and Jurisprudence,

Vol. IV, p. 525, 1985.

In this case, at the time the contract was entered into,

succession to Bernabes estate had yet to be opened, and the
object thereof, i.e., Bernabes share in the subject lot, formed part
of his childrens inheritance, and the children merely had an
inchoate hereditary right thereto.

True,

the

prohibition

on

contracts

respecting

future

inheritance admits of exceptions, as when a person partitions his

estate by an act inter vivos under Article 1080 of the Civil Code. 108
[12] However, the private deed of sale does not purport to be a
partition of Bernabes estate as would exempt it from the
application of Article 1347. Nowhere in the said document does
Bernabe separate, divide, and assign to his children his share in
the subject lot effective only upon his death. 109[13] Indeed, the
document does not even bear the signature of Bernabe.
108[12] J.L.T. Agro, Inc. v. Balansag, G.R. No. 141882, March 11, 2005, 453 SCRA 211, 223.
Civil Code, Article 1080:
Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such
partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.
A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, desires to keep any agricultural,
industrial, or manufacturing enterprise intact, may avail himself of the right granted to him in
this article, by ordering that the legitime of the other children to whom the property is not
assigned, be paid in cash.

109[13] See Civil Code, Article 1079 and J.L.T. Agro v. Balansag, supra note 12, at
226.

Neither did the parties demonstrate that Bernabe undertook

an oral partition of his estate. Although we have held on several
occasions that an oral or parole partition is valid, our holdings
thereon were confined to instances wherein the partition had
actually been consummated, enforced, and recognized by the
parties.110[14] Absent a showing of an overt act by Bernabe
indicative of an unequivocal intent to partition his estate among
his children, his knowledge and ostensible acquiescence to the
private deed of sale does not equate to an oral partition by an act
inter vivos. Besides, partition of property representing future
inheritance cannot be made effective during the lifetime of its
owner.111[15]

Considering the foregoing, it follows that the 1986 deed of

confirmation of sale which sought to ratify the 1978 sale likewise
suffers from the same infirmity.112[16] In short, the 1986 deed is
also void.
110[14] Chavez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68282, November 8, 1990,
191 SCRA 211, 216; Tan v. Lim, G.R. No. 128004, September 25, 1998, 296 SCRA
455, 474-475; Hernandez v. Andal, 78 Phil. 196, 203 (1947).
111[15] Bautista v. Grio-Aquino, G.R. No. L-79958, October 28, 1988, 166 SCRA
790, 795; Tinsay v. Yusay, 47 Phil. 639 (1925).
112[16] See Taedo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104482, January 22, 1996, 252
SCRA 80, 87.

Nevertheless, it is apparent that Bernabe treated his

share113[17] in the subject lot as his childrens present inheritance,
and he relinquished all his rights and claim thereon in their favor
subject to Beethovens compensation for the expenses he initially
shouldered for the family. The records reveal that Bernabe, prior
to his hospitalization and death, wanted to ensure that his
children attended to the expenditure relating thereto, and even
articulated his desire that such surpass the provision for both his
son

and

wife,

Beethovens

and

Fes

brother

and

mother,

respectively.114[18] Their arrangement contemplated the Deliarte

siblings equal responsibility for the familys incurred expenses.

We

take

judicial

notice

of

this

collective

sense

of

responsibility towards family. As with most nuclear Filipino

families, the Deliarte siblings endeavored to provide for their
parents or any member of their family in need. This was evident
in Florenda Deliarte Nacuas, the youngest Deliarte siblings,

113[17] One-half of the subject lot as his share in the conjugal partnership, plus 1/10 of one-half,
his wifes share. See Civil Code, Article 892, par. 2. The share of the surviving spouse is equal to
that of one child.

114[18] TSN, September 8, 1995, p. 5; TSN, September 28, 1995, p. 25.

remittance to her parents of her salary for two years so they could
redeem the subject lot.115[19]

Florenda corroborated the testimony of Beethoven that their

father was present during, and was aware of, the transaction that
took place among his children. 116[20] The 1978 deed of sale,
albeit void, evidenced the consent and acquiescence of each
Deliarte sibling to said transaction. They raised no objection even
after Beethoven forthwith possessed and occupied the subject lot.

The foregoing arrangement, vaguely reflected in the void

deed of sale, points to a meeting of the minds among the parties
constitutive of an innominate contract, akin to both an onerous
and a remuneratory donation. 117[21] In this regard, Bernabes
waiver and relinquishment of his share in the subject lot is
effectively a donation inter vivos to his children. However, the
gratuitous

act

is

coupled

with

an

onerous

cause

equal

accountability of the Deliarte siblings for the hospitalization and

death expenses of deceased family members to be taken from
their shares in the subject lot. In turn, the remunerative cause
115[19] TSN, September 25, 1995, p. 24.
116[20] Id. at 34.
117[21] See Civil Code, Articles 1305, 1307, 726 and 733.

pertains to Beethovens recompense for the family expenses he

initially shouldered.

During his lifetime, Bernabe remained the absolute owner of

his undivided interest in the subject lot. Accordingly, he could
have validly disposed of his interest therein. His consent to the
disposition of the subject lot in favor of Beethoven, agreed upon
among his children, is evident, considering his presence in,
knowledge of, and acquiescence to the transaction. Further, the
arrangement was immediately effected by the parties with no
objection from Bernabe or any of the Deliarte siblings, including
herein petitioner Fe. Ineluctably, the actual arrangement between
the parties included Bernabe, and the object thereof did not
constitute future inheritance.

Second. The parole evidence rule is applicable. While the

application

thereof

presupposes

the

existence

of

valid

agreement, the innominate contract between the parties has

been directly put in issue by the respondents. Verily, the failure of
the deed of sale to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties supports the application of the parole evidence rule.118[22]

118[22] Rules of Court, Rules 130, Section 9.

Contrary to petitioners contention, the absence of Bernabes

signature in the 1978 deed of sale is not necessarily conclusive of
his dissent or opposition to the effected arrangement. As
previously adverted to, the agreement had multiple causes or
consideration, apart from the P15,000.00 stated in the deed of
sale. To repeat, the agreement between the parties had both an
onerous and a remunerative cause. Also worthy of note is the
moral consideration for the agreement given the relationship
between the parties.

Third. We agree with both the lower and the appellate courts
that the Statute of Frauds is not applicable to the instant case.

The general rule is that contracts are valid in whatever form

they may be.119[23] One exception thereto is the Statute of Frauds
which requires a written instrument for the enforceability of a
contract.120[24] However, jurisprudence dictates that the Statute
119[23] Civil Code, Article 1356:
Contracts shall be obligatory, in whatever form they may
have been entered into, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present.
However, when the law requires that a contract be in some form in order that it may be valid or
enforceable, or that a contract be proved in a certain way, that requirement is absolute and
indispensable. In such cases, the right of the parties stated in the following article cannot be
exercised.

120[24] See Civil Code, Articles 1356 and 1402.

of Frauds only applies to executory, not to completed, executed,

or partially consummated, contracts. 121[25]

In the case at bench, we find that all requisites for a valid

contract are present, specifically: (1) consent of the parties; (2)
object or subject matter, comprised of the parties respective
shares in the subject lot; and (3) the consideration, over and
above the P15,000.00 stipulated price. We note that the
agreement between the parties had long been consummated and
completed.

In

fact,

the

agreement

clearly

contemplated

immediate execution by the parties. More importantly, the

parties, including petitioner Fe, ratified the agreement by the
acceptance of benefits thereunder.122[26]

One other thing militates against Fes claim of ownership silence and palpable failure to object to the execution of the
agreement. Fe insists that she only intended to sell her share of
121[25] Averia v. Averia, G.R. No. 141877, August 13, 2004, 436 SCRA 459, 466;
Swedish Match, AB v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128120, October 20, 2004, 441
SCRA 1, 22; Ainza v. Padua, G.R. No. 165420, June 30, 2005, 462 SCRA 614, 619;
Sps. Dela Cerna v. Sps. Briones, G.R. No. 160805, November 24, 2006.

122[26] Civil Code, Article 1405:Contracts infringing the Statute of Frauds, referred to in
No. 2 of Article 1403, are ratified by the failure to object to the presentation of oral evidence to
prove the same, or by the acceptance of benefits under them.

the lot inherited from her mothers estate, exclusive of her fathers
share therein.

We

are

not

persuaded

by

the

belated

claim.

This

afterthought is belied by the express stipulations in the 1978

deed of sale that the heirs of Bernabe and Gregoria, absolutely
sell, quitclaim, and transfer the subject lot in favor of Beethoven.
Although a void contract is not a source of rights and obligations
between the parties, the provisions in the written agreement and
their signature thereon are equivalent to an express waiver of all
their rights and interests in the entire lot in favor of Beethoven,
regardless of which part pertained to their mothers or fathers
estate.

Truly significant is the fact that in all the years that

Beethoven occupied the subject lot, Fe never disturbed the former
in his possession. Neither did she present her other siblings to
buttress her contradicting claim over the subject lot. Likewise, she
never asked for a partition of the property even after the death of
their father, Bernabe, to settle his estate, or when her other
siblings executed the deed of confirmation of sale in 1986. Fe also
does not pretend to share in the payment of realty taxes thereon,
but merely advances the claim that Priscillana, one of their

siblings, had already paid said taxes. 123[27] Ultimately, petitioner

Fe is estopped from staking a claim on the subject lot and
wresting ownership therein from Beethoven.

123[27] TSN, December 14, 1995, pp. 13-14.

Our holding in the case of Tinsay v. Yusay124[28] is still good

law, thus:

Juana Servando not being a party to the partition agreement

Exhibit 1, the agreement standing alone was, of course, ineffective as
against her. The attempt to partition her land among her heirs,
constituting a partition of future inheritance was invalid under the
second paragraph of Article 1271 of the Civil Code and for the same
reason the renunciation of all interest in the land which now constitutes
lots Nos. 241 and 713 made by the appellants in favor of the children
of Jovito Yusay would likewise be of no binding force as to the
undivided portion which belonged to Juan Servando. But if the parties
entered into the partition agreement in good faith and treated all of the
land as a present inheritance, and if the appellants on the strength of
the agreement obtained their Torrens title to the land allotted to them
therein, and if Perpetua Sian in reliance on the appellants renunciation
of all interest claimed by her on behalf of her children in the cadastral
case refrained from presenting any opposition to the appellants claim
to the entire fee in the land assigned to them in the partition
agreement and if the appellants after the death of Juana Servando
continued to enjoy the benefits of the agreement refusing to
compensate the heirs of Jovito Yusay for the latters loss of their interest
in lots Nos. 2 and 744 through the registration of the lots in the name
of the appellants and the subsequent alienation of the same to
innocent third parties, said appellants are now estopped from
repudiating the partition agreement of 1911 and from claiming any
further interest in lots Nos. 241 and 713. There is, however, no reason
why they should not be allowed to share in the distribution of the other
property left by Juana Servando.

Fourth. As to the lower courts award of moral damages, we

sustain respondents entitlement thereto. Undeniably, respondents
124[28] Supra note 15, at 644-645.

suffered besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and social

humiliation due to the damaging placards. 125[29] The injury is
aggravated because of the relationship among the parties.
Respondent Beethoven was able to prove that his nephews,
petitioners Lordito, Johnston, and Arme, Jr., stayed with him at
some point, and that he financially supported and trained them to
be electricians.126[30]

Yet, Lordito denies malice in the aforesaid act. He argues

that his only quarrel with Beethoven stems from the latters claim
of ownership over the subject lot which was, supposedly, already
bequeathed to him by his grandfather, Bernabe. Lordito maintains
that his claim is valid, supported by a will Beethoven had torn up,
which allegedly negates malice in his act of putting up the
placards.

We are not convinced.

125[29] See Civil Code, Articles 2217 and 2219.

126[30] TSN, September 8, 1995, pp. 18-20.

To begin with, the supposed devise to Lordito appears to be

void. Considering that Bernabes estate consisted merely of his
conjugal share in the subject lot, the bequeathal infringes on his
compulsory heirs legitimes, including that of Lorditos mother,
Fe.127[31]

Lorditos claim,

therefore,

is only subordinate to

Beethovens claim as a compulsory heir, even without delving into

the innominate contract between the parties. In all, the ascription
of malice and Lorditos corresponding liability for moral damages
is correct given the words he employed in the placards.

However, we agree with petitioners that there is a dearth of

evidence pointing to their collective responsibility for Lorditos act.

Corollary

thereto,

Lordito

admits

and

claims

sole

responsibility for putting up the placards. The other petitioners

specific participation in the tortious act was not proven. Failure to
prevent Lordito or command him to remove the placards, alone,
does not justify the finding that all the petitioners are jointly and
severally liable. It does not suffice that all the petitioners were
127[31] Civil Code, Article 842:
One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of
all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene
the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs.

moved by a common desire to acquire the subject property,

absent any proof that they individually concurred in Lorditos act.

Entrenched is the rule that the rights of a party cannot be

prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. 128[32]
The exception under Section 32, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
does

not

obtain

in

this

instance.

The

other

petitioners

acquiescence to and apparent concurrence in Lorditos act cannot

be inferred merely from their failure to remove the placards or
reprimand Lordito. While the placards indeed defamed Beethoven,
there is nothing that directly links the other petitioners to this
dastardly act.

WHEREFORE,

premises

considered,

the

petition

is

PARTIALLY GRANTED. The August 28, 2001 Decision of the

Court

of

Appeals

is

hereby

MODIFIED.

Petitioner

Lordito

Arrogante is held solely liable to respondents for moral damages

in the amount of P150,000.00. The quieting of title in favor of
respondents is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

128[32] Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 28.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIAMARTINEZ

MINITA V. CHICONAZARIO

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been

reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13,

the Division Chairperson's
conclusions in the above
consultation before the case
opinion of the Courts Division.

Article VIII of the Constitution and

Attestation, I certify that the
decision had been reached in
was assigned to the writer of the

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

FIRST DIVISION

NELSON CABALES and

G.R. No. 162421

RITO CABALES,
Petitioners,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- versus -

CORONA,

AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.

COURT OF APPEALS,

Promulgated:

JESUS FELIANO and

ANUNCIACION FELIANO,
Respondents.

August 31, 2007

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the

decision129[1] of the Court of Appeals dated October 27, 2003, in CA-G.R. CV No.
68319 entitled Nelson Cabales and Rito Cabales v. Jesus Feliano and Anunciacion
Feliano, which affirmed with modification the decision 130[2] of the Regional Trial
Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, dated August 11, 2000, in Civil Case
No. R-2878. The resolution of the Court of Appeals dated February 23, 2004, which
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, is likewise herein assailed.

The facts as found by the trial court and the appellate court are well
established.

Rufino Cabales died on July 4, 1966 and left a 5,714-square meter parcel of
land located in Brgy. Rizal, Sogod, Southern Leyte, covered by Tax Declaration No.
17270 to his surviving wife Saturnina and children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco,
Leonora, Alberto and petitioner Rito.

On July 26, 1971, brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto sold
the subject property to Dr. Cayetano Corrompido for P2,000.00, with right to
repurchase within eight (8) years. The three (3) siblings divided the proceeds of the
sale among themselves, each getting a share of P666.66.

The following month or on August 18, 1971, Alberto secured a note (vale)
from Dr. Corrompido in the amount of P300.00.
129[1] Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and concurred in by
Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Arsenio J. Magpale.
130[2] Penned by Judge Romeo M. Gomez.

In 1972, Alberto died leaving his wife and son, petitioner Nelson.

On December 18, 1975, within the eight-year redemption period, Bonifacio

and Albino tendered their payment of P666.66 each to Dr. Corrompido. But Dr.
Corrompido only released the document of sale with pacto de retro after Saturnina
paid for the share of her deceased son, Alberto, including his vale of P300.00.

On even date, Saturnina and her four (4) children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco
and Leonora sold the subject parcel of land to respondents-spouses Jesus and
Anunciacion Feliano for P8,000.00. The Deed of Sale provided in its last paragraph,
thus:

It is hereby declared and

THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
corresponding and belonging to
Rito Cabales who are still minors
are held

understood that the amount of TWO

EIGHTY SIX PESOS (P2,286.00)
the Heirs of Alberto Cabales and to
upon the execution of this instrument

in trust by the VENDEE and to be paid and delivered only to them upon
reaching the age of 21.

On December 17, 1985, the Register of Deeds of Southern Leyte issued

Original Certificate of Title No. 17035 over the purchased land in the names of
respondents-spouses.

On December 30, 1985, Saturnina and her four (4) children executed an
affidavit to the effect that petitioner Nelson would only receive the amount of
P176.34 from respondents-spouses when he reaches the age of 21 considering that

Saturnina paid Dr. Corrompido P966.66 for the obligation of petitioner Nelsons late
father Alberto, i.e., P666.66 for his share in the redemption of the sale with pacto de
retro as well as his vale of P300.00.

On July 24, 1986, 24-year old petitioner Rito Cabales acknowledged receipt of
the sum of P1,143.00 from respondent Jesus Feliano, representing the formers share
in the proceeds of the sale of subject property.

In 1988, Saturnina died. Petitioner Nelson, then residing in Manila, went back
to his fathers hometown in Southern Leyte. That same year, he learned from his
uncle, petitioner Rito, of the sale of subject property. In 1993, he signified his
intention to redeem the subject land during a barangay conciliation process that he
initiated.

On January 12, 1995, contending that they could not have sold their
respective shares in subject property when they were minors, petitioners filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte, a complaint for
redemption of the subject land plus damages.

In their answer, respondents-spouses maintained that petitioners were

estopped from claiming any right over subject property considering that (1)
petitioner Rito had already received the amount corresponding to his share of the
proceeds of the sale of subject property, and (2) that petitioner Nelson failed to
consign to the court the total amount of the redemption price necessary for legal
redemption. They prayed for the dismissal of the case on the grounds of laches and
prescription.

No amicable settlement was reached at pre-trial. Trial ensued and on August

11, 2000, the trial court ruled against petitioners. It held that (1) Alberto or, by his
death, any of his heirs including petitioner Nelson lost their right to subject land
when not one of them repurchased it from Dr. Corrompido; (2) Saturnina was
effectively subrogated to the rights and interests of Alberto when she paid for
Albertos share as well as his obligation to Dr. Corrompido; and (3) petitioner Rito
had no more right to redeem his share to subject property as the sale by Saturnina,
his legal guardian pursuant to Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court, was perfectly
valid; and it was shown that he received his share of the proceeds of the sale on July
24, 1986, when he was 24 years old.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court. It
held that the sale by Saturnina of petitioner Ritos undivided share to the property
was unenforceable for lack of authority or legal representation but that the contract
was effectively ratified by petitioner Ritos receipt of the proceeds on July 24, 1986.
The appellate court also ruled that petitioner Nelson is co-owner to the extent of
one-seventh (1/7) of subject property as Saturnina was not subrogated to Albertos
rights when she repurchased his share to the property. It further directed petitioner
Nelson to pay the estate of the late Saturnina Cabales the amount of P966.66,
representing the amount which the latter paid for the obligation of petitioner
Nelsons late father Alberto. Finally, however, it denied petitioner Nelsons claim for
redemption for his failure to tender or consign in court the redemption money within
the period prescribed by law.

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners contend that the Court of
Appeals erred in (1) recognizing petitioner Nelson Cabales as co-owner of subject
land but denied him the right of legal redemption, and (2) not recognizing petitioner
Rito Cabales as co-owner of subject land with similar right of legal redemption.

First, we shall delineate the rights of petitioners to subject land.

When Rufino Cabales died intestate, his wife Saturnina and his six (6)
children, Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco, Leonora, Alberto and petitioner Rito, survived
and succeeded him. Article 996 of the New Civil Code provides that [i]f a widow or
widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in
the succession the same share as that of each of the children. Verily, the seven (7)
heirs inherited equally on subject property. Petitioner Rito and Alberto, petitioner
Nelsons father, inherited in their own rights and with equal shares as the others.

But before partition of subject land was effected, Alberto died. By operation
of law, his rights and obligations to one-seventh of subject land were transferred to
his legal heirs his wife and his son petitioner Nelson.

We shall now discuss the effects of the two (2) sales of subject land to the
rights of the parties.
The first sale with pacto de retro to Dr. Corrompido by the brothers and coowners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto was valid but only as to their pro-indiviso
shares to the land. When Alberto died prior to repurchasing his share, his rights and
obligations were transferred to and assumed by his heirs, namely his wife and his
son, petitioner Nelson. But the records show that it was Saturnina, Albertos mother,
and not his heirs, who repurchased for him. As correctly ruled by the Court of
Appeals, Saturnina was not subrogated to Albertos or his heirs rights to the property
when she repurchased the share.

In Paulmitan v. Court of Appeals,131[3] we held that a co-owner who

redeemed the property in its entirety did not make her the owner of all of it. The
131[3] G.R. No. 61584, November 25, 1992, 215 SCRA 867, citing Adille v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-44546, January 29, 1988, 157 SCRA 455.

property remained in a condition of co-ownership as the redemption did not provide

for a mode of terminating a co-ownership. 132[4] But the one who redeemed had the
right to be reimbursed for the redemption price and until reimbursed, holds a lien
upon the subject property for the amount due. 133[5] Necessarily, when Saturnina
redeemed for Albertos heirs who had then acquired his pro-indiviso share in subject
property, it did not vest in her ownership over the pro-indiviso share she redeemed.
But she had the right to be reimbursed for the redemption price and held a lien
upon the property for the amount due until reimbursement. The result is that the
heirs of Alberto, i.e., his wife and his son petitioner Nelson, retained ownership over
their pro-indiviso share.
Upon redemption from Dr. Corrompido, the subject property was resold to
respondents-spouses by the co-owners. Petitioners Rito and Nelson were then
minors and as indicated in the Deed of Sale, their shares in the proceeds were held
in trust by respondents-spouses to be paid and delivered to them upon reaching the
age of majority.

As to petitioner Rito, the contract of sale was unenforceable as correctly held

by the Court of Appeals. Articles 320 and 326 of the New Civil Code 134[6] state
that:
Art. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal
administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental
authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the
father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court
of First Instance.
132[4] Id.
133[5] Id.
134[6] Law applicable to the case. Executive Order No. 209 otherwise known as the
Family Code of the Philippines, which expressly repealed these provisions, took
effect on August 4, 1988.

Art. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two
thousand pesos, the father or mother shall be considered a guardian of
the childs property, subject to the duties and obligations of guardians
under the Rules of Court.
In other words, the father, or, in his absence, the mother, is considered legal
administrator of the property pertaining to the child under his or her parental
authority without need of giving a bond in case the amount of the property of the
child does not exceed two thousand pesos. 135[7] Corollary to this, Rule 93, Section
7 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, applicable to this case, automatically
designates the parent as legal guardian of the child without need of any judicial
appointment in case the latters property does not exceed two thousand pesos, 136

[8] thus:
Sec. 7. Parents as guardians. When the property of the child
under parental authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the
father or the mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall
be his legal guardian x x x x137[9]

135[7] See Badillo v. Ferrer, No. L-51369, July 29, 1987, 152 SCRA 407.
136[8] Id.

137[9] The New Rules on Guardianship of Minors, adapted in the May 1, 2003 Resolution of the
Court in A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC, provide, inter alia:
Section 1. Applicability of the Rule. This Rule shall apply to petitions for
guardianship over the person or property, or both, of a minor.
The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over
the person and property of their unemancipated common child without the
necessity of a court appointment. In such case, this Rule shall be suppletory to
the provisions of the Family Code on guardianship.

Saturnina was clearly petitioner Ritos legal guardian without necessity of

court appointment considering that the amount of his property or one-seventh of
subject property was P1,143.00, which is less than two thousand pesos. However,
Rule 96, Sec. 1138[10] provides that:
Section 1. To what guardianship shall extend. A guardian
appointed shall have the care and custody of the person of his ward,
and the management of his estate, or the management of the estate
only, as the case may be. The guardian of the estate of a nonresident
shall have the management of all the estate of the ward within the
Philippines, and no court other than that in which such guardian was
appointed shall have jurisdiction over the guardianship.

Indeed, the legal guardian only has the plenary power of administration of
the minors property. It does not include the power of alienation which needs judicial
authority.139[11] Thus, when Saturnina, as legal guardian of petitioner Rito, sold
the latters pro-indiviso share in subject land, she did not have the legal authority to
do so.

Article 1403 of the New Civil Code provides, thus:

Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless
they are ratified:

(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one

who has been given no authority or legal representation, or who has
acted beyond his powers;

138[10] Revised Rules of Court of 1964.

139[11] Revised Rules of Court of 1964, Rule 95.

xxxx

Accordingly, the contract of sale as to the pro-indiviso share of petitioner Rito

was unenforceable. However, when he acknowledged receipt of the proceeds of the
sale on July 24, 1986, petitioner Rito effectively ratified it. This act of ratification
rendered the sale valid and binding as to him.
With respect to petitioner Nelson, on the other hand, the contract of sale was
void. He was a minor at the time of the sale. Saturnina or any and all the other coowners were not his legal guardians with judicial authority to alienate or encumber
his property. It was his mother who was his legal guardian and, if duly authorized by
the courts, could validly sell his undivided share to the property. She did not.
Necessarily, when Saturnina and the others sold the subject property in its entirety
to respondents-spouses, they only sold and transferred title to their pro-indiviso
shares and not that part which pertained to petitioner Nelson and his mother.
Consequently, petitioner Nelson and his mother retained ownership over their
undivided share of subject property.140[12]

But may petitioners redeem the subject land from respondents-spouses?

Articles 1088 and 1623 of the New Civil Code are pertinent:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a
stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the
price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month
from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.

Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not

be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the
prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of
140[12] Nothing on the records indicates that petitioner Nelsons mother
predeceased him.

sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless

accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written
notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.

The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining

owners.

Clearly, legal redemption may only be exercised by the co-owner or coowners who did not part with his or their pro-indiviso share in the property held in
common. As demonstrated, the sale as to the undivided share of petitioner Rito
became valid and binding upon his ratification on July 24, 1986. As a result, he lost
his right to redeem subject property.

However, as likewise established, the sale as to the undivided share of

petitioner Nelson and his mother was not valid such that they were not divested of
their ownership thereto. Necessarily, they may redeem the subject property from
respondents-spouses. But they must do so within thirty days from notice in writing
of the sale by their co-owners vendors. In reckoning this period, we held in Alonzo
v. Intermediate Appellate Court,141[13] thus:
x x x we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by
its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the
law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its
provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should
never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never
within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in
fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render
justice.

141[13] No. L-72873, May 28, 1987, 150 SCRA 259.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in

consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must
keep them so. x x x x
x x x x While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not
there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its
enactment. In doing so, we defer not to the letter that killeth but to the
spirit that vivifieth, to give effect to the lawmakers will.

In requiring written notice, Article 1088 (and Article 1623 for

that matter)142[14] seeks to ensure that the redemptioner is properly
notified of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the
starting time of the 30-day period of redemption. Considering the
shortness of the period, it is really necessary, as a general rule, to
pinpoint the precise date it is supposed to begin, to obviate the
problem of alleged delays, sometimes consisting of only a day or two.
In the instant case, the right of redemption was invoked not days but years
after the sale was made in 1978. We are not unmindful of the fact that petitioner
Nelson was a minor when the sale was perfected. Nevertheless, the records show
that in 1988, petitioner Nelson, then of majority age, was informed of the sale of
subject property. Moreover, it was noted by the appellate court that petitioner
Nelson was likewise informed thereof in 1993 and he signified his intention to
redeem subject property during a barangay conciliation process. But he only filed
the complaint for legal redemption and damages on January 12, 1995, certainly
more than thirty days from learning about the sale.

In the face of the established facts, petitioner Nelson cannot feign ignorance
of the sale of subject property in 1978. To require strict proof of written notice of the
sale would be to countenance an obvious false claim of lack of knowledge thereof,
thus commending the letter of the law over its purpose, i.e., the notification of
redemptioners.

142[14] Included for its application in the case at bar.

The Court is satisfied that there was sufficient notice of the sale to petitioner
Nelson. The thirty-day redemption period commenced in 1993, after petitioner
Nelson sought the barangay conciliation process to redeem his property. By January
12, 1995, when petitioner Nelson filed a complaint for legal redemption and
damages, it is clear that the thirty-day period had already expired.

As in Alonzo, the Court, after due consideration of the facts of the instant
case, hereby interprets the law in a way that will render justice. 143[15]

Petitioner Nelson, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, can no longer

redeem subject property. But he and his mother remain co-owners thereof with
respondents-spouses. Accordingly, title to subject property must include them.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals of October 27, 2003 and February 23, 2004 are
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The Register of Deeds of Southern Leyte is
ORDERED to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 17035 and to issue in lieu thereof
a new certificate of title in the name of respondents-spouses Jesus and Anunciacion
Feliano for the 6/7 portion, and petitioner Nelson Cabales and his mother for the
remaining 1/7 portion, pro indiviso.

SO ORDERED.

143[15] See note 3.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I

certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

THIRD DIVISION

SPS. VIRGILIO F. SANTOS &

ESPERANZA LATI SANTOS,
SPS.VICTORINO F. SANTOS,
&
LAGRIMAS
SANTOS,
ERNESTO F. SANTOS, and
TADEO F. SANTOS,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 169129

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,*

** On leave.

- versus -

CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.

SPS. JOSE LUMBAO and

PROSERFINA LUMBAO,

Promulgated:

Respondents.

March 28, 2007

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under

Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to

annul and set aside the Decision 144[1] and Resolution145[2] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60450 entitled, Spouses Jose
Lumbao and Proserfina Lumbao v. Spouses Virgilio F. Santos and
Esperanza Lati, Spouses Victorino F. Santos and Lagrimas F.
Santos, Ernesto F. Santos and Tadeo F. Santos, dated 8 June 2005
and 29 July 2005, respectively, which granted the appeal filed by
herein respondents Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proserfina Lumbao
(Spouses Lumbao) and ordered herein petitioners Spouses Virgilio
F. Santos and Esperanza Lati, Spouses Victorino F. Santos and
Lagrimas F. Santos, Ernesto F. Santos and Tadeo F. Santos to
reconvey to respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject property
and to pay the latter attorneys fees and litigation expenses, thus,
reversing the Decision146[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City, dated 17 June 1998 which dismissed the Complaint for
Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents Spouses
Lumbao for lack of merit.

Herein petitioners Virgilio, Victorino, Ernesto and Tadeo, all

surnamed Santos, are the legitimate and surviving heirs of the
late Rita Catoc Santos (Rita), who died on 20 October 1985. The
144[1] Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. with Associate Justices
Lucas P. Bersamin and Lucenito N. Tagle, concurring, rollo, pp. 47-62.
145[2] Id. at 64.
146[3] Penned by Judge Ma. Cristina C. Estrada, rollo, pp. 103-114.

other petitioners Esperanza Lati and Lagrimas Santos are the

daughters-in-law of Rita.

Herein respondents Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proserfina

Lumbao are the alleged owners of the 107-square meter lot
(subject property), which they purportedly bought from Rita
during her lifetime.

The facts of the present case are as follows:

On two separate occasions during her lifetime, Rita sold to

respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject property which is a part
of her share in the estate of her deceased mother, Maria Catoc
(Maria), who died intestate on 19 September 1978. On the first
occasion, Rita sold 100 square meters of her inchoate share in her
mothers estate through a document denominated as Bilihan ng
Lupa, dated 17 August 1979.147[4] Respondents Spouses Lumbao
claimed the execution of the aforesaid document was witnessed
by petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo, as shown by their signatures
affixed therein. On the second occasion, an additional seven
square meters was added to the land as evidenced by a

147[4] Id. at 73-74.

document also denominated as Bilihan ng Lupa, dated 9 January

1981.148[5]

After acquiring the subject property, respondents Spouses

Lumbao took actual possession thereof and erected thereon a
house which they have been occupying as exclusive owners up to
the present. As the exclusive owners of the subject property,
respondents Spouses Lumbao made several verbal demands upon
Rita, during her lifetime, and thereafter upon herein petitioners,
for them to execute the necessary documents to effect the
issuance of a separate title in favor of respondents Spouses
Lumbao

insofar

as

the

subject

property

is

concerned.

Respondents Spouses Lumbao alleged that prior to her death, Rita

informed respondent Proserfina Lumbao she could not deliver the
title to the subject property because the entire property inherited
by her and her co-heirs from Maria had not yet been partitioned.

On

May

1986,

the

Spouses

Lumbao

claimed

that

petitioners, acting fraudulently and in conspiracy with one

another, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, 149[6]
adjudicating and partitioning among themselves and the other
148[5] Id. at 77-78.
149[6] Id. at 80-82.

heirs, the estate left by Maria, which included the subject property
already sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao and now covered by
TCT No. 81729150[7] of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City.

On 15 June 1992, respondents Spouses Lumbao, through

counsel, sent a formal demand letter151[8] to petitioners but
despite receipt of such demand letter, petitioners still failed and
refused to reconvey the subject property to the respondents
Spouses Lumbao. Consequently, the latter filed a Complaint for
Reconveyance with Damages152[9] before the RTC of Pasig City.

Petitioners filed their Answer denying the allegations that the

subject property had been sold to the respondents Spouses
Lumbao. They likewise denied that the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement had been fraudulently executed because the same
was duly published as required by law. On the contrary, they
prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of cause of
action because respondents Spouses Lumbao failed to comply
with the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law under Republic
Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
150[7] Id. at 83.
151[8] Id. at 84-86.
152[9] Id. at 66-72.

1991,

which

repealed

Presidential

Decree

No.

1508 153[10]

requiring first resort to barangay conciliation.

Respondents Spouses Lumbao, with leave of court, amended

their Complaint because they discovered that on 16 February
1990, without their knowledge, petitioners executed a Deed of
Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Julieta S. Esplana for the sum of
P30,000.00. The said Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was
annotated at the back of TCT No. PT-81729 on 26 April 1991. Also,
in answer to the allegation of the petitioners that they failed to
comply

with

the

mandate

of

the

Revised

Katarungang

Pambarangay Law, respondents Spouses Lumbao said that the

Complaint was filed directly in court in order that prescription or
the Statute of Limitations may not set in.

During the trial, respondents Spouses Lumbao presented

Proserfina Lumbao and Carolina Morales as their witnesses, while
the petitioners presented only the testimony of petitioner Virgilio.

The trial court rendered a Decision on 17 June 1998, the

dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
153[10] A decree, Establishing a System of Amicably Settling Disputes at the
Barangay Level.

Premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby denied for

lack of merit.

Considering that [petitioners] have incurred expenses in order to

protect their interest, [respondents spouses Lumbao] are hereby
directed to pay [petitioners], to wit: 1) the amount of P30,000.00 as
attorneys fees and litigation expenses, and 2) costs of the suit. 154[11]

Aggrieved, respondents Spouses Lumbao appealed to the

Court of Appeals. On 8 June 2005, the appellate court rendered a
Decision, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby

GRANTED. The appealed Decision dated June 17, 1998 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 in Civil Case No. 62175 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby entered ordering
[petitioners] to reconvey 107 square meters of the subject [property]
covered by TCT No. PT-81729 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City,
Metro Manila, and to pay to [respondents spouses Lumbao] the sum of
P30,000.00 for attorneys fees and litigation expenses.

No pronouncement as to costs.155[12]

154[11] Rollo, p. 114.

155[12] Id. at 61.

Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of

the aforesaid Decision but it was denied in the Resolution of the
appellate court dated 29 July 2005 for lack of merit.

Hence, this Petition.

The grounds relied upon by the petitioners are the following:

I.
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT, THEREBY CREATING A VARIANCE ON THE FINDINGS OF
FACTS OF TWO COURTS.

II.
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ORDERING THE PETITIONERS TO
RECONVEY THE SUBJECT [PROPERTY] TO THE RESPONDENTS
[SPOUSES LUMBAO] AND IN NOT RULING THAT THEY ARE GUILTY
OF LACHES, HENCE THEY CANNOT RECOVER THE LOT
ALLEGEDLY SOLD TO THEM.

III.
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING HEREIN PETITIONER[S] TO
BE IN GOOD FAITH IN EXECUTING THE DEED OF EXTRAJUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT DATED [2 MAY 1986].

IV.
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE

NOT LEGALLY BOUND TO COMPLY WITH THE SUPPOSED BILIHAN

NG LUPA DATED [17 AUGUST 1979] AND [9 JANUARY 1981] THAT
WERE SUPPOSEDLY EXECUTED BY THE LATE RITA CATOC.

V.
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS
[SPOUSES LUMBAOS] ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE WITH
DAMAGES CANNOT BE SUPPORTED WITH AN UNENFORCEABLE
DOCUMENTS, SUCH AS THE BILIHAN NG LUPA DATED [17
AUGUST 1979] AND [9 JANUARY 1981].

VI.
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS
[SPOUSES LUMBAOS] COMPLAINT FOR RECONVEYANCE IS
DISMISSABLE (SIC) FOR NON COMPLIANCE OF THE MANDATE OF
[P.D. NO.] 1508, AS AMENDED BY Republic Act No. 7160.

VII.
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS
[SPOUSES LUMBAO] SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR PETITIONERS
CLAIM FOR DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY[]S FEES.

Petitioners

ask

this

Court

to

scrutinize

the

evidence

presented in this case, because they claim that the factual

findings of the trial court and the appellate court are conflicting.
They allege that the findings of fact by the trial court revealed
that petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo did not witness the execution of
the documents known as Bilihan ng Lupa; hence, this finding runs
counter to the conclusion made by the appellate court. And even

assuming that they were witnesses to the aforesaid documents,

still, respondents Spouses Lumbao were not entitled to the
reconveyance of the subject property because they were guilty of
laches for their failure to assert their rights for an unreasonable
length of time. Since respondents Spouses Lumbao had slept on
their rights for a period of more than 12 years reckoned from the
date of execution of the second Bilihan ng Lupa, it would be
unjust and unfair to the petitioners if the respondents will be
allowed to recover the subject property.

Petitioners allege they are in good faith in executing the

Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement because even respondents
Spouses Lumbaos witness, Carolina Morales, testified that neither
petitioner Virgilio nor petitioner Tadeo was present during the
execution of the Bilihan ng Lupa, dated 17 August 1979 and 9
January 1981. Petitioners affirm that the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement was published in a newspaper of general circulation to
give notice to all creditors of the estate subject of partition to
contest the same within the period prescribed by law. Since no
claimant appeared to interpose a claim within the period allowed
by law, a title to the subject property was then issued in favor of
the petitioners; hence, they are considered as holders in good
faith and therefore cannot be barred from entering into any
subsequent transactions involving the subject property.

Petitioners also contend that they are not bound by the

documents denominated as Bilihan ng Lupa because the same
were null and void for the following reasons: 1) for being falsified
documents because one of those documents made it appear that
petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo were witnesses to its execution and
that they appeared personally before the notary public, when in
truth and in fact they did not; 2) the identities of the properties in
the Bilihan ng Lupa, dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 in
relation to the subject property in litigation were not established
by the evidence presented by the respondents Spouses Lumbao;
3) the right of the respondents Spouses Lumbao to lay their claim
over the subject property had already been barred through
estoppel by laches; and 4) the respondents Spouses Lumbaos
claim over the subject property had already prescribed.

Finally,

petitioners

claim

that

the

Complaint

for

Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents Spouses

Lumbao was dismissible because they failed to comply with the
mandate of Presidential Decree No. 1508, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7160, particularly Section 412 of Republic Act No.
7160.

Given the foregoing, the issues presented by the petitioners

may be restated as follows:

I.
Whether or not the Complaint for Reconveyance
with Damages filed by respondents spouses Lumbao is
dismissible for their failure to comply with the mandate of the
Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law under R.A. No. 7160.

II.
Whether or not the documents known as Bilihan ng
Lupa are valid and enforceable, thus, they can be the bases of
the respondents spouses Lumbaos action for reconveyance with
damages.

III.
Whether or not herein petitioners are legally bound
to comply with the Bilihan ng Lupa dated 17 August 1979 and 9
January 1981 and consequently, reconvey the subject property
to herein respondents spouses Lumbao.

It is well-settled that in the exercise of the Supreme Courts

power of review, the court is not a trier of facts and does not
normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented
by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering
that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and
binding on the Court.156[13] But, the rule is not without
exceptions. There are several recognized exceptions 157[14] in
which factual issues may be resolved by this Court. One of these
exceptions is when the findings of the appellate court are contrary
156[13] Almendrala v. Ngo, G.R. No. 142408, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 311,
322.

to those of the trial court. This exception is present in the case at

bar.

Going to the first issue presented in this case, it is the

argument of the petitioners that the Complaint for Reconveyance
with Damages filed by respondents Spouses Lumbao should be
dismissed for failure to comply with the barangay conciliation
proceedings

as

mandated

by

the

Revised

Katarungang

Pambarangay Law under Republic Act No. 7160. This argument

cannot be sustained.

157[14] Recognized exceptions to this rule are: (1) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when
the finding of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellee and the appellant; (7) when the findings are
contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or (11) when the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties,
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion [Langkaan Realty
Development, Inc. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 139437, 8 December
2000, 347 SCRA 542; Nokom v. National Labor Relations Commissions, 390 Phil.
1228, 1243 (2000); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Embroidery and Garments
Industries (Phils.), Inc., 364 Phil. 541, 546-547 (1999); Sta. Maria v. Court of
Appeals, 349 Phil. 275, 282-283 (1998); Almendrala v. Ngo, G.R. No. 142408, 30
September 2005, 471 SCRA 311, 322].

Section 408 of the aforesaid law and Administrative Circular

No. 14-93158[15] provide that all disputes between parties actually
residing in the same city or municipality are subject to barangay
conciliation. A prior recourse thereto is a pre-condition before
filing a complaint in court or any government offices. Noncompliance with the said condition precedent could affect the
sufficiency of the plaintiffs cause of action and make his
complaint vulnerable to dismissal on ground of lack of cause of
action or prematurity; but the same would not prevent a court of
competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication
over the case before it, where the defendants failed to object to
such exercise of jurisdiction.159[16]

While it is true that the present case should first be referred

to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation because the parties
involved herein actually reside in the same city (Pasig City) and
the dispute between them involves a real property, hence, the
said dispute should have been brought in the city in which the
real property, subject matter of the controversy, is located, which
happens to be the same city where the contending parties reside.
158[15] Guidelines on the Katarungang Pambarangay Conciliation Procedure to
Prevent Circumvention of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law [Sections
399-442, Chapter VII, Title I, Book III, R.A. No. 7160,otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991] issued by the Supreme Court on 15 July 1993.
159[16] Royales v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-65072, 31 January 1984,
127 SCRA 470, 473-474.

In the event that respondents Spouses Lumbao failed to comply

with

the

said

condition

precedent,

their

Complaint

for

Reconveyance with Damages can be dismissed. In this case,

however, respondents Spouses Lumbaos non-compliance with the
aforesaid

condition

precedent

cannot

be

considered

fatal.

Although petitioners alleged in their answer that the Complaint

for Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents spouses
Lumbao should be dismissed for their failure to comply with the
condition precedent, which in effect, made the complaint
prematurely instituted and the trial court acquired no jurisdiction
to hear the case, yet, they did not file a Motion to Dismiss the said
complaint.

Emphasis must be given to the fact that the petitioners could

have prevented the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the
case had they filed a Motion to Dismiss. However, instead of
doing so, they invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an
answer seeking an affirmative relief from it. Worse, petitioners
actively participated in the trial of the case by presenting their
own witness and by cross-examining the witnesses presented by
the respondents Spouses Lumbao. It is elementary that the active
participation of a party in a case pending against him before a
court is tantamount to recognition of that courts jurisdiction and a
willingness to abide by the resolution of the case which will bar

said party from later on impugning the courts jurisdiction. 160[17] It

is also well-settled that the non-referral of a case for barangay
conciliation when so required under the law is not jurisdictional in
nature and may therefore be deemed waived if not raised
seasonably

in

motion

to

dismiss. 161[18]

Hence,

herein

petitioners can no longer raise the defense of non-compliance

with the barangay conciliation proceedings to seek the dismissal
of the complaint filed by the respondents Spouses Lumbao,
because they already waived the said defense when they failed to
file a Motion to Dismiss.

As regards the second issue, petitioners maintain that the

Bilihan ng Lupa, dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 are
null and void for being falsified documents as it is made to appear
that petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo were present in the execution
of the said documents and that the identities of the properties in
those documents in relation to the subject property has not been
established by the evidence of the respondents Spouses Lumbao.
Petitioners also claim that the enforceability of those documents
is barred by prescription of action and laches.

160[17] Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante, G.R. No. 112526, 16 March
2005, 453 SCRA 432, 477.

161[18] Baares II v. Balising, G.R. No. 132624, 13 March 2000, 328 SCRA 36, 50-51.

It is the petitioners incessant barking that the Bilihan ng

Lupa documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 were
falsified because it was made to appear that petitioners Virgilio
and Tadeo were present in the executions thereof, and their
allegation that even respondents Spouses Lumbaos witness
Carolina Morales proved that said petitioners were not present
during the execution of the aforementioned documents. This is
specious.

Upon examination of the aforesaid documents, this Court

finds that in the Bilihan ng Lupa, dated 17 August 1979, the
signatures of petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo appeared thereon.
Moreover, in petitioners Answer and Amended Answer to the
Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages, both petitioners
Virgilio and Tadeo made an admission that indeed they acted as
witnesses in the execution of the Bilihan ng Lupa, dated 17
August 1979.162[19] However, in order to avoid their obligations in
the said Bilihan ng Lupa, petitioner Virgilio, in his crossexamination, denied having knowledge of the sale transaction
and claimed that he could not remember the same as well as his
appearance before the notary public due to the length of time
that

had

passed.

Noticeably,

petitioner

Virgilio

did

not

categorically deny having signed the Bilihan ng Lupa, dated 17

August 1979 and in support thereof, his testimony in the cross162[19] Rollo, pp. 87, 97.

examination propounded by the counsel of the respondents

Spouses Lumbao is quoted hereunder:

ATTY. CHIU:
Q.

Now, you said, Mr. WitnessVirgilio Santos, that you dont know
about this document which was marked as Exhibit A for the
[respondents spouses Lumbao]?

ATTY. BUGARING:

The question is misleading, your Honor. Counsel premised the

question that he does not have any knowledge but not that he
does not know.

ATTY. CHIU:
Q.

Being you are one of the witnesses of this document? [I]s it not?

WITNESS:

A.

No, sir.

Q.

I am showing to you this document, there is a signature at the

left hand margin of this document Virgilio Santos, will you please
go over the same and tell the court whose signature is this?

A.

I dont remember, sir, because of the length of time that had

passed.

Q.

But that is your signature?

A.

I dont have eyeglasses My signature is different.

Q.

You never appeared

Mangahas?

A.

I dont remember.163[20]

before

this

notary

public

Apolinario

As a general rule, facts alleged in a partys pleading are

deemed admissions of that party and are binding upon him, but
this is not an absolute and inflexible rule. An answer is a mere
statement of fact which the party filing it expects to prove, but it
is not evidence.164[21] And in spite of the presence of judicial
admissions in a partys pleading, the trial court is still given
leeway to consider other evidence presented. 165[22] However, in
the case at bar, as the Court of Appeals mentioned in its Decision,
[herein petitioners] had not adduced any other evidence to
override the admission made in their [A]nswer that [petitioners
Virgilio and Tadeo] actually signed the [Bilihan ng Lupa dated 17
August 1979] except that they were just misled as to the purpose

163[20] TSN, 12 September 1996. Records, pp. 13-14.

164[21] Atillo III v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119053, 23 January 1997, 266 SCRA
596, 604.
165[22] Id. at 605.

of the document, x x x.166[23] Virgilios answers were unsure and

quibbled. Hence, the general rule that the admissions made by a
party in a pleading are binding and conclusive upon him applies in
this case.

On the testimony of respondents Spouses Lumbaos witness

Carolina Morales, this Court adopts the findings made by the
appellate court. Thus [T]he trial court gave singular focus on her reply to a question during
cross-examination if the [petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] were not with
her and the vendor [Rita] during the transaction. It must be pointed out
that earlier in the direct examination of said witness, she confirmed
that [respondents spouses Lumbao] actually bought the lot from [Rita]
(nagkabilihan). Said witness positively identified and confirmed the two
(2) documents evidencing the sale in favor of [respondents spouse
Lumbao]. Thus, her subsequent statement that the [petitioners Virgilio
and Tadeo] were not with them during the transaction does not
automatically imply that [petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] did not at any
time sign as witnesses as to the deed of sale attesting to their mothers
voluntary act of selling a portion of her share in her deceased mothers
property. The rule is that testimony of a witness must be considered
and calibrated in its entirety and not by truncated portions thereof or
isolated passages therein.167[24]

Furthermore, both Bilihan ng Lupa documents dated 17

August 1979 and 9 January 1981 were duly notarized before a
166[23] Rollo, p. 55.
167[24] Id. at 55-56.

notary public. It is well-settled that a document acknowledged

before a notary public is a public document 168[25] that enjoys the
presumption of regularity. It is a prima facie evidence of the truth
of the facts stated therein and a conclusive presumption of its
existence

and

due

execution.169[26]

To

overcome

this

presumption, there must be presented evidence that is clear and

convincing. Absent such evidence, the presumption must be
upheld.170[27] In addition, one who denies the due execution of a
deed where ones signature appears has the burden of proving
that contrary to the recital in the jurat, one never appeared before
the notary public and acknowledged the deed to be a voluntary
act. Nonetheless, in the present case petitioners denials without
clear and convincing evidence to support their claim of fraud and
falsity were not sufficient to overthrow the above-mentioned
presumption; hence, the authenticity, due execution and the truth
of the facts stated in the aforesaid Bilihan ng Lupa are upheld.

168[25] Rule 132, Section 19(b) of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

169[26] Id., Section 23 of the Revised Rules on Evidence; Medina v. Greenfield
Development Corporation, G.R. No. 140228, 19 November 2004, 443 SCRA 150,
160; Agasen v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115508, 15 February 2000, 325 SCRA 504,
511.

170[27] Medina v. Greenfield Development Corporation, id.

The defense of petitioners that the identities of the

properties described in the Bilihan ng Lupa, dated 17 August 1979
and 9 January 1981 in relation to the subject property were not
established by respondents Spouses Lumbaos evidence is likewise
not acceptable.

It is noteworthy that at the time of the execution of the

documents denominated as Bilihan ng Lupa, the entire property
owned by Maria, the mother of Rita, was not yet divided among
her and her co-heirs and so the description of the entire estate is
the only description that can be placed in the Bilihan ng Lupa,
dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 because the exact
metes and bounds of the subject property sold to respondents
Spouses Lumbao could not be possibly determined at that time.
Nevertheless, that does not make the contract of sale between
Rita and respondents Spouses Lumbao invalid because both the
law and jurisprudence have categorically held that even while an
estate remains undivided, co-owners have each full ownership of
their respective aliquots or undivided shares and may therefore
alienate, assign or mortgage them.171[28] The co-owner, however,
has no right to sell or alienate a specific or determinate part of
the thing owned in common, because such right over the thing is
represented by an aliquot or ideal portion without any physical
171[28] Barcenas v. Tomas, G.R. No. 150321, 31 March 2005, 454 SCRA 593, 610611.

division. In any case, the mere fact that the deed purports to
transfer a concrete portion does not per se render the sale void.
The sale is valid, but only with respect to the aliquot share of the
selling co-owner. Furthermore, the sale is subject to the results of
the partition upon the termination of the co-ownership. 172[29]

In the case at bar, when the estate left by Maria had been
partitioned on 2 May 1986 by virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement, the 107- square meter lot sold by the mother of the
petitioners to respondents Spouses Lumbao should be deducted
from the total lot, inherited by them in representation of their
deceased mother, which in this case measures 467 square
meters. The 107-square meter lot already sold to respondents
Spouses Lumbao can no longer be inherited by the petitioners
because the same was no longer part of their inheritance as it
was already sold during the lifetime of their mother.

Likewise, the fact that the property mentioned in the two

Bilihan ng Lupa documents was described as a portion of a parcel
of land covered in Tax Declarations No. A-018-01674, while the
subject matter of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement was the
property described in Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 3216 of
172[29] Heirs of the Late Spouses Aurelio and Esperanza Balite v. Lim, G.R. No.
152168, 10 December 2004, 446 SCRA 56, 71.

the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal in the name of Maria

is of no moment because in the Bilihan ng Lupa, dated 17 August
1979 and 9 January 1981, it is clear that there was only one
estate left by Maria upon her death. And this fact was not refuted
by the petitioners. Besides, the property described in Tax
Declaration No. A-018-01674 and the property mentioned in TCT
No. 3216 are both located in Barrio Rosario, Municipality of Pasig,
Province of Rizal, and almost have the same boundaries. It is,
thus, safe to state that the property mentioned in Tax Declaration
No. A-018-01674 and in TCT No. 3216 are one and the same.

The defense of prescription of action and laches is likewise

unjustifiable. In an action for reconveyance, the decree of
registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought
instead is the transfer of the property or its title which has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another persons name to
its rightful or legal owner, or to the one with a better right. It is,
indeed, true that the right to seek reconveyance of registered
property is not absolute because it is subject to extinctive
prescription. However, when the plaintiff is in possession of
the land to be reconveyed, prescription cannot set in. Such
an exception is based on the theory that registration proceedings

could not be used as a shield for fraud or for enriching a person at

the expense of another.173[30]

In the case at bar, the right of the respondents Spouses

Lumbao to seek reconveyance does not prescribe because the
latter have been and are still in actual possession and occupation
as owners of the property sought to be reconveyed, which fact
has not been refuted nor denied by the petitioners. Furthermore,
respondents Spouses Lumbao cannot be held guilty of laches
because from the very start that they bought the 107-square
meter lot from the mother of the petitioners, they have constantly
asked for the transfer of the certificate of title into their names
but Rita, during her lifetime, and the petitioners, after the death
of Rita, failed to do so on the flimsy excuse that the lot had not
been partitioned yet. Inexplicably, after the partition of the entire
estate of Maria, petitioners still included the 107-square meter lot
in their inheritance which they divided among themselves despite
their knowledge of the contracts of sale between their mother and
the respondents Spouses Lumbao.

173[30] Heirs of Pomposa Saludares v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128254, 16 January 2004, 420 SCRA 51, 5658.

Under the above premises, this Court holds that the Bilihan
ng Lupa documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981
are valid and enforceable and can be made the basis of the
respondents Spouses Lumbaos action for reconveyance. The
failure of respondents Spouses Lumbao to have the said
documents

registered

does

not

affect

its

validity

and

enforceability. It must be remembered that registration is not a

requirement for validity of the contract as between the parties, for
the effect of registration serves chiefly to bind third persons. The
principal purpose of registration is merely to notify other persons
not parties to a contract that a transaction involving the property
had been entered into. Where the party has knowledge of a prior
existing interest which is unregistered at the time he acquired a
right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered
interest has the effect of registration as to him. 174[31] Hence, the
Bilihan ng Lupa documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January
1981, being valid and enforceable, herein petitioners are bound to
comply with their provisions. In short, such documents are
absolutely valid between and among the parties thereto.
Finally, the general rule that heirs are bound by contracts
entered into by their predecessors-in-interest applies in the
present case. Article 1311175[32] of the NCC is the basis of this
rule. It is clear from the said provision that whatever rights and
obligations the decedent have over the property were transmitted
174[31] Heirs of Eduardo Manlapat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125585, 8 June
2005, 459 SCRA 412, 426.

to the heirs by way of succession, a mode of acquiring the

property, rights and obligations of the decedent to the extent of
the value of the inheritance of the heirs. 176[33] Thus, the heirs
cannot escape the legal consequence of a transaction entered
into by their predecessor-in-interest because they have inherited
the property subject to the liability affecting their common
ancestor. Being heirs, there is privity of interest between them
and their deceased mother. They only succeed to what rights their
mother had and what is valid and binding against her is also valid
and binding as against them. The death of a party does not
excuse nonperformance of a contract which involves a property
right and the rights and obligations thereunder pass to the
personal

representatives

of

the

deceased.

Similarly,

nonperformance is not excused by the death of the party when

the other party has a property interest in the subject matter of
the contract.177[34]

175[32] Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and
heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are
not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is
not liable beyond the value of the property he received from the decedent.
176[33] Tanay Recreation Center and Development Corp. v. Fausto, G.R. No.
140182, 12 April 2005, 455 SCRA 436, 446
177[34] DKC Holdings Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118248, 5 April 2000, 329
SCRA 666, 674-675.

In the end, despite the death of the petitioners mother, they

are still bound to comply with the provisions of the Bilihan ng
Lupa, dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981. Consequently,
they must reconvey to herein respondents Spouses Lumbao the
107-square meter lot which they bought from Rita, petitioners
mother. And as correctly ruled by the appellate court, petitioners
must pay respondents Spouses Lumbao attorneys fees and
litigation expenses for having been compelled to litigate and incur
expenses to protect their interest.178[35] On this matter, we do not
find reasons to reverse the said findings.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is

hereby DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated 8 June 2005 and 29 July 2005, respectively, are
hereby AFFIRMED. Herein petitioners are ordered to reconvey to
respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject property and to pay the
latter attorneys fees and litigation expenses. Costs against
petitioners.
178[35] Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation, other than judicial costs cannot be recovered, except: (1) x x x
(2) When the defendants act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate
with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
(3) x x x

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

On leave

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were

reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and

the Division Chairpersons attestation, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Today is Tuesday, October 25, 2016

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 211972

July 22, 2015

WILSON GO and PETER GO, Petitioners,

vs.
THE ESTATE OF THE LATE FELISA TAMIO DE BUENA VENTURA, represented by RESURRECCION A.
BIHIS, RHEA A. BIHIS, and REGINA A. BIHIS; and RESURRECCION A. BIHIS, RHEA A. BIHIS and REGINA
A. BIHIS, in their personal capacities, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 212045
ELLA A. GUERRERO, DELFIN A. GUERRERO, JR. and LESTER ALVIN A. GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.

THE ESTATE OF THE LATE FELISA TAMIO DE BUENA VENTURA, herein represented by RESURRECION A.
BIHIS, RHEA A. BIHIS and REGINA A. BIHIS, and RESURRECION A. BIHIS, RHEA A. BIHIS and REGINA A.
BIHIS, in their personal capacities, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in these consolidated1 petitions for review on certiorari2 are the Decision3 dated December 19, 2013 and the
Resolution4 dated April 1, 2014 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 96697, which modified the
Decision5 dated June 8, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 (RTC) in Civil Case No. Q-97-32515,
and thereby ordered: (a) the nullification of the Deed of Sale dated January 23, 1997 in favor of Wilson Go (Wilson) and
Peter Go (Peter), petitioners in G.R. No. 211972; (b) the reconveyance of the disputed property to the Estate of Felisa
Tamio; and (c) the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-1704 75, as well as the issuance of a new title in
the name of the Estate of Felisa Tamio by the Register of Deeds.
The Facts
On March 17, 1959, the late Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura (Felisa) purchased from Carmen Zaragosa, Inc. a parcel of land
with an area of 533 square meters, more or less, situated at Retiro corner Kanlaon Streets, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City
(subject property) and, thus, TCT No. 45951/T-233 was issued in her name. Thereafter, she constructed a three-storey
building thereon, called D'Lourds Building, where she resided until her death on February 19, 1994.6 On February 10, 1960,
Felisa supposedly sold the subject property to one of her daughters, Bella Guerrero (Bella), the latter's husband, Delfin
Guerrero, Sr. (Delfin, Sr.), and Felimon Buenaventura, Sr. (Felimon, Sr.), Felisa's common-law husband.7 Bella, copetitioner in G.R. No. 212045, and Delfin, Sr. paid P15,000.00 as consideration therefor.8 Thus, TCT No. 45951/T-233 in
the name of Felisa was cancelled and TCT No. 498699 was issued in the names of Felimon, Sr. and Bella, married to Delfin,
Sr..
Sometime in 1968, Resurrecion A. Bihis10 (Resurrecion), the other daughter of Felisa, sister of Bella, and respondent in
both G.R. Nos. 211972 a nd 212045, began to occupy the second floor of the D'Lourds Building and stayed therein until her
death in 2007.11
As it appears that TCT No. 49869 in the names of Felimon, Sr. and Bella, married to Delfin, Sr., was irretrievably destroyed
in the interim, Bella caused its reconstitution and was issued TCT No. RT-74910 (49869),12 again registered in their names.
When Felisa died on February 19, 1994, she allegedly bequeathed, in a disputed last will and testament, half of the subject
property to Resurrecion and her daughters, Rhea A. Bihis (Rhea) and Regina A. Bihis (Regina), corespondents in both G.R.
Nos. 211972 and 212045 (collectively, the Bihis Family). Thus, on April 19, 1994, the Bihis Family caused the annotation of
an adverse claim on TCT No. RT-74910 (49869). Felisa's purported will likewise declared Bella as the administrator of the
subject property.13
On the strength of such appointment, Bella filed, on May 24, 1994, a petition for the probate of Felisa's will. She was
eventually appointed as the administratrix of the Estate of Felisa and, in an inventory of Felisa's properties, Bella included
the subject property as part of said estate.14

On January 22, 1997, the adverse claim of the Bihis Family was cancelled. The following day, January 23, 1997, Felimon
Buenaventura, Jr. (Felimon, Jr.) and Teresita Robles, a.k.a. Rosalina Buenaventura Mariano15 (Teresita), apparently the
heirs of Felimon, Sr. (Heirs of Felimon, Sr.), executed a purported Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Felimon
Buenaventura, Sr., and caused its annotation on TCT No. RT-74910 (49869). By virtue thereof, TCT No. RT-74910 (49869)
was cancelled and TCT No. N-170416 was issued in the names of the Heirs of Felimon, Sr., Bella, and her co-petitioners in
G.R. No. 212045, Delfin A. Guerrero, Jr. (Delfin, Jr.) and Lester Alvin A. Guerrero (Lester) (collectively, Bella, et al.).16
On the very same day, January 23, 1997, through a Deed of Sale of even date, the subject property was sold to Wilson and
Peter by Bella, et al. for the amount of P4,500,000.00, a transaction completely unknown to Felisa's other heirs, the Bihis
Family. Thus, TCT No. N-170416 was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 170475 was issued in the names of Wilson
and Peter. Thereafter, Wilson and Peter filed ejectment cases against the occupants and/or lessees of the subject property.17
In July 1997, the probate court revoked the appointment of Bella as administratrix of the Estate of Felisa and eventually,
granted letters of administration to Resurrecion.18 Hence, on October 17, 1997, herein respondents, the Estate of Felisa, as
represented by the Bihis Family, and the Bihis Family, in their personal capacities (collectively, respondents), filed a
complaint for reconveyance and damages before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-32515, against Bella, et al.,
Wilson, Peter, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, alleging that Felisa, during her lifetime, merely entrusted the
subject property to Felimon, Sr., Bella, and Delfin, Sr. for the purpose of assisting Bella and Delfin, Sr. to obtain a loan and
mortgage from the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). To facilitate the transaction, Felisa agreed to have the title
over the subject property transferred to Bella and Felimon, Sr. However, Felisa never divested herself of her ownership over
the subject property, as evidenced by her continuous residence thereon, as well as her act of leasing several units to various
tenants. In fact, in a letter19 dated September 21, 1970 (September 21, 1970 letter) addressed to Delfin, Sr., Felisa reminded
Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. that the subject property was merely entrusted to them for Bella and Delfin, Sr. to
procure a loan from the GSIS.20 At the bottom of the letter, Bella's and Delfin, Sr.' s signatures appear beside their names.21
Likewise, respondents alleged that Wilson and Peter were buyers in bad faith, as they were aware of the facts and
circumstances that would have warranted further inquiry into the validity of the title of the sellers, Bella, et al. They averred
that Wilson and Peter knew that the building was occupied by individuals other than the sellers, as in fact, the Bihis Family
was residing therein.22
In their defense, Bella and Felimon, Jr. claimed that the subject property was owned by Bella and (the late) Felimon, Sr., as
evidenced by TCT No. RT-74910 (49869), which title was issued to them as early as February 10, 1960. Such title has
therefore subsisted for almost thirty seven (37) years without having been voided or nullified by a court decree. Moreover,
they have exercised acts of ownership over the subject property, such as m01igaging the same and leasing the building to
third parties. Finally, they asserted that Bella's act of including the subject property in the inventory of properties of the
Estate of Felisa was merely because of inadvertence.23
For his part, Wilson claimed that when he and his brother, Peter, purchased the subject property from Bella, et al. on January
23, 1997, he was not aware of the judicial settlement of the Estate of Felisa. He testified that before they acquired the subject
property, he verified the validity of the title covering the same with the Registry of Deeds, and that a period of two (2)
months had lapsed before the sale was consummated because his lawyer advised him to request Bella to cancel the
encumbrance annotated on the title over the subject property. However, he asserted that .his lawyer merely advised him to
ask for the cancellation of the annotation but he was not aware of the details surrounding the same. Eventually, the
annotation was cancelled and that he only knew that the subject property was included in the Estate of Felisa when herein
respondents' complaint before the RTC was filed. As such, he maintained that he and Peter were purchasers in good faith.24

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision25 dated June 8, 2009, the RTC found that there was an implied trust between Felisa, on the one hand, and
Bella and Felimon, Sr., on the other, created by operation of law. The RTC concluded that it was the intention of the late
Felisa to merely entrust to Bella and Felimon, Sr. the subject property for the sole purpose of using the same as collateral to
secure a loan with the GSIS. As such, while it is true that a title was issued in the names of Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon,
Sr. by virtue of the sale of the subject property to them, it was clear that Felisa never intended to relinquish her ownership
over the subject property. In concluding so, the RTC gave probative weight to the September 21, 1970 letter executed and
signed by Felisa which not only reminded Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. that the subject property was merely entrusted
to them for purposes of securing a loan from the GSIS, but also expressed Felisa's desire to have the subject property
divided equally among her heirs.26
However, the R TC held that reconveyance can no longer be effected since the subject property had already been transferred
to Wilson and Peter, whom it found to be purchasers in good faith. The RTC found that through Wilson's testimony, they
were able to disprove respondents' allegation that they were aware of an infirmity in the title of the sellers when they
acquired the subject property.27
Consequently, as Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. were unjustly enriched at the expense of the respondents who, as
compulsory heirs, were also entitled to their share in the subject property, the RTC directed Bella, et al. to pay plaintiffs,
jointly and severally, the amounts of: (a) P2,000,000.00 as compensatory damages, representing half of the purchase price of
the subject property considering that reconveyance can no longer be granted; (b) P200,000.00 as moral damages; (c)
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) P200,000.00 as attorney's fees.28
Dissatisfied, the following parties filed their separate appeals before the CA: the Estate of Felisa; the Bihis Family; the
Estate of Rosalinda B. Mariano;29 and Bella, Delfin, Jr., and Lester.30 The CA simplified the issues raised in the separate
appeals, as follows: (a) whether or not there was a trust established by Felisa in favor of Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr.;
(b) whether or not the action for reconveyance had already prescribed; and (c) whether or not Wilson and Peter are
purchasers in good faith.31
The CA Ruling
In a Decision32 dated December 19, 2013, the CA modified the RTC Decision, and thereby ordered: (a) the nullification of
the Deed of Sale dated January 23, 1997 in favor of Wilson and Peter; ( b) the reconveyance of the disputed property to the
Estate of Felisa; and (c) the cancellation of TCT No. N-170475 in the name of Wilson and Peter, as well as the issuance of a
new title in the name of the Estate of Felisa by the Register of Deeds.33
In its ruling, the CA upheld the RTC's finding that an implied trust was constituted between Felisa, during her lifetime, and
Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. when the former sold the subject property to the latter. Like the RTC, it gave substantial
weight and credence to the September 21, 1970 letter executed by Felisa which expressed her intention to convey the subject
property to Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. only for the purpose of obtaining a loan from the GSIS. The CA similarly
found that Felisa had not intended to relinquish her ownership over the subject property in their favor, as evidenced not only
by the said letter but also by her contemporaneous and subsequent acts of ownership, i.e., leasing the building to tenants,
instituting ejectment suits, having business permits issued in her name, and including the subject property in her last will and
testament.34

Moreover, the CA ruled that the issuance of TCT No. 49869 in the names of Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. did not
operate to vest ownership of the subject property upon them, as a certificate of title is not equivalent to title. Hence, the
presentation of TCT No. 49869 does not conclusively prove their claim of ownership over the subject property.35
With respect to the issue of whether or not the action for reconveyance based on an implied trust had already prescribed, the
CA found that prescription has not set in. Citing jurisprudence, it held that an action for reconveyance based on an implied
trust prescribes in ten ( 10) years, to be counted from the date of issuance of the Torrens title over the property. However, the
rule applies only when the claimant or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property. When the claimant
is in actual possession of the property, the action for reconveyance, which is effectively an action for quieting of title, is
imprescriptible. In this case, it has been indubitably established that the Bihis Family have been in actual possession of the
subject property; hence, their action for reconveyance is imprescriptible.36
Finally, with regard to the question of whether or not Wilson and Peter are purchasers in good faith, the CA ruled in the
negative. It took into consideration the admission made by Wilson that he has knowledge of the adverse claim of the Bihis
Family annotated on the title of the subject property but denied knowledge of its contents. Likewise, he admitted that he
directed his lawyer to have the said annotation cancelled before purchasing the subject property. Records also show that he
knew that the Bihis Family have been occupying the second floor of the D'Lourds Building. However, despite knowledge of
the foregoing facts, he and his brother failed to make the necessary inquiries as to the validity of the title of the sellers, Bella,
et al. Consequently, he and Peter cannot be considered as buyers in good faith.37
Wilson and Peter, Bella, Delfin, Jr., and Lester, Felimon, Jr., and the Estate of Rosalinda Buenaventura Mariano filed
separate motions for reconsideration,38 which were all denied in the Resolution39 dated April 1, 2014; hence, these
petitions.
The Issues Before the Court
The issues advanced for the Court's consideration are: (a) whether or not the CA erred in ruling that there was an implied
trust created between Felisa, on one hand, and Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr., on the other; (b) whether or not the action
for reconveyance had not yet prescribed; and (c) whether or not Wilson and Peter are purchasers in good faith.
The Court's Ruling
The petitions are bereft of merit.
The following facts are undisputed: in 1960, Felisa, as owner of the subject property, transferred the same to her daughter
Bella, married to Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. to assist them in procuring a loan from the GSIS. In view thereof, her title
over the property, TCT No. 45951/T-233, was cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 49869, was issued in the names of Bella,
married to Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. After it was lost, TCT No. 49869 was reconstituted and TCT No. RT-74910 (49869)
was issued in their names.
Upon Felisa's death in 1994, the Bihis Family, Felisa's other heirs who have long been occupying the subject property,
caused the annotation of their adverse claim over the same on TCT No. RT-74910 (49869). Subsequently, however, or on
January 22, 1997, the said annotation was cancelled, and the next day, the Heirs of Felimon, Sr. executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement of his estate and caused its annotation on said title. TCT No. RT-74910 (49869) was then cancelled and TCT No.
N-170416 was issued in the names of Bella, et al. Finally, by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated January 23, 1997, the subject

property was sold to Wilson and Peter, in whose names TCT No. 170475 currently exists. Months later, or on October 17,
1997,40 the complaint for reconveyance and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-32515, was instituted.
From the foregoing factual milieu, the Court holds that: one, a trust was established between Felisa, on the one hand, and
Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr., on the other, albeit not an implied trust as concluded by the RTC and the CA but an
express one; two, the present action for reconveyance has not yet prescribed; and, three, Wilson and Peter are not purchasers
in good faith.
I.
Trust is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in another. It is a fiduciary
relationship that obliges the trustee to deal with the property for the benefit of the beneficiary.1wphi1 Trust relations
between parties may either be express or implied. An express trust is created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties,
while an implied trust comes into being by operation of law.41
Express trusts are created by direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words either
expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust. Under Article 1444 of the Civil Code, "[n]o particular words
are required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended." It is possible to create a
trust without using the word "trust" or "trustee." Conversely, the mere fact that these words are used does not necessarily
indicate an intention to create a trust. The question in each case is whether the trustor manifested an intention to create the
kind of relationship which to lawyers is known as trust. It is immaterial whether or not he knows that the relationship which
he intends to create is called a trust, and whether or not he knows the precise characteristics of the relationship which is
called a trust.42
Further, in the case of Tamayo v. Callejo,43 the Court recognized that a trust may have a constructive or implied nature in
the beginning, but the registered owner's subsequent express acknowledgement in a public document of a previous sale of
the property to another party effectively converted the same into an express trust.44
In the present case, both the R TC and the CA found that an implied trust was established, heavily giving credence, among
others, to the September 21, 1970 letter executed by Felisa during her lifetime, which partly reads:
Dear Delfin,
Ipinaaabot ko sa iyo ang sulat kong ito upang malaman mo ang aking nagiging damdamin. Hinihiling ko sa iyo at
ipinakikiusap sa iyo tungkol doon sa late at building ng D 'lourds.
Hindi naman kaila sa ivo kung papaano ko ito naisalin sa inyong pangalan nina Filemon C. Buenaventura Sr., Bella Alvarez
Guerrero at Delfin Guerrero Sr. Ang dahilan nito ay dahil sa pag-utang sa GSIS.
Kaya gusto kong malaman mo na ito ay nagpapatotoo na ito ay sarili kong pag-aari at walang sinumang nagbigay o
tumulong sa akin sa lupang ito. At maski si Ka Fe ling mo ay walang naibigay na pera dito.
Kaya hinihiling ko ang gusto kong mangyari sa ngayon ay maging kaparehong-kapareho ang paghahati ng bawat isa sa
anumang aking kabuhayan.

Kaya hinihiling ko sa iyo Delfin na kung maaari lamang ay ang lahat ng nakatala dito ay pirmahan ninyo.
x x x x45 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Beneath the letter appear the signatures of Bella and Delfin, and the signature of Felisa signing as "MOMMY" as well.46
Taking the contents of the foregoing letter into consideration the validity and due execution of which were never put in
issue, hence, indubitably established - the Court therefore differs from the finding of the courts a quo that an implied trust
was established; instead, the Court rules that an express trust was duly proved in this case.
The words of Felisa in the above-quoted letter unequivocally and absolutely declared her intention of transferring the title
over the subject property to Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. in order to merely accommodate them in securing a loan
from the GSIS. She likewise stated clearly that she was retaining her ownership over the subject property and articulated her
wish to have her heirs share equally therein. Hence, while in the beginning, an implied trust was merely created between
Felisa, as trustor, and Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr., as both trustees and beneficiaries, the execution of the September
21, 1970 letter settled, once and for all, the nature of the trust established between them as an express one, their true
intention irrefutably extant thereon.
Bella's attempt to thwart the express trust established in this case by claiming that she affixed her signature on the September
21, 1970 letter only "to appease" her mother, Felisa, and that she could afford to sign the letter since the title covering the
subject property was in their name as owners anyway,47 does not hold water. As correctly ruled by the CA, citing Lee Tek
Sheng v. CA,48 the "[m]ere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility
that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the ce1iificate or that the registrant may only be
a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title,"49 as in this
case.50 Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title.51 Moreover, the Court notes that even during
the proceedings before the RTC, Bella never denied the purpose for which the sale to them of the subject property was
effected. Instead, they relied heavily and anchored their defense on the existence of their certificate of title covering the
subject property, which, to reiterate, was insufficient to prove their ownership over the same independent of the express
trust.
In light of the foregoing, while the Court agrees with the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon,
Sr. only hold the subject property in trust for Felisa, the Court however finds that an express trust, not an implied one, was
established in this case.
II.
Anent the issue of prescription, the Court finds that the action for reconveyance instituted by respondents has not yet
prescribed, following the jurisprudential rule that express trusts prescribe in ten (10) years from the time the trust is
repudiated.52
In this case, there was a repudiation of the express trust when Bella, as the remaining trustee, sold the subject property to
Wilson and Peter on January 23, 1997.53 As the complaint for reconveyance and damages was filed by respondents on
October 17, 1997,54 or only a few months after the sale of the subject property to Wilson and Peter, it cannot be said that the
same has prescribed.

III.
Finally, with regard to the question of whether or not Wilson and Peter are purchasers of the subject property in good faith,
the Court concurs with the CA' s finding that they are not.
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to, or an
interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of
some other person's claim or interest in the property.55 Corollary thereto, when a piece of land is in the actual possession of
persons other than the seller, the buyer must be wary and should investigate the rights of those in possession. Without
making such inquiry, one cannot claim that he is a buyer in good faith. When a man proposes to buy or deal with realty, his
duty is to read the public manuscript, that is, to look and see who is there upon it and what his rights are. A want of caution
and diligence, which an honest man of ordinary prudence is accustomed to exercise in making purchases, is in
contemplation of law, a want of good faith. The buyer who has failed to know or discover that the land sold to him is in
adverse possession of another is a buyer in bad faith.56
In his testimony57 before the R TC, Wilson claimed to have verified the validity of the title covering the subject property
before the Registry of Deeds. However, he also admitted that two (2) months had lapsed before the sale could be
consummated because his lawyer advised him to request Bella, one of the sellers, to cancel the encumbrance annotated on
the title of the subject property. He also claimed that he had no knowledge about the details of such annotation, and that he
was aware that individuals other than the sellers were in possession of the subject property.
As aptly concluded by the CA, such knowledge of the existence of an annotation on the title covering the subject property
and of the occupation thereof by individuals other than the sellers negates any presumption of good faith on the part of
Wilson and Peter when they purchased the subject property. A person who deliberately ignores a significant fact which
would create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man is not an innocent purchaser for value,58 as in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Decision dated December 19, 2013 and the Resolution dated April 1, 2014
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96697 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.*
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN**
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN***

Associate Justice

AT T E S T AT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the cases were assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, First Division
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the cases were assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes
* Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 2114 dated July 22, 2015.
** Per Special Order No. 2102 dated July 13, 2015.
*** Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 2108 dated July 13, 2015.
1 See Court's Resolution dated June 2, 2014; rollo (G.R. No. 211972), pp. 36-49 and rollo, (G.R. No.
212045), pp. 36-49.
2 Rollo (G.R. No. 211972), pp. 8-30; rollo, (G.R. No. 212045), pp. 11-29.
3 Rollo (G.R. No. 211972), pp. 36-49; rollo, (G.R. No. 212045), pp. 36-49. Penned by Associate Justice
Socorro B. lnting with Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez concurring.
4 Rollo (G.R. No. 211972), pp. 51-54; rollo (G.R. No. 212045), pp. 51-54.
5 Rollo (G.R. No. 211972), pp. 61-67. Penned by Presiding Judge Tita Marilyn Payoyo-Villordon.
6 See rollo (G.R. No. 211972), pp. 61-62.
7 Id. at 64.
8 Id. at 61.

9 Rollo (G.R. No. 212045), pp. 66-67.

10 "Resurreccion" in some parts of the records.
11 Rollo (G.R. No. 211972), p. 62.
12 Rollo (G.R. No. 212045), p. 114.
13 See rollo (G.R. No. 211972), p. 62.
14 Id.
15 "Rosalinda" in some parts of the records.
16 See rollo (G.R. No. 211972), p. 62.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Rollo (G.R. No. 212045), p. 100.
20 See rollo (G.R. No. 211972), pp. 61 and 63.
21 Rollo (G.R. No. 212045), p. 100.
22 Rollo (G.R. No. 211972), p. 63.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 64.
25 Id. at 61-67.
26 See id. 64-65.
27 See id. 65-66.
28 See id. at 65-67.
29 Also known as "Teresita Robles" in the RTC proceedings.
30 Rollo (G.R. No. 211972), p. 37; rollo (G.R. No. 212045), p. 37.
31 Rollo (G.R. No. 211972), p. 42; rollo (G.R. No. 212045), p. 42.

32 Rollo (G.R. No. 211972), pp. 36-49; rollo, (G.R. No. 212045), pp. 36-49.
33 Rollo (G.R. No. 211972), p. 48; rollo (G.R. No. 212045), p. 48.
34 See rollo (G.R. No. 211972), pp. 43-45; rollo (G.R. No. 212045), pp. 43-45.
35 See rollo (G.R. No. 211972), pp. 45-46; rollo (G.R. No. 212045), pp. 45-46.
36 See rollo (G.R. No. 211972), pp. 46-47; rollo, (G.R. No. 212045), pp. 46-47.
37 See Rollo (G.R. No. 211972), pp. 47-48; rollo, (G.R. No. 212045), pp. 47-48.
38 Not attached to the rollos.
39 Rollo (G.R. No. 211972), pp. 51-54; rollo (G.R. No. 212045), pp. 51-54.
40 Rollo (G.R. No. 211972), p. 61.
41 Heirs of Tranquilino Labiste v. Heirs of Jose Labiste, 605 Phil. 495, 503 (2009).
42 Torbela v. Spouses Rosario, 678 Phil. I, 38-39 (2011 ); emphasis and underscoring supplied.
43 150-B Phil. 31 (1972).
44 See id. at 37-38.
45 Rollo (G.R. No. 212045), p. 100.
46 Id.
47 See id. at 20-21 and 132.
48 354 Phil. 556 (1998).
49 Id. at 561-562.
50 Rollo (G.R. No. 211972), pp. 45-46; rollo (G.R. No. 212045), pp. 45-46.
51 Heirs of Rosa and Cirila Dumaliang v. Serban, 545 Phil. 243, 256 (2007).
52 See Torbela v. Rosario, supra note 42, at 40, citing Heirs of Maximo Labanon v. Heirs of Constancio
Labanon, 556 Phil. 750, 762-763 (2007), further citing Escay v. CA, 158 Phil. I 008, 1031 (1974) and Secuya
v. De Selma, 383 Phil. 126, 137.

53 See Secuya v. De Selma, id.

54 Rollo (G.R. No. 211972), p. 61.
55 De Leon v. Ong, 625 Phil. 221, 230 (2010).
56 Rosaroso v. Soria, G.R. No. 194846, June 19, 2013, 699 SCRA 232, 247-248.
57 Rollo (G.R. No. 211972), p. 66.
58 Sps. Sarmiento v. CA, 507 Phil. 101, 127 (2005).
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Tuesday, October 25, 2016

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 162784

June 22, 2007

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
SEGUNDA ALMEIDA, COURT OF APPEALS, and RTC of SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA, BR. 31, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 filed by the National Housing Authority (NHA) against the Court
of Appeals, the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 31, and private respondent Segunda Almeida.

On June 28, 1959, the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) awarded to Margarita Herrera several portions of land which are
part of the Tunasan Estate in San Pedro, Laguna. The award is evidenced by an Agreement to Sell No. 3787.1 By virtue of
Republic Act No. 3488, the LTA was succeeded by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). On July 31, 1975, the DAR
was succeeded by the NHA by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 757.2 NHA as the successor agency of LTA is the petitioner
in this case.
The records show that Margarita Herrera had two children: Beatriz Herrera-Mercado (the mother of private respondent) and
Francisca Herrera. Beatriz Herrera-Mercado predeceased her mother and left heirs.
Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971.3
On August 22, 1974, Francisca Herrera, the remaining child of the late Margarita Herrera executed a Deed of SelfAdjudication claiming that she is the only remaining relative, being the sole surviving daughter of the deceased. She also
claimed to be the exclusive legal heir of the late Margarita Herrera.
The Deed of Self-Adjudication was based on a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated October 7, 1960, allegedly executed by
Margarita Herrera. The pertinent portions of which are as follows:
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY
SA SINO MAN KINAUUKULAN;
Akong si MARGARITA HERRERA, Filipina, may 83 taong gulang, balo, kasalukuyang naninirahan at
tumatanggap ng sulat sa Nayon ng San Vicente, San Pedro Laguna, sa ilalim ng panunumpa ay malaya at
kusang loob kong isinasaysay at pinagtitibay itong mga sumusunod:
1. Na ako ay may tinatangkilik na isang lagay na lupang tirikan (SOLAR), tumatayo sa Nayon ng San
Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna, mayroong PITONG DAAN AT PITUMPU'T ISANG (771) METRONG
PARISUKAT ang laki, humigit kumulang, at makikilala sa tawag na Lote 17, Bloke 55, at pag-aari ng Land
Tenure Administration;
2. Na ang nasabing lote ay aking binibile, sa pamamagitan ng paghuhulog sa Land Tenure Administration, at
noong ika 30 ng Julio, 1959, ang Kasunduang sa Pagbibile (AGREEMENT TO SELL No. 3787) ay ginawa at
pinagtibay sa Lungsod ng Maynila, sa harap ng Notario Publico na si G. Jose C. Tolosa, at lumalabas sa
kaniyang Libro Notarial bilang Documento No. 13, Pagina No. 4; Libro No. IV, Serie ng 1959;
3. Na dahilan sa ako'y matanda na at walang ano mang hanap buhay, ako ay nakatira at pinagsisilbihan nang
aking anak na si Francisca Herrera, at ang tinitirikan o solar na nasasabi sa unahan ay binabayaran ng
kaniyang sariling cuarta sa Land Tenure Administration;
4. Na alang-alang sa nasasaysay sa unahan nito, sakaling ako'y bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay, ang
lupang nasasabi sa unahan ay aking ipinagkakaloob sa nasabi kong anak na FRANCISCA HERRERA,
Filipina, nasa katamtamang gulang, kasal kay Macario Berroya, kasalukuyang naninirahan at tumatanggap ng
sulat sa Nayong ng San Vicente, San Pedro Laguna, o sa kaniyang mga tagapagmana at;

5. Na HINIHILING KO sa sino man kinauukulan, na sakaling ako nga ay bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay
ay KILALANIN, IGALANG at PAGTIBAYIN ang nilalaman sa pangalan ng aking anak na si Francisca
Herrera ang loteng nasasabi sa unahan.
SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT, ako ay nag-didiit ng hinlalaki ng kanan kong kamay sa ibaba nito at sa
kaliwang gilid ng unang dahon, dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila, ngayong ika 7 ng Octubre, 1960.4
The said document was signed by two witnesses and notarized. The witnesses signed at the left-hand side of both pages of
the document with the said document having 2 pages in total. Margarita Herrera placed her thumbmark5 above her name in
the second page and at the left-hand margin of the first page of the document.
The surviving heirs of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado filed a case for annulment of the Deed of Self-Adjudication before the then
Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch 1 in Binan, Laguna (now, Regional Trial Court Branch 25). The case for
annulment was docketed as Civil Case No. B-1263.6
On December 29, 1980, a Decision in Civil Case No. B-1263 (questioning the Deed of Self-Adjudication) was rendered and
the deed was declared null and void.7
During trial on the merits of the case assailing the Deed of Self-Adjudication, Francisca Herrera filed an application with the
NHA to purchase the same lots submitting therewith a copy of the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" executed by her mother. Private
respondent Almeida, as heir of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado, protested the application.
In a Resolution8 dated February 5, 1986, the NHA granted the application made by Francisca Herrera, holding that:
From the evidence of the parties and the records of the lots in question, we gathered the following facts: the
lots in question are portions of the lot awarded and sold to the late Margarita Herrera on July 28, 1959 by the
defunct Land Tenure Administration; protestant is the daughter of the late Beatriz Herrera Mercado who was
the sister of the protestee; protestee and Beatriz are children of the late Margarita Herrera; Beatriz was the
transferee from Margarita of Lot Nos. 45, 46, 47, 48 and 49, Block 50; one of the lots transferred to Beatriz,
e.g. Lot 47, with an area of 148 square meters is in the name of the protestant; protestant occupied the lots in
question with the permission of the protestee; protestee is a resident of the Tunasan Homesite since birth;
protestee was born on the lots in question; protestee left the place only after marriage but resided in a lot
situated in the same Tunasan Homesite; her (protestee) son Roberto Herrera has been occupying the lots in
question; he has been there even before the death of the late Margarita Herrera; on October 7, 1960,
Margarita Herrera executed a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" whereby she waived or transferred all her rights
and interest over the lots in question in favor of the protestee; and protestee had paid the lots in question in
full on March 8, 1966 with the defunct Land Tenure Administration.
This Office finds that protestee has a better preferential right to purchase the lots in question.9
Private respondent Almeida appealed to the Office of the President.10 The NHA Resolution was affirmed by the Office of the
President in a Decision dated January 23, 1987.11
On February 1, 1987, Francisca Herrera died. Her heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of her estate which they
submitted to the NHA. Said transfer of rights was approved by the NHA.12 The NHA executed several deeds of sale in favor

of the heirs of Francisca Herrera and titles were issued in their favor.13 Thereafter, the heirs of Francisca Herrera directed
Segunda Mercado-Almeida to leave the premises that she was occupying.
Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Office of the President and the resolution of the NHA, private respondent Segunda
Mercado-Almeida sought the cancellation of the titles issued in favor of the heirs of Francisca. She filed a Complaint on
February 8, 1988, for "Nullification of Government Lot's Award," with the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna,
Branch 31.
In her complaint, private respondent Almeida invoked her forty-year occupation of the disputed properties, and re-raised the
fact that Francisca Herrera's declaration of self-adjudication has been adjudged as a nullity because the other heirs were
disregarded. The defendant heirs of Francisca Herrera alleged that the complaint was barred by laches and that the decision
of the Office of the President was already final and executory.14 They also contended that the transfer of purchase of the
subject lots is perfectly valid as the same was supported by a consideration and that Francisca Herrera paid for the property
with the use of her own money.15 Further, they argued that plaintiff's occupation of the property was by mere tolerance and
that they had been paying taxes thereon.16
The Regional Trial Court issued an Order dated June 14, 1988 dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.17 The Court of
Appeals in a Decision dated June 26, 1989 reversed and held that the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction to hear and
decide the case involving "title and possession to real property within its jurisdiction."18 The case was then remanded for
further proceedings on the merits.
A pre-trial was set after which trial ensued.
On March 9, 1998, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision setting aside the resolution of the NHA and the decision of
the Office of the President awarding the subject lots in favor of Francisca Herrera. It declared the deeds of sale executed by
NHA in favor of Herrera's heirs null and void. The Register of Deeds of Laguna, Calamba Branch was ordered to cancel the
Transfer Certificate of Title issued. Attorney's fees were also awarded to private respondent.
The Regional Trial Court ruled that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an assignment of rights but a disposition of property
which shall take effect upon death. It then held that the said document must first be submitted to probate before it can
transfer property.
Both the NHA and the heirs of Francisca Herrera filed their respective motions for reconsideration which were both denied
on July 21, 1998 for lack of merit. They both appealed to the Court of Appeals. The brief for the heirs of Francisca Herrera
was denied admission by the appellate court in a Resolution dated June 14, 2002 for being a "carbon copy" of the brief
submitted by the NHA and for being filed seventy-nine (79) days late.
On August 28, 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, viz:
There is no dispute that the right to repurchase the subject lots was awarded to Margarita Herrera in 1959.
There is also no dispute that Margarita executed a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" on October 7, 1960. Defendant
NHA claims that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" is, in effect, a waiver or transfer of rights and interest over the
subject lots in favor of Francisca Herrera. This Court is disposed to believe otherwise. After a perusal of the
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" of Margarita Herrera, it can be ascertained from its wordings taken in their ordinary
and grammatical sense that the document is a simple disposition of her estate to take effect after her death.

Clearly the Court finds that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" is a will of Margarita Herrera. Evidently, if the
intention of Margarita Herrera was to merely assign her right over the lots to her daughter Francisca Herrera,
she should have given her "Sinumpaang Salaysay" to the defendant NHA or to Francisca Herrera for
submission to the defendant NHA after the full payment of the purchase price of the lots or even prior thereto
but she did not. Hence it is apparent that she intended the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" to be her last will and not
an assignment of rights as what the NHA in its resolution would want to make it appear. The intention of
Margarita Herrera was shared no less by Francisca Herrera who after the former's demise executed on August
22, 1974 a Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming that she is her sole and legal heir. It was only when said deed
was questioned in court by the surviving heirs of Margarita Herrera's other daughter, Beatriz Mercado, that
Francisca Herrera filed an application to purchase the subject lots and presented the "Sinumpaang Salaysay"
stating that it is a deed of assignment of rights.19
The Court of Appeals ruled that the NHA acted arbitrarily in awarding the lots to the heirs of Francisca Herrera. It upheld
the trial court ruling that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an assignment of rights but one that involved disposition of
property which shall take effect upon death. The issue of whether it was a valid will must first be determined by probate.
Petitioner NHA elevated the case to this Court.
Petitioner NHA raised the following issues:
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESOLUTION OF THE NHA AND THE DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT HAVE ATTAINED FINALITY, AND IF SO, WHETHER OR NOT THE PRINCIPLE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE RES JUDICATA BARS THE COURT FROM FURTHER DETERMINING WHO
BETWEEN THE PARTIES HAS PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS FOR AWARD OVER THE SUBJECT LOTS;
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO MAKE THE AWARD ON THE
SUBJECT LOTS; AND
C. WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD OF THE SUBJECT LOTS BY THE NHA IS ARBITRARY.
We rule for the respondents.
Res judicata is a concept applied in review of lower court decisions in accordance with the hierarchy of courts. But
jurisprudence has also recognized the rule of administrative res judicata: "the rule which forbids the reopening of a matter
once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial facts of public, executive
or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial
powers . . . It has been declared that whenever final adjudication of persons invested with power to decide on the property
and rights of the citizen is examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari, such final adjudication may
be pleaded as res judicata."20 To be sure, early jurisprudence were already mindful that the doctrine of res judicata cannot be
said to apply exclusively to decisions rendered by what are usually understood as courts without unreasonably
circumscribing the scope thereof and that the more equitable attitude is to allow extension of the defense to decisions of
bodies upon whom judicial powers have been conferred.
In Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals,21 the Court held that the rule prescribing that
"administrative orders cannot be enforced in the courts in the absence of an express statutory provision for that purpose" was

relaxed in favor of quasi-judicial agencies.

In fine, it should be remembered that quasi-judicial powers will always be subject to true judicial powerthat which is held
by the courts. Quasi-judicial power is defined as that power of adjudication of an administrative agency for the "formulation
of a final order."22 This function applies to the actions, discretion and similar acts of public administrative officers or bodies
who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a
basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.23 However, administrative agencies are not
considered courts, in their strict sense. The doctrine of separation of powers reposes the three great powers into its three (3)
branchesthe legislative, the executive, and the judiciary. Each department is co-equal and coordinate, and supreme in its
own sphere. Accordingly, the executive department may not, by its own fiat, impose the judgment of one of its agencies,
upon the judiciary. Indeed, under the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is empowered to "determine whether or
not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."24 Courts have an expanded role under the 1987 Constitution in the resolution of societal
conflicts under the grave abuse clause of Article VIII which includes that duty to check whether the other branches of
government committed an act that falls under the category of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.25
Next, petitioner cites Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 198026 where it is therein provided
that the Intermediate Appellate Court (now, Court of Appeals) shall exercise the "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all
final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards, of the Regional Trial Courts and Quasi-Judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance
with the Constitution"27 and contends that the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction to rule over awards made by the
NHA.
Well-within its jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals, in its decision of August 28, 2003, already ruled that the issue of the trial
court's authority to hear and decide the instant case has already been settled in the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
June 26, 1989 (which has become final and executory on August 20, 1989 as per entry of judgment dated October 10,
1989).28 We find no reason to disturb this ruling. Courts are duty-bound to put an end to controversies. The system of
judicial review should not be misused and abused to evade the operation of a final and executory judgment.29 The appellate
court's decision becomes the law of the case which must be adhered to by the parties by reason of policy.30
Next, petitioner NHA contends that its resolution was grounded on meritorious grounds when it considered the application
for the purchase of lots. Petitioner argues that it was the daughter Francisca Herrera who filed her application on the subject
lot; that it considered the respective application and inquired whether she had all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications of a possible awardee. It is the position of the petitioner that private respondent possessed all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications for lot award and hence the award was not done arbitrarily.
The petitioner further argues that assuming that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was a will, it could not bind the NHA.31 That,
"insofar as [the] NHA is concerned, it is an evidence that the subject lots were indeed transferred by Margarita Herrera, the
original awardee, to Francisca Herrera was then applying to purchase the same before it."32
We are not impressed. When the petitioner received the "Sinumpaang Salaysay," it should have noted that the effectivity of
the said document commences at the time of death of the author of the instrument; in her words "sakaling ako'y bawian na
ng Dios ng aking buhay" Hence, in such period, all the interests of the person should cease to be hers and shall be in the
possession of her estate until they are transferred to her heirs by virtue of Article 774 of the Civil Code which provides that:

Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the
extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others
either by his will or by operation of law.33
By considering the document, petitioner NHA should have noted that the original applicant has already passed away.
Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971.34 The NHA issued its resolution35 on February 5, 1986. The NHA gave
due course to the application made by Francisca Herrera without considering that the initial applicant's death would transfer
all her property, rights and obligations to the estate including whatever interest she has or may have had over the disputed
properties. To the extent of the interest that the original owner had over the property, the same should go to her estate.
Margarita Herrera had an interest in the property and that interest should go to her estate upon her demise so as to be able to
properly distribute them later to her heirsin accordance with a will or by operation of law.
The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over the property. Margarita Herrera had an existing
Contract to Sell36 with NHA as the seller. Upon Margarita Herrera's demise, this Contract to Sell was neither nullified nor
revoked. This Contract to Sell was an obligation on both partiesMargarita Herrera and NHA. Obligations are
transmissible.37 Margarita Herrera's obligation to pay became transmissible at the time of her death either by will or by
operation of law.
If we sustain the position of the NHA that this document is not a will, then the interests of the decedent should transfer by
virtue of an operation of law and not by virtue of a resolution by the NHA. For as it stands, NHA cannot make another
contract to sell to other parties of a property already initially paid for by the decedent. Such would be an act contrary to the
law on succession and the law on sales and obligations.38
When the original buyer died, the NHA should have considered the estate of the decedent as the next "person"39 likely to
stand in to fulfill the obligation to pay the rest of the purchase price. The opposition of other heirs to the repurchase by
Francisca Herrera should have put the NHA on guard as to the award of the lots. Further, the Decision in the said Civil Case
No. B-1263 (questioning the Deed of Self-Adjudication) which rendered the deed therein null and void40 should have alerted
the NHA that there are other heirs to the interests and properties of the decedent who may claim the property after a testate
or intestate proceeding is concluded. The NHA therefore acted arbitrarily in the award of the lots.
We need not delve into the validity of the will. The issue is for the probate court to determine. We affirm the Court of
Appeals and the Regional Trial Court which noted that it has an element of testamentary disposition where (1) it devolved
and transferred property; (2) the effect of which shall transpire upon the death of the instrument maker.41
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition of the National Housing Authority is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 68370 dated August 28, 2003, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna in Civil
Case No. B-2780 dated March 9, 1998, is hereby AFFIRMED.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.
Footnotes

Rollo, at 8.

A Decree Creating the National Housing Authority and Dissolving the Existing Housing Agencies, Defining
Its Powers and Functions, Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes, Presidential Decree No. 757,
promulgated July 31, 1975.
3

Rollo, at 70.

Id.

It should be noted that a thumbmark is considered a valid signature. As held in Payad v. Tolentino, 62 Phil.
848 (1936): "The testator's thumbprint is always valid and sufficient signature for the purpose of complying
with the requirement of the article. While in most of these cases, the testator was suffering from some
infirmity which made the writing of the testator's name difficult or impossible, there seems to be no basis for
limiting the validity of thumbprints only to cases of illness or infirmity."
6

Rollo, at 49.

Vol. 1, Original Record, at 11-14.

Rollo, at 39-43.

Id., at 41-42 (emphasis supplied).

10

Id., at 9.

11

Id., at 9, 44-47.

12

Id., at 9.

13

Id., at 25-26. Francisca Herrera left behind her husband, Macario Berroya, and children: Ramon, Antonio,
Alberto, Rosita, Pacita, Bernabe, Gregorio, Josefina and Rustica. In the extra judicial settlement made by the
said heirs, Rosita, Pacita, Bernabe, Gregorio, Josefina and Rustica waived all their rights, interest and
participation therein in favor of their siblings Macario, Alberto, Ramon and Antonio. Deeds of sale involving
the subject lots were executed by the NHA in favor of Alberto, Antonio and Macario. Hence, TCT Nos. T173557, T-173579, T-173578 and T-183166 were issued to Macario, Alberto and Antonio, respectively.
14

Id., at 27.

15

Id., at 27-28.

16

Id., at 28.

17

Id., at 5.

18

Id., at 6; see Annex "F."

19

Id., at 71-72.

20

Brillantes v. Castro, 99 Phil. 497, 503 (1956).

21

G.R. No. L-14791, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 75.

22

Administrative Code of 1987, Executive Order No. 292, Bk. VIII, ch. 1, 2(9).

23

Midland Insurance Corp. v. IAC, G.R. No. L-71905, August 13, 1986, 143 SCRA 458, 462.

24

1987 Phil. Const., art. VIII, 1 as explained in United Residents of Dominical Hills, Inc. v. Commission on
Settlement of Land Problems, G.R. No. 135945, March 7, 2001, 353 SCRA 783, 797-798.
25

1987 Phil. Const., art. VIII, 1 2.

26

An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, promulgated August 14, 1981.
27

Id. 9 (3).

28

Records, vol.1, at 80.

29

Buaya v. Stronghold Insurance, Corp., 396 Phil. 739 (2000).

30

Ayala Corp. v. Rosa-Diana Realty and Dev't. Corp., 400 Phil. 511 (2000).

31

Rollo, at 17.

32

Id.

33

Civil Code, art. 774 (emphasis supplied).

34

Rollo, at 70.

35

Id., at 39-43.

36

Id., at 24; C.A. G.R. No. 68370 citing Agreement No. 3787, dated July 28, 1959.

37

Araneta v. Montelibano, 14 Phil. 117 (1909).

38

Civil Code, arts. 1544 (which prohibit double sales) and 1165 (which established the obligation of the seller
to the buyer respecting a thing which is determinate in nature).

39

Because the estate acquires juridical personality to continue the transmissible obligations and rights of the
decedent.
40

Vol. 1, Original Record, at 11-14.

41

Rollo, at 34.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

THIRD DIVISION

CRESENCIANA TUBO

G.R. No. 175720

RODRIGUEZ (now deceased),

substituted by SUSANA A. LLAGAS,
Petitioner,

Present:

Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),

- versus -

Austria-Martinez,
Chico-Nazario,
Nachura, and
Reyes, JJ.

EVANGELINE RODRIGUEZ,

BELEN RODRIGUEZ and

Promulgated:

BUENAVENTURA RODRIGUEZ,
Respondents.

September 11, 2007

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision179[1]

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91442 dated June 27,
2006, which set aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City, Branch 134, in Civil Case No. 03-517, and
reinstated the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of
Makati City, Branch 63, in Civil Case No. 75717, dismissing the
complaint for ejectment; as well as the Resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration.

179[1] Rollo, pp. 39-49. Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and concurred
in by Associate Justices Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente and Sesinando E. Villon.

Juanito Rodriguez owned a five-door apartment located at San

Jose Street, Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati City, and covered by TCT
No. 144865.180[2] On October 27, 1983, Juanito executed a Huling
Habilin

at

Testamento

giving

petitioner

Cresenciana

Tubo

Rodriguez, his live-in partner, apartments D and E, and his

children

Benjamin

Rodriguez

(the

deceased

husband

of

respondent Evangeline Rodriguez), apartment A, respondent

Buenaventura Rodriguez, apartment B, and respondent Belen
Rodriguez, apartment C.181[3]

However, on June 14, 1984, Juanito executed a Deed of

Absolute Sale over the property in favor of petitioner. 182[4] Thus,
TCT No. 144865 was cancelled and a new TCT No. 150431 was
issued in the name of the petitioner.183[5]

The case arose when petitioner filed on September 20, 2001

a complaint for unlawful detainer against the respondents,
alleging that she is the lawful and registered owner of the
property; and that in 1984, she allowed respondents Evangeline,
180[2] Id. at 157.
181[3] Id. at 160-162.
182[4] Id. at 168.
183[5] Id. at 145.

Buenaventura and Belen, out of kindness and tolerance, to

personally occupy units A, B and D, respectively. However,
without her knowledge and consent, respondents separately
leased the units to Montano Magpantay, Mel Navarro and Socorro
Escota, who despite repeated demands, failed and refused to
vacate the premises and to pay the rentals thereof. 184[6]

In their Answer, respondents claimed ownership over the subject

property by succession. They alleged that while petitioner is the
registered owner of the property, however, she is not the lawful
owner thereof because the June 14, 1984 Deed of Absolute Sale
was simulated and void. As in Civil Case No. 01-1641 now pending
before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 141, which they filed to
assail the validity of the said sale, respondents maintain that
petitioner exerted undue influence over their father, who at that
time was seriously ill, to agree to the sale of the property for only
P20,000.00 after knowing that only two apartments were given to
her in the Huling Habilin at Testamento. Further, she had no cause
of action against them for being a party to the August 23, 1990
Partition Agreement wherein they recognized each other as coowners and partitioned the property in accordance with the
provision of the last will and testament. 185[7]
184[6] Id. at 78-82.
185[7] Id. at 92-97.

On February 26, 2002, the MTC rendered a judgment in favor of

the respondents and held that the deed of sale was simulated
otherwise petitioner would not have entered into the Partition
Agreement, which legally conferred upon each heir exclusive
ownership over their respective shares, thus:

WHEREFORE, the Complaint is DISMISSED. Plaintiff is ordered to

pay attorneys fees of P10,000.00 and the costs of suit in favor of
defendants.

SO ORDERED.186[8]

On appeal, the RTC reversed the decision of the MTC. It held

that petitioners certificate of title is a conclusive evidence of
ownership of the land described therein; and that unless and until
said title has been annulled by a court of competent jurisdiction,
such title is existing and valid. This is true also with respect to the
deed of sale. The present action, which involves only the issue of
physical or material possession, is not the proper action to
challenge it. Further, the MTC erred when it relied heavily on the
Huling Habilin at Testamento, which was not probated hence has
no effect and no right can be claimed therein. The Partition
186[8] Id. at 177. Penned by Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya-Chua.

Agreement which was allegedly entered into pursuant to the

Huling Habilin at Testamento should not also be considered. Thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision rendered by the

Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati City, is hereby ordered
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Consequently, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering the defendants and all persons claiming rights under
them to vacate the premises and surrender the possession thereof to
the plaintiff. Defendants are likewise ordered to pay jointly and
severally the plaintiff an amount of P5,000.00 a month per unit
beginning 13 August 2001 until they finally vacate the premises and
the costs of this suit.

SO ORDERED.187[9]

Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for review before the

Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the decision of the
RTC and reinstated the decision of the MTC. It held that the MTC
correctly received evidence on ownership since the question of
possession could not be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership. Further, the Huling Habilin at Testamento transmitted
ownership of the specific apartments not only to the respondents
but also to the petitioner; and pursuant thereto, the parties
executed the Partition Agreement in accordance with the wishes
of the testator, thus:

187[9] Id. at 217. Penned by Judge Perpetua Atal-Pao.

WHEREFORE, this Court resolves to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the

Decision of the Regional Trial Court. The decision dated February 26,
2002 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati City in Civil
Case No. 75717 dismissing the complaint for ejectment is hereby
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.188[10]

The motion for reconsideration was denied hence, petitioner filed

the present petition for review raising the following errors:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW

AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE
THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND REINSTATING THE
DECISION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT DISMISSING
PETITIONERS COMPLAINT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW

AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DECLARING THAT THE
PROPERTY, A PARCEL OF LAND UPON WHICH A FIVE-UNIT APARTMENT
STANDS, BECAME THE SUBJECT OF JUANITO RODRIGUEZS HULING
HABILIN AT TESTAMENTO WHEREIN THE PROPERTY WAS DISTRIBUTED

188[10] Id. at 48.

TO HIS HEIRS (HEREIN RESPONDENTS) INCLUDING THE RESPONDENT

(PETITIONER HEREIN).189[11]

Petitioner alleges that as the registered owner of the subject

property, she enjoys the right of possession thereof and that
question of ownership cannot be raised in an ejectment case
unless it is intertwined with the issue of possession. While the
court may look into the evidence of title or ownership and
possession de jure to determine the nature of possession, it
cannot resolve the issue of ownership because the resolution of
said issue would effect an adjudication on ownership which is not
proper in the summary action for unlawful detainer. Petitioner
insists that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Huling
Habilin at Testamento transmitted ownership of the specific
apartments disregarding the fact that the same is not probated
yet and that the testator changed or revoked his will by selling
the property to petitioner prior to his death.

Contrarily, respondents pray that the instant petition for

review be dismissed since the resolution of the question of
ownership by the MTC and the Court of Appeals was provisional
only to resolve the issue of possession. Petitioner can always avail
of legal remedies to have the issue of ownership passed upon by
189[11] Id. at 18.

the proper court. Aware of the provisional nature of the resolution

on ownership in ejectment cases, respondents filed Civil Case No.
01-1641 to assail the validity of the deed of sale of the property
and the registration thereof in petitioners name.

The petition has merit.

An action for unlawful detainer exists when a person

unlawfully withholds possession of any land or building against or
from a lessor, vendor, vendee or other persons, after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue
of any contract, express or implied. 190[12] The sole issue to be
resolved is the question as to who is entitled to the physical or
material possession of the premises or possession de facto.191[13]
Being a summary proceeding intended to provide an expeditious
means of protecting actual possession or right to possession of
property, the question of title is not involved 192[14] and should be

190[12] Racaza v. Gozum, G.R. No. 148759, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 302, 312.
191[13] Domalsin v. Valenciano, G.R. No. 158687, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 114,
131.
192[14] Id.

raised by the affected party in an appropriate action in the proper

court.193[15]

However, when the issue of ownership is raised the court is

not ousted of its jurisdiction. Section 16 of Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court provides:

SEC 16. Resolving defense of ownership. When the defendant

raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership,
the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession.

Thus, all that the trial court can do is to make an initial

determination of who is the owner of the property so that it can
resolve who is entitled to its possession absent other evidence to
resolve ownership.194[16] But this adjudication is only provisional
and does not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties
involving title to the property.195[17]
193[15] Ocampo v. Tirona, G.R. No. 147812, April 6, 2005, 455 SCRA 62, 74.
194[16] Arambulo v. Gungab, G.R. No. 156581, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 640,
649.
195[17] Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. v. Ong, G.R. No. 132197, August 16, 2005, 467
SCRA 35, 50.

In the case at bar, petitioners cause of action for unlawful

detainer was based on her alleged ownership of land covered by
TCT No. 150431 and that she merely tolerated respondents stay
thereat. However, when respondents leased the apartments to
other persons without her consent, their possession as well as
those persons claiming right under them became unlawful upon
their refusal to vacate the premises and to pay the rent. On the
other hand, respondents assailed petitioners title by claiming that
the deed of sale upon which it was based was simulated and void.
They insisted that they were co-owners thus, they have the right
to possess the said property. To prove their claim, they presented
the Huling Habilin at Testamento of Juanito Rodriguez and the
Partition Agreement.

The lower courts considered the following documentary

evidence in arriving at their respective decisions, albeit the RTC
decision contradicts that of the MTC and Court of Appeals: 1)
Huling Habilin at Testamento executed by Juanito Rodriguez on
October 27, 1983; 2) Deed of Sale of the property executed by
Juanito Rodriguez and the petitioner on June 14, 1984; 3) TCT No.
150431 in the name of the petitioner; and 4) the August 23, 1990
Partition Agreement executed by both the respondents and the
petitioner.

Based on the foregoing documentary evidence, we find that

there is preponderance of evidence in favor of the petitioners
claim. Respondents failed to prove their right of possession, as
the Huling Habilin at Testamento and the Partition Agreement
have no legal effect since the will has not been probated. Before
any will can have force or validity it must be probated. This
cannot be dispensed with and is a matter of public policy. 196[18]
Article 838 of the Civil Code mandates that [n]o will shall pass
either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court. As the will was not probated,
the Partition Agreement which was executed pursuant thereto can
not be given effect. Thus, the fact that petitioner was a party to
said agreement becomes immaterial in the determination of the
issue of possession.

Moreover, at the time the deed of sale was executed in favor

of the petitioner, Juanito Rodriguez remained the owner thereof
since ownership would only pass to his heirs at the time of his
death. Thus, as owner of the property, he had the absolute right
to dispose of it during his lifetime. Now, whether or not the
disposition was valid is an issue that can be resolved only in Civil

196[18] Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III (1979), pp. 151-152.

Case No. 01-1641, an action instituted by the respondents for that

purpose.

We are, thus, left with the deed of sale and the certificate of title
over the property to consider.

We agree with the RTC that a certificate of title is a

conclusive evidence of ownership of the land described therein;
the validity of which shall not be subject to a collateral attack,
especially in an ejectment case which is summary in nature.

In Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. v. Ong,197[19] the Court held

that:

The long settled rule is that the issue of ownership cannot be

subject of a collateral attack.

In Apostol v. Court of Appeals, this Court had the occasion to

clarify this:

. . . Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No.

1529, a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
197[19] Supra note 17 at 51.

attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled, except

in a direct proceeding for that purpose in accordance with
law. The issue of the validity of the title of the
respondents can only be assailed in an action expressly
instituted for that purpose. Whether or not the petitioners
have the right to claim ownership over the property is
beyond the power of the court a quo to determine in an
action for unlawful detainer.

Further, in Co v. Militar,198[20] it was held that:

[T]he Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was

believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of
land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of
ownership is established and recognized.

It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is indefeasible and binding

upon the whole world unless and until it has been nullified by a court of
competent jurisdiction. Under existing statutory and decisional law, the
power to pass upon the validity of such certificate of title at the first
instance properly belongs to the Regional Trial Courts in a direct
proceeding for cancellation of title.

As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession

of the property, which is one of the attributes of ownership. x x x

We emphasize, however, that our ruling on the issue of

ownership is only provisional to determine who between the
parties has the better right of possession.

It is, therefore, not

conclusive as to the issue of ownership, which is the subject

198[20] G.R. No. 149912, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 455, 459-460.

matter of Civil Case No. 01-1641. Our ruling that petitioner has a
better right of possession was arrived at on the basis of evidence
without prejudice to the eventual outcome of the annulment case,
where the issue as to who has title to the property in question is
fully threshed out. As the law now stands, in an ejectment suit,
the question of ownership may be provisionally ruled upon for the
sole purpose of determining who is entitled to possession de
facto.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91442 dated June 27, 2006 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 134, in Civil Case No. 03-517,
reversing the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of
Makati City, Branch 63, in Civil Case No. 75717, is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were

reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and

the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in

consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the

opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Today is Tuesday, October 25, 2016

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 148777

October 18, 2007

ESTATE OF THE LATE ENCARNACION VDA. DE PANLILIO, represented by GEORGE LIZARES, Petitioner,
vs.
GONZALO DIZON, RICARDO GUINTU, ROGELIO MUNOZ, ELISEO GUINTU, ROBERTO DIZON,

EDILBERTO CATU, HERMINIGILDO FLORES, CIPRIANO DIZON, JUANARIO MANIAGO, GORGONIO

CANLAS, ANTONIO LISING, CARLOS PINEDA, RENATO GOZUN, ALFREDO MERCADO, BIENVENIDO
MACHADA, and the REGIONAL DIRECTOR of the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, REGION III,
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 157598
REYNALDO VILLANUEVA, CENON GUINTO, CELESTINO DIZON, CARMELITA VDA. DE DAVID,
FORTUNATO TIMBANG, OSCAR SANTIAGO, CELESTINO ESGUERRA, ANTONIO DIZON, and TEODULO
DIZON, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GEORGE LIZARES, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Did the owner of two (2) lots by a subsequent affidavit validly and legally revoke the first affidavit voluntarily surrendering
said lots for land acquisition under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law? The answer will determine the rights of the
parties in the instant petitionsthe heirs of the lot owner vis--vis the tenants declared to be beneficiaries of the Operation
Land Transfer (OLT) under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27.1
The Case
Before us are two petitions. The first is a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 docketed as G.R. No. 148777,
which seeks to set aside the November 29, 2000 Amended Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
47502, which affirmed the August 7, 1997 Decision4 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
in DARAB Case Nos. 4558-4561; and the June 26, 2001 Resolution5 disregarding the Motion for Reconsideration6 of said
Amended Decision. The other is a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus7 under Rule 65 docketed as G.R. No. 157598,
which seeks to set aside the November 14, 2002 CA Resolution8 which denied petitioners Motion for Entry of Judgment,9
and the January 24, 2003 CA Resolution10 likewise denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.11
Through our August 27, 2003 Resolution,12 these cases were consolidated as they arose out of the same factual milieu.
The Facts
Encarnacion Vda. De Panlilio is the owner of the disputed landholdings over a vast tract of land, with an aggregate area of
115.41 hectares called Hacienda Masamat located in Masamat, Mexico, Pampanga covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCT) Nos. 3510, 3513, 3514, 3515, 3522, 3523, 3524, 3525, 3526, 3528, 3530, 3531, 3532, 3533, RT-499 (9191), and RT500 (11670),13 all of the Pampanga Registry of Deeds.
On April 19, 1961, Panlilio entered into a contract of lease over the said landholdings with Paulina Mercado, wife of
Panlilios nephew. The contract of lease was subsequently renewed on October 13, 196414 and September 18, 1974,15

covering agricultural years from 1961 to 1979.

Sometime in 1973, pursuant to the OLT under PD 27, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued thirty eight (38)
Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) to Panlilios tenants. The tenant-awardees were made defendants in the instant
consolidated complaints filed by petitioner Lizares.
On November 26, 1973, lessee Paulina Mercado filed a letter-complaint with the DAR questioning the issuance of CLTs to
Panlilios tenants, alleging, among others, that the DAR should not have issued the CLTs since the land involved was
principally being planted with sugar and was outside the coverage of PD 27. She claimed that respondents surreptitiously
planted palay (rice plant) instead of sugar in order to bring the land within the purview of the law. After proper investigation,
the DAR concluded that the CLTs were "properly and regularly issued."
Paulina Mercado likewise filed a similar complaint with the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) at San Fernando, Pampanga,
docketed as CAR Case No. 1649-P74.
On December 4, 1976, the tenants of the portion of the land planted with sugar cane petitioned the DAR to cause the
reversion of their sugarland to riceland so that it may be covered by the Agrarian Reform Law. The petition was with the
conformity of Panlilio.
Thus, on January 12, 1977, Panlilio executed an Affidavit, partly quoted as follows:
1. That I am the owner of an agricultural landholding situated [in] Mexico, Pampanga, with an area of 115.4
hectares, more or less, dedicated at present to the production of palay and sugarcane crops;
2. That I have been informed that 50.22 hectares comprising the portion dedicated to palay crop have been
placed under the provisions and coverage of P.D. No. 27 and that Certificates of Land Transfer have been
issued to the tenant-farmers thereon;
3. That as owner of the abovementioned property, I interpose no objection to the action taken by the
Department of Agrarian Reform in placing the aforesaid portion dedicated to palay crop within the coverage
of P.D. No. 27;
4. That lately, all the tenants of my said property including those in the sugarcane portions, have filed a
petition dated December 4, 1976 with the Honorable Secretary Conrado F. Estrella, Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, requesting for the reversion of the sugarcane portion of my property adverted to [the] palay land
which is the original classification of my entire subject property;
5. That the aforesaid petition dated December 4, 1976 of the tenants of my property which was filed with the
DAR carries my written conformity;
6. That it is my desire that my entire subject property which is referred to as Hacienda Masamat be placed
under the coverage of P.D. 27 without exception and that thereafter the same be sold to tenant-petitioners.16
(Emphasis supplied.)
On January 20, 1977, by virtue of the said Affidavit, the DAR Secretary, through Director Gaudencio Besa, ordered Director

Severino Santiago, Regional Director of Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga, "to distribute all land transfer certificates, in
view of the desire of Encarnacion Vda. de Panlilio to place her property under the Land Transfer Program of the
government."
On the basis of the action of the DAR Secretary, the CAR, on March 17, 1978, issued an Order dismissing the complaint of
Paulina Mercado (lessee) in CAR Case No. 1649-P74, thus:
With this development, the resolution of the principal issue in the instant case has become moot and academic, it being
already settled in the DAR proceedings the placement of the land in question under the land transfer program of the
government. Therefore, the instant case should be dismissed. Necessarily, all pending incidents should be deemed disposed
of. 17
On December 29, 1986, Panlilio died.
Thereafter, sometime in 1993, the DAR issued Emancipation Patents (EPs) to the following tenants of Panlilio:
EP Nos.
Hermenegildo Flores

690774
143627

Celestino Dizon

690960
683355
45390

Gonzalo Dizon

680524

Roberto Dizon

690758

Cipriano Dizon

45260
45256

Antonio Dizon

681072

Teodulo Dizon

45326

Juanario Maniago

143207

Celestino Esguerra

45265
45219

Florentino Lapuz

690759
45259

Gorgonio Canlas

143508

Carlos Pineda

197097
45254

Renato Gozun

143208

Romeo Pangilinan

475341

Jose Serrano

475340

Wenceslao Pangilinan

476572

Guillermo del Rosario

475339

Candido Timbang

143931
45262
45257

Arsenio Legaspi

4526618

Subsequently, in June 1994, the Bacolod City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 49 appointed petitioner George Lizares as
executor of the estate of Panlilio.19 Records show that petitioner Lizares is the son of the late Jesus Lizares, Panlilios
administrator of Hacienda Masamat during her lifetime.
On February 28, 1994, petitioner Lizares filed his first complaint with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD), Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga, docketed as DARAB Case No. 638 P94,20 for annulment of coverage of
landholdings under PD 27 and ejectment against Reynaldo Villanueva, et al. who filed their Answer with Counterclaim21 on
April 12, 1994.
On April 10, 1995, petitioner filed with the PARAD three more complaints for cancellation of EPs, docketed as DARAB
Case Nos. 933-P95,22 934-P95,23 and 935-P95,24 against the rest of respondents who filed their motions to dismiss25 on
grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. On July 13, 1995, the PARAD denied the motions.26 Respondents
then filed their Answer with Counterclaim.27
Upon petitioners motion, all the cases were consolidated. The PARAD then directed the parties to submit their respective
position papers,28 and, thereafter, considered the cases submitted for decision.
The three (3) complaints filed in 1995 for cancellation of EPs have the following defendants: (1) in DARAB Case No. 933P95, Herminigildo Flores and the Regional Director, DAR, Region III; (2) in DARAB Case No. 934-P95, Celestino Dizon,
Gonzalo Dizon, Roberto Dizon, and the Regional Director, DAR, Region III; and (3) in DARAB Case No. 935-P95,
Cipriano Dizon, Antonio Dizon, Teodulo Dizon, Juanario Maniago, Celestino Esguerra, Florentino Lapuz, Gorgonio Canlas,
Antonio Lising, Carlos Pineda, Renato Gozun, Alfredo Mercado, Romeo Pangilinan, Jose Serrano, Wenceslao Pangilinan,
Guillermo del Rosario, Candido Timbang, Bienvenido Mechada, and Arsenio Legaspi, and the Regional Director, DAR,
Region III.
Thus, aside from public respondent DAR Regional Director, Region III, DARAB Case No. 638-P94 had 15 defendants,
DARAB Case No. 933-P95 had a sole defendant, DARAB Case No. 934-P95 had three defendants, and DARAB Case No.
935-P95 had 18 defendants. All the four (4) consolidated cases were against 37 defendants.
The Ruling of the PARAD in DARAB Case
Nos. 638-P94, 933-P95, 934-P95 and 935-P95
On November 14, 1995, the PARAD rendered a Joint Decision29 dismissing petitioner Lizares complaint on the ground that
the subject landholdings have been properly placed under the coverage of PD 27 through the January 12, 1977 Affidavit30 of

Panlilio, unequivocally placing her entire property within the coverage of the OLT. In addition, the PARAD relied on the
report of the DAR and the Bureau of Lands personnel that the subject landholding is devoted to palay. And, finally, the
PARAD applied the equitable remedy of laches, in that Panlilio failed during her lifetime to bring to the attention of the
DAR and CAR her February 3, 1977 Affidavit31 ostensibly revoking her previous January 12, 1977 Affidavit.
The Ruling of the DARAB in DARAB Case Nos. 4558-4561
(DARAB Case Nos. 638-P94, 933-P95, 934-P95 and 935-P95)
Aggrieved, petitioner Lizares appealed the PARAD decision before the DARAB, which, on August 7, 1997, rendered a
Decision32 affirming the PARAD decision.
The DARAB likewise disregarded petitioner Lizares Motion for Reconsideration33 of the August 7, 1997 Decision.
Prior to the issuance of the August 7, 1997 DARAB Decision, petitioner Lizares and defendant-appellees Wenceslao
Pangilinan, Romeo Pangilinan, Jose Serrano, and Guillermo del Rosario filed their February 10, 1997 Joint Partial Motion to
Dismiss34 with the DARAB, seeking dismissal of their respective claims in DARAB Case No. 4561 (DARAB Case No. 935P95) based on an Affidavit of Cancellation of Lis Pendens Annotation of TCT Nos. 14321, 14322, 14323, and 14324, all of
the Pampanga Register of Deeds,35 which was executed by petitioner Lizares. Apparently, petitioner Lizares received from a
certain Ms. Petronila Catap the amount of PhP 1,356,619 for the settlement of DARAB Case No. 4561 (DARAB Case No.
935-P95) against the abovementioned defendant-appellees.36
Earlier on, petitioner Lizares filed his April 19, 1996 Motion to Withdraw Appeal in favor of defendant-appellees Reynaldo
Villanueva, Cenon Guinto, Carmelita Vda. de David, Oscar Santiago, Celestino Dizon, Fortunato Timbang, and Florentino
Lapuz in DARAB Case No. 4558 (DARAB Case No. 638-P94); defendant-appellee Celestino Dizon in DARAB Case No.
4559 (DARAB Case No. 933-P95); and defendant-appellees Antonio Dizon, Teodulo Dizon, Celestino Esguerra, Florentino
Lapuz, and Candido Timbang in DARAB Case No. 4561 (DARAB Case No. 935-P95), as said defendant-appellees agreed
to settle and compromise with petitioner Lizares. The motion was however resisted by other defendant-appellees through a
May 27, 1996 Counter-Motion to the Plaintiff-Appellant Motion to Withdraw Appeal,37 on the ground that a piece-meal
withdrawal is not proper as the matter in controversy is common and the same to all.
Unfortunately, the Motion to Withdraw Appeal was not resolved as petitioner Lizares did not attend the DARAB scheduled
hearings. Thus, the August 7, 1997 Decision was subsequently promulgated in favor of all defendant-appellees.
Petitioner Lizares elevated the DARAB consolidated cases to the CA for review in CA-G.R. SP No. 47502 under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The April 11, 2000 CA Decision
At the outset, the CA saw it differently.
On April 11, 2000, the CA rendered a Decision sustaining petitioners position and granted relief, thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
affirming the decision of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga is

REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Certificates of Land Transfer issued to private respondents insofar as they pertain to
sugarlands are hereby declared NULL and VOID.38
The CA primarily anchored its ruling on Panlilios February 3, 1977 Affidavit ostensibly revoking her January 12, 1977
Affidavit and ascribed error to both the PARAD and DARAB in ignoring Panlilios second affidavit. Moreover, it relied on
the November 26, 1973 letter-complaint of Paulina Mercado to the DAR Secretary and the CAR Resolution in CAR Case
No. 1649-P74, that the subject landholding in question is principally devoted to the production of sugar cane as buttressed
by the report and findings of Atty. Gregorio D. Sapera, Legal Officer III of the DAR Central Office.
The November 29, 2000 CA Amended Decision
Unconvinced, Reynaldo Villanueva, et al. interposed a Motion for Reconsideration or in the alternative, Motion to Remand
for New Trial39 of said Decision, where they contended that:
1. Petitioners complaints should have been dismissed for his failure to implead therein indispensable parties,
namely the Land Bank of the Philippines which paid Panlilio the amortizations on the land and the third
persons who purchased the landholdings from the tenants;
2. [The CA] disturbed and reversed the findings of fact by the PARAD and the DARAB supported by
substantial evidence. x x x
3. It is not the job of the appellate court to sieve through the evidence considered by the administrative
agency in adjudicating the case before it, following the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. x x x
4. [The CA] violated the principle of res judicata in reversing the CAR resolution dismissing the complaint in
Case No. 1649-P74 rendered twenty-two years ago. Likewise, estoppel and laches bar the instant actions. x x
x
5. Lastly, the petition should be dismissed in favor of Romeo Pangilinan, Wenceslao Pangilinan, Jose Serrano
and Guillermo del Rosario in view of the compromise agreement in DARAB Case No. 4561 between them
and petitioner herein. They submitted, as proof, their joint motion to dismiss the complaint executed on
February 10, 1997 and petitioner Lizares receipt from them of P1,356,619.00 as consideration for the
dismissal of his complaints against them.40
After considering the above contentions together with petitioner Lizares Comment on the Motion for Reconsideration dated
May 2, 2000 with Motion for Correction of the Dispositive Portion of the Decision,41 respondents Reply42 to said comment,
and petitioners Rejoinder,43 the appellate court rendered on November 29, 2000 the assailed Amended Decision on a vote of
3-2, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, respondents motion for reconsideration of Our Decision is hereby GRANTED. The petition is ordered
DISMISSED and the challenged DARAB decision is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.44
In reversing its earlier April 11, 2000 Decision, the CA concluded that the February 3, 1977 Affidavit was not executed by
Panlilio, ratiocinating that if she indeed made the second affidavit which purportedly repudiated her earlier January 12, 1977
Affidavit, the natural course of action to take was for her to submit the second affidavit to the DAR to exclude the majority

of her landholdings planted with sugar cane from the coverage of the OLT under PD 27. Her failure to effectuate the
removal of her land from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage for nine (9) years until her death
on December 29, 1986 led the court a quo to believe that the second affidavit was not genuine. Moreover, Jesus Lizares,
Panlilios administrator and father of petitioner Lizares, likewise did not take any action, in accordance with the second
affidavit showing that he was not aware of such affidavit of revocation. The CA even doubted petitioner Lizares contention
that the second affidavit was submitted to the DAR and CAR but was not acted upon for such averment was not
substantiated.
The appellate court also found Panlilio and her successors-in-interest guilty of laches, pointing out that aside from the
alleged second affidavit of revocation, there was no indication of Panlilios intention to recover the disputed landholdings.
On the issue of fraud and collusion on the part of the DAR personnel, the CA found that no preponderance of evidence was
evinced to prove the accusation.
In fine, the CA recognized and applied the principle of res judicata to the March 17, 1978 CAR Order rendered more than
20 years ago, holding that the resolution of said court placing the entire landholdings in question under the coverage of PD
27 had long become final and executory.
Petitioner Lizares plea for recall of the assailed Amended Decision was rejected through the assailed June 26, 2001 CA
Resolution.45
Petition for review on certiorari under G.R. No. 148777
Thus, we have this Petition for Review on Certiorari against only 15 private respondents from the original defendants below,
namely: Gonzalo Dizon, Ricardo Guintu, Rogelio Munoz, Eliseo Guintu, Roberto Dizon, Edilberto Catu, Herminigildo
Flores, Cipriano Dizon, Juanario Maniago, Gorgonio Canlas, Antonio Lising, Carlos Pineda, Renato Gozun, Alfredo
Mercado, and Bienvenido Machada.
Petition for certiorari under G.R. No. 157598
Consequent to the filing of the Petition for Review on Certiorari by petitioner Lizares, on January 28, 2002, the other
original defendants in the consolidated cases before the PARAD and DARAB, who were not made respondents in G.R. No.
148777, namely: Reynaldo Villanueva, Cenon Guinto, Celestino Dizon, Carmelita Vda. de David, Florentino Lapuz,
Fortunato Timbang, Oscar Santiago, Candido Timbang, Celestino Esguerra, Antonio Dizon, and Teodulo Dizon, filed before
the CA a Motion for Entry of Judgment46 of the November 29, 2000 Amended Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 47502 based on
the out-of-court settlement during the pendency of the case. On July 4, 2002, a second Motion for Entry of Judgment47 with
the same averments was filed reiterating their plea for execution.
The November 14, 2002 CA Resolution48 denied their motions for entry of judgment. A Motion for Reconsideration49 having
been turned down through the January 24, 2003 CA Resolution,50 petitioners now register the instant Petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus in G.R. No. 157598, assailing the aforesaid Resolutions for grave abuse of discretion.
The Issues
In G.R. No. 148777, petitioner Lizares presents the following issues for our consideration:

1. Whether or not in its 29 November 2000 Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals erred gravely in
reversing its ruling in the 11 April 2000 Decision on the import and significance of the second affidavit
executed by Encarnacion L. Vda. de Panlilio revoking or repudiating her first affidavit (by which she
purportedly agreed to have her land at Hacienda Masamat, which was dedicated to sugarcane, placed under
the coverage of P.D. No. 27);
2. Whether or not in its 29 November 2000 Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals erred gravely in setting
aside the 11 April 2000 Decisions ruling that the land in question being planted with sugarcane is not
covered by P.D. No. 27, by instead declaring that "the fact that land is sugarland has become inconsequential
to the coverage under P.D. No. 27 in the light of the affidavit dated January 12, 1977";
3. Whether or not in its 29 November 2000 Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals erred gravely in finding
Encarnacion L. Vda. de Panlilio and petitioner guilty of laches or estoppel;
4. Whether or not res judicata applies in the instant case;
5. Whether or not in its 29 November 2000 Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals erred gravely in failing
to rule that there was fraud and collusion on the part of the respondents in the coverage of the subject parcels
of land;
6. Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring the transfer made by
the private respondents to third persons valid;
7. Whether or not forum-shopping or a false certification of non-forum shopping [is present] here; and
8. Whether or not the instant petition complies with the nature and requisites of an appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45.51
In G.R. No. 157598, petitioners raise the sole issue of "whether the petitioners are entitled to an entry of judgment."52
The Courts Ruling
G.R. No. 148777
Before we go to the substantial issues, we tackle first the procedural issues raised in the last two issues in G.R. No. 148777
on whether the instant petition complies with the requirements of Rule 45 and whether forum shopping is present.
Petition complied with requisites for review on certiorari
Private respondents contend that the grounds relied upon by petitioner are factual in nature and thus outside the purview of a
review on certiorari by this Court. Petitioner disagrees and posits that the petition raises issues of both fact and law which
are so intimately intertwined and that issues of law permeate the controversy between the parties.
We find for petitioner. The rule is clearquestions of facts are proscribed by Rule 45. A question of law exists when the
doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does

not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A
question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.53
The rule is subject to exceptions. One such exception exists in this case. Mixed questions of law and facts are raised
pertaining to the applicability of PD 27 on a large portion of subject landholdings that were planted with sugar cane, which
would have been otherwise exempt, but were voluntary waived through an affidavit by the lot owner to be placed under the
OLT pursuant to said law; the import and significance of the purported affidavit of revocation; and, the interpretation of
Executive Order No. (EO) 22854 in relation to subsequent land transfer made by the farmer-beneficiaries.
At the very least, the instant petition complies with the requisites of Rule 45, particularly Section 6, as we have given the
instant petition due course.55
No forum shopping
Private respondents argue that petitioner Lizares is guilty of forum shopping for having pursued other civil cases allegedly
involving the same subject matter and on the same grounds raised in this petition. Petitioner Lizares counters that there is no
forum shopping, first, as the instant petition is a mere continuation of a pending action, that is, the consolidated cases filed
with the PARAD; second, the causes of action and issues raised in the other civil cases lodged with the RTC were different.
Respondents postulation cannot be entertained.
Private respondents failed to furnish us copies of portions of the relevant records of the other civil cases instituted by
petitioner Lizares needed to determine the existence of forum shopping. Absent such necessary pleadings, we are
constrained to take petitioners assertion at face value that the other cases, particularly Civil Case Nos. 11342, 11344, 11345,
11346 and 11347, filed before the RTC differ from the instant case as to the issues raised, the reliefs prayed for, and the
parties impleaded.
Time and again, the court has reminded prospective petitioners and lawyers alike that it is necessary that they attach to the
petition under Rule 45 all the material portions of the case records of the lower courts or quasi-judicial bodies which at one
time or another had adjudicated the case or complaint. These documents are required to support the grounds presented in the
petition under Rule 45.56 Any decision, order, pleading, or document forming parts of the records that is relevant or
important to the petition should be appended to it so that the court, in reviewing the petition, will have easy access to these
papers. More importantly, the submission will obviate delay as the court can readily decide the petition without need of the
elevation of the records of the court or quasi-judicial body a quo.
Now we move on to the substantive issues.
Main Issue: Genuineness and authenticity
of the February 3, 1977 Affidavit
The pith of the dispute is whether or not the February 3, 1977 affidavit of the lot owner, the late Encarnacion Vda. de
Panlilio, is genuine or authentic.

We rule in the negative.

In a slew of cases, the principle is firmly entrenched in this jurisdiction that this Court is not a trier of facts, and is not tasked
to calibrate and assess the probative weight of evidence adduced by the parties during trial all over again.57 However, in rare
occasions, exceptions are allowed. One exception is when there are competing factual findings by the different triers of fact,
such as those made by the quasi-agencies on the one hand and the CA on the other, this Court is compelled to go over the
records of the case, as well as the submissions of the parties, and resolve the factual issues.58 In this case, however, there is
coalescence in the findings of the appellate court with that of the two quasi-judicial agencies belowthe PARAD and
DARABon the issue of the authenticity of the second Panlilio Affidavit.
It being a question of fact, we find no reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the court a quo in its questioned
November 29, 2000 Amended Decision holding that the challenged February 3, 1977 Panlilio Affidavit is not an authentic
document. We quote with approval the factual findings of the CA which completely gave full accord and affirmed the
findings of the PARAD and DARAB, viz:
After assessing the grounds raised by respondents in their motion for reconsideration and a meticulous review of the records,
We are now in serious doubts as to the correctness of Our Decision. Our reasons are:
First, according to petitioner Lizares, Panlilios second affidavit (revoking her first affidavit) upon which this Court anchors
its assailed Decision, was executed as early as February 2, 1977. If it were true, Panlilios natural reaction was to submit her
second affidavit or affidavit of revocation to the DAR in order to exclude her landholdings from the coverage of the
Operation Land Transfer under P.D. 27. Significantly, Panlilio died on December 29, 1986. She had therefore, nine (9) years
from the date of execution of her second affidavit, within which to have her land excluded by the DAR from such coverage
considering that it was principally planted [with] sugar and that she was misled by DAR lawyer, Atty. Pepito Sanchez, into
signing her first affidavit. But she did not. Petitioners father, Jesus Lizares, was her administrator. Yet he did not also take
any action for apparently he was not aware of such affidavit of revocation.
Moreover, in her second affidavit, Panlilio specifically stated:
"That another reason for my desire not to place my entire property referred to as Hacienda Masamat in Mexico, Pampanga,
under P.D. 27 is the fact that the said Hacienda Masamat is leased to my nephews wife, Mrs. Paulina Y. Mercado, and the
lease contract I executed in her favor covering my said Hacienda Masamat is still subsisting and in force and will expire
only after the agricultural crop year 1978-1979;"
If Panlilio indeed signed her affidavit of revocation, why did she not inform her niece Paulina about it in order to protect her
right as a lessee? It must be remembered that at that time, the latters complaints (for cancellation of CLTs) against the
tenants of Panlilio were still pending in the DAR and the CAR. Had Panlilio given Paulina a copy of such second affidavit,
she could have brought it to the attention of the CAR and the DAR. Certainly, the subject landholdings could not have been
placed entirely under Operation Land Transfer. We need not emphasize here that being a lessee, Paulina would not want to
part with her Aunts landholdings.
Out of the blue, the second affidavit surfaced only in 1994 and 1995 when petitioner Lizares brought the instant actions
against Panlilios tenants or after eighteen (18) years from the date of its alleged execution. At this juncture, We can only
conclude without hesitation that Panlilio did not execute the second affidavit.

Petitioner alleged in his position paper that the same affidavit of revocation was submitted to the DAR and the CAR, but
they were not acted upon because of the dismissal of the cases for cancellation of CLTs filed by Paulina Mercado.
Petitioners claim is a mere allegation. It has not been substantiated. Again, if it were true, why did Panlilio and Paulina fail
to pursue any further action?59
We respect and accord finality to the aforequoted findings of facts of the CA, being the tribunal tasked to undertake a final
review of the facts of the case subject of course to certain tolerated exceptional situations. Once again we reiterate the
prevailing rule that the findings of fact of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals are binding
upon this Court.60
Second Issue: There is valid waiver through
the January 12, 1977 Affidavit
The CA likewise did not err in reversing its April 11, 2000 Decision that the subject land was properly covered by PD 27
since Panlilio surrendered said lot to the DAR for coverage under PD 27 pursuant to her January 12, 1977 Affidavit. The
non-existence of the February 3, 1977 Affidavit supports the inclusion of the entire lot in the CARP of the Government.
On the other hand, petitioner Lizares argues that there was no valid waiver under PD 27.
We are not convinced.
Considering the non-revocation of the January 12, 1977 Panlilio Affidavit,, the CA considered the land of Panlilio planted
with sugar cane as falling under the coverage of PD 27, thus:
[W]hile the proceedings in the CAR tend to establish the land as principally sugarland, hence outside the coverage of P.D.
27, still, Panlilios consent to have the entire land covered by the said law as alleged in her first affidavit, cannot be
construed as a violation of its provisions. In fact, in executing the said affidavit, she did not defeat, nor contravene the
express intent of the law to emancipate her tenants from the bondage of the soil. In doing so, she even supported its
implementation.
In Our challenged Decision We found that the subject land was principally planted [with] sugar and therefore outside the
pale of P.D. 27. But We overlooked the fact that Panlilio in her first affidavit, which was not validly revoked, expressed her
desire to have her entire landholdings placed within the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. To be sure, the fact that
Panlilios land is sugarland has become inconsequential in the light of her first affidavit.61
We agree with the CA.
While PD 27 clearly applies to private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of sharecrop or
lease-tenancy, whether classified as landed estate or not, it does not preclude nor prohibit the disposition of landholdings
planted with other crops to the tenants by express will of the landowner under PD 27.
In the instant case, a large portion of Hacienda Masamat with an aggregate area of 115.41 hectares was planted with sugar
cane. It is undisputed, as was duly shown in the January 12, 1977 Panlilio Affidavit, that only 50.22 hectares were planted
with palay. Thus, approximately 65.19 hectares of the subject landholdings were planted with sugar cane aside from the
portions used for the residences of the tenants and planted with crops for their daily sustenance. Needless to say, with the

January 12, 1977 Panlilio Affidavit, she expressed her intent to include the 65.19 hectares to be placed under the OLT
pursuant to PD 27 in favor of her tenants which otherwise would have been exempt. Indeed, waiver or an intentional and
voluntary surrender of a right can give rise to a valid title or ownership of a property in favor of another under Article 6 of
the Civil Code. Thus, such disposition through the OLT pursuant to PD 27 is indeed legal and proper and no irregularity can
be attributed to the DAR which merely relied on the January 12, 1977 Panlilio Affidavit.
Third Issue: Equitable remedy of laches
The court a quo correctly ruled that Panlilio and her successors-in-interest are bound by the coverage of the lot under PD 27
by reason of laches.
Even granting arguendo that the February 3, 1977 Affidavit of revocation is genuine and was furnished both the DAR and
the CAR, still, no relief can be accorded petitioner Lizares on account of laches.
Laches and its elements
Delay for a prolonged period of time can result in loss of rights and actions. The equitable defense of laches does not even
concern itself with the character of the defendants title, but only with plaintiffs long inaction or inexcusable neglect to bar
the latters action as it would be inequitable and unjust to the defendant.
According to settled jurisprudence, "laches" means "the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that whichby the exercise of due diligencecould or should have been done earlier."62 Verily, laches serves to
deprive a party guilty of it of any judicial remedies. Its elements are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one
under whom the defendant claims, giving rise to the situation which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the
complainants rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendants conduct as having been afforded an
opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert
the right in which the defendant bases the suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to
the complainant, or the suit is not held barred.63
In Santiago v. Court of Appeals, we explained that there is "no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of
demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances."64
Laches has set in
The records demonstrate clear signs of laches. The first element is undisputed. Panlilios erstwhile tenants were issued CLTs
sometime in 1973 and subsequently EPs in 1993. CAR Case No. 1649-P74 filed by Panlilios lessee, Paulina Mercado, was
dismissed with finality on March 17, 1978 as no appeal was pursued. Since then, Panlilio and her administrator for the
subject landholdings in Hacienda Masamat, Jesus Lizares, did not take any action to revoke the CLTs. With the dismissal of
the land case in 1978, with finality, the possession of the tenants of Panlilio was fully recognized by her and her successorsin-interest.
It cannot be disputed that Panlilios tenants, the private respondents, occupied portions of the subject landholdings in an
open, continuous, and adverse manner in the concept of owners from 1978 until 1994 and 1995 when the subject cases were
instituted by petitioner Lizares or for more than sixteen (16) years. Private respondents possession of said portions for a
lengthy period of time gave cause to petitioner to complain and take legal steps to protect Panlilios rights of ownership and

title over the disputed lot. No such action was taken.

Likewise, the second element of laches is amply shown. Panlilio and her successors-in-interest did not take any
administrative or judicial action to protect her rights for more than 16 years.
As it is, if Panlilio indeed executed the affidavit of revocation in February 3, 1977, why did she not pursue any action to
implement her affidavit disregarding her January 12, 1977 Affidavit? Indeed, Panlilio, during her lifetime, did not lift a
finger to regain her land. After she died on December 29, 1986, Jesus Lizares, her administrator for Hacienda Masamat,
likewise did not initiate any legal action to effectuate her alleged wish. Unfortunately for petitioner Lizares, the cases
initiated by him in 1994 and 1995 were belatedly filed and much delay had transpired which proved to be prejudicial to his
interests.
Anent the third element, private respondents did not know nor anticipate that their possession, occupancy, and ownership of
the subject landholdings after 16 years would still be questioned. In fact, private respondents did not only continue tilling the
land, but later on had conveyed their lots to innocent third parties for value. Moreover, we take judicial notice that numerous
commercial buildings, residential houses, and a large mall stand on major portions of former Hacienda Masamat. In fact, the
subject landholdings are now much different from what they were more than two decades ago. Thus, after more than sixteen
(16) years of unquestioned, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession, private respondents did not expect that petitioner Lizares
would still assert any right over the landholdings after the lapse of such a long period of occupation.
Finally, grave prejudice and serious damage would befall private respondents, in general, who relied on their CLTs and EPs,
and subsequent purchasers for value of the lots forming parts of the former hacienda who relied on private respondents titles
if the complaints of petitioner were not barred. As a matter of fact, some buyers not impleaded in the instant case opted to
settle out-of-court with petitioner Lizares rather than be disturbed in their possession and their right of ownership.
Considering the foregoing discussion, we uphold the finding of laches. Verily, it would be a grave injustice if private
respondents and the subsequent purchasers for value would now be made to suffer after petitioner Lizares and his
predecessors-in-interest had slept on their rights for more than 16 years.
Fourth Issue: Principle of res judicata inapplicable
Private respondents contend that the dismissal in CAR Case No. 1649-P74 constitutes res judicata over the instant case.
CAR Case No. 1649-P74 involved Panlilios lessee against private respondents with the issue of the crops being planted on
subject landholdings, while the instant case involves Panlilios successor-in-interest petitioner Lizares against private
respondents involving the issue of the alleged affidavit of revocation.
The reliance on res judicata is misplaced.
Res judicata, either in the concept of bar by former judgment or conclusiveness of judgment, cannot be applied to the
present case.
In Vda. de Cruzo v. Carriaga, Jr., we discussed the doctrine of res judicata, as follows:
The doctrine of res judicata thus lays down two main rules which may be stated as follows: 1) The judgment or decree of a
court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the parties and their privies to the litigation and constitutes a bar to a

new action or suit involving the same cause of action either before the same or any other tribunal; and 2) Any right, fact, or
matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in
which a judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be
litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim or demand, purpose or subject matter of the two suits
is the same. These two main rules mark the distinction between the principles governing the two typical cases in which a
judgment may operate as evidence. In speaking of these cases, the first general rule above stated, and which corresponds to
the aforequoted paragraph (b) of Section 49, is referred to as "bar by former judgment" while the second general rule, which
is embodied in paragraph (c) of the same section, is known as "conclusiveness of judgment."
Stated otherwise, when we speak of res judicata in its concept as a "bar by former judgment," the judgment rendered in the
first case is an absolute bar to the subsequent action since said judgment is conclusive not only as to the matters offered and
received to sustain that judgment but also as to any other matter which might have been offered for that purpose and which
could have been adjudged therein. This is the concept in which the term res judicata is more commonly and generally used
and in which it is understood as the bar by prior judgment constituting a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases.
On the other hand, the less familiar concept or less terminological usage of res judicata as a rule on conclusiveness of
judgment refers to the situation where the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to the matters actually
determined therein or which were necessarily included therein. Consequently, since other admissible and relevant matters
which the parties in the second action could properly offer are not concluded by the said judgment, the same is not a bar to
or a ground for dismissal of the second action.
At bottom, the other elements being virtually the same, the fundamental difference between the rule of res judicata as a bar
by former judgment and as merely a rule on the conclusiveness of judgment is that, in the first, there is an identity in the
cause of action in both cases involved whereas, in the second, the cause of action in the first case is different from that in the
second case.65
Premised on the foregoing disquisition, the principle of res judicata requires the concurrence of the following requisites:
a) The former judgment or order must be final;
b) It must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence
or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case;
c) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and
d) There must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of
action. This requisite is satisfied if the two actions are substantially between the same parties.66
For want of the fourth requisite that there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter,
and cause of action, the instant case is thus removed from the operation of the principle of res judicata. Stated differently,
there is no identity of parties and issues in CAR Case No. 1649-P74 and the instant case.
Nevertheless, while res judicata is not applicable in the instant case, still, it will not accord legal relief to petitioner with
respect to his claim of ownership over the lots in dispute.

Fifth Issue: Fraud and collusion not proven

Petitioner Lizares accuses the DAR personnel and private respondents of fraud and collusion. Absent any proof, such
allegation falls flat.
In the recent case of Heirs of Cipriano Reyes v. Calumpang, we elucidated on this same issue of the required evidential
proof, thus:
Basic is the rule of actori incumbit onus probandi, or the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff. Differently stated, upon the
plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. In the case at bar, petitioners must therefore establish their case by a
preponderance of evidence, that is, evidence that has greater weight, or is more convincing than that which is offered in
opposition to itwhich petitioners utterly failed to do so. Besides, it is an age-old rule in civil cases that one who alleges a
fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence. Fraud is never presumed, but must be established by
clear and convincing evidence. Thus, by admitting that Victorino, Luis, and Jovito, all surnamed Reyes, indeed executed the
Deed of Quitclaim coupled with the absence of evidence substantiating fraud and mistake in its execution, we are
constrained to uphold the appellate courts conclusion that the execution of the Deed of Quitclaim was valid.67
Hence, we uphold the CAs pronouncement that there was no collusion and fraud especially considering that no clear and
convincing evidence was presented to overwhelm and rebut the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed68 by the DAR personnel.
Sixth Issue: Subsequent transfers valid only
to qualified farmer-beneficiaries
Petitioner Lizares asseverates that ownership of lands granted to tenant-farmers under PD 27 may not be transferred or
conveyed to third parties except by hereditary succession or to the Government. He contends that the CA committed grave
abuse of discretion in declaring the sale of the land by private respondents Gonzalo Dizon, et al. to third persons valid. The
CA ratiocinated that EO 228 was enacted after PD 27 and since EO 228 is a later law, it will prevail over PD 27. Thus, the
ownership of the lot may now be transferred to persons other than the heirs of the beneficiary or the Government.
Petitioner is correct.
EO 228 not inconsistent with PD 27 on prohibition of transfers
The prohibition in PD 27, the Tenants Emancipation Decree, which took effect on October 21, 1972, states that "[t]itle to
land acquired pursuant to this Decree or the Land Reform Program of the Government shall not be transferable except by
hereditary succession or to the Government in accordance with the provisions of this Decree, the Code of Agrarian Reforms
and other existing laws and regulations (emphasis supplied)."
Hereditary succession means succession by intestate succession or by will to the compulsory heirs under the Civil Code, but
does not pertain to testamentary succession to other persons. "Government" means the DAR through the Land Bank of the
Philippines which has superior lien by virtue of mortgages in its favor.
Thus, PD 27 is clear that after full payment and title to the land is acquired, the land shall not be transferred except to the
heirs of the beneficiary or the Government. If the amortizations for the land have not yet been paid, then there can be no

transfer to anybody since the lot is still owned by the Government. The prohibition against transfers to persons other than the
heirs of other qualified beneficiaries stems from the policy of the Government to develop generations of farmers to attain its
avowed goal to have an adequate and sustained agricultural production. With certitude, such objective will not see the light
of day if lands covered by agrarian reform can easily be converted for non-agricultural purposes.
On the other hand, Sec. 6 of EO 228 provides, thus:
Sec. 6 The total cost of the land including interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum with a two percent (2%) interest
rebate for amortizations paid on times, shall be paid by the farmer-beneficiary or his heirs to the Land Bank over a period of
up to twenty (20) years in twenty (20) equal annual amortizations. Lands already valued and financed by Land Bank are
likewise extended a 20-year period of payment of twenty (20) equal annual amortizations. However, the farmer-beneficiary
if he so elects, may pay in full before the twentieth year or may request the Land Bank to structure a repayment period of
less than twenty (20) years if the amount to amount to be financed and the corresponding annual obligations are well within
the farmers capacity to meet. Ownership of lands acquired by farmer-beneficiary may be transferred after full payment of
amortizations. (Emphasis supplied.)
The CA highlighted and made much of the last sentence of Sec. 6 which authorizes the transfer of the ownership of the lands
acquired by the farmer-beneficiary after full payment of amortizations. It construed said provision to mean that the farmerbeneficiary can sell the land even to a non-qualified person.
This is incorrect.
First of all, the provision in question is silent as to who can be the transferees of the land acquired through the CARP. The
rule in statutory construction is that statutes in pari materia should be construed together and harmonized.69 Since there
appears to be no irreconcilable conflict between PD 27 and Sec. 6 of EO 228, then the two (2) provisions can be made
compatible by maintaining the rule in PD 27 that lands acquired under said decree can only be transferred to the heirs of the
original beneficiary or to the Government. Second, PD 27 is the specific law on agrarian reform while EO 228 was issued
principally to implement PD 27. This can easily be inferred from EO 228 which provided for the mode of valuation of lands
subject of PD 27 and the manner of payment by the farmer-beneficiary and mode of compensation to the land owner. Third,
implied repeals are not favored. A perusal of the aforequoted Sec. 6 of EO 228 readily reveals that it confers upon the
beneficiary the privilege of paying the value of the land on a twenty (20)-year annual amortization plan at six percent (6%)
interest per annum. He may elect to pay in full the installments or have the payment plan restructured. Said provision
concludes by saying that after full payment, ownership of the land may already be transferred. Thus, it is plain to see that
Sec. 6 principally deals with payment of amortization and not on who qualify as legal transferees of lands acquired under
PD 27. Since there is no incompatibility between PD 27 and EO 228 on the qualified transferees of land acquired under PD
27, ergo, the lands acquired under said law can only be transferred to the heirs of the beneficiary or to the Government for
eventual transfer to qualified beneficiaries by the DAR pursuant to the explicit proscription in PD 27.
Thus, the alleged transfers made by private respondents in G.R. No. 148777 of lands acquired under PD 27 to non-qualified
persons are illegal and null and void.70
The ruling in Victorino Torres v. Leon Ventura sheds light on the policy behind the prohibition, thus:
The law is clear and leaves no room for doubt. Upon the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 27 on October 21, 1972,
petitioner was DEEMED OWNER of the land in question. As of that date, he was declared emancipated from the bondage

of the soil. As such, he gained the rights to possess, cultivate, and enjoy the landholding for himself. Those rights over that
particular property were granted by the government to him and to no other. To insure his continued possession and
enjoyment of the property, he could not, under the law, make any valid form of transfer except to the government or by
hereditary succession, to his successors.71
In addition, the prohibition was expanded not only to cover the title issued to the tenant-farmer but also the rights and
interests of the farmer in the land while he is still paying the amortizations on it. A contrary ruling would make the farmer an
"easy prey to those who would like to tempt [him/her] with cash in exchange for inchoate title over the same," and PD 27
could be easily circumvented and the title shall eventually be acquired by non-tillers of the soil.72
Anent the contravention of the prohibition under PD 27, we ruled in Siacor v. Gigantana73 and more recently in CaliwagCarmona v. Court of Appeals,74 that sales or transfers of lands made in violation of PD 27 and EO 228 in favor of persons
other than the Government by other legal means or to the farmers successor by hereditary succession are null and void. The
prohibition even extends to the surrender of the land to the former landowner. The sales or transfers are void ab initio, being
contrary to law and public policy under Art. 5 of the Civil Code that "acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or
prohibiting laws shall be void x x x." In this regard, the DAR is duty-bound to take appropriate measures to annul the illegal
transfers and recover the land unlawfully conveyed to non-qualified persons for disposition to qualified beneficiaries. In the
case at bar, the alleged transfers made by some if not all of respondents Gonzalo Dizon, et al. (G.R. No. 148777) of lands
covered by PD 27 to non-qualified persons are illegal and null and void.
G.R. No. 157598
Finally, we resolve the sole issue raised in G.R. No. 157598 on whether petitioners Reynaldo Villanueva, et al. are entitled to
a partial entry of judgment of the Amended Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 47502.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 157598 are not entitled to a partial entry of judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 47502
Petitioners contend that they are entitled to a partial entry of judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 47502 as respondent George
Lizares in G.R. No. 148777 deliberately excluded them on account of the amicable settlement concluded between them.
Thus, they contend that any judgment rendered by the Court in G.R. No. 148777 will not affect them. In gist, petitioners
strongly assert that the Amended Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 47502 is already final and executory with respect to them.
Respondent Lizares, on the other hand, has continually affirmed that he deliberately excluded petitioners in his petition for
review under G.R. No. 148777 as they had amicably settled with him; and that he has released, discharged, and waived any
and all claims against petitioners on account of the petition. Thus, respondent Lizares interposes no objection for the
issuance of a partial entry of judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 47502 insofar as petitioners are concerned, as the issues and
reliefs he is seeking in G.R. No. 148777 do not concern nor prejudice petitioners.
We disagree.
It is clear that petitioners, though they settled with respondent Lizares out-of-court, were not able to get a favorable ruling
from the DARAB approving the motion to withdraw appeal filed by respondent Lizares in DARAB Case Nos. 4558, 4559,
and 4561. This motion for the recall of the appeal remained unacted upon until the August 7, 1997 DARAB Decision was
rendered in favor of all the defendants and appellees.

Subsequently, the DARAB cases were elevated for review to the CA and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 47502.
In its November 29, 2000 Amended Decision, the CA upheld the DARAB Decision.
On January 28, 2002, petitioners Reynaldo Villanueva, et al. filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment based on their out-ofcourt settlement with petitioner Lizares while the DARAB case was pending. On July 4, 2002, a second motion for entry of
judgment was filed which was denied together with the first motion by the CA on November 14, 2002.
The reason for the denial by the CA of the aforementioned prayers for entry of judgment is as follows:
Our Amended Decision in this case had long been elevated to the Supreme Court by a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45. As held by the Supreme Court in Heirs of the Late Justice Jose B. L. Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, by the mere fact of
the filing of the petition, the finality of the Court of Appeals decision was stayed, and there could be no entry of judgment
therein, and hence, no premature execution could be had. In that case, the High Court emphatically declared that when this
Court adopted a resolution granting execution pending appeal after the petition for review was already filed in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals encroached on the hallowed grounds of the Supreme Court. Thus, We find no legal basis or
justification to allow [the] motions for partial entry of judgment even on the ground that private [respondent]-movants were
not impleaded in G.R. No. 148777 and in the absence of opposition from herein petitioner who had allegedly concluded an
out-of-court settlement with private [respondent]-movants.75
We fully agree with the CA that there should be no partial entry of judgment for petitioners Reynaldo Villanueva, et al. since
their motion to withdraw was not acted upon by the DARAB nor by the CA. Thus, there is nothing to record in the Book of
Entry of Judgments.
More importantly, it appears that the transfers made by some or all of petitioners Reynaldo Villanueva, et al. (G.R. No.
157598) to non-qualified persons are proscribed under PD 27. Such finding necessarily preludes the entry of judgment in
favor of said petitioners. Consequently, the alleged transfers made by petitioners Villanueva, et al., being in contravention of
a prohibitory provision of PD 27, are null and void, and the titles issued to non-qualified individuals have to be cancelled
and new ones issued to the Government.1wphi1
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 148777 is partly granted. The November 29, 2000 Amended Decision of the CA in
CA-G.R. SP No. 47502 is affirmed with the modification that the transfers made by private respondents to non-qualified
persons, if any, under PD 27 are illegal and declared NULL and VOID, and the titles issued based on the transfers are
likewise NULL and VOID. The DAR is ORDERED to investigate the transfers covering the subject landholdings and, based
on the findings of illegal transfers for violations of PD 27 and EO 228, to coordinate with the Register of Deeds of
Pampanga for the cancellation of the titles registered in the names of the transferees or to their subsequent transferees and to
issue new titles to the Government for disposition to qualified beneficiaries. The November 14, 1995 PARAD Joint Decision
in DARAB Cases Nos. 638-P94, 933-P95, 934-P95, and 935-P95, as affirmed by the August 7, 1997 DARAB Decision
in DARAB Case Nos. 4558, 4559, 4560, and 4561, is accordingly MODIFIED.
The petition in G.R. No. 157598 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The transfers made by petitioners Reynaldo, et al. to nonqualified persons, if any, under PD 27 are likewise declared NULL and VOID. Similarly, the DAR is ORDERED to
investigate the transfers covering the subject landholdings and, based on the findings of illegal transfers for violations of PD
27 and EO 228, to coordinate with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga for the cancellation of the titles concerned registered
in the names of the transferees or to their subsequent transferees and to issue new titles to the Government for disposition to

qualified beneficiaries.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
AT T E S T AT I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

"Decreeing the Emancipation of Tenants from the Bondage of the Soil, Transferring to them the Ownership
of the Land They Till and Providing the Instruments and Mechanism Therefor" (1972).

Rollo (G.R. No. 148777), pp. 3-22.

Id. at 24-52. The Amended Decision was penned by Associate Justice Angelina Sandoval Gutierrez
(Chairperson, now a Member of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr.
and Perlita J. Tria Tiron; with Associate Justice Remedios Salazar-Fernando dissenting, id. at 53-70,
concurred in by Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr.
4

CA rollo, pp. 46-64.

Rollo (G.R. No. 148777), p. 84.

Id. at 71-82.

Rollo (G.R. No. 157598), pp. 9-24.

Id. at 26-28.

Id. at 100-103.

10

Id. at 30.

11

Id. at 110-117.

12

Rollo (G.R. No. 148777), p. 440.

13

CA rollo, pp. 283-285, 286, 287-289, 290-292, 256-258, 273, 293-294, 298-300, 259-261, 277-279, 274276, 262-264, 295-297, 265-269, 270-272, & 280-282, respectively.
14

Id. at 195-200.

15

Id. at 307-312.

16

Id. at 156.

17

Id. at 229-232.

18

Rollo (G.R. No. 148777), pp. 30-31.

19

CA rollo, pp. 233-234.

20

Rollo (G.R. No. 148777), pp. 265-277.

21

CA rollo, pp. 87-92.

22

Id. at 95-99.

23

Rollo (G.R. No. 148777), pp. 279-285.

24

Id. at 287-294.

25

Id. at 118-123.

26

Id. at 133-134.

27

Id. at 135-139.

28

Id. at 159-160.

29

CA rollo, pp. 326-342.

30

Supra note 16.

31

CA rollo, pp. 321-322.

32

Supra note 4.

33

CA rollo, pp. 65-74.

34

Id. at 402-404.

35

Id. at 400.

36

Id. at 401. The receipt was issued by petitioner Lizares.

37

Id. at 441-442.

38

Id. at 356-376, at 375. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and
concurred in by Associate Justices Angelina Sandoval Gutierrez (Chairperson, now a Member of this Court)
and Salvador J. Valdez, Jr.
39

Id. at 377-399.

40

Id. at 514-516.

41

Id. at 408-416.

42

Id. at 417-421.

43

Id. at 431-440.

44

Supra note 3, at 51.

45

Supra note 5.

46

Supra note 9.

47

CA rollo, pp. 778-782.

48

Supra note 8.

49

Rollo (G.R. No. 157598), pp. 110-117.

50

Supra note 10.

51

Rollo (G.R. No. 148777), pp. 332-333.

52

Rollo (G.R. No. 157598), p. 159.

53

Heirs of Cipriano Reyes v. Calumpang, G.R. No. 138463, October 30, 2006, 506 SCRA 56, 70; citations
omitted.
54

"Declaring Full Land Ownership to Qualified Farmer Beneficiaries Covered by Presidential Decree No. 27;
Determining the Value of Remaining Unvalued Rice and Corn Lands Subject to P.D. No. 27; and Providing
for the Manner of Payment by the Farmer Beneficiary and Mode of Compensation to the Landowner" (1987).
55

Rollo (G.R. No. 148777), pp. 307-308, April 10, 2002 Resolution of the Third Division.

56

Sec. 4.

57

See Union Motor Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 159738, December 9,
2004, 445 SCRA 683; citing Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. and Manolet Lavides v. ICC Leasing
and Financing Corporation, G.R. No. 150673, February 28, 2003, 398 SCRA 508.
58

See Fujitsu Computer Products Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158232, March 31, 2005, 454
SCRA 737; citing Globe Telecom, Inc. v. Florendo-Flores, G.R. No. 150092, September 27, 2002, 390 SCRA
201.
59

Supra note 3, at 42-45.

60

Xentrex Automotive, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121559, June 18, 1998, 291 SCRA 66, 71; citations
omitted.
61

Supra note 3, at 47-48.

62

Soliva v. The Intestate Estate of Marcelo M. Villalba, G.R. No. 154017, December 8, 2003, 417 SCRA 277,

286; citing Ramos v. Heirs of Ramos, Sr., G.R. No. 140848, April 25, 2002, 381 SCRA 594, 605; Westmont
Bank v. Ong, G.R. No. 132560, January 30, 2002, 375 SCRA 212, 222.
63

Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation v. Heirs of Baba, G.R. No. 138945, August 19, 2003, 409
SCRA 306, 315; citing Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. 133895, 2 October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 395, 405-406.
64

G.R. No. 103959, August 21, 1997, 278 SCRA 98, 112.

65

G.R. Nos. 75109-10, June 28, 1989, 174 SCRA 330, 338-339.

66

I Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 472-473 (6th rev. ed.).

67

Supra note 53, at 71-72.

68

Revised Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 3(m).

69

Rodriguez, Statutory Construction 250 (2nd ed., 1998); citing 82 C.J.S. Statutes, 367.

70

On transfers of lots acquired under RA 6657 which took effect on June 10, 1998, Section 27 provides:
Section 27. Transferability of Awarded Lands.Land acquired by beneficiaries under this Act may
not be sold, transferred or conveyed except through hereditary succession, or to the government, or to
the LBP, or to other qualified beneficiaries for a period of ten (10) years: Provided, however, That the
children or the spouse of the transferor, shall have a right to repurchase the land from the government
or LBP within a period of two (2) years. Due notice of the availability of the land shall be given by
the LBP to the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) of the barangay where the land is
situated. The Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee (PARCCOM), as herein provided,
shall in turn, be given due notice thereof by the BARC. (Emphasis supplied.)
If the land has not yet been fully paid by the beneficiary, the rights to the land may be transferred or
conveyed, with prior approval of the DAR, to any heir of the beneficiary or to any other beneficiary
who, as a condition for such transfer or conveyance, shall cultivate the land himself. Failing
compliance herewith, the land shall be transferred to the LBP which shall give due notice of the
availability of the land in the manner specified in the immediately preceding paragraph.
In the event of such transfer to the LBP, the latter shall compensate the beneficiary in one lump sum
for the amounts the latter has already paid, together with the value of improvements he has made on
the land.
Unlike in PD 27, RA 6657 now authorizes the transfer of the rights to the land to any heir of the
beneficiary or other qualified beneficiary who shall personally cultivate the land even if the
amortizations have not yet been paid. It is clear however that the land will continuously be devoted to
agricultural production.
If the amortizations have been fully paid, the land can only be sold, transferred, or conveyed through

hereditary succession or to the government, the LBP, or other qualified beneficiaries within a period
of ten (10) years from date of acquisition. After the ten (10)-year period had elapsed, then the land can
be sold to anybody even if the transferee is not a qualified beneficiary. If the land has been the subject
of conversion under Article 65 of RA 6657, it can be transferred to anybody after the lapse of five (5)
years from date of acquisition.
71

G.R. No. 86044, July 2, 1990, 187 SCRA 96, 104.

72

Id. at 105.

73

G.R. No. 147877, April 5, 2002, 380 SCRA 306, 313.

74

G.R. No. 148157, July 27, 2006, 496 SCRA 723, 734.

75

Supra note 8, at 27.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 112014. December 5, 2000]

TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, petitioner, vs. GILDA L. JARDELEZA, ERNESTO L.
JARDELEZA, JR., MELECIO GIL L. JARDELEZA, and GLENDA L. JARDELEZA,
respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the orderi[1] dismissing Special
Proceedings No. 4689 of the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City for appointment of judicial
guardian over the person and estate of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. on the ground that
such guardianship is superfluous and will only serve to duplicate the powers of the wife,
Mrs. Gilda L. Jardeleza, under the explicit provisions of Article 124, second paragraph,
of the Family Code.
Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and Gilda L. Jardeleza were married long before 03 August
1988, when the Family Code took effect. The union produced five children, namely:
petitioner, Ernesto, Jr., Melecio, Glenda and Rolando, all surnamed L. Jardeleza.

On 25 March 1991, Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. then 73 years old, suffered a stroke and
lapsed into comatose condition. To date, his condition has not materially improved.
On 06 June 1991, petitioner commenced with the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City
Special Proceedings No. 45689, a petition for appointment of judicial guardian over the
person and property of Dr. Jardeleza, Sr. and prayed for the issuance of letters of
guardianship to his mother, Gilda L. Jardeleza. ii[2]
On 19 June 1991, the trial court issued an order setting the petition for hearing so that
all persons concerned may appear and show cause if any why the petition should not
be granted.iii[3]
On 3 July 1991, petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for the issuance of letters of
guardianship to him, rather than to his mother, on the ground that she considered the
property acquired by Dr. Jardeleza as her own and did not want to be appointed
guardian.iv[4]
On 09 August 1991, respondents filed with the trial court an opposition to the petition for
guardianship and the motion for issuance of letters of guardianship to petitioner.v[5]
On 20 August 1993, the trial court issued an order dismissing the petition for
guardianship.vi[6] The trial court concluded, without explanation, that the petition is
superfluous and would only serve to duplicate the powers of the wife under the explicit
provisions of Article 124, second paragraph, of the Family Code.
On 17 September 1993, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration pointing out that the
Court of Appeals held in a case under Article 124 of the Family Code where the
incapacitated spouse is incapable of being notified or unable to answer the petition, the
procedural recourse is guardianship of the incapacitated spouse. vii[7]
On 24 September 1993, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration finding it
unmeritorious.viii[8]
Hence, this petition.ix[9]
The petition raises a pure legal question, to wit: whether Article 124 of the Family Code
renders superfluous the appointment of a judicial guardian over the person and estate
of an incompetent married person.
Very recently, in a related case, we ruled that Article 124 of the Family Code was not
applicable to the situation of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and that the proper procedure
was an application for appointment of judicial guardian under Rule 93 of the 1964
Revised Rules of Court.x[10]
WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition, reverses and sets aside the resolutions of
the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, in Special Proceedings No. 4689.

The Court remands the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this
decision.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 191031, October 05, 2015
DOLORES L. HACBANG AND BERNARDO J. HACBANG, Petitioners, v. ATTY.
BASILIO H. ALO, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:*
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the 13 October 2009 Decision and the 21
January 2010 resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R CV No. 83137.1 The CA
affirmed the Quezon City Regional Trial Court's (RTC) dismissal of the petitioners' complaint in
Civil Case No. Q 99-366602 for lack of cause of action.
ANTECEDENTS
On 3 April 1937, Bishop Sofronio Hacbang (Bishop Sofronio) died leaving several properties
behind. Among these was Lot No. 8-A of subdivision Plan Psd-6227 located at Espaa Street,
San Juan, Rizal,3 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (19896) 227644 (the
subject lot).
Bishop Sofronio was survived by his parents, Basilio and Maria Hacbang, and his siblings:
Perfecto Hacbang, Joaquin Hacbang, Lucia Teresita Hacbang, and Dolores Hacbang Alo.
Petitioner Dolores L. Hacbang is the grandchild of Perfecto while petitioner Bernardo Hacbang
(Bernardo) is a son of Joaquin. The respondent Basilio Alo is the son of Dolores.
Bishop Sofronio left a will denominated as Ultima Voluntad y Testamento. He left one-half of his
properties to his parents and devised the other half - including the subject lot - to his sister
Dolores. The pertinent portions of his will read:
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FOURTH: By these presents I give, name, declare and institute as heirs my parents BASILIO
HACBANG and MARIA GABORNY DE HACBANG of one-half of all my properties, whether

real, personal or mixed, in whatever place they may be found, whether they were acquired before
or after the execution of this testament, including all the properties that at the time of my death I
may have the power to dispose of by will, and which properties consist of the following:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Fifty (50) percent of the shares of stock that I own in the "SAMAR NAVIGATION CO. INC."
A parcel of land with its camarin situated in the Municipality of Carigara, Province of Leyte.
A parcel of land in the Barrio of Pinamopuan, of the Municipality of Capoocan, Province of
Leyte.
A parcel of land with house and planted to coconuts in the Barrio of Sorsogon, Municipality of
Sta. Margarita, Province of Samar.
FIFTH: The other remaining half of my properties wherever they may be located, by these
presents I give, cede and hand over to my sister Dolores Hacbang, which properties are more
particularly described as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Fifty (50) percent of my stockholdings in the "SAMAR NAVIGATION CO. INC."

A piece of land with one house where the Botica San Antonio is located, in the Municipality of
Calbayog, Province of Samar.
A piece of land with house in Acedillo St., Municipality of Calbayog, Province of Samar.
A piece of land with 1 camarin in the barrio of Sorsogon, Municipality of Sta. Margarita,
Province of Samar.
Six (6) Parcels of land located in "NEW MANILA," Municipality of San Juan, Province of
Rizal, in 7th St., described as follows: Block 7, Lots 16, 18, 20 and 22, and in 3rd Street, Block 3,
Lots 4 and 6.
A piece of land situated in Espana St., Municipality of San Juan del Monte of the Province
of Rizal, marked as Lot 8-A, Block 17, of 1,403 square meters in area.4
chanrobl eslaw

On 16 April 1937, a petition for the probate of Bishop Sofronio's will and the settlement of his
estate was filed before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila. The petition was
docketed as SP. PROC. No. 51199.
On 21 May 1937, the CFI admitted Bishop Sofronio's will to probate.5
The records are bare with respect to what happened next. They show, however, that the CFI
ordered the proceedings to be archived on 2 November 1957.
On 24 September 1971, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City appears to have issued TCT No.
169342 over the subject lot in the name of respondent Basilio H. Alo. TCT No. 169342 cancelled

TCT No. 117322/T-500. However, this Court cannot determine the circumstances surrounding
the issuance of TCT No. 169342 or the relationship between TCT No. 117322/T-500 and TCT
No. (19896) 227644 due to the inadequacy of the documents on record.
On 17 March 1975, Dolores Hacbang Alo moved to revive the settlement proceedings because
the CFI had not yet completed adjudicating the properties.
On 23 May 1975, the CFI denied the motion for revival because the order to archive "had long
become final and executory."6
On 1 February 1999, petitioners Dolores L. Hacbang and Bernardo filed a petition to cancel TCT
No. 169342 on the ground that it was fraudulently secured. In support of their allegations, they
submitted the 5 March 1997 Investigation Report of Land Registration Authority (LRA)
Investigator Rodrigo I. Del Rosario. The report concluded that TCT No. 117322 was of "doubtful
authenticity" and was neither derived from TCT No. 117322 nor issued by the Registry of Deeds
of Quezon City on 24 September 1971 at 2:30 PM.
In his Answer dated 18 August 1999, Basilio denied all allegations of irregularity and
wrongdoing. He also moved to dismiss the petition because the petitioners were neither heirs nor
devisees of Bishop Sofronio and had no legal interest in the subject lot.
On 7 January 2003, the RTC dismissed the petition because the petitioners had no right to
prosecute the case on the subject lot. The RTC noted that Bishop Sofronio's will had already
been admitted into probate in 1937; thus, the intrinsic validity of the will is no longer in question.
Though the settlement proceedings were archived, Bishop Sofronio already designated his heirs:
Bishop Sofronio's parents were compulsory heirs entitled to half of his estate while the
respondent's mother, Dolores Hacbang Alo, was devised the remaining half (the free portion).
Thus, the petitioners, who are neither compulsory nor testamentary heirs, are not real parties in
interest.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration which the RTC denied on 19 August 2003.
The petitioners appealed to the CA, arguing that: (1) Bishop Sofronio's will did not validly
transfer the subject property to Dolores Hacbang Alo; (2) the probate of the will is not conclusive
as to the validity of its intrinsic provisions; and (3) only a final decree of distribution of the estate
vests title on the properties from the estate on the distributees.7 The appeal was docketed as CAG.R CV No. 83137.
They further argued that the distribution of the estate should be governed by intestate succession
because: (1) the subject property was not adjudicated; and (2) the settlement proceedings were
archived and dismissed. Thus, all the properties passed on to and became part of the estate of
Bishop Sofronio's parents. The petitioners concluded that they had legal interest in the subject lot
as representatives of their ascendants, the other children of Bishop Sofronio's parents.
In his appeal brief, the respondent insisted that the petitioners do not have a clear legal right to
maintain the suit because: (1) as collateral relatives, they cannot invoke the right of

representation to the estate of Bishop Sofronio; and (2) they are not real parties in interest and
have no right of action over the subject lot.
On 13 October 2009, the CA affirmed the RTC's order of dismissal. The CA held that the
admission of Bishop Sofronio's will to probate precluded intestate succession unless the will was
intrinsically invalid or failed to completely dispose of his estate. Contrary to the petitioners'
contention, the settlement proceedings were not dismissed but archived; the will did not lose its
validity merely because the proceedings were archived. Undoubtedly, Bishop Sofronio did not
die intestate.
The CA denied the petitioners' claim to a right of inheritance by representation. It held that the
presence of Bishop Sofronio's parents during his death excluded his brothers and sisters from
being compulsory heirs; the petitioners cannot represent those who are hot entitled to succeed.
Considering that they are neither compulsory nor testamentary heirs, petitioners have no legal
interest in the subject property.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration which the CA denied on 21 January 2010. The denial
paved the way for the petitioners to file the present petition for review on certiorari.
THE PETITION
The petitioners argue: (1) that the CA erred when it failed to rule on the validity of TCT No.
169342; (2) that the probate proceedings of the estate was dismissed, not archived; and (3) that
the CA erred when it used Bishop Sofronio's will as basis to declare that they are not real parties
in interest.
In his Comment, the respondent maintained that the petitioners had no right over the property
and moved to dismiss the present petition.
OUR RULING
At the outset, this Court observes that the parties and even the lower courts erroneously applied
the provisions of the present Civil Code to the will and the estate of Bishop Sofronio. The law in
force at the time of the decedent's death determines the applicable law over the settlement of his
estate.8 Bishop Sofronio died in 1937 before the enactment of the Civil Code in 1949. Therefore,
the correct applicable laws to the settlement of his estate are the 1889 Spanish Civil Code and the
1901 Code of Civil Procedure.
In any case, under both the Spanish Code and our Civil Code, successional rights are vested at
the precise moment of the death of the decedent. Section 657 of the Spanish code provides:
cral awlawlibrary

Art. 657. Los derechos a la sucesion de una persona se transmiten desde el momento de su
muerte.9
chanrobleslaw

The inheritance vests immediately upon the decedent's death without a moment's interruption.
This provision was later on translated and adopted as Article 777 of our Civil Code.10

As a consequence of this principle, ownership over the inheritance passes to the heirs at the
precise moment of death - not at the time the heirs are declared, nor at the time of the partition,
nor at the distribution of the properties. There is no interruption between the end of the
decedent's ownership and the start of the heir/legatee/devisee's ownership.
For intestate heirs, this means that they are immediately entitled to their hereditary shares in the
estate even though they may not be entitled to any particular properties yet. For legatees and
devisees granted specific properties, this means that they acquire ownership over the legacies and
devises at that immediate moment without prejudice to the legitimes of compulsory heirs.
Undoubtedly, Bishop Sofronio did not die intestate. He left a will that was probated in 1937. He
left half of his properties to his parents and the remaining half to his sister Dolores Hacbang Alo.
The admission of his will to probate is conclusive with respect to its due execution and extrinsic
validity.11
Unfortunately, the settlement proceedings were never concluded; the case was archived without
any pronouncement as to the intrinsic validity of the will or an adjudication of the properties.
Because of this, the petitioners posit that intestate succession should govern. They maintain that
the entire inheritance should have gone to Bishop Sofronio's parents, the petitioners' ascendants.
Thus, they claim to have a legal interest in the subject lot as representatives of the other children
of Bishop Sofronio's parents.
We do not find the petitioners' argument meritorious.
Our jurisdiction has always respected a decedent's freedom to dispose of his estate, whether
under the Spanish Civil Code or under the present Civil Code. Article 763 of the Spanish Code
provides:
cral awlawlibrary

Art. 763. El que no tuviere herederos forzosos puede disponer por testamento de todos sus bienes
o de parte de ellos en favor de cualquiera persona que tenga capacidad para adquirirlos. El que
tuviere herederos forzosos solo podra disponer de sus bienes en la forma y con las limitaciones
que se establecen en la section quinta de este capitulo.
chanrobl eslaw

This provision states that a person without compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate, either in
part or in its entirety, in favor of anyone capacitated to succeed him; if the testator has
compulsory heirs, he can dispose of his property provided he does not impair their legitimes.
This provision was later translated and adopted as Article 842 of our Civil Code.12
Our jurisdiction accords great respect to the testator's freedom of disposition. Hence, testate
succession has always been preferred over intestacy.13 As much as possible, a testator's will is
treated and interpreted in a way that would render all of its provisions operative.14 Hence, there is
no basis to apply the provisions on intestacy when testate succession evidently applies.
Even though the CFI archived the settlement proceedings, there is no indication that it declared
any of the dispositions in the will invalid. The records are understandably bare considering the
probate proceedings were initiated as early as 1937. Nonetheless, we find no reason to doubt the
intrinsic validity of the will.

Bishop Sofronio was free to dispose of his estate without prejudice to the legitimes of his
compulsory heirs. Bishop Sofronio's only compulsory heirs were his parents.15 Their legitime
was one-half of Bishop Sofronio's estate.16 Considering that Bishop Sofronio gave his parents
half of his estate, then he was free to dispose of the free portion of his estate in favor of his sister,
Dolores Hacbang Alo. Thus, his will was intrinsically valid.
The CFPs failure to adjudicate the specific properties is irrelevant because Bishop Sofronio did
not just name his heirs; he also identified the specific properties forming part of their inheritance.
The dispositions in the will rendered court adjudication and distribution unnecessary.
The petitioners' contention that only a final decree of distribution of the estate vests title to the
land of the estate in the distributees is also incorrect. Again, ownership over the inheritance vests
upon the heirs, legatees, and devisees immediately upon the death of the decedent.
At the precise moment of death, the heirs become owners of the estate pro-indiviso. They
become absolute owners of their undivided aliquot share but with respect to the individual
properties of the estate, they become co-owners. This co-ownership remains until partition and
distribution. Until then, the individual heirs cannot claim any rights over a specific property from
the estate. This is because the heirs do not know which properties will be adjudicated to them
yet. Hence, there is a need for a partition before title over particular properties vest in the
distributee-heirs.
However, heirs, legatees, and devisees bequeathed specific properties do not require Court
adjudication to identify which particular properties become theirs; the testator had already
identified these. From the very moment of the testator's death, title over these particular
properties vests on the heir, legatee, or devisee.
On 3 April 1937, title over the subject lot passed on to the respondent's mother, Dolores Hacbang
Alo, at the exact moment of her brother's death. From that moment on, she was free to dispose of
the subject lot as a consequence of her ownership.
On the other hand, Bishop Sofronio's parents, Basilio and Maria Gaborny Hacbang, never
acquired the title over the subject lot. Thus, it never became part of their estate. Clearly, the
petitioners - who claim to represent the children of Basilio and Maria Gaborny in the spouses'
estate -have no legal right or interest over the subject lot.
Every ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of action - an act or omission that violates
the rights of the plaintiff.17 A cause of action requires:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) a legal right in favor of the plaintiff;

ChanRoblesVirtual awlibrary

(2) a correlative duty of the defendant to respect the plaintiffs right; and
(3) an act or omission of the defendant in violation of the plaintiffs right.18

Every action must also be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest: the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment.19 These fundamental requirements
are not merely technical matters; they go into the very substance of every suit.
The petitioners came to the courts praying for the annulment of the respondent's title yet they
failed to show that they are entitled to even ask for such relief. They have no right over the
subject lot and the respondent has no legal obligation to them with respect to the subject lot.
Even if we assume that the respondent fraudulently or irregularly secured his certificate of title,
the bottom-line is that the petitioners have no legal standing to sue for the cancellation of this
title. This right only belongs to the rightful owner of the subject lot.
Judicial power is the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable.20 Courts settle real legal disputes involving the rights
and obligations between parties. If either of the parties is not the real party in interest, the Court
cannot grant the reliefs prayed for because that party has no legal right or duty with respect to his
opponent. Further litigation becomes an academic exercise in legal theory that eventually settles
nothing - a waste of time that could have been spent resolving actual justiciable controversies.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against
the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

THIRD DIVISION

CELESTINO BALUS,

G.R. No. 168970

Petitioner,
Present:

CORONA, J., Chairperson,

- versus -

VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
PERALTA, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

SATURNINO
BALUS
and
LEONARDA BALUS VDA. DE
CALUNOD,

Promulgated:

Respondents.
January 15, 2010
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule

45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision 199[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated May 31, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 58041 which
set aside the February 7, 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Lanao del Norte, Branch 4 in Civil Case No. 3263.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the
spouses

Rufo

and

Sebastiana

Balus.

Sebastiana

died

on

September 6, 1978, while Rufo died on July 6, 1984.

On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, which
he owns, as security for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of
Maigo, Lanao del Norte (Bank). The said property was originally
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-439(788) and more
particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land with all the improvements thereon, containing
an area of 3.0740 hectares, more or less, situated in the Barrio of
Lagundang, Bunawan, Iligan City, and bounded as follows: Bounded on
the NE., along line 1-2, by Lot 5122, Csd-292; along line 2-12, by
Dodiongan River; along line 12-13 by Lot 4649, Csd-292; and along line
12-1, by Lot 4661, Csd-292. x x x 200[2]

199[1]Penned by Associate Justice Arturo G. Tayag, with Associate Justices Rodrigo F.

Lim, Jr. and Normandie B. Pizarro, concurring; CA rollo, pp. 69-76.

Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the mortgaged

property was foreclosed and was subsequently sold to the Bank
as the sole bidder at a public auction held for that purpose. On
November 20, 1981, a Certificate of Sale 201[3] was executed by
the sheriff in favor of the Bank. The property was not redeemed
within the period allowed by law. More than two years after the
auction, or on January 25, 1984, the sheriff executed a Definite
Deed of Sale202[4] in the Bank's favor. Thereafter, a new title was
issued in the name of the Bank.
On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and respondents
executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate 203[5] adjudicating
to each of them a specific one-third portion of the subject
property consisting of 10,246 square meters. The Extrajudicial
Settlement

also

contained

provisions

wherein

the

parties

admitted knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged the

subject property to the Bank and that they intended to redeem
the same at the soonest possible time.

200[2]See Certificate of Sale and Definite Deed of Sale, Exhibits A and B,

respectively, records, pp. 74-75.
201[3]Exhibit A, records, p. 74.
202[4] Exhibit B, id. at 75.
203[5] Exhibit C/4, id. at 76.

Three

years

after

the

execution

of

the

Extrajudicial

Settlement, herein respondents bought the subject property from

the Bank. On October 12, 1992, a Deed of Sale of Registered
Land204[6] was executed by the Bank in favor of respondents.
Subsequently,

Transfer

39,484(a.f.)205[7]

was

Certificate

issued

in

the

of

Title
name

(TCT)
of

No.

T-

respondents.

Meanwhile, petitioner continued possession of the subject lot.

On June 27, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint 206[8] for
Recovery

of

Possession

and

Damages

against

petitioner,

contending that they had already informed petitioner of the fact

that they were the new owners of the disputed property, but the
petitioner still refused to surrender possession of the same to
them. Respondents claimed that they had exhausted all remedies
for the amicable settlement of the case, but to no avail.
On February 7, 1997, the RTC rendered a Decision 207[9]
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the
plaintiffs to execute a Deed of Sale in favor of the defendant, the one-

204[6]Exhibit D, id. at 79.

205[7]Exhibit E, id. at 80.
206[8]Records, pp. 1-6.
207[9] Id. at 131-140.

third share of the property in question, presently possessed by him,

and described in the deed of partition, as follows:
A one-third portion of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T39,484 (a.f.), formerly Original Certificate of Title No. P788, now in the name of Saturnino Balus and Leonarda B.
Vda. de Calunod, situated at Lagundang, Bunawan, Iligan
City, bounded on the North by Lot 5122; East by shares of
Saturnino Balus and Leonarda Balus-Calunod; South by
Lot 4649, Dodiongan River; West by Lot 4661, consisting
of 10,246 square meters, including improvements
thereon.
and dismissing all other claims of the parties.
The amount of P6,733.33 consigned by the defendant with the
Clerk of Court is hereby ordered delivered to the plaintiffs, as purchase
price of the one-third portion of the land in question.
Plaintiffs are ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.208[10]

The RTC held that the right of petitioner to purchase from the
respondents his share in the disputed property was recognized by
the provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, which the
parties had executed before the respondents bought the subject
lot from the Bank.
Aggrieved by the Decision of the RTC, herein respondents
filed an appeal with the CA.

208[10]Id. at 139-140.

On May 31, 2005, the CA promulgated the presently assailed

Decision, reversing and setting aside the Decision of the RTC and
ordering petitioner to immediately surrender possession of the
subject property to the respondents. The CA ruled that when
petitioner and respondents did not redeem the subject property
within the redemption period and allowed the consolidation of
ownership and the issuance of a new title in the name of the
Bank, their co-ownership was extinguished.
Hence, the instant petition raising a sole issue, to wit:
WHETHER OR NOT CO-OWNERSHIP AMONG THE PETITIONER
AND THE RESPONDENTS OVER THE PROPERTY PERSISTED/CONTINUED
TO EXIST (EVEN AFTER THE TRANSFER OF TITLE TO THE BANK) BY
VIRTUE OF THE PARTIES' AGREEMENT PRIOR TO THE REPURCHASE
THEREOF BY THE RESPONDENTS; THUS, WARRANTING THE
PETITIONER'S ACT OF ENFORCING THE AGREEMENT BY REIMBURSING
THE RESPONDENTS OF HIS (PETITIONER'S) JUST SHARE OF THE
REPURCHASE PRICE.209[11]

The main issue raised by petitioner is whether co-ownership

by him and respondents over the subject property persisted even
after the lot was purchased by the Bank and title thereto
transferred to its name, and even after it was eventually bought
back by the respondents from the Bank.
Petitioner insists that despite respondents' full knowledge of
the fact that the title over the disputed property was already in
the name of the Bank, they still proceeded to execute the subject
Extrajudicial

Settlement,

209[11]Rollo, p. 21.

having

in

mind

the

intention

of

purchasing back the property together with petitioner and of

continuing their co-ownership thereof.
Petitioner posits that the subject Extrajudicial Settlement is,
in and by itself, a contract between him and respondents,
because it contains a provision whereby the parties agreed to
continue their co-ownership of the subject property by redeeming
or repurchasing the same from the Bank. This agreement,
petitioner contends, is the law between the parties and, as such,
binds the respondents. As a result, petitioner asserts that
respondents' act of buying the disputed property from the Bank
without notifying him inures to his benefit as to give him the right
to claim his rightful portion of the property, comprising 1/3
thereof, by reimbursing respondents the equivalent 1/3 of the
sum they paid to the Bank.
The Court is not persuaded.
Petitioner and respondents are arguing on the wrong
premise that, at the time of the execution of the Extrajudicial
Settlement, the subject property formed part of the estate of their
deceased father to which they may lay claim as his heirs.
At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no dispute
with respect to the fact that the subject property was exclusively
owned by petitioner and respondents' father, Rufo, at the time
that it was mortgaged in 1979. This was stipulated by the parties

during the hearing conducted by the trial court on October 28,

1996.210[12] Evidence shows that a Definite Deed of Sale 211[13]
was issued in favor of the Bank on January 25, 1984, after the
period of redemption expired. There is neither any dispute that a
new title was issued in the Bank's name before Rufo died on July
6, 1984. Hence, there is no question that the Bank acquired
exclusive ownership of the contested lot during the lifetime of
Rufo.
The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the
moment of his death.212[14] In addition, the inheritance of a
person consists of the property and transmissible rights and
obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as those
which

have

accrued

thereto

since

the

opening

of

the

succession.213[15] In the present case, since Rufo lost ownership

of the subject property during his lifetime, it only follows that at
the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer
formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated
differently, petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject
lot from their father.

210[12]See TSN, October 28, 1996 p. 2.

211[13]Exhibit B, records, p. 75.
212[14]Civil Code, Art. 777.
213[15]Civil Code, Art. 781.

Petitioner

and

respondents,

therefore,

were

wrong

in

assuming that they became co-owners of the subject lot. Thus,

any issue arising from the supposed right of petitioner as coowner of the contested parcel of land is negated by the fact that,
in the eyes of the law, the disputed lot did not pass into the hands
of petitioner and respondents as compulsory heirs of Rufo at any
given point in time.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds a necessity
for a complete determination of the issues raised in the instant
case to look into petitioner's argument that the Extrajudicial
Settlement is an independent contract which gives him the right
to enforce his right to claim a portion of the disputed lot bought
by respondents.
It is true that under Article 1315 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, contracts are perfected by mere consent; and from
that moment, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of
what

has

been

expressly

stipulated

but

also

to

all

the

consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping

with good faith, usage and law.
Article 1306 of the same Code also provides that the
contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided
these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
or public policy.

In the present case, however, there is nothing in the subject

Extrajudicial Settlement to indicate any express stipulation for
petitioner and respondents to continue with their supposed coownership of the contested lot.
On the contrary, a plain reading of the provisions of the
Extrajudicial

Settlement

would

not,

in

any

way,

support

petitioner's contention that it was his and his sibling's intention to

buy the subject property from the Bank and continue what they
believed to be co-ownership thereof. It is a cardinal rule in the
interpretation of contracts that the intention of the parties shall
be accorded primordial consideration. 214[16] It is the duty of the
courts to place a practical and realistic construction upon it,
giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated
and the purpose which it is intended to serve. 215[17] Such
intention

is

determined

from

the

express

terms

of

their

agreement, as well as their contemporaneous and subsequent

acts.216[18] Absurd and illogical interpretations should also be
avoided.217[19]
214[16]Alio v. Heirs of Angelica A. Lorenzo, G.R. No. 159550, June 27, 2008, 556
SCRA 139, 148.
215[17]TSPIC Corporation v. TSPIC Employees Union (FFW), G.R. No. 163419,
February 13, 2008, 545 SCRA 215, 226.
216[18]Tating v. Marcella, G.R. No. 155208, March 27, 2007, 519 SCRA 79, 87.
217[19]TSPIC Corporation v. TSPIC Employees Union (FFW), supra note 17.

For petitioner to claim that the Extrajudicial Settlement is an

agreement between him and his siblings to continue what they
thought was their ownership of the subject property, even after
the same had been bought by the Bank, is stretching the
interpretation of the said Extrajudicial Settlement too far.
In the first place, as earlier discussed, there is no coownership to talk about and no property to partition, as the
disputed lot never formed part of the estate of their deceased
father.
Moreover, petitioner's asseveration of his and respondents'
intention of continuing with their supposed co-ownership is
negated by no less than his assertions in the present petition that
on several occasions he had the chance to purchase the subject
property back, but he refused to do so. In fact, he claims that
after the Bank acquired the disputed lot, it offered to re-sell the
same to him but he ignored such offer. How then can petitioner
now claim that it was also his intention to purchase the subject
property from the Bank, when he admitted that he refused the
Bank's offer to re-sell the subject property to him?
In addition, it appears from the recitals in the Extrajudicial
Settlement that, at the time of the execution thereof, the parties
were not yet aware that the subject property was already
exclusively owned by the Bank. Nonetheless, the lack of

knowledge on the part of petitioner and respondents that the

mortgage was already foreclosed and title to the property was
already transferred to the Bank does not give them the right or
the authority to unilaterally declare themselves as co-owners of
the disputed property; otherwise, the disposition of the case
would be made to depend on the belief and conviction of the
party-litigants and not on the evidence adduced and the law and
jurisprudence applicable thereto.
Furthermore, petitioner's contention that he and his siblings
intended to continue their supposed co-ownership of the subject
property contradicts the provisions of the subject Extrajudicial
Settlement where they clearly manifested their intention of
having the subject property divided or partitioned by assigning to
each of the petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion of
the same. Partition calls for the segregation and conveyance of a
determinate portion of the property owned in common. It seeks a
severance of the individual interests of each co-owner, vesting in
each of them a sole estate in a specific property and giving each
one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference
from the other.218[20] In other words, the purpose of partition is to
put an end to co-ownership,219[21] an objective which negates
petitioner's claims in the present case.
218[20]Arbolario v. Court of Appeals, 449 Phil. 357, 369 (2003).
219[21]Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122904, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 165,
171; Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 446 Phil. 722, 743 (2003).

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed

Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated May 31, 2005 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 58041, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been

reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

Third Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13,

the Division Chairpersons
conclusions in the above
consultation before the case
opinion of the Courts Division.

Article VIII of the Constitution and

Attestation, I certify that the
Decision had been reached in
was assigned to the writer of the

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

FIRST DIVISION

CORAZON M. GREGORIO, as
administratrix of the estate
litigated in the case below,
RAMIRO T. MADARANG, and
the heirs of CASIMIRO R.
MADARANG,
JR.,
namely:
Estrelita L. Madarang, Consuelo P.
Madarang, Casimiro Madarang
IV, and Jane Margaret MadarangCrabtree,

G.R. No. 185226

Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,

Petitioners, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BERSAMIN, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
- versus -

ATTY. JOSE R. MADARANG and

VICENTE R. MADARANG,
Respondents.

Promulgated:

February 11, 2010

x-------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.
Casimiro V. Madarang, Sr. (Casimiro, Sr. or the decedent) died intestate on
June 3, 1995, leaving real and personal properties with an estimated value of
P200,000.00.220[1] He was survived by his wife Dolores and their five children,
namely Casimiro, Jr., Jose, Ramiro, Vicente and Corazon.

In the intestate proceedings filed by the couples son Jose which was lodged
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57, Dolores was
appointed as administratrix of the intestate estate of Casimiro, Sr.221[2]

220[1] Records, Vol. 1, Petition for Letters of Administration, p. 2.

221[2] Id. at 44.

Dolores submitted an Inventory Report listing the properties of the

decedents estate. Jose filed his Comment on the Report, alleging that it omitted six
lots including Lot 829-B-4-B located in Cebu City which is covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 125429.

A hearing was thus conducted to determine whether the six lots formed part
of the estate of the decedent. By Order of April 5, 2002,

[3] the RTC, noting the

222

following:

x x x The said properties appear to have been acquired by the spouses after [their
marriage on] December 27, 1931 and during their marriage or coverture. Article
160 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines (which is the governing law in this
particular case) is very explicit in providing that all properties of the marriage are
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. This presumption, to the mind of
the Court, has not been sufficiently rebutted by the special administratrix.
[Dolores] This presumption applies and holds even if the land is registered under
the wifes name as long as it was acquired during marriage (De Guinoo vs. Court
of Appeals. G.R. No. L-5541, June 26, 1955) or even if the wife purchased the
land alone (Flores, et.al. Vs. Escudero, et.al., G.R. No. L-5302, March 11,
1953).223[4] (underscoring supplied),

instructed Dolores to revise her Inventory Report to include the six lots.

222[3] Id. at 222-226.

223[4] Id. at 225-226.

Dolores and her children, except Jose who suggested that the former be
referred to as oppositors,224[5] questioned the RTC order of inclusion of the six lots
via motion for reconsideration during the pendency of which motion the court
appointed herein petitioner Corazon as co-administratrix of her mother Dolores.

As Dolores and her co-oppositors alleged that the six lots had been
transferred during the lifetime of the decedent, they were ordered to submit their
affidavits, in lieu of oral testimony, to support the allegation. Only herein
respondent Vicente complied. In his Affidavit, Vicente declared that one of the six
lots, Lot 829-B-4-B, was conveyed to him by a Deed of Donation executed in
August 1992 by his parents Dolores and Casimiro, Sr.225[6]

It appears that petitioners later manifested that they no longer oppose the
provisional inclusion of the six lots, except Lot 829-B-4-B.

The RTC, by Order of January 20, 2003,226[7] thus modified its April 5, 2002
Order as follows:

224[5] Manifestation and Motion, id. at 273, 276-277.

225[6] Id. at 305-306.
226[7] Id. at 324-325.

Of the six lots directed included in the inventory, Lot 829 B-4-B should be
excluded. The administratrix is directed within sixty (60) days: (1) to submit a
revised inventory in accordance with the Order dated April 5, 2002, as here
modified; and (2) to render an accounting of her administration of the estate of
Casimiro V. Madarang. (underscoring supplied),

Jose moved to reconsider the RTC January 20, 2003 Order, arguing that
since the title to Lot 829-B-4-B remained registered in the name of his parents, it
should not be excluded from the Inventory; and that the Deed of Donation in
Vicentes favor was not notarized nor registered with the Register of Deeds. Joses
motion for reconsideration having been denied by Order of February 5, 2003, he
filed a Notice of Appeal.

In his Brief filed before the Court of Appeals, Jose claimed that the RTC
erred in excluding Lot 829-B-4-B from the Inventory as what the lower court
should have done was to . . . maintain the order including said lot in the inventory
of the estate so Vicente can file an ordinary action where its ownership can be
threshed out.

Jose later filed before the appellate court a Motion to Withdraw Petition
which his co-heirs-oppositors-herein petitioners opposed on the ground that, inter
alia, a grant thereof would end the administration proceedings. The appellate court,

by Resolution of January 18, 2008,227[8] granted the withdrawal on the ground that
it would not prejudice the rights of the oppositors.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the appellate courts grant of Joses

Motion to Withdraw Petition was, by Resolution of November 6, 2008,228[9]
denied in this wise:

xxxx
In the instant case, the Probate Court found that the parties of the case
interposed no objection to the non-inclusion of Lot No. 829-B-4-B in the
inventory of the estate of Casimiro V. Madarang, in effect, they have consented
thereto. x x x
xxxx
Moreover, [herein petitioners] in their appeal brief, ha[ve] extensively
argued that . . . Vicente Madarang [to whom the questioned lot was donated]
and his family have been in continuous, actual and physical possession of the
donated lot for over twenty (20) years, even before the execution of the so called
donation inter vivos in 1992. . . . Vicente Madarang has his residential house
thereon and that his ownership over the donated lot has been fully recognized by
the entire Madarang Clan, including all his brothers and sisters, except the much
belated objection by the appellant (Jose), allegedly resorted to as an act of
harassment. 229[10] (emphasis and underscoring supplied),

227[8] Penned by Associate Justice Francisco P. Acosta, with the concurrence of

Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, records, Vol. 2, pp.
1242-1243.
228[9] Id. at 1192-1202.
229[10] Id. at 1197-1199.

thus affirming the RTC order of exclusion of the questioned lot.

Hence, the present petition for review filed by the oppositors-herein

petitioners. Casimiro, Jr. having died during the pendency of the case, he was
substituted by his wife petitioner Estrelita and co-petitioners children Consuelo,
Casimiro IV, and Jane Margaret.

Petitioners contend that since the only issue for consideration by the
appellate court was the merit of Joses Motion to Withdraw Petition, it exceeded its
jurisdiction when it passed upon the merits of Joses appeal from the RTC order
excluding Lot 829-B-4-B from the Inventory.

Petitioners contention does not lie.

In their Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate courts grant of Joses
Motion to Withdraw Petition, petitioners, oddly denying the existence of a petition,
raised the issue of the propriety of the RTC Order excluding Lot 829-B-4-B from
the Inventory. Their prayer in their Motion clearly states so:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Oppositors-Appellees [petitioners]

respectfully PRAY for this Honorable Court to RECONSIDER its questioned
Resolution and rendering [sic], forthwith, a decision resolving the merits of the

Partial Appeal of petitioner-appellant Jose Madarang.230[11] (capitalization in the

original; emphasis supplied)

The appellate court did not thus err in passing on the said issue.

More specifically, petitioners question the appellate courts finding that as the
parties interposed no objection to the non-inclusion of Lot No. 829-B-4-B in the
inventory of the estate of Casimiro V. Madarang, in effect, they have consented
thereto.231[12]

A review of the voluminous records of the case shows that, indeed, there was
no accord among the parties respecting the exclusion of Lot 829-B-4-B.

While a probate court, being of special and limited jurisdiction, cannot act
on questions of title and ownership, it can, for purposes of inclusion or exclusion in
the inventory of properties of a decedent, make a provisional determination of
ownership, without prejudice to a final determination through a separate action in a
court of general jurisdiction.

230[11] CA rollo, p. 121.

231[12] Rollo, pp. 51-52.

The facts obtaining in the present case, however, do not call for the probate
court to make a provisional determination of ownership of Lot 829-B-4-B. It bears
stress that the question is one of collation or advancement by the decedent to an
heir over which the question of title and ownership can be passed upon by a
probate court.232[13]

As earlier reflected, Vicentes claim of ownership over Lot 829-B-4-B rests

upon a deed of donation by his father (decedent) and his mother.

Article 1061 of the Civil Code expressly provides:

Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs,
must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have
received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation,
or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination
of the legitime of each heir and in the account of partition. (underscoring
supplied)

in relation to which, Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court provides:

232[13] Reyes v. Hon. Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 142, G.R. No. 165744,
August 11, 2008, 561 SCRA 593.

Sec. 2. Questions as to advancement to be determined. Questions as to

advancement made, or alleged to have been made, by the deceased to any heir
may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the
person raising the questions and on the heir. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

By express provision of law then, Lot 829-B-4-B, which was alleged to have
been donated by the decedent and his wife to their son-respondent Vicente, should
not be excluded from the inventory of the properties of the decedent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed November 6,
2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. Petitioner Corazon M.
Gregorio and her co-administratrix Dolores Madarang are DIRECTED to include
Lot 829-B-4-B in the Inventory of the properties of the intestate estate of Casimiro
V. Madarang, Sr.

Let the records of the case be remanded to the court of origin, the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 57, which is DIRECTED to proceed with the
disposition of the case with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Baguio City

SECOND DIVISION

ATTY.
FERRER,

PEDRO

M.

G.R. No. 165300

Petitioner,

Present:
- versus CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
SPOUSES ALFREDO DIAZ

ABAD,

and IMELDA DIAZ,

DEL CASTILLO, and

REINA
and

PEREZ, JJ.

COMANDANTE

SPOUSES BIENVENIDO
PANGAN and ELIZABETH
PANGAN,
Respondents.

Promulgated:
April 23, 2010

x-------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The basic questions to be resolved in this case are: Is a waiver

of hereditary rights in favor of another executed by a future heir while
the parents are still living valid? Is an adverse claim annotated on the
title of a property on the basis of such waiver likewise valid and
effective as to bind the subsequent owners and hold them liable to
the claimant?

This Petition for Review on Certiorari233[1] under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court assails the December 12, 2003 Decision 234[2] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 70888. 235[3] Said Decision

233[1] Rollo, pp. 13-14.

234[2] CA rollo, pp. 140-149; penned by Associate Justice Arsenio J. Magpale and
concurred in by Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Bienvenido L. Reyes.
235[3] Entitled Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Spouses Alfredo Diaz and
Imelda Diaz, Reina Commandante and Spouses Bienvenido Pangan and Elizabeth
Pangan.

modified the June 14, 2001 Summary Judgment236[4] of the Regional

Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-99-38876 by
holding respondents Spouses Bienvenido and Elizabeth Pangan (the
Pangans) not solidarily liable with the other respondents, Spouses
Alfredo and Imelda Diaz (the Diazes) and Reina Comandante
(Comandante), to petitioner Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer (Atty. Ferrer).
Likewise assailed is the CA Resolution237[5] dated September 10, 2004
which denied petitioners as well as respondents Spouses Diaz and
Comandantes respective motions for reconsideration.

The parties respective versions of the factual antecedents are as

follows:

Version of the Petitioner

Petitioner Atty. Ferrer claimed in his original Complaint238[6] that on May 7, 1999,
the Diazes, as represented by their daughter Comandante, through a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA),239[7] obtained from him a loan of P1,118,228.00. The loan was secured
236[4] Records, pp. 287-291; penned by Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr.
237[5] CA rollo, p. 91.
238[6] Records, pp. 3-6.
239[7] Id. at 7.

by a Real Estate Mortgage Contract 240[8] by way of second mortgage over Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-6604241[9] and a Promissory Note242[10] payable
within six months or up to November 7, 1999. Comandante also issued to petitioner
postdated checks to secure payment of said loan.

Petitioner further claimed that prior to this or on May 29, 1998, Comandante, for a
valuable consideration of P600,000.00, which amount formed part of the
abovementioned secured loan, executed in his favor an instrument entitled Waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided), 243[11] the
pertinent portions of which read:
I, REINA D. COMANDANTE, of legal age, Filipino, married, with residence
and postal address at No. 6, Road 20, Project 8, Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines,
for a valuable consideration of SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P600,000.00)
which constitutes my legal obligation/loan to Pedro M. Ferrer, likewise of legal age,
Filipino, married to Erlinda B. Ferrer, with residence and postal address at No. 9, Lot 4,
Puerto Rico Street, Loyola Grand Villas, Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, by
virtue of these presents, do hereby WAIVE, and/or REPUDIATE all my hereditary rights
and interests as a legitimate heir/daughter of Sps. Alfredo T. Diaz and Imelda G. Diaz in
favor of said Pedro M. Ferrer, his heirs and assigns over a certain parcel of land together
with all the improvements found thereon and which property is more particularly
described as follows:

240[8] Id. at 14-17.

241[9] Id. at 92-95.
242[10] Id. at 18.
243[11] Id. at 19-20.

TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE

NO. RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887

xxxx

and which property is titled and registered in the name of my parents Alfredo T. Diaz and
Imelda G. Diaz, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT 6604 (82020) PR18887.

(sgd.)
REINA D. COMANDANTE
Affiant

On the basis of said waiver, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Adverse

Claim244[12] which he caused to be annotated at the back of TCT No. RT-6604 on May
26, 1999.

The Diazes, however, reneged on their obligation as the checks issued by

Comandante were dishonored upon presentment. Despite repeated demands, said
respondents still failed and refused to settle the loan. Thus, petitioner filed on September

244[12] Id. at 21.

29, 1999 a Complaint245[13] for Collection of Sum of Money Secured by Real Estate
Mortgage Contract against the Diazes and Comandante docketed as Civil Case No. Q99-38876 and raffled to Branch 224 of RTC, Quezon City.

Petitioner twice amended his complaint. First, by including as an alternative relief

the Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage246[14] and, second, by impleading as additional
defendants the Pangans as the mortgaged property covered by TCT No. RT-6604 was
already transferred under their names in TCT No. N-209049. Petitioner prayed in his
second amended complaint that all the respondents be ordered to jointly and solidarily
pay him the sum of P1,118,228.00, exclusive of interests, and/or for the judicial
foreclosure of the property pursuant to the Real Estate Mortgage Contract.

Version of the Respondents

In her Answer247[15] to petitioners original complaint, Comandante alleged that

petitioner and his wife were her fellow members in the Couples for Christ Movement.
Sometime in 1998, she sought the help of petitioner with regard to the mortgage with a
bank of her parents lot located at No. 6, Rd. 20, Project 8, Quezon City and covered by
TCT No. RT-6604. She also sought financial accommodations from the couple on several
245[13] Id. at 3-6.
246[14] Id. at 48-51 and 69-72.
247[15] Id. at 29-33.

occasions which totaled P500,000.00. Comandante, however, claimed that these loans
were secured by chattel mortgages over her taxi units in addition to several postdated
checks she issued in favor of petitioner.

As she could not practically comply with her obligation, petitioner and his wife,
presented to Comandante sometime in May 1998 a document denominated as Waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) pertaining to a
waiver of her hereditary share over her parents abovementioned property. Purportedly,
the execution of said waiver was to secure Comandantes loan with the couple which at
that time had already ballooned to P600,000.00 due to interests.

A year later, the couple again required Comandante to sign the following
documents: (1) a Real Estate Mortgage Contract over her parents property; and, (2) an
undated Promissory Note, both corresponding to the amount of P1,118,228.00, which
petitioner claimed to be the total amount of Comandantes monetary obligation to him
exclusive of charges and interests. Comandante alleged that she reminded petitioner that
she was not the registered owner of the subject property and that although her parents
granted her SPA, same only pertains to her authority to mortgage the property to banks
and other financial institutions and not to individuals. Petitioner nonetheless assured
Comandante that the SPA was also applicable to their transaction. As Comandante was
still hesitant, petitioner and his wife threatened to foreclose the formers taxi units and
present the postdated checks she issued to the bank for payment. For fear of losing her
taxi units which were the only source of her livelihood, Comandante was thus
constrained to sign the mortgage agreement as well as the promissory note. Petitioner,

however, did not furnish her with copies of said documents on the pretext that they still
have to be notarized, but, as can be gleaned from the records, the documents were never
notarized. Moreover, Comandante claimed that the SPA alluded to by petitioner in his
complaint was not the same SPA under which she thought she derived the authority to
execute the mortgage contract.

Comandante likewise alleged that on September 29, 1999 at 10:00 o clock in the
morning, she executed an Affidavit of Repudiation/Revocation of Waiver of Hereditary
Rights and Interests Over A (Still Undivided) Real Property,248[16] which she caused to
be annotated on the title of the subject property with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City on the same day. Interestingly, petitioner filed his complaint later that day too.

By way of special and affirmative defenses, Comandante asserted in her Answer

to the amended complaint249[17] that said complaint states no cause of action against her
because the Real Estate Mortgage Contract and the waiver referred to by petitioner in his
complaint were not duly, knowingly and validly executed by her; that the Waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) is a useless
document as its execution is prohibited by Article 1347 of the Civil Code,250[18] hence, it
248[16] Id. at 38.
249[17] Id. at 208-219.

250[18] ART. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of men, including future
things, may be the object of a contract. All rights which are not intransmissible may also be
the object of contracts.
No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance
except in cases expressly authorized by law.

cannot be the source of any right or obligation in petitioners favor; that the Real Estate
Mortgage was of doubtful validity as she executed the same without valid authority from
her parents; and, that the prayer for collection and/or judicial foreclosure was irregular as
petitioner cannot seek said remedies at the same time.

Apart from executing the affidavit of repudiation, Comandante also filed on

October 4, 1999 a Petition for Cancellation of Adverse Claim (P.E. 2468) Under The
Memorandum of Encumbrances of TCT No. RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887 251[19]
docketed as LRC Case No. Q-12009 (99) and raffled to Branch 220 of RTC, Quezon
City. Petitioner who was impleaded as respondent therein moved for the consolidation of
said case252[20] with Civil Case No. Q-99-38876. On June 24, 2000, Branch 220 of RTC,
Quezon City ordered the consolidation of LRC Case No. Q-12009 (99) with Civil Case
No. Q-99-38876. Accordingly, the records of the former case was forwarded to Branch
224.

For their part, the Diazes asserted that petitioner has no cause of action against
them. They claimed that they do not even know petitioner and that they did not execute
any SPA in favor of Comandante authorizing her to mortgage for the second time the
All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy may likewise be the object of a contract.

251[19] Records, p. 1.
252[20] Id. at 93.

subject property. They also contested the due execution of the SPA as it was neither
authenticated before the Philippine Consulate in the United States nor notarized before a
notary public in the State of New York where the Diazes have been residing for 16 years.
They claimed that they do not owe petitioner anything. The Diazes also pointed out that
the complaint merely refers to Comandantes personal obligation to petitioner with which
they had nothing to do. They thus prayed that the complaint against them be dismissed.253
[21]

At the Pangans end, they alleged that they acquired the subject property by
purchase in good faith and for a consideration of P3,000,000.00 on November 11, 1999
from the Diazes through the latters daughter Comandante who was clothed with SPA
acknowledged before the Consul of New York. The Pangans immediately took actual
possession of the property without anyone complaining or protesting. Soon thereafter,
they were issued TCT No. N-209049 in lieu of TCT No. RT-6604 which was cancelled.
254

[22]

However, on December 21, 1999, they were surprised upon being informed by
petitioner that the subject land had been mortgaged to him by the Diazes. Upon inquiry
from Comandante, the latter readily admitted that she has a personal loan with petitioner
for which the mortgage of the property in petitioners favor was executed. She admitted,
though, that her parents were not aware of such mortgage and that they did not authorize
her to enter into such contract. Comandante also informed the Pangans that the signatures
253[21] See Answer with Compulsory Counter-Claim of the Diazes, id. at 231-237.
254[22] See Answer with Compulsory Counter-Claim of the Pangans, id. at 172-183.

of her parents appearing on the SPA are fictitious and that it was petitioner who prepared
such document.

As affirmative defense, the Pangans asserted that the annotation of petitioners

adverse claim on TCT No. RT-6604 cannot impair their rights as new owners of the
subject property. They claimed that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a
Real Property (Still Undivided) upon which petitioners adverse claim is anchored cannot
be the source of any right or interest over the property considering that it is null and void
under paragraph 2 of Article 1347 of the Civil Code.

Moreover, the Pangans asserted that the Real Estate Mortgage Contract cannot
bind them nor in any way impair their ownership of subject property because it was not
registered before the Register of Deeds.255[23]

All the respondents interposed their respective counterclaims and prayed for moral
and exemplary damages and attorneys fees in varying amounts.

After the parties have submitted their respective pre-trial briefs, the Diazes filed on
March 29, 2001 a Motion for Summary Judgment256[24] alleging that: first, since the
255[23] Id.
256[24] Id. at 246-257.

documents alluded to by petitioner in his complaint were defective, he was not entitled to
any legal right or relief; and, second, it was clear from the pleadings that it is
Comandante who has an outstanding obligation with petitioner which the latter never
denied. With these, the Diazes believed that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact against them and, hence, they were entitled to summary judgment.

On May 7, 2001, petitioner also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, 257[25]
claiming that his suit against the respondents is meritorious and well-founded and that
same is documented and supported by law and jurisprudence. He averred that his adverse
claim annotated at the back of TCT No. RT-6604, which was carried over in TCT No.
209049 under the names of the Pangans, is not merely anchored on the Waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by
Comandante, but also on the Real Estate Mortgage likewise executed by her in
representation of her parents and in favor of petitioner. Petitioner insisted that said
adverse claim is not frivolous and invalid and is registrable under Section 70 of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529. In fact, the Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City had
already determined the sufficiency and/or validity of such registration by annotating said
claim, and this, respondents failed to question. Petitioner further averred that even before
the sale and transfer to the Pangans of the subject property, the latter were already aware
of the existence of his adverse claim. In view of these, petitioner prayed that his Motion
for Summary Judgment be granted.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

257[25] Id. at 262-268.

After the filing of the parties respective Oppositions to the said motions for
summary judgment, the trial court, in an Order dated May 31, 2001,258[26] deemed both
motions for summary judgment submitted for resolution. Quoting substantially
petitioners allegations in his Motion for Summary Judgment, it thereafter rendered on
June 14, 2001 a Summary Judgment259[27] in favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, summary judgment is hereby rendered in

favor of plaintiff and against defendants by:

a)
ORDERING all defendants jointly and solidarily to pay plaintiff the sum
of ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
TWENTY EIGHT PESOS (P1,118,228.00) which is blood money of plaintiff;

b)
ORDERING the Honorable Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City that the
rights and interest of the plaintiff over subject property be annotated at the back of T.C.T.
No. N-209049;

c)
SENTENCING all defendants to pay plaintiffs expenses of TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) and to pay the costs of suit.

258[26] Id. at 286.

259[27] Id. at 287-291.

IT IS SO ORDERED.260[28]

The Pangans, the Diazes, and Comandante appealed to the CA.261[29] The
Pangans faulted the trial court in holding them jointly and severally liable with the Diazes
and Comandante for the satisfaction of the latters personal obligation to petitioner in the
total amount of P1,118,228.00. The Diazes and Comandante, on the other hand, imputed
error upon the trial court in rendering summary judgment in favor of petitioner. They
averred that assuming the summary judgment was proper, the trial court should not have
considered the Real Estate Mortgage Contract and the Promissory Note as they were
defective, as well as petitioners frivolous and non-registrable adverse claim.

In its Decision262[30] dated December 12, 2003, the CA declared Comandantes

waiver of hereditary rights null and void. However, it found the Real Estate Mortgage
executed by Comandante on behalf of her parents as binding between the parties thereto.

As regards the Pangans, the CA ruled that the mortgage contract was not binding
upon them as they were purchasers in good faith and for value. The property was free
from the mortgage encumbrance of petitioner when they acquired it as they only came to
260[28] Id. at 290-291.
261[29] Id. at 295 and 301.
262[30] CA rollo, pp. 140-149.

know of the adverse claim through petitioners phone call which came right after the
formers acquisition of the property. The CA further ruled that as Comandantes waiver of
hereditary rights and interests upon which petitioners adverse claim was based is a
nullity, it could not be a source of any right in his favor. Hence, the Pangans were not
bound to take notice of such claim and are thus not liable to petitioner.

Noticeably, the appellate court did not rule on the propriety of the issuance of the
Summary Judgment as raised by the Diazes and Comandante. In the ultimate, the CA
merely modified the assailed Summary Judgment of the trial court by excluding the
Pangans among those solidarily liable to petitioner, in effect affirming in all other
respects the assailed summary judgment, viz:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision of the Regional

Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 in Civil Case No. Q-99-38876 is hereby
MODIFIED, as follows:

1. Ordering defendants-appellants Comandante and Spouses Diaz to jointly and

severally pay plaintiff the sum of Php 1,118, 228.00; and

2. Ordering defendants-appellants Comandante and Spouses Diaz to jointly and

severally pay plaintiff the amount of Php10,000.00 plus cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.263[31]
263[31] Id. at 148.

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration264[32] having been denied by the CA in its

Resolution265[33] dated September 10, 2004, he now comes to us through this petition for
review on certiorari insisting that the Pangans should, together with the other
respondents, be held solidarily liable to him for the amount of P1,118,228.00.

Our Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Petitioner merely reiterates his contentions in the Motion for Summary Judgment
he filed before the trial court. He insists that his Adverse Claim annotated at the back of
TCT No. RT-6604 is not merely anchored on Comandantes Waiver of Hereditary Rights
and Interests Over A Real Property (Still Undivided) but also on her being the attorneyin-fact of the Diazes when she executed the mortgage contract in favor of petitioner. He
avers that his adverse claim is not frivolous or invalid and is registrable as the Registrar of
Deeds of Quezon City even allowed its annotation. He also claims that even prior to the
sale of subject property to the Pangans, the latter already knew of his valid and existing
adverse claim thereon and are, therefore, not purchasers in good faith. Thus, petitioner
264[32] Id. 166-170.
265[33] Id. at 191.

maintains that the Pangans should be held, together with the Diazes and Comandante,
jointly and severally liable to him in the total amount of P1,118,228.00.

Petitioners contentions are untenable.

The Affidavit of Adverse Claim executed by petitioner reads in part:

xxxx

1. That I am the Recipient/Benefactor of compulsory heirs share over an

undivided certain parcel of land together with all the improvements found therein x x x
as evidenced by Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over A Real Property,
executed by REINA D. COMANDANTE (a compulsory/legitimate heir of Sps. Alfredo
T. Diaz and Imelda G. Diaz), x x x.

2. That in order to protect my interest over said property as a

Recipient/Benefactor, for the registered owners/parents might dispose (of) and/or
encumber the same in a fraudulent manner without my knowledge and consent, for the
owners duplicate title was not surrendered to me, it is petitioned that this Affidavit of
Adverse Claim be ANNOTATED at the back of the said title particularly on the original
copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887 which is on file with
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.

3. That I am executing this Affidavit in order to attest (to) the truth of the
foregoing facts and to petition the Honorable Registrar of Deeds, Quezon City, to
annotate this Affidavit of Adverse Claim at the back of the said title particularly the
original copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887 which is on
file with the said office, so that my interest as Recipient/Benefactor of the said property
will be protected especially the registered owner/parents, in a fraudulent manner might

dispose (of) and/or encumber the same without my knowledge and consent. (Emphasis
ours)

Clearly, petitioners Affidavit of Adverse Claim was based solely on the waiver of
hereditary interest executed by Comandante. This fact cannot be any clearer especially so
when the inscription of his adverse claim at the back of TCT No. RT-6604 reads as
follows:

P.E. 2468/T-(82020)RT-6604 - - AFFIDAVIT OF ADVERSE CLAIM - Executed under oath by PEDRO M. FERRER, married to Erlinda B. Ferrer, claiming
among others that they have a claim, the interest over said property as
Recipient/Benefactor, by virtue of a waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest over a
real property x x x266[34] (Emphasis ours)

Therefore, there is no basis for petitioners assertion that the adverse claim was also
anchored on the mortgage contract allegedly executed by Comandante on behalf of her
parents.

The questions next to be resolved are: Is Comandantes waiver of hereditary rights

valid? Is petitioners adverse claim based on such waiver likewise valid and effective?

266[34] Dorsal side of p. 13 of the Records.

We note at the outset that the validity of petitioners adverse claim should have
been determined by the trial court after the petition for cancellation of petitioners adverse
claim filed by Comandante was consolidated with Civil Case No. Q-99-38876. 267[35]
This is in consonance with Section 70 of PD 1529 which provides:

Section 70. Adverse Claim. Whoever claims any part or interest in registered
land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original
registration, may, if no other provision is made in this Decree for registering the same,
make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or
under whom acquired, a reference to the number of the certificate of title of the registered
owner, the name of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right
or interest is claimed.

The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimants
residence, and a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall
be entitled to registration as an adverse claim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim
shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration. After the lapse
of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a
verified petition therefor by the party in interest: Provided, however, That after
cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the same ground shall be registered by
the same claimant.

Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a petition
in the Court of First Instance where the land is situated for the cancellation of the
adverse claim, and the court shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of validity
of such adverse claim, and shall render judgment as may be just and equitable. If the
267[35] Records, p. 66.

adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration thereof shall be ordered

cancelled. If, in any case, the court, after notice and hearing, shall find that the adverse
claim thus registered was frivolous, it may fine the claimant in an amount not less than
one thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, in its discretion. Before the lapse
of thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his adverse claim by filing with the Register of
Deeds a sworn petition to that effect. (Emphasis ours)

Pursuant to the third paragraph of the afore-quoted provision, it has been held that
the validity or efficaciousness of an adverse claim may only be determined by the Court
upon petition by an interested party, in which event, the Court shall order the immediate
hearing thereof and make the proper adjudication as justice and equity may warrant. And,
it is only when such claim is found unmeritorious that the registration of the adverse
claim may be cancelled.268[36]

As correctly pointed out by respondents, the records is bereft of any showing that
the trial court conducted any hearing on the matter. Instead, what the trial court did was to
include this material issue among those for which it has rendered its summary judgment
as shown by the following portion of the judgment:

x x x it will be NOTED that subject Adverse Claim annotated at the back of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-6604 (82020) PR-18887, and carried over to defendants-Sps.
Pangans Title No. N-20909, is not merely anchored on defendant Reina Comandantes
Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property but also on her being the
Attorney-In-Fact of the previous registered owners/parents/defendants Sps. Alfredo and
Imelda Diaz about the Real Estate Mortgage Contract for a loan of P1,118,228.00 which
268[36] Sajonas v. Court of Apeals, 327 Phil. 689, 712 (1996).

is a blood money of the plaintiff. Moreover, subject Adverse Claim in LRC Case No. Q12009 (99) is NOT frivolous and invalid and consequently, REGISTRABLE by virtue
of Section 110 of the Land Registration Act (now Section 70 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529). 269[37] (Emphasis ours)

It does not escape our attention that the trial court merely echoed the claim of
petitioner that his adverse claim subject of LRC Case No. Q-12009 (99) is not frivolous,
invalid and is consequently registrable. We likewise lament the apparent lack of effort on
the part of said court to make even a short ratiocination as to how it came up with said
conclusion. In fact, what followed the above-quoted portion of the summary judgment
are mere recitals of the arguments raised by petitioner in his motion for summary
judgment. And in the dispositive portion, the trial court merely casually ordered that
petitioners adverse claim be inscribed at the back of the title of the Pangans. What is
worse is that despite this glaring defect, the CA manifestly overlooked the matter even if
respondents vigorously raised the same before it.
Be that as it may, respondents efforts of pointing out this flaw, which we find
significant, have not gone to naught as will be hereinafter discussed.

All the respondents contend that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest
Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by Comandante is null and void for
being violative of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, hence, petitioners adverse claim which
was based upon such waiver is likewise void and cannot confer upon the latter any right
or interest over the property.
269[37] Records, p. 290.

We agree with the respondents.

Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, no contract
may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by
law. For the inheritance to be considered future, the succession must not have been
opened at the time of the contract. A contract may be classified as a contract upon future
inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of Article 1347, where the following
requisites concur:

(1)

That the succession has not yet been opened.

(2)

That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and,

(3)

That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which
is purely hereditary in nature.270[38]

In this case, there is no question that at the time of execution of Comandantes

Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided),
succession to either of her parents properties has not yet been opened since both of them
are still living. With respect to the other two requisites, both are likewise present
270[38] J.L.T. Agro Inc. v. Balansag, 493 Phil. 365, 378-379 (2005).

considering that the property subject matter of Comandantes waiver concededly forms
part of the properties that she expect to inherit from her parents upon their death and,
such expectancy of a right, as shown by the facts, is undoubtedly purely hereditary in
nature.
From the foregoing, it is clear that Comandante and petitioner entered into a
contract involving the formers future inheritance as embodied in the Waiver of
Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by her in
petitioners favor.

In Taedo v. Court of Appeals,271[39] we invalidated the contract of sale between

Lazaro Taedo and therein private respondents since the subject matter thereof was a one
hectare of whatever share the former shall have over Lot 191 of the cadastral survey of
Gerona, Province of Tarlac and covered by Title T-13829 of the Register of Deeds of
Tarlac. It constitutes a part of Taedos future inheritance from his parents, which cannot be
the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation between the parties.

Guided by the above discussions, we similarly declare in this case that the Waiver
of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by
Comandante in favor of petitioner as not valid and that same cannot be the source of any
right or create any obligation between them for being violative of the second paragraph
of Article 1347 of the Civil Code.

271[39] 322 Phil 84 (1996).

Anent the validity and effectivity of petitioners adverse claim, it is provided in

Section 70 of PD 1529, that it is necessary that the claimant has a right or interest in the
registered land adverse to the registered owner and that it must arise subsequent to
registration. Here, as no right or interest on the subject property flows from Comandantes
invalid waiver of hereditary rights upon petitioner, the latter is thus not entitled to the
registration of his adverse claim. Therefore, petitioners adverse claim is without any basis
and must consequently be adjudged invalid and ineffective and perforce be cancelled.

Albeit we have already resolved the issues raised by petitioner, we shall not stop
here as the Diazes and Comandante in their Comment 272[40] call our attention to the
failure of the CA to pass upon the issue of the propriety of the issuance by the trial court
of the Summary Judgment in favor of petitioner despite the fact that they have raised this
issue before the appellate court. They argue that summary judgment is proper only when
there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact in the action. Thus, where the
defendant presented defenses tendering factual issue which call for presentation of
evidence, as when he specifically denies the material allegations in the complaint,
summary judgment cannot be rendered.

The Diazes and Comandante then enumerate the genuine issues in the case which
they claim should have precluded the trial court from issuing a summary judgment in
petitioners favor. First, the execution of the SPA in favor of Comandante referred to by
petitioner in his complaint was never admitted by the Diazes. They assert that as such fact
is disputed, trial should have been conducted to determine the truth of the matter, same
272[40] Rollo, pp. 192-210.

being a genuine issue. Despite this, the trial court merely took the word of the plaintiff
and assumed that said document was indeed executed by them. Second, although
Comandante acknowledges that she has a personal obligation with petitioner, she
nevertheless, did not admit that it was in the amount of P1,118,228.00. Instead, she
claims only the amount of P500,000.00 or P600,000.00 (if inclusive of interest) as her
obligation. Moreover, the Diazes deny borrowing any money from petitioner and neither
did the Pangans owe him a single centavo. Thus, the true amount of the obligation due
the petitioner and how each of the respondents are responsible for such amount are
genuine issues which need formal presentation of evidence. Lastly, they aver that the trial
court ignored factual and material issues such as the lack of probative value of
Comandantes waiver of hereditary rights as well as of the SPA; the fact that Comandante
signed the mortgage contract and promissory note in her personal capacity; and, that all
such documents were prepared by petitioner who acted as a lawyer and the creditor of
Comandante at the same time.

Rule 35 of the Rules of Court provides for summary judgment, the pertinent
provisions of which are the following:

Section 1. Summary Judgment for claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a

claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after
the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits,
depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part
thereof.

Section 2. Summary Judgment for the defending party. A party against whom a
claim, counterclaim or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any

time, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary

judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.

Section 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
ten (10) days before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party may serve
opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days before the hearing.
After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
supporting affidavits, depositions and admissions on file, show that, except as to the
amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

As can be deduced from the above provisions, summary judgment is a procedural

devise resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless delays. When
the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of facts to be tried, the Rules
of Court allows a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment. That is,
when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by
applying the law to the material facts. Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuine
issue, summary judgment is not proper. A genuine issue is such fact which requires the
presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false
claim.273[41]

Here, we find the existence of genuine issues which removes the case from the
coverage of summary judgment. The variance in the allegations of the parties in their
pleadings is evident.
273[41] D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Duvas Corporation, G.R. No. 155174, August 4, 2009.

Petitioner anchors his complaint for sum of money and/or judicial foreclosure on
the alleged real estate mortgage over the subject property allegedly entered into by
Comandante in behalf of her parents to secure payment of a loan amounting to
P1,118,228.00. To support this claim, petitioner attached to his complaint (1) the SPA
alleged to have been executed by the Diazes; (2) the Real Estate Mortgage Contract
pertaining to the amount of P1,118,228.00; and, (3) a Promissory Note.

Comandante, in her Answer to petitioners Amended Complaint, assailed the

validity and due execution of the abovementioned documents. She asserted that the same
were not duly, knowingly and validly executed by her and that it was petitioner who
prepared all of them. Also, although she admitted owing petitioner, same was not an
absolute admission as she limited herself to an obligation amounting only to P600,000.00
inclusive of charges and interests. She likewise claimed that such obligation is her
personal obligation and not of her parents.

The Diazes, for their part, also denied that they executed the SPA authorizing their
daughter to mortgage their property to petitioner as well as having any obligation to the
latter.

Clearly, there are genuine issues in this case which require the presentation of
evidence. For one, it is necessary to ascertain in a full blown trial the validity and due
execution of the SPA, the Real Estate Mortgage and the Promissory Notes because the

determination of the following equally significant questions depends on them, to wit: (1)
Are the Diazes obligated to petitioner or is the obligation a purely personal obligation of
Comandante? and, (2) Is the sum of P1,118,228.00 as shown in the Real Estate Mortgage
and the Promissory Note, the amount which is really due the petitioner?

To stress, trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and
may do so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the
facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary
judgment cannot take the place of trial.274[42] From the foregoing, it is apparent that the
trial court should have refrained from issuing the summary judgment but instead
proceeded to conduct a full blown trial of the case. In view of this, the present case
should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings and proper disposition
according to the rudiments of a regular trial on the merits and not through an abbreviated
termination of the case by summary judgment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of

Appeals dated December 12, 2003 insofar as it excluded the respondents Spouses
Bienvenido Pangan and Elizabeth Pangan from among those solidarily liable to petitioner
Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer, is AFFIRMED. The inscription of the adverse claim of petitioner
Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer on T.C.T. No. N-209049 is hereby ordered CANCELLED.
Insofar as its other aspects are concerned, the assailed Decision is SET ASIDE and
VACATED. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 224 for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
274[42] Id.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been

reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the

Division Chairpersons attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 139611. October 4, 2002]

NOLI ALFONSO and ERLINDA FUNDIALAN, petitioners, vs. SPS. HENRY and LIWANAG
ANDRES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal are two resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 7450-UDK. The first,
dated March 17, 1999,275[1] dismissed petitioners appeal for their failure to pay docket and other
lawful fees, while the second, dated August 9, 1999,276[2] denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
As gleaned from the records, the following are the antecedent facts:
The original case involved a complaint for accion publiciana with a claim for damages, entitled
Sps. Henry Andres and Natividad Liwanag-Andres vs. Noli Alfonso and Erlinda Fundialan,
docketed as Civil Case No. 1182, filed with the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal. It was
decided against herein petitioners in favor of the spouses Andres, now the respondents herein.
On July 15, 1997, a copy of the decision277[3] was served upon petitioners.
On July 17, 1997, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal, without the assistance of counsel and
without payment of the docket and other lawful fees.
On July 21, 1997, the RTC granted the notice of appeal.
On August 25, 1997, respondents herein, through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss petitioners
appeal, citing Section 1(c), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
On October 9, 1997, the trial court dismissed the motion and directed petitioners to pay the
proper fees to cure the technical defect, stating thus:
The Motion to Dismiss Appeal dated August 25, 1997, filed by the plaintiffs, through counsel is
hereby DENIED.

275[1] Rollo, p. 15.

276[2] Id. at 11.
277[3] Dated July, 8, 1997. See Rollo, p. 43.

Defendants are directed to pay the corresponding docket fees and other required fees, within five
(5) days from receipt of this Order, considering that the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which
took effect on July 1, 1997, must at least in the meantime, be construed liberally.

SO ORDERED.278[4]
On the same date, petitioners paid the subject fees, as evidenced by official receipts279[5] issued
by the RTC of San Mateo to petitioner Erlinda Fundialan. The receipts, all dated October 9,
1997, showed payments for appeal and legal research fees in Civil Case No. 1182, in compliance
with the trial courts order of even date, the details of which are as follows:
PARTICULARS O.R. No. AMOUNT
--------------------- ---------------- ----------------Appeal fee 7403333 P 48.00
Appeal fee 7402555 352.00
Legal Research 1880282 20.00
----------------TOTAL P 420.00
==========
Respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. Upon a review of the records, which
included the proofs of payment of the docket and appeal fees, the appellate court nevertheless
resolved to dismiss the appeal in this wise:
For failure of defendants-appellants to pay the required docket fees, as reported by the Judicial
Records Division (JRD) on February 24, 1999, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED (Section 1 (c),
Rule 50 in relation to Section 4, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
SO ORDERED.280[6]
278[4] Rollo, p. 4.
279[5] Id. at 14.
280[6] Id. at 15.

On April 12, 1999, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing resolution,
which the Court of Appeals denied on August 9, 1999. Thus:
THROUGH a motion for reconsideration, defendants-appellants claim having paid the docketing
fees on October 9, 1997, beyond the period for perfecting an appeal.
Any subsequent compliance with the formal requirements for filing an appeal as prescribed by
the Rules will not per se warrant reconsideration of Our Resolution.
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.281[7]
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners submit that the sole issue to be resolved is whether the Court of Appeals was correct
in its strict construction of the provisions of Section 1(c), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Specifically, however, we find two main issues for our resolution: (1) whether or not
the payment of docket and other lawful fees within the period for perfecting an appeal is
mandatory; and (2) whether or not petitioners have shown sufficient reason for the relaxation of
what otherwise should be a stringent application of the rule on the payment of appellate docket
and other lawful fees.
As ground for the dismissal of the appeal, the appellate court cites Section 1 (c), Rule 50, in
relation to Section 4, Rule 41, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 1 (c), Rule 50
provides:
SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal.- An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of
Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
xxx
(c) Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees as provided in section 5 of
Rule 40 and section 4 of Rule 41;
xxx
Section 4, Rule 41 in turn provides:
SECTION 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. - Within the period for taking an
appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of
payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record
or the record on appeal. (Underscoring supplied.)
281[7] Id. at 11.

Petitioners argue for liberal construction of the Rules,282[8] stating that its delay283[9] in the
payment of the fees, was a trivial technical oversight which was nonetheless cured by the order
of the court a quo directing it to make the payment.284[10] By such payment of the docket and
other lawful fees, the technical deficiency was cured.285[11] Petitioners also cites Section 13, Rule
41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure286[12] and argues that in the case at bar, although the
notice of appeal had been seasonably filed, there was the unintentional and excusable nonpayment of the required fees.287[13] In fact, albeit belatedly, petitioners did pay the required fees
on the very day the trial court ordered its payment. According to petitioners, substantial justice
should not be sacrificed over technicalities.288[14]
On the other hand, respondents aver that under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, perfection of
an appeal requires the payment of the docket and other lawful fees. Since the same were not
seasonably paid, such failure to pay was a fatal defect which an order from the trial court cannot
cure.289[15]
At the outset, it should be stressed that failure to pay the appellate docket and lawful fees is a
serious matter affecting the courts jurisdiction. Time and again, we have consistently held that
the payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an
appeal. Without such payment, the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject
282[8] Citing Section 6, Rule 1 thereof which provides: SECTION 6. Construction. These rules
shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.

283[9] Rollo, p. 6.
284[10] Id. at 5.
285[11] Id. at 7.
286[12] SECTION 13. Dismissal of appeal. Prior to the transmittal of the original
record or the record on appeal to the appellate court, the trial court may motu
propio or on motion to dismiss the appeal for having been taken out of time.
287[13] Rollo, p. 6.
288[14] Id. at 8.
289[15] Id. at 24.

matter of the action and the decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory.290
[16]

Appeal is not a right but a statutory privilege; thus, appeal must be made strictly in accordance
with provisions set by law.291[17] The requirement of the law under Section 4, Rule 41 is clear.
The payment of appellate docket fee is not a mere technicality of law or procedure but an
essential requirement for the perfection of an appeal.292[18]
However, notwithstanding the mandatory nature of such requirement, this Court has also held
that the strict application of the jurisdictional nature of the above rule on payment of appellate
docket fees may be mitigated under exceptional circumstances to better serve the interest of
justice.293[19] Hence, we resolve the second issue. Has petitioners presented any sufficient or
satisfactory reason for the relaxation of the rules?
We note that at the time petitioners filed said notice of appeal on July 17, 1997, the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure had then very recently taken effect on July 1, 1997.
In the case of Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Mangubat, 312 SCRA 463, 466467 (1999),294[20] where the notice of appeal was likewise filed only 14 days after the effectivity
of the new rules, this Court has stated:
We find the delay excusable. In the case of Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. vs. Ricafort the court
held that failure to attach to the Answer a written explanation why alternative mode of service of
pleading is availed of, thirty nine (39) days after the effectivity of the new rules, may be excused
as the counsel may not have been fully aware of the new requirements. This Court further
ordered that strictest compliance with the said mandatory requirement is to be enforced one
month from the promulgation of the said decision on August 5, 1998. The intent of the Court is
clear to afford litigants full opportunity to comply with the new rules and to temper enforcement
of sanctions in view of the recency of the changes introduced by the new rules. x x x We also
note that the Solicitor General observed the procedure for perfecting an appeal under the old rule
wherein only the notice of appeal is filed with the trial court and the docket fees were later paid
to the appellate court after notice from the latter court that payment of docket fees are due. x x x .
(Underscoring supplied.)

290[16] Sps. Manalili vs. Sps. De Leon, G.R. No. 140858, November 27, 2001, p. 6.
291[17] Ibid.
292[18] Id. at 7.
293[19] Ayala Land, Inc. vs. Carpo, 345 SCRA 579, 584 (2000).
294[20] Citing Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. vs. Ricafort, 293 SCRA 661 (1998).

Indeed, as averred by petitioners in the present case, at the time of the filing of the notice of
appeal, the changes introduced by the 1997 Rules of Civil procedure were yet novel, and even
judges and lawyers needed time to familiarize themselves with the rules intricacies. The trial
court acknowledged this fact when it resolved to grant the appeal, and favorably considered a
liberal application of the rules in the meantime.
Also material is the fact that petitioners were not assisted by counsel when they filed their notice
of appeal. Indeed, it appears that on August 20, 1997,295[21] petitioners former counsel made
formal the withdrawal of appearance from this case. In the case of Solar Team Entertainment,
Inc. vs. Ricafort, 293 SCRA 661 (1998), this Court even assumed that counsel therein may not
have been fully aware yet of the new requirements, and deemed failure to observe them
excusable. In this case, where petitioners themselves filed the notice of appeal, without
assistance of counsel, there is more reason to relax the application of the new rules.
Respondents reliance on the case of Lazaro vs. Court of Appeals296[22] is not well taken. In
Lazaro, the case in the trial court was decided months after the new rules had already taken
effect. The litigants had the assistance of counsel and payment of fees was made belatedly after
six months from the expiration of the appeal period. This delay was not sufficiently explained.
Thus, this Court saw no compelling reason therein to deviate from the strict application of the
rules. Moreover, the case of Lazaro also admits that the rules may be relaxed in exceptionally
meritorious cases.
We also note that petitioners were not informed by the trial court that the docket fees were
already due at that time. This failure of the trial court might have stemmed from the recency of
the rules. Hence, fairness bids us not to take this circumstance against petitioners.
While it is true, as pointed out by respondents, that the same docket fees were only paid on
October 9, 1997, or more than two months after the period to appeal has lapsed, this matter was
sufficiently explained by petitioners. The records bear out the fact that the notice of appeal was
granted on July 21, 1997. It was only on August 25, 1997 that respondents motion to dismiss was
filed. Hence, following the course of judicial proceedings, including setting the motion for
hearing, filing of an opposition thereto, with a resetting of a hearing also thrown in, the said
motion was only resolved on October 9, 1997. Petitioners demonstrated their willingness to pay
the docket fees, as shown by their immediate compliance with the order of the trial court, on the
very day the motion was resolved. Late payment of docket fees may be admitted when the party
showed willingness to abide by the rules, by immediately paying the required fees.297[23]
295[21] Rollo, p. 37.
296[22] 330 SCRA 208 (2000).
297[23] Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Mangubat, supra, citing
Teofilo Gensoli and Co. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 289 SCRA 407
(1998).

WHEREFORE, the assailed resolutions in CA-G.R. CV No. 7450-UDK are SET ASIDE. The
appeal is hereby REINSTATED and the case REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Acting C.J., (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Mendoza, J., on official leave.

Today is Tuesday, October 25, 2016

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24561 June 30, 1970
MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA
DIZON, oppositors-appellants.
Punzalan, Yabut & Eusebio for executrix-appellee.
Leonardo Abola for oppositors-appellants.

TEEHANKEE, J.:
Appeal from orders of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga approving the Executrix-appellee's project of partition
instead of Oppositors-Appellants' proposed counter-project of partition. 1

On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles, Pampanga, and was survived by seven compulsory
heirs, to wit, six legitimate children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein executrix-appellee),
Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of
Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent. Six of these seven compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the
executrix-appellee) are the oppositors-appellants.
The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and written in the Pampango dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will
were the above-named compulsory heirs, together with seven other legitimate grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera, Jr., Gilbert D.
Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and Laureano Tiambon.
In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties appraised at P1,801,960.00 (except two small parcels of
land appraised at P5,849.60, household furniture valued at P2,500.00, a bank deposit in the sum of P409.95 and ten shares of
Pampanga Sugar Development Company valued at P350.00) among her above-named heirs.
Testate proceedings were in due course commenced 2 and by order dated March 13, 1961, the last will and testament of the decedent
was duly allowed and admitted to probate, and the appellee Marina Dizon-Rivera was appointed executrix of the testatrix' estate, and
upon her filing her bond and oath of office, letters testamentary were duly issued to her.
After the executrix filed her inventory of the estate, Dr. Adelaido Bernardo of Angeles, Pampanga was appointed commissioner to
appraise the properties of the estate. He filed in due course his report of appraisal and the same was approved in toto by the lower
court on December 12, 1963 upon joint petition of the parties.
The real and personal properties of the testatrix at the time of her death thus had a total appraised value of P1,811,695.60, and the
legitime of each of the seven compulsory heirs amounted to P129,362.11. 3 (/7 of the half of the estate reserved for the legitime of legitimate children and
4
descendants). In her will, the testatrix "commanded that her property be divided" in accordance with her testamentary disposition,
whereby she devised and bequeathed specific real properties comprising practically the entire bulk of her estate among her six children
and eight grandchildren. The appraised values of the real properties thus respectively devised by the testatrix to the beneficiaries
named in her will, are as follows:
1. Estela Dizon ....................................... P 98,474.80
2. Angelina Dizon .................................. 106,307.06
3. Bernardita Dizon .................................. 51,968.17
4. Josefina Dizon ...................................... 52,056.39
5. Tomas Dizon ....................................... 131,987.41
6. Lilia Dizon .............................................. 72,182.47
7. Marina Dizon ..................................... 1,148,063.71
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ...................................... 69,280.00
9. Lilia Dizon, Gilbert Garcia,
Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera,
Agripina Ayson, Dioli or Jolly
Jimenez, Laureano Tiamzon ................. 72,540.00
Total Value ...................... P1,801,960.01
The executrix filed her project of partition dated February 5, 1964, in substance adjudicating the estate as follows:
(1) with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a basis Marina (exacultrix-appellee) and Tomas (appellant)
are admittedly considered to have received in the will more than their respective legitime, while the rest of the
appellants, namely, Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia received less than their respective legitime;
(2) thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the properties respectively given them in the will, plus cash and/or
properties, to complete their respective legitimes to P129,254.96; (3) on the other hand, Marina and Tomas are
adjudicated the properties that they received in the will less the cash and/or properties necessary to complete

the prejudiced legitime mentioned in number 2 above;

(4) the adjudications made in the will in favor of the grandchildren remain untouched.<re||an1w>
On the other hand oppositors submitted their own counter-project of partition dated February 14, 1964, wherein
they proposed the distribution of the estate on the following basis:
(a) all the testamentary dispositions were proportionally reduced to the value of one-half () of the entire
estate, the value of the said one-half () amounting to P905,534.78; (b) the shares of the OppositorsAppellants should consist of their legitime, plus the devises in their favor proportionally reduced; (c) in payment
of the total shares of the appellants in the entire estate, the properties devised to them plus other properties left
by the Testatrix and/or cash are adjudicated to them; and (d) to the grandchildren who are not compulsory heirs
are adjudicated the properties respectively devised to them subject to reimbursement by Gilbert D. Garcia, et
al., of the sums by which the devise in their favor should be proportionally reduced.
Under the oppositors' counter-project of partition, the testamentary disposition made by the testatrix of practically her whole estate of
P1,801,960.01, as above stated, were proposed to be reduced to the amounts set forth after the names of the respective heirs and
devisees totalling one-half thereof as follows:
1. Estela Dizon ........................................... P 49,485.56
2. Angelina Dizon ......................................... 53,421.42
3. Bernardita Dizon ....................................... 26,115.04
4. Josefina Dizon .......................................... 26,159.38
5. Tomas V. Dizon ......................................... 65,874.04
6. Lilia Dizon .................................................. 36,273.13
7. Marina Dizon ........................................... 576,938.82
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ......................................... 34,814.50
9. Grandchildren Gilbert Garcia et al .......... 36,452.80
T o t a l ................................................... P905,534.78
while the other half of the estate (P905,534.78) would be deemed as constituting the legitime of the executrix-appellee and oppositorsappellants, to be divided among them in seven equal parts of P129,362.11 as their respective legitimes.
The lower court, after hearing, sustained and approved the executrix' project of partition, ruling that "(A)rticles 906 and 907 of the New
Civil Code specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be completed and satisfied. While it is
true that this process has been followed and adhered to in the two projects of partition, it is observed that the executrix and the
oppositors differ in respect to the source from which the portion or portions shall be taken in order to fully restore the impaired legitime.
The proposition of the oppositors, if upheld, will substantially result in a distribution of intestacy, which is in controversion of Article 791
of the New Civil Code" adding that "the testatrix has chosen to favor certain heirs in her will for reasons of her own, cannot be doubted.
This is legally permissible within the limitation of the law, as aforecited." With reference to the payment in cash of some P230,552.38,
principally by the executrix as the largest beneficiary of the will to be paid to her five co-heirs, the oppositors (excluding Tomas Dizon),
to complete their impaired legitimes, the lower court ruled that "(T)he payment in cash so as to make the proper adjustment to meet
with the requirements of the law in respect to legitimes which have been impaired is, in our opinion, a practical and valid solution in
order to give effect to the last wishes of the testatrix."
From the lower court's orders of approval, oppositors-appellants have filed this appeal, and raise anew the following issues: .
1. Whether or not the testamentary dispositions made in the testatrix' will are in the nature of devises imputable to the free portion of her
estate, and therefore subject to reduction;
2. Whether the appellants are entitled to the devise plus their legitime under Article 1063, or merely to demand completion of their

legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code; and

3. Whether the appellants may be compelled to accept payment in cash on account of their legitime, instead of some of the real
properties left by the Testatrix;
which were adversely decided against them in the proceedings below.
The issues raised present a matter of determining the avowed intention of the testatrix which is "the life and soul of a will." 5 In
consonance therewith, our Civil Code included the new provisions found in Articles 788 and 791 thereof that "(I)f a testamentary
disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be
preferred" and "(T)he words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one
which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent
intestacy." In Villanueva vs. Juico 6 for violation of these rules of interpretation as well as of Rule 123, section 59 of the old Rules of
Court, 7 the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, overturned the lower court's decision and stressed that "the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly
expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith,
following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise." 8
The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, 9 when
expressed clearly and precisely in his last will amount to the only law whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his executors, heirs and devisees
and legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts may substitute their own criterion for the testator's will. Guided and restricted by these fundamental premises, the
Court finds for the appellee.
1. Decisive of the issues at bar is the fact that the testatrix' testamentary disposition was in the nature of a partition of her estate by will. Thus, in the third paragraph of her will, after
commanding that upon her death all her obligations as well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and the expenses for probate of her last will and for the administration of
her property in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it is my wish and I command that my property be divided" in accordance with the dispositions immediately
thereafter following, whereby she specified each real property in her estate and designated the particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to
10
whom she bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition
of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Article 1080 of the

Civil Code, providing that "(S)hould a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be
respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs." This right of a testator to partition his estate is subject
only to the right of compulsory heirs to their legitime. The Civil Code thus provides the safeguard for the right of such compulsory heirs:
ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the legitime belonging to him
may demand that the same be fully satisfied.
ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the legitime of the compulsory heirs shall be
reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they may be inofficious or excessive.
This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project of partition, wherein the five oppositorsappellants namely Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia, were adjudicated the properties respectively
distributed and assigned to them by the testatrix in her will, and the differential to complete their respective
legitimes of P129,362.11 each were taken from the cash and/or properties of the executrix-appellee, Marina,
and their co-oppositor-appellant, Tomas, who admittedly were favored by the testatrix and received in the
partition by will more than their respective legitimes.
2. This right of a testator to partition his estate by will was recognized even in Article 1056 of the old Civil Code which has been
reproduced now as Article 1080 of the present Civil Code. The only amendment in the provision was that Article 1080 "now permits any
person (not a testator, as under the old law) to partition his estate by act inter vivos." 11 This was intended to repeal the then prevailing
doctrine 12 that for a testator to partition his estate by an act inter vivos, he must first make a will with all the formalities provided by law.
Authoritative commentators doubt the efficacy of the amendment 13 but the question does not here concern us, for this is a clear case of
partition by will, duly admitted to probate, which perforce must be given full validity and effect. Aside from the provisions of Articles 906
and 907 above quoted, other codal provisions support the executrix-appellee's project of partition as approved by the lower court rather
than the counter-project of partition proposed by oppositors-appellants whereby they would reduce the testamentary disposition or
partition made by the testatrix to one-half and limit the same, which they would consider as mere devises or legacies, to one-half of the
estate as the disposable free portion, and apply the other half of the estate to payment of the legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs.
Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify the testatrix' will, contrary to Article

791 of the Civil Code. It would further run counter to the provisions of Article 1091 of the Civil Code that "(A) partition legally made
confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him."
3. In Habana vs. Imbo, 14 the Court upheld the distribution made in the will of the deceased testator Pedro Teves of two large coconut
plantations in favor of his daughter, Concepcion, as against adverse claims of other compulsory heirs, as being a partition by will, which
should be respected insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs, in accordance with Article 1080 of the Civil
Code. In upholding the sale made by Concepcion to a stranger of the plantations thus partitioned in her favor in the deceased's will
which was being questioned by the other compulsory heirs, the Court ruled that "Concepcion Teves by operation of law, became the
absolute owner of said lots because 'A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property
adjudicated to him' (Article 1091, New Civil Code), from the death of her ancestors, subject to rights and obligations of the latter, and,
she can not be deprived of her rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law (Arts. 657, 659, and 661, Civil Code). 15
Concepcion Teves could, as she did, sell the lots in question as part of her share of the proposed partition of the properties, especially
when, as in the present case, the sale has been expressly recognized by herself and her co-heirs ..."
4. The burden of oppositors' contention is that the testamentary dispositions in their favor are in the nature of devises of real property,
citing the testatrix' repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her assignment or distribution of her real properties to the respective heirs.
From this erroneous premise, they proceed to the equally erroneous conclusion that "the legitime of the compulsory heirs passes to
them by operation of law and that the testator can only dispose of the free portion, that is, the remainder of the estate after deducting
the legitime of the compulsory heirs ... and all testamentary dispositions, either in the nature of institution of heirs or of devises or
legacies, have to be taken from the remainder of the testator's estate constituting the free portion." 16
Oppositors err in their premises, for the adjudications and assignments in the testatrix' will of specific properties to specific heirs cannot
be considered all devises, for it clearly appear from the whole context of the will and the disposition by the testatrix of her whole estate
(save for some small properties of little value already noted at the beginning of this opinion) that her clear intention was to partition her
whole estate through her will. The repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her testamentary dispositions acquire no legal significance,
such as to convert the same into devises to be taken solely from the free one-half disposable portion of the estate. Furthermore, the
testatrix' intent that her testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere devisees,
and that said dispositions were therefore on account of the respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the
fourth paragraph of her will, immediately following her testamentary adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I
likewise command that in case any of those I named as my heirs in this testament any of them shall die before I do, his forced heirs
under the law enforced at the time of my death shall inherit the properties I bequeath to said deceased." 17
Oppositors' conclusions necessarily are in error. The testamentary dispositions of the testatrix, being dispositions in favor of compulsory
heirs, do not have to be taken only from the free portion of the estate, as contended, for the second paragraph of Article 842 of the Civil
Code precisely provides that "(O)ne who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the
provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs." And even going by oppositors' own theory of bequests, the second
paragraph of Article 912 Civil Code covers precisely the case of the executrix-appellee, who admittedly was favored by the testatrix with
the large bulk of her estate in providing that "(T)he devisee who is entitled to a legitime may retain the entire property, provided its value
does not exceed that of the disposable portion and of the share pertaining to him as legitime." For "diversity of apportionment is the
usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate." 18 Fundamentally, of course, the dispositions
by the testatrix constituted a partition by will, which by mandate of Article 1080 of the Civil Code and of the other cited codal provisions
upholding the primacy of the testator's last will and testament, have to be respected insofar as they do not prejudice the legitime of the
other compulsory heirs.
Oppositors' invoking of Article 1063 of the Civil Code that "(P)roperty left by will is not deemed subject to collation, if the testator has not
otherwise provided, but the legitime shall in any case remain unimpaired" and invoking of the construction thereof given by some
authorities that "'not deemed subject to collation' in this article really means not imputable to or chargeable against the legitime", while it
may have some plausibility 19 in an appropriate case, has no application in the present case. Here, we have a case of a distribution and
partition of the entire estate by the testatrix, without her having made any previous donations during her lifetime which would require
collation to determine the legitime of each heir nor having left merely some properties by will which would call for the application of
Articles 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation. The amount of the legitime of the heirs is here determined and undisputed.
5. With this resolution of the decisive issue raised by oppositors-appellants, the secondary issues are likewise necessarily resolved.

Their right was merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code and this has been complied with in the
approved project of partition, and they can no longer demand a further share from the remaining portion of the estate, as bequeathed
and partitioned by the testatrix principally to the executrix-appellee.
Neither may the appellants legally insist on their legitime being completed with real properties of the estate instead of being paid in
cash, per the approved project of partition. The properties are not available for the purpose, as the testatrix had specifically partitioned
and distributed them to her heirs, and the heirs are called upon, as far as feasible to comply with and give effect to the intention of the
testatrix as solemnized in her will, by implementing her manifest wish of transmitting the real properties intact to her named
beneficiaries, principally the executrix-appellee. The appraisal report of the properties of the estate as filed by the commissioner
appointed by the lower court was approved in toto upon joint petition of the parties, and hence, there cannot be said to be any question
and none is presented as to fairness of the valuation thereof or that the legitime of the heirs in terms of cash has been
understated. The plaint of oppositors that the purchasing value of the Philippine peso has greatly declined since the testatrix' death in
January, 1961 provides no legal basis or justification for overturning the wishes and intent of the testatrix. The transmission of rights to
the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent (Article 777, Civil Code) and accordingly, the value thereof
must be reckoned as of then, as otherwise, estates would never be settled if there were to be a revaluation with every subsequent
fluctuation in the values of the currency and properties of the estate. There is evidence in the record that prior to November 25, 1964,
one of the oppositors, Bernardita, accepted the sum of P50,000.00 on account of her inheritance, which, per the parties' manifestation,
20
"does not in any way affect the adjudication made to her in the projects of partition of either party as the same is a mere advance of
the cash that she should receive in both projects of partition." The payment in cash by way of making the proper adjustments in order to
meet the requirements of the law on non-impairment of legitimes as well as to give effect to the last will of the testatrix has invariably
been availed of and sanctioned. 21 That her co-oppositors would receive their cash differentials only now when the value of the currency
has declined further, whereas they could have received them earlier, like Bernardita, at the time of approval of the project of partition
and when the peso's purchasing value was higher, is due to their own decision of pursuing the present appeal.
ACCORDINGLY, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed. Without cost.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.

# Footnotes
1 Appeal was directed to this Court, as the value of the estate exceeded P200,000.00, in accordance with the then subsisting provisions of Sec. 17,
third paragraph, subsec. 5, now eliminated by Rep. Act 5440 enacted on Sept. 9, 1968.
2 Sp. Proc. No. 1582 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.
3 These figures are those of oppositors-appellants which are adopted for purposes of this decision. Per appellee's brief, p. 3, executrix-appellee
sums up the value of the estate P1,809,569.55, and therefore the legitime of each of the seven (7) forced heirs at P129,254.96. While there is thus a
slight difference in the valuation of the estate and legitime of the forced heirs (a difference of P2,126.05 for the whole estate and of P107.15 in each
legitime), the same is of no importance... because the issue involved in this appeal is not the value of the estate but the manner it should be
distributed among the heirs." (Notes in parentheses supplied)
4 Art. 888, Civil Code.
5 Santos vs. Madarang, 27 Phil. 209.
6 L-15737, Feb. 28, 1962; 4 SCRA 550.
7 "SEC. 59. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. In the construction of an instrument where there are several provisions or
particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all." (now Rule 130, sec. 9)
8 Citing in In re Estate of Calderon, 26 Phil. 333.
9 Tribunal Supremo of Spain, sentencia of 20 Marzo 1918.

10 ART. 1079. Partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. The
thing itself may be divided, or its value. (n)
11 Romero vs. Villamor, 102 Phil. 641 (1957).
12 Legasto vs. Versoza, 54 Phil. 766 (1930); Fajardo vs. Fajardo, 54 Phil. 842 (1930).
13 Reyes and Puno, Vol. III, p. 216; Tolentino, Vol. III, pp. 538-540.
14 L-15598 and L-16726, March 31, 1964; 10 SCRA 471.
15 See Arts. 776 and 777 Phil. Civil Code. The latter article provides that "(T)he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent."
16 Appellants' brief, pp. 15-16.
17 Rec. on Appeal, p. 20; emphasis supplied.
18 Icasiano vs. Icasiano, L-18979, June 30, 1964; 11 SCRA 422.
19 III Tolentino's Civil Code, 1961 ed., p. 518.
20 Record on Appeal, p. 107.
21 See Arts. 955, 1080 and 1104, Civil Code.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Tuesday, October 25, 2016

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND SPECIAL DIVISION
G.R. No. 183053

October 10, 2012

EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioner,

vs.

ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, Respondent.

RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
The now overly prolonged, all-too familiar and too-much-stretched imbroglio over the estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay
has continued. We issued a Decision in the dispute as in Inter Caetera.1 We now find a need to replace the decision.
Before us is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay (respondent Isabel) of our Decision2
in G.R. No. 183053 dated 16 June 2010, directing the issuance of joint letters of administration to both petitioner Emilio
A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to both
petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond to be set by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court,
Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to make a determination and to declare the heirs of decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the actual factual milieu as proven by the parties, and all other persons with legal interest in
the subject estate. It is further directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.3
We are moved to trace to its roots the controversy between the parties.
The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June 1990. Cristina was survived by her spouse, Dr.
Federico Suntay (Federico) and five grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren, including herein respondent, Isabel; and
two illegitimate grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio III, all by Federicos and Cristinas only child, Emilio A. Suntay
(Emilio I), who predeceased his parents.
The illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita, were both reared from infancy by the spouses Federico and Cristina.
Their legitimate grandchildren, Isabel and her siblings, Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their mother Isabel Cojuangco,
following the separation of Isabels parents, Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco. Isabels parents, along with her paternal
grandparents, were involved in domestic relations cases, including a case for parricide filed by Isabel Cojuangco against
Emilio I. Emilio I was eventually acquitted.
In retaliation, Emilio I filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife, charging her among others with infidelity. The
trial court declared as null and void and of no effect the marriage of Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco on the finding that:
From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined in the Veterans memorial Hospital. Although at the time of
the trial of parricide case (September 8, 1967) the patient was already out of the hospital, he continued to be under
observation and treatment.
It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration classified as schizophernia (sic) had
made themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that the disease worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually
placed under expert neuro-psychiatrist (sic) treatment; that even if the subject has shown marked progress, the remains

bereft of adequate understanding of right and wrong.

There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July 9, 1958, years after plaintiffs mental
illness had set in. This fact would justify a declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes after (sic) existing at the time of the marriage:
xxxx
(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as
husband or wife.
There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the mental condition of plaintiff; and there is
proof that plaintiff continues to be without sound reason. The charges in this very complaint add emphasis to the findings of
the neuro-psychiatrist handling the patient, that plaintiff really lives more in fancy than in reality, a strong indication of
schizophernia (sic).4
Intent on maintaining a relationship with their grandchildren, Federico and Isabel filed a complaint for visitation rights to
spend time with Margarita, Emilio II, and Isabel in the same special lower court. The Juvenile Domestic Relations Court in
Quezon City (JDRC-QC) granted their prayer for one hour a month of visitation rights which was subsequently reduced to
thirty minutes, and ultimately stopped, because of respondent Isabels testimony in court that her grandparents visits caused
her and her siblings stress and anxiety.5
On 27 September 1993, more than three years after Cristinas death, Federico adopted his illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio
III and Nenita.
On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration over Cristinas estate docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. Federico,
opposed the petition, pointing out that: (1) as the surviving spouse of the decedent, he should be appointed administrator of
the decedents estate; (2) as part owner of the mass of conjugal properties left by the decedent, he must be accorded
preference in the administration thereof; (3) Isabel and her siblings had been alienated from their grandparents for more than
thirty (30) years; (4) the enumeration of heirs in the petition was incomplete as it did not mention the other children of his
son, Emilio III and Nenita; (5) even before the death of his wife, Federico had administered their conjugal properties, and
thus, is better situated to protect the integrity of the decedents estate; (6) the probable value of the estate as stated in the
petition was grossly overstated; and (7) Isabels allegation that some of the properties are in the hands of usurpers is untrue.
Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabels petition for letters of administration on the ground that Isabel had no right of
representation to the estate of Cristina, she being an illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a result of Isabels parents
marriage being declared null and void. However, in Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, we categorically declared that Isabel and
her siblings, having been born of a voidable marriage as opposed to a void marriage based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the
Civil Code, were legitimate children of Emilio I, who can all represent him in the estate of their legitimate grandmother, the
decedent, Cristina.
Undaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the decedents estate on his behalf in the event

letters of administration issues to Federico. Consequently, Emilio III filed an Opposition-In-Intervention, echoing the
allegations in his grandfathers opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than
respondent to administer and manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina.
On 13 November 2000, Federico died.
Almost a year thereafter or on 9 November 2001, the trial court rendered a decision appointing Emilio III as administrator of
decedent Cristinas intestate estate:
WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is DENIED and the Opposition-in-Intervention is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III (sic) is hereby appointed administrator of the estate of the decedent
Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay, who shall enter upon the execution of his trust upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P
200,000.00, conditioned as follows:
(1) To make and return within three (3) months, a true and complete inventory;
(2) To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all debts, legatees, and charge on the same, or dividends thereon;
(3) To render a true and just account within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the court, and
(4) To perform all orders of the Court.
Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of Administration be issued in his favor.6
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued
to Emilio III, and appointed respondent as administratrix of the subject estate:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed decision dated November 9, 2001 of Branch 78, Regional Trial
Court of Malolos, Bulacan in SPC No. 117-M-95 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the letters of administration issued by
the said court to Emilio A.M. Suntay III, if any, are consequently revoked. Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is hereby
appointed administratrix of the intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. Let letters of administration be issued in her
favor upon her filing of a bond in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand (P 200,000.00) Pesos.7
As previously adverted to, on appeal by certiorari, we reversed and set aside the ruling of the appellate court. We decided to
include Emilio III as co-administrator of Cristinas estate, giving weight to his interest in Federicos estate. In ruling for coadministration between Emilio III and
Isabel, we considered that:
1. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her husband, Federico, who both
acknowledged him as their grandchild;
2. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of the decedent, Cristina, as forming part of
their conjugal partnership of gains during the subsistence of their marriage;

3. Cristinas properties, forming part of her estate, are still commingled with those of her husband, Federico,
because her share in the conjugal partnership remains undetermined and unliquidated; and
4. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the distribution of the latters estate as
a direct heir, one degree from Federico, and not simply in representation of his deceased illegitimate father,
Emilio I.
In this motion, Isabel pleads for total affirmance of the Court of Appeals Decision in favor of her sole administratorship
based on her status as a legitimate grandchild of Cristina, whose estate she seeks to administer.
Isabel contends that the explicit provisions of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court on the order of preference for the
issuance of letters of administration cannot be ignored and that Article 992 of the Civil Code must be followed. Isabel
further asserts that Emilio III had demonstrated adverse interests and disloyalty to the estate, thus, he does not deserve to
become a co-administrator thereof.
Specifically, Isabel bewails that: (1) Emilio III is an illegitimate grandchild and therefore, not an heir of the decedent; (2)
corollary thereto, Emilio III, not being a "next of kin" of the decedent, has no interest in the estate to justify his appointment
as administrator thereof; (3) Emilio IIIs actuations since his appointment as administrator by the RTC on 9 November 2001
emphatically demonstrate the validity and wisdom of the order of preference in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court; and
(4) there is no basis for joint administration as there are no "opposing parties or factions to be represented."
To begin with, the case at bar reached us on the issue of who, as between Emilio III and Isabel, is better qualified to act as
administrator of the decedents estate. We did not choose. Considering merely his demonstrable interest in the subject estate,
we ruled that Emilio III should likewise administer the estate of his illegitimate grandmother, Cristina, as a co-administrator.
In the context of this case, we have to make a choice and therefore, reconsider our decision of 16 June 2010.
The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent is laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the
Rules of Court:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or
executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such
person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or
unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may
select.
Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of preference, in the appointment of an administrator. This order
of preference, which categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors in the appointment of an

administrator, has been reinforced in jurisprudence.8

The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the estate of a decedent is the prospective
administrators interest in the estate.9 This is the same consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into account in
establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the rule is that
those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the
consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer
the estate correctly.10 In all, given that the rule speaks of an order of preference, the person to be appointed administrator of a
decedents estate must demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but an interest therein greater than any other candidate.
To illustrate, the preference bestowed by law to the surviving spouse in the administration of a decedents estate presupposes
the surviving spouses interest in the conjugal partnership or community property forming part of the decedents estate.11
Likewise, a surviving spouse is a compulsory heir of a decedent12 which evinces as much, if not more, interest in
administering the entire estate of a decedent, aside from her share in the conjugal partnership or absolute community
property.
It is to this requirement of observation of the order of preference in the appointment of administrator of a decedents estate,
that the appointment of co-administrators has been allowed, but as an exception. We again refer to Section 6(a) of Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court which specifically states that letters of administration may be issued to both the surviving spouse and the
next of kin. In addition and impliedly, we can refer to Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court which say that "x x x when
an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust
alone, x x x."
In a number of cases, we have sanctioned the appointment of more than one administrator for the benefit of the estate and
those interested therein.13 We recognized that the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent or the
determination of a persons suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment
of the court exercising the power of appointment.14
Under certain circumstances and for various reasons well-settled in Philippine and American jurisprudence, we have upheld
the appointment of co-administrators: (1) to have the benefits of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different
interests represented;15 (2) where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the
management of the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to
settle;16 (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the
estate;17 and when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have another competent person associated
with him in the office.18
In the frequently cited Matias v. Gonzales, we dwelt on the appointment of special co-administrators during the pendency of
the appeal for the probate of the decedents will. Pending the probate thereof, we recognized Matias special interest in the
decedents estate as universal heir and executrix designated in the instrument who should not be excluded in the
administration thereof. Thus, we held that justice and equity demands that the two (2) factions among the non-compulsory
heirs of the decedent, consisting of an instituted heir (Matias) and intestate heirs (respondents thereat), should be represented
in the management of the decedents estate.19
Another oft-cited case is Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, where we held that "inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-half of the
conjugal properties and that she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to deprive her of any hand in the administration of

the estate prior to the probate of the will would be unfair to her proprietary interests."20
Hewing closely to the aforementioned cases is our ruling in Ventura v. Ventura21 where we allowed the appointment of the
surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent as co-administrators. However, we drew a distinction between the
heirs categorized as next of kin, the nearest of kin in the category being preferred, thus:
In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona while the next of kin are:
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The "next of kin" has been defined as those persons who are
entitled under the statute of distribution to the decedents property (citations omitted). It is generally said that "the nearest of
kin, whose interest in the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator. Among members of a
class the strongest ground for preference is the amount or preponderance of interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of
kin is to be preferred." (citations omitted)
As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate
children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura,
they are entitled to preference over the illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel Ventura. Hence,
under the aforestated preference provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons to be appointed administrator are
Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the Court, in order to represent both interests.22 (Emphasis supplied)
In Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals,23 we maintained that the order of preference in the appointment of an administrator
depends on the attendant facts and circumstances. In that case, we affirmed the legitimate childs appointment as special
administrator, and eventually as regular administrator, of the decedents estate as against the surviving spouse who the lower
court found unsuitable. Reiterating Sioca v. Garcia24 as good law, we pointed out that unsuitableness for appointment as
administrator may consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate.
In Valarao v. Pascual,25 we see another story with a running theme of heirs squabbling over the estate of a decedent. We
found no reason to set aside the probate courts refusal to appoint as special co-administrator Diaz, even if he had a
demonstrable interest in the estate of the decedent and represented one of the factions of heirs, because the evidence
weighed by the probate court pointed to Diazs being remiss in his previous duty as co-administrator of the estatein the early
part of his administration. Surveying the previously discussed cases of Matias, Corona, and Vda. de Dayrit, we clarified,
thus:
Respondents cannot take comfort in the cases of Matias v. Gonzales, Corona v. Court of Appeals, and Vda. de Dayrit v.
Ramolete, cited in the assailed Decision. Contrary to their claim, these cases do not establish an absolute right demandable
from the probate court to appoint special co-administrators who would represent the respective interests of squabbling heirs.
Rather, the cases constitute precedents for the authority of the probate court to designate not just one but also two or more
special co-administrators for a single estate. Now whether the probate court exercises such prerogative when the heirs are
fighting among themselves is a matter left entirely to its sound discretion.
Furthermore, the cases of Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit hinge upon factual circumstances other than the incompatible
interests of the heirs which are glaringly absent from the instant case. In Matias this Court ordered the appointment of a
special co-administrator because of the applicant's status as the universal heir and executrix designated in the will, which we
considered to be a "special interest" deserving protection during the pendency of the appeal. Quite significantly, since the
lower court in Matias had already deemed it best to appoint more than one special administrator, we found grave abuse of

discretion in the act of the lower court in ignoring the applicant's distinctive status in the selection of another special
administrator.
In Corona we gave "highest consideration" to the "executrix's choice of Special Administrator, considering her own inability
to serve and the wide latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix in her will," for this Court to compel her appointment as
special co-administrator. It is also manifest from the decision in Corona that the presence of conflicting interests among the
heirs therein was not per se the key factor in the designation of a second special administrator as this fact was taken into
account only to disregard or, in the words of Corona, to "overshadow" the objections to the appointment on grounds of
"impracticality and lack of kinship."
Finally in Vda. de Dayrit we justified the designation of the wife of the decedent as special co-administrator because it was
"our considered opinion that inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-half of the conjugal properties and that she, too, is a
compulsory heir of her husband, to deprive her of any hand in the administration of the estate prior to the probate of the will
would be unfair to her proprietary interests." The special status of a surviving spouse in the special administration of an
estate was also emphasized in Fule v. Court of Appeals where we held that the widow would have more interest than any
other next of kin in the proper administration of the entire estate since she possesses not only the right of succession over a
portion of the exclusive property of the decedent but also a share in the conjugal partnership for which the good or bad
administration of the estate may affect not just the fruits but more critically the naked ownership thereof. And in Gabriel v.
Court of Appeals we recognized the distinctive status of a surviving spouse applying as regular administrator of the deceased
spouse's estate when we counseled the probate court that "there must be a very strong case to justify the exclusion of the
widow from the administration."
Clearly, the selection of a special co-administrator in Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit was based upon the independent
proprietary interests and moral circumstances of the appointee that were not necessarily related to the demand for
representation being repeatedly urged by respondents.26 (Emphasis supplied)
In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, we unequivocally declared the mandatory character of the rule on the order of preference for
the issuance of letters of administration:
Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the order of preference in the issuance of letters of administration,
it categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors, and requires that sequence to be observed in
appointing an administrator. It would be a grave abuse of discretion for the probate court to imperiously set aside and
insouciantly ignore that directive without any valid and sufficient reason therefor.27
Subsequently, in Angeles v. Angeles-Maglaya,28 we expounded on the legal contemplation of a "next of kin," thus:
Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the deceased, the surviving
spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When the law speaks of "next of kin," the reference is to those who
are entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the decedent's property; one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to
share in the estate as distributed, or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters of
administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue
of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this consideration, the trial court acted within
bounds when it looked into and passed upon the claimed relationship of respondent to the late Francisco Angeles.29
Finally, in Uy v. Court of Appeals,30 we took into consideration the size of, and benefits to, the estate should respondent

therein be appointed as co-administrator. We emphasized that where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and
perplexing one to settle, the appointment of co-administrators may be sanctioned by law.
In our Decision under consideration, we zeroed in on Emilio IIIs demonstrable interest in the estate and glossed over the
order of preference set forth in the Rules. We gave weight to Emilio IIIs demonstrable interest in Cristinas estate and
without a closer scrutiny of the attendant facts and circumstances, directed co-administration thereof. We are led to a review
of such position by the foregoing survey of cases.
The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate to be settled does not ipso facto entitle an
interested person to co-administration thereof. Neither does squabbling among the heirs nor adverse interests necessitate the
discounting of the order of preference set forth in Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of administrator of the
estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed
as administrator.31 Given Isabels unassailable interest in the estate as one of the decedents legitimate grandchildren and
undoubted nearest "next of kin," the appointment of Emilio III as co-administrator of the same estate, cannot be a
demandable right. It is a matter left entirely to the sound discretion of the Court32 and depends on the facts and the attendant
circumstances of the case.33
Thus, we proceed to scrutinize the attendant facts and circumstances of this case even as we reiterate Isabels and her
siblings apparent greater interest in the estate of Cristina.
These considerations do not warrant the setting aside of the order of preference mapped out in Section 6, Rule 78 of the
Rules of Court. They compel that a choice be made of one over the other.
1. The bitter estrangement and long-standing animosity between Isabel, on the one hand, and Emilio III, on
the other, traced back from the time their paternal grandparents were alive, which can be characterized as
adverse interest of some kind by, or hostility of, Emilio III to Isabel who is immediately interested in the
estate;
2. Corollary thereto, the seeming impossibility of Isabel and Emilio III working harmoniously as coadministrators may result in prejudice to the decedents estate, ultimately delaying settlement thereof; and
3. Emilio III, for all his claims of knowledge in the management of Cristinas estate, has not looked after the
estates welfare and has acted to the damage and prejudice thereof.
Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that Emilio IIIs demonstrable interest in the estate makes him a suitable
co-administrator thereof, the evidence reveals that Emilio III has turned out to be an unsuitable administrator of the estate.
Respondent Isabel points out that after Emilio IIIs appointment as administrator of the subject estate in 2001, he has not
looked after the welfare of the subject estate and has actually acted to the damage and prejudice thereof as evidenced by the
following:
1. Emilio III, despite several orders from the probate court for a complete inventory, omitted in the partial
inventories34 he filed therewith properties of the estate35 including several parcels of land, cash, bank deposits,
jewelry, shares of stock, motor vehicles, and other personal properties, contrary to Section 1,36 paragraph a,
Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.

2. Emilio III did not take action on both occasions against Federicos settlement of the decedents estate
which adjudicated to himself a number of properties properly belonging to said estate (whether wholly or
partially), and which contained a declaration that the decedent did not leave any descendants or heirs, except
for Federico, entitled to succeed to her estate.37
In compliance to our Resolution dated 18 April 2012 requiring Emilio III to respond to the following imputations of Isabel
that:
1. Emilio III did not file an inventory of the assets until November 14, 2002;
2. The inventory Emilio III submitted did not include several properties of the decedent;
3. That properties belonging to the decedent have found their way to different individuals or persons; several properties to
Federico Suntay himself; and
4. While some properties have found their way to Emilio III, by reason of falsified documents;38
Emilio III refutes Isabels imputations that he was lackadaisical in assuming and performing the functions of administrator
of Cristinas estate:
1. From the time of the RTCs Order appointing Emilio III as administrator, Isabel, in her pleadings before
the RTC, had vigorously opposed Emilio IIIs assumption of that office, arguing that "the decision of the RTC
dated 9 November 2001 is not among the judgments authorized by the Rules of Court which may be
immediately implemented or executed;"
2. The delay in Emilio IIIs filing of an inventory was due to Isabels vociferous objections to Emilio IIIs
attempts to act as administrator while the RTC decision was under appeal to the Court of Appeals;
3. The complained partial inventory is only initiatory, inherent in the nature thereof, and one of the first steps
in the lengthy process of settlement of a decedents estate, such that it cannot constitute a complete and total
listing of the decedents properties; and
4. The criminal cases adverted to are trumped-up charges where Isabel, as private complainant, has been
unwilling to appear and testify, leading the Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44 of Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro, to warn the prosecutor of a possible motu propio dismissal of the cases.
While we can subscribe to Emilio IIIs counsels explanation for the blamed delay in the filing of an inventory and his
exposition on the nature thereof, partial as opposed to complete, in the course of the settlement of a decedents estate, we do
not find any clarification on Isabels accusation that Emilio III had deliberately omitted properties in the inventory, which
properties of Cristina he knew existed and which he claims to be knowledgeable about.
The general denial made by Emilio III does not erase his unsuitability as administrator rooted in his failure to "make and
return x x x a true and complete inventory" which became proven fact when he actually filed partial inventories before the
probate court and by his inaction on two occasions of Federicos exclusion of Cristinas other compulsory heirs, herein
Isabel and her siblings, from the list of heirs.

As administrator, Emilio III enters into the office, posts a bond and executes an oath to faithfully discharge the duties of
settling the decedents estate with the end in view of distribution to the heirs, if any. This he failed to do. The foregoing
circumstances of Emilio IIIs omission and inaction become even more significant and speak volume of his unsuitability as
administrator as it demonstrates his interest adverse to those immediately interested in the estate of the decedent, Cristina.
In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and the protracted litigation, is the inescapable fact that
Emilio III and respondent Isabel have a deep aversion for each other.1awp++i1 To our mind, it becomes highly impractical,
nay, improbable, for the two to work as co-administrators of their grandmothers estate. The allegations of Emilio III, the
testimony of Federico and the other witnesses for Federico and Emilio III that Isabel and her siblings were estranged from
their grandparents further drive home the point that Emilio III bears hostility towards Isabel. More importantly, it appears
detrimental to the decedents estate to appoint a co-administrator (Emilio III) who has shown an adverse interest of some
kind or hostility to those, such as herein respondent Isabel, immediately interested in the said estate.
Bearing in mind that the issuance of letters of administration is simply a preliminary order to facilitate the settlement of a
decedents estate, we here point out that Emilio III is not without remedies to protect his interests in the estate of the
decedent. In Hilado v. Court of Appeals,39 we mapped out as among the allowable participation of "any interested persons"
or "any persons interested in the estate" in either testate or intestate proceedings:
xxxx
4. Section 640 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the estate of the deceased "to complain to the court of the
concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of evidence of the decedents title or interest
therein;"
5. Section 1041 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of the examination and allowance of the
Administrators account "to persons interested;"
6. Section 7(b)42 of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the persons interested" before it may hear and grant a
petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the estate; and
7. Section 1,43 Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in the estate" to petition for an order for the distribution of the
residue of the estate of the decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or provided for.44
In addition to the foregoing, Emilio III may likewise avail of the remedy found in Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court,
to wit:
Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation, or
removal. If an executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle the estate according to law, or to perform
an order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise
incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or, in its discretion, may permit him to resign.
When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the remaining executor or administrator may administer the
trust alone, unless the court grants letters to someone to act with him. If there is no remaining executor or administrator,
administration may be granted to any suitable person.
Once again, as we have done in the Decision, we exercise judicial restraint: we uphold that the question of who are the heirs

of the decedent Cristina is not yet upon us. Article 992 of the Civil Code or the curtain bar rule is inapplicable in resolving
the issue of who is better qualified to administer the estate of the decedent.
Thus, our disquisition in the assailed Decision:
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to refrain from making a final declaration of heirship and
distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in the estates of Cristina and Federico, considering that the question on
who will administer the properties of the long deceased couple has yet to be settled.
Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata on the same issue remains good law:
The declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature, although the evidence sufficiently shows who are entitled to
succeed the deceased. The estate had hardly been judicially opened, and the proceeding has not as yet reached the stage of
distribution of the estate which must come after the inheritance is liquidated.
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the foregoing admonition:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made. - x x x. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the
lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless
the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs.45
Lastly, we dispose of a peripheral issue raised in the Supplemental Comment46 of Emilio III questioning the Special Second
Division which issued the 18 April 2012 Resolution. Emilio III asseverates that "the operation of the Special Second
Division in Baguio is unconstitutional and void" as the Second Division in Manila had already promulgated its Decision on
16 June 2010 on the petition filed by him:
7. The question is: who created the Special Second Division in Baguio, acting separately from the Second Division of the
Supreme Court in Manila? There will then be two Second Divisions of the Supreme Court: one acting with the Supreme
Court in Manila, and another Special Second Division acting independently of the Second Division of the Supreme Court in
Manila.47
For Emilio IIIs counsels edification, the Special Second Division in Baguio is not a different division created by the
Supreme Court.
The Second Division which promulgated its Decision on this case on 16 June 2010, penned by Justice Antonio Eduardo B.
Nachura, now has a different composition, with the advent of Justice Nachuras retirement on 13 June 2011. Section 7, Rule
2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court provides:
Sec. 7. Resolutions of motions for reconsideration or clarification of decisions or signed resolutions and all other motions
and incidents subsequently filed; creation of a Special Division. Motions for reconsideration or clarification of a decision
or of a signed resolution and all other motions and incidents subsequently filed in the case shall be acted upon by the

ponente and the other Members of the Division who participated in the rendition of the decision or signed resolution.
If the ponente has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is disqualified, or has inhibited himself or herself from acting
on the motion for reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall be replaced through raffle by a new ponente who shall be
chosen among the new Members of the Division who participated in the rendition of the decision or signed resolution and
who concurred therein. If only one Member of the Court who participated and concurred in the rendition of the decision or
signed resolution remains, he or she shall be designated as the new ponente.
If a Member (not the ponente) of the Division which rendered the decision or signed resolution has retired, is no longer a
Member of the Court, is disqualified, or has inhibited himself or herself from acting on the motion for reconsideration or
clarification, he or she shall be replaced through raffle by a replacement Member who shall be chosen from the other
Divisions until a new Justice is appointed as replacement for the retired Justice. Upon the appointment of a new Justice, he
or she shall replace the designated Justice as replacement Member of the Special Division.
Any vacancy or vacancies in the Special Division shall be filled by raffle from among the other Members of the Court to
constitute a Special Division of five (5) Members.
If the ponente and all the Members of the Division that rendered the Decision or signed Resolution are no longer Members
of the Court, the case shall be raffled to any Member of the Court and the motion shall be acted upon by him or her with the
participation of the other Members of the Division to which he or she belongs.
If there are pleadings, motions or incidents subsequent to the denial of the motion for reconsideration or clarification, the
case shall be acted upon by the ponente on record with the participation of the other Members of the Division to which he or
she belongs at the time said pleading, motion or incident is to be taken up by the Court. (Emphasis supplied)
As regards the operation thereof in Baguio City, such is simply a change in venue for the Supreme Court's summer session
held last April.48
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Our Decision in G.R. No. 183053 dated 16
June 2010 is MODIFIED. Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall solely issue
to respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos,
Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise
directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO*

Chief Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
AT T E S T AT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Special Second Division
C E T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
*

Per raffle dated 4 July 2011.

The Papal Bull mentioned in our Decision of 16 June 2010 (Suntay III v. Conjuangco-Suntay, G.R. No.
183053, 16 June 2010, 621 SCRA 142, 144).
2

Penned by Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura (now retired) with Associate Justices Antonio T.
Carpio (Chairperson), Diosdado M. Peralta, Roberto A. Abad and Jose Portugal Perez of the Second Division,
concurring. Rollo, pp. 231-246.
3

Id. at 244-245.

Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, 360 Phil. 932, 936-937 (1998).

Rollo, pp. 43-44.

Id. at 60.

Id. at 31.

Uy v. Court of Appeals, 519 Phil. 673 (2006); Angeles v. Angeles-Maglaya, 506 Phil. 347 (2005); Valarao v.
Pascual, 441 Phil. 226 (2002); Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 364 Phil. 188 (1999).
9

Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-59935, 30 September 1982, 117 SCRA 608, 612; Corona v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. L-59821, 30 August 1982, 116 SCRA 316, 320; Matias v. Gonzales, 101 Phil. 852, 858
(1957).
10

Gonzales v. Aguinaldo, G.R. No. 74769, 28 September 1990, 190 SCRA 112, 117-118.

11

See Articles 91 and 106 of the Family Code.

12

See Article 887, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code.

13

Matias v. Gonzales; Corona v. Court of Appeals; Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, supra note 9.

14

Uy v. Court of Appeals, supra note 8 at 680; Angeles v. Angeles-Maglaya, supra note 8 at 365;
Valarao v. Pascual, supra note 8 at 234; Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 8 at 210-211.

15

Gonzales v. Aguinaldo, supra note 10 at 118-119.

16

Uy v. Court of Appeals, supra note 8 at 681; Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101512, 7 August 1992,
212 SCRA 413, 423 citing Copeland v. Shapley, 100 NE. 1080.
17

Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, id.

18

In re Fichters Estate, 279 N.Y.S. 597.

19

Supra note 9.

20

Supra note 9 at 612.

21

243 Phil. 952 (1988).

22

Id. at 962-963.

23

Supra note 8.

24

44 Phil. 711 (1923).

25

Supra note 8.

26

Id. at 233-235.

27

Supra note 16 at 420.

28

Supra note 8.

29

Id. at 365.

30

Supra note 8.

31

Gonzales v. Aguinaldo, supra note 10 at 117.

32

Fernandez v. Maravilla, G.R. No. L-18799, 26 March 1965, 13 SCRA 416, 419-420.

33

Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 8 at 211.

34

Annexes "3," "5," and "6," of respondents Motion for Reconsideration. Rollo, pp. 318-331.

35

Annex "4," of respondents Motion for Reconsideration. Id. at 326.

36

Section 1. Bond to be given issuance of letters. Amount. Conditions. Before an executor or administrator
enters upon the execution of his trust, and letters testamentary or of administration issue, he shall give a bond,
in such sum as the court directs, conditioned as follows:
(a) To make and return to the court, within three (3) months, a true and complete inventory of all
goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which shall come to his possession or
knowledge or to the possession of any other person for him;
37

Annexes "1," and "2," of respondents Motion for Reconsideration. Rollo, pp. 318-321.

38

Id. at 407.

39

G.R. No. 164108, 8 May 2009, 587 SCRA 464.

40

Section 6. Proceedings when property concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed.

If an executor or administrator, heir, legatee, creditor, or other individual interested in the estate of
the deceased, complains to the court having jurisdiction of the estate that a person is suspected of
having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away any of the money, goods, or chattels of the deceased,
or that such person has in his possession or has knowledge of any deed, conveyance, bond, contract,
or other writing which contains evidence of or tends to disclose the right, title, interest, or claim of the
deceased to real or personal estate, or the last will and testament of the deceased, the court may cite
such suspected person to appear before it and may examine him on oath on the matter of such
complaint; and if the person so cited refuses to appear, or to answer on such examination or such
interrogatories as are put to him, the court may punish him for contempt, and may commit him to

prison until he submits to the order of the court. The interrogatories put to any such person, and his
answers thereto, shall be in writing and shall be filed in the clerks office.
41

Section 10. Account to be settled on notice. Before the account of an executor or administrator is allowed,
notice shall be given to persons interested of the time and place of examining and allowing the same; and
such notice may be given personally to such persons interested or by advertisement in a newspaper or
newspapers, or both, as the court directs.
42

Section 7. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber estate. x x x.
(a) x x x
(b) The court shall thereupon fix a time and place for hearing such petition, and cause notice stating
the nature of the petition, the reason for the same, and the time and place of hearing, to be given
personally or by mail to the persons interested, and may cause such further notice to be given, by
publication or otherwise, as it shall deem proper.

43

Section 1. When order for distribution of residue made. When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of
administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance
with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person
interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons
entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons
may demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person
having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of
the deceased person or as to he distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above-mentioned has been made
or provided for, unless the distributes, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court,
conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.
44

Hilado v. Court of Appeals, supra note 37 at 472-473.

45

Rollo, pp. 243-244.

46

Id. at 442-445.

47

Id. at 443.

48

See Resolution dated 9 February 2012, A.M. No. 12-2-7-SC Re: 2012 Summer Session in Baguio City.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

SPOUSES NICANOR
G.R. No. 153736
TUMBOKON (deceased),
substituted by: ROSARIO
SESPEE and their
Children, namely:
NICANOR S.
TUMBOKON, JR., NELIA
S. TUMBOKON, NEMIA
T. SEGOVIA, NOBELLA
S. TUMBOKON,
Present:
NABIGAIL T. TAAY,
NAZARENE T.
MONTALVO, NORGEL S.
TUMBOKON, NEYSA S.
TUMBOKON,
SILVESTRE S.
TUMBOKON, NORA T.
MILCZAREK, NONITA T. CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson
BRION,
CARPIO, NERLYN S.
TUMBOKON, and NINFA BERSAMIN,
ABAD,* and
T. SOLIDUM,
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ
Petitioners,

-versus-

Promulgated:
APOLONIA G. LEGASPI,
and PAULINA S. DE
MAGTANUM,
* and* Additional member per Special Order No. 843 dated May 17, 2010.

Respondents.
August 4, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The question presented in this appeal is whether the ruling in a criminal

prosecution for qualified theft (involving coconut fruits) bound the complainant
(petitioners herein) and the accused (respondents herein) on the issue of ownership
of the land, which was brought up as a defense, as to preclude the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) or the Court of Appeals (CA) from adjudicating the same issue in a
civil case filed prior to the promulgation of the decision in the criminal case.

Under contention herein are the ownership and possession of that parcel of
land with an area of 12,480 square meters, more or less, situated in Barangay
Buenavista (formerly Barangay San Isidro, in the Municipality of Ibajay, Province
of Aklan. The land planted to rice, corn, and coconuts was originally owned by the
late Alejandra Sespee (Alejandra), who had had two marriages. The first marriage
was to Gaudencio Franco, by whom she bore Ciriaca Franco, whose husband was

Victor Miralles. The second marriage was to Jose Garcia, by whom she bore
respondent Apolonia Garcia (Apolonia), who married Primo Legaspi. Alejandra
died without a will in 1935, and was survived by Apolonia and Crisanto Miralles,
the son of Ciriaca (who had predeceased Alejandra in 1924) and Victor Miralles;
hence, Crisanto Miralles was Alejandras grandson.

The ownership and possession of the parcel of land became controversial

after Spouses Nicanor Tumbokon and Rosario Sespee (petitioners) asserted their
right in it by virtue of their purchase of it from Cresenciana Inog, who had
supposedly acquired it by purchase from Victor Miralles. The tug-of-war over the
property between the petitioners and the respondents first led to the
commencement of a criminal case. The Spouses Nicanor Tumbokon and Rosario
Sespee filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft against respondents Apolonia
and Paulina S. Magtanum and others not parties herein, namely: Rosendo
Magtanum, Antonio Magtanum, Ulpiano Mangilaya, charging them with stealing
coconut fruits from the land subject of the present case. 298[1] The criminal case,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 2269, was assigned to Branch III of the erstwhile
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Aklan.299[2]

298[1] CA Decision, CA-G.R. CV-No. 45672 dated May 15, 2001, penned by Justice
Roberto A. Barrios (deceased), with Justices Ramon Mabutas, Jr. (retired) and
Edgardo P. Cruz (retired), concurring; rollo, pp. 24-32.
299[2] Rollo, p. 25.

After trial, the CFI found the respondents and their co-accused guilty as
charged in its decision dated June 10, 1972. The respondents appealed (C.A.-G.R.
No. 13830-CR), but the CA affirmed their conviction on February 19, 1975,
whereby the CA rejected respondent Apolonias defense of ownership of the land. 300
[3]

In the meanwhile, on September 21, 1972, or prior to the CAs rendition of

its decision in the criminal case, the petitioners commenced this suit for recovery
of ownership and possession of real property with damages against the respondents
in the CFI. This suit, docketed as Civil Case No. 240 and entitled Spouses Nicanor
P. Tumbokon and Rosario S. Sespee v. Apolonia G. Legaspi, Jesus Legaspi,
Alejandra Legaspi, Primo Legaspi, Jose Legaspi, and Paulina S. de Magtanum,
was assigned also to Branch III of the CFI, and involved the same parcel of land
from where the coconut fruits subject of the crime of qualified theft in Criminal
Case No. 2269 had been taken.

On February 17, 1994, the RTC, which meanwhile replaced the CFI
following the implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, 301[4] rendered
its decision in favor of the petitioners herein, holding and disposing thus:

300[3] Id., pp. 65-71 (The ponente was then Associate Justice Ramon C. Fernandez,
and the concurring members were then Associate Justice Efren I. Plana and
Associate Justice Venicio Escolin, all of whom became Members of the Court, but
had since retired).
301[4] Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

After a careful study of the evidence on record, the Court finds that the
plaintiffs were able to establish that plaintiff Rosario Sespee Tumbokon purchased
the land in question from Cresenciana Inog on December 31, 1959 (Exh. C).
Cresenciana Inog, in turn, acquired the land by purchase from Victor Miralles on
June 19, 1957 (Exh. B). Seven (7) years before, on May 8, 1950, the land was
mortgaged by Victor Miralles to Cresenciana Inog as shown by a Deed of Pacto
de Retro (Exh. A), and from 1950 up to 1959, Cresenciana Inog was in continuous
and peaceful possession of the land in question. xxx
xxxx
WHEREFORE, finding preponderance of evidence in favor of the plaintiffs,
judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. The plaintiffs are hereby declared the true and lawful owners, and entitled
to the possession of the parcel of land of 12,480 square meters in area, declared in
the name of plaintiff Rosario S. Tumbokon, under Tax Declaration No. 29220,
situated in Barangay Buenavista (formerly San Isidro), Ibajay, Aklan;
2. The defendants are ordered and directed to vacate the land in question,
and restore and deliver the possession thereof to the plaintiffs; and
3. No pronouncement as to damages, but with costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.302[5]

The respondents appealed to the CA.

On May 15, 2001, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and dismissed
the complaint,303[6] opining and ruling thus:

302[5] Penned by Judge Sheila Martelino-Cortes; rollo, pp. 35-37.

303[6] Supra, at note 1.

The appellees trace their acquisition of the subject lot to the admitted primal
owner Alejandra Sespee through her supposed sale of it to her son-in-law Victor
Miralles, who sold this to Cresenciana Inog, and who in turn sold it to the
appellees. In the process, they presented the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. B, June
19, 1957) executed by Victor Miralles in favor of Cresenciana Inog but wherein it
is provided in the said instrument that:

That this parcel of land abovementioned was inherited from the

deceased Alejandra Sespee, by the party of the First Part being the sole
heir of the said Alejandra Sespee, having no other brothers or sisters.
This claim of being the sole heir is obviously false and erroneous for Alejandra
Sespee had more than one intestate heir, and Victor Miralles as a mere son-in-law
could not be one of them.
This also damages and puts to serious doubt their other and contradictory
claim that Victor Miralles instead bought the lot from Alejandra Sespee. This
supposed sale was oral, one that can of course be facilely feigned. And it is likely
to be so for the claim is sweeping, vacuous and devoid of the standard particulars
like what was the price, when and where was the sale made, who were present, or
who knew of it. The record is bereft too of documentary proof that Victor Miralles
exercised the rights and performed the obligations of an owner for no tax
declarations nor tax receipt has been submitted or even adverted to.
The testimonial evidence of the appellants as to ownership, the sale and
possession is inadequate, with even the appellant Nicanor Tumbokon stating that:
Q Did you come to know before you purchase (sic) the property
from whom did V. Miralles acquired (sic) the land?
A No, sir.
xxx
Q And you did not come to know out (sic) and why V. Miralles
came to possess the land under litigation before it was sold to C.
Inog?
A All I was informed was V. Miralles became automatically the
heir of A. Sespee after the death of the wife which is the only
daughter of A. Sespee.
Q How did you know that V. Miralles became automatically the
heir of the land after the death of his wife?
A He is the only son-in-law. (TSN, pp. 2-3, Feb. 26, 1974;
emphasis supplied)

While Victor Miralles may have been in physical possession of the lot for a while,
this was not as owner but as mere Administrator as was clearly appearing in tax
declaration no. 21714 (Exhs. J, 1).The corroboration in this by Lourdes Macawili
(TSN, June 7, 1973) does not help the appellees (herein petitioners) any for she
never knew the source of the property. Neither does the testimony of Crisanto
Miralles succor the appellees (petitioners). He was the son of Victor Miralles and
the husband of the said Cresenciana Inog, the supposed buyer, owner and
possessor of the land in question from 1950-1957, and yet Crisanto Miralles could
only say:
Q Are there improvements on the land in question?
A I do not know because I did not bother to go to the land in
question.(TSN, p. 4, Aug. 18, 1973; emphasis supplied)]
These strongly suggest that the sales and claim of possession were shams,
and are further demolished by the following testimonies:
Q After the death of Alejandra Sespee who inherited this land in
question?
A Apolonia.
Q At present who is in possession of the land in question?
A Apolonia Legaspi.
Q From the time that Apolonia Legaspi took possession of the land
up to the present do you know if anybody interrupted her
possession?
A No sir. (tsn, Urbana Ta-an Vda. de Franco, p. 7, Nov. 24, 1977)
xxx
Q Now, since when did you know the land in question?
A Since I was at the age of 20 yrs. old. (TSN; Crispina Taladtad, p.
3; Jan. 20, 1977; [she was 74 yrs. old at the time of this
testimony]).
xxx
Q And for how long has Apolonia Garcia Legaspi been in
possession of the land in question?
A Since the time I was at the age of 20 yrs. old when I was been
(sic) invited there to work up to the present she is in possession of
the land.
Q You said that you know Cresenciana Inog, do you know if
Cresenciana Inog has ever possessed the land in question?

A Never.
Q You also said that you know Nicanor Tumbokon and his wife
Rosario Tumbokon, my question is do you know if this Nicanor
Tumbokon and his wife Rosario have ever possessed and
usufructed this land under litigation?
A No, sir.
Q You also stated a while ago that you know Victor Miralles, do
you know if Victor Miralles had ever possessed this under
litigation?
A No, he had not. (p. 9, ibid; emphasis supplied)
Thus neither do We buy the appellees contention that ownership of the
disputed land was acquired by their predecessors-in-interest thru lapse of time.
Acquisitive prescription requires possession in the concept of owner, and they
have not been able to prove even mere possession.
As proponents it was incumbent upon the appellees to prove that they were
the owners of the lot and that they were being unlawfully deprived of their
possession thereof. But this they failed to do. It is a basic rule in evidence that
each party must prove his affirmative allegation. Since the burden of evidence lies
with the party who asserts the affirmative allegation, the plaintiff or complainant
has to prove this affirmative allegations in the complaint and the defendant or the
respondent has to prove the affirmative allegation in his affirmative defenses and
counterclaim.(AKELCO vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 121439, Jan 25,2000)
But this hoary rule also cuts both ways. Appellants too must also prove the
allegations to support their prayer to declare the litigated lot the exclusive
property of the defendants Apolonia G. Legaspi and Paulina S. Magtanum;
(Answer, p. 6, record). Apolonia Legaspi however is only one of the putative
intestate heirs of Alejandra Sespee, the other being Crisanto Miralles who stands
in the stead of Ciriaca, his predeceased mother and other daughter of the
decedent. But then no judgment can be made as to their successional rights for
Crisanto Miralles was never impleaded. Neither is there a proof that can convince
that Paulina S. Magtanum who is merely a niece of the decedent, should also be
declared a co-owner of the inherited lot.
Because of said inadequacies, We cannot rule beyond the holding that the
appellees (petitioners) are not the owners and therefore not entitled to the
recovery of the litigated lot.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
in its place judgment is rendered DISMISSING the Complaint.

SO ORDERED.304[7]

Hence, the petitioners appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

Issues

The issues to be resolved are the following:

1. Whether or not the decision in C.A.-G.R. CV 45672 reversing the

decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 240 was supported by law
and the evidence on record;
2. Whether or not the decision in C.A.-G.R. No. 13830-CR affirming
the decision of the CFI of Aklan in Criminal Case No. 2269 had
the effect of res judicata on the issue of ownership of the land
involved in Civil Case No. 240, considering that such land was the
same land involved in Criminal Case No. 2269.

Ruling

The petition has no merit.

304[7] Rollo, pp. 28-32.

A
Reversal by the CA was supported
by law and the evidence on record

The CA correctly found that the petitioners claim of ownership could not be
legally and factually sustained.
First of all, the petitioners adduced no competent evidence to establish that
Victor Miralles, the transferor of the land to Cresenciana Inog (the petitioners
immediate predecessor in interest) had any legal right in the first place to transfer
ownership. He was not himself an heir of Alejandra, being only her son-in-law (as
the husband of Ciriaca, one of Alejandras two daughters). Thus, the statement in
the deed of absolute sale (Exhibit B) entered into between Victor Miralles and
Cresenciana Inog, to the effect that the parcel of land was inherited from the
deceased Alejandra Sespee by Victor Miralles being the sole heir of the said
Alejandra Sespee, having no other brothers or sisters, was outrightly false.

Secondly, a decedents compulsory heirs in whose favor the law reserves a

part of the decedents estate are exclusively the persons enumerated in Article 887,
Civil Code, viz:

Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate
parents and ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with

respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are not excluded by those in
Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned,
shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code.
(807a)

Only two forced heirs survived Alejandra upon her death, namely:
respondent Apolonia, her daughter, and Crisanto Miralles, her grandson. The latter
succeeded Alejandra by right of representation because his mother, Ciriaca, had
predeceased Alejandra. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue
of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person
represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if she were living
or if she could have inherited.305[8] Herein, the representative (Crisanto Miralles)
was called to the succession by law and not by the person represented (Ciriaca); he
thus succeeded Alejandra, not Ciriaca.306[9]

305[8] Article 970, Civil Code.

306[9] Article 971, Civil Code.

The foregoing undeniable facts rendered the hearsay testimony of Nicanor

Tumbokon to the effect that he had been informed that Victor Miralles had
bec[o]me automatically the heir of Alejandra after the death of his wife, the wife
being the only daughter and he the only son-in-law a plain irrelevancy.

Thirdly, Victor Miralles supposed acquisition of the land by oral sale from
Alejandra had no competent factual support in the records. For one, the oral sale
was incompatible with the petitioners anchor claim that he had acquired the land
by inheritance from Alejandra. Also, the evidence that the petitioners adduced on
the oral sale was insufficient and incredible, warranting the CAs rejection of the
oral sale under the following terms:

This also damages and puts to serious doubt their other and contradictory
claim that Victor Miralles instead bought the lot from Alejandra Sespee. This
supposed sale was oral, one that can of course be facilely feigned. And it is
likely to be so for the claim is sweeping, vacuous and devoid of the standard
particulars like what was the price, when and where was the sale made, who
were present, or who knew of it. The record is bereft too of documentary
proof that Victor Miralles exercised the rights and performed the obligations
of an owner for no tax declarations nor tax receipt has been submitted or
even adverted to.307[10]

With Victor Miralles lacking any just and legal right in the land, except as an
heir of Ciriaca, the transfer of the land from him to Cresenciana Inog was
ineffectual. As a consequence, Cresenciana Inog did not legally acquire the land,
and, in turn, did not validly transfer it to the petitioners.
307[10] Supra, at note 1, p. 28.

B
Bar by res judicata is not applicable.

The petitioners submit that the final ruling in the criminal case had already
determined the issue of ownership of the land; and that such ruling in the criminal
case barred the issue of ownership in the civil case under the doctrine of res
judicata.

The submission has no merit.

Res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or

decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.308[11] The doctrine of res judicata is
an old axiom of law, dictated by wisdom and sanctified by age, and founded on the
broad principle that it is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to
litigation by the same parties over a subject once fully and fairly adjudicated. It has
been appropriately said that the doctrine is a rule pervading every well-regulated
system of jurisprudence, and is put upon two grounds embodied in various maxims
of the common law: the one, public policy and necessity, which makes it to the
interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation reipublicae ut sit finis
litium; the other, the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for
308[11] Manila Electric Company v. Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc., G.R. No.
101783, January 23, 2002, 374 SCRA 262, 272.

one and the same cause nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa. A contrary
doctrine will subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of
individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of
suitors to the preservation of the public tranquillity and happiness.309[12]

Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the
parties or their privies in all later suits and on all points and matters determined in
the previous suit.310[13] The foundation principle upon which the doctrine rests is
that the parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once;
that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive
upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.311[14]

For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and

309[12]Allied Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108089, January 10,
1994, 229 SCRA 252.
310[13] Dela Cruz v. Joaquin, G.R. No. 162788, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 576.
311[14] Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101115, August 22, 2002, 387 SCRA
549.

second actions (a) identity of parties, (b) identity of the subject matter, and (c)
identity of cause of action.312[15]

The doctrine of res judicata has two aspects: the first, known as bar by prior
judgment, or estoppel by verdict, is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the
prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action;
the second, known as conclusiveness of judgment, also known as the rule of auter
action pendant, ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit
cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a
different cause of action and has the effect of preclusion of issues only.313[16]

Based on the foregoing standards, this action is not barred by the doctrine of
res judicata.
First of all, bar by prior judgment, the first aspect of the doctrine, is not
applicable, because the causes of action in the civil and the criminal actions were
different and distinct from each other. The civil action is for the recovery of
ownership of the land filed by the petitioners, while the criminal action was to
determine whether the act of the respondents of taking the coconut fruits from the
trees growing within the disputed land constituted the crime of qualified theft. In
312[15] Custodio v. Corrado, G.R. No. 146082, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA 500; Suarez
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83251, January 23, 1991; 193 SCRA 183; Filipinas
Investment and Finance Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
66059-60, December 4, 1989 (July 30 2004).
313[16] Rasdas v. Estenor, G.R. No. 157605, December 13, 2005, 477 SCRA 538,
548.

the former, the main issue is the legal ownership of the land, but in the latter, the
legal ownership of the land was not the main issue. The issue of guilt or innocence
was not dependent on the ownership of the land, inasmuch as a person could be
guilty of theft of the growing fruits even if he were the owner of the land.

Conclusiveness of judgment is not also applicable. The petitioners

themselves commenced both actions, and fully and directly participated in the trial
of both actions. Any estoppel from assailing the authority of the CA to determine
the ownership of the land based on the evidence presented in the civil action
applied only to the petitioners, who should not be allowed to assail the outcome of
the civil action after the CA had ruled adversely against them.

Moreover, the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment is subject to

exceptions, such as where there is a change in the applicable legal context, or to
avoid inequitable administration of justice.314[17] Applying the doctrine of
conclusiveness of judgments to this case will surely be iniquitous to the
respondents who have rightly relied on the civil case, not on the criminal case, to
settle the issue of ownership of the land. This action for recovery of ownership was
brought precisely to settle the issue of ownership of the property. In contrast, the
pronouncement on ownership of the land made in the criminal case was only the
response to the respondents having raised the ownership as a matter of defense.

314[17] Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, G.R. No. 118910, July 17, 1995, 246 SCRA 540,
561.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is denied, and the

decision rendered on May 15, 2001 by the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

AT T E S TAT I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

Chairperson

C E R T I F I C AT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

SECOND DIVISION

JARABINI G. DEL ROSARIO,

G.R. No. 187056

Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus -

PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,*
ABAD, and
PEREZ,** JJ.

ASUNCION G. FERRER, substituted

by her heirs, VICENTE, PILAR,
ANGELITO, FELIXBERTO, JR.,
all surnamed G. FERRER, and

Promulgated:

MIGUELA FERRER ALTEZA,

Respondents.

September 20, 2010

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

** Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza,

per Special Order 886 dated September 1, 2010.
**** Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo
B. Nachura, per Special Order 894 dated September 20, 2010.

This case pertains to a gift, otherwise denominated as a

donation mortis causa, which in reality is a donation inter vivos
made effective upon its execution by the donors and acceptance
thereof by the donees, and immediately transmitting ownership of
the donated property to the latter, thus precluding a subsequent
assignment thereof by one of the donors.

The Facts and the Case

On August 27, 1968 the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe

Gonzales

executed

document

entitled

Donation

Mortis

Causa315[1] in favor of their two children, Asuncion and Emiliano,

and their granddaughter, Jarabini (daughter of their predeceased
son, Zoilo) covering the spouses 126-square meter lot and the
house on it in Pandacan, Manila 316[2] in equal shares. The deed of
donation reads:

It is our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be

315[1] Rollo, p. 101.
316[2] Covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) 101873.

irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving spouse.

It is our will that Jarabini Gonzales-del Rosario and

Emiliano Gonzales will continue to occupy the portions now
occupied by them.

It is further our will that this DONATION MORTIS CAUSA

shall not in any way affect any other distribution of other
properties belonging to any of us donors whether testate or
intestate and where ever situated.

It is our further will that any one surviving spouse

reserves the right, ownership, possession and administration
of this property herein donated and accepted and this
Disposition and Donation shall be operative and effective upon
the death of the DONORS.317[3]

Although denominated as a donation mortis causa, which in

law is the equivalent of a will, the deed had no attestation clause
and was witnessed by only two persons. The named donees,
however, signified their acceptance of the donation on the face of
the document.

Guadalupe, the donor wife, died in September 1968. A few

months later or on December 19, 1968, Leopoldo, the donor
husband, executed a deed of assignment of his rights and
interests in subject property to their daughter Asuncion. Leopoldo
317[3] Supra note 1.

died in June 1972.

In 1998 Jarabini filed a petition for the probate of the August

27, 1968 deed of donation mortis causa before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila in Sp. Proc. 98-90589. 318[4] Asuncion
opposed the petition, invoking his father Leopoldos assignment of
his rights and interests in the property to her.

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision dated June 20,

2003,319[5] finding that the donation was in fact one made inter
vivos, the donors intention being to transfer title over the
property to the donees during the donors lifetime, given its
irrevocability. Consequently, said the RTC, Leopoldos subsequent
assignment of his rights and interest in the property was void
since he had nothing to assign. The RTC thus directed the
registration of the property in the name of the donees in equal
shares.320[6]

On Asuncions appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter

318[4] In the Matter of the Petition for the Allowance of the Donation Mortis Causa
of Leopoldo Gonzales. Jarabini del Rosario, Petitioner.
319[5] Rollo, pp. 125-128.
320[6] Id. at 128.

rendered a decision on December 23, 2008, 321[7] reversing that of

the RTC. The CA held that Jarabini cannot, through her petition for
the probate of the deed of donation mortis causa, collaterally
attack Leopoldos deed of assignment in Asuncions favor. The CA
further held that, since no proceeding exists for the allowance of
what Jarabini claimed was actually a donation inter vivos, the RTC
erred in deciding the case the way it did. Finally, the CA held that
the donation, being one given mortis causa, did not comply with
the requirements of a notarial will, 322[8] rendering the same void.
321[7] Id. at 54-64; penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. with the
concurrence of Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes and Mariflor P. Punzalan
Castillo.

322[8] Art. 728. Donations which are to take effect upon the death of the donor partake of
the nature of testamentary provisions, and shall be governed by the rules established in the Title
on Succession.Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end
thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last,
on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the
upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the
fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write
his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the
latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of
one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted
to them.

Following the CAs denial of Jarabinis motion for reconsideration, 323

[9] she filed the present petition with this Court.

Issue Presented

The key issue in this case is whether or not the spouses

Leopoldo and Guadalupes donation to Asuncion, Emiliano, and
Jarabini was a donation mortis causa, as it was denominated, or in
fact a donation inter vivos.

The Courts Ruling

That the document in question in this case was captioned

Donation Mortis Causa is not controlling. This Court has held that,
if a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not
altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa.324[10]

323[9] Rollo, p. 66.

324[10] Concepcion v. Concepcion, 91 Phil. 823, 828 (1952).

In Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals,325[11] the Court held

that irrevocability is a quality absolutely incompatible with the
idea of conveyances mortis causa, where revocability is precisely
the essence of the act. A donation mortis causa has the following
characteristics:

1.It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee

before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the
same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership
(full or naked) and control of the property while alive;

2.
That before his death, the transfer should be
revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability
may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in
the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and

3.
That the transfer should be void if the transferor
should survive the transferee.326[12] (Underscoring supplied)

The Court thus said in Austria-Magat that the express

irrevocability of the donation is the distinctive standard that
identifies the document as a donation inter vivos. Here, the
donors plainly said that it is our will that this Donation Mortis
Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving
spouse. The intent to make the donation irrevocable becomes
325[11] 426 Phil. 263 (2002).
326[12] Aluad v. Aluad, G.R. No. 176943, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 697, 705-706.

even clearer by the proviso that a surviving donor shall respect

the irrevocability of the donation. Consequently, the donation was
in reality a donation inter vivos.

The donors in this case of course reserved the right,

ownership, possession, and administration of the property and
made the donation operative upon their death. But this Court has
consistently held that such reservation (reddendum) in the
context of an irrevocable donation simply means that the donors
parted with their naked title, maintaining only

beneficial

ownership of the donated property while they lived. 327[13]

Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the

donation, which acceptance the deed required. 328[14] This Court
has held that an acceptance clause indicates that the donation is
inter vivos, since acceptance is a requirement only for such kind
of donations. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will,
need not be accepted by the donee during the donors lifetime. 329
327[13] Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals, supra note 11, at 274; Spouses Gestopa
v. Court of Appeals, 396 Phil. 262, 271 (2000); Alejandro v. Judge Geraldez, 168 Phil.
404, 420-421 (1977); Cuevas v. Cuevas, 98 Phil. 68, 71 (1955); Bonsato v. Court of
Appeals, 95 Phil. 481, 488 (1954).
328[14] Rollo, p. 101.
329[15] Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals, supra note 11, at 276-277.

[15]

Finally, as Justice J. B. L. Reyes said in Puig v. Peaflorida,330

[16] in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed a
donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid
uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the
deed.

Since the donation in this case was one made inter vivos, it
was immediately operative and final. The reason is that such kind
of donation is deemed perfected from the moment the donor
learned

of

the

donees

acceptance

of

the

donation.

The

acceptance makes the donee the absolute owner of the property

donated.331[17]

Given that the donation in this case was irrevocable or one

given inter vivos, Leopoldos subsequent assignment of his rights
and interests in the property to Asuncion should be regarded as
void for, by then, he had no more rights to assign. He could not
give what he no longer had. Nemo dat quod non habet.332[18]

330[16] 122 Phil. 665, 672 (1965).

331[17] Heirs of Sevilla v. Sevilla, 450 Phil. 598, 613 (2003).

The trial court cannot be faulted for passing upon, in a

petition for probate of what was initially supposed to be a
donation mortis causa, the validity of the document as a donation
inter vivos and the nullity of one of the donors subsequent
assignment of his rights and interests in the property. The Court
has held before that the rule on probate is not inflexible and
absolute.333[19] Moreover, in opposing the petition for probate
and in putting the validity of the deed of assignment squarely in
issue, Asuncion or those who substituted her may not now claim
that the trial court improperly allowed a collateral attack on such
assignment.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE

the assailed December 23, 2008 Decision and March 6, 2009
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 80549, and
REINSTATES in toto the June 20, 2003 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19, in Sp. Proc. 98-90589.

332[18] Gochan & Sons Realty Corp. v. Heirs of Raymundo Baba, 456 Phil. 569, 579
(2003).
333[19] Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 266, 273 (1997).

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been

reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13,

the Division Chairpersons
conclusions in the above
consultation before the case
opinion of the Courts Division.

Article VIII of the Constitution and

Attestation, I certify that the
Decision had been reached in
was assigned to the writer of the

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

AMELIA
P.
ARELLANO,
represented
by
her
duly
appointed guardians, AGNES P.
ARELLANO and NONA P.
ARELLANO,

G.R. No. 189776

Present:

Petitioner,
CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,
PERALTA,*
BERSAMIN,
MENDOZA,** and

- versus -

SERENO, JJ.

FRANCISCO PASCUAL
MIGUEL PASCUAL,

and

Respondents
.

Promulgated:
December 15, 2010

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
** Additional member per raffle dated January 6, 2010.
** and** Additional member per Special Order No. 921 dated December 13. 2010.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his
siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her
daughters334[1] Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents
Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual.335[2]

In a petition for Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of

Letters of Administration, docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. M-5034, filed
by respondents on April 28, 2000 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati,
respondents alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of land (the donated property) located
in Teresa Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the
decedent to petitioner the validity of which donation respondents assailed, may be
considered as an advance legitime of petitioner.

Respondents nephew Victor was, as they prayed for, appointed as

Administrator of the estate by Branch 135 of the Makati RTC.336[3]

334[1] Records (Vol. II), p. 646.

335[2] Id. at 542.
336[3] Records (Vol. I), p. 137.

Respecting the donated property, now covered in the name of petitioner by

Transfer Certificate of Title No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds of Makati, which
respondents assailed but which they, in any event, posited that it may be considered
as an advance legitime to petitioner, the trial court, acting as probate court, held
that it was precluded from determining the validity of the donation.

Provisionally passing, however, upon the question of title to the donated

property only for the purpose of determining whether it formed part of the
decedents estate,337[4] the probate court found the Deed of Donation valid in light
of the presumption of validity of notarized documents. It thus went on to hold that
it is subject to collation following Article 1061 of the New Civil Code which
reads:338[5]

Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must
bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received
from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any
other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in the determination of the
legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.

The probate court thereafter partitioned the properties of the intestate estate.
Thus it disposed:

337[4] CA rollo at p. 29.

338[5] Id. at 30.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered

declaring that:

1.

The property covered by TCT No. 181889 of the Register of Deeds of

Makati as part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual;

2.

The property covered by TCT No. 181889 to be subject to collation;

3.

1/3 of the rental receivables due on the property at the mezzanine and the
3rd floor of Unit 1110 Tanay St., Makati City form part of the estate of Angel
N. Pascual;

4.

The following properties form part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual:

a.

1/3 share in the House and Lot at 1110 Tanay St., Rizal Village Makati
TCT No. 348341 and 1/3 share in the rental income thereon;

b. 1/3 share in the Vacant Lot with an area of 271 square meters located
at Tanay St., Rizal Village, Makati City, TCT No. 119063;

c.

Agricultural land with an area of 3.8 hectares located at Puerta Galera

Mindoro covered by OCT No. P-2159;

d. Shares of stocks in San Miguel Corporation covered by the following

Certificate Numbers: A0011036, A006144, A082906, A006087,
A065796, A11979, A049521, C86950, C63096, C55316, C54824,
C120328, A011026, C12865, A10439, A021401, A007218, A0371,
S29239, S40128, S58308, S69309;

e.

Shares of stocks in Paper Industries Corp. covered by the following

Certificate Numbers: S29239, S40128, S58308, S69309, A006708,
07680, A020786, S18539, S14649;

f.

share in Eduardo Pascuals shares in Baguio Gold Mining Co.;

g.

Cash in Banco De Oro Savings Account No. 2 014 12292 4 in the

name of Nona Arellano;

i.

Property previously covered by TCT No. 119053 now covered by

TCT No. 181889, Register of Deeds of Makati City;

j.

Rental receivables from Raul Arellano per Order issued by Branch 64

of the Court on November 17, 1995.

5. AND the properties are partitioned as follows:

a.

To heir Amelia P. Arellano-the property covered by TCT No. 181889;

b.

To heirs Francisco N. Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual-the real

properties covered by TCT Nos. 348341 and 119063 of the Register of
Deeds of Makati City and the property covered by OCT No. 2159, to
be divided equally between them up to the extent that each of their
share have been equalized with the actual value of the property in 5(a)
at the time of donation, the value of which shall be determined by an
independent appraiser to be designated by Amelia P. Arellano, Miguel
N. Pascual and Francisco N. Pascual. If the real properties are not
sufficient to equalize the shares, then Franciscos and Miguels shares
may be satisfied from either in cash property or shares of stocks, at the
rate of quotation. The remaining properties shall be divided equally
among Francisco, Miguel and Amelia. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner faulted the trial court in holding that

I
. . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT AMELIA PASCUAL
ARELLANO IS PART OF THE ESTATE OF ANGEL PASCUAL, JR.

II
. . . THE PROPERTY DONATED TO APPELLANT IS SUBJECT TO
COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE 1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
III
. . . APPELLEES WHO ARE MERELY COLLATERAL RELATIVES OF
DECEASED ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. AS HIS COMPULSORY HEIRS
ENTITLED TO LEGITIMES.
xxxx

and

V
. . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR.
EQUALLY AMONG HIS LEGAL OR INTESTATE HEIRS. 339[6] (underscoring
supplied)

339[6] CA rollo at p. 47.

By Decision340[7] of July 20, 2009, the Court of Appeals found petitioners

appeal partly meritorious. It sustained the probate courts ruling that the property
donated to petitioner is subject to collation in this wise:

Bearing in mind that in intestate succession, what governs is the rule on

equality of division, We hold that the property subject of donation inter vivos in
favor of Amelia is subject to collation. Amelia cannot be considered a creditor
of the decedent and we believe that under the circumstances, the value of such
immovable though not strictly in the concept of advance legitime, should be
deducted from her share in the net hereditary estate. The trial court therefore
committed no reversible error when it included the said property as forming part
of the estate of Angel N. Pascual.341[8] (citation omitted; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

The appellate court, however, held that, contrary to the ruling of the probate
court, herein petitioner was able to submit prima facie evidence of shares of stocks
owned by the [decedent] which have not been included in the inventory submitted
by the administrator.

Thus, the appellate court disposed, quoted verbatim:

340[7] Penned by now Supreme Court Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., and
concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Normandie B. Pizarro, rollo,
pp. 21-41.
341[8] Id. at 37.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby

PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated January 29, 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 135 in Special Proceeding Case No. M-5034 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the order of inclusion of
properties of the Intestate Estate of Angel N. Pascual, Jr. as well as the partition
and distribution of the same to the co-heirs are concerned.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the said court for further proceedings
in accordance with the disquisitions herein.342[9] (underscoring supplied)

Petitioners Partial Motion for Reconsideration343[10] having been denied by

the appellate court by Resolution344[11] of October 7, 2009, the present petition for
review on certiorari was filed, ascribing as errors of the appellate court its ruling

I
. . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED BY ANGEL N. PASCUAL, JR. TO
PETITIONER AMELIA PASCUAL ARELLANO IS PART OF HIS ESTATE AT
THE TIME OF HIS DEATH.
II
. . . THAT THE PROPERTY DONATED TO PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO
COLLATION UNDER ARTICLE 1061 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
III
. . . THAT RESPONDENTS ARE COMPULSORY HEIRS OF THEIR
DECEASED BROTHER ANGEL N. PASCUAL JR. AND ARE ENTITLED TO
LEGITIMES.
IV
342[9] Id. at 40-41.
343[10] CA rollo at p. 138.
344[11] Rollo at 43.

. . . IN NOT PARTITIONING THE ESTATE OF ANGEL N. PASCUAL, JR.

EQUALLY AMONG PETITIONER AND RESPONDENTS, AS HIS LEGAL
OR INTESTATE HEIRS.345[12] (underscoring supplied)

Petitioners thus raise the issues of whether the property donated to petitioner
is subject to collation; and whether the property of the estate should have been
ordered equally distributed among the parties.

On the first issue:

The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical
operation by the addition of the value of donations made by the testator to the
value of the hereditary estate; and second, it is the return to the hereditary estate of
property disposed of by lucrative title by the testator during his lifetime.346[13]

The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs
in so far as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime,
so that inofficious donations may be reduced.347[14]
345[12] Id. at 13-14.
346[13] III TOLENTINO, 1992 Edition, p. 332, citing 10 Fabres 295-299 Colin &
Capitant 526-528;2-11 Ruggiero 394; 5 Planiol & Ripert 67; De Buen; 8 Colin &
Capitant 340.

Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes
being to determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir,
there is no legitime to be safeguarded.348[15]

The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or
concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his
collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime that part of the
testators property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for
compulsory heirs.349[16]

The compulsory heirs may be classified into (1) primary, (2) secondary, and (3)
concurring. The primary compulsory heirs are those who have precedence over
and exclude other compulsory heirs; legitimate children and descendants are
primary compulsory heirs. The secondary compulsory heirs are those who
succeed only in the absence of the primary heirs; the legitimate parents and
ascendants are secondary compulsory heirs. The concurring compulsory heirs are
those who succeed together with the primary or the secondary compulsory heirs;
the illegitimate children, and the surviving spouse are concurring compulsory
heirs.350[17]

347[14] III TOLENTINO, 1992 Edition, pp. 331-332, citing 6 Manresa 406.
348[15] III TOLENTINO, 1992 Edition, p. 337, citing 6 Manresa 413.
349[16] Article 886, Civil Code.
350[17] III TOLENTINO, 1992 Edition, p.252.

The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any
legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for
his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that
it was valid,351[18] is deemed as donation made to a stranger, chargeable against
the free portion of the estate.352[19] There being no compulsory heir, however, the
donated property is not subject to collation.
On the second issue:

The decedents remaining estate should thus be partitioned equally among his
heirs-siblings-collateral relatives, herein petitioner and respondents, pursuant to the
provisions of the Civil Code, viz:

Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or

a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles. (underscoring supplied)
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full
blood, they shall inherit in equal shares. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision

ordering the collation of the property donated to petitioner, Amelia N. Arellano, to
the estate of the deceased Angel N. Pascual, Jr. is SET ASIDE.
351[18] It appears that its validity is in issue in Sp. Proc. No. M-3893 (for
guardianship over the person and estate of Angel N. Pascual, Jr.) before Br. 139 of
the Makati RTC, vide petition, par. 6, Record, pp. 1-4.
352[19] Vide III TOLENTINO, 1992 Edition, p. 341.

Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the court of origin, Branch
135 of the Makati Regional Trial Court, which is ordered to conduct further
proceedings in the case for the purpose of determining what finally forms part of
the estate, and thereafter to divide whatever remains of it equally among the
parties.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

SECOND DIVISION

JARABINI G. DEL ROSARIO,

G.R. No. 187056

Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus -

PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,*
ABAD, and
PEREZ,** JJ.

ASUNCION G. FERRER, substituted

by her heirs, VICENTE, PILAR,
ANGELITO, FELIXBERTO, JR.,
all surnamed G. FERRER, and

Promulgated:

MIGUELA FERRER ALTEZA,

** Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza,
per Special Order 886 dated September 1, 2010.
**** Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo
B. Nachura, per Special Order 894 dated September 20, 2010.

Respondents.

September 20, 2010

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case pertains to a gift, otherwise denominated as a

donation mortis causa, which in reality is a donation inter vivos
made effective upon its execution by the donors and acceptance
thereof by the donees, and immediately transmitting ownership of
the donated property to the latter, thus precluding a subsequent
assignment thereof by one of the donors.

The Facts and the Case

On August 27, 1968 the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe

Gonzales

executed

document

entitled

Donation

Mortis

Causa353[1] in favor of their two children, Asuncion and Emiliano,

and their granddaughter, Jarabini (daughter of their predeceased
son, Zoilo) covering the spouses 126-square meter lot and the
house on it in Pandacan, Manila 354[2] in equal shares. The deed of
donation reads:

It is our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be

irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving spouse.

It is our will that Jarabini Gonzales-del Rosario and

Emiliano Gonzales will continue to occupy the portions now
occupied by them.

It is further our will that this DONATION MORTIS CAUSA

shall not in any way affect any other distribution of other
properties belonging to any of us donors whether testate or
intestate and where ever situated.

It is our further will that any one surviving spouse

reserves the right, ownership, possession and administration
of this property herein donated and accepted and this
Disposition and Donation shall be operative and effective upon
the death of the DONORS.355[3]

353[1] Rollo, p. 101.

354[2] Covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) 101873.
355[3] Supra note 1.

Although denominated as a donation mortis causa, which in

law is the equivalent of a will, the deed had no attestation clause
and was witnessed by only two persons. The named donees,
however, signified their acceptance of the donation on the face of
the document.

Guadalupe, the donor wife, died in September 1968. A few

months later or on December 19, 1968, Leopoldo, the donor
husband, executed a deed of assignment of his rights and
interests in subject property to their daughter Asuncion. Leopoldo
died in June 1972.

In 1998 Jarabini filed a petition for the probate of the August

27, 1968 deed of donation mortis causa before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila in Sp. Proc. 98-90589. 356[4] Asuncion
opposed the petition, invoking his father Leopoldos assignment of
his rights and interests in the property to her.

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision dated June 20,

2003,357[5] finding that the donation was in fact one made inter
356[4] In the Matter of the Petition for the Allowance of the Donation Mortis Causa
of Leopoldo Gonzales. Jarabini del Rosario, Petitioner.
357[5] Rollo, pp. 125-128.

vivos, the donors intention being to transfer title over the

property to the donees during the donors lifetime, given its
irrevocability. Consequently, said the RTC, Leopoldos subsequent
assignment of his rights and interest in the property was void
since he had nothing to assign. The RTC thus directed the
registration of the property in the name of the donees in equal
shares.358[6]

On Asuncions appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter

rendered a decision on December 23, 2008, 359[7] reversing that of
the RTC. The CA held that Jarabini cannot, through her petition for
the probate of the deed of donation mortis causa, collaterally
attack Leopoldos deed of assignment in Asuncions favor. The CA
further held that, since no proceeding exists for the allowance of
what Jarabini claimed was actually a donation inter vivos, the RTC
erred in deciding the case the way it did. Finally, the CA held that
the donation, being one given mortis causa, did not comply with
the requirements of a notarial will, 360[8] rendering the same void.
358[6] Id. at 128.
359[7] Id. at 54-64; penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. with the
concurrence of Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes and Mariflor P. Punzalan
Castillo.

360[8] Art. 728. Donations which are to take effect upon the death of the donor partake of
the nature of testamentary provisions, and shall be governed by the rules established in the Title
on Succession.Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end
thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible

Following the CAs denial of Jarabinis motion for reconsideration, 361

[9] she filed the present petition with this Court.

Issue Presented

The key issue in this case is whether or not the spouses

Leopoldo and Guadalupes donation to Asuncion, Emiliano, and
Jarabini was a donation mortis causa, as it was denominated, or in
fact a donation inter vivos.

witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last,
on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the
upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the
fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write
his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the
latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of
one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted
to them.

361[9] Rollo, p. 66.

The Courts Ruling

That the document in question in this case was captioned

Donation Mortis Causa is not controlling. This Court has held that,
if a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not
altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa.362[10]

In Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals,363[11] the Court held

that irrevocability is a quality absolutely incompatible with the
idea of conveyances mortis causa, where revocability is precisely
the essence of the act. A donation mortis causa has the following
characteristics:

1.It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee

before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the
same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership
(full or naked) and control of the property while alive;

2.
That before his death, the transfer should be
revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability
may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in
the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and

362[10] Concepcion v. Concepcion, 91 Phil. 823, 828 (1952).

363[11] 426 Phil. 263 (2002).

3.
That the transfer should be void if the transferor
should survive the transferee.364[12] (Underscoring supplied)

The Court thus said in Austria-Magat that the express

irrevocability of the donation is the distinctive standard that
identifies the document as a donation inter vivos. Here, the
donors plainly said that it is our will that this Donation Mortis
Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving
spouse. The intent to make the donation irrevocable becomes
even clearer by the proviso that a surviving donor shall respect
the irrevocability of the donation. Consequently, the donation was
in reality a donation inter vivos.

The donors in this case of course reserved the right,

ownership, possession, and administration of the property and
made the donation operative upon their death. But this Court has
consistently held that such reservation (reddendum) in the
context of an irrevocable donation simply means that the donors
parted with their naked title, maintaining only

beneficial

ownership of the donated property while they lived. 365[13]

364[12] Aluad v. Aluad, G.R. No. 176943, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 697, 705-706.
365[13] Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals, supra note 11, at 274; Spouses Gestopa
v. Court of Appeals, 396 Phil. 262, 271 (2000); Alejandro v. Judge Geraldez, 168 Phil.
404, 420-421 (1977); Cuevas v. Cuevas, 98 Phil. 68, 71 (1955); Bonsato v. Court of
Appeals, 95 Phil. 481, 488 (1954).

Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the

donation, which acceptance the deed required. 366[14] This Court
has held that an acceptance clause indicates that the donation is
inter vivos, since acceptance is a requirement only for such kind
of donations. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will,
need not be accepted by the donee during the donors lifetime. 367
[15]

Finally, as Justice J. B. L. Reyes said in Puig v. Peaflorida,368

[16] in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed a
donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid
uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the
deed.

Since the donation in this case was one made inter vivos, it
was immediately operative and final. The reason is that such kind
of donation is deemed perfected from the moment the donor
learned

of

the

donees

acceptance

of

the

donation.

366[14] Rollo, p. 101.

367[15] Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals, supra note 11, at 276-277.
368[16] 122 Phil. 665, 672 (1965).

The

acceptance makes the donee the absolute owner of the property

donated.369[17]

Given that the donation in this case was irrevocable or one

given inter vivos, Leopoldos subsequent assignment of his rights
and interests in the property to Asuncion should be regarded as
void for, by then, he had no more rights to assign. He could not
give what he no longer had. Nemo dat quod non habet.370[18]

The trial court cannot be faulted for passing upon, in a

petition for probate of what was initially supposed to be a
donation mortis causa, the validity of the document as a donation
inter vivos and the nullity of one of the donors subsequent
assignment of his rights and interests in the property. The Court
has held before that the rule on probate is not inflexible and
absolute.371[19] Moreover, in opposing the petition for probate
and in putting the validity of the deed of assignment squarely in
issue, Asuncion or those who substituted her may not now claim
that the trial court improperly allowed a collateral attack on such
369[17] Heirs of Sevilla v. Sevilla, 450 Phil. 598, 613 (2003).
370[18] Gochan & Sons Realty Corp. v. Heirs of Raymundo Baba, 456 Phil. 569, 579
(2003).
371[19] Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 266, 273 (1997).

assignment.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE

the assailed December 23, 2008 Decision and March 6, 2009
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 80549, and
REINSTATES in toto the June 20, 2003 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19, in Sp. Proc. 98-90589.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been

reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13,

the Division Chairpersons
conclusions in the above
consultation before the case
opinion of the Courts Division.

Article VIII of the Constitution and

Attestation, I certify that the
Decision had been reached in
was assigned to the writer of the

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Today is Tuesday, October 25, 2016

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 183448

June 30, 2014

SPOUSES DOMINADOR PERALTA AND OFELIA PERALTA, Petitioners,

vs.
HEIRS OF BERNARDINA ABALON, represented by MANSUETO ABALON, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 183464
HEIRS OF BERNARDINA ABALON, represented by MANSUETO ABALON, Petitioners,
vs.
MARISSA ANDAL, LEONIL AND AL, ARNEL AND AL, SPOUSES DOMINDOR PERALTA AND OFELIA
PERALTA, and HEIRS of RESTITUTO RELLAMA, represented by his children ALEX, IMMANUEL, JULIUS and
SYLVIA, all surnamed RELLAMA.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
Before us are the consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the 30 May
2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) Seventeenth Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 85542. The CA had reversed the 14
April 2005 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Fifth Judicial Region of Legaspi City, Branch 5, in Civil Case No.
9243.
The civil case before the RTC of Legaspi City involved a parcel of land registered under the name of Bernardina Abalon and
fraudulently transferred to Restituto Rellama and who, in turn, subdivided the subject property and sold it separately to the
other parties to this case Spouses Dominador and Ofelia Peralta; and Marissa, Leonil and Arnel, all surnamed Andal.
Thereafter, Spouses Peralta and the Andals individually registered the respective portions of the land they had bought under

their names. The heirs of Bernardina were claiming back the land, alleging that since it was sold under fraudulent
circumstances, no valid title passed to the buyers. On the other hand, the buyers, who were now title holders of the subject
parcel of land, averred that they were buyers in good faith and sought the protection accorded to them under the law.
THE FACTS
The RTC and the CA have the same findings of fact, but differ in their legal conclusions. There being no factual issues raised
in the Petitions, we adopt the findings of fact of the CA in CA-G.R. No. 85542, as follows:
The subject parcel of land, described as Lot 1679 of the Cadastral Survey of Legaspi, consisting of 8,571 square meters, was
originally covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. (O) 16 and registered in the name of Bernardina Abalon
(Abalon). It appears that a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed over the subject property in favor of Restituto M. Rellama
(Rellama) on June 10, 1975. By virtue of such conveyance OCT No. (O) 16 was cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42108 was issued in the name of Rellama. The subject property was then subdivided into
three (3) portions: Lot 1679-A, Lot 1679-B, Lot 1679-C. Lot 1679-A was sold to Spouses Dominador P. Peralta, Jr. and
Ofelia M. Peralta (Spouses Peralta) for which reason TCT No. 42254 was issued in their names. Lot 1679-B, on the other
hand, was first sold to Eduardo Lotivio (Lotivio) who thereafter transferred his ownership thereto to Marissa Andal, Arnel
Andal, and Leonil Andal (the Andals) through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 9, 1995. On even date, TCT No.
42482 was issued in the name of the Andals. The Andals likewise acquired Lot 1679-C as evidenced by the issuance of TCT
No. 42821 in their favor on December 27, 1995.
Claiming that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Abalon in favor of Rellama was a forged document, and claiming
further that they acquired the subject property by succession, they being the nephew and niece of Abalon who died without
issue, plaintiff-appellees Mansueta Abalon and Amelia Abalon filed the case below against Rellama, Spouses Peralta, and
the Andals, the herein defendants-appellants and the Bank of the Philippines [sic] Islands which was later dropped as a party
defendant.
It was alleged in their Complaint and subsequent Amended Complaint, under five separate causes of action, that Rellama
was able to cause the cancellation of OCT No. (O) 16, and in lieu thereof the issuance of TCT No. 42108 in his own name
from which the defendants-appellants derived their own titles, upon presentation of a xerox copy of the alleged forged deed
of absolute sale and the order granting the issuance of a second owners duplicate copy of OCT No. (O) 16 in his favor in
Miscellaneous Cadastral Case No. 10648, which he had filed on the pretext that Lot 1679 covered by OCT No. (O) 16 was
sold to him and that the owners duplicate copy of the said title got lost in 1976 after the same was delivered to him. They
averred that the owners duplicate copy of Oct NO. (O) 16 had always been with Abalon and that upon her death, it was
delivered to them. Likewise, they alleged that Abalon had always been in possession of the subject property through her
tenant Pedro Bellen who was thereafter succeeded by his wife, Ruperta Bellen, and then his son, Godofredo Bellen. On the
other hand, they said that Rellama had never set foot on the land he was claiming. They further alleged that after the
ownership over the subject property was transferred to them upon the death of Abalon, they took possession thereof and
retained Godofredo as their own tenant. However, they averred that in 1995 the defendants-appellants were able to wrest
possession of the subject property from Godofredo Bellen. They alleged that the defendants-appellants are not buyers in
good faith as they were aware that the subject land was in the possession of the plaintiffs-appellees at the time they made the
purchase. They thus claim that the titles issued to the defendants-appellants are null and void.
In his answer, Rellama alleged that the deed of absolute sale executed by Abalon is genuine and that the duplicate copy of

OCT No. (O) 16 had been delivered to him upon the execution of the said deed of transfer.
As for Spouses Peralta and the Andals, who filed their separate answers to the complaint, they mainly alleged that they are
buyers in good faith and for value.
During the trial, Rellama passed away. He was substituted by his heirs.
After the plaintiffs-appellees rested their case, instead of presenting their own evidence, the defendants-appellants and the
Heirs of Restituto Rellama, on different occasions, filed a demurrer to evidence.
On April 14, 2005, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs-appellees and ordered the restoration of OCT
No. (O) 16 in the name of Abalon and the cancellation of the titles issued to the defendants-appellants. The fact that only a
xerox copy of the purported deed of sale between Rellama and Abalon was presented before the Register of Deeds for
registration and the absence of such xerox copy on the official files of the said Office made the court a quo conclude that the
said document was a mere forgery. On the other hand, the court a quo noted that the duplicate copy of OCT No. (O) 16 in
the hands of the plaintiffs-appellees bears [sic] the perforated serial number B 221377, which it held is a convincing proof of
its authenticity and genuineness. It thus stated that "Miscellaneous Cadastral Case No. 10648 is a (mere) strategem [sic]
fraudulently concocted ... for the issuance of a fabricated (second) owners duplicate certificate of Oct No. (O) 16" since the
owners duplicate copy of OCT No. (O) 16 has not been lost at all. It said that any subsequent registration procured by the
presentation of such forged instrument is null and void. The dispositive portion of the court a quos decision reads:
WHEREFORE, [p]remises [c]onsidered, judgment is rendered as follows, to wit:
1. Ordering the restoration of Original Certificate of Title No. (O) 16 embracing Lot 1679 in the name of
Bernardina Abalon into the official files of the Registry of Deeds of Legaspi City a copy of the owners
duplicate certificate embodying the technical description of Lot 1679 forming official part of the record as
Exhibit "D" as well as ordering the cancellation of any and all transfer certificates of title succeeding
Original Certificate of title No. (O) 16 including Transfer Certificates (sic) of Title Nos. 42108, 42254,
42255, 42256, 42821 [,] and 42482;
2. Ordering the defendants Marissa Andal, Leonil Andal, Arnel Andal[,] and the spouses Dominador and
Ofelia Peralta to vacate Lot 1679 and to peacefully surrender such lot to the plaintiffs;
3. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P50,000.00 as litigation expenses; and
4. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of suit.
The counterclaims by [sic] the defendants are all dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Spouses Peralta and the Andals filed their separate Notices of Appeal and thereafter, upon approval, filed their respective
Defendants-Appellants Briefs. The Heirs of Rellama, on the other hand, opted not to challenge the ruling of the lower
court.3
The Andals and Spouses Peralta appellants in CA-G.R. CV No. 85542 raised several issues, which the CA summarized

as follows:
1. Whether the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Abalon in favor of Rellama was spurious
2. Whether the Andals and Spouses Peralta were buyers in good faith and for value
3. Who among the parties were entitled to their claims for damages.4
THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
On 30 May 2007, the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed judgment setting aside the RTC
Decision. The CA ruled that the circumstances surrounding the sale of the subject property showed badges of fraud or
forgery against Rellama. It found that Abalon had not parted with her ownership over the subject property despite the claim
of Rellama that they both executed a Deed of Absolute Sale. As proof, the CA pointed out the existence of a notarized
contract of leasehold executed by Abalon with Ruperta Bellen on 11 June 1976. The genuineness and due execution of the
said leasehold agreement was uncontroverted by the parties. On this basis, the appellate court concluded that Abalon could
not have leased the subject parcel of land to Bellen if the former had parted with her ownership thereof.5
The CA also found no evidence to show that Rellama exercised dominion over the subject property, because he had not
introduced improvements on the property, despite claiming to have acquired it in 1975.6 Further, the CA noted that he did
not cause the annotation of the Deed of Sale, which he had executed with Abalon, on OCT No. (O) 16. It observed that when
the original copy of OCT No. (O) 16 was allegedly lost in 1976, while Rellama was on his way to Legaspi City to register
the title to his name, it took him almost 20 years to take steps to judicially reconstitute a copy thereof. To the appellate court,
these circumstances cast doubt on the veracity of Rellamas claim of ownership over such a significant property, which was
almost a hectare.7
The CA also ruled that the heirs of Bernardina Abalon had the legal standing to question the sale transaction between
Rellama and their predecessor-in-interest. It concluded that the heirs of Abalon had acquired the subject property by
ordinary acquisitive prescription and thus had every right to attack every document that intended to divest them of
ownership thereof,8 which in this case was the Deed of Sale that Bernardina executed in favor of Rellama. Lastly, the
appellate court considered the Spouses Peralta as buyers in bad faith for relying on a mere photocopy of TCT No. 42108
when they bought the property from Rellama.9 On the other hand, it accorded the Andals the presumption of good faith,
finding no evidence that would rebut this presumption.10
The dispositive portion of the assailed CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85542 is as follows:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is SET ASIDE and a new judgment is rendered as follows:
1. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42482 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42821, both in the names of
Andals, are held legal and valid.
2. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42254 registered in the names of Spouses Peralta is cancelled for being
null and void. Hence, they are ordered to vacate the land covered thereby and to surrender possession thereof
in favor of the plaintiffs-appellees.

SO ORDERED.11
The heirs of Abalon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 30 May 2007 Decision, insofar as the CA declared the Andals
to be buyers in good faith of the subject property and, thus, that the land title issued in their favor was valid. Spouses Peralta,
for their part, filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the said CA Decision pertaining to the portion that declared them
as buyers in bad faith which accordingly nullified the title issued to them.
On 10 June 2008, the CA denied the Motions for Partial Reconsideration of the movants for lack of merit.12
On 11 August 2008, Spouses Peralta filed with this Court a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the 30 May 2007 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85542.13 On the same day, the heirs of Bernardina Abalon,
represented by Mansueto Abalon, filed a similar Petition questioning the portion of the mentioned CA Decision declaring the
validity of the title issued to the Andals, who were adjudged by the appellate court as buyers in good faith.14 THE ISSUES
The Petition filed by Spouses Peralta, docketed as G.R. No. 183448, lists the following issues:
a) The case for annulment should have been dismissed because the purported Deed of Sale executed by
Abalon and Rellama was not introduced in evidence and thus, forgery was not proven.
b) The heirs of Abalon are notforced heirs of Bernardina Abalon; hence, they do not have the legal
personality to file the action to annul the subject Deed of Sale.
c) The heirs of Abalon failed to prove that they had inherited the subject property.
d) Spouses Peralta are buyers in good faith and, thus title to their portion of the subject property must be
upheld15
As for the heirs of Abalon, their Petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183464, raises the following issues:
a) The Andals cannot be considered as buyers in good faith by simply applying the ordinary presumption in
the absence of evidence showing the contrary.
b) The CA erred in applying in favor of the Andals, the doctrine that a forged instrument may become the root
of a valid title in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, because Abalon never parted with her
possession of the valid and uncancelled title over the subject property
c) The CA erred in declaring the validity of the title issued in the names of the Andals, because Rellama was
bereft of any transmissible right over the portion of the property he had sold to them.16
THE COURTS RULING
We deny the Petitions and affirm the ruling of the CA.
The main issue to be resolved in this case is whether a forged instrument may become the root of a valid title in the hands of
an innocent purchaser for value, even if the true owner thereof has been in possession of the genuine title, which is valid and

has not been cancelled.

It is well-settled that "a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in
favor of the person whose name appears therein. The real purpose of the Torrens system of land registration is to quiet title
to land and put a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title."17
In Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals,18 we explained the purpose of the Torrens system and its legal implications to third
persons dealing with registered land, as follows:
The main purpose of the Torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of title to real estate and to facilitate transactions
relative thereto by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the
need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should
impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry. Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of
the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the court cannot disregard such rights and order the total
cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such an outright cancellation would be to impair public confidence in the
certificate of title, for everyone dealing with property registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire in every
instance as to whether the title has been regularly or irregularly issued by the court. Every person dealing with registered
land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go
beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property.
The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the
integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a
person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller's title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being
told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were
permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded and land transactions would have to be attended by complicated
and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence would be that land conflicts
could be even more numerous and complex than they are now and possibly also more abrasive, if not even violent. The
Government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued
thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied.
The Torrens system was intended to guarantee the integrity and conclusiveness of the certificate of registration, but the
system cannot be used for the perpetration of fraud against the real owner of the registered land. The system merely
confirms ownership and does not create it. It cannot be used to divest lawful owners of their title for the purpose of
transferring it to another one who has not acquired it by any of the modes allowed or recognized by law. Thus, the Torrens
system cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner or to shield the commission of fraud or to enrich oneself at
the expense of another.19
It is well-established in our laws and jurisprudence that a person who is dealing with a registered parcel of land need not go
beyond the face of the title. A person is only charged with notice of the burdens and claims that are annotated on the title.20
This rule, however, admits of exceptions, which we explained in Clemente v. Razo:21
Any buyer or mortgagee of realty covered by a Torrens certificate of title, in the absence of any suspicion, is not obligated to
look beyond the certificate to investigate the titles of the seller appearing on the face of the certificate. And, he is charged
with notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title.

We do acknowledge that the rule thus enunciated is not cast in stone. For, indeed, there are exceptions thereto. Thus, in
Sandoval vs. CA, we made clear the following:
The aforesaid principle admits of an unchallenged exception: that a person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on
the Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further except when the party has actual knowledge
of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has
knowledge ofa defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire
into the status of the title of the property in litigation. The presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion should
then prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said
certificate. One who falls within the exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser
in good faith; and hence does not merit the protection of the law.22
Thus, the determination whether one is a buyer in good faith or can be considered an innocent purchaser for value becomes
imperative. Section 55 of the Land Registration Act provides protection to an innocent purchaser for value23 by allowing
him to retain the parcel of land bought and his title is considered valid. Otherwise, the title would be cancelled and the
original owner of the parcel of land is allowed to repossess it.
Jurisprudence has defined an innocent purchaser for value as one who buys the property of another without notice that some
other person has a right to or interest therein and who then pays a full and fair price for it at the time of the purchase or
before receiving a notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. Buyers in good faith buy a property
with the belief that the person from whom they receive the thing is the owner who can convey title to the property. Such
buyers do not close their eyes to facts that should put a reasonable person on guard and still claim that they are acting in
good faith.24
The assailed Decision of the CA held that the Andals were buyers in good faith, while Spouses Peralta were not. Despite its
determination that fraud marred the sale between Bernardina Abalon and Rellama, a fraudulent or forged document of sale
may still give rise to a valid title. The appellate court reasoned that if the certificate of title had already been transferred from
the name of the true owner to that which was indicated by the forger and remained as such, the land is considered to have
been subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser, whose title is thus considered valid.25 The CA concluded that this was the
case for the Andals.
The appellate court cited Fule v. Legare26 as basis for its ruling. In the said case, the Court made an exception to the general
rule that a forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no title. A fraudulent document may then become the root of a
valid title, as it held in Fule:
Although the deed of sale in favor of John W. Legare was fraudulent, the fact remains that he was able to secure a registered
title to the house and lot. It was this title which he subsequently conveyed to the herein petitioners. We have indeed ruled
that a forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no title (Director of Lands vs. Addison, 49 Phil., 19). However, we
have also laid down the doctrine that there are instances when such a fraudulent document may become the root of a valid
title. One such instance is where the certificate of title was already transferred from the name of the true owner to the forger,
and while it remained that way, the land was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser. For then, the vendee had the right
to rely upon what appeared in the certificate (Inquimboy vs. Cruz, G.R. No. L-13953, July 28, 1960).
We have been constrained to adopt the conclusion here set forth because under the Torrens system, "registration is the
operative act that gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land (Secs. 50 and 51, Land Registration Act).

Consequently, where there was nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the
property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title upon its
face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto. If the rule were
otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of the certificate of title which the Torrens system seeks to insure would entirely
be futile and nugatory. (Reynes vs. Barrera, 68 Phil., 656; De Lara and De Guzman vs. Ayroso, 50 O.G. No 10, 4838). The
public shall then be denied of its foremost motivation for respecting and observing the Land Registration Act. In the end, the
business community stands to be inconvenienced and prejudiced immeasurably.
Furthermore, when the Register of Deeds issued a certificate of title in the name of John W. Legare, and thereafter registered
the same, John W. Legare, insofar as third parties were concerned, acquired valid title to the house and lot here disputed.
When, therefore, he transferred this title to the herein petitioners, third persons, the entire transaction fell within the purview
of Article 1434 of the Civil Code. The registration in John W. Legare's name effectively operated to convey the properties to
him.
After executing the Deed of Sale with Bernardina Abalon under fraudulent circumstances, Rellama succeeded in obtaining a
title in his name and selling a portion of the property to the Andals, who had no knowledge of the fraudulent circumstances
involving the transfer from Abalon to Rellama. In fact, the Decisions of the RTC and the CA show no factual findings or
proof that would rebut the presumption in favor of the Andals as buyers in good faith. Thus, the CA correctly considered
them as buyers in good faith and upheld their title.
The Abalons counter this ruling and allege that the CA erred in relying on Fuleto justify its assailed Decision. They argue
that Torres v. Court of Appeals27 is the applicable ruling, because the facts therein are on all fours with the instant case.28
In Torres, the subject property was covered by TCT No. 53628 registered in the name of Mariano Torres. His brother-in-law
Francisco Fernandez, misrepresenting that the copy of the title had been lost, succeeded in obtaining a court Order for the
issuance of another copy of TCT No. 53628. He then forged a simulated deed of sale purportedly showing that Torres had
sold the property to him and caused the cancellation of TCT No. 53628, as well as the issuance of TCT No. 86018 in his
name. Soon, Fernandez mortgaged the property to Mota. Upon learning of the fraud committed by Fernandez, Torres caused
the annotation of an adverse claim on the formers copy and succeeded in having Fernandezs title declared null and void.
Meanwhile, Mota was able to foreclose on Fernandezs real estate mortgage, as well as to cause the cancellation of TCT No.
86018 and the issuance of a new one TCT No. 105953 in her name. The issue to be resolved in Torres was whether Mota
can be considered an innocent mortgagee for value, and whether her title can be deemed valid. Ruling in the negative, the
Court explained:
There is nothing on the records which shows that Torres performed any act or omission which could have jeopardized his
peaceful dominion over his realties. The decision under review, however, in considering Mota an innocent mortgagee
protected under Section 65 of the Land Registration Law, held that Torres was bound by the mortgage. Inevitably, it
pronounced that the foreclosure sale, where Mota was the highest bidder, also bound Torres and concluded that the
certificate of title issued in the name of Mota prevails over that of Torres'. As correctly pointed out by Torres, however, his
properties were sold on execution, and not on foreclosure sale, and hence, the purchaser thereof was bound by his notice of
adverse claim and lis pendens annotated at the back of Fernandez' TCT. Moreover, even if We grant Mota the status of an
innocent mortgagee, the doctrine relied upon by the appellate court that a forged instrument may become the root of a valid
title, cannot be applied where the owner still holds a valid and existing certificate of title covering the same interest in a
realty. The doctrine would apply rather when, as in the cases for example of De la Cruz v. Fabie, 35 Phil. 144 [1916], Fule v.
De Legare, No. L-17951, February 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 351, and Republic v. Umali, G.R. No. 80687, April 10, 1989, the

forger thru insidious means obtains the owners duplicate certificate of title, converts it in his name, and subsequently sells
or otherwise encumbers it to an innocent holder for value, for in such a case the new certificate is binding upon the owner
(Sec.55, Act 496; Sec. 53, P.D. No. 1529). But if the owner holds a valid and existing certificate of title, his would be
indefeasible as against the whole world, and not that of the innocent holder's. "Prior tempore potior jure" as We have said in
Register of Deeds v. Philippine National Bank, No. L-17641, January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 46, citing Legarda v. Saleeby, 31
Phil.590, Roman Catholic Bishop v. Philippine Railway, 49 Phil. 546, Reyes v. Borbon, 50 Phil. 791.29 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
We do not agree with the contention of the Abalons that the ruling in Torresis controlling in this case. They quoted a portion
in the said case that is clearly an obiter. In Torres, it was shown that Mariano had annotated an adverse claim on the title
procured by Fernandez prior to the execution sale, in which Mota was the highest bidder. This Court declared her as a
mortgagee in bad faith because, at the back of Fernandezs title, Torres made an annotation of the adverse claim and the
notice of lis pendens. The annotation of the adverse claim was made while the forged document was still in the name of the
forger, who in this case is Fernandez. That situation does not obtain in the instant case.
The records of the RTC and the CA have a finding that when Rellama sold the properties to the Andals, it was still in his
name; and there was no annotation that would blight his clean title. To the Andals, there was no doubt that Rellama was the
owner of the property being sold to them, and that he had transmissible rights of ownership over the said property. Thus,
they had every right to rely on the face of his title alone.
The established rule is that a forged deed is generally null and cannot convey title, the exception thereto, pursuant to Section
55 of the Land Registration Act, denotes the registration of titles from the forger to the innocent purchaser for value. Thus,
the qualifying point here is that there must be a complete chain of registered titles.30 This means that all the transfers
starting from the original rightful owner to the innocent holder for value and that includes the transfer to the forger must
be duly registered, and the title must be properly issued to the transferee. Contrary to what the Abalons would like to
impress on us, Fuleand Torresdo not present clashing views. In Fule, the original owner relinquished physical possession of
her title and thus enabled the perpetrator to commit the fraud, which resulted in the cancellation of her title and the issuance
of a new one. The forged instrument eventually became the root of a valid title in the hands of an innocent purchaser for
value. The new title under the name of the forger was registered and relied upon by the innocent purchaser for value. Hence,
it was clear that there was a complete chain of registered titles.
On the other hand in Torres, the original owner retained possession of the title, but through fraud, his brother-in-law secured
a court order for the issuance of a copy thereof. While the title was in the name of the forger, the original owner annotated
the adverse claim on the forged instrument. Thus, before the new title in the name of the forger could be transferred to a
third person, a lien had already been annotated on its back. The chain of registered titles was broken and sullied by the
original owners annotation of the adverse claim. By this act, the mortgagee was shown to be in bad faith.
In the instant case, there is no evidence that the chain of registered titles was broken in the case of the Andals. Neither were
they proven to have knowledge of anything that would make them suspicious of the nature of Rellamas ownership over the
subject parcel of land. Hence, we sustain the CAs ruling that the Andals were buyers in good faith. Consequently, the
validity of their title to the parcel of the land bought from Rellama must be upheld.
As for Spouses Peralta, we sustain the ruling of the CA that they are indeed buyers in bad faith. The appellate court made a
factual finding that in purchasing the subject property, they merely relied on the photocopy of the title provided by Rellama.
The CA concluded that a mere photocopy of the title should have made Spouses Peralta suspicious that there was some flaw

in the title of Rellama, because he was not in possession of the original copy. This factual finding was supported by
evidence.
The CA pointed out Spouses Peraltas Answer to the Complaint of the Abalons in Case No. 9243 in the RTC of Legaspi City,
Branch 5. In their Answer, they specifically alleged as follows:
2- These defendants [Spouses Peralta] acquired lot No. 1679-A by purchase in good faith and for value from
Restituto Rellama under Doc. No. 11212, page No. 26, Book No. 60, Series of 1996 of Notary Public Atty.
Otilio Bongon, Legaspi City on March 2, 1995 copy of which is attached as and made part of this answer as
Exhibit "1;"
3- That these defendants were handed over by Rellama xerox [sic] copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 42103 issued by the Register of Deed of Legaspi City on the 2nd day of August 1995 copy attached and
made integral part as Exhibit "1-A" and also Original Certificate of Title No. (O) 16 as Exhibit "1-B"31
We have no reason to disturb this factual finding of the CA because it is supported by the evidence on record. Spouses
Peralta filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, which allows only questions of law to be raised. It is a
settled rule that questions of fact are not reviewable in this kind of appeal. Under Rule 45, Section 1, "petitions for review on
certiorari shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth."32 A question of fact arises when there is "as to
the truth or falsehood of facts or when there is a need to calibrate the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of
the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and
to the whole, and the probability of the situation."33 It is further pointed out that "the determination of whether one is a
buyer in good faith is a factual issue, which generally is outside the province of this Court to determine in a petition for
review."34
Whether or not Spouses Peralta are buyers in good faith, is without a doubt, a factual issue. Although this rule admits of
exceptions,35 none of these applies to their case. There is no conflict between the factual findings and legal conclusions of
the RTC and those of the CA, both of which found them to be buyers in bad faith. The fact that they did not participate in the
proceedings before the lower court does not help their case either.
On the issue of the legal standing of the Abalons to file this case, we find that the CA correctly upheld their standing as heirs
of the deceased Bernardina Abalon. The appellate court ruled that during her lifetime, Bernardina Abalon had promised her
heirs - siblings Mansueto and Amelia - that she would give them the subject property. A duplicate copy of OCT No. (0) 16
was delivered to them upon her death. Thus, the CA concluded that the two siblings acquired the subject property by
ordinary prescription. Further, it deduced that the mode of transmission of the property from Bernardina to her nephew and
niece was a form of donation mortis causa, though without the benefit of a will.36 Despite this omission, it still held that
Mansueto and Amelia acquired the subject property through ordinary acquisitive prescription because, since the death of
their aunt Bernardina, they had been in possession of the property for more than 10 years that ripened into full ownership.37
Under Article 97538 of the Civil Code, siblings Mansueto and Amelia Abalon are the legal heirs of Bernardina, the latter
having had no issue during her marriage. As such, they succeeded to her estate when she passed away. While we agree with
the CA that the donation mortis causa was invalid in the absence of a will, it erred in concluding that the heirs acquired the
subject property through ordinary acquisitive prescription. The subject parcel of land is a titled property; thus, acquisitive
prescription is not applicable.39 Upon the death of Bernardina, Mansueto and Amelia, being her legal heirs, acquired the
subject property by virtue of succession, and not by ordinary acquisitive prescription.

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 183448 and 183464 are DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision in CA-G.R. CV
No. 85542 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice, Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85542 dated 30 May 2007 penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino
and concurred in by Associate Justices Lucentino N. Tagle and Sixto C. Marella, Jr., rollo (G.R. No. 183448),
pp.70-84.
2 RTC Decision dated 14 April 2005 in Civil Case No. 9243 penned by Judge Pedro R. Soriao, rollo (G.R.
No. 183448), pp. 65-68.
3 Rollo (G.R. No. 183448), pp. 70-74.
4 Id. at 76
5 Id. at 78.

6 Id.
7 Id. at 79.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 82.
10 Id. at 83.
11 Id. at 83-84.
12 Id. at 61-63.
13 Id. at 10-37.
14 Rollo (G.R. No. 183464), pp. 17-45
15 Rollo (G.R. No. 183448), p. 14.
16 Rollo (G.R. No. 183464), pp. 28-29.
17 Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation vs. Heirs of Vicente Coronado, G.R. No. 180357, 04 August
2009, 595 SCRA 263, 272.
18 G.R. No. 107967, 01 March 1994, 230 SCRA 550.
19 Heirs of Marcelino Doronio v. Heirs of Fortunato Doronio, G.R. No. 169454, 27 December 2007, 541
SCRA 479, 506.
20 Tiongco v. Dela Merced, 157 Phil. 92 (1972).
21 493 Phil. 119 (2005).
22 Id. at 128.
23 Land Registration Act, Section 55:
The production of the owner's duplicate certificate whenever any voluntary instrument is presented
for registration shall be conclusive authority from the registered owner to the register of deeds to enter
a new certificate or to make a memorandum of registration in accordance with such instrument, and
the new certificate or memorandum shall be binding upon the registered owner and upon all persons
claiming under him, in favor of every purchaser for value and in good faith: Provided, however, That
in all cases of registration procured by fraud the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable
remedies against the parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent

holder for value of a certificate of title: And provided further, That after the transcription of the decree
of registration on the original application, any subsequent registration under this Act procured by the
presentation of a forged duplicate certificate, or of a forged deed or other instrument, shall be null and
void. In case of the loss or theft of an owner's duplicate certificate, notice shall be sent by the owner
or by someone in his behalf to the register of deeds of the province in which the land lies as soon as
the loss or theft is discovered.
24 Yared v. Tiongco, G.R. No. 161360, 19 October 2011, 659 SCRA 545, 555.
25 Rollo (G.R. No.183448), p. 80.
26 117 Phil. 367 (1963).
27 264 Phil. 1062 (1990).
28 Rollo (G.R. No. 183464), p. 36.
29 Id. at 1067.
30 Noblejas and Noblejas, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES AND DEEDS, 416 (2007 Rev. Ed.).
31 RTC records, p. 33.
32 Abalos v. Heirs of Vicente Torio, G.R. No. 175444, 14 December 2011, 662 SCRA 450, 456.
33 Guy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 165849, 10 December 2007, 539 SCRA 584, 606-667.
34 Orquiola v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 323, 331 (2002).
35 Among the recognized exceptions to the rule are the following:
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary
to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;

(g) When the CA's findings are contrary to those by the trial court;
(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent;
(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by
the evidence on record; or
(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. Spouses Andrada v. Pilhino Sales
Corporation, G.R. No. 156448, 23 February 2011 (644 SCRA 1, 10), as cited in Abalos v., Heirs of
Vicente Torio, id.
36 Rollo (G.R. No. 183448), p. 79.
37 Id. at 80.
38 Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the
deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or
aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions.
39 Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 328 Phil. 171 (1996).
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

EN BANC

LENIDO LUMANOG and

AUGUSTO SANTOS,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 182555

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

CESAR FORTUNA,

G.R. No. 185123

Petitioner,

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 187745

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:

CORONA, C.J.,

- versus -

CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,

SPO2 CESAR FORTUNA y

ABUDO, RAMESES DE JESUS y
CALMA, LENIDO LUMANOG y
LUISTRO, JOEL DE JESUS y
VALDEZ
and
AUGUSTO
SANTOS y GALANG,
Accused,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,

RAMESES DE JESUS y CALMA

ABAD,

and JOEL DE JESUS y VALDEZ,

VILLARAMA, JR.,

Accused-Appellants.

PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:
September 7, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
* On official leave.

For review is the Decision372[1] dated April 1, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00667 which affirmed with modification the Joint
Decision373[2] dated July 30, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 103 in Criminal Case Nos. Q-96-66679, Q-96-66680, Q-96-66682, Q-9666683 and Q-96-66684.
The consolidated cases arose in connection with the killing of former Chief
of the Metropolitan Command Intelligence and Security Group of the Philippine
Constabulary, now the Philippine National Police (PNP), Colonel Rolando N.
Abadilla (Abadilla), who was ambushed in broad daylight while driving his car
along Katipunan Avenue, Quezon City.
The Facts
On June 13, 1996, at around 8:00 oclock in the morning, Abadilla left his
house at Soliven I, Loyola Grand Villas, Loyola Heights, Quezon City and drove
his car, a black Honda Accord with Plate No. RNA-777. Soon after he left, his wife
Susan Abadilla received a phone call from him and they briefly talked. Just a few
minutes after their conversation, she received another phone call from Abadillas
tailor who was asking about her husband because, according to him, he heard a
radio broadcast report that Abadilla met an accident.374[3]
372[1]Penned by Associate Justice Agustin S. Dizon and concurred in by Associate Justices
Regalado E. Maambong and Celia C. Librea-Leagogo.

373[2] Penned by Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr.

374[3]TSN, September 18, 1996, pp. 31-35.

Meanwhile, at about 8:40 a.m., Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2 Arthur Ortiz,
the desk officer on duty at Station 8 of the Central Police District Command
(CPDC) located at P. Tuazon Blvd., Project 4, Quezon City, answered a telephone
call from a male person who reported a shooting incident along Katipunan Avenue.
Station Commander Police Chief Inspector (Insp.) Edward Villena, together with
his investigators SPO2 Wahab Magundacan, Police Officer (PO) 2 Gerardo
Daganta and PO1 Ronald Francisco immediately boarded a PNP marked vehicle
and headed towards Katipunan Avenue.375[4]
Upon reaching the area at 8:45 a.m., they saw several onlookers around and
near a black Honda Accord with Plate No. RNA-777 on a stop position in the
middle lane of Katipunan Avenue facing south going to Libis. They found the
victims bloodied and bullet-riddled body partly slumped onto the pavement at the
cars left door, which was open. The front windshield and sliding glass windows on
the left and right side were shattered; a hole was seen on the glass window of the
left rear door, apparently pierced by a bullet. Glass splinters were scattered inside
the car and on the pavement at both sides of the car. On orders of Chief Insp.
Villena, PO2 Daganta and PO1 Francisco assisted by a certain Cesar Espiritu,
immediately brought the victim to the Quirino Memorial Hospital in Project 4,
Quezon City. SPO2 Magundacan was instructed to stay behind to cordon the area
for the start of the investigation while Chief Insp. Villena went to their station to
get his camera.376[5] After ten (10) minutes, Chief Insp. Villena returned and took

375[4]TSN, August 1, 1996, pp. 14-22; TSN, August 6, 1996, pp. 14-19; TSN, August 7,
1996, pp. 11-13.

376[5]TSN, August 1, 1996, pp. 22-34; TSN, August 6, 1996, pp. 19-23, 35-37; TSN, August
7, 1996, pp. 13-16.

pictures of the crime scene, and also of the victim at the hospital. 377[6] SPO2
Magundacan was able to pick up several spent shells and two (2) slugs, apparently
fired from .45 and 9 mm. pistols.378[7] A sketch was prepared by PO2 Daganta who
also interviewed some of the witnesses present at the crime scene. 379[8] The spot
report and list of recovered items (including a Philippine Military Academy gold
ring on which was engraved the name Rolando N. Abadilla) were later prepared by
SPO2 Magundacan at the police station.380[9]

On the same day, witnesses Cesar F. Espiritu (who was driving his car ahead
of the victim), Aurora Urbano (Metro Aide), Ani C. Icot (house gardener of the
Abadilla family, Freddie Alejo (security guard posted at Eliscon Electrical Supply
store located at 211 Katipunan Avenue) and Minella Alarcon (college professor at
Ateneo de Manila University) gave their respective statements before the Criminal
Investigation Division of the Central Police District Command (CID-CPDC), PNPNational Capital Region (NCR) at Camp Karingal, Sikatuna Village, Quezon City,
while the statement of Merlito Herbas (security guard posted at the Blue Ridge
Realty Corporation located at No. 219 Katipunan Avenue, Quezon City) was taken
at Station No. 8, CPDC at P. Tuazon Blvd., Proj. 4, Quezon City.381[10]

377[6]TSN, August 7, 1996, pp. 17-26; Exhibits A to A-9, folder of exhibits, pp. 6-9. Also
Exhibits 29 to 35 for the Defense, pp. 356-362.

378[7]TSN, August 1, 1996, pp. 41-46.

379[8]TSN, August 1, 1996, pp. 40-41; TSN, August 6, 1996, pp. 30-61; Exhibit D, folder of
exhibits, p. 13.

380[9]TSN, August 1, 1996, pp. 55-59; TSN, August 6, 1996, pp. 75-76; Exhibits B and C,
folder of exhibits, pp. 10-12.

Based on their accounts, the black Honda Accord with Plate Number RNA777 was caught in traffic while traversing Katipunan Avenue going to Santolan at
past 8:00 oclock on the morning of June 13, 1996. While on a stop position, four
(4) men armed with handguns surrounded the said car and fired several successive
shots at the man inside it. One (1) of the men who were positioned at the left side
of the car opened its door and took something inside. He grabbed the victim by the
neck and dropped his body down towards the pavement at the left door. When
there were already several people who had come out to see what was happening,
one of the suspects shouted, Walang gagalawDapa!
Minella Alarcon, who was then with her son-in-law on board her white KIA
Pride, was following the victims car (at other side or diagonal line) at the time of
the incident. After the shooting, two (2) of the armed men who fired at the victims
car approached their car and pounded at it saying BabaBaba! Terrified, she and her
son-in-law got off and crawled towards the side of the street. The assailants then
boarded the KIA Pride and went away to the direction of an alley along Katipunan
Avenue. Her car was later recovered, as it was found abandoned along Aguinaldo
Street near the corner of J.P. Rizal Street, Project 4, Quezon City, still with
bloodstains on the car door.382[11]
The victim was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. The victims
identity was confirmed by Susan Abadilla who had rushed to the hospital. Chief
Insp. Villena escorted her in bringing the victims body to the PNP Crime
Laboratory in Camp Crame for the autopsy requested by the CPDC, PNP-NCR,
381[10]Records, Vol. I, pp. 27-40.
382[11]Records, Vol. I, pp. 39-40; See also Exhibits 37 to 45-B-1 for the Defense, folder of
exhibits, pp. 363-371.

Camp Karingal.383[12] From the testimony and medico-legal report of Dr. Jesusa N.
Vergara, it was disclosed that the victim died of hemorrhage as a result of multiple
gunshot wounds, mostly in the head and chest, and also sustained abrasions,
contusions, lacerated skin, hematoma and incised wounds or cuts in the skin
caused by glass splinters.384[13]
Records indicate that immediately after the incident, elements of the CPDC,
PNP-NCR at Camp Karingal were already coordinating with investigators of
Station 8-CPDC who had turned over to said office the evidence gathered and
referred the witnesses present at the crime scene. 385[14] As a result of follow-up
operations, Joel de Jesus, alias Tabong, was apprehended on June 19, 1996 at his
house at Dahlia St., Fairview, Quezon City. He executed his Sinumpaang Salaysay
dated June 20, 1996 and Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay dated June 21,
1996.386[15]
In his first statement, Joel de Jesus narrated that on June 13, 1996 at 6:30 in
the morning after parking his tricycle at the corner of Regalado and Camaro
Streets, Fairview, he was fetched by Lorenzo Larry delos Santos who was his
neighbor at Ruby St. Larry was accompanied by his nephew Ogie, and a certain
Tisoy who drove the owner-type jeep. Larry told him they were going to kill a bigtime personality (may titirahin na malaking tao), whose name was Abadilla, and
that they were going to ambush the latter at Katipunan Avenue. The ambush would
383[12]TSN, August 7, 1996, pp. 26-28; TSN, September 18, 1996, pp. 36-37.
384[13]TSN, September 10, 1996, p. 97; Exhibit Q, folder of exhibits, pp. 34-35.
385[14]Testimony of P/Insp. Rogelio Castillo - TSN, August 7, 1996, pp. 54-124.
386[15]Exhibits E and N, folder of exhibits, pp. 14-20, 30.

be carried out by Joel, Larry, Tisoy, Ram (de Jesus), Cesar who was a policeman,
and four (4) others. That same morning, they proceeded to Katipunan Avenue on
board Larrys owner-type jeep without a plate and a Mitsubishi L-300 van. They
carried .45 and 9 mm. pistols; Joel used a .38 caliber revolver. According to Joel,
he only acted as lookout; Lorenzo, Ram and Cesar were the ones who fired shots,
while Tisoy focused on a security guard at a store. After the shooting, they
separated ways: the owner-type jeep he was riding in headed towards Santolan;
Cesars group split so that three (3) of them rode the L-300 van and the three (3)
others boarded a car stolen from a woman driver. Upon reaching Commonwealth
Avenue and Tandang Sora, they stopped at Glori Supermarket where all the
firearms used were returned to the group, including the revolver earlier given to
Joel. It was already dusk when Lorenzo dropped him off at the tricycle parking
area at Camaro St.387[16]
Joel further stated that the ambush-slay of Abadilla was planned by the
group three (3) days before, when they met at the house of Ram de Jesus also in
Fairview near his house. Although he did not know the identity of the person who
masterminded the ambush-slay of Abadilla, he described the mastermind as the one
(1) who opened Abadillas car and pulled Abadilla from the inside of the car, and he
was also the one (1) who drove the L-300 van. Lorenzo told him he should not
worry because Lorenzo would take care that he would be compensated for his
participation. When they reached Katipunan Avenue, they alighted from their
respective vehicles to wait for Abadilla. The L-300 van where the mastermind and
Cesar rode was just behind Abadillas car. There was no more order given to fire
because when traffic stopped the vehicles on the road, those in the L-300 van just
got down, positioned themselves and fired upon Abadilla. The mastermind not only
387[16]Id., at pp. 15-17.

fired at Abadilla from outside the latters car, he even made sure Abadilla was dead,
as half of his body went inside the car, firing again at Abadilla before finally
dropping him to the ground. Joel added that he just remained silent after the
incident, for which he did not earn anything and was threatened by one (1) of those
who were in the L-300 van whose name he did not know.388[17]
In his second statement, Joel pointed to his cohorts in a police line-up inside
the CID-CPDC, PNP-NCR, Camp Karingal, Quezon City where he positively
identified Rameses de Jesus (Ram), Cesar Fortuna, Lenido Lumanog and PO2
Romeo Costibolo as among those who participated in the ambush-slaying of
Abadilla on June 13, 1996.389[18]
The afore-named suspects identified by Joel were apprehended during
further follow-up operations conducted on June 20, 1996 by Task Force Rolly
subsequently formed by the PNP after the lead initially provided by him. As
mentioned in the Joint Affidavit executed by Police Senior Inspector (P/Sr. Insp.)
Ronello N. Navarro, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Ferdinand A. Marticio, SPO4
Wilfredo G. Galvan and SPO1 Allan dela Cruz dated June 21, 1996, as early as
June 15, 1996, or two (2) days after the ambush-slay of Abadilla, their
investigation already established the identities of a number of suspects through
photo files and forensic sketches of suspects provided by eyewitnesses. 390[19] Said
arresting officers were also able to seize certain firearms and other pieces of
evidence, to wit:
388[17]Id., at pp. 18-19.
389[18]Id., at p. 30.
390[19]Exhibit 1 for the Defense (Fortuna), folder of exhibits, pp. 99-101; Records, Vol. I, pp.
60-62.

4. That after SPO2 cesar Fortuna revealed the whereabouts of the slain
victims stolen cal .45 pistol, we conducted a follow up in a gunsmith located at
Sampaloc, Manila on 21 June 1996, from where we held for investigation, one
DANTE MONTEVIRGEN y VILLANUEVA, 37 years old, married, selfemployed/gunsmith, native of Pula, Oriental Mindoro and with given
address at 1412 Riverside Street, Commonwealth Avenue, Bgy. Holy
Spirit, Quezon City.
5. That upon confrontation said subject person surrendered two (2) cal .45
pistols whom suspect Cesar Fortuna allegedly brought to him for repair/tampering
of serial numbers, to wit:
(a) 1- COLT MARK IV cal .45 pistol Govt Model
SN-66B5574; and
(b) 1-COLT MARK IV cal .45 pistol Series 70
SN-647048.
6. On the same day, 21 June 1996, after SPO2 Cesar Fortuna expressed
willingness to surrender the motorcycle allegedly used in casing and surveillance
upon the deceased victim, we took said motorcycle at Gate 2 of Camp Crame
along Santolan Road (Col Bony Serrano Avenue), Quezon City, to wit:
1- Unit, KAWASAKI motorcycle without
license plate, chassis No. C-5121696, Motor No.
658 122951
7. That the aforenamed subject person together with the property/articles
recovered were turned over to the Police Headquarters for investigation and
appropriate action;
x x x391[20]

With respect to Lorenzo delos Santos, he also executed a statement dated

June 21, 1996 admitting his participation in the ambush-slay of Abadilla on June
13, 1996, and pointing to Rameses de Jesus as the mastermind and also named the
following suspects: POGS whose real name was Lenido Lumanog, Joel de Jesus
alias Tabong, Cesar Fortuna and four (4) others whom he did not know. He said
that he was just brought along by Rameses de Jesus and was further threatened that
391[20]Id., at p. 100.

if he would not go with them, they would kill his family. He claimed that he
merely acted as a lookout. As similarly recounted by Joel, Lorenzo stated that the
group used an L-300 van, a car and a jeep in going to Katipunan Avenue in the
morning of June 13, 1996. Joel had a .45 cal pistol, Cesar a .38 revolver, Lenido a
9 mm., a certain Manuel dela Rosa who did not get out of the vehicle, carried a .38
cal revolver, and Lorenzo, also a .38 cal revolver. Rameses, Joel, Cesar and Lenido
were the ones who shot Abadilla. After the shooting, the group left him behind and
he just walked on the street before taking a taxi ride to the Bureau of Customs.
Lorenzo maintained that he was not given any money. He was just picked up from
his house at Ruby St., Fairview Subdivision by Rameses, Lenido, Cesar and Joel.
He was made to board Rameses car with a warning that if he did not join the
group, they would throw a hand grenade at his family.392[21]
In his Karagdagang Salaysay dated June 21, 1996, security guard Freddie
Alejo positively identified Joel and Lorenzo during a police line-up. Alejo
confirmed these two (2) as the persons he saw from his guard post walking to and
fro before the shooting incident. They were also the ones who shouted that no one
(1) should interfere at the time the four (4) armed men were firing shots at
Abadilla.393[22]
SPO2 Cesar Fortuna y Abudo, Rameses de Jesus y Calma, Lorenzo delos
Santos y Dela Cruz, Lenido Lumanog y Luistro, Joel de Jesus y Valdez and Arturo
Napolitano y Caburnay were charged in Criminal Case No. Q-96-66679 with theft
of the alleged gun owned by the late Abadilla (Colt Mark IV cal .45 pistol SN66BS574), a gold-plated Omega wristwatch and a wallet containing an
392[21]Exhibit S, folder of exhibits, pp. 37-38.
393[22]Exhibit M, folder of exhibits, p. 29.

undetermined amount of cash plus calling cards and other important papers, all of
which were supposedly stolen by them after killing Abadilla.394[23]
On the other hand, Lorenzo delos Santos y Dela Cruz, SPO2 Cesar Fortuna
y Abudo and Rameses de Jesus y Calma were respectively charged with illegal
possession of firearms (Presidential Decree No. 1866) in Criminal Case Nos. Q-9666680, Q-96-66682 and Q-96-66683.395[24]
All the seven (7) named accused in Criminal Case No. Q-96-66684 were
indicted for Murder under the following Information:
That on or about the 13th day of June, 1996 in Quezon City, Philippines,
the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with several other
persons whose true names, identities, whereabouts have not as yet been
ascertained and mutually helping with one another, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, with evident premeditation,
treachery, in consideration of a price, reward or promise, and taking advantage of
superior strength, attack and employ personal violence upon the person of COL.
ROLANDO ABADILLA y NOLASCO by then and there shooting the latter with
the use of different kinds of firearms, hitting him on the different parts of his
body, thereby causing the instant and immediate cause of his death, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of the said COL. ROLANDO ABADILLA y
NOLASCO.
Contrary to law.396[25]

When arraigned, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the murder charge.
In view of the dismissal of the criminal cases for illegal possession of
firearms (P.D. No. 1866) and theft (Criminal Case Nos. Q-96-66679, Q-96-66680,
394[23]Records, Vol. I, pp. 2-3.
395[24]Id., at pp. 4-9.
396[25]Id., at pp. 10-12.

Q-96-66682 and Q-96-66683),397[26] our discussion of the proceedings before the

trial court will be confined to the case for murder against Fortuna, Lumanog, Joel
de Jesus, Rameses de Jesus and Santos.
Evidence for the Prosecution
The prosecution presented the testimonies of police officers who conducted
the investigation and follow-up operations up to the actual apprehension of
suspects in the killing of Abadilla: SPO2 Wahab Magundacan, PO2 Gerardo
Daganta, Maj. Edward Villena, P/Insp. Rogelio Castillo, SPO2 Jose Garcia, Jr.,
SPO3 Romeo De Guzman, SPO2 Pio Tarala, Atty. Florimond Rous, P/Sr. Insp.
Jose B. Macanas and P/Insp. Ferdinand Marticio.
The testimonies of P/Insp. Castillo, SPO2 Garcia, SPO2 Tarala, Atty. Rous
and P/Sr. Insp. Macanas were given in court in the light of serious allegations of
torture, forced confessions and violations of constitutional rights raised by the
accused, which were widely reported in the media and brought before the
Commission of Human Rights (CHR) and eventually to Amnesty InternationalUSA.
P/Insp. Castillo, testifying on cross-examination, admitted that accused Joel
de Jesus was apprehended by members of his squad led by Lt. Rodolfo on June 19,
1996, but said suspect was not presented to him until noontime of the next day,
June 20, 1996. He did not ask his men if Joel had been subjected to investigation
and if he was, whether he was assisted by counsel. He explained that there were
still then follow-up operations in which they needed Joel. As for the press
397[26]Records, Vol. 3, pp. 1014-1020 and 1027.

conference wherein Joel was presented together with then Secretary Barbers and
General Recaredo Sarmiento, he learned about it only later.398[27]
The witness declared that the constitutional mandate and requirements under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7438 had been complied with because he secured the
services of a counsel during the interrogation of then suspect Joel de Jesus when
his sworn statement was taken on June 20, 1996. He had informed the said suspect
of his right to counsel in the presence of CID personnel and when he brought him
to the office of Atty. Confesor R. Sansano of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) located at the second floor of the Hall of Justice, Quezon City Hall. Asked
why it occurred to him to bring the suspect to the IBP, the witness replied that he
believed IBP was a private, not a government, institution. He also asked Joel -who was allowed to make a telephone call, although he was not aware if Joel made
any such call -- whether he had his own lawyer. He recalled asking Joel if he was
willing to go with them to the City Hall, because he had asked to secure the
services of counsel. There had been instances when the IBP lawyers assisted some
suspects brought by the CPDC. The CPDC provided the typewriter and papers to
be used and in this case, Atty. Sansano accommodated them in using the facilities
of the IBP Chapter office. Joel executed his statement, with SPO2 Jose L. Garcia,
Jr. propounding the questions. They started taking his statement at 1:10 p.m. of
June 20, 1996 at Room 235, IBP Office, Quezon City Hall of Justice in the
presence of Atty. Sansano and a number of people inside said office. 399[28] He was
apprised for the first time about a suspect (Joel) who was just apprehended when
he called their office upon arriving home on the night of June 19, 1996. The
398[27]TSN, August 15, 1996, pp. 14, 31-39, 57-62.
399[28]Id., at pp. 46, 64-67, 70-83.

information was given to him by the desk sergeant and thereupon he gave
instruction to contact the witness and include that suspect in a line-up. He then
informed their Chief regarding this development. When he asked for the
whereabouts of this suspect, he was given the reply that the suspect was still with
their squad conducting follow-up operations.400[29]
P/Insp. Castillo recounted that he reported to the office at 8:00 oclock in the
morning of June 20, 1996 and Joel was actually presented to him by Lt. Rodolfo at
10:00 oclock that same morning, in the presence of CID men. He told Joel he was
being implicated in the case, to which Joel replied Sir, lookout lang naman ako, sir.
This initial questioning of Joel took place at the investigation room of the CID,
where there were other private complainants talking to investigators, and there
were a number of policemen around who were not in uniform. He advised Joel that
he was free to use the telephone, and although Joel had no relatives present at that
time, he warned Joel that his case was serious and he must seek the services of
counsel. He first thought of the legal assistance provided by the City Attorney, then
that by the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), and lastly by the IBP. Between 12:30
and 1:00 p.m., he and his men, together with Joel in a separate vehicle, left the CID
to go to the Quezon City Hall. They scouted for a lawyer and inquired from the
IBP chapter office. They found Atty. Florimond Rous and the lady counsel at a
hearing in a courtroom. Atty. Rous advised them to wait for Atty. Sansano, who
apparently was the head of the IBP chapter office. He was moving in and out of the
office while the statement of Joel was being taken in the presence of Atty. Sansano.
Before that, Atty. Sansano talked to Joel alone, after which they were called in

400[29]Id., at pp. 85-99.

again for the taking of the statement at 2:00 p.m. They left City Hall at past 4:00 or
5:00 that afternoon.401[30]
SPO2 Garcia, Jr. testified that he was a member of the CID-CPDC at Camp
Karingal. On June 20, 1996 when he reported for duty, he was assigned by P/Insp.
Castillo to take down the statement of Joel de Jesus. While still inside the office of
P/Insp. Castillo, he asked Joel if his statement was voluntary and what kind of
statement he was going to give. Joel answered that his statement was voluntary and
he wanted to be included as state witness in the Abadilla case. Together with Joel,
SPO2 Tarala and SPO1 Edilberto Nicanor, he took lunch at the back of their office
before proceeding to the Quezon City Hall at around 12:00 oclock noon, with
P/Insp. Castillo who said that Joels statement would be taken infront of a counsel.
At the Hall of Justice lobby, P/Insp. Castillo instructed them to guard Joel as he
would look for a counsel. After more or less 25 to 30 minutes, P/Insp. Castillo
came back and they proceeded to the second floor of the office of the IBP chapter.
They were met by a lady secretary, and afterwards he saw P/Insp. Castillo talking
to a lawyer whom he came to know as Atty. Rous. It seemed Atty. Rous could not
decide on what P/Insp. Castillo told him and said he (Atty. Rous) would first ask
the permission of Atty. Sansano. They waited for Atty. Sansano, who arrived in
about twenty (20) to twenty-five (25) minutes. Atty. Sansano and P/Insp. Castillo
talked for about five (5) minutes and thereafter, Atty. Sansano requested them to
leave, because he would talk personally to Joel. Atty. Sansano and Joel talked
inside the room for five (5) to ten (10) minutes. Thereafter, he, P/Insp. Castillo,
SPO2 Tarala and SPO1 Edilberto Nicanor went inside the room and that was the
time Atty. Sansano announced that Joel was ready for the taking of his statement. 402
[31]
401[30]Id., at pp. 99-122, 125-141, 145-154.

SPO2 Garcia, Jr. further testified that he took down the statement of Joel
using a typewriter in the office of Atty. Sansano. He brought said typewriter near
the table of Atty. Sansano and a chair to sit on beside Joel. Joel was seated infront
of the desk where Atty. Sansano was sitting. After completing the taking down of
the statement, he gave it to Joel and asked the latter to read it. Joel read the
typewritten statement and when he finished reading, he gave the same to Atty.
Sansano. Atty. Sansano read all the contents of the document and asked Joel if he
understood it, to which he answered Yes, sir. Atty. Sansano then asked Joel if he
was willing to sign the statement, to which the latter again replied in the
affirmative. Joel signed the statement in his presence and also that of Atty.
Sansano, who likewise signed it in his presence. SPO2 Garcia, Jr. also identified
his own signature and that of SPO1 Nicanor who signed the statement in his
presence. From the office of Atty. Sansano, they proceeded to the fourth floor in
the office of Prosecutor Ramon Gerona before whom Joel subscribed his statement.
After reading the statement, Fiscal Gerona explained to Joel in Tagalog the
consequences of the statement he executed. Joel was calm and said he was only a
lookout in the crime. Earlier, before propounding questions to Joel at the office of
Atty. Sansano, the latter addressed Joel in Tagalog: Joel naiintindihan mo na ang
mga itinatanong sa iyo ng mga pulis? Ito ba sarili mo o boluntaryo ba tong
statement mo na ito hindi ka ba nila tinakot, sinaktan o anupaman? While Joel was
answering his questions, Atty. Sansano halted him from typing the answer given by
Joel to ask the latter if he could understand the question propounded to him. The
witness was also asked to identify Joel de Jesus inside the courtroom.403[32]

402[31]TSN, September 24, 1996, pp. 5-28.

403[32]Id., at pp. 29-71.

On cross-examination, SPO2 Garcia, Jr. affirmed that before the taking

down of the statement, he had explained to Joel the consequences of his being a
state witness, in accordance with the instruction of P/Insp. Castillo. He specifically
explained to Joel: Itong statement na ito ay puwedeng gamitin laban o panig sa yo
sa alinmang hukuman dito sa Pilipinas. Ikaw ba ay nakahandang tumestigo sa
mga sasabihin ng tao dito sa statement mo na ito na magiging laban sa kanila.
Joel told him, Yes, sir. P/Insp. Castillo had told him that Joel was to turn state
witness before the latter was brought to the IBP Office. When P/Insp. Castillo had
returned to the lobby of the Hall of Justice, he told them that the only person
present who would act as Joels counsel would be located at the IBP Office, and
Joel would be brought there. It was his first time to meet Atty. Sansano. As to
whether Joel was also assisted by Atty. Rous when he was investigated on June 21,
1996, the witness said he did not know.404[33] Regarding the portion of the
statement dated June 20, 1996 wherein he asked Joel about a pending case against
him, which Joel identified as a rape case, he denied having knowledge of any such
pending case before the taking of the statement. He also did not ask Joel if he
already had a counsel, or if Joel already knew Atty. Sansano. Another lawyer, Atty.
Rous, was actually present when he was taking Joels statement at the office of Atty.
Sansano, who was also present throughout the time he was taking down the
statement of Joel. He did not hear Joel mention the name of another lawyer to Atty.
Sansano, specifically that of Atty. David as suggested by defense counsel.405[34]
SPO2 Tarala testified that as a member of the PNP Station in Kamuning,
Quezon City, assigned at the CID, he came to investigate accused Lorenzo delos
404[33]Id., at pp. 78-97.
405[34]TSN, September 25, 1996, pp. 93-113, 135-137.

Santos on June 21, 1996. On that day, after lunch, he was instructed by P/Insp.
Castillo to proceed to the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC),
Dallas Bldg. in Tomas Morato Avenue, because one (1) of the suspects in the
Abadilla slaying was apprehended by the PARAC follow-up team and was
supposed to give his statement. So he went there together with SPO1 Primo Borito
and PO3 Ramil Hatchero. Upon arriving at said office, he met P/Sr. Insp. Macanas,
who called a person he introduced as Lorenzo delos Santos. Before taking down
the statement of Lorenzo, he advised the latter of his rights under the law, warning
that any statement he would make could be used against him in any court of law, so
that he had the right not to answer any question which to his mind would
incriminate him. Lorenzo responded by saying that he wanted to give a statement
and to be a state witness. When Lorenzo asked if he could use a telephone at the
information table, he said yes. Lorenzo then called his office because he was a
customs broker, and also called up a relative who was a certain Col. Sala (Col.
Milagros Sala), a Quezon City police official. He told Lorenzo that he should have
a lawyer of his choice during the taking down of his statement. He prodded
Lorenzo to call the lawyer, whom Lorenzo knew to be always at the City Hall.
They then proceeded to the Quezon City Hall to look for that lawyer at the Office
of the City Attorney. However, Lorenzo was not able to find said lawyer; he asked
somebody (a woman) who referred them to the Hall of Justice. After failing to find
the person Lorenzo was looking for to be his counsel, an old man, a vendor
suggested to them to go upstairs at the IBP Office. The lady secretary of the IBP
chapter office introduced them to Atty. Florimond Rous, who then asked him and
his companions to step out of the room so Atty. Rous could talk to Lorenzo. Atty.
Rous and Lorenzo talked for ten (10) to fifteen (15) minutes, after which they were
called again to enter the office. His two (2) companions were left outside and he

was told by Atty. Rous that he had already apprised Lorenzo of his rights, but
Lorenzo still wanted to give a statement.406[35]
Upon the instruction of Atty. Rous, he took down the statement of Lorenzo,
the three (3) of them in one (1) corner of the room while over at the receiving area
there were the secretary and a lady lawyer. The statement of Lorenzo was in
Tagalog, typewritten in question-and-answer form. Each time after he had asked a
question, Atty. Rous would in turn ask Lorenzo if he wanted to answer it, and
Lorenzo would answer yes. He was at the typewriter, and the two (2) (Atty. Rous
and Lorenzo) were infront of him, seated across each other. The taking of the
statement started at about 3:10 in the afternoon and was finished in more than one
(1) hour. He asked Lorenzo to read first his statement, and then Atty. Rous read it
also. Next, they went up to the office of Fiscal Refuerzo, but was referred by the
secretary to the inquest fiscal on duty, Fiscal Ben dela Cruz. At his office, Fiscal
dela Cruz asked Lorenzo to stand infront of him and asked if the statement was
voluntarily given by him, if what was contained therein was true, and if he was
ready to swear before him. Lorenzo answered yes, and the subscribing of his
statement before Fiscal dela Cruz was also witnessed by Atty. Rous. 407[36] Lorenzo
had earlier told him and his companions at the PARAC office that his participation
in the ambush-slay of Abadilla was that of a lookout, and that he was only forced
to join the group because of the threat to his family.408[37]

406[35]TSN, October 3, 1996, pp. 23-46; TSN, October 8, 1996, pp. 19-20.
407[36]TSN, October 3, 1996, pp. 47-68.
408[37]TSN, October 8, 1996, pp. 38-41.

SPO2 Tarala admitted that the first time he went to the IBP Office at the Hall
of Justice was on June 20, 1996 when SPO2 Garcia, Jr. took the statement of Joel
de Jesus. Since only SPO2 Garcia, Jr. and Joel stayed inside the room, he and his
companion just walked around.409[38]
Atty. Rous testified that he was one (1) of the free legal aid counsels of the
Free Legal Aid Committee of the IBP-Quezon City Chapter. One (1) of their
primary duties was to assist indigents in their cases, and aside from this, they were
also tasked to assist the various suspects during custodial investigations in the
various investigations of different agencies, such as the CIS and PNP. He recalled
handling at least ten (10) to fifteen (15) of such custodial investigations. On June
21, 1996, he assisted a person by the name of Lorenzo delos Santos accompanied
by a police investigator (whose name he could no longer remember) from the
Central Police District, who told him that the said suspect was willing to make a
confession and asked if he could assist him during his custodial investigation. He
identified Lorenzo inside the courtroom.410[39] The police investigator had
informed him of the charge against Lorenzo, which was the killing of Abadilla. 411
[40]
Before the start of the investigation of Lorenzo, Atty. Rous related that he
asked the policeman to leave him and Lorenzo. When the investigators were gone,
he asked Lorenzo to remove his shirt so he could see if there were any tell-tale
marks of any harm or specific mark upon him. Having satisfied himself that there
409[38]TSN, October 9, 1996, pp. 66-67.
410[39]TSN, October 15, 1996, pp. 10-17.
411[40]Id., at pp. 45-48.

were no such mark on the suspects body, Atty. Rous began interviewing him. He
asked Lorenzo if he was willing to execute a confession, and Lorenzo answered he
was willing to do so. He then asked Lorenzo if he was willing to have him as his
counsel. Evidently, Lorenzo wanted him to be his counsel during the custodial
investigation for the taking of his statement. Convinced that Lorenzo was giving
his statement without any pressure or force, they started the investigation proper.
The police investigator who accompanied Lorenzo to their office was the one (1)
who had propounded questions in Tagalog and typed the answers given by Lorenzo
also in Tagalog. He was just within hearing distance and was present during the
entire time of the taking of Lorenzos statement. Afterwards, he let Lorenzo read the
typewritten statement, and he asked Lorenzo if those were the questions given to
him and the answers he had given, to which he replied in the affirmative. He
further asked Lorenzo if he was willing to sign the statement without pressure, and
Lorenzo said he was willing to sign the same. He asked Lorenzo to sign his
statement before the office of Prosecutor Ben dela Cruz. Prosecutor dela Cruz first
read the statement and then asked Lorenzo if he was willing to sign the same, and
he answered in the affirmative. Lorenzo signed the statement in their presence; he
and Prosecutor dela Cruz also signed it.412[41]
Atty. Rous further testified on cross-examination, that after the police
investigator and Lorenzo had left, a few minutes later, some other investigators
arrived at their office, bringing along Joel de Jesus. This Joel de Jesus had given a
statement the previous day, June 20, 1996, and he was told that Joel would be
giving this time a supplemental statement. The investigators apprised Joel of his
constitutional rights before the taking down of his statement. He was not sure if
Lorenzo and the police investigator had actually left already, and he could not
412[41]Id., at pp. 17-39.

remember exactly what transpired at this point. The defense counsel noted the
absence of the word competent to qualify the word counsel in the preliminary
portion of Lorenzos statement. Atty. Rous described the answers given by Lorenzo
as spontaneous, and he did not recall any hesitancy on the part of the latter. He
maintained that he found no contusions or abrasions on Lorenzos body.413[42]
P/Sr. Insp. Macanas testified that he was then assigned at the PARAC as its
operations officer. They were closely coordinating with and sharing evidence for
case build-up operations with the CPDC in the investigation of the killing of
Abadilla. On June 19, 1996, at around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon, they were
directed to proceed to the CPDC headquarters in view of an information that a
certain suspect alias Tabong was already located while repairing his tricycle
somewhere in Fairview, during which he was identified by an eyewitness, security
guard Alejo who went there with CPDC operatives. At the time this radio message
was received, they were within the vicinity of Fairview, and the CPDC gave the
signal for them to accost said suspect. He was present when Tabong, who was later
identified as Joel de Jesus, was arrested by the joint elements of the CPDC and
PARAC. Joel was turned over to the CID-CPDC at about past 4:00 p.m.
Subsequently, their superior, P/Sr. Supt. Bartolome Baluyot, informed them of
revelations given by Joel, for which they were called in again for joint follow-up
operations. They brought Joel to Fairview along Ruby St. where Joels supposed
companions, namely: one alias Ram, Lorenzo delos Santos, Ogie and one (1) alias
Cesar, could be found. Joel first pointed to the house of Ram (Rameses de Jesus),
but they did not find him there; instead they found a man named Cesar Fortuna,
whom Joel pointed to infront of said house. They immediately apprehended
Fortuna and identified themselves. He informed Fortuna that he was being
413[42]Id., at pp. 100-164.

implicated by Joel in the killing of Col. Abadilla. Fortuna introduced himself as a

policeman assigned with the Traffic Management Command (TMC). As a standard
procedure, they informed Fortuna of his constitutional rights and then brought him
to the CPDC for investigation. At the time, Fortuna had a gun (caliber .38) tucked
in his waist, which they confiscated.414[43]
P/Sr. Insp. Macanas further testified that in the course of their follow-up
operations, with information being provided by Joel, they were also able to arrest
another suspect alias Larry, whom they met at a dark alley. Upon being pointed to
by Joel, they apprehended Larry who was later identified as Lorenzo delos Santos,
frisked him and found in his possession a cal .38 Smith and Wesson, for which he
could not present any license or document. They brought Lorenzo to the CIDCPDC. He identified both Lorenzo and Fortuna inside the courtroom. 415[44] On
cross-examination, the witness admitted they had no warrant of arrest when they
went to Fairview to locate the suspects, as it was a hot person case ordered by their
superior and requiring the immediate arrest of suspects identified by witnesses like,
in this case, Joel. Joel had admitted to the CID-CPDC investigators his
participation in the Abadilla killing. After accosting Joel at Camaro St., whom they
identified through a photograph, and before taking him to the CID-CPDC, he
informed Joel that he was identified as one (1) of the suspects in the killing of Col.
Abadilla; that he had a right to remain silent; that anything he will say could be
used against him; he had the right to counsel of his own choice, and if he could not
afford one, the government would provide him. As to Lorenzo, he was arrested past
midnight of June 20, 1996; they had brought Joel along while moving to locate
414[43]TSN, November 12, 1996, pp. 12-45.
415[44]TSN, November 28, 1996, pp. 3-13.

Lorenzo.416[45] He was just at the back of those operatives who actually arrested
Lorenzo.417[46]
The principal witness for the prosecution was Freddie Alejo, who testified
that as a security guard employed by Provider Security Agency, he was then
assigned at 211 Katipunan Avenue, Blue Ridge, Quezon City. On June 13, 1996, he
reported for duty at 7:00 oclock in the morning. By 7:30 a.m., he noticed two (2)
men walking back and forth infront of his post. He was shown by the prosecutor
some photographs taken of the parking area he was then guarding, his guard post
beside the building and the street infront of said building (Exhibits G, H, I and
J418[47]).
Alejo recounted that there was a man riding in a black car who was shot by
four (4) persons infront of the building he was guarding. The car was in the middle
lane of the road, and the cars specific location was found in one (1) of the
photographs (Exhibit H-4419[48]). One (1) of the two (2) persons he earlier saw
walking back and forth in front of him pointed a gun at him (the position of said
man was marked as Exhibit H-5420[49]). That man was holding a short gun and he
told Alejo to come down (Baba!), but he did not budge. He then saw one (1) of the

416[45]Id., at pp. 14-36.

417[46]TSN, December 10, 1996, pp. 25-43.
418[47]Folder of exhibits, pp. 22-25.
419[48]Id., at p. 23.
420[49]Id.

assailants (No. 1 in Exhibit H421[50]), the one (1) standing on the left side of the car
(left front door), grab the victim by the neck, get the clutch bag of the victim inside
the car, pull said victim out of the car, and drop him on the road. He then heard
another shot coming from said attacker (No. 1). Another man (No. 5 in Exhibit
H422[51]) shouted: Dapawalang makikialam! and the rest of the four (4) men
(marked as Nos. 2, 3 and 4 in Exhibit H423[52]) faced him (witness Alejo). Next,
the companion of No. 5, who was earlier walking back and forth infront of him
(marked as No. 6 in Exhibit H424[53]), pointed a gun at him. This time, he did come
down, lowering his body and bowing his head inside the guardhouse. The witness
identified the suspects inside the courtroom as the persons he saw and marked as
No. 5 (Joel de Jesus) the first one who pointed a gun at him shouting Baba ka!;
No. 1 who grabbed the victim, got his clutch bag and pulled him out of the car
(Lenido Lumanog); No. 2 (Rameses de Jesus); No. 6 the second person who
pointed a gun at him (Lorenzo delos Santos); No. 4 (Augusto Santos) and No. 3
who was positioned at the right front door of the victims car (Cesar Fortuna).
Nos. 1 and 3 (Lumanog and Fortuna) were the ones who shot the victim with short
firearms, while No. 2 (Rameses) was just standing and facing the victim with a gun
in his hand, and No. 4 (Augusto) was also just standing facing the driver and
holding a short gun. It was probably less than a minute when the gunfire stopped,
and he stood up at his guard post. The assailants were no longer in sight and he saw

421[50]Id.
422[51]Id.
423[52]Id.
424[53]Id.

the cars window shattered. He identified the victims black car as shown in
photographs (Exhibits A-1 to A-4425[54]).426[55]
Alejo further testified that he was one (1) of those asked by the policemen
who arrived regarding the incident. He was told to go to Station 8, which was just
near the place. At Station 8, another security guard of an adjacent building was also
being investigated. Thereafter, the police officers brought him to Camp Karingal,
along with the other security guard.427[56]
On cross-examination, Alejo described his guard post as elevated; and two
(2) arms length on the left and right side, there was an alley just beside the guard
post which was at the corner.428[57] The victims car was infront of the building he
was guarding, at a slightly slanted direction from it (Lihis po ng konti). His view
was toward the direction of the front door of the car (rear end). From where he was
at the time, the car was at a distance of more or less ten (10) meters. The first time
one (1) of the suspects pointed a gun at him, he was not scared. He saw four (4)
men standing around the victims car, two (2) on the left side, and two (2) on the
right side. He saw only two (2) of them (the ones at the front left and right sides of
the car) shooting at the car; they were carrying short firearms. One (1) of these two
(2) got the clutch bag (at the left front side of the car), grabbed the victim by the
neck and shot him once before dropping him down the road. Even if he could not
see the gun when that assailant pulled the victim from the car, he knew that the
425[54]Folder of exhibits, p. 23.
426[55]TSN, August 20, 1996, pp. 11-69.
427[56]Id., at pp. 70-75.
428[57]Id., at pp. 114-120.

victim was shot again, because he saw a gun smoke just beside the left side of the
car where the victim was dropped. The second man who pointed a gun at him
shouted Dapa! and thereupon his companions (the ones at the right rear side, left
rear side, and front right side) faced him for less than a minute. Because at that
precise moment the gun was not yet poked at him, he was able to recognize their
faces. When finally the gun was pointed at him, he became nervous and bowed
down his head inside the guard house. The color of the clutch bag taken from the
victim was black. He could see the inside of the car from his guard post because
the cars glass window was not tinted and, besides, his position was elevated or
higher than the height of the car.429[58] He confirmed the contents of his
Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit L) before policeman Edilberto Nicanor on June 13,
1996 taken at the CID-PNP, Camp Karingal at 1:55 p.m. or barely four (4) hours
after the shooting incident.430[59]
Alejo further testified on cross-examination that on June 19, 1996 at around
2:00 oclock in the afternoon, he was fetched by four (4) policemen at his agency in
Monumento and they told him they were going to Fairview. Before this, in the
afternoon of June 18, 1996, they showed him a picture of a man wearing
eyeglasses, but he told them he would not point a man in photographs, but would
like to see the man in person. That was the second time he saw Joel de Jesus since
the shooting incident on June 13, 1996. He executed a supplemental statement on
June 21, 1996 when he identified said suspect in a police line-up.431[60]

429[58]TSN, August 21, 1996, pp. 27-28, 39-43, 45-60, 71-72, 75-87.
430[59]TSN, August 29, 1996, pp. 4-10.
431[60]TSN, September 3, 1996, pp. 10-11, 13-22, 27, 80-82.

On September 26, 1996, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the
place where the shooting incident took place, in the presence of the prosecutors,
defense counsel, Alejo and Maj. Villena. Alejo was asked to demonstrate his exact
location, the relative positions of the assailants and the victims car, and the entire
incident he had witnessed in the morning of June 13, 1996. The Presiding Judge
who took the same position of Alejo in the guardhouse made the following
observations:
COURT:
From this position, the Presiding Judge can see the car very clearly even if
the car would be moved back by another segment of the cement or even if
it is forwarded by another segment also, as segment can accommodate one
car of the likes of Honda Accord and the Court observes that from the
guard post the faces of the persons beside the car are very clear.
xxx
COURT:
The Court observed that from where the witness Alejo was he can still see
the whole car as it has been moved back per the directive of Major Villena.
xxx
COURT:
The Court adds that from the position of the witness, Freddie Alejo, the
Court can still see faces behind the car which can accommodate another
car.
xxx
COURT:
The front right window has been rolled down and also the back right
window of the car have been rolled down with the left front door opened,
the Court can observed the two (2) front seats particularly the upper
portion, meaning the head rest and the back rest, half of the back rest, all
the head rest can be seen.
xxx

INTERPRETER:
(measuring the distance from the guardhouse to the black car).
The measurement from the foot of the guardpost up to the right front door
of the black car is fifteen (15) meters.
xxx
INTERPRETER:
(Measuring the distance between the bodega to the black car)
The measurement from the front portion of the bodega (papaya) to
the side of the black car is 11.8 meters.
xxx
INTERPRETER:
The measurementthe distance from where suspect No. 6 was standing to
the guard house when measured is 7.34 meters, your Honor.
xxx
INTERPRETER:
The distance from where suspect No. 5 was standing up to the guard house
is 5.17 meters.
xxx
COURT:
After the demonstration while witness Alejo was demonstrating how
[suspect No. 2] got the clutch bag and how [suspect No. 2] grabbed the
neck of the driver of the black car, the Judge was at the guard post and saw
for himself that [Alejo] clearly saw the taking of the clutch bag even if the
untinted windows were closed and the pulling of the driver of the black
car.432[61]

P/Insp. Castillo, on re-direct examination testified that Atty. Sansano

actively assisted Joel de Jesus during the time the latters Sinumpaang Salaysay was
being taken by SPO2 Garcia, Jr. There were questions propounded to Joel which
432[61]TSN, September 26, 1996, pp. 21-22, 43-44, 46-47, 61-62, 69.

Atty. Sansano had told Joel not to answer, and advice was given by said counsel.
They left Quezon City Hall at about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon and returned to
the CPDC headquarters. He maintained that all the accused were brought before
the City Prosecutor for inquest proceedings prior to the filing of the information in
court.433[62]
Susan Samonte-Abadilla testified that their family incurred expenses for
the burial of her husband, repair of the Honda Accord and loss of the .45 cal gold
cup pistol and Omega watch during the shooting of her husband. She further
testified that she was very shocked and saddened by the tragic death of her
husband. Because she led a practically sheltered life, it was difficult for her, as it
was the older children who were now taking care of their businesses, which were
attended to by her husband when he was still alive. Three (3) of her eight (8)
children were still studying (Ana, 14; Nico, 13; and BJ, 10), and one had just
graduated last March 1997.434[63]
Merlito Herbas, in his Karagdagang Salaysay dated June 21, 1996,
identified Joel de Jesus in a police line-up at the CID-CPDC, Camp Karingal, as
one (1) of those men who shot the victim on June 13, 1996. 435[64] However, not
having been presented by the prosecution as witness, he testified for the defense
declaring that none of those whom he saw during the shooting incident was present
inside the courtroom. He produced a list of amounts he had received from Mayor
Abadilla, totaling P30,000.00 in support of his claim that Mayor Abadilla did not
433[62]TSN, September 17, 1996, pp. 16-21.
434[63]TSN, September 18, 1996, pp. 28-30, 36-39, 41-55.
435[64]Exhibit EE, folder of exhibits, p. 315.

fulfill his promise to give him exactly the same salary he was receiving as security
guard (P6,000.00 monthly only instead of the P8,000.00 he used to receive as
monthly pay), although he admitted having stayed for free inside the Abadilla
compound from July 11, 1996 up to November 26, 1996. He was later told that he
would no longer be presented as witness because the testimony of Alejo would be
sufficient.436[65]
Defense Evidence
All the accused raised the defense of alibi, highlighted the negative findings
of ballistic and fingerprint examinations, and further alleged torture in the hands of
police officers and denial of constitutional rights during custodial investigation.
P/Insp. Reynaldo D. de Guzman, firearms examiner and Chief of the
Firearms Division of the PNP Crime Laboratory, testified that he conducted an
examination of the slug recovered from the body of Col. Abadilla, as per request of
the CPDC for cross-matching with a bullet also recovered from the body of another
shooting victim, Suseso de Dios, i.e., whether or not they were fired from one (1)
and the same firearm.437[66] The result of their microscopic examination was that
the aforesaid bullets were fired from the same firearm.438[67]

436[65]TSN, February 20, 1998, pp. 58-68, 73-79, 84-85, 91-92, 103-105; Exhibit 48 (U for
Prosecution), folder of exhibits, p. 188.

437[66]Exhibits 2-F-19 and 2-F-20 and 3, folder of exhibits, pp. 106-108, 111; TSN,
December 10, 1997, pp. 15-27.

438[67]TSN, December 10, 1997, pp. 40-42; Exhibits 2 to 2-F-14, folder of exhibits, pp. 102105.

Dr. Jesse Rey Cruel, medico-legal officer of the CHR, testified that he
examined accused Cesar Fortuna, Rameses de Jesus, Lenido Lumanog on June 25,
1996 and Lorenzo delos Santos on July 3, 1996. His findings showed that their
bodies bore the following injuries: (1) Fortuna - abrasions on forearm, elbow and
knee; contusions on chest area; and incised wounds on the waist and legs 439[68];
(2) Rameses - contusions on chest, abdomen, knee and thigh areas 440[69]; (3)
Lumanog - contusions on abdomen and lumbar region, and a horizontal lacerated
wound on the forehead441[70]; and (4) Lorenzo - abrasions on the arms, contusions
in thigh and knee, petechia marks (minute hemorrhages) between chest/abdomen
and the penis, discoloration on right arm, and new scars on left arm, right foot and
second toe.442[71] All said wounds required not more than nine (9) days of medical
attendance. The defense also presented pictures taken at the time of the
examination.443[72] On cross-examination, Dr. Cruel opined that it was possible the
injuries could have been self-inflicted and pointed out that the injury on the
forehead of Lumanog was not complained of.444[73]
Remedios Dedicatoria, a fingerprint examiner at the PNP Crime Laboratory
testified on the results stated in a Dactyloscopy Report No. F-086-96 comparison
439[68]Exhibit 5, folder of exhibits, p. 112.
440[69]Exhibit 6, Id. at p. 113.
441[70]Exhibit 8, Id. at p. 116.
442[71]Exhibit 7, Id. at p. 114.
443[72]Exhibits 7-A, 7-B, 9-a to 9-g, Id. at pp. 115, 117-121; TSN, December 11, 1997, pp.
16-17, 26-149.

444[73]TSN, December 11, 1997, pp. 174-183.

of the latent prints lifted from the Honda Accord with Plate No. RNA-777, Kia
Pride PTZ-401 and Mitsubishi Lancer car with the standard fingerprints of the
accused. The only match was found in the specimen fingerprint of Rameses de
Jesus with respect to the fragmentary prints lifted from the Mitsubishi Lancer car.
None of the fingerprints of the accused is identical with the latent prints lifted from
the Honda Accord and Kia Pride.445[74] On cross-examination, the witness stated
that if a person had touched the car and rubbed it, there would be no fingerprint
that could be lifted therefrom. She also admitted that no latent print was taken from
inside the Honda Accord nor was there any fingerprint taken of the late Rolando
Abadilla (only two [2] fingerprints were taken from his car). When asked if a
person opened the car holding only the back portion of the handle, the witness
answered that there would likewise be no fingerprint on the outside of the car.446
[75]
Joel de Jesus testified that on June 19, 1996, at around 3:00 oclock in the
afternoon, he was at their street corner fixing his tricycle and was with Arturo
Napolitano and Felicisimo Herrera. A van stopped and six (6) armed men alighted
from it, among whom he recognized Antonio Rodolfo, Pio Tarala and Dario Aasco
(whom he came to know when they charged him with rape on January 17, 1994,
from which charge he was acquitted on June 19, 1996). He even greeted said cops,
but they forced him into the van, and handcuffed and blindfolded the three (3) of
them. They were brought to a certain house where they were boxed, kicked and
slammed on the wall. When his blindfold was removed, the police officers were
forcing him to admit that he killed Abadilla. Capt. Rodolfo was also there and he
445[74]TSN, January 9, 1998, pp. 12-13, 29-43, 92-98.
446[75]Id., at pp. 119-132.

later identified the rest of those who picked him up as Romulo Sales, Lt. Castillo,
Bartolome Baluyot, Major Reyes and Catalua. After he denied having anything to
do with the killing, PO2 Tarala tried to suffocate him with a plastic bag. He could
not breathe and lost consciousness. Recounting his ordeal in tears, the witness said
that for one (1) hour his captors repeatedly inserted a plastic bag and boxed him. A
younger looking man then slapped him saying that they had ambushed his father.
While detained, he was only given water to drink and not allowed to contact his
relatives. He was asked to sign by Lt. Castillo a seven (7)-page document, torturing
him if he refused to do so. There were already other signatures on the edge and
every page of said document (Sinumpaang Salaysay dated June 20, 1996). He
denied the contents of this statement but admitted that he was brought to the IBP
Office, Quezon City Hall. After signing, he heard Lt. Castillo call somebody
saying, Parating na kami dyan. He was then made to board a vehicle and was
taken to the Quezon City Hall where a man wearing barong tagalog was waiting,
asking if he was Joel de Jesus. When Lt. Castillo answered in the affirmative, the
man just signed the document. He denied having met Atty. Confesor Sansano, nor
was he told of his right to the assistance of counsel; he even told them the name of
his lawyer at that time, but they just said, Mas marunong ka pa sa amin.447[76]
Testifying on cross-examination, Joel insisted that on June 13, 1996, he went
home at around 10:00 oclock in the evening. He started plying his route at 6:00
oclock in the morning; he was hired (inarkila) by a passenger who asked him to
bring her to an albularyo in Roosevelt Avenue, Novaliches. He admitted this was
the first time he mentioned this, as it was not mentioned in his Affidavits 448[77]
447[76]TSN, September 9, 1998, pp. 9-32.
448[77]Exhibits 5 and 6, folder of exhibits, pp. 112-113.

which were prepared by the police. Atty. Lupino Lazaro assisted him in filing
charges against the police officers and Atty. Hector Corpuz before the Department
of Justice (DOJ). He admitted that he did not say anything about the illegality of
his arrest and the torture he suffered prior to his arraignment. 449[78] On re-direct
examination, he denied having executed the Karagdagang Salaysay dated June 21,
1996 before the IBP lawyer, because at this time he was still detained in a
safehouse where he remained until June 25, 1996. He was just forced to sign said
document; after signing it, he heard Lt. Castillo say to one (1) Fiscal Soler, Fiscal,
salamat. Thereafter, he and the other accused were presented in a press conference
as suspects in the Abadilla slaying inside Camp Crame. During this time, he
pointed to Lorenzo delos Santos and Augusto Santos, because they were his
enemies at their place. He only pointed to them out of fear that he might be
salvaged by the police and because of the torture. He really did not know Abadilla
nor was he at any time within the vicinity of Katipunan Avenue on June 13, 1996.
He knew Rameses de Jesus, being his longtime neighbor, and also Lumanog who
ran for councilor in their place. All he knows was that his co-accused were picked
up from their place, and he saw them only during the press conference. He
affirmed the contents of the Sinumpaang Salaysay he executed before Police Major
(Pol. Maj.) Escote with the assistance of Atty. Lazaro.450[79]
Joel admitted that he was the one (1) who pointed out Cesar Fortuna and
Rameses de Jesus to the PARAC investigators. He confirmed that he was known as

449[78]TSN, September 9, 1998, pp. 33-43.

450[79]TSN, August 26, 1998, pp. 40-61.

Tabong in their locality. He also filed a complaint before the CHR against the same
police officers.451[80]
Cesar Fortuna testified that he was a member of the PNP assigned at
Cagayan de Oro City. He came to Manila on June 7, 1996, as he was ordered by
his superior, Col. Roberto Sacramento, to attend to the documents required for
reassignment of some of their companions (as evidenced by a used Super Ferry
ticket and an unused return ticket for June 20, 1996). On June 11, 1996, he went to
the PNP Directorate for Personnel at the office of Insp. Oscar Alcala. However, on
the night of June 19, 1996, he was arrested by PARAC operatives while he was at
the house of an acquaintance, Rameses de Jesus, in Ruby St., Fairview. He had
brought for repair a Ford Maverick Model 69 registered in the name of Col.
Sacramento. At 11:00 oclock in the evening, his mechanic road-tested the car, but
since he was left alone, he decided to go to the house of Rameses which was near
the shop. Several armed policemen arrived and entered the house of Rameses. Not
finding Rameses there, they asked him instead to go along with them. He was
made to board an owner-type jeep and immediately blindfolded. After one (1) hour,
they arrived at a place which he was told was the office of PARAC. Somebody
approached him and he felt a lighters flame touch his chin. He then identified
himself as a policeman, but was only told: Walang pulis pulis dito. They kept on
asking him where Rameses could be found. Still blindfolded, he led them to
Palmera Subdivision where he knew Rameses had another house. Upon reaching
Palmera, his blindfold was removed, but he was unable to locate the house until
they went home at 5:00 p.m. In the morning of June 20, 1996, the policemen told
him that he was just confusing them (nililito), but he explained that he had been to
that house only once. The driver of the Honda Civic was already angry at him and
451[80]TSN, September 9, 1998, pp. 21-29.

inserted a .45 cal pistol in his mouth. They went back to the PARAC office, and he
was interrogated about the Abadilla killing. He was informed that he was being
implicated as somebody had pointed at him. When he still denied having any
knowledge about the ambush-slay, he was repeatedly suffocated with a plastic bag
placed on his head while he was handcuffed and blindfolded. After one (1) hour
and due to hardship he suffered, he just told them he would admit whatever it was
they wanted him to admit. He said that he acted as a look-out. They had him copy a
prepared sketch and when his blindfold was finally removed, someone introduced
himself as Col. Bartolome Baluyot who told him he just had to obey and he would
not be hurt. Maj. George Reyes arrived, looked at the sketch and said it was not the
place where Col. Abadilla was ambushed. He was blamed for that fiasco even as he
said it was they who prepared the sketch. After an hour, they returned to Palmera
Subdivision, Novaliches and this was already between 2:00 and 3:00 p.m. After
rounding the area, he found the house, but Rameses was not there. He was made to
sit the whole night in the kitchen.452[81]
Fortuna continued to narrate that on June 21, 1996, he was made to lie down
on a bench covered with a GI sheet and was asked where the firearm of Col.
Abadilla was. When he answered that he really did not know about it, they
electrocuted him and poured cold water on his body. He told them that if they
needed a gun, he had a gun in Sampaloc, a .45 cal licensed firearm. Thereupon,
they asked him to go to that place where Dante Montevirgen was the gunsmith.
Only the policemen alighted from the vehicle and talked to Montevirgen. He saw
that Montevirgen gave them two (2) firearms, after which they went back to the
PARAC office. On his licensed firearm, he just brought this for repair on May 10,
1996, saying ayaw mag-automatic, while the other gun belonged to Capt. Regis,
452[81]TSN, September 16, 1998, pp. 4-30; Exhibits 54to 58, folder of exhibits, pp. 205-209.

and these were covered by receipts. Next, they asked him about the Rolex watch of
Col. Abadilla. When he denied having any knowledge about it, he was again
electrocuted. He had filed a complaint before the CHR for the injuries inflicted on
him and the violation of his rights. Aside from this case and the charge of illegal
possession of firearms, he was also charged with an administrative case and a
criminal complaint for carnapping (of the KIA Pride). The carnapping complaint
was dismissed by Assistant Prosecutor Amolin on September 23, 1996. The
Decision issued by P/Sr. Supt. Rodolfo N. Caisip of the PNP Headquarters Traffic
Management Group also dismissed Administrative Case No. 96-09-03. He insisted
that on the morning of June 13, 1996, he was at Camp Crame following up the
reassignment papers of his colleagues, showing the letter-order issued by Col.
Sacramento. He saw PO3 Ramon Manzano at the Office of the Directorate for
Personnel at about 9:00 oclock in the morning. He left said office as soon as he got
the folder, signed their logbook, gave it to SPO4 Mercado of the Office of PNP
Personnel Highway Patrol. Then he went home to eat before proceeding to the
Metro Traffic Force, Central District at the office of Col. Juanito de Guzman at
Roces St., Quezon City, at around 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, for the renewal of
the license of Col. Sacramentos driver.453[82] He also filed with the CHR an
administrative complaint against those police officers who had illegally arrested,
detained and tortured him.
Fortuna further testified that PARAC operatives seized his Kawasaki
motorcycle which he had left inside Camp Crame because it had no fender.
However, the certificate of registration was lost since it had been in custody of the
police; the Land Transportation Office (LTO) registration paper was locked inside,
453[82]TSN, September 16, 1998, pp. 31-74; Exhibits 59 to 70-C, 80, folder of exhibits, pp.
210-228, 245.

and he forgot what its plate number was. He admitted that he was able to use said
motorcycle in June 1996 even with the missing fender. He left the motorcycle at
Gate 2, Camp Crame before leaving for Cagayan de Oro City; as to his car, he left
it at Pier 2. He admitted that he was the same person charged with kidnapping and
serious illegal detention with ransom in Criminal Case No. 96-312, which was
filed on July 15, 1996 in Mabalacat, Pampanga against him, Lumanog and
Rameses by a certain Dr. Jesusa dela Cruz. Said case was transferred to the Quezon
City RTC in the same sala of the presiding judge in this case. The filing of this
case destroyed his reputation as a police officer and affected his children, who
stopped going to school. He admitted though that he had once been dishonorably
discharged from the service as a result of an extortion case filed against him. He
had appealed his case and he was reinstated on August 20, 1983. A memorandum
dated June 25, 1996 was issued by Col. Sacramento to attest to his moral character
and loyalty to the service.454[83] He admitted that he never raised the issue of the
legality of his arrest or the torture he suffered while in detention, during his
arraignment. When confronted with his sworn statement submitted to the CHR, he
admitted that he did not mention therein the pouring of cold water on his body, that
he was asked to make a sketch of Katipunan Avenue, that a .45 cal pistol was
inserted into his mouth and that there was no firearm confiscated from him at the
time of his arrest. When he was apprehended on the night of June 19, 1996 at the
house of Rameses at Ruby St., he was half-naked standing outside at the balcony.
He saw someones hand, but not the whole body of that person to whom he was
shown that night, and he just heard from the policemen he had been positively
identified.455[84]

454[83]TSN, November 17, 1998, pp. 13-18, 24-27, 31-38, 43-69; Exhibits LL and 76, folder
of exhibits, pp. 326, 234-235.

Fortunas claim that he was at Camp Crame following up papers in the

morning of June 13, 1996 was corroborated by Oscar Alcala (Chief Clerk of the
Recruitment and Selection Division) and SPO2 Ramon Manzano (Office of the
Directorate for Personnel and Recruitment). However, Alcala could not present the
particular logbook containing the record of the documents and transaction with
Fortuna, as it could not be located, as it got lost after the office renovation in the
early part of 1997. A xerox copy of the logbook entry was presented in court
(Exhibit 70).456[85] However, said witness admitted he was not the custodian of the
said logbook, and he did not have personal knowledge of the date and time of the
entries in Exhibit 70; it was also SPO2 Manzano who xeroxed the said logbook
entry.457[86] Manzano confirmed that he personally saw Fortuna in the morning of
June 13, 1996, between 9:00 and 9:30, when Fortuna retrieved the papers he earlier
submitted in May 1996.458[87]
On further cross-examination, Fortuna admitted that he never told his lawyer
(Atty. Ramonito M. Delfin) when they brought his complaint before the CHR that
he had documents to prove he was at Camp Crame in the morning of June 13,
1996. He explained that the matter did not enter his mind because he had no food
and no sleep for several days: At the time my salaysay was taken from me,
everything was still fresh and there were so many things that I wanted to say but I
was not able to say because masama pa ang aking pakiramdam. Neither did he
455[84]TSN, November 24, 1998, pp. 6-10, 14-16; Exhibit 65, folder of exhibits, pp. 217220.

456[85]TSN, October 21, 1998, pp. 5-13; folder of exhibits, p. 228.

457[86]TSN, October 21, 1998, pp. 19-20, 25-33.
458[87]Id., at pp. 35-37, 47-48.

mention it to Fiscal Refuerzo who interviewed him after the press conference, as
they did not ask him about it.459[88] He had brought up such matter with his lawyer
in another case not before the sala of the presiding judge in this case.460[89]
Lorenzo delos Santos testified that on June 13, 1996, he left his house at
Fairview and boarded a bus bound for Quiapo. Upon reaching Quiapo, he heard
mass in Quiapo Church until around 8:30 a.m. He arrived in their office at Binondo
on June 13, 1996 at 9:30 a.m. He remembered going to the office of the Felipe
Santos Brokerage in the same building to check on the date of arrival of a certain
shipment. Thereafter, he went back to his office and stayed there until 2:30 p.m. He
left his place of work about 4:30 in the afternoon and went to a client who invited
him to drink at the house of his brother somewhere in Quezon City. On June 19,
1996, at around 11:00 olock in the evening, several persons suddenly barged into
his house while he and his wife were sleeping. Sgt. Bela introduced himself, and he
was slapped and handcuffed and the house was searched. They took his .38 cal
revolver which was licensed. He was blindfolded, made to board a car and taken to
a safehouse where he was tied and tortured (suffocation with plastic bag and
electrocution). He was told that he was pointed to by Joel, but he explained to them
that Joel was his opponent in a court case (for grave threats, physical injuries and
trespassing).461[90] He also answered their questions regarding his co-accused. He
told them that he used to see Rameses when he brings his children to school and
came to know Lumanog when he ran as city councilor, while he did not know
Fortuna. After the interrogation, he was again subjected to torture and he felt weak;
459[88]TSN, November 25, 1998, pp. 6-13.
460[89]Id., at p. 17.
461[90]Exhibits 6,6-A and 7, folder of exhibits, pp. 381, 382-384, 405, 406-408.

this lasted up to June 21, 1996. On June 21, 1996, he was brought to a field (bukid)
where he was forced to sign a paper. He was then brought to the Quezon City Hall
of Justice at the second floor and instructed that he should just walk along. There
were two (2) women inside aside from policemen, and he was elbowed by a
policeman to sign a document. He signed it out of fear, and the document was
handed by the policemen to a man who entered the room, whom he later came to
know as Atty. Florimond Rous. He was brought to another floor at the Fiscals
Office while he was still limping. Somebody there asked why he was in that
condition, but one (1) of his police companions elbowed him so he just said it was
nothing. A man who was probably the Fiscal signed the document, and they left at
around 5:00 in the afternoon.462[91] Lorenzo admitted he had an owner-type jeep,
which was registered in his own name, but said jeep had been mortgaged to Danilo
Lintag since May 27, 1996.463[92]
Lorenzo presented as witness Edith Lingan, an employee of Felipe M.
Santos, who corroborated his alibi.464[93]
Augusto Santos testified that on June 13, 1996 at around 7:00 oclock in the
morning, he accompanied his brother-in-law Jonas Ayhon whose wife, his sister,
gave birth on June 11, 1996 at the Jose Fabella Hospital at Sta. Cruz, Manila. He
stayed there until 2:00 oclock in the afternoon. On June 26, 1996, five (5) men
suddenly barged into their house. He was hit in the neck with a .45 cal. pistol,
blindfolded and brought outside where he was beaten. They had no warrant of
462[91]TSN, December 2, 1998, pp. 6-27.
463[92]TSN, December 9, 1998, pp. 3-6.
464[93]TSN, January 28, 1999, pp. 5-10.

arrest but were forcing him to admit that Joel de Jesus gave him big money and
that he knew what it was. He told them that he did not know anything, and that Joel
was his enemy, as his Tito Lorenzo had a quarrel with Joel in which he helped his
Tito. He confirmed the contents of the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 3, 1996
which he executed at Camp Crame, and also presented a copy of the birth
certificate of the baby delivered by his sister at Fabella Hospital.465[94]
Jonas Padel Ayhon corroborated the foregoing testimony of his brother-inlaw, Augusto Ogie Santos, whose half-sister was his wife.466[95]
Rameses de Jesus testified that on June 12, 1996 at 7:00 oclock in the
evening, he and Lumanog left for Mabalacat, Pampanga on board the latters brand
new Mitsubishi Lancer, together with Romeo Costibollo, Manny dela Rosa and
Boni Mandaro. They arrived in Mabalacat at about 10:00 oclock in the evening and
after resting they started digging infront of the church, inside the compound of the
Tiglao family, Lumanogs in-laws. They dug until 4:00 oclock in the morning of
June 13, 1996. Thereafter, they slept and woke up at around 10:00 oclock in the
morning. They helped in the preparations for the celebration of the wedding
anniversary of the Tiglaos. After eating lunch, they drank liquor. They returned to
Manila only on June 14, 1996 at 7:00 p.m.. On June 19, 1996, they went back to
Pampanga and returned to Manila on June 20, 1996. At around 10:00 p.m., they
proceeded to Fairview, Quezon City to visit the sick child of Romeo Costibollo
who was then confined at Fairview Polymedic Hospital. After Costibollo and
Lumanog alighted from their car and while he was parking infront of the hospital,
465[94]TSN, January 7, 1999, pp. 4-17; Exhibits 1, 2 and 3, folder of exhibits, pp.
398-400.
466[95]TSN, January 28, 1999, pp. 34-38.

several armed men came. Two (2) men approached him from behind and asked him
if Costibollo and Lumanog were his companions. When he replied yes, he was
pushed inside the car; Costibollo and Lumanog were handcuffed. Without any
warrant, they were apprehended, blindfolded and taken to a place where he was
tortured. They were forcing him to admit that he and his companions killed Kabise
who was the ex-governor of Ilocos Norte. Despite his denials they continued to
torture him by electrocution and suffocation with a plastic bag. A policeman
arrived with Fortuna, who was asked how much Ram gave them, to which Fortuna
replied P10,000.00. He got mad at Fortuna and cursed him for telling such a lie.
After two (2) days, he was brought to Camp Karingal still blindfolded. He was
again tortured for two (2) days, the policemen forcing him to admit he participated
in the killing of Col. Abadilla. When he could no longer bear the torture, he finally
admitted to Insp. Castillo that he took part in the Abadilla ambush-slay. When the
one (1) interviewing him asked how he did it, he just said that Fortuna came to his
house with an owner-type jeep and two (2) other persons, and that they rode to
Dau, Pampanga and headed to Tarlac, on their way to Ilocos to kill Abadilla. Insp.
Castillo got angry, saying that he was just fooling them and he was again hit.467[96]
Rameses continued to narrate that after two (2) or three (3) days stay at
Camp Karingal, he and the other accused were presented at a press conference.
During the inquest conducted by Fiscal Refuerzo, he saw Freddie Alejo for the first
time, and also his co-accused Lumanog, Fortuna, Lorenzo, Joel and Augusto. As
far as he knew, they had brought the matter of the torture they suffered in the hands
of policemen to the DOJ.468[97]
467[96]TSN, March 9, 1999, pp. 2-49.
468[97]TSN, March 18, 1999, pp. 3-10.

On cross-examination, Rameses was shown a medical certificate issued by

Dr. Servillano B. Ritualo III at the PNP General Hospital, Camp Crame, but he said
he could no longer remember the date he was examined by said doctor. He
confirmed that Fortuna was renting a room in his house together with his mistress
Baby. When confronted with his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated June 26, 1996 he
executed before the CHR, he admitted that there was no mention therein of their
treasure-hunting trip to Pampanga on June 12 to 15, 1996. He said he was never
asked about it. He likewise admitted that he was included in the kidnapping charge
filed in Mabalacat, but asserted that it was trumped-up (Ipinatong po sa akin yan
ni Col. Baluyot).469[98]
The Trial Courts Verdict
On August 11, 1999, the trial court promulgated a Joint Decision dated July
30, 1999, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
xxx
V. In Criminal Case No. Q-96-66684, for Murder,:
1. Accused Arturo Napolitano y Caburnay is hereby ACQUITTED;
2. Accused SPO2 Cesar Fortuna y Abudo, Rameses de Jesus y Calma,
Leonardo Lumanog y Luistro (a.k.a. Leonido or Lenido), Joel de Jesus y Valdez,
and Augusto Santos y Galang are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
as co-principals of the crime of MURDER as defined and penalized in the
Revised Penal Code for the death of ex-Col. Rolando Abadilla y Nolasco with the
aggravating circumstances of treachery (absorbing abuse of superior strength) and
evident premeditation and they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
DEATH;
3. Accused Lorenzo delos Santos y dela Cruz is hereby ACQUITTED.
469[98]Id., at pp. 10-20; Exhibits PP, QQ, SS and TT, folder of exhibits, pp. 333-342.

On the civil aspect, accused SPO2 Cesar Fortuna y Abudo, Rameses de

Jesus y Calma, Leonardo Lumanog y Luistron (a.k.a. Leonido or Lenido), Joel de
Jesus y Valdez and Augusto Santos y Galang are hereby ordered jointly and
solidarily to pay the heirs of the deceased ex-Col. Rolando Abadilla y Nolasco the
following:
1. As actual damages, the sum of P294,058.86;
2. As indemnity damages, the sum of P50,000.00;
3. As moral damages, the sum of P500,000.00;
4. As exemplary damages, the sum of P500,000.00.
The firearm, one (1) Smith & Wesson .38 caliber revolver with Serial No.
980974, subject of Case No. Q-96-66680 is hereby ordered returned to Lorenzo
delos Santos y dela Cruz.
The firearm, one (1) Amscor .38 caliber revolver with Serial No. 21907,
subject of Case No. Q-96-66683 is hereby ordered forwarded to the PNP Firearms
and Explosives Division, Camp Crame, Quezon City for safekeeping in
accordance with law and as said firearm belongs and is licensed to accused
Leonardo Lumanog y Luistro (a.k.a. Leonido or Lenido) who has been sentenced
in Case No. Q-96-66684 for Murder, until further orders from this court.
Costs against the accused.
Let the entire records of these cases be transmitted forthwith to the
Honorable Supreme Court for automatic review, in accordance with law and the
Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.470[99]

The trial court was firmly convinced that the prosecution succeeded in
establishing the identities of accused Joel, Rameses, Lumanog, Fortuna and
Augusto as the perpetrators in the fatal shooting of Abadilla in the morning of June
13, 1996. It found that both security guards Alejo and Herbas confirmed the
presence of Joel de Jesus in the crime scene. However, with respect to the positive
identification of all the five (5) accused, namely, Joel de Jesus, Rameses de Jesus,
Cesar Fortuna, Lenido Lumanog and Augusto Santos, the trial court gave more
credence to the testimony of Alejo than the declaration on the witness stand of
470[99]Records, Vol. 3, pp. 1027-1028.

Herbas who had backtracked on his earlier statement dated June 21, 1996 wherein
he pointed to Joel as one (1) of those participants in the shooting incident.
In doubting the credibility of Herbas, the trial court stressed that Herbas was
obviously disgruntled at the Abadilla familys failure to give him the promised
salary, and circumstances showed that his need for job and money colored his
perception and attitude in testifying for the defense. Moreover, despite the
impression he had given to the police and the Abadilla family that he could identify
the four (4) persons who surrounded Col. Abadillas car, Herbas could not have
really been able to recognize the faces of the ambushers for three (3) reasons: (1)
he was on the ground when he turned his head (lumingon) towards where the
gunshots were being fired and quite a lot of vehicles in traffic stopped at the time;
(2) the whole incident, as far as Herbas observed, happened in seconds only; and
(3) Herbas was three (3) Meralco posts away from the ambush site. All these
factors combined, according to the trial court, could not have given Herbas enough
time and opportunity to clearly see those who ambushed Abadilla, and hence he
was really a poor and inadequate witness either for the prosecution or the
defense.471[100]
Compared to Herbas, the trial court found the eyewitness testimony of Alejo
more credible due to his elevated position at his guard post and the fact that the
ambush had taken place before his very eyes, so near that one (1) of the
conspirators had to order him to lie flat (which obviously he could not do because
of the narrow space inside his guard house), and which appeared to be the reason
why a second order came for him to get down from the guard house, to which he
nervously complied. From his vantage point, Alejo sufficiently and in a detailed
471[100]CA rollo, Vol. II, p. 1021.

manner recognized the relative positions and participations of the ambushers, each
of whom he had identified as Rameses, Fortuna, Lumanog, Augusto and Joel, both
in the police line-up and again inside the courtroom during the trial.472[101]
The trial court also found that the statements of Joel, in which he admitted
his participation in the crime assisted by Atty. Sansano and in the presence of the
IBP personnel and police investigators, were not flawed by intimidation or
violence when obtained and sworn to before the fiscal. The common defense of
alibi put up by all the accused was rejected by the trial court, holding that (1) the
alleged treasure-hunting trip made by Lumanog and Rameses was incredible and
unpersuasive, as it was contrary to ordinary human experience; (2) Fortunas claim
was weak, the logbook entry on his supposed transaction in the Office of the
Directorate for Personnel and Recruitment at Camp Crame was a mere photocopy,
and also, as in the case of Rameses, he never mentioned such digging activity in
Pampanga in the sworn complaint he had filed before the CHR; (3) Augustos alibi
was supported only by his brother-in-law, and it was simply not usual for menfolk,
instead of women, in our family culture, to fetch a woman who had just given birth
at the hospital, aside from the observation that Augusto could have gone straight to
Fabella Hospital in Sta. Cruz, Manila instead of going first to Buendia, Makati
before 7:00 a.m. to fetch his brother-in-law. With respect to Lumanog, the trial
court pointed out that his silence and failure to testify in court, despite the evidence
implicating him in the murder of Abadilla, justified an inference that he was not
innocent.473[102]

472[101]Id., at pp. 1022.

473[102]Id., at pp. 1024-1025.

On August 25, 1999, Lumanog filed a motion for reconsideration. 474[103] On

September 2, 1999, Joel filed a motion for new trial based on newly discovered
evidence to present two witnesses, Merevic S. Torrefranca and Rosemarie P.
Caguioa, who offered to testify on the whereabouts of Joel on the day of the
incident.475[104] Lumanog likewise filed a motion for new trial for the presentation
of a new witness, who was allegedly on board a taxi immediately behind Abadillas
car, and who clearly saw that those who perpetrated the gruesome crime were not
the accused.476[105] In his Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration,
Lumanog assailed the inconsistencies in the declarations of Alejo, and the nonpresentation of eyewitnesses Minella Alarcon and Metro Aide Aurora Urbano. In
addition, Lumanog pointed to well-publicized statements of the Alex Boncayao
Brigade (ABB), which claimed responsibility for the killing of Abadilla, but the
investigation got sidetracked by another angle -- that a political rival of Abadilla
paid money for a contract assassination. He contended that the police opted for the
path of least resistance by rounding up the usual suspects, indeed another glaring
example of our law enforcers strategy of instituting trumped-up charges against
innocent people just to comply with their superiors directive to accelerate solving
an ambush-slay case.477[106] In additional pleadings filed by his new counsel,
Lumanog reiterated the ABBs assassination theory in the light of more recent press
statements issued by said group describing the accused as mere fall guys of the

474[103]Records, Vol. 4, pp. 1039-1049.

475[104]Id., at pp. 1050-1056.
476[105]Id., at pp. 1099-1103.
477[106]Id., at pp. 1183-1201.

police to project an image of efficiency.478[107]

On January 25, 2000, the trial court issued an Order ruling on the pending
motions:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court resolves:
1. to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration by accused Lenido
Lumanog;
2. to DENY the Motion for New Trial by accused Joel de Jesus;
3. to consider the Motion for New Trial by accused Lenido Lumanog
as abandoned and/or withdrawn;
4. to DENY the Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration by
accused Lenido Lumanog as well as his addendum thereto and his
Manifestation and Motion dated December 15, 1999 to allow him to
introduce additional evidence in support of his Supplement to the
Motion for Reconsideration;
5. to DENY the Manifestation and Submission dated December 14,
1999 by accused Lenido Lumanog;
6. and to ORDER the immediate transmittal of the records of these
cases to the Honorable Supreme Court for automatic review pursuant
to law, the Rules of Court and the Joint Decision of this court dated
July 30, 1999.
SO ORDERED.479[108]

On January 19, 2000, Fr. Roberto P. Reyes, parish priest of the Parish of the
Holy Sacrifice, University of the Philippines at Diliman, Quezon City, assisted by
Atty. Neri J. Colmenares, filed an Urgent Independent Motion for Leave of Court
to Present Vital Evidence. Fr. Reyes claimed that an ABB personality came to him
confessing that the ABB was responsible for the killing of Abadilla and gave him
478[107]Id., at pp. 1215-1228, 1248-1269.
479[108]Id., at p. 1320.

an object (Omega gold wristwatch) taken from said victim, which can be presented
as evidence in this case to prove the innocence of the accused who were
erroneously convicted by the trial court and save them from the penalty of death. 480
[109]
After due hearing, the trial court denied the said motion of Fr. Reyes,
holding that the latters proposed testimony could not be considered an exception to
the hearsay rule, considering that: (1) it cannot be said that the person who
allegedly approached Fr. Reyes was unable to testify, as said person was simply
unwilling to face in a court of law the legal consequences of whatever admissions
he made to Fr. Reyes; (2) the alleged admission was made long after trial had
ended and long after the court had promulgated its decision, at which time the
public and persons interested in the outcome of the case knew already what were
the courts findings and conclusions of fact; and (3) going by the advertised image
of the ABB as an ideologically motivated group that would shoot to death public
officers and private individuals perceived by its ranking cadres as corrupt, the court
found it hard to believe that ABB gunman would in full view of idealist comrades
and everybody else, would open Abadillas car and steal that watch, and remain
unscathed for his unproletarian act by his peers in the organization. 481[110] The
trial court, however, ordered that the Omega wristwatch allegedly belonging to the
late Col. Abadilla, the copy of the motion for leave to present vital evidence and
the transcript of the proceedings on January 26, 2000 be attached to the records of
the case as part of the offer of proof of the defense.

480[109]Id., at pp. 1270-1273.

481[110]Id., at pp. 1355-1362.

Two (2) more pleadings were filed by Lumanogs counsel just before the
records of Criminal Case No. Q-96-66684 were transmitted to this Court for
automatic review, namely, a Final Submission to This Court dated February 8,
2000, together with an attached copy of the letter of Lt. Gen Jose M. Calimlim of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Intelligence Service regarding an
unsuccessful operation of the ABB to kill Col. Abadilla, and Final Manifestation to
This Court dated February 9, 2000.482[111]
Lumanog challenged before this Court the validity of the Orders dated
January 25, 26, and 28, 2000 allegedly issued with grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial judge who thereby denied the accused the opportunity to introduce
evidence on the alleged role of the ABB in the ambush-slay of Col. Abadilla. On
September 7, 2001, we denied his petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 142065, 483
[112] as we thus held:
A perusal of the pieces of evidence, except the Omega wristwatch, which
are sought to be presented by the petitioners in a new trial are not newly
discovered evidence because they were either available and could have been
presented by the defense during the trial of the case with the exercise of due
diligence, such as the alleged newspaper reports and AFP/PNP intelligence
materials on Col. Abadilla. The wristwatch allegedly belonging to the late Col.
Abadilla is immaterial to the case of murder while the testimony of F. Roberto
Reyes on the turn over of the said wristwatch by an alleged member of the ABB
who purportedly knows certain facts about the killing of Col. Abadilla would be
hearsay without the testimony in court of the said alleged member of the ABB.
The document which granted amnesty to Wilfredo Batongbakal is irrelevant to the
killing of Col. Abadilla inasmuch as Batongbakal does not appear privy to the
actual commission of the crime of murder in the case at bar. If at all, those pieces
of additional evidence will at most be merely corroborative to the defense of alibi
and denial of herein petitioners. Petitioners alternative prayer that this Court itself
conduct hearings and receive evidence on the ABB angle is not well taken for the
reason that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.484[113]
482[111]Id., at pp. 1365-1371.
483[112]Lumanog v. Salazar, Jr., 364 SCRA 719.

Accused-petitioners motion for reconsideration of the above decision was

denied with finality on November 20, 2001. 485[114] On September 17, 2002, this
Court likewise denied for lack of merit the motion for new trial and related relief
dated April 26, 2002 filed by counsel for said accused-petitioner.486[115]
Pursuant to our decision in People v. Mateo,487[116] this case was transferred
to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review on January 18, 2005.488[117]
Ruling of the CA
On April 1, 2008, the CA rendered the assailed decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the impugned decision is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the accused-appellants are sentenced
each to suffer reclusion perpetua without the benefit of parole.
In all other respects, the lower courts decision is AFFIRMED.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.489[118]

484[113]Id., at pp. 725-726.

485[114]CA rollo, Vol. I, pp. 244-245.
486[115]Id., at p. 388.
487[116]G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
488[117]CA rollo, Vol. II, pp. 1583-1584.
489[118]Id., at p. 1797.

The CA upheld the conviction of the accused-appellants based on the

credible eyewitness testimony of Alejo, who vividly recounted before the trial
court their respective positions and participation in the fatal shooting of Abadilla,
having been able to witness closely how they committed the crime. On the
sufficiency of prosecution evidence to establish appellants guilt beyond reasonable
doubt and the scant weight of their defense of alibi, as well as the allegations of
torture and intimidation in the hands of the police investigator and negative results
of ballistic and fingerprint tests, the CA ruled as follows:
Despite a lengthy and exhaustive cross-examination by the defense
counsel, eyewitness Alejo stuck to the essentials of his story, including the
identification of the persons who killed Col. Abadilla. He was only ten (10)
meters away from the locus crimini. Standing on an elevated guardhouse, he had a
close and unobstructed view of the whole incident. He was in a vantage position
to clearly recognize Col. Abadillas assailants, more so because the crime
happened in clear and broad daylight.
Even standing alone, Alejos positive and unequivocal declaration is
sufficient to support a conviction for murder against appellants. Indeed, the
testimony of a single witness, when positive and credible, is sufficient to support
a conviction even for murder. For there is no law requiring that the testimony of a
simple [sic] witness should be corroborated for it to be accorded full faith and
credit. The credible testimony of a lone witness(es) assumes more weight when
there is no showing that he was actuated by improper motive to testify falsely
against the accused, as in the case of Freddie Alejo.
xxx
appellants failed to prove that it was physically impossible for them to be
at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity at the time the crime was
committed.
In the case of Joel de Jesus, he maintains that he was driving his tricycle
on a special chartered trip for a passenger going to Roosevelt, Novalichez,
Quezon City. But, it was not impossible for him to have also gone to Katipunan
Avenue, which is also part of Quezon City; not to mention the fact that with his
tricycle, he could have easily moved from one place to another.
The testimonies of Rameses de Jesus and Leonido Lumanog that they
were treasure hunting in Mabalacat, Pampanga on the day in question, lack
credence as they are unsupported by the testimonies of independent witnesses. At
any rate, Rameses de Jesus admitted that they were using the new car of Leonido

Lumanog. Hence, it was not physically impossible for them to travel to Quezon
City via the North Expressway at the time the crime took place.
Augusto claims that he was at the Fabella Hospital in Sta. Cruz, Manila,
and his alibi was corroborated by his brother-in-law, Jonas Padel Ayhon, who is
not an impartial witness. Where nothing supports the alibi except the testimony of
a relative, it deserves scant consideration.
xxx
Finally, Cesar Fortuna claims that he was in Camp Crame on the day the
murder took place. But it was not impossible for him to have gone to Katipunan
Road, Blue Ridge, which is relatively near Camp Crame when the shooting
happened around 8:40 in the morning. After the shooting, he could have easily
and quickly transferred to Camp Crame between 9:00 and 9:30 in the morning of
the same day.
In any event, appellants alibis were belied by the positive identification
made by prosecution eyewitness Freddie Alejo.
xxx
Further, appellants allegations that the police authorities maltreated them,
and forcibly extracted their extra-judicial confessions do not exculpate them from
criminal liability. For one, their conviction was not based on their extra-judicial
confessions, but on their positive identification of Freddie Alejo as the authors of
the crime. Such positive identification is totally independent of their extra-judicial
confessions. For another, the Constitutional guarantees contained in the Bill of
Rights cannot be used as a shield whereby a person guilty of a crime may escape
punishment. Thus, the Supreme Court in Draculan vs. Donato, held:
x x x. Pangalawa, ang mga karapatan ng mga mamamayan na
natatala sa Saligang Batas (sa Bill of Rights) ay hindi mga paraan upang
ang isang tunay na may pagkakasala na labag sa batas, ay makaligtas sa
nararapat na pagdurusa. Ang tunay na layunin ng mga tadhanang iyon ng
Saligang Batas ay walang iba kundi tiyakin na sinumang nililitis ay
magkaroon ng sapat na pagkakataon at paraan na maipagtanggol ang
sarili, bukod sa pagbabawal ng pagtanggap ng katibayan (evidence) laban
sa kanya na bunga ng pagpipilit, dahas at iba pang paraang labag sa
kanyang kalooban.
To repeat, assuming that appellants allegations of torture were true, the
same do not exculpate them from liability for the crime which the People had
adequately established by independent evidence, neither was their claim that the
results of the ballistics test purportedly showing that the bullets and bullet shells
found in the crime scene did not match with any of the firearms supposedly in
their possession. But these ballistic results are inconclusive and can never prevail
over appellants positive identification by eyewitness Freddie Alejo as the persons

who perpetrated the ambush-slay of Col. Abadilla. Besides, there is no showing

that the firearms supposedly found in appellants possession long after the incident
were the same ones they used in the ambush-slay.490[119]

In its Resolution491[120] dated October 28, 2008, the CA denied the motions
for reconsideration respectively filed by Fortuna and Joel de Jesus.492[121]
Rameses de Jesus and Joel de Jesus filed notices of appeal493[122] (G.R. No.
187745), while Fortuna (G.R. No. 185123), and Lumanog and Augusto Santos
(G.R. No. 182555) filed their respective petitions for review. On August 6, 2009,
G.R. No. 187745 was ordered consolidated with the already consolidated petitions
in G.R. Nos. 182555 and 185123.494[123] In view of the judgment of the CA
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua, said petitions for review are treated as
appeals, in accordance with A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC (Amendments to the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death Penalty Cases)495[124] which
provides under Rule 124 (c):
(c) In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing
such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of
appeal filed with the Court of Appeals.

490[119]Id., at pp. 1792-1795.

491[120]Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and concurred in by
Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Romeo F. Barza.
492[121]CA rollo, Vol. II, pp. 2027-2028.
493[122]Id., at pp. 2036-2037, 2046-2047.
494[123]Rollo (G.R. No. 187745), pp. 40-48.
495[124]Effective October 15, 2004.

Appellants Arguments
Lenido Lumanog and Augusto Santos set forth the following arguments in
their memorandum, which basically reflect the same issues raised by appellants in
the memorandum filed in G.R. No. 182555:
1. The Court of Appeals did not make a real and honest review of the appealed
case. There was a failure of appellate review, rendering its decision void.
2. The affirmation of the conviction over-relies on the testimony of one alleged
eyewitness, Freddie Alejo.
3. The affirmation of the conviction misappreciates the alibi evidence for the
defense.
4. The affirmation of conviction gravely erred when it unduly disregarded other
pieces of vital evidence.
5. The penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals is unconstitutional.496[125]

On his part, Fortuna alleges that:

I. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious error and gravely abused its
discretion when it affirmed the conviction of the petitioner and his co-accused
based solely on the incredible and contradicted eyewitness account of Security
Guard (S/G) Alejo.
II. The Honorable Court of Appeals seriously erred and gravely abused its
discretion in not considering the defense of petitioner herein despite the weakness
of the evidence of the prosecution.
III. The Honorable Court seriously erred in favoring the prosecution on the
ballistic test showing that the bullets and bullet shells found in the crime scene did
not match with any firearms supposedly in petitioners possession; evidence which
was supposed to support the theory of the prosecution. When such physical
evidence did not favor the prosecutions theory the same was still taken against the
petitioner.

496[125]Rollo (G.R. No. 182555), p. 285.

IV. The Honorable Court of Appeals seriously erred in disregarding allegations

and proof of torture and maltreatment by police officers against the petitioner in
affirming his conviction.497[126]

Appellants assail the wholesale adoption, if not verbatim copying, by the CA

of the factual narration, as well as the arguments for and disposition of the merits
of the case from the Consolidated Brief for the Appellees, which in turn is based on
the memorandum submitted by the private prosecutors to the trial court. This
anomaly, according to the appellants, which was aggravated by the insufficient
findings of fact and absence of actual discussion of the assignment of errors raised
by each appellant before the CA, resulted in the failure of intermediate review
without any independent findings and resolution of important issues of the case,
thus rendering the CA decision void. Hence, appellants seek not just to overturn or
reverse the CA decision but also to declare it null and void, by way of radical relief
from this Court.
On the merits, appellants principally contend that the CA gravely erred in its
over-reliance on the problematic identification provided by the prosecutions lone
eyewitness, security guard Alejo. The CA simply did not rule on questions
concerning the credibility of said eyewitness through the totality of circumstances
test. They also fault the CA for misappreciating their common defense of alibi,
thus disregarding exculpatory documentary evidence including negative results of
ballistic and fingerprint examinations, and evidence of torture which appellants had
suffered in the hands of police investigators. Equally deplorable is the trial and
appellate courts refusal to admit evidence coming from underground revolutionary
forces, in particular the ABB which claimed responsibility for the killing of Col.
Abadilla, a notorious military henchman during the martial law era. Appellants
497[126]Rollo (G.R. No. 185123), pp. 30, 41-42 and 44.

maintain that violations of constitutional rights have been held as a ground for
acquittal or dismissal in certain cases. In one (1) case, the long delay in the
termination of preliminary investigation was found to be violative of the accuseds
constitutional rights to procedural due process and speedy disposition of cases and
was cause for the dismissal of the case by this Court as a matter of radical relief.
Finally, the appellants argue that the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
the benefit of parole meted by the CA pursuant to Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 9346 is
unconstitutional. Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution provides that
any death penalty imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. There is no
mention of without the benefit of parole or shall not be eligible for parole therein.
Appellants contend that the questioned provisions of R.A. No. 9346
constitute encroachments or dilutions of the Presidents broad, if not near absolute,
constitutional power of executive clemency, based not only on Article VII, Sec. 19,
but also on constitutional tradition and jurisprudence. Although the said section
does not explicitly mention parole as a form of executive clemency, constitutional
tradition and jurisprudence indicate it to be such. In Tesoro v. Director of
Prisons,498[127] for instance, it was held that the power to pardon given to the
President by the Constitution includes the power to grant and revoke paroles. The
aforesaid provision of R.A. No. 9346 also inflicts an inhuman punishment, which
is prohibited by the Constitution, and also violates the equal protection clause of
the Bill of Rights.
Our Ruling

498[127]68 Phil. 154 (1939).

Once again, this Court upholds the constitutional mandate protecting the
rights of persons under custodial investigation. But while we strike down the
extrajudicial confession extracted in violation of constitutionally enshrined rights
and declare it inadmissible in evidence, appellants are not entitled to an acquittal
because their conviction was not based on the evidence obtained during such
custodial investigation. Even without the extrajudicial confession of appellant Joel
de Jesus who was the first to have been arrested, the trial courts judgment is
affirmed, as the testimonial and documentary evidence on record have established
the guilt of appellants beyond reasonable doubt.
CA Decision meets the
constitutional standard
The Constitution commands that [n]o decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based.499[128] Judges are expected to make complete findings of fact in
their decisions and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of the
evidence presented. They should avoid the tendency to generalize and form
conclusions without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are deduced.
500

[129]

Section 2, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended,

likewise provides:
Sec. 2. Form and contents of judgments. -- The judgment must be written in
the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by
499[128]Art. VIII, Sec. 14, 1987 Constitution.
500[129]Velarde v. Social Justice Society, G.R. No. 159357, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA
283, 305, citing Administrative Circular No. 1 issued on January 28, 1988.

him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or
admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based.
xxx

xxx

x x x. [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]

We have sustained decisions of lower courts as having substantially or

sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction, notwithstanding the
laconic and terse manner in which they were written; and even if there (was left)
much to be desired in terms of (their) clarity, coherence and comprehensibility,
provided that they eventually set out the facts and the law on which they were
based, as when they stated the legal qualifications of the offense constituted by the
facts proved, the modifying circumstances, the participation of the accused, the
penalty imposed and the civil liability; or discussed the facts comprising the
elements of the offense that was charged in the information, and accordingly
rendered a verdict and imposed the corresponding penalty; or quoted the facts
narrated in the prosecutions memorandum, but made their own findings and
assessment of evidence, before finally agreeing with the prosecutions evaluation of
the case.501[130]
In the same vein, we have expressed concern over the possible denial of due
process when an appellate court failed to provide the appeal the attention it
rightfully deserved, thus depriving the appellant of a fair opportunity to be heard
by a fair and responsible magistrate. This situation becomes more ominous in
criminal cases, as in this case, where not only property rights are at stake but also

501[130]Yao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132428, October 24, 2000, 344 SCRA 202,
215-216, citing People v. Bongbahoy, G.R. No. 124097, June 17, 1999, 308 SCRA
383, People v. Landicho, G.R. No. 116600, July 3, 1996, 258 SCRA 1, 26, People v.
Sadiosa, G.R. No. 107084, May 15, 1998, 290 SCRA 92, 107 and People v. Gastador,
G.R. No. 123727, April 14, 1999, 305 SCRA 659, 670.

the liberty if not the life of a human being. 502[131] The parties to a litigation should
be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal
reasons that led to the conclusions of the trial court. The losing party is entitled to
know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he
believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and
distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the
dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is
unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. 503
[132]
In Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Leobrera,504[133] we held that though it
is not a good practice, we see nothing illegal in the act of the trial court completely
copying the memorandum submitted by a party, provided that the decision clearly
and distinctly states sufficient findings of fact and the law on which they are
based.505[134] In another case where we upheld the validity of memorandum
decisions, we nevertheless took occasion to remind judges that it is still desirable
for an appellate judge to endeavor to make the issues clearer and use his own
perceptiveness in unraveling the rollo and his own discernment in discovering the

502[131]See Yao v. Court of Appeals, supra at 218, citing Romero v. Court of

Appeals, No. L-59606, January 8, 1987, 147 SCRA 183.
503[132]Yao v. Court of Appeals, supra at 219.
504[133]G.R. No. 137147, January 29, 2002, 375 SCRA 81.
505[134]Id. at 86, citing Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104874, December
14, 1993, 228 SCRA 429, 435 and Valdez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85082,
February 25, 1991, 194 SCRA 360.

law. No less importantly, he must use his own language in laying down his
judgment.506[135]
Perusing the CA decision, we hold that it cannot be deemed constitutionally
infirm, as it clearly stated the facts and law on which the ruling was based, and
while it did not specifically address each and every assigned error raised by
appellants, it cannot be said that the appellants were left in the dark as to how the
CA reached its ruling affirming the trial courts judgment of conviction. The
principal arguments raised in their Memorandum submitted before this Court
actually referred to the main points of the CA rulings, such as the alleged
sufficiency of prosecution evidence, their common defense of alibi, allegations of
torture, probative value of ballistic and fingerprint test results, circumstances
qualifying the offense and modification of penalty imposed by the trial court. What
appellants essentially assail is the verbatim copying by the CA of not only the facts
narrated, but also the arguments and discussion including the legal authorities, in
disposing of the appeal. On such wholesale adoption of the Office of the Solicitor
Generals position, as well as the trial courts insufficient findings of fact, appellants
anchor their claim of failure of intermediate review by the CA.
We now proceed to the other substantive issues presented by appellants.
Rights of Accused During
Custodial Investigation
The rights of persons under custodial investigation are enshrined in Article
III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
506[135]See Francisco v. Permskul, G.R. No. 81006, May 12, 1989, 173 SCRA 324
(1989), cited in ABD Overseas Manpower Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 117056,
February 24, 1998, 286 SCRA 454, 463.

Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an

offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means
which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17
hereof (right against self-incrimination) shall be inadmissible in evidence against
him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violation of this
section as well as compensation for the rehabilitation of victims of tortures or
similar practices, and their families. [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]

Extrajudicial Confession
of Joel de Jesus Not Valid
Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, but has begun
to focus on a particular person as a suspect. 507[136] Police officers claimed that
appellants were apprehended as a result of hot pursuit activities on the days
following the ambush-slay of Abadilla. There is no question, however, that when
appellants were arrested they were already considered suspects: Joel was
pinpointed by security guard Alejo who went along with the PARAC squad to
Fairview on June 19, 1996, while the rest of appellants were taken by the same
operatives in follow-up operations after Joel provided them with the identities of
his conspirators and where they could be found.

507[136]People v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 129211, October 2, 2000, 341 SCRA 645, 654,
citing People v. Domantay, G.R. No. 130612, May 11, 1999, 307 SCRA 1, 15 and
People v. Andan, G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997, 269 SCRA 95.

R.A. No. 7438,508[137] approved on May 15, 1992, has reinforced the
constitutional mandate protecting the rights of persons under custodial
investigation. The pertinent provisions read:
SEC. 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or under Custodial
Investigation; Duties of Public Officers.
a. Any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall at
all times be assisted by counsel.
b. Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his
place, who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of
an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known to and understood by him,
of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer private
with the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such person
cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided by with a
competent and independent counsel.
xxxx
f. As used in this Act, custodial investigation shall include the practice of
issuing an invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense
he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the inviting
officer for any violation of law. [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]

Police officers claimed that upon arresting Joel, they informed him of his
constitutional rights to remain silent, that any information he would give could be
used against him, and that he had the right to a competent and independent
counsel, preferably, of his own choice, and if he cannot afford the services of
counsel he will be provided with one (1). However, since these rights can only be
waived in writing and with the assistance of counsel, there could not have been
such a valid waiver by Joel, who was presented to Atty. Sansano at the IBP Office,

508[137]Otherwise known as An Act Defining Certain Rights of Persons Arrested,

Detained or Under Custodial Investigation as well as the Duties of the Arresting,
Detaining and Investigating Officers and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof.

Quezon City Hall only the following day and stayed overnight at the police station
before he was brought to said counsel.
P/Insp. Castillo admitted that the initial questioning of Joel began in the
morning of June 20, 1996, the first time said suspect was presented to him at the
CPDC station, even before he was brought to the IBP Office for the taking of his
formal statement. Thus, the possibility of appellant Joel having been subjected to
intimidation or violence in the hands of police investigators as he claims, cannot be
discounted. The constitutional requirement obviously had not been observed.
Settled is the rule that the moment a police officer tries to elicit admissions or
confessions or even plain information from a suspect, the latter should, at that
juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he waives this right in writing and in the
presence of counsel.509[138] The purpose of providing counsel to a person under
custodial investigation is to curb the police-state practice of extracting a confession
that leads appellant to make self-incriminating statements.510[139]
Even assuming that custodial investigation started only during Joels
execution of his statement before Atty. Sansano on June 20, 1996, still the said
confession must be invalidated. To be acceptable, extrajudicial confessions must
conform to constitutional requirements. A confession is not valid and not
admissible in evidence when it is obtained in violation of any of the rights of
persons under custodial investigation.511[140]
509[138]People v. Rapeza, G.R. No. 169431, April 4, 2007, 520 SCRA 596, 623, citing
People v. Delmo, 439 Phil. 212 (2002), cited in People v. Dueas, Jr., G.R. No.
151286, March 31, 2004, 426 SCRA 666.
510[139]Id. at 630.
511[140]People v. Muleta, G.R. No. 130189, June 25, 1999, 309 SCRA 148, 160.

Since Joel was provided with a lawyer secured by CPDC investigators from
the IBP-Quezon City chapter, it cannot be said that his right to a counsel preferably
of his own choice was not complied with, particularly as he never objected to Atty.
Sansano when the latter was presented to him to be his counsel for the taking down
of his statement. The phrase preferably of his own choice does not convey the
message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as
to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling the
defense; otherwise the tempo of custodial investigation would be solely in the
hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the
interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not
available to protect his interest.512[141] Thus, while the choice of a lawyer in cases
where the person under custodial interrogation cannot afford the services of
counsel or where the preferred lawyer is not available is naturally lodged in the
police investigators, the suspect has the final choice, as he may reject the counsel
chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is
deemed engaged by the accused when he does not raise any objection against the
counsels appointment during the course of the investigation, and the accused
thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing officer.513
[142]
The question really is whether or not Atty. Sansano was an independent and
competent counsel as to satisfy the constitutional requirement. We held that the
modifier competent and independent in the 1987 Constitution is not an empty
512[141]People v. Mojello, G.R. No. 145566, March 9, 2004, 425 SCRA 11, 18, citing
People v. Barasina, G.R. No. 109993, January 21, 1994, 229 SCRA 450.
513[142]Id., at 18, citing People v. Continente, G.R. Nos. 100801-02, August 25,
2000, 339 SCRA 1.

rhetoric. It stresses the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful
conditions of a custodial investigation, an informed judgment on the choices
explained to him by a diligent and capable lawyer.514[143] An effective and vigilant
counsel necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to
advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question
asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession.
Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and
that the person under investigation fully understands the nature and the
consequence of his extrajudicial confession in relation to his constitutional rights.
A contrary rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional rights to
remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed innocent.515[144]
Atty. Sansano, who supposedly interviewed Joel and assisted the latter while
responding to questions propounded by SPO2 Garcia, Jr., did not testify on
whether he had properly discharged his duties to said client. While SPO2 Garcia,
Jr. testified that Atty. Sansano had asked Joel if he understood his answers to the
questions of the investigating officer and sometimes stopped Joel from answering
certain questions, SPO2 Garcia, Jr. did not say if Atty. Sansano, in the first place,
verified from them the date and time of Joels arrest and the circumstances thereof,
or any previous information elicited from him by the investigators at the station,
and if said counsel inspected Joels body for any sign or mark of physical torture.

514[143]People v. Suela, G.R. Nos. 133570-71, January 15, 2002, 373 SCRA 163,
182, citing People v. Deniega, G.R. No. 103499, December 29, 1995, 251 SCRA 626,
638-639 and People v. Santos, G.R. No. 117873, December 22, 1997, 283 SCRA 443.
515[144]Id., at pp. 181-182, citing People v. Labtan, G.R. No. 127493, December 8,
1999, 320 SCRA, 140, 159.

The right to counsel has been written into our Constitution in order to
prevent the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from
a suspect in a crime. The lawyers role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere
witness to the signing of a pre-prepared confession, even if it indicated compliance
with the constitutional rights of the accused. The accused is entitled to effective,
vigilant and independent counsel.516[145] Where the prosecution failed to discharge
the States burden of proving with clear and convincing evidence that the accused
had enjoyed effective and vigilant counsel before he extrajudicially admitted his
guilt, the extrajudicial confession cannot be given any probative value.517[146]
With respect to the other appellants, they were likewise entitled to the rights
guaranteed by the Constitution when they were brought to the police station as
suspects and were, therefore under custodial investigation.518[147] However, they
cannot simply rely on those violations of constitutional rights during custodial
investigation, which are relevant only when the conviction of the accused by the
trial court is based on the evidence obtained during such investigation. 519[148] As
for the matters stated in the extrajudicial confession of appellant Joel, these were
not the basis for appellants conviction. It has to be stressed further that no
516[145]People v. Peralta, G.R. No. 145176, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 472, 481482, citing People v. Binamira, G.R. No. 110397, August 14, 1997, 277 SCRA 232,
238; People v. Ordoo, G.R. No. 132154, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 673, 688; People
v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 129211, October 2, 2000, 341 SCRA 645, 653; People v.
Rayos, G.R. No. 133823, February 7, 2001, 351 SCRA 336, 344; and People v.
Patungan, G.R. No. 138045, March 14, 2001, 354 SCRA 413, 424.
517[146]People v. Paule, G.R. Nos. 118168-70, September 11, 1996, 261 SCRA 649.
518[147]See People v. Hijada, G.R. No. 123696, March 11, 2004, 425 SCRA 304.
519[148]People v. Sabalones, G.R. No. 123485, August 31, 1998, 294 SCRA 751,
790.

confession or statement by appellants Fortuna, Lumanog, Augusto and Rameses

was used as evidence by the prosecution at the trial.
After a thorough and careful review, we hold that there exists sufficient
evidence on record to sustain appellants conviction even without the extrajudicial
confession of appellant Joel de Jesus.

Allegations of Torture and

Intimidation
The Court notes with utmost concern the serious allegations of torture of
appellants who were dubbed by the media as the Abadilla 5. This was brought by
appellants before the CHR which, in its Resolution dated July 26, 1996, did not
make any categorical finding of physical violence inflicted on the appellants by the
police authorities. The CHR, however, found prima facie evidence that respondent
police officers could have violated R.A. No. 7438, particularly on visitorial rights
and the right to counsel, including the law on arbitrary detention, and accordingly
forwarded its resolution together with records of the case to the Secretary of
Justice, Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government, the PNP
Director General and the Ombudsman to file the appropriate criminal and/or
administrative actions against the person or persons responsible for violating the
human rights of the suspects as the evidence may warrant. 520[149] As per the
manifestation of appellants, the DOJ, after conducting a preliminary investigation,
referred the matter to the Ombudsman in 2004. As of July 2007, the case before the
520[149]Exhibit 79, folder of exhibits, pp. 237-243.

Ombudsman docketed as OMB-P-C-04-1269/CPL-C-04-1965 was still pending

preliminary investigation.521[150]
Right to Speedy Disposition of
Cases
Appellants further cite the comment made by the United Nations Human
Rights Committee in its Communication No. 1466/2006 that under the
circumstances, there was, insofar as the eight (8)-year delay in the disposition of
their appeal in the CA was concerned, a violation of Article 14, paragraph 3 (c) of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). It provides that in
the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled, as
among the minimum guarantees provided therein, to be tried without undue
delay.522[151]
Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that all persons
shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasijudicial, or administrative bodies.523[152] This protection extends to all citizens and
covers the periods before, during and after trial, affording broader protection than
Section 14(2), which guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial. 524[153]
However, just like the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial, speedy disposition
521[150]Letter-reply dated of Ombudsman addressed to Atty. Soliman M. Santos, Jr.,
Annex F of Memorandum for Petitioners, rollo of G.R. No. 182555, p. 442.
522[151]Addendum to Petition, CA rollo, Vol. II, pp. 1975-1985.
523[152]Sec. 16, Article III.
524[153]Abadia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105597, September 23, 1994, 236
SCRA 676, 682, cited in Licaros v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 145851, November 22,
2001, 370 SCRA 394, 407.

of cases is a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the
circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and
oppressive delays, which render rights nugatory.525[154]
In this case, the records of Criminal Case No. Q-96-66684 were transmitted
to this Court for automatic review on February 11, 2000. On September 7, 2001,
this Court rendered a decision dismissing the Petition for Certiorari (Rule 65) and
for Extraordinary Legal and Equitable Relief (G.R. No. 142065). By June 2004, all
appeal briefs for the present review had been filed and on July 6, 2004, appellants
filed a Consolidated Motion for Early Decision. On December 13, 2004, they filed
a Motion for Early Decision.526[155]
By resolution of January 18, 2005, we transferred this case to the CA for
intermediate review, conformably with our pronouncement in People v. Mateo
decided on July 7, 2004. Appellants Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of Transfer
to the Court of Appeals filed on February 24, 2005 was denied on March 29, 2005.
A similar request filed on June 2, 2005 was likewise denied by our Resolution
dated July 12, 2005.527[156] At the CA, appellants also moved for early resolution
of their appeal after the case was submitted for decision on November 29, 2006.
The case remained unresolved due to a number of factors, such as the CA internal
reorganization and inhibition of some Justices to whom the case was re-raffled. 528
[157] Before the retirement of the ponente, Justice Agustin S. Dizon, the CAs
525[154]Ombudsman v. Jurado, G.R. No. 154155, August 6, 2008, 561 SCRA 135,
146-147, citing Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr., G.R. No. L-45647, August 21, 1987, 153
SCRA 153, 163.
526[155]CA rollo, Vol. II, pp. 1530-1531 and 1580.
527[156]Id., at pp. 1581-1582, 1605-1609.

Sixteenth Division finally rendered its decision on April 1, 2008. Appellants

motion for reconsideration was denied by the Special Former Sixteenth Division
on October 28, 2008.
It must be stressed that in the determination of whether the right to speedy
disposition of cases has been violated, particular regard must be taken of the facts
and circumstances peculiar to each case. A mere mathematical reckoning of the
time involved would not be sufficient. 529[158] Under the circumstances, we hold
that the delay of (4) four years during which the case remained pending with the
CA and this Court was not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive.
In several cases where it was manifest that due process of law or other rights
guaranteed by the Constitution or statutes have been denied, this Court has not
faltered to accord the so-called radical relief to keep accused from enduring the
rigors and expense of a full-blown trial.530[159] In this case, however, appellants
are not entitled to the same relief in the absence of clear and convincing showing
that the delay in the resolution of their appeal was unreasonable or arbitrary.
Credibility of Eyewitness Testimony
528[157]Id., at pp. 1728-1761.
529[158]Gaas v. Mitmug, G.R. No. 165776, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 335, 342-343,
citing Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 146368-69, October 18, 2004, 440
SCRA 423, 425-426.
530[159]Uy v. Adriano, G.R. No. 159098, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA 625, 652-653,
citing Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 146368-69, October 18, 2004, 440
SCRA 423; Dimayacyac v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136264, May 28, 2004, 430
SCRA 121; Dela Pea v. Sandiganbayan, 412 Phil. 921 (2001); Dansal v. Hon.
Fernandez, Sr., 383 Phil. 897, 908; Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, 352 Phil. 557 (1998);
and Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. L-72335-39, March 21, 1998, 159 SCRA 70.

Time and again, we have held that the testimony of a sole eyewitness is
sufficient to support a conviction so long as it is clear, straightforward and worthy
of credence by the trial court. 531[160] Indeed, when it comes to credibility of
witnesses, this Court accords the highest respect, even finality, to the evaluation
made by the lower court of the testimonies of the witnesses presented before it.
This holds true notwithstanding that it was another judge who presided at the trial
and Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr. who penned the decision in this case heard only
some witnesses for the defense. It is axiomatic that the fact alone that the judge
who heard the evidence was not the one who rendered the judgment, but merely
relied on the record of the case, does not render his judgment erroneous or
irregular. This is so even if the judge did not have the fullest opportunity to weigh
the testimonies, not having heard all the witnesses speak or observed their
deportment and manner of testifying.532[161]
Verily, a judge who was not present during the trial can rely on the transcript
of stenographic notes taken during the trial as basis of his decision. Such reliance
does not violate substantive and procedural due process. 533[162] We have ruled in
People v. Rayray534[163] that the fact that the judge who heard the evidence was
not himself the one who prepared, signed and promulgated the decision constitutes
no compelling reason to jettison his findings and conclusions, and does not per se
531[160]People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 139185, September 29, 2003, 412 SCRA 224,
236.
532[161]Concepcion v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120706, January 31, 2000, 324
SCRA 85, 92.
533[162]Serna v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124605, June 18, 1999, 308 SCRA 527,
533, citing People v. Espanola, G.R. No. 119308, April 18, 1997, 271 SCRA 689, 716.
534[163]G.R. No. 90628, February 1, 1995, 241 SCRA 1, 8-9.

render his decision void. The validity of a decision is not necessarily impaired by
the fact that its ponente only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided
at the trial. This circumstance alone cannot be the basis for the reversal of the trial
courts decision.535[164]
In giving full credence to the eyewitness testimony of security guard Alejo,
the trial judge took into account his proximity to the spot where the shooting
occurred, his elevated position from his guardhouse, his opportunity to view
frontally all the perpetrators for a brief time -- enough for him to remember their
faces (when the two [2] lookouts he had earlier noticed walking back and forth
infront of his guard post pointed their guns at him one [1] after the other, and later
when the four [4] armed men standing around the victims car momentarily looked
at him as he was approached at the guardhouse by the second lookout), and his
positive identification in the courtroom of appellants as the six (6) persons whom
he saw acting together in the fatal shooting of Abadilla on June 13, 1996. The clear
view that Alejo had at the time of the incident was verified by Judge Jose Catral
Mendoza (now an Associate Justice of this Court) during the ocular inspection
conducted in the presence of the prosecutors, defense counsel, court personnel, and
witnesses Alejo and Maj. Villena.
The trial judge also found that Alejo did not waver in his detailed account of
how the assailants shot Abadilla who was inside his car, the relative positions of
the gunmen and lookouts, and his opportunity to look at them in the face. Alejo
immediately gave his statement before the police authorities just hours after the
incident took place. Appellants make much of a few inconsistencies in his
535[164]Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Gobonseng, Jr., G.R. No. 163562,
July 21, 2006, 496 SCRA 305, 320.

statement and testimony, with respect to the number of assailants and his reaction
when he was ordered to get down in his guard post. But such inconsistencies have
already been explained by Alejo during cross-examination by correcting his earlier
statement in using number four (4) to refer to those persons actually standing
around the car and two (2) more persons as lookouts, and that he got nervous only
when the second lookout shouted at him to get down, because the latter actually
poked a gun at him. It is settled that affidavits, being ex-parte, are almost always
incomplete and often inaccurate, but do not really detract from the credibility of
witnesses.536[165] The discrepancies between a sworn statement and testimony in
court do not outrightly justify the acquittal of an accused, 537[166] as testimonial
evidence carries more weight than an affidavit.538[167]
As to appellants attempt to discredit Alejo by reason of the latters acceptance
of benefits from the Abadilla family, the same is puerile, considering that the trial
court even verified for itself how Alejo could have witnessed the shooting incident
and after he withstood intense grilling from defense lawyers. Case law has it that
where there is no evidence that the principal witness for the prosecution was
actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and
his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.539[168]

536[165]People v. Silvano, G.R. No. 125923, January 31, 2001, 350 SCRA 650, 660.
537[166]People v. Gallo, G.R. No. 133002, October 19, 2001, 367 SCRA 662, 668.
538[167]People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 142654, November 16, 2001, 369 SCRA 268,
286.
539[168]People v. Tagana, G.R. No. 133027, March 4, 2004, 424 SCRA 620, 639.

The trial judge also correctly rejected appellants proposition that the
eyewitness testimony of security guard Herbas should have been given due weight
and that other eyewitnesses should have been presented by the prosecution,
specifically Cesar Espiritu and Minella Alarcon, who allegedly had better
opportunity to recognize Abadillas attackers. As correctly pointed out by the trial
judge, Herbas could not have really seen at close range the perpetrators from his
position at a nearby building, which is several meters away from the ambush site,
as confirmed by photographs submitted by the prosecution, which Herbas failed to
refute. The same thing can be said of Espiritu who admitted in his Sinumpaang
Salaysay that his car was ahead of the Honda Accord driven by Abadilla, and that
he had already alighted from his car some houses away from the exact spot where
Abadilla was ambushed while his car was in the stop position.540[169]
Positive Identification of Appellants
Appellants assail the out-of-court identification made by Alejo who pointed
to appellant Joel de Jesus and Lorenzo delos Santos in a line-up at the police
station together with police officers. However, appellants claim that the police
officers who joined the line-up were actually in their police uniforms at the time, as
to make the identification process suggestive and hence not valid, was
unsubstantiated.
In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,541[170] we explained the procedure for out-ofcourt identification and the test to determine the admissibility of such
identification, thus:
540[169]Records , Vol. I, pp. 27-29.
541[170]G.R. Nos. 111206-08, October 6, 1995, 249 SCRA 54.

Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is

done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the
witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown
to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness
identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. . . In
resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of
suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they
consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness opportunity to view the
criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness degree of attention at that time;
(3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time
between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure.542[171] [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]

Examining the records, we find nothing irregular in the identification made

by Alejo at the police station for which he executed the Karagdagang Sinumpaang
Salaysay dated June 21, 1996, during which he positively identified Joel de Jesus
and Lorenzo delos Santos as those lookouts who had pointed their guns at him
demanding that he buck down at his guardhouse. In any case, the trial court did not
rely solely on said out-of-court identification considering that Alejo also positively
identified appellants during the trial. Thus, even assuming arguendo that Alejos
out-of-court identification was tainted with irregularity, his subsequent
identification in court cured any flaw that may have attended it. 543[172] We have
held that the inadmissibility of a police line-up identification should not necessarily
foreclose the admissibility of an independent in-court identification.544[173]

542[171]Id., at p. 95.
543[172]People v. Rivera, supra, at p. 239, citing People v. Timon, G.R. Nos. 9784142, November 12, 1997, 281 SCRA 577, 592.
544[173]Id., citing People v. Timon, id. and People v. Lapura, G.R. No. 94494, March
15, 1996, 255 SCRA 85, 96.

We also found none of the danger signals enumerated by Patrick M. Wall, a

well-known authority in eyewitness identification, which give warning that the
identification may be erroneous even though the method used is proper. The danger
signals contained in the list, which is not exhaustive, are:
(1)

the witness originally stated that he could not identify anyone;

(2)

the identifying witness knew the accused before the crime, but made no
accusation against him when questioned by the police;

(3)

a serious discrepancy exists between the identifying witness original

description and the actual description of the accused;

(4)

before identifying the accused at the trial, the witness erroneously identified
some other person;

(5)

other witnesses to the crime fail to identify the accused;

(6)

before trial, the witness sees the accused but fails to identify him;

(7)

before the commission of the crime, the witness had limited opportunity to
see the accused;

(8)

the witness and the person identified are of different racial groups;

(9)

during his original observation of the perpetrator of the crime, the witness
was unaware that a crime was involved;

(10) a considerable time elapsed between the witness view of the criminal and
his identification of the accused;
(11) several persons committed the crime; and
(12) the witness fails to make a positive trial identification.545[174]

Appellants nonetheless point out the allegedly doubtful prior descriptions

given by Alejo, who was able to describe the physical appearance of only two (2)
suspects in his statement:
545[174]People v. Pineda, G.R. No. 141644, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 478, 503-504,
citing Patrick M. Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in Criminal Cases 74 (1965), pp. 90130.

Iyong tumutok sa akin ay naka-asul na t-shirt, edad 30-35, 55-56 ang taas,
katamtaman ang katawan, maikli ang buhok, kayumanggi. Ang baril niya ay
tipong 45 o 9 mm na pistola. Iyong sumakal sa biktima at nang-agaw ng clutch
bag nito ay 25-30 ang edad, payat, mahaba ang buhok na nakatali, maitim, may
taas na 55-56, maiksi din ang baril niya at naka-puting polo. Iyong iba ay maaring
makilala ko kung makikita ko uli.546[175]

Appellants claimed that if Alejo was referring to appellant Joel de Jesus who
pointed a gun at him, his description did not jibe at all since Joel de Jesus was just
22 years old and not 30-35 years of age, and who stands 59 and not 55-56. And if
indeed it was appellant Lenido Lumanog whom Alejo saw as the gunman who had
grabbed the victim by the neck after opening the cars left front door, his description
again failed because far from being maitim, Lumanog was in fact faircomplexioned.
We are not persuaded. Alejo positively identified Joel de Jesus in a line-up at
the police station and again inside the courtroom as the first lookout who pointed a
gun at him. Though his estimate of Joels age was not precise, it was not that far
from his true age, especially if we consider that being a tricycle driver who was
exposed daily to sunlight, Joels looks may give a first impression that he is older
than his actual age. Moreover Alejos description of Lumanog as dark-skinned was
made two (2) months prior to the dates of the trial when he was again asked to
identify him in court. When defense counsel posed the question of the discrepancy
in Alejos description of Lumanog who was then presented as having a fair
complexion and was 40 years old, the private prosecutor manifested the possible
effect of Lumanogs incarceration for such length of time as to make his appearance
different at the time of trial.

546[175]Exhibit L-1, folder of exhibits, p. 27.

Applying the totality-of-circumstances test, we thus reiterate that Alejos outcourt-identification is reliable, for reasons that, first, he was very near the place
where Abadilla was shot and thus had a good view of the gunmen, not to mention
that the two (2) lookouts directly approached him and pointed their guns at them;
second, no competing event took place to draw his attention from the event; third,
Alejo immediately gave his descriptions of at least two (2) of the perpetrators,
while affirming he could possibly identify the others if he would see them again,
and the entire happening that he witnessed; and finally, there was no evidence that
the police had supplied or even suggested to Alejo that appellants were the
suspects, except for Joel de Jesus whom he refused to just pinpoint on the basis of
a photograph shown to him by the police officers, insisting that he would like to
see said suspect in person. More importantly, Alejo during the trial had positively
identified appellant Joel de Jesus independently of the previous identification made
at the police station. Such in-court identification was positive, straightforward and
categorical.
Appellants contend that the subsequent acquittal of Lorenzo delos Santos,
whom Alejo had categorically pointed to as one (1) of the two (2) men whom he
saw walking to and fro infront of his guard post prior to the shooting incident, and
as one (1) of the two (2) men who pointed a gun at him and ordered him to get
down, totally destroyed said witness credibility and eroded the trustworthiness of
each and every uncorroborated testimony he gave in court. This assertion is
untenable. A verdict of acquittal is immediately final; hence, we may no longer
review the acquittal of accused Lorenzo delos Santos. 547[176] However, the
acquittal of their co-accused does not necessarily benefit the appellants. We have
547[176]People v. Dulay, G.R. No. 174775, October 11, 2007, 535 SCRA 656, 662,
citing People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159261, February 21, 2007, 516 SCRA
383.

ruled that accused-appellant may not invoke the acquittal of the other conspirators
to merit the reversal of his conviction for murder.548[177]
Ballistic
and
fingerprint
examination
results
are
inconclusive
and
not
indispensable
Appellants deplore the trial courts disregard of the results of the ballistic and
fingerprint tests, which they claim should exonerate them from liability for the
killing of Abadilla. These pieces of evidence were presented by the defense to
prove that the empty shells recovered from the crime scene and deformed slug
taken from the body of Abadilla were not fired from any of the firearms seized
from appellants. Instead, they matched the same firearm used in the killings of
Suseso de Dios and other supposed victims of ambush-slay perpetrated by
suspected members of the ABB. Further, none of the fingerprints lifted from the
KIA Pride, used by the gunmen as getaway vehicle, matched any of the specimens
taken from the appellants.
We are not persuaded. As correctly held by the CA, the negative result of
ballistic examination was inconclusive, for there is no showing that the firearms
supposedly found in appellants possession were the same ones used in the ambushslay of Abadilla. The fact that ballistic examination revealed that the empty shells
and slug were fired from another firearm does not disprove appellants guilt, as it
was possible that different firearms were used by them in shooting Abadilla. 549
548[177]Id., citing People v. Uganap, G.R. No. 130605, June 19, 2001, 358 SCRA 674,
684.
549[178]See Maandal v. People, G.R. No. 144113, June 28, 2001, 360 SCRA 209,
228.

[178] Neither will the finding that the empty shells and slug matched those in
another criminal case allegedly involving ABB members, such that they could have
been fired from the same firearms belonging to said rebel group, exonerate the
appellants who are on trial in this case and not the suspects in another case. To
begin with, the prosecution never claimed that the firearms confiscated from
appellants, which were the subject of separate charges for illegal possession of
firearms, were the same firearms used in the ambush-slay of Abadilla. A ballistic
examination is not indispensable in this case. Even if another weapon was in fact
actually used in killing the victim, still, appellants Fortuna and Lumanog cannot
escape criminal liability therefor, as they were positively identified by eyewitness
Freddie Alejo as the ones who shot Abadilla to death.550[179]
As this Court held in Velasco v. People551[180] -As regards the failure of the police to present a ballistic report on the
seven spent shells recovered from the crime scene, the same does not constitute
suppression of evidence. A ballistic report serves only as a guide for the courts in
considering the ultimate facts of the case. It would be indispensable if there are no
credible eyewitnesses to the crime inasmuch as it is corroborative in nature. The
presentation of weapons or the slugs and bullets used and ballistic
examination are not prerequisites for conviction. The corpus delicti and the
positive identification of accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime are
more than enough to sustain his conviction. Even without a ballistic report, the
positive identification by prosecution witnesses is more than sufficient to prove
accuseds guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case, since the identity of
the assailant has been sufficiently established, a ballistic report on the slugs
can be dispensed with in proving petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
[EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]

The negative result of the fingerprint tests conducted by fingerprint

examiner Remedios is likewise inconclusive and unreliable. Said witness admitted
550[179]See People v. Belaro, G.R. No. 99869, May 26, 1999, 307 SCRA 591, 605.
551[180]G.R. No. 166479, February 28, 2006, 483 SCRA 649, 666-667.

that no prints had been lifted from inside the KIA Pride and only two (2)
fingerprints were taken from the car of Abadilla.
Defense of Alibi Cannot
Prevail
Over
Positive
Identification
Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to
disprove, and it is for this reason that it cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused by the witnesses. 552[181] To be valid for purposes of
exoneration from a criminal charge, the defense of alibi must be such that it would
have been physically impossible for the person charged with the crime to be at the
locus criminis at the time of its commission, the reason being that no person can be
in two places at the same time. The excuse must be so airtight that it would admit
of no exception. Where there is the least possibility of accuseds presence at the
crime scene, the alibi will not hold water.553[182]
Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that positive identification
of the accused, where categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill motive
on the part of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of
appellants, whose testimonies are not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence.554[183] However, none of the appellants presented clear and convincing
excuses showing the physical impossibility of their being at the crime scene

552[181]People v. Medina, G.R. No. 155256, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA 610, 619.
553[182]People v. Bracamonte, G.R. No. 95939, June 17, 1996, 257 SCRA 380.
554[183]People v. Abes, 465 Phil. 165 (2004).

between 8:00 oclock and 9:00 oclock in the morning of June 13, 1996. Hence, the
trial court and CA did not err in rejecting their common defense of alibi.
As to the failure of appellant Lumanog to take the witness stand, indeed the
grave charges of murder and illegal possession of firearms would have normally
impelled an accused to testify in his defense, particularly when his life is at stake.
As this Court observed in People v. Delmendo:555[184]
An adverse inference may also be deduced from appellant's failure to take
the witness stand. While his failure to testify cannot be considered against him, it
may however help in determining his guilt. The unexplained failure of the
accused to testify, under a circumstance where the crime imputed to him is so
serious that places in the balance his very life and that his testimony might at
least help in advancing his defense, gives rise to an inference that he did not
want to testify because he did not want to betray himself.
An innocent person will at once naturally and emphatically repel an
accusation of crime, as a matter of self-preservation, and as a precaution against
prejudicing himself. A persons silence, therefore, particularly when it is persistent,
may justify an inference that he is not innocent. Thus, we have the general
principle that when an accused is silent when he should speak, in circumstances
where an innocent person so situated would have spoken, on being accused of a
crime, his silence and omission are admissible in evidence against him.
Accordingly, it has been aptly said that silence may be assent as well as consent,
and may, where a direct and specific accusation of crime is made, be regarded
under some circumstances as a quasi-confession.556[185]

Treachery and Evident Premeditation

Attended the Commission of the Crime
As regards the presence of treachery as a qualifying circumstance, the
evidence clearly showed that the attack on the unsuspecting victim -- who was
inside his car on a stop position in the middle of early morning traffic when he was
555[184]G.R. No. 123300, September 25, 1998, 296 SCRA 371, 379-380.
556[185]

Id.

suddenly fired upon by the appellants -- was deliberate, sudden and unexpected.
There was simply no chance for Abadilla to survive the ambush-slay, with
successive shots quickly fired at close range by two (2) armed men on both sides of
his car; and much less to retaliate by using his own gun, as no less than 23 gunshot
wounds on his head and chest caused his instantaneous death. As we have
consistently ruled, the essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on
an unsuspecting victim by the perpetrator of the crime, depriving the victim of any
chance to defend himself or to repel the aggression, thus insuring its commission
without risk to the aggressor and without any provocation on the part of the
victim.557[186]
Evident premeditation was likewise properly appreciated by the trial court,
notwithstanding the inadmissibility of Joel de Jesuss extrajudicial confession
disclosing in detail the pre-planned ambush of Abadilla, apparently a contract
killing in which the perpetrators were paid or expected to receive payment for the
job. As correctly pointed out by the CA, Alejo had stressed that as early as 7:30 in
the morning of June 13, 1996, he already noticed something unusual going on upon
seeing the two (2) lookouts (appellants Joel de Jesus and Lorenzo delos Santos)
walking to and fro along Katipunan Avenue infront of the building he was
guarding. True enough, they were expecting somebody to pass that way, who was
no other than Abadilla driving his Honda Accord. After the lapse of more or less
one (1) hour, he already heard successive gunshots, while in his guard post, from
the direction of the middle lane where Abadillas car was surrounded by four (4)
men carrying short firearms. All the foregoing disclosed the execution of a preconceived plan to kill Abadilla. The essence of evident premeditation is that the
execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the
557[186]People v. Castillo, 426 Phil. 752, 767 (2002).

resolution to carry out criminal intent within a span of time sufficient to arrive at a
calm judgment.558[187]
The trial court and CA were therefore correct in declaring the appellants
guilty as conspirators in the ambush-slay of Abadilla, the presence of treachery and
evident premeditation qualifying the killing to murder under Art. 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Proper Penalty
The CA correctly modified the death penalty imposed by the trial court. At
the time the crime was committed, the penalty for murder was reclusion perpetua
to death. Since the penalty is composed of two (2) indivisible penalties, then for
the purpose of determining the imposable penalty, Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, must be considered. It provides in part:
1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one
aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.

With the presence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery and there

being no mitigating circumstance, the higher penalty of death should be
imposed.559[188]
In view, however, of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346 entitled, An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, which was signed
558[187]People v. Rabanillo, G.R. No. 130010, May 26, 1999, 307 SCRA 613, 621.
559[188]People v. Nabong, G.R. No. 172324, April 3, 2007, 520 SCRA 437, 457,
citing People v. Navida, G.R. Nos. 132239-40, December 4, 2000, 346 SCRA 821,
834.

into law on June 24, 2006, the imposition of the death penalty has been prohibited.
Pursuant to Section 2 thereof, the penalty to be meted to appellants shall be
reclusion perpetua. Said section reads:
SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of
the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make
use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.

Notwithstanding the reduction of the penalty imposed on appellants, they are

not eligible for parole following Section 3 of said law which provides:560[189]
SECTION 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion
perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of
this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.

Appellants attack on the constitutionality of the above provision on grounds

of curtailment of the Presidents absolute power to grant executive clemency,
imposition of an inhuman punishment and violation of equal protection clause, is
utterly misplaced.
As succinctly explained by this Court in People v. Gardon561[190]
We should point out that the benefit of parole cannot be extended to
Gardon even if he committed the crimes for which he is now convicted prior to
the effectivity of R.A. No. 9346. Sec. 2 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
provides that the law shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished
with death penalty or life- imprisonment. Although the law makes no reference to
persons convicted to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua such as Gardon, the
560[189]Mendoza v. People, G.R. No. 173551, October 4, 2007, 534 SCRA 669, 701.
561[190]G.R. No. 169872, September 27, 2006, 503 SCRA 757, 770-771.

Court has consistently held that the Indeterminate Sentence Law likewise does not
apply to persons sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In People v. Enriquez, we
declared:
[R]eclusion perpetua is the only penalty that can be imposed
against the appellants. As correctly argued by the Solicitor General, Act
No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, cannot be
applied in the case of appellants considering the proscription in Sec. 2
thereof, viz:
xxxx
Indeed, in People v. Asturias, Serrano v. Court of Appeals, People
v. Lampaza and People v. Tan, to name a few cases, we in effect equated
the penalty of reclusion perpetua as synonymous to life-imprisonment for
purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and ruled that the latter law
does not apply to persons convicted of offenses punishable with the said
penalty. Consequently, we affirm the Court of Appeals in not applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in imposing upon appellants the penalty
of reclusion perpetua instead.
Reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty without a minimum or
maximum period. Parole, on the other hand, is extended only to those sentenced
to divisible penalties as is evident from Sec. 5 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
which provides that it is only after any prisoner shall have served the minimum
penalty imposed on him that the Board of Indeterminate Sentence may consider
whether such prisoner may be granted parole.562[191]

Further, we cite the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Dante Tinga in People
v. Tubongbanua,563[192] addressing the issue herein raised by appellants, to wit:
No constitutional sanctities will be offended if persons previously sentenced
to death, or persons sentenced to reclusion perpetua, are denied the benefit of
parole conformably to Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 9346. As to persons previously
sentenced to death, it should be remembered that at the time of the
commission of the crime, the penalty attached to the crime was death. To their
benefit, Rep. Act No. 9346 reduced the penalty attached to the crime to
reclusion perpetua. Yet such persons cannot claim the benefit of parole on the basis
of the ex post facto clause of the Constitution, since an ex post facto law is one
562[191]Id., citing People v. Enriquez, Jr., G.R. No. 158797, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA
407, 418; and People v. Tubongbanua, G.R. No. 171271, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA
727 (see Concurring Opinion).
563[192]Id.

which, among others, changes punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than
the law annexed to the crime when committed. Rep. Act No. 9346 had the effect of
inflicting a lighter punishment, not a greater punishment, than what the law
annexed to the crime when committed.564[193] [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]

Civil Liability
When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded:
(1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or
compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5)
temperate damages.565[194]
Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without
need of proof other than the commission of the crime.566[195] We have ruled that
even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed because of the prohibition in R.A.
No. 9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is proper, because it is not dependent
on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying
circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the
commission of the offense.567[196] As explained in People v. Salome,568[197] while
R.A. No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the fact remains that
564[193]Id., at pp. 746-747.
565[194] Id., citing People v. Enriquez, Jr., G.R. No. 158797, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA
407, 418; and People v. Tubongbanua, G.R. No. 171271, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA
727 (see Concurring Opinion).
566[195] Id.
567[196] Madsali v. People, G.R. No. 179570, February 4, 2010, citing People v.
Quiachon, G.R. No. 170236, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 704, 719.
568[197] 500 Phil. 659, 676 (2006).

the penalty provided for by the law for a heinous offense is still death, and the
offense is still heinous. Accordingly, the heirs of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla is
entitled to civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00. The grant of actual
damages representing burial expenses, funeral services and cost of repair of the
Honda car, is likewise in order, being duly supported by receipts.569[198]
With regard to moral and exemplary damages, we find the amounts awarded
by the trial court excessive and the same are hereby reduced to P75,000.00 and
P30,000.00, respectively. It must again be stressed that moral damages are
emphatically not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of the defendant.
When awarded, moral damages must not be palpably and scandalously excessive
as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of
the trial judge or appellate court justices. 570[199] As to exemplary damages, the
same is justified under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code when a crime is
committed with an aggravating circumstance, either qualifying or generic.571[200]
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions and appeal are hereby
DISMISSED. The Decision dated April 1, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 00667 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that the civil
569[198] Exhibits T to T-6, folder of exhibits, pp. 40-46; TSN, January 27, 1997, p. 3.
570[199] Francisco v. Ferrer, Jr., G.R. No. 142029, February 28, 2001, 353 SCRA 261,
266-267, citing American Home Assurance Company v. Chua, G.R. No. 130421, June
28, 1999, 309 SCRA 250, 263, Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 127326, December 23, 1999, 321 SCRA 524, 537, Singson v.
Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 831, 845 and De la Serna v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
109161, June 21, 1994, 233 SCRA 325, 329-330.
571[200] People v. Padilla, G.R. No. 167955 (Formerly G.R. No. 151275), September
30, 2009, citing People v. Marcos, G.R. No. 185380, June 18, 2009.

indemnity for the death of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla is hereby increased to

P75,000.00, and the amounts of moral and exemplary damages awarded to his heirs
are reduced to P75,000.00 and P30,000.00, respectively.
With costs against the accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

See dissenting opinion

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

I join the dissent of JJ Carpio & Abad

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

No part, signed pleading as Sol Gen

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

J. Brion on official leave but he left

his vote concurring with J.
Villarama and the majority
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

With concurring opinion

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

See my dissenting opinion

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

No part
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

I join the dissents of the Js. Abad and Carpio

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Today is Tuesday, October 25, 2016

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 192531

November 12, 2014

BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner,

vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
This Appeal, filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, seeks to annul the March 17, 2010 Decision1 of the Employees
Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10, entitled Bernardina P. Bartolome v. Social Security
System (SSS) [Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.}, declaring that petitioner is not a beneficiary of the deceased employee
under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by PD 626.2
The Facts

John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on board the
vessel Maersk Danville, since February 2008. As such, he was enrolled under the government's Employees' Compensation
Program (ECP).3 Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008, an accident occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John,
which led to his untimely death the following day.4
John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, Johns biological
mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626 with the Social Security
System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union. However, the SSS La Union office, in a letter dated June 10, 20095
addressed to petitioner, denied the claim, stating:
We regret to inform you that wecannot give due course to your claim because you are no longer considered as the parent of
JOHN COLCOL as he was legally adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL based on documents you submitted to us.
The denial was appealed tothe Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the ruling of the SSS La
Union Branch through the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the claim is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.6
In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC ruled against petitioners entitlement to the death benefits
sought after under PD 626 on the ground she can no longer be considered Johns primary beneficiary. As culled from the
records, John and his sister Elizabeth were adopted by their great grandfather, petitioners grandfather, Cornelio Colcol
(Cornelio), by virtue of the Decision7 in Spec. Proc. No. 8220-XII of the Regional Trial Court in Laoag City dated February
4, 1985, which decree of adoption attained finality.8 Consequently, as argued by the agencies, it is Cornelio who qualifies as
Johns primary beneficiary, not petitioner. Neither, the ECC reasoned, would petitioner qualify as Johns secondary
beneficiary even if it wereproven that Cornelio has already passed away. As the ECC ratiocinated:
Under Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626, as amended, provides (sic) that beneficiaries are the "dependent spouse until he remarries
and dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parentsand subject to the
restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are the secondary
beneficiaries; Provided; that the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when
there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit."
The dependent parent referred to by the above provision relates to the legitimate parent of the covered member, as provided
for by Rule XV, Section 1 (c) (1) of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation. This Commission believes that the
appellant is not considered a legitimate parent of the deceased, having given up the latter for adoption to Mr. Cornelio C.
Colcol. Thus, in effect, the adoption divested her of the statusas the legitimate parent of the deceased.
xxxx
In effect, the rights which previously belong [sic] to the biological parent of the adopted child shall now be upon the
adopting parent. Hence, in this case, the legal parent referred to by P.D. 626, as amended, as the beneficiary, who has the
right to file the claim, is the adoptive father of the deceased and not herein appellant.9 (Emphasis supplied)

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was likewise denied by the ECC.10 Hence, the instant
petition.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues in the petition:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I. The Honorable ECCs Decision is contrary to evidence on record.
II. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse in denying the just, due and lawful claims of the petitioner as
a lawful beneficiary of her deceased biological son.
III. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse of discretion in not giving due course/denying petitioners
otherwise meritorious motion for reconsideration.11
In resolving the case, the pivotal issue is this: Are the biological parents of the covered, but legally adopted, employee
considered secondary beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in appropriate cases, to receive the benefits under the ECP?
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The ECCs factual findings are not consistent with the evidence on record
To recall, one of the primary reasons why the ECC denied petitioners claim for death benefits is that eventhough she is
Johns biological mother, it was allegedly not proven that his adoptive parent, Cornelio, was no longer alive. As intimated by
the ECC:
Moreover, there had been no allegation in the records as to whether the legally adoptive parent, Mr. Colcol, is dead, which
would immediately qualify the appellant [petitioner] for Social Security benefits. Hence, absent such proof of death of the
adoptive father, this Commission will presume him to be alive and well, and as such, is the one entitled to claim the benefit
being the primary beneficiary of the deaceased. Thus, assuming that appellant is indeed a qualified beneficiary under the
Social Security law, in view of her status as other beneficiary, she cannot claim the benefit legally provided by law to the
primary beneficiary, in this case the adoptive father since he is still alive.
We disagree with the factual finding of the ECC on this point.
Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts by
reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agenciesover matters falling under their jurisdiction.12
However, in the extant case, the ECC had overlooked a crucial piece of evidence offered by the petitioner Cornelios death
certificate.13
Based on Cornelios death certificate, it appears that Johns adoptive father died on October 26, 1987,14 or only less than

three (3) years since the decree of adoption on February 4, 1985, which attained finality.15 As such, it was error for the ECC
to have ruled that it was not duly proven that the adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already passed away.
The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is contrary to law
This brings us to the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to the death benefits claim in view of Johns workrelated demise. The pertinent provision, in this regard, is Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended, which reads:
ART. 167. Definition of terms. - Asused in this Title unless the context indicates otherwise:
xxxx
(j) 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries.
In their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate
children and legitimate descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided, that the dependent acknowledged natural
child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible
for monthly income benefit. (Emphasis supplied)
Concurrently, pursuant to the succeeding Article 177(c) supervising the ECC "[T]o approve rules and regulations governing
the processing of claims and the settlement of disputes arising therefrom as prescribed by the System," the ECC has issued
the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, interpreting the above-cited provision as follows:
RULE XV BENEFICIARIES
SECTION 1. Definition. (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or secondary, and determined atthe time of employees
death.
(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:
(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee at the time of the employees death until he
remarries; and
(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledged natural children, who are
unmarried not gainfully employed, not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age provided
that he is incapacitated and incapable of self - support due to physicalor mental defect which is
congenital or acquired during minority; Provided, further, that a dependent acknowledged
natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary only when there are no other
dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit; provided
finally, that if there are two or more acknowledged natural children, they shall be counted
from the youngest and without substitution, but not exceeding five.
(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:
(1) The legitimate parentswholly dependent upon the employee for regular support;

(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who are unmarried, not gainfully
employed, and not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age providedthat he is
incapacitated and incapable of self - support dueto physical or mental defect which is
congenital or acquired during minority. (Emphasis supplied)
Guilty of reiteration, the ECC denied petitioners claim on the ground that she is no longer the deceaseds legitimate parent,
as required by the implementing rules. As held by the ECC, the adoption decree severed the relation between John and
petitioner, effectively divesting her of the status of a legitimate parent, and, consequently, that of being a secondary
beneficiary.
We disagree.
a. Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation deviates from the clear language of Art. 167
(j) of the Labor Code, as amended
Examining the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation in light of the Labor Code, as amended, it is at once apparent
that the ECC indulged in an unauthorized administrative legislation. In net effect, the ECC read into Art. 167 of the Code an
interpretation not contemplated by the provision. Pertinent in elucidating on this point isArticle 7 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which reads:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not beexcused by disuse,
or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution.(Emphasis supplied)
As applied, this Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation16 that:
As we have previously declared, rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings in
order to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with
the provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic
law. (Emphasis supplied)
Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation is patently a wayward
restriction of and a substantial deviation from Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase "dependent
parents" to refer to "legitimate parents."
It bears stressing that a similar issue in statutory construction was resolved by this Court in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate
Court17 in this wise:
It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben

Balane has this to say:

The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In accordancetherefore with the canons of
statutory interpretation, it should beunderstood to have a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a general one.
Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. That the law does not make a distinction prevents us from making one: Ubi lex
non distinguit, nec nos distinguera debemus. xxx
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more restrictive sense thanit is used and intended
is not warranted by any rule ofinterpretation. Besides, he further states that when the law intends to use the termin a more
restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code.
Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not only collateral relatives but also all
the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense
which as already discussed earlier, is not so in the case at bar. (Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" in the afore-quoted Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code
is usedand ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly limited to "legitimate parents" as what the ECC did.
The phrase "dependent parents" should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether by
nature or by adoption. When the law does not distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, "dependent parents" are
parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption,who are in need of support or assistance.
Moreover, the same Article 167 (j),as couched, clearly shows that Congress did not intend to limit the phrase "dependent
parents" to solely legitimate parents. At the risk of being repetitive, Article 167 provides that "in their absence, the
dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate
descendants who are secondary beneficiaries." Had the lawmakers contemplated "dependent parents" to mean legitimate
parents, then it would have simply said descendants and not "legitimate descendants." The manner by which the provision in
question was crafted undeniably show that the phrase "dependent parents" was intended to cover all parents legitimate,
illegitimate or parents by nature or adoption.
b. Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation is in contravention of the equal protection
clause
To insist that the ECC validly interpreted the Labor Code provision is an affront to the Constitutional guarantee of equal
protection under the laws for the rule, as worded, prevents the parents of an illegitimate child from claiming benefits under
Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended by PD 626. To Our mind, such postulation cannot be countenanced.
As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner.18 In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to
govern impartially, and it may not drawdistinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a
legitimate governmental objective.19
The concept of equal protection, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction. What it simply requires isequality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.
Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of

reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane tothe
purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same
class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."20
In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis to discriminate against illegitimate parents. Simply put, the
above-cited rule promulgated by the ECC that limits the claim of benefits to the legitimate parents miserably failed the test
of reasonableness since the classification is not germane to the law being implemented. We see no pressing government
concern or interest that requires protection so as to warrant balancing the rights of unmarried parents on one hand and the
rationale behind the law on the other. On the contrary, the SSS can better fulfill its mandate, and the policy of PD 626 that
employees and their dependents may promptly secure adequate benefits in the event of work-connected disability or death will be better served if Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is not so narrowly interpreted.
There being no justification for limiting secondary parent beneficiaries to the legitimate ones, there can be no other course of
action to take other than to strikedown as unconstitutional the phrase "illegitimate" as appearing in Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1)
of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation.
Petitioner qualifies as Johns dependent parent
In attempting to cure the glaring constitutional violation of the adverted rule, the ECC extended illegitimate parents an
opportunity to file claims for and receive death benefitsby equating dependency and legitimacy to the exercise of parental
authority. Thus, as insinuated by the ECC in its assailed Decision, had petitioner not given up John for adoption, she could
have still claimed death benefits under the law.
To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that "legitimate parents" pertain to those who exercise parental
authority over the employee enrolled under the ECP. Itwas only in the assailed Decision wherein such qualification was
made. In addition, assuming arguendothat the ECC did not overstep its boundaries in limiting the adverted Labor Code
provision to the deceaseds legitimate parents, and that the commission properly equated legitimacy to parental authority,
petitioner can still qualify as Johns secondary beneficiary.
True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adoptedJohn, then about two (2) years old, petitioners parental authority over John was
severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelios death, was that when the
adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.
Johns minority at the time of his adopters death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental
authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent
ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption,21 who was then
left to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological parents is not a novel concept. Section
20 of Republic Act No. 855222 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act, provides:
Section 20. Effects of Rescission. If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is granted, the parental authority of the
adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a
minoror incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be
extinguished. (emphasis added)
The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned.1wphi1 The

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 193551, November 19, 2014
HEIRS OF GREGORIO LOPEZ, REPRESENTED BY ROGELIA LOPEZ, ET AL.,
Petitioners, v. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES [NOW SUBSTITUTED
BY PHILIPPINE INVESTMENT TWO (SPV-AMC), INC.], Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
This case involves the application of the doctrine on innocent purchaser or mortgagee for value.
It also involves the application of the doctrines on sales by persons who are not owners of the
property.
This is a Rule 45 petition1 filed on October 15, 2010, assailing the Court of Appeals May 8, 2009
decision2 and August 16, 2010 resolution.3 The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
Regional Trial Courts December 27, 2005 decision,4 which ordered the nullification of the
affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Enrique Lopez, and the documents relating to the sale
and mortgage of the property to respondent Development Bank of the Philippines.
Gregoria Lopez owned a 2,734-square-meter property in Bustos, Bulacan.5 She died on March
19, 19226 and was survived by her three sons: Teodoro Lopez, Francisco Lopez, and Carlos
Lopez.7 Tax Declaration No. 613 was issued under the names of Teodoro, Francisco, and
Carlos.8
Teodoro, Francisco, and Carlos died.9 Only Teodoro was survived by children: Gregorio,
Enrique, Simplicio, and Severino.10
Petitioners in this case are Simplicio substituted by his daughter Eliza Lopez, and the heirs of
Gregorio and Severino.11 Enrique is deceased.12
Petitioners discovered that on November 29, 1990, Enrique executed an affidavit of selfadjudication declaring himself to be Gregoria Lopezs only surviving heir, thereby adjudicating
upon himself the land in Bulacan.13 He sold the property to Marietta Yabut.14
Petitioners demanded from Marietta the nullification of Enriques affidavit of self-adjudication
and the deed of absolute sale.15 They also sought to redeem Enriques one-fourth share.16
Marietta, who was already in possession of the property, refused.17
Sometime in 1993, Marietta obtained a loan from Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)
and mortgaged the property to DBP as security.18 At the time of the loan, the property was
covered by Tax Declaration No. 18727, with the agreement that the land shall be brought under
the Torrens system.19 On July 26, 1993, an original certificate of title was issued in Mariettas
name.20 Marietta and DBP executed a supplemental document dated 28 February 1995 placing

the subject [property] within the coverage of the mortgage.21 The mortgage was annotated to
the title.22
Sometime between 1993 and 1994, petitioners filed a complaint23 and an amended complaint24
with the Regional Trial Court for the annulment of document, recovery of possession, and
reconveyance of the property. They prayed that judgment be rendered, ordering the annulment
of Enriques affidavit of self-adjudication, the deed of sale executed by Enrique and Marietta,
and the deed of real estate mortgage executed by Marietta in favor of DBP.25 Petitioners also
prayed for the reconveyance of their three-fourth share in the property, their exercise of their
right of redemption of Enriques one-fourth share, as well as attorneys fees and costs of suit.26
Petitioners caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of the original certificate
of title.27 The annotation was inscribed on June 27, 1994.28
Marietta failed to pay her loan to DBP.29 DBP instituted foreclosure proceedings on the . . .
land.30 It was awarded the sale of the [property] as the highest bidder.31 The Certificate of
Sale was registered with the Register of Deeds . . . on 11 September 1996.32 Marietta failed to
redeem the property.33 The title to the property was consolidated in favor of DBP.34
On December 27, 2005, the Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of petitioners.35 The Regional
Trial Court found that the affidavit of self-adjudication and the deed of absolute sale did not
validly transfer to Marietta the title to the property.36 Enrique could not transfer three-fourths of
the property since this portion belonged to his co-heirs.37 The Regional Trial Court also found
that Marietta was not an innocent purchaser for value because when the deed of absolute sale
was executed, the property was only covered by a tax declaration in the name of the heirs of
Gregoria Lopez,38 thus:
[Marietta] should have looked further into the veracity of vendor Enrique Lopez claim of
ownership over the subject property considering that he has not presented her any other proof of
his ownership when the said Deed of Absolute Sale was executed other than his mere allegation
of ownership thereof.39
Hence, the issuance of the original certificate of title would not protect Marietta. Title is not
vested through a certificate.40 At best, Mariettas ownership over the subject property would
cover only Enriques share.41
The Regional Trial Court also found that DBP was not a mortgagee in good faith because at the
time of the execution of the mortgage contract, a certificate of title was yet to be issued in favor
of Marietta.42 Mariettas title at that time was still based on a tax declaration.43 Based on
jurisprudence, a tax declaration is not a conclusive proof of ownership.44 The DBP should have
exerted due diligence in ascertaining Mariettas title to the property.45
The Regional Trial Court ordered the nullification of Enriques affidavit of self-adjudication, the
sale of the three-fourth portion of the subject property in favor of Marietta, the reconveyance of
the three-fourth share of the property in favor of petitioners, the nullification of the real estate
mortgage executed in favor of DBP, and the surrender of possession of the property to

petitioners.46 The trial court also ordered DBP to pay attorneys fees.
DBP, substituted by Philippine Investment Two (PI Two), appealed to the Court of Appeals.47
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court in the decision48
promulgated on May 8, 2009. It held that DBP was a mortgagee in good faith:
[W]ith the absence of any evidence to show that the DBP was ever privy to the fraudulent
execution of the late Enrique Lopez [sic] affidavit of Adjudication over the subject land, the
right of the former over the same must be protected and respected by reason of public policy.49
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The 27 December 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE as to defendant-appellant Development Bank of
the Philippines and dismissing the complaint against the latter [now substituted by Philippine
Investment Two (SPV-AMC), Inc.]50
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on August 16, 2010.51
Petitioners filed a Rule 45 petition52 before this court on October 15, 2010.
The issue in this case is whether the property was validly transferred to Marietta and, eventually,
to DBP.
Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals erred in its application of the doctrine on innocent
purchaser for value.53 DBP should have exercised diligence in ascertaining Mariettas claim of
ownership since at the time of the mortgage, the property was only covered by a tax declaration
under Mariettas name.54 As a financial institution of which greater care and prudence55 is
required, DBP should not have relied on the face of a certificate of title to the property.56
On the other hand, DBPs position, citing Blanco v. Esquierdo,57 was that since its participation
in Enriques execution of the affidavit of self-adjudication was not shown on record, it could not
have been aware that there was any irregularity in the sale in favor of Marietta and in her title to
the property.58 Moreover, Marietta was in possession of the property at the time of the contract
with DBP.59 Therefore, DBP should enjoy the protection accorded to innocent purchasers for
value.60
We find merit in the petition.
I
Validity of Enriques affidavit and the sale to Marietta
We have consistently upheld the principle that no one can give what one does not have.61 A
seller can only sell what he or she owns, or that which he or she does not own but has authority
to transfer, and a buyer can only acquire what the seller can legally transfer. 62

This principle is incorporated in our Civil Code. It provides that in a contract of sale, the seller
binds himself to transfer the ownership of the thing sold, thus:
Art. 1458. By the contract of sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the
ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in
money or its equivalent.
The seller cannot perform this obligation if he or she does not have a right to convey ownership
of the thing. Hence, Article 1459 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1459. The thing must be licit and the vendor must have a right to transfer the ownership
thereof at the time it is delivered.
Title or rights to a deceased persons property are immediately passed to his or her heirs upon
death.63 The heirs rights become vested without need for them to be declared heirs.64 Before
the property is partitioned, the heirs are co-owners of the property.65
In this case, the rights to Gregoria Lopezs property were automatically passed to her sons
Teodoro, Francisco, and Carlos when she died in 1922.66 Since only Teodoro was survived by
children, the rights to the property ultimately passed to them when Gregoria Lopezs sons died.67
The children entitled to the property were Gregorio, Simplicio, Severino, and Enrique.
Gregorio, Simplicio, Severino, and Enrique became co-owners of the property, with each of them
entitled to an undivided portion of only a quarter of the property. Upon their deaths, their
children became the co-owners of the property, who were entitled to their respective shares, such
that the heirs of Gregorio became entitled to Gregorios one-fourth share, and Simplicios and
Severinos respective heirs became entitled to their corresponding one-fourth shares in the
property.68
The heirs cannot alienate the shares that do not belong to them. Article 493 of the Civil Code
provides:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Since Enriques right to the property was limited to his one-fourth share, he had no right to sell
the undivided portions that belonged to his siblings or their respective heirs. Any sale by one
heir of the rest of the property will not affect the rights of the other heirs who did not consent to
the sale. Such sale is void with respect to the shares of the other heirs.
Regardless of their agreement, Enrique could only convey to Marietta his undivided one-fourth
share of the property, and Marietta could only acquire that share. This is because Marietta
obtained her rights from Enrique who, in the first place, had no title or interest over the rest of
the property that he could convey.

This is despite Enriques execution of the affidavit of self-adjudication wherein he declared

himself to be the only surviving heir of Gregoria Lopez. The affidavit of self-adjudication is
invalid for the simple reason that it was false. At the time of its execution, Enriques siblings
were still alive and entitled to the three-fourth undivided share of the property. The affidavit of
self-adjudication did not have the effect of vesting upon Enrique ownership or rights to the
property.
The issuance of the original certificate of title in favor of Marietta does not cure Enriques lack
of title or authority to convey his co-owners portions of the property. Issuance of a certificate of
title is not a grant of title over petitioners undivided portions of the property.69 The physical
certificate of title does not vest in a person ownership or right over a property.70 It is merely an
evidence of such ownership or right.71
Marietta could acquire valid title over the whole property if she were an innocent purchaser for
value. An innocent purchaser for value purchases a property without any notice of defect or
irregularity as to the right or interest of the seller.72 He or she is without notice that another
person holds claim to the property being purchased.73
As a rule, an ordinary buyer may rely on the certificate of title issued in the name of the seller.74
He or she need not look beyond what appears on the face [of the certificate of title].75
However, the ordinary buyer will not be considered an innocent purchaser for value if there is
anything on the certificate of title that arouses suspicion, and the buyer failed to inquire or take
steps to ensure that there is no cloud on the title, right, or ownership of the property being sold.
Marietta cannot claim the protection accorded by law to innocent purchasers for value because
the circumstances do not make this available to her.
In this case, there was no certificate of title to rely on when she purchased the property from
Enrique. At the time of the sale, the property was still unregistered. What was available was
only a tax declaration issued under the name of Heirs of Lopez.
The defense of having purchased the property in good faith may be availed of only where
registered land is involved and the buyer had relied in good faith on the clear title of the
registered owner.76 It does not apply when the land is not yet registered with the Registry of
Deeds.
At the very least, the unregistered status of the property should have prompted Marietta to
inquire further as to Enriques right over the property. She did not. Hence, she was not an
innocent purchaser for value. She acquired no title over petitioners portions of the property.
II
Validity of the mortgage
One of the requisites of a valid mortgage contract is ownership of the property being
mortgaged.77 Article 2085 of the Civil Code enumerates the requisites of a mortgage contract:

Art. 2085. The following requisites are essential to the contracts of pledge and mortgage:
(1) That they be constituted to secure the fulfilment of a principal obligation;
(2) That the pledgor or mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing pledged or mortgaged;
(3) That the persons constituting the pledge or mortgage have the free disposal of their property,
and in the absence thereof, that they be legally authorized for the purpose.
Third persons who are not parties to the principal obligation may secure the latter by pledging or
mortgaging their own property.
Applying this provision and having established that Marietta acquired no valid title or ownership
from Enrique over the undivided portions of the property, this court finds that no valid mortgage
was executed over the same property in favor of DBP. Without a valid mortgage, there was also
no valid foreclosure sale and no transfer of ownership of petitioners undivided portions to DBP.
In other words, DBP acquired no right over the undivided portions since its predecessor-ininterest was not the owner and held no authority to convey the property.
As in sales, an exception to this rule is if the mortgagee is a mortgagee in good faith.78 This
exception was explained in Torbela v. Rosario:
Under this doctrine, even if the mortgagor is not the owner of the mortgaged property, the
mortgage contract and any foreclosure sale arising therefrom are given effect by reason of public
policy. This principle is based on the rule that all persons dealing with property covered by a
Torrens Certificate of Title, as buyers or mortgagees, are not required to go beyond what appears
on the face of the title. This is the same rule that underlies the principle of "innocent purchasers
for value." The prevailing jurisprudence is that a mortgagee has a right to rely in good faith on
the certificate of title of the mortgagor to the property given as security and in the absence of any
sign that might arouse suspicion, has no obligation to undertake further investigation. Hence,
even if the mortgagor is not the rightful owner of, or does not have a valid title to, the mortgaged
property, the mortgagee in good faith is, nonetheless, entitled to protection.79
DBP claims that it is covered by this exception. DBP is mistaken. The exception applies when,
at the time of the mortgage, the mortgagor has already obtained a certificate of title under his or
her name.80 It does not apply when, as in this case, the mortgagor had yet to register the property
under her name.81
The facts show that DBP disregarded circumstances that should have aroused suspicion. For
instance, at the time of the mortgage with DBP, Marietta only had a tax declaration under her
name to show that she was the owner of the property. A tax declaration, by itself, neither proves
ownership of property nor grants title. Yet, DBP agreed to accept the property as security even
though Mariettas claim was supported only by the tax declaration, and a certificate of title was
yet to be issued under her name.
Granting that Marietta was in possession of the property, DBP should have inquired further as to

Mariettas rights over the property since no certificate of title was issued to her. DBP took the
risks attendant to the absence of a certificate of title. It should bear the burden of checking the
ownership as well as the validity of the deed of sale. This is despite the eventual issuance of a
certificate of title in favor of Marietta.
The rule on innocent purchasers or [mortgagees] for value is applied more strictly when the
purchaser or the mortgagee is a bank. Banks are expected to exercise higher degree of diligence
in their dealings, including those involving lands. Banks may not rely simply on the face of the
certificate of title.
Thus, in Cruz v. Bancom Finance Corporation,82 this court ruled that:
Respondent . . . is not an ordinary mortgagee; it is a mortgagee-bank. As such, unlike private
individuals, it is expected to exercise greater care and prudence in its dealings, including those
involving registered lands. A banking institution is expected to exercise due diligence before
entering into a mortgage contract. The ascertainment of the status or condition of a property
offered to it as security for a loan must be a standard and indispensable part of its operations.83
(Citations omitted)
DBP failed to exercise the degree of diligence required of banks when it accepted the
unregistered property as security for Mariettas loan despite circumstances that should have
aroused its suspicion.
Citing Blanco v. Esquierdo, DBP argued that since it did not participate in the dealings between
Enrique and Marietta, it should be considered as an innocent mortgagee for value.
Blanco involves an alleged widow of the deceased who adjudicated to herself the deceaseds
property and thereafter mortgaged the property to DBP.84 The brothers and sisters of the
deceased filed an action for the annulment of the affidavit executed by the alleged widow and the
cancellation of the certificate of title under her name.85 The trial court ordered the cancellation of
the certificate of title issued to the alleged widow, including the registration of the mortgage
deed.86
In Blanco, this court declared that DBP was a mortgagee in good faith, thus:
The trial court, in the decision complained of, made no finding that the defendant mortgagee
bank was a party to the fraudulent transfer of the land to Fructuosa Esquierdo. Indeed, there is
nothing alleged in the complaint which may implicate said defendant mortgagee in the fraud, or
justify a finding that it acted in bad faith. On the other hand, the certificate of title was in the
name of the mortgagor Fructuosa Esquierdo when the land was mortgaged by her to the
defendant bank. Such being the case, the said defendant bank, as mortgagee, had the right to rely
on what appeared in the certificate and, in the absence of anything to excite suspicion, was under
no obligation to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the mortgagor appearing
on the face of said certificate. (De Lara, et al. vs. Ayroso, 95 Phil., 185; 50 Off. Gaz., 10 4838;
Joaquin vs. Madrid, et al., 106 Phil., 1060). Being thus an innocent mortgagee for value, its right
or lien upon the land mortgaged must be respected and protected, even if the mortgagor obtained
her title thereto thru fraud.87

DBPs reliance on Blanco is misplaced. In Blanco, the certificate of title had already been issued
under the name of the mortgagor when the property was mortgaged to DBP. This is not the
situation in this case.
To reiterate, the protection accorded to mortgagees in good faith cannot be extended to
mortgagees of properties that are not yet registered or registered but not under the mortgagors
name.
Therefore, the Regional Trial Court did not err in ordering the nullification of the documents of
sale and mortgage. Contracts involving the sale or mortgage of unregistered property by a
person who was not the owner or by an unauthorized person are void.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 8,
2009 and its resolution dated August 16, 2010 are reversed and SET ASIDE. The December 27,
2005 decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

DANILO ALUAD, LEONORA

ALUAD,
DIVINA
ALUAD,
PROSPERO
ALUAD,
and
CONNIE ALUAD,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 176943

Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
- versus -

VELASCO, JR., and

BRION, JJ.

ZENAIDO ALUAD,
Respondent.

Promulgated:
October 17, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioners mother, Maria Aluad (Maria), and respondent Zenaido Aluad
were raised by the childless spouses Matilde Aluad (Matilde) and Crispin Aluad
(Crispin).

Crispin was the owner of six lots identified as Lot Nos. 674, 675, 676, 677,
680, and 682 of the Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After Crispin died, his wife Matilde
adjudicated the lots to herself.572[1]
572[1] Exhibit G, Records, pp. 172-173.

On November 14, 1981, Matilde executed a document entitled Deed of

Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos573[2] (Deed of Donation) in favor of
petitioners mother Maria574[3] covering all the six lots which Matilde inherited
from her husband Crispin. The Deed of Donation provided:

That, for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR
[Matilde] for the DONEE [Maria], the latter being adopted and hav[ing] been
brought up by the former the DONOR, by these presents, transfer and convey, BY
WAY OF DONATION, unto the DONEE the property above-described, to
become effective upon the death of the DONOR , but in the event that the
DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed
rescinded and [of] no further force and effect; Provided, however, that anytime
during the lifetime of the DONOR or anyone of them who should survive, they
could use[,] encumber or even dispose of any or even all of the parcels of land
herein donated.575[4] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On September 30, 1986, Original Certificates of Title over Lot Nos. 674 and
676 were issued in Matildes name.

573[2] Exhibit A, id. at 164-165.

574[3] Maria Aluad, as donee, accepted the donation as expressly stated in the
deed and confirmed by her signature thereon (Exhibit A-3, [vide note 2]).
575[4] Exhibit A-1, id. at 164.

On August 26, 1991, Matilde sold Lot No. 676 to respondent by a Deed of
Absolute Sale of Real Property.576[5]

Subsequently or on January 14, 1992, Matilde executed a last will and

testament,577[6] devising Lot Nos. 675, 677, 682, and 680 to Maria, and her
remaining properties including Lot No. 674 to respondent.

Matilde died on January 25, 1994, while Maria died on September 24 of the
same year.578[7]

On August 21, 1995, Marias heirs-herein petitioners filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City a Complaint,579[8] for declaration and recovery of
ownership and possession of Lot Nos. 674 and 676, and damages against
respondent, alleging:
That in 1978, plaintiff[s] possessed the two (2) parcels of land abovedescribed until January 1991 when defendant entered and possessed the two (2)
parcels of land claiming as the adopted son of Crispin Aluad who refused to give
back possession until Matilde Aluad died in [1994] and then retained the
576[5] Exhibit 1, id. at 221.
577[6] Exhibit 2, id. at 222-223.
578[7] Exhibits B C, id. at 166-167.
579[8] Id. at 1-6.

possession thereof up to and until the present time, thus, depriving the plaintiffs of
the enjoyment of said parcels of land x x x;
That after the death of Matilde R. Aluad, the plaintiffs succeeded by
inheritance by right of representation from their deceased mother, Maria Aluad
who is the sole and only daughter of Matilde Aluad[.]580[9]

To the complaint respondent alleged in his Answer.581[10]

That Lot 674 is owned by the defendant as this lot was adjudicated to him
in the Last Will and Testament of Matilde Aluad x x x while Lot 676 was
purchased by him from Matilde Aluad. These two lots are in his possession as true
owners thereof.582[11] (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioners later filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint Already Filed
to Conform to Evidence583[12] to which it annexed an Amended Complaint584[13]
which cited the donation of the six lots via Deed of Donation in favor of their
mother Maria. Branch 15 of the RTC granted the motion and admitted the Amended
Complaint.585[14]

580[9] Id. at 3.
581[10] Id. at 15-21.
582[11] Id. at 18-19.
583[12] Id. at 102-104.
584[13] Id. at 105-110.

Respondent filed an Amended Answer586[15] contending, inter alia, that the

Deed of Donation is forged and falsified and petitioners change of theory showed
that said document was not existing at the time they filed their complaint and was
concocted by them after realizing that their false claim that their mother was the
only daughter of Matild[e] Aluad cannot in anyway be established by them; 587[16]
and that if ever said document does exist, the same was already revoked by Matilde
when [she] exercised all acts of dominion over said properties until she sold Lot
676 to defendant and until her death with respect to the other lots without any
opposition from Maria Aluad.588[17]

The trial court, by Decision589[18] of September 20, 1996, held that Matilde
could not have transmitted any right over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 to respondent, she
having previously alienated them to Maria via the Deed of Donation. Thus it
disposed:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

585[14] Id. at 121-122.
586[15] Id. at 132-139.
587[16] Id. at 134.
588[17] Id. at 136-137.
589[18] Id. at 238-247.

1. Declaring the plaintiffs as the rightful owners of the subject Lots Nos.
674 and 676, Pilar Cadastre;
2. Ordering the defendant to deliver the possession of the subject lots to
the plaintiffs;

3. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs:

a.

Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorneys fees;

b.

Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), representing the income

from subject Lot 676, a year from 1991 up to the time said lot is
delivered to the plaintiffs, together with the interest thereof at the
legal rate until fully paid;

c.

Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00), representing the income from

the subject Lot No. 674, a year from 1991 up to the time said lot is
delivered to the plaintiffs, plus legal interest thereof at the legal
rate until fully paid; and

d. The costs of the suit.

Defendants counterclaim is ordered dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.590[19]

On petitioners motion, the trial court directed the issuance of a writ of

execution pending appeal.591[20] Possession of the subject lots appears to have in
fact been taken by petitioners.
590[19] Id. at 246-247.
591[20] Id. at 260-261.

By Decision592[21] of August 10, 2006, the Court of Appeals reversed the

trial courts decision, it holding that the Deed of Donation was actually a donation
mortis causa, not inter vivos, and as such it had to, but did not, comply with the
formalities of a will. Thus, it found that the Deed of Donation was witnessed by
only two witnesses and had no attestation clause which is not in accordance with
Article 805 of the Civil Code, reading:

Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at
the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testators name written by some
other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and
of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the
instrumental witnesses of the will shall, also sign, as aforesaid, each and every
page thereof, except the last on the left margin and all the pages shall be
numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is
written, and the fact that that testator signed the will and every page thereof, or
caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed
the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator, and of one
another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it
shall be interpreted to them.

While the appellate court declared respondent as the rightful owner of Lot
No. 676, it did not so declare with respect to Lot No. 674, as Matildes last will and
testament had not yet been probated. Thus the Court of Appeals disposed:
592[21] Penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla, with
the concurrence of Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Marlene GonzalesSison; CA rollo, pp. 130-146.

WHEREFORE, finding the instant petition worthy of merit, the same is

hereby GRANTED and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City,
Branch 15, dated 20 September 1996, in Civil Case No. V-6686 for declaration of
ownership, recovery of ownership and possession, and damages is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.
A new one is entered in its stead declaring defendant-appellant as the
lawful owner of Lot [No.] 676 of the Pilar Cadastre. Accordingly, plaintiffsappellees are directed to return the possession of the said lot to the defendantappellant.
Moreover, plaintiffs-appellees are ordered to pay P40,000.00 to defendantappellant as attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
Costs against plaintiffs-appellees.
SO ORDERED.593[22] (Emphasis in the original; underscoring
supplied)

Their Motion for Reconsideration594[23] having been denied,595[24]

petitioners filed the present Petition for Review,596[25] contending that the Court of
Appeals erred

593[22] Id. at 145-146.

594[23] Id. at 155-159.
595[24] Id. at 166-167.
596[25] Rollo, pp. 18-50.

X X X WHEN IT REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE COURT BELOW

(RTC, Branch 15, Roxas City) HOLDING THAT THE DEED OF DONATION
INTER VIVOS IN FAVOR OF PETITIONERS MOTHER IS IN FACT A
DONATION MORTIS CAUSA.
II
X X X WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT IS THE RIGHTFUL OWNER
OF LOT NO. 676 AS LOT BUYER ON THE BASIS OF A DEED OF SALE
EXECUTED BY THE DONOR WHO HAD NO MORE RIGHT TO SELL THE
SAME.
III
X X X WHEN IT FAILED TO DECLARE PETITIONERS THE RIGHTFUL
OWNER OF LOT NO. 674 AFTER HAVING RULED WHEN IT HELD THAT
RESPONDENT CANNOT BE DECLARED OWNER THEREOF.
IV
X X X WHEN IT HELD THAT THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF EXECUTION
PENDING APPEAL IS IN VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH (a) SECTION 2,
RULE 39, OF THE RULES OF COURT (AND ORDERING PETITIONERS TO
RETURN POSSESSION OF LOT 676 TO RESPONDENT) AND ORDERING
PETITIONERS TO PAY ATTORNEYS FEES AND COST[S] OF SUIT.597[26]

As did the appellate court, the Court finds the donation to petitioners mother
one of mortis causa, it having the following characteristics:

(1)

It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the

transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should
retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;

(2)

That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable by
the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for
indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the
properties conveyed; and

597[26] Id. at 29-30.

(3)

That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.598[27] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The phrase in the earlier-quoted Deed of Donation to become effective upon

the death of the DONOR admits of no other interpretation than to mean that
Matilde did not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioners mother
during her (Matildes) lifetime.599[28]

The statement in the Deed of Donation reading anytime during the lifetime
of the DONOR or anyone of them who should survive, they could use, encumber
or even dispose of any or even all the parcels of land herein donated 600[29]
means that Matilde retained ownership of the lots and reserved in her the right to
dispose them. For the right to dispose of a thing without other limitations than those
established by law is an attribute of ownership. 601[30] The phrase in the Deed of
Donation or anyone of them who should survive is of course out of sync. For the
Deed of Donation clearly stated that it would take effect upon the death of the

598[27] Maglasang v. Heirs of Corazon Cabatingan, 432 Phil. 548, 554 (2002); Reyes
v. Mosqueda, G.R. No. 45262, July 23, 1990, 187 SCRA 661, 670-671; Bonsato, et al.
v. Court of Appeals, et al., 95 Phil. 481, 487 (1954).
599[28] Ibid.
600[29] Exhibit A-1, records, p. 164.
601[30] Vide CIVIL CODE, Article 428: The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose
of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law x x x.

donor, hence, said phrase could only have referred to the donor Matilde. Petitioners
themselves concede that such phrase does not refer to the donee, thus:
x x x [I]t is well to point out that the last provision (sentence) in the
disputed paragraph should only refer to Matilde Aluad, the donor, because she
was the only surviving spouse at the time the donation was executed on 14
November 1981, as her husband Crispin Aluad [] had long been dead as early as
1975.602[31]

The trial court, in holding that the donation was inter vivos, reasoned:

x x x The donation in question is subject to a resolutory term or period

when the donor provides in the aforequoted provisions, but in the event that the
DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed
rescinded and [of] no further force and effect. When the donor provides that
should the DONEE xxx die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be
deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect the logical construction
thereof is that after the execution of the subject donation, the same became
effective immediately and shall be deemed rescinded and [of] no further force
and effect upon the arrival of a resolutory term or period, i.e., the death of the
donee which shall occur before that of the donor. Understandably, the arrival
of this resolutory term or period cannot rescind and render of no further force
and effect a donation which has never become effective, because, certainly
what donation is there to be rescinded and rendered of no further force and
effect upon the arrival of said resolutory term or period if there was no
donation which was already effective at the time when the donee died? 603[32]
(Underscoring supplied)

A similar ratio in a case had been brushed aside by this Court, however, thus:

602[31] Rollo, p. 37.

603[32] Records, pp. 242-243.

x x x [P]etitioners contend that the stipulation on rescission in case

petitioners [donee] die ahead of [donor] Cabatingan is a resolutory condition that
confirms the nature of the donation as inter vivos.
Petitioners arguments are bereft of merit.604[33]
xxxx
x x x The herein subject deeds expressly provide that the donation shall be
rescinded in case [donees] the petitioners predecease [the donor] Conchita
Cabatingan. As stated in Reyes v. Mosqueda, one of the decisive characteristics of
a donation mortis causa is that the transfer should be considered void if the donor
should survive the donee. This is exactly what Cabatingan provided for in her
donations. If she really intended that the donation should take effect during her
lifetime and that the ownership of the properties donated to the donee or
independently of, and not by reason of her death, she would not have expressed
such proviso in the subject deeds.605[34] (Underscoring supplied)

As the Court of Appeals observed, x x x [t]hat the donation is mortis causa is

fortified by Matildes acts of possession as she continued to pay the taxes for the
said properties which remained under her name; appropriated the produce; and
applied for free patents for which OCTs were issued under her name.606[35]

604[33] Maglasang v. Heirs of Corazon Cabatingan, supra note 27 at 553-554.

605[34] Id. at 556.
606[35] CA rollo, p. 140.

The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have
been observed607[36] but they were not, as it was witnessed by only two, not three
or more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code.608[37]

Further, the witnesses did not even sign the attestation clause 609[38] the
execution of which clause is a requirement separate from the subscription of the
will and the affixing of signatures on the left-hand margins of the pages of the will.
So the Court has emphasized:

x x x Article 805 particularly segregates the requirement that the

instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will from the requisite that the will
be attested and subscribed by [the instrumental witnesses]. The respective intents
behind these two classes of signature[s] are distinct from each other. The
signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify, among others, that the
witnesses are aware that the page they are signing forms part of the will. On the
other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the witnesses are
referring to the statements contained in the attestation clause itself. Indeed, the
attestation clause is separate and apart from the disposition of the will. An
unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested will. Even if the
instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the page containing the
unsigned attestation clause, such signatures cannot demonstrate these witnesses
607[36] CIVIL CODE, Article 728:Donations which are to take effect upon
the death of the donor partake of the nature of testamentary provisions and shall
be governed by the rules established in the Title on Succession.
Alejandro v. Judge Geraldez, 168 Phil. 404, 414-415 (1977).

608[37] CIVIL CODE, Article 805.

609[38] Exhibit A, records, p. 165.

undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that do appear on the page were
directed towards a wholly different avowal.
x x x It is the witnesses, and not the testator, who are required under
Article 805 to state the number of pages used upon which the will is written; the
fact that the testator had signed the will and every page thereof; and that they
witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another. The only proof in the will that the witnesses have
stated these elemental facts would be their signatures on the attestation clause.610
[39] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Furthermore, the witnesses did not acknowledge the will before the notary
public,611[40] which is not in accordance with the requirement of Article 806 of the
Civil Code that every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses.

More. The requirement that all the pages of the will must be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page was not also
followed.612[41]

The Deed of Donation which is, as already discussed, one of mortis causa,
not having followed the formalities of a will, it is void and transmitted no right to
petitioners mother. But even assuming arguendo that the formalities were
610[39] Azuela v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122880, April 12, 2006, 487 SCRA 119,
141-142. Vide Cagro v. Cagro, 92 Phil. 1032, 1033-1034 (1953).
611[40] Exhibit A, records, p. 165.
612[41] Id. at 164-165. Vide CIVIL CODE, Article 805.

observed, since it was not probated, no right to Lot Nos. 674 and 676 was
transmitted to Maria.613[42] Matilde thus validly disposed of Lot No. 674 to
respondent by her last will and testament, subject of course to the qualification that
her (Matildes) will must be probated. With respect to Lot No. 676, the same had, as
mentioned earlier, been sold by Matilde to respondent on August 26, 1991.

Petitioners nevertheless argue that assuming that the donation of Lot No.
674 in favor of their mother is indeed mortis causa, hence, Matilde could devise it
to respondent, the lot should nevertheless have been awarded to them because they
had acquired it by acquisitive prescription, they having been in continuous,
uninterrupted, adverse, open, and public possession of it in good faith and in the
concept of an owner since 1978.614[43]

Petitioners failed to raise the issue of acquisitive prescription before the

lower courts, however, they having laid their claim on the basis of inheritance from
their mother. As a general rule, points of law, theories, and issues not brought to the
attention of the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 615[44] For a
contrary rule would be unfair to the adverse party who would have no opportunity

613[42] RULES OF COURT, Rule 75, Section 1.

614[43] Rollo, p. 43.
615[44] Vide General Credit Cooperation v. Alsons Development and Investment
Corporation, G.R. No. 154975, January 29, 2007, 513 SCRA 225, 235-236 (citations
omitted).

to present further evidence material to the new theory, which it could have done
had it been aware of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court.616[45]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
616[45] Vide Philippine Ports Authority v. City of Iloilo, 453 Phil. 927, 934 (2003)
(citation omitted).

Chairperson

DANTE O. TINGA

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS,

G.R. No. 179922

Petitioner,
Present:

- versus -

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also

CHICO-NAZARIO,

known as FELICIDAD S. VDA.

NACHURA, and

DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD

REYES, JJ.

SANDOVAL CARLOS or
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA.
DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO

Promulgated:

CARLOS II,
Respondents.

December 16, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital

bond for marriages solemnized during the effectivity of the Family
Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The
nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a
judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of
judgment.

We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the

Decision617[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed and set
aside the summary judgment618[2] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a
child, recovery of property, reconveyance, sum of money, and
damages.

The Facts

The events that led to the institution of the instant suit are
unveiled as follows:

Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate.

They left six parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo
Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are particularly
described as follows:

617[1] Rollo, pp. 47-63. Dated October 15, 2002. Penned by Associate Justice
Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, with Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia and Bernardo P.
Abesamis, concurring.
618[2] Civil Case No. 95-135.

Parcel No. 1

Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137 of
the Court of Land Registration.

Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is

specifically reserved.

Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.

Parcel No. 2

A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in
the Bo. of Alabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x
containing an area of Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty One
(13,441) square meters.

Parcel No. 3

A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903,

approved as a non-subd. project), being a portion of Lot 159-B [LRC]
Psd- Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon.
Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot 155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the
SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-B-5; on the S, points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-3;
on the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-1 (Road widening) all of the subd.
plan, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS,
more or less.

PARCEL No. 4

A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a

portion of Lot 28, Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137), situated in
the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Bounded on the
NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27, Muntinlupa Estate; on the East & SE,
along lines 2 to 6 by Mangangata River; and on the West., along line 61, by Lot 28-B of the subd. plan x x x containing an area of ONE
THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.

PARCEL No. 5

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de Solocan.

Linda por el NW, con la parcela 49; por el NE, con la parcela 36; por el
SE, con la parcela 51; y por el SW, con la calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo
de un punto marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W,
72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de
concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman
las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo un extension
superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.

PARCEL No. 6

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De Solocon.

Linda por el NW, con la parcela 50; por el NE, con la parcela 37; por el
SE, con la parcela 52; por el SW, con la Calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo
de un punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E,
82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de
concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman

las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una extension

superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS. 619[3]

During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his

estate to Teofilo. The agreement was made in order to avoid the
payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver
and turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De
Dios Carlos.

Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred

and registered in the name of Teofilo. These three (3) lots are now
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 234824 issued by
the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued by
the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; and TCT No. 139058 issued
by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.

Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot

is now covered by TCT No. 160401 issued by the Registry of
Deeds of Makati City.

619[3] Rollo, pp. 49-51.

On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by

respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II).
Upon Teofilos death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the
name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The
said two (2) parcels of land are covered by TCT Nos. 219877 and
210878, respectively, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila.

In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents

before the RTC in Muntinlupa City, docketed as Civil Case No. 941964. In the said case, the parties submitted and caused the
approval

of

partial

compromise

agreement.

Under

the

compromise, the parties acknowledged their respective shares in

the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of land.
This includes the remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said
land.

On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of

extrajudicial partition, dividing the remaining land of the first
parcel between them.

Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,620[4]

2,331 square meters of the second parcel of land were
620[4] Docketed as Civil Case No. 11975, CA decision, p. 6.

adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000square meter portion was later divided between petitioner and
respondents.

The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise

agreement executed on August 17, 1994, with respect to Civil
Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted the supplemental
compromise agreement, which was approved accordingly.
Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts
in August 1994. Under the contracts, the parties equally divided
between them the third and fourth parcels of land.

In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed

as Civil Case No. 95-135, against respondents before the court a
quo with the following causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity
of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d)
reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and damages. The
complaint was raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.

In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage

between his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a
nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He

likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the

natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.

Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he

entered into with respondent Felicidad with respect to the subject
real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of the
certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He argued
that the properties covered by such certificates of title, including
the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be
reconveyed to him.

Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of

moral

and

exemplary

damages,

attorneys

fees,

litigation

expenses, and costs of suit.

On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer.

They denied the material averments of petitioners complaint.
Respondents contended that the dearth of details regarding the
requisite marriage license did not invalidate Felicidads marriage
to Teofilo. Respondents declared that Teofilo II was the illegitimate
child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with another woman.

On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of

jurisdiction over the subject matter, respondents prayed for the
dismissal of the case before the trial court. They also asked that
their counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorneys fees, be granted.

But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial,

respondents moved for summary judgment. Attached to the
motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace who
solemnized

the

marriage.

Respondents

also

submitted

the

Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate,

the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad were designated
as parents.

On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for

summary judgment on the ground of irregularity of the contract
evidencing the marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodged his
own motion for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a
certification from the Local Civil Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan,
certifying that there is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.

Petitioner

also

incorporated

in

the

counter-motion

for

summary judgment the testimony of respondent Felicidad in

another case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-2384,
entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Pias. In
her testimony, respondent Felicidad narrated that co-respondent
Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo.621[5]

Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa

submitted to the trial court its report and manifestation,
discounting the possibility of collusion between the parties.
RTC and CA Dispositions

On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as

follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants (respondents)

Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiffs (petitioners)
Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and
summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff as follows:

1.Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval

and Teofilo Carlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962,
evidenced by the Marriage Certificate submitted in this case, null and
void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage license;

621[5] Rollo, p. 55.

2.
Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is
not the natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late Teofilo
E. Carlos;
3.
Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to
plaintiff the sum of P18,924,800.00 together with the interest thereon
at the legal rate from date of filing of the instant complaint until fully
paid;

4.
Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the
parcel of land, less the portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
11975, covered by TCT No. 139061 of the Register of Deeds of Makati
City, and ordering said Register of Deeds to cancel said title and to
issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;

5.
Declaring the Contract, Annex K of complaint, between
plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void, and ordering the
Register of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCT No. 139058 in the name
of Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff
herein;

6.
Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint,
between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void;

7.
Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names
of defendant Sandoval and defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and
ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the
exclusive name of plaintiff herein;

8.
Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name
of defendant Sandoval and defendant Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and
ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the
sole name of plaintiff herein.

Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiffs
evidence on his claim for moral damages, exemplary damages,

attorneys fees, appearance fees, and litigation expenses on June 7,

1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.

SO ORDERED.622[6]

Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal,

respondents argued, inter alia, that the trial court acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment
annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in
declaring Teofilo II as not an illegitimate child of Teofilo, Sr.

On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC
ruling, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is

REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new one is entered
REMANDING the case to the court of origin for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.623[7]

The CA opined:
622[6] CA rollo, pp. 48-49.
623[7] Id. at 63.

We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment

by the court a quo contrary to law and public policy as ensconced in
the aforesaid safeguards. The fact that it was appellants who first
sought summary judgment from the trial court, did not justify the grant
thereof in favor of appellee. Not being an action to recover upon a
claim or to obtain a declaratory relief, the rule on summary judgment
apply (sic) to an action to annul a marriage. The mere fact that no
genuine issue was presented and the desire to expedite the disposition
of the case cannot justify a misinterpretation of the rule. The first
paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil Code expressly prohibit the
rendition of decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of
facts or a confession of judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to the
petition for summary judgment practically amount to these methods
explicitly proscribed by the law.

We are not unmindful of appellees argument that the foregoing

safeguards have traditionally been applied to prevent collusion of
spouses in the matter of dissolution of marriages and that the death of
Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had effectively dissolved the marriage
herein impugned. The fact, however, that appellees own brother and
appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together as husband and wife for
thirty years and that the annulment of their marriage is the very
means by which the latter is sought to be deprived of her participation
in the estate left by the former call for a closer and more thorough
inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the case. Rather that the
summary nature by which the court a quo resolved the issues in the
case, the rule is to the effect that the material facts alleged in the
complaint for annulment of marriage should always be proved. Section
1, Rule 19 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an

answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the
court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on
such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or
for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved. (Underscoring supplied)

Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the

rules on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the
record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still
not be warranted. While it may be readily conceded that a valid
marriage license is among the formal requisites of marriage, the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to
Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the Civil Code the failure to
reflect the serial number of the marriage license on the marriage
contract evidencing the marriage between Teofilo Carlos and appellant
Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal as appellee
represents it to be. Aside from the dearth of evidence to the contrary,
appellant Felicidad Sandovals affirmation of the existence of said
marriage license is corroborated by the following statement in the
affidavit executed by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the Peace who
officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:

That as far as I could remember, there was a

marriage license issued at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962
as basis of the said marriage contract executed by Teofilo
Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval, but the number of said
marriage license was inadvertently not placed in the
marriage contract for the reason that it was the Office
Clerk who filled up the blanks in the Marriage Contract
who in turn, may have overlooked the same.

Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We

are of the considered view that the veracity and credibility of the
foregoing statement as well as the motivations underlying the same
should be properly threshed out in a trial of the case on the merits.

If the non-presentation of the marriage contract the primary

evidence of marriage is not proof that a marriage did not take place,
neither should appellants non-presentation of the subject marriage
license be taken as proof that the same was not procured. The burden
of proof to show the nullity of the marriage, it must be emphasized,
rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the validity of the marriage.

Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who
disputes the legitimacy of a particular party, the same may be said of
the trial courts rejection of the relationship between appellant Teofilo
Carlos II and his putative father on the basis of the inconsistencies in
appellant Felicidad Sandovals statements. Although it had effectively
disavowed appellants prior claims regarding the legitimacy of appellant
Teofilo Carlos II, the averment in the answer that he is the illegitimate
son of appellees brother, to Our mind, did not altogether foreclose the
possibility of the said appellants illegitimate filiation, his right to prove
the same or, for that matter, his entitlement to inheritance rights as
such.

Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case,

We find appellees bare allegation that appellant Teofilo Carlos II was
merely purchased from an indigent couple by appellant Felicidad
Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient to support what could well be a
minors total forfeiture of the rights arising from his putative filiation.
Inconsistent though it may be to her previous statements, appellant
Felicidad Sandovals declaration regarding the illegitimate filiation of
Teofilo Carlos II is more credible when considered in the light of the fact
that, during the last eight years of his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said
appellant the use of his name and the shelter of his household. The
least that the trial court could have done in the premises was to
conduct a trial on the merits in order to be able to thoroughly resolve
the issues pertaining to the filiation of appellant Teofilo Carlos II. 624[8]

On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration

and for the inhibition of the ponente, Justice Rebecca De GuiaSalvador. The CA denied the twin motions.

Issues

624[8] Id. at 60-63.

In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following

issues:

1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment

under the Decision, Annex A hereof, and in denying petitioners Motion
for reconsideration under the Resolution, Annex F hereof, with respect
to the nullity of the impugned marriage, petitioner respectfully submits
that the Court of Appeals committed a grave reversible error in
applying Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code, despite the fact that the
circumstances of this case are different from that contemplated and
intended by law, or has otherwise decided a question of substance not
theretofore decided by the Supreme Court, or has decided it in a
manner probably not in accord with law or with the applicable
decisions of this Honorable Court;

2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment

and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the case to the court
of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits
that the Court of Appeals committed a serious reversible error in
applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules of
Court providing for judgment on the pleadings, instead of Rule 35
governing Summary Judgments;

3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment

and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the case to the court
of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits
that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion,
disregarded judicial admissions, made findings on ground of
speculations, surmises, and conjectures, or otherwise committed
misapplications of the laws and misapprehension of the facts.625[9]
(Underscoring supplied)

625[9] Rollo, pp. 24-25.

Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage

may be declared void ab initio through a judgment on the
pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a
trial. But there are other procedural issues, including the capacity
of one who is not a spouse in bringing the action for nullity of
marriage.

Our Ruling

I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be

proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed.
So is confession of judgment disallowed.

Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 19 626[10] of the Revised

Rules of Court, which provides:

626[10] Rules of Civil Procedure (1997), Rule 34, Sec. 1.SECTION 1. Judgment on the
pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse partys pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct
judgment on such pleading. However, in actions for declaration of nullity or annulment
of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall
always be proved.

SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender

an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse partys
pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such
pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.

He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court
governing summary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings.

Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the
provisions of the Rule on judgment on the pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial
court, the CA likewise considered the provisions on summary judgments, to wit:

Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules on

summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the
finding of the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. x x x627[11]

But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the

CA was correct in reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court.
Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no
place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment
of marriage.
627[11] CA rollo, p. 61.

With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as Rule on Declaration of

Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the
question on the application of summary judgments or even judgment on the
pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of marriage has been stamped with
clarity. The significant principle laid down by the said Rule, which took effect on
March 15, 2003628[12] is found in Section 17, viz.:

SEC. 17. Trial. (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial
of the case. No delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except
as to matters involving property relations of the spouses.

(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of

marriage must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or
confession of judgment shall be allowed. (Underscoring supplied)

Likewise instructive is the Courts pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.629

[13] In that case, We excluded actions for nullity or annulment of marriage from
the application of summary judgments.

628[12] Sec. 25. Effectivity. This Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003 following
its publication in a newspaper of general circulation not later than March 7, 2003.
629[13] G.R. No. 152154, November 18, 2003, 416 SCRA 133, citing Family Code,
Arts. 48 & 60, and Roque v. Encarnacion, 96 Phil. 643 (1954).

Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of marriage

or declaration of its nullity or for legal separation, summary judgment is
applicable to all kinds of actions.630[14] (Underscoring supplied)

By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of
its lawful right and duty to intervene in the case. The participation of the State is
not terminated by the declaration of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists
between the parties. The State should have been given the opportunity to present
controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered.631[15]

Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the
prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage when
the public prosecutor sees to it that there is no suppression of evidence.
Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of evidence, the public prosecutor
has to make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid down before the court is
not fabricated.

630[14] Republic v. Sandiganbayan, id. at 143.

631[15] Republic v. Cuison-Melgar, G.R. No. 139676, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 177,
citing Malcampo-Sin v. Sin, G.R. No. 137590, March 26, 2001, 355 SCRA 285, 289,
and Republic v. Dagdag, G.R. No. 109975, February 9, 2001, 351 SCRA 425, 435.

To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the

Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of
the public prosecutor, viz.:

SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. (a) x x x

(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public

prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on the merits to prevent
suppression or fabrication of evidence. (Underscoring supplied)

Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor
General will ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in
proceedings for declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing the fabrication or
suppression of evidence.632[16]

II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be

filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases
commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages
celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.

632[16] Id. at 187-188, citing Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, September 21,
2005, 470 SCRA 508, 529, and Ancheta v. Ancheta, G.R. No. 145370, March 4, 2004,
424 SCRA 725, 740.

Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and

Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it
exclusively a right of the spouses by stating:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.

(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (Underscoring supplied)

Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to
file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of
the Rule is enlightening, viz.:

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of

voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such
petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the
State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the
petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death
of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of
the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the
concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution. 633[17]
(Underscoring supplied)
633[17] Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli, G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007,
534 SCRA 418, 429, citing Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable
Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation
and Provisional Orders.

The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole
architects of a healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who can
decide when and how to build the foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are
the engineers of their marital life. They are simultaneously the directors and actors
of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can and should decide
when to take a cut, but only in accordance with the grounds allowed by law.

The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a

demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those
solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into
during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. 634
[18]

The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages

marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to
bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never
intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights.

While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of

absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does
634[18] Id. at 427-428, citing Modequillo v. Brava, G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990,
185 SCRA 766, 772. (Note in the citation omitted.)

not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the
law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of
the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the
validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of
nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.635[19]

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already
commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the
coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective
on March 15, 2003636[20] is prospective in its application. Thus, the Court held in
Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,637[21] viz.:

635[19] Id. at 429-430.

636[20] A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages.SEC. 25. Effectivity. This Rule shall take effect on March 15,
2003 following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation not later than March 7,
2003.

637[21] Supra note 17.

As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under

the Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its application.638[22]
(Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent

Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962.
Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took place.639[23]

The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time
of its celebration.640[24] But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action
to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action
for the declaration of nullity of marriage?

We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code

cannot be construed as a license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage
case. Such person must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. 641[25]
Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in
638[22] Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli, id. at 428.
639[23] Malang v. Moson, G.R. No. 119064, August 22, 2000, 338 SCRA 393.
640[24] See Republic v. Dayot, G.R. No. 175581, and Tecson-Dayot v. Dayot, G.R.
No. 179474, March 28, 2008; Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 167746, August 28,
2007, 531 SCRA 446.

procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of
the real party-in-interest.642[26]

Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest
in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from
mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One
having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as
plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, the case is
dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.643[27]

641[25] Republic v. Agunoy, Sr., G.R. No. 155394, February 17, 2005, 451 SCRA 735,
746.
642[26] Oco v. Limbaring, G.R. No. 161298, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 348.
643[27] Id. at 358, citing Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 152574,
November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 507, 521; Pascual v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
115925, August 15, 2003, 409 SCRA 105, 117; and Bank of America NT & SA v.
Court of Appeals, 448 Phil. 181, 194-195 (2003); Borlongan v. Madrideo, 380 Phil.
215, 224 (2000); Mathay v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 466, 482 (1999); Ralla v.
Ralla, G.R. No. 78646, July 23, 1991, 199 SCRA 495, 499; Rebollido v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 81123, February 28, 1989, 170 SCRA 800, 806; Chua v. Torres,
G.R. No. 151900, August 30, 2005, 468 SCRA 358, citing Tan v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 127210, August 7, 2003, 408 SCRA 470, 475-76; citing in turn University of
the Philippines Board of Regents v. Ligot-Telan, G.R. No. 110280, October 21, 1993,
227 SCRA 342, 355; Ralla v. Ralla, supra; Rebollido v. Court of Appeals, supra;
Shipside, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143377, February 20, 2001, 352 SCRA
334, 346, in turn citing Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. Nos. 84197 & 84157, July 18, 1989, 175 SCRA 668.

Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of

Appeals,644[28] where the Court held:

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the
respondents were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific
provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however,
only a party who can demonstrate proper interest can file the same. A petition to
declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest and must be based on a cause of
action. Thus, in Nial v. Badayog, the Court held that the children have the
personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased
father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.

xxxx

In fine, petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of

marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and
the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for
reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent
Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted
the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree
was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlandos remarriage, then
the trial court should declare respondents marriage as bigamous and void ab initio
but reduced the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and
exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is
proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to
remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of
marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal
personality to file the same.645[29] (Underscoring supplied)
644[28] G.R. No. 167109, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 607, citing RULES OF COURT,
Rule 3, Sec. 2, Rule 2, Sec. 1; Nial v. Badayog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000,
328 SCRA 122.

III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner

is a real-party-in-interest to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in
controversy.

In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his
only surviving compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II.
Under the law on succession, successional rights are transmitted from the moment
of death of the decedent and the compulsory heirs are called to succeed by
operation of law.646[30]

Upon Teofilos death in 1992, all his property, rights and

obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance are
transmitted

to

his

compulsory

heirs.

These

heirs

were

respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and

child, respectively.

Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:

645[29] Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals, id. at 614-615.

646[30] Rabadilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113725, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA
522.

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents
and ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to
their legitimate children and descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.647[31]

Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although
a collateral relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a
compulsory heir, he still has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003
of the New Civil Code provide:

647[31] Paragraphs 4 & 5 are no longer controlling. The distinctions among different
classes of illegitimate children under the Civil Code have been removed. All of them
fall in the category of illegitimate children, as provided under Article 165 of the Family
Code:Article 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are
illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in this Code.

ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and
the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children,

or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of
the deceased in accordance with the following articles. (Underscoring supplied)

Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children

excludes collateral relatives from succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The
presence of legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the deceased
precludes succession by collateral relatives.648[32] Conversely, if there are no
descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent.649[33]

If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the

legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner would then have a
personality to seek the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent
Felicidad. This is so, considering that collateral relatives, like a brother and sister,
acquire successional right over the estate if the decedent dies without issue and
without ascendants in the direct line.
648[32] See Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117740, October 30, 1998, 298
SCRA 322; see also Reyes v. Sotero, G.R. No. 167405, February 16, 2006, 482 SCRA
520; Pedrosa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118680, March 5, 2001, 353 SCRA 620;
Heirs of Ignacio Conti v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118464, December 21, 1998, 300
SCRA 345.
649[33] Heirs of Ignacio Conti v. Court of Appeals, supra.

The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no
other siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not
a legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other
half of the estate of his brother, the first half being allotted to the widow pursuant
to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes petitioner a real-party-interest
to seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with
respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio,
petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.

It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring

the nullity of marriage case is contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo II
is not a legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.

If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son

of Teofilo, then petitioner has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of marriage
of his deceased brother and respondent Felicidad. This is based on the ground that
he has no successional right to be protected, hence, does not have proper interest.
For although the marriage in controversy may be found to be void from the
beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit. This is because the presence of

descendant, illegitimate,650[34] or even an adopted child651[35] excludes the

collateral relatives from inheriting from the decedent.

Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to
determine the validity or nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But the RTC
is strictly instructed to dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of
action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate, illegitimate, or
legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner.

IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent

Teofilo II is proper and in order. There is a need to vacate the disposition of
the trial court as to the other causes of action before it.

Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on the
remand of the case concerning the filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This
notwithstanding, We should not leave the matter hanging in limbo.

650[34] Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, supra note 32.

651[35] Reyes v. Sotero, supra note 32; Pedrosa v. Court of Appeals, supra note 32.

This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or
assigned as error by the parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a
just resolution of the case.652[36]

We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the
case, petitioners bare allegation that respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an
indigent couple is insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his
putative filiation. However, We are not inclined to support its pronouncement that
the declaration of respondent Felicidad as to the illegitimate filiation of respondent
Teofilo II is more credible. For the guidance of the appellate court, such
declaration of respondent Felicidad should not be afforded credence. We remind
the CA of the guaranty provided by Article 167 of the Family Code to protect the
status of legitimacy of a child, to wit:

ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the

mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as
an adulteress. (Underscoring supplied)

It is stressed that Felicidads declaration against the legitimate status of

Teofilo II is the very act that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The
language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the
652[36] Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Brion, G.R. Nos. 157696-97, February 9,
2006, 482 SCRA 87, citing Sociedad Europea de Financiacion, S.A. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 75787, January 21, 1991, 193 SCRA 105, 114, citing in turn Saura
Import & Export Co., Inc. v. Philippine International Co., Inc., 118 Phil. 150, 156
(1963); and Miguel v. Court of Appeals, 140 Phil. 304, 312 (1969).

legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived
within a valid marriage.653[37]

Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of action
concerning reconveyance, recovery of property, and sum of money must be
vacated. This has to be so, as said disposition was made on the basis of its finding
that the marriage in controversy was null and void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:

1.

The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the

action on the status and filiation of respondent Teofilo Carlos II and
the validity or nullity of marriage between respondent Felicidad
Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;

2.

If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or

legally adopted son of the late Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is strictly
INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action for nullity of marriage for
lack of cause of action;

653[37] Concepcion v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005, 468
SCRA 438.

3.

The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision is

VACATED AND SET ASIDE.

The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with
dispatch and to give this case priority in its calendar.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been

reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and

the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the

conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in

consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

FIRST DIVISION

MANUEL L. LEE,

A.C. No. 5281

Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
-versus-

CORONA,

AZCUNA and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

ATTY. REGINO B. TAMBAGO,

Respondent.

Promulgated:
February 12, 2008

x------------------------------------------ - - - - - - - -x

RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:

In a letter-complaint dated April 10, 2000, complainant

Manuel L. Lee charged respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago with
violation of the Notarial Law and the ethics of the legal profession
for notarizing a spurious last will and testament.

In his complaint, complainant averred that his father, the

decedent Vicente Lee, Sr., never executed the contested will.

Furthermore, the spurious will contained the forged signatures of

Cayetano Noynay and Loreto Grajo, the purported witnesses to its
execution.

In the said will, the decedent supposedly bequeathed his

entire estate to his wife Lim Hock Lee, save for a parcel of land
which he devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee, half-siblings of
complainant.

The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before

respondent on June 30, 1965.654[1] Complainant, however, pointed
out that the residence certificate655[2] of the testator noted in the
acknowledgment of the will was dated January 5, 1962. 656[3]
Furthermore, the signature of the testator was not the same as
his signature as donor in a deed of donation 657[4] (containing his
654[1] Rollo, p. 3.
655[2] Now known as Community Tax Certificate.
656[3] Page two, Last Will and Testament of Vicente Lee, Sr., rollo, p. 3.
657[4] Id., p. 10.

purported genuine signature). Complainant averred that the

signatures of his deceased father in the will and in the deed of
donation were in any way (sic) entirely and diametrically opposed
from (sic) one another in all angle[s]. 658[5]

Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the

residence certificates of the purported witnesses Noynay and
Grajo. He alleged that their signatures had likewise been forged
and merely copied from their respective voters affidavits.

Complainant further asserted that no copy of such purported

will was on file in the archives division of the Records
Management and Archives Office of the National Commission for
Culture and the Arts (NCCA). In this connection, the certification of
the chief of the archives division dated September 19, 1999
stated:

658[5] Id., p. 1.

Doc. 14, Page No. 4, Book No. 1, Series of 1965 refers to an AFFIDAVIT
executed by BARTOLOME RAMIREZ on June 30, 1965 and is available in
this Office[s] files.659[6]

Respondent in his comment dated July 6, 2001 claimed that

the complaint against him contained false allegations: (1) that
complainant was a son of the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr. and (2)
that the will in question was fake and spurious. He alleged that
complainant was not a legitimate son of Vicente Lee, Sr. and the
last will and testament was validly executed and actually
notarized by respondent per affidavit660[7] of Gloria Nebato,
common-law wife of Vicente Lee, Sr. and corroborated by the joint
affidavit661[8] of the children of Vicente Lee, Sr., namely Elena N.
Lee and Vicente N. Lee, Jr. xxx.662[9]

659[6] Rollo, p. 9.
660[7] Dated July 11, 2001. Id., p. 94.
661[8] Dated July 11, 2001. Id., p. 95.
662[9] Id., p. 90.

Respondent further stated that the complaint was filed

simply to harass him because the criminal case filed by
complainant against him in the Office of the Ombudsman did not
prosper.

Respondent did not dispute complainants contention that no

copy of the will was on file in the archives division of the NCCA.
He claimed that no copy of the contested will could be found
there because none was filed.

Lastly, respondent pointed out that complainant had no valid

cause of action against him as he (complainant) did not first file
an action for the declaration of nullity of the will and demand his
share in the inheritance.

In a resolution dated October 17, 2001, the Court referred

the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. 663[10]
663[10] Rollo, p. 107.

In

his

report,

the

investigating

commissioner

found

respondent guilty of violation of pertinent provisions of the old

Notarial Law as found in the Revised Administrative Code. The
violation constituted an infringement of legal ethics, particularly
Canon 1664[11] and Rule 1.01665[12] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).666[13] Thus, the investigating commissioner
of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the
suspension of respondent for a period of three months.

The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006285 dated May 26, 2006, resolved:

[T]o ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,

with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation
664[11] CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS
OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
665[12] Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
666[13] Annex A, Report and Recommendation by Commissioner Elpidio G. Soriano
III, dated February 27 2006. Rollo, p. 13.

fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and considering Respondents failure to comply with the laws in
the discharge of his function as a notary public, Atty. Regino B.
Tambago is hereby suspended from the practice of law for one year
and Respondents notarial commission is Revoked and Disqualified
from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2) years. 667[14]

We affirm with modification.

A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the

formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the
disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death. 668[15] A will
may either be notarial or holographic.

The law provides for certain formalities that must be

followed in the execution of wills. The object of solemnities
surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door on bad faith

667[14] Notice of Resolution, IBP Board of Governors. (Emphasis in the original)

668[15] CIVIL CODE, Art. 783.

and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to

guarantee their truth and authenticity.669[16]

A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required

by law to be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself.
In addition, it should be attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one
another.670[17]

The will in question was attested by only two witnesses,

Noynay and Grajo. On this circumstance alone, the will must be
considered void.671[18] This is in consonance with the rule that acts
executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws
shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.

669[16] Jurado, Desiderio P., COMMENTS AND JURISPRUDENCE ON SUCCESSION, 8th

ed. (1991), Rex Bookstore, Inc., p. 52. In re: Will of Tan Diuco, 45 Phil. 807 (1924);
Unson v. Abella, 43 Phil. 494 (1922); Aldaba v. Roque, 43 Phil. 379 (1922); Avera v.
Garcia, 42 Phil. 145 (1921); Abangan v. Abangan, 40 Phil. 476 (1919).
670[17] CIVIL CODE, Art. 804.
671[18] CIVIL CODE, Art. 5.

The Civil Code likewise requires that a will must be

acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses.672[19] The importance of this requirement is highlighted
by the fact that it was segregated from the other requirements
under Article 805 and embodied in a distinct and separate
provision.673[20]

An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a

deed in going before some competent officer or court and
declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step
undertaken whereby the signatory actually declares to the notary
public that the same is his or her own free act and deed. 674[21] The
acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1) to
safeguard the testators wishes long after his demise and (2) to

672[19] CIVIL CODE, Art. 806.

673[20] Azuela v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122880, 12 April 2006, 487 SCRA 142.
674[21] Id.

assure that his estate is administered in the manner that he

intends it to be done.

A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in

question shows that this particular requirement was neither
strictly nor substantially complied with. For one, there was the
conspicuous absence of a notation of the residence certificates of
the notarial witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the acknowledgment.
Similarly, the notation of the testators old residence certificate in
the same acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These
omissions by respondent invalidated the will.

As

the

acknowledging

officer

of

the

contested

will,

respondent was required to faithfully observe the formalities of a

will and those of notarization. As we held in Santiago v.
Rafanan:675[22]

The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of

notaries public. They are required to certify that the party to every
675[22] A.C. No. 6252, 5 October 2004, 440 SCRA 98.

document acknowledged before him had presented the proper

residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to
enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification .

These formalities are mandatory and cannot be disregarded,

considering the degree of importance and evidentiary weight
attached to notarized documents.676[23] A notary public, especially
a lawyer,677[24] is bound to strictly observe these elementary
requirements.

The Notarial Law then in force required the exhibition of the

residence

certificate

upon

notarization

of

document

or

instrument:

Section 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of [cedula] residence tax.

Every contract, deed, or other document acknowledged before a notary public
shall have certified thereon that the parties thereto have presented their proper
676[23] Santiago v. Rafanan, id., at 99.
677[24] Under the old Notarial Law, non-lawyers may be commissioned as notaries
public subject to certain conditions. Under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (A.M.
No. 02-8-13-SC, effective August 1, 2004), however, only lawyers may be granted a
notarial commission.

[cedula] residence certificate or are exempt from the [cedula] residence tax, and
there shall be entered by the notary public as a part of such certificate the number,
place of issue, and date of each [cedula] residence certificate as aforesaid.678[25]

The importance of such act was further reiterated by Section

6 of the Residence Tax Act679[26] which stated:

When a person liable to the taxes prescribed in this Act acknowledges any
document before a notary public xxx it shall be the duty of such person xxx with
whom such transaction is had or business done, to require the exhibition of the
residence certificate showing payment of the residence taxes by such person xxx.

In the issuance of a residence certificate, the law seeks to

establish the true and correct identity of the person to whom it is
issued, as well as the payment of residence taxes for the current
year. By having allowed decedent to exhibit an expired residence
certificate, respondent failed to comply with the requirements of
both the old Notarial Law and the Residence Tax Act. As much
678[25] REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, Book I, Title IV, Chapter 11, Sec. 251.
679[26] Commonwealth Act No. 465.

could be said of his failure to demand the exhibition of the

residence certificates of Noynay and Grajo.

On the issue of whether respondent was under the legal

obligation to furnish a copy of the notarized will to the archives
division, Article 806 provides:

Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary

public by the testator and the witness. The notary public shall not
be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the
office of the Clerk of Court. (emphasis supplied)

Respondents failure, inadvertent or not, to file in the archives

division a copy of the notarized will was therefore not a cause for
disciplinary action.

Nevertheless, respondent should be faulted for having failed

to make the necessary entries pertaining to the will in his notarial

register. The old Notarial Law required the entry of the following
matters in the notarial register, in chronological order:

1.

nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged

before him;

2.

person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument;

3.

witnesses, if any, to the signature;

4.

date of execution, oath, or acknowledgment of the instrument;

5.

fees collected by him for his services as notary;

6.

give each entry a consecutive number; and

7.

if the instrument is a contract, a brief description of the substance

of the instrument.680[27]

In an effort to prove that he had complied with the

abovementioned rule, respondent contended that he had crossed
out a prior entry and entered instead the will of the decedent. As
proof, he presented a photocopy of his notarial register. To
reinforce

his

claim,

he

presented

photocopy

of

680[27] REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, Book I, Title IV, Chapter 11, Sec. 246.

certification681[28] stating that the archives division had no copy of

the affidavit of Bartolome Ramirez.

A photocopy is a mere secondary evidence. It is not

admissible unless it is shown that the original is unavailable. The
proponent must first prove the existence and cause of the
unavailability of the original, 682[29] otherwise, the evidence
presented

will

not

be

admitted.

Thus,

the

photocopy

of

respondents notarial register was not admissible as evidence of

the entry of the execution of the will because it failed to comply
with the requirements for the admissibility of secondary evidence.

In the same vein, respondents attempt to controvert the

certification dated September 21, 1999683[30] must fail. Not only
681[28] Dated March 15, 2000. Rollo, p. 105.
682[29] When the original document is unavailable. When the original document has
been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its
execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his
part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. RULES OF
COURT, Rule 130, Sec. 5.
683[30] Supra note 6.

did he present a mere photocopy of the certification dated March

15, 2000;684[31] its contents did not squarely prove the fact of
entry of the contested will in his notarial register.

Notaries public must observe with utmost care 685[32] and

utmost fidelity the basic requirements in the performance of their
duties, otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of
notarized deeds will be undermined.686[33]

Defects in the observance of the solemnities prescribed by

law render the entire will invalid. This carelessness cannot be
taken lightly in view of the importance and delicate nature of a
will, considering that the testator and the witnesses, as in this
case, are no longer alive to identify the instrument and to confirm
its

contents.687[34]

Accordingly,

respondent

must

be

684[31] Rollo, p. 105.

685[32] Bon v. Ziga, A.C. No. 5436, 27 May 2004, 429 SCRA 185.
686[33] Zaballero v. Montalvan, A.C. No. 4370, 25 May 2004, 429 SCRA 78.

held

accountable for his acts. The validity of the will was seriously
compromised as a consequence of his breach of duty. 688[35]

In this connection, Section 249 of the old Notarial Law

provided:

Grounds for revocation of commission. The following derelictions of

duty on the part of a notary public shall, in the discretion of the proper
judge of first instance, be sufficient ground for the revocation of his
commission:

xxx

(b)

xxx

The failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in

his notarial register touching his notarial acts in the manner
required by law.

xxx

(f)

xxx

xxx

xxx

The failure of the notary to make the proper notation regarding

cedula certificates.689[36]

687[34] Annex A, Report and Recommendation by Commissioner Elpidio G. Soriano

III, dated February 27, 2006, rollo, p. 12
688[35] Id., p. 13.

These gross violations of the law also made respondent

liable for violation of his oath as a lawyer and constituted
transgressions of Section 20 (a), Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court690[37] and Canon 1691[38] and Rule 1.01692[39] of the CPR.

The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain

allegiance

to

the Republic of the Philippines,

uphold the

Constitution and obey the laws of the land.693[40] For a lawyer is

the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which
689[36]REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, Book 1, Title IV, Chapter 11.

690[37] Duties of attorneys. It is the duty of an attorney:(a) To maintain

allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution
and obey the laws of the Philippines;
(b) Xxx, RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Sec. 20, par. (a).

691[38] CANON 1, supra note 11.

692[39] Rule 1.01, supra note 12.
693[40] Montecillo v. Gica, 158 Phil. 443 (1974). Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. No. L79690-707, 7 October 1988, 166 SCRA 316.

society

has

entrusted

the

administration

of

law

and

the

dispensation of justice.694[41]

While the duty to uphold the Constitution and obey the law is
an obligation imposed on every citizen, a lawyer assumes
responsibilities well beyond the basic requirements of good
citizenship. As a servant of the law, a lawyer should moreover
make himself an example for others to emulate. 695[42] Being a
lawyer, he is supposed to be a model in the community in so far
as respect for the law is concerned. 696[43]

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. 697

[44]

A breach of these conditions justifies disciplinary action

against the erring lawyer. A disciplinary sanction is imposed on a

694[41] Agpalo, Ruben E., LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, 7th Edition (2002), Rex
Bookstore, Inc., p. 69. Comments of IBP Committee that drafted the Code of
Professional Responsibility, pp. 1-2 (1980).
695[42]Id.
696[43] Id.
697[44] Agpalo, Ruben E., LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, 7th Edition (2002), Rex
Bookstore, Inc., p. 465.

lawyer upon a finding or acknowledgment that he has engaged in

professional misconduct.698[45] These sanctions meted out to
errant lawyers include disbarment, suspension and reprimand.

Disbarment

is

the

most

severe

form

of

disciplinary

sanction.699[46] We have held in a number of cases that the power

to disbar must be exercised with great caution 700[47] and should
not be decreed if any punishment less severe such as reprimand,
suspension, or fine will accomplish the end desired. 701[48] The rule
then is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court.702[49]

698[45] Guidelines for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline.
699[46] San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Romanillos, A.C. No. 5580, 15 June
2005, 460 SCRA 105.
700[47] Santiago v Rafanan, supra note 22 at 101. Alitagtag v. Garcia, A.C. No.
4738, 10 June 2003, 403 SCRA 335.
701[48] Suzuki v. Tiamson, A.C. No. 6542, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 140;
Amaya v. Tecson, A.C. No. 5996, 7 February 2005, 450 SCRA 510, 516.
702[49] Bantolo v. Castillon, Jr., A.C. No. 6589, 19 December 2005, 478 SCRA 449.

Respondent, as notary public, evidently failed in the

performance of the elementary duties of his office. Contrary to his
claims that he exercised his duties as Notary Public with due care
and with due regard to the provision of existing law and had
complied with the elementary formalities in the performance of
his duties xxx, we find that he acted very irresponsibly in
notarizing the will in question. Such recklessness warrants the
less severe punishment of suspension from the practice of law. It
is,

as

well,

commission703[50]

sufficient
and

his

basis

for

perpetual

the

revocation

of

his

disqualification

to

be

commissioned as a notary public.704[51]

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby

found guilty of professional misconduct. He violated (1) the
Lawyers Oath; (2) Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; (3) Canon 1 and
703[50] Cabanilla v. Cristal-Tenorio, A.C. No. 6139, 11 November 2003, 415 SCRA
361. Guerrero v. Hernando, 160-A Phil. 725 (1975).
704[51] Tan Tiong Bio v. Gonzales, A.C. No. 6634, 23 August 2007.

Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; (4) Art. 806 of

the Civil Code and (5) the provisions of the old Notarial Law.

Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby SUSPENDED from the

practice of law for one year and his notarial commission
REVOKED. Because he has not lived up to the trustworthiness
expected of him as a notary public and as an officer of the court,
he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a
notary public.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all the courts of

the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of
the Bar Confidant, as well as made part of the personal records of
respondent.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

SECOND DIVISION

PAZ SAMANIEGO-CELADA,

G.R. No. 145545

Petitioner,
Present:

- versus -

QUISUMBING,
Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.

LUCIA D. ABENA,

Promulgated:

J.,

Respondent.
June 30, 2008
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure seeking to reverse the Decision 705[1] dated
October 13, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
41756, which affirmed the Decision706[2] dated March 2, 1993 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 66, Makati City. The RTC had
declared the last will and testament of Margarita S. Mayores
probated and designated respondent Lucia D. Abena as the
executor of her will. It also ordered the issuance of letters
testamentary in favor of respondent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Paz Samaniego-Celada was the first cousin of
decedent Margarita S. Mayores (Margarita) while respondent was
705[1] Rollo, pp. 41-48. Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., with Associate
Justices Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. and Eliezer R. delos Santos concurring.
706[2] Id. at 34-40. Penned by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr.

the decedents lifelong companion since 1929.

On April 27, 1987, Margarita died single and without any
ascending nor descending heirs as her parents, grandparents and
siblings predeceased her. She was survived by her first cousins
Catalina

Samaniego-Bombay,

Manuelita

Samaniego

Sajonia,

Feliza Samaniego, and petitioner.

Before her death, Margarita executed a Last Will and
Testament707[3] on February 2, 1987 where she bequeathed onehalf of her undivided share of a real property located at Singalong
Manila, consisting of 209.8 square meters, and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1343 to respondent, Norma
A. Pahingalo, and Florentino M. Abena in equal shares or one-third
portion each. She likewise bequeathed one-half of her undivided
share of a real property located at San Antonio Village, Makati,
consisting of 225 square meters, and covered by TCT No. 68920
to respondent, Isabelo M. Abena, and Amanda M. Abena in equal
shares or one-third portion each. Margarita also left all her
personal properties to respondent whom she likewise designated
as sole executor of her will.
On August 11, 1987, petitioner filed a petition for letters of
administration of the estate of Margarita before the RTC of Makati.
The case was docketed as SP Proc. No. M-1531.

707[3] Id. at 31-33.

On October 27, 1987, respondent filed a petition for probate

of the will of Margarita before the RTC of Makati. The case was
docketed as SP Proc. No. M-1607 and consolidated with SP Proc.
No. M-1531.
On March 2, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the
last will and testament of Margarita probated and respondent as
the executor of the will. The dispositive portion of the decision
states:
In view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1)

declaring the will as probated;

2)

declaring Lucia Abena as the executor of the will who will

serve as such without a bond as stated in paragraph VI of the
probated will;

3)

ordering the issuance of letters testamentary in favor of

Lucia Abena.

So ordered.708[4]

Petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals.

But the Court of Appeals, in a decision dated October 13, 2000,
affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. The dispositive portion of the
Court of Appeals decision states:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the appeal
having no merit in fact and in law, is hereby ORDERED DISMISSED
and the appealed Decision of the trial court AFFIRMED IN TOTO, with
cost to oppositors-appellants.
708[4] Id. at 40.

SO ORDERED.709[5]

Hence, the instant petition citing the following issues:

I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN NOT INVALIDATING THE WILL SINCE IT DID NOT CONFORM TO
THE FORMALITIES REQUIRED BY LAW;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED ERROR IN NOT
INVALIDATING THE WILL BECAUSE IT WAS PROCURED THROUGH
UNDUE INFLUENCE AND PRESSURE[;] AND
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING PETITIONER, HER SIBLINGS AND COUSIN AS THE LEGAL
HEIRS OF MARGARITA S. MAYORES AND IN NOT ISSUING LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION TO HER.710[6]

Briefly stated, the issues are (1) whether the Court of

Appeals erred in not declaring the will invalid for failure to comply
with the formalities required by law, (2) whether said court erred
in not declaring the will invalid because it was procured through
undue influence and pressure, and (3) whether it erred in not
declaring petitioner and her siblings as the legal heirs of
Margarita, and in not issuing letters of administration to
petitioner.
709[5] Id. at 47.
710[6] Id. at 85.

Petitioner, in her Memorandum,711[7] argues that Margaritas

will failed to comply with the formalities required under Article
805712[8] of the Civil Code because the will was not signed by the
testator in the presence of the instrumental witnesses and in the
presence of one another. She also argues that the signatures of
the testator on pages A, B, and C of the will are not the same or
similar, indicating that they were not signed on the same day. She
further argues that the will was procured through undue influence
and pressure because at the time of execution of the will,
Margarita was weak, sickly, jobless and entirely dependent upon
respondent and her nephews for support, and these alleged
handicaps allegedly affected her freedom and willpower to decide
on her own. Petitioner thus concludes that Margaritas total
711[7] Id. at 82-102.

712[8] Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end
thereof by the testator himself or by the testators name written by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.The testator or the person
requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign,
as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages
shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the
fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to
write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and
that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to
them.

dependence on respondent and her nephews compelled her to

sign the will. Petitioner likewise argues that the Court of Appeals
should have declared her and her siblings as the legal heirs of
Margarita since they are her only living collateral relatives in
accordance with Articles 1009713[9] and 1010714[10] of the Civil
Code.
Respondent, for her part, argues in her Memorandum 715[11]
that the petition for review raises questions of fact, not of law and
as a rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and
conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme
Court. She also points out that although the Court of Appeals at
the outset opined there was no compelling reason to review the
petition, the Court of Appeals proceeded to tackle the assigned
errors and rule that the will was validly executed, sustaining the
findings of the trial court that the formalities required by law were
duly complied with. The Court of Appeals also concurred with the
findings of the trial court that the testator, Margarita, was of

713[9] Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters nor children of brothers or
sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate. The latter shall succeed
without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole
blood.

714[10] Art. 1010. The right to inherit ab intestato shall not extend beyond the fifth
degree of relationship in the collateral line.
715[11] Rollo, pp. 108-111.

sound mind when she executed the will.

After careful consideration of the parties contentions, we rule
in favor of respondent.
We find that the issues raised by petitioner concern pure
questions of fact, which may not be the subject of a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The issues that petitioner is raising now i.e., whether or not
the will was signed by the testator in the presence of the
witnesses and of one another, whether or not the signatures of
the witnesses on the pages of the will were signed on the same
day, and whether or not undue influence was exerted upon the
testator which compelled her to sign the will, are all questions of
fact.
This Court does not resolve questions of fact in a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section
1716[12] of Rule 45 limits this Courts review to questions of law
only.
Well-settled is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier
of facts. When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of
716[12] SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal
by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by
law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The
petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.

fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the

parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls
under any of the following recognized exceptions:
(1)

When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,

surmises and conjectures;

(2)

When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or

impossible;

(3)

Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;

(4)

When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(5)

When the findings of fact are conflicting;

(6)

When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond

the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions
of both appellant and appellee;

(7)

When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;

(8)

When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of

specific evidence on which they are based;

(9)

When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the

petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record.717[13]

We find that this case does not involve any of the

abovementioned exceptions.
Nonetheless, a review of the findings of the RTC as upheld by
717[13] Ontimare, Jr. v. Elep, G.R. No. 159224, January 20, 2006, 479 SCRA 257,
265.

the Court of Appeals, reveal that petitioners arguments lack basis.

The RTC correctly held:
With [regard] to the contention of the oppositors [Paz
Samaniego-Celada, et al.] that the testator [Margarita Mayores] was
not mentally capable of making a will at the time of the execution
thereof, the same is without merit. The oppositors failed to establish,
by preponderance of evidence, said allegation and contradict the
presumption that the testator was of sound mind (See Article 800 of
the Civil Code). In fact, witness for the oppositors, Dr. Ramon
Lamberte, who, in some occasions, attended to the testator months
before her death, testified that Margarita Mayores could engage in a
normal conversation and he even stated that the illness of the testator
does not warrant hospitalization. Not one of the oppositors witnesses
has mentioned any instance that they observed act/s of the testator
during her lifetime that could be construed as a manifestation of
mental incapacity. The testator may be admitted to be physically weak
but it does not necessarily follow that she was not of sound mind. [The]
testimonies of contestant witnesses are pure aforethought.
Anent the contestants submission that the will is fatally
defective for the reason that its attestation clause states that the will is
composed of three (3) pages while in truth and in fact, the will consists
of two (2) pages only because the attestation is not a part of the
notarial will, the same is not accurate. While it is true that the
attestation clause is not a part of the will, the court, after examining
the totality of the will, is of the considered opinion that error in the
number of pages of the will as stated in the attestation clause is not
material to invalidate the subject will. It must be noted that the subject
instrument is consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and C which is a
sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an omission of some of the
pages. The error must have been brought about by the honest belief
that the will is the whole instrument consisting of three (3) pages
inclusive of the attestation clause and the acknowledgement. The
position of the court is in consonance with the doctrine of liberal
interpretation enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code which
reads:
In the absence of bad faith, forgery or fraud, or
undue [and] improper pressure and influence,
defects and imperfections in the form of
attestation or in the language used therein shall

not render the will invalid if it is proved that the

will was in fact executed and attested in
substantial compliance with all the requirements of
Article 805.
The court also rejects the contention of the oppositors that the
signatures of the testator were affixed on different occasions based on
their observation that the signature on the first page is allegedly
different in size, texture and appearance as compared with the
signatures in the succeeding pages. After examination of the
signatures, the court does not share the same observation as the
oppositors. The picture (Exhibit H-3) shows that the testator was
affixing her signature in the presence of the instrumental witnesses
and the notary. There is no evidence to show that the first signature
was procured earlier than February 2, 1987.
Finally, the court finds that no pressure nor undue influence was
exerted on the testator to execute the subject will. In fact, the picture
reveals that the testator was in a good mood and smiling with the
other witnesses while executing the subject will (See Exhibit H).
In fine, the court finds that the testator was mentally capable of
making the will at the time of its execution, that the notarial will
presented to the court is the same notarial will that was executed and
that all the formal requirements (See Article 805 of the Civil Code) in
the execution of a will have been substantially complied with in the
subject notarial will.718[14] (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, we find no reason to disturb the abovementioned

findings of the RTC. Since, petitioner and her siblings are not
compulsory heirs of the decedent under Article 887 719[15] of the
718[14] Rollo, pp. 38-40.

719[15] Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs: (1) Legitimate
descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;

children

and

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their
legitimate
children and descendants;

Civil Code and as the decedent validly disposed of her properties

in a will duly executed and probated, petitioner has no legal right
to claim any part of the decedents estate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision
dated October 13, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
41756 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and
2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit
from them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code.

LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been

reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.

LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and

the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Today is Tuesday, October 25, 2016

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-28594 June 30, 1971

EDILBERTO M. RAMOS, PACIANO CAPALONGAN, VICTORINO REYES, CONSORCIA JOVEN, JOSEFINA COLOMA, JOSE JOAQUIN, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
HON. BENJAMIN H. AQUINO, Provincial Fiscal, Pasig, Rizal, BRIG. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, AFP, Commanding General, Philippine Army Fort Bonifacio, Rizal,
respondents-appellees.
Clodualdo C. de Jesus for petitioners-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor Augusto M. Amores for respondents-appellees.

FERNANDO, J.:
A constitutional question with an element of novelty is raised in this appeal from a lower court order dismissing an action for certiorari and prohibition against the then respondent
Fiscal of Rizal, Benjamin H. Aquino, to prevent him from conducting a preliminary investigation. It is whether there is an encroachment on the constitutional prerogatives of the
Auditor General if, after the final approval of certain vouchers by him without an appeal being made, an inquiry by a provincial fiscal to determine whether criminal liability for
malversation through falsification of public, official and commercial documents based thereon could lawfully be conducted. The lower court that a prosecutor could, without offending
the constitutional grant of authority to the Auditor General, do so. We therefore affirm. In the certiorari and prohibition proceeding filed with the lower court on June 6, 1967,
1
petitioners, now appellants, assailed the jurisdiction of cases Benjamin Aquino, then Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, to conduct the preliminary

investigation of the alleged commission of malversation through falsification of public, official and commercial documents imputed to
them by the other respondent, then the Commanding General, Philippine Army, Fort Bonifacio, Rizal, Romeo Espino. The basis for such
a motion was that under the Constitution, the Auditor General is not only vested with the duty to examine or audit all expenditures of
funds of the Government, but also to audit or investigate and "bring to the attention of the proper administrative officer expenditures of
funds or property which in his opinion are irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant." It is their contention that under the above,
it is incumbent on the Auditor General to determine whether criminal responsibility for the anomaly discovered in the courage of his
audit or examination of the accounts lies. It was further contended that the decisions of the Auditor-General on the correctness of the
vouchers on which the alleged of cases were based having become final and irrevocable, not even the courts could substitute its
findings. Otherwise the provision of law that vouchers, claims or accounts "once finally settled shall in no case be opened or reviewed
except as herein provided" would be meaningless if the army authorities and respondent Fiscal were permitted to proceed with the
preliminary investigation to determine whether criminal case could be filed. 2
The above legal objections were brought to the attention of the then cases Provincial Fiscal by petitioners in a motion to quash which
was denied by him in a resolution of May 23, 1967 on this ground: "The exclusive jurisdiction of the Auditor General on matters now
raised by respondents refer to auditorial requirements and approval but not to the criminal liability, if any, of the persons involved in an
alleged irregular or anomalous disbursement of public funds. The authority of the Fiscal to investigate whether a criminal act has been
committed or not in the disbursement of public funds, and finally of the Courts to try any person involved in the alleged malversation of
public funds is not curtailed or in any way divested by the administrative findings of the Auditor General. To hold otherwise would be to

arrogate unto the Office of the Auditor General the power which pertains to the judicial branch of the government." 3
Then came thus petition before the lower court, petitioners praying for a judgment annulling aforesaid resolution of cases Provincial
Fiscal denying their motion to quash, rendering judgment that he was without petition to conduct such preliminary investigation and
prohibiting him from further proceeding on the matter. 4 On November 2, 1967, there was a motion to dismiss by respondent Provincial
Fiscal based on the argument that the amounts subject to the criminal cases were not closed and settled accounts and that even if they
were such, respondent Fiscal could still institute the appropriation criminal action, there being no need for a certification by the Auditor
General as to any irregularity in the settlement of accounts as an essential element for a criminal prosecution in malversation cases.
After an opposition was filed by petitioner to the aforesaid motion to dismiss on November 21, 1967, the lower court, in an order of
December 20, 1967, dismissed the petition. In support of such an order, it was set forth in such order of dismissal: "The Provincial
Fiscal is only studying whether or not, as complained of, from these accounts or vouchers which have already been passed in audit by
the Auditor General or his representatives more than three years ago, there is a crime to be prosecuted in which the petitioners are
answerable. 5 It was further emphasized: Were the theory of the petitioners to prevail, then the Auditor General will be arrogating unto
himself duties which pertain to the judicial branch of the government. 6 The last ground on which the plea that the prohibition be
dismissed was sustained the principle that one "cannot restrain the Fiscal, by means of injunction from prosecuting [this] case ...." 7
The matter was duly elevated on appeal to this Court on January 3, 1968. The brief for petitioners appellants was filed on March 6 of
that year. With the submission of the brief for respondents as appellants on May 3, 1968, the appeal was deemed submitted. As set
forth at the outset, there is no legal ground for reversing the lower court.
1. Appellants, in their brief, reiterate their principal argument that the order of the lower court dismissing their motion and thus allowing
their investigation by cases Fiscal to proceed, did amount to an encroachment on the constitutional prerogatives of the Auditor General.
Such a contention lacks merit. It betrays on its face a lack of understanding of the constitutional provision relied upon. The Auditor
General, as noted, is vested with the power to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenues and receipts from
whatever source, and to audit, in accordance with law and administrative regulations" all expenditures of funds or property pertaining to
or held in trust by the government as well as the provinces or municipalities thereof. 8 That is one thing. The ascertainment of whether a
crime committed and by whom is definitely another.
There is thus a manifest failure on the part of appellants to appreciate correctly the constitutional objective in the conferment of
authority on the Auditor General. It is based on the fundamental postulate that in the division of powers, the control over the purse
remains with the legislative branch. There is the explicit requirement then that there be no expenditure of public founds except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law. 9 There is need, therefore, for an enactment to permit disbursement from the public
treasury. Nor does fidelity to this constitutional mandated end there. There must be compliance with the terms of the statute. If it were
not so to, the extent that there is a deviation, there is a frustration of the legislative will. It is obvious that Congress itself is not in a
position to oversee and supervise the actual release of each and every appropriation. That is where the Auditor General comes in. It is
the responsibility of his office to exact obedience to any law that allows the expenditure of public funds. He serves as the necessary
check to make certain that no department of the government, especially its main spending arm, the Executive, exceeds the statutory
limits of the appropriation to which it is entitled. That is the purpose and end calling for the creation of such an office, certainly not the
enforcement of criminal statutes.
So it has been made clear by the then Delegate, later President, Manuel Roxas in the Constitutional Convention of 1934. To the
question as to the method or means to determine whether public funds are spent in accordance with the congressional will, this was his
answer: "The only means provided in our Constitution, as in the constitutions in other countries, is the office of the auditor; therefore, if
the auditor is a check on the Executive, it is not wise to make the auditor depend on the Executive. For another ways, the Executive, if
he is able to influence the auditor, may spent the proper checking of the expenditures of the public money." 10 For such a dignitary to live
up to such grave responsibility, he must, according to Delegate Roxas, be independent, not only of the President but even of Congress,
even if he were in a true and vital sense fulfilling a task appertaining to it. Thus, "In the United States while the auditor is appointed by
the President with the advice and consent of the United States Senate, the office is kept as an independent office independent [of]
the Executive and independent [of] the Legislature, because he has not only to check the accounts of the Executive, but also the
accounts of the Legislature ...." 11
It could be that appellants were not completely oblivious to the force of the observations. They therefore did seek to lend plausibility to

their contention with reminder that there is likewise included in the constitutional provision in question the task incumbent on the Auditor
General to "bring forth the attention of the proper administrative officer expenditures of funds or property which, in his opinion, are
irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant." From which, by a process of construction rather latitudinarian in character, they
would imply that on the Auditor General alone rests the determination of whether or not criminal liability is incurred for any anomaly
discovered in the course of his audit or examination. Such a conclusion is at war with the controlling doctrine. As construed in Guevara
v. Gimenez, 12 at most such a duty goes no further then requiring him to call the attention of the proper administrative officer of the
existence of such a situation but does not even extend to the power "to refuse and disapprove payment of such expenditures, ...." 13
Much less then could it justify the assertion devoid of any legal justification that even, the ascertainment of any possible criminal liability
is likewise a part and parcel of such constitutional competence of the Auditor General. How, then, can it be said that their plea is
thereby strengthened?
There is likewise an invocation by appellants of alleged statutory support for their untenable view. It is likewise in vain. All that
appellants have to go on is the concluding paragraph of section 657 of the Revised Administrative Code: "Accounts once finally settled
shall in no case be opened or reviewed except as herein provided." The paragraph immediately preceding should have disabused the
minds of appellants of any cause for optimism. All that set it provides for is that in case any settled account "appears to be infected with
fraud, collusion or error of calculation or when new and material evidence is discovered, the Auditor General may within three years
after original settlement, open such account, and after a reasonable time for his reply or appearance, may certify thereon a new
balance." The official given the opportunity for a reply or appearance is the provincial auditor, for under the first paragraph of this
particular section, the Auditor General at any time before the expiration of three years and the making of any settlement by a provincial
auditor, may, of his own motion, review and revise the same and certify a new balance. Nowhere does it appear that such a statutory
grant of authority of the Auditor General to open revised accounts carries with it the power to determine who may be constituted in the
event that in the preparation thereof a crime has been committed. The conclusive effect of the finality of his decision on the execution of
branch of the government thus relates solely to the administrative aspect of the matter. 14
From the constitutional, no less than the statutory standpoint then, this claim of appellants finds no support. It has nothing but novelty to
call for any attention being paid to it. It is singularly unpersuasive. To repeat, it would be to stretch to unwarranted limits the
constitutional power thus conferred on the Auditor General to accede to such a plea. Nothing is better settled than that, broad and
comprehensive as it is, it does not include a participation in the investigation of charges to determine whether or not a criminal
prosecution should be instituted. 15 Thus, the first two errors of the appellants which would impugn the order of dismissal for reaching a
similar conclusion are disposed of.
2. The third assigned error by appellants would find fault with the lower court's reliance on the well-settled doctrine that as a general
principle, no action lies to enjoin fiscals from conducting investigations to ascertain whether an offense has been committed. To
demonstrate its equally groundless character, it suffices to refer to Ramos v. Torres, 16 dismissing an original action for prohibition
instituted, by five of the six petitioners, now appellants, 17 to cut short further proceedings on an information accusing them of
malversation through falsification of public and commercial documents. In the opinion of the present Chief Justice, it is emphatically
affirmed: "Upon a review of the record, we are satisfied that petitioners herein have not established their right to the writ prayed for.
Indeed, it is well-settled that, as a matter of general rule, the writ of prohibition will not issue to restrain criminal prosecution." 18 An
excerpt from the opinion of Justice Sanchez in Hernandez v. Albano 19 was then quoted. Thus: "Agreeably to the foregoing, a rule now
of long standing and frequent application was formulated that ordinarily criminal prosecution may not be blocked by court prohibition or
injunction. Really, if at every turn investigation of a crime will be halted by a court order, the administration of criminal justice will meet
with an undue setback. Indeed, the investigative power of the Fiscal may suffer such a tremendous shrinkage that it may end up in
hollow sound rather than as a part and parcel of the machinery of criminal justice." 20 Nor is the accused person thereby left unprotected
for, as was noted by the Chief Justice, referring to Gorospe v. Peaflorida, 21 he could defend himself from any possible prosecution by
establishing that he did not commit the act charged or that the statute or ordinance on which the prosecution is based is invalid or in the
event of conviction, he could appeal. While the general rule admits of exceptions, no showing has been made that petitioners
appropriately invoke them. As they failed in their previous action of prohibition in Ramos v. Torres, so they must now.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the lower court of December 20, 1967 dismissing the petitioners' action for certiorari and
prohibition is affirmed. With costs against petitioner-appellants.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ, concur.

Castro and Barredo, JJ., took no part.

Footnotes
1 Except for petitioner Andres Ascueta, who is not a party, the other petitioners were identified in a previous case Ramos v. Torres, L-23454, Oct. 25,
1968, 25 SCRA 557 thus: "Petitioners herein are Edilberto M. Ramos, Pagano Capalongan, Victorino B. Reyes, Andres Atienza, Consorcia Joven,
Jose Joaquin and Andres Ascueta. All of them are army personnel, working, with the exception of the last, in the Finance Service of the Philippine
Army, the first as Colonel and Chief of said service, the second as Major and Chief of the Audit and Fiscal Branch thereof, the third as Captain and
Officer-in-Charge of its Audit on the fourth as Captain, in charge of pre-auditing and processing commercial vouchers, the fifth as Audit Examiner,
and the sixth as Clerk in charge of processing vouchers." At p. 558. Andres Atienza is not a petitioner in this suit.
2 For the requisite statutory support for the above view, petitioners invoke Section 657 of the Administrative Code which reads: "Power of Auditor to
open and settled accounts. At any time before the expiration of three years after the making of any settlement by a provincial auditor, the Auditor
General may, on his own motion, review and revise the same and certify a new balance. For such purpose he may require any account, vouchers,
or other papers connected with the matter to be forwarded to him. When any settled account appears to be infected with fraud, collusion, or error of
calculation, or when new and material evidence is discovered, the Auditor General may, within three years after original settlement, open such
account, and after a reasonable time for his reply or appearance, may certify thereon a new balance. A provincial auditor may exercise the same
power in respect to settled accounts pertaining to the branches of the Government under his jurisdiction. Accounts once finally settled shall in no
case be opened or reviewed except as herein provided." Cf. Petition before the lower court, pars. 5 and 8.
3 Ibid, par. 6, referring to Annex B thereof.
4 Ibid, petitory part.
5 Order, Record on Appeal, pp. 77-78.
6 Ibid, p. 78.
7 Ibid.
8 "The constitutional provision reads in full: "The Auditor General shall examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenues and
receipts from whatever source, including trust funds derived from bond issues; and audit, in accordance with law and administrative regulations, all
expenditures of funds of property pertaining to or held in trust by the Government or the provinces or municipalities thereof. He shall keep the
general accounts of the Government and preserve the vouchers pertaining thereto. It shall be the duty of the Auditor General to bring to the attention
of the proper administrative officer expenditures of funds or property which in his opinion, are irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant. He
shall also perform such other functions as may be prescribed by law." Art. XI, Sec. 2, Constitution. "According to the Constitution:
"No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."
9 According to the constitution: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." Art. VI, sec. 23,
par. 2.
10 V Laurel, Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention, 636 (1967).
11 Ibid, p. 637.
12 L-17115, Nov. 30, 1962, 6 SCRA 807.
13 Ibid, p. 813. The authoritative excerpt from the opinion of the present Chief Justice reads as follows: "Under our Constitution, the authority of the
Auditor General, in connection with expenditures of the Government is limited to the auditing of expenditures of funds or property pertaining to, or
held in trust by, the Government or the provinces or municipalities thereof (Article XI, section 2, of the Constitution). Such function is limited to a
determination of whether there is a law appropriating funds for a given purpose; whether a contract, made by the proper officer, has been entered
into in conformity with said appropriation law; whether the goods or services covered by said contract have been delivered or rendered in pursuance
of the provisions thereof, as attested to by the proper officer; and whether payment therefor has been authorized by the officials of the
corresponding department or bureau. If these requirements have been fulfilled, it is the ministerial duty of the Auditor General to approve and pass
in audit the voucher and treasury warrant for said payment. He has no discretion or authority to disapprove said payment upon the ground that the
aforementioned contract was unwise or that the amount stipulated thereon is unreasonable. If he entertains such belief, he may do no more than
discharge the duty imposed upon him by the Constitution (Article XI, section 2), 'to bring to the attention of the proper administrative officer
expenditures of funds or property which, in his opinion, are irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant'. This duty implies a negation of the
power to refuse and disapprove payment of such expenditures, for its disapproval, if he had authority therefor, would bring to the attention of the

aforementioned administrative officer the reason for the adverse action thus taken by the General Auditing Office, and, hence, render the imposition
of said duty unnecessary."
14 Section 655 of the Administrative Code reads as follows: "Finality of decision by Auditor. A decision of the Auditor General or of a provincial
auditor upon any matter within their respective powers shall be conclusive upon the executive branches of the Government, subject to appeal or
review as hereinafter provided."
15 Cf Guevara v. Gimenez, L-17115, Nov. 30, 1962, 6 SCRA 807; Villegas v. Auditor General, L-21352, Nov. 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 877; Resins, Inc. v.
Auditor General, L-17888, Oct. 29, 1968, 25 SCRA 754.
16 L-23454, Oct. 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 557.
17 Vide fn 1.
18 Ibid, p. 563. Six cases were referred to by the Chief Justice, starting from Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 103 (1920); where the doctrine
was first announced through Justice Malcolm. The other cases follow: Gorospe v. Peaflorida, 101 Phil. 886 (1957); University of the Philippines v.
City Fiscal of Quezon City, L-18562, July 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 980; Tadeo v. Provincial Fiscal, L-16474, January 31, 1962, 4 SCRA 235; Grifien v.
Consolacion, L-16050, July 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 722; Lava v. Gonzales, L-23084, July 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 650. People v. Mencias, L-19633, Nov. 28,
1966, 18 SCRA 807, may also be cited.
19 L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95.
20 Ibid, p. 98.
21 101 Phil. 886 (1957).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

THIRD DIVISION

HILARION, JR. and ENRICO

ORENDAIN, represented by FE
D. ORENDAIN,

G.R. No. 168660

Petitioners,720[1]
720[1] The case before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4, is entitled
Trusteeship of the Estate of Doa Margarita Rodriguez v. Jesus Ayala and Lorenzo
Rodriguez. In the present petition filed by petitioners, they erroneously designate
the petitioner as the Trusteeship of the Estate of Doa Margarita Rodriguez v. Jesus
Ayala and Lorenzo Rodriguez, the executors of the estate. The title of the present
petition should reflect the actual petitioners, and the Trusteeship of the Estate of
Doa Margarita Rodriguez, represented by the executors, as the respondent.

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,

- versus -

CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
TRUSTEESHIP OF THE ESTATE
OF DOA MARGARITA
RODRIGUEZ,
Respondent.

PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:

June 30, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This petition for certiorari, filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of

Court, assails the Order721[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 4 in SP. PROC. No. 51872 which denied petitioners
(Hilarion, Jr. and Enrico Orendain, heirs of Hilarion Orendain, Sr.)
Motion to Dissolve the Trusteeship of the Estate of Doa Margarita
Rodriguez.

First, we revisit the long settled facts.

On July 19, 1960, the decedent, Doa Margarita Rodriguez,

died in Manila, leaving a last will and testament. On September
23, 1960, the will was admitted to probate by virtue of the order
of the Court of First Instance of Manila City (CFI Manila) in Special
Proceeding No. 3845. On August 27, 1962, the CFI Manila
approved the project of partition presented by the executor of
Doa Margarita Rodriguezs will.

At the time of her death, the decedent left no compulsory or

forced heirs and, consequently, was completely free to dispose of
721[2] Penned by Judge Socorro B. Inting, rollo, pp. 17-18.

her properties, without regard to legitimes, 722[3] as provided in her

will. Some of Doa Margarita Rodriguezs testamentary dispositions
contemplated the creation of a trust to manage the income from
her properties for distribution to beneficiaries specified in the will,
to wit:

xxxx

CLAUSULA SEGUNDA O PANG-DALAWA: - x x x Ipinaguutos ko na

matapos magawa ang pagaayos ng aking Testamentaria at masara na
ang Expediente ng aking Testamentaria, ang lahat ng pagaare ko sa
aking ipinaguutos na pangasiwaan sa habang panahon ay ipagbukas
sa Juzgado ng tinatawag na FIDEICOMISO at ang ilalagay na
fideicomisario ang manga taong nasabi ko na sa itaas nito, at ang
kanilang gaganahin ay ang nasasabi sa testamentong ito na
gaganahen ng tagapangasiwa at albacea. x x x x

CLAUSULA TERCERA O PANG-TATLO: - Ipinaguutos ko na ang

kikitain ng lahat ng aking pagaare, na ang hindi lamang kasama ay
ang aking lupain na nasasabi sa Certificado de Transferencia de Titulo
No. 7156 (Lote No. 1088-C), Certificado Original de Titulo No. 4588
(LOTE No. 2492), Certificado Original de Titulo No. 4585 (Lote No.
1087) ng lalawigan ng Quezon, at ang bahaging maytanim na palay ng
lupang nasasaysay sa Certificado Original de Titulo No. 4587 (Lote No.
1180) ng Quezon, ay IIPUNIN SA BANCO upang maibayad sa
anillaramiento, ang tinatawag na estate Tax, ang impuesto de herencia
na dapat pagbayaran ng aking pinagbibigyan na kasama na din ang
pagbabayaran ng Fideicomiso, gastos sa abogado na magmamakaalam
ng testamentaria at gastos sa Husgado. Ngunit bago ipasok sa Banco
ang kikitaen ng nabangit na manga gagaare, ay aalisin muna ang
manga sumusunod na gastos:

722[3] See Article 886 of the Civil Code.

xxxx

CLAUSULA DECIMA O PANG-SAMPU: - Ipinaguutos ko na ang

manga pagaareng nasasabi sa Clausulang ito ay pangangasiwaan sa
habang panahon, at ito nga ang ipagbubukas ng Fideicomiso sa
Jusgado pagkatapos na maayos ang naiwanan kong pagaare. Ang
pangangasiwaang pagaare ay ang manga sumusunod:

xxxx

Ang lahat ng pagaaring nasasabe sa Clusulang ito (hindi

kasama ang generator at automovil) hindi maisasanla o
maipagbibili kailan man, maliban sa pagaaring nasa Quezon
Boulevard, Maynila, na maaring isanla kung walang fondo na
gagamitin sa ipagpapaigui o ipagpapagawa ng panibago
alinsunod sa kaayusang hinihingi ng panahon.

xxxx

CLAUSULA DECIMA SEGUNDA O PANG-LABING DALAWA: - Ang

kuartang matitipon sa Banco ayon sa tagubilin na nasasaysay sa
Clausulang sinusundan nito ay gagamitin sa manga sumusunod na
pagkakagastusan; at ganito din ang gagawin sa lahat ng aking pagaare
na nasasakop ng fideicomiso at walang ibang pinaguukulan. Ang
pagkakagastusan na ito ay ang sumusunod:

xxxx

CLAUSULA VIGESIMA CUARTA O PANG-DALAWANGPU AT APAT: Ipinaguutos ko sa aking manga Tagapangasiwa na sa fondong
ipinapasok sa Banco para sa gastos ng Nia Maria, Misa at iba pa,
kukuha sila na kakailanganin para maitulong sa manga sumusunod:
Florentina Luna, Roberta Ponce, Marciada Ponce, Benita Ponce,
Constancia Pineda, Regino Pineda, Tomas Payumo, Rosito Payumo,

Loreto Payumo, Brigido Santos at Quintin Laino, Hilarion Orendain at

manga anak. Ang manga dalaga kung sakali at inabutan ng
pagkamatay ko na ako ay pinagtiisan at hindi humiwalay sa akin, kung
magkasakit ay ipagagamot at ibabayad sa medico, at ibibili ng gamot,
at kung kailangan ang operacion ay ipaooperacion at ipapasok sa
Hospital
na
kinababagayan
ng
kaniyang
sakit,
at
kahit
maypagkakautang pa sa impuesto de herencia at estate tax ay ikukuha
sa nasabing fondo at talagang ibabawas doon, at ang paggagamot ay
huag pagtutuusan, at ang magaalaga sa kanya ay bibigyan ng gastos
sa pagkain at sa viaje at iba pa na manga kailangan ng nagaalaga.
Kung nasa provincia at dadalhin ditto sa Maynila ay bibigyan ng gastos
sa viaje ang maysakit at ang kasama sa viaje, at ang magaalaga ay
dito tutuloy sa bahay sa Tuberias at Tanduay na natatalaga sa manga
may servicio sa akin, at kung mamatay at gusting iuwi sa provincia ang
bangkay ay iupa at doon ilibing at dapit ng Pare at hated sa nicho na
natotoka sa kanya. Ganito din ang gagawain kung mayasawa man ay
nasa poder ko ng ako ay mamatay. Ang wala sa poder ko datapua at
nagservicio sa akin, kaparis ng encargado, ang gagawaing tulong ay
ipagagamot, ibibili ng gamot at kung kailangan ang operacion o matira
sa Hospital, ipaooperacion at ipagbabayad sa Hospital. 723[4] (emphasis
supplied)

xxxx

As regards Clause 10 of the will which explicitly prohibits the

alienation or mortgage of the properties specified therein, we had
occasion to hold, in Rodriguez, etc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et
al.,724[5] that the clause, insofar as the first twenty-year period is
concerned, does not violate Article 870 725[6] of the Civil Code. We
declared, thus:
723[4] Records, Vol. I, pp. 3-15.
724[5] G.R. No. L-28734, March 28, 1969, 137 Phil. 371.

The codal provision does not need any interpretation. It speaks

categorically. What is declared void is the testamentary disposition
prohibiting alienation after the twenty-year period. In the interim, such
a provision does not suffer from the vice of invalidity. It cannot be
stricken down. Time and time again, We have said, and We now repeat,
that when a legal provision is clear and to the point, there is no room
for interpretation. It must be applied according to its literal terms.

Even with the purpose that the testatrix had in mind were not as
unequivocal, still the same conclusion emerges. There is no room for
intestacy as would be the effect if the challenged resolution of January
8, 1968 were not set aside. The wishes of the testatrix constitute the
law. Her will must be given effect. This is so even if there could be an
element of uncertainty insofar as the ascertainment thereof is
concerned. In the language of a Civil Code provision: If a testamentary
disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that
interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be
preferred. Nor is this all. A later article of the Civil Code equally calls for
observance. Thus: The words of a will are to receive an interpretation
which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one which
will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of
interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy.

xxxx

Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that [Petra, Antonia and

Rosa, all surnamed Rodriguez] could not challenge the provision in
question. [They] had no right to vindicate. Such a right may never
arise. The twenty-year period is still with us. What would transpire
thereafter is still locked up in the inscrutable future, beyond the power
of mere mortals to foretell. At any rate, We cannot anticipate. Nor
should We. We do not possess the power either of conferring a cause of

725[6] Art. 870. The dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate
inalienable for more than twenty years are void.

action to a party when, under the circumstances disclosed, it had

none.726[7]

Almost four decades later, herein petitioners Hilarion, Jr. and

Enrico Orendain, heirs of Hilarion Orendain, Sr. who was
mentioned in Clause 24 of the decedents will, moved to dissolve
the trust on the decedents estate, which they argued had been in
existence for more than twenty years, in violation of Articles
867727[8] and 870 of the Civil Code, and inconsistent with our
ruling in Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals.728[9]

On April 18, 2005, the RTC issued the herein assailed

Order:729[10]

726[7] Supra note 5 at pp. 376-379.

727[8] Art. 867. The following shall not take effect. x x x x

2. Provisions which contain a perpetual prohibition to alienate, and even a
temporary one, beyond the limit fixed in article 863.
xxxx

728[9] Supra note 5.

729[10] Rollo, pp. 17-18.

The above-cited provisions of the civil code find no application in

the present motion to dissolve the trust created by the testatrix. There
is no question that the testamentary disposition of Doa Margarita
Rodriguez prohibiting the mortgage or sale of properties mentioned in
clause X of her Last Will and Testament forevermore is void after the
lapse of the twenty year period. However, it does not mean that the
trust created by [the] testatrix in order to carry out her wishes under
clauses 12, 13 and 24 will also become void upon expiration of the
twenty year period. As ruled by the Supreme Court in Emetrio Barcelon
v. CA, the codal provision cited in Art. 870 is clear and unequivocal and
does not need any interpretation. What is declared void is the
testamentary disposition prohibiting alienation after the twenty year
period. Hence, the trustees may dispose of the properties left by the
testatrix in order to carry out the latters testamentary disposition.

The question as to whether a trust can be perpetual, the same

finds support in Article 1013[,] paragraph 4 of the Civil Code, which
provides that the Court, at the instance of an interested party or its
motion, may order the establishment of a permanent trust so that only
the income from the property shall be used. In the present case, the
testatrix directed that all the twenty five (25) pieces of property listed
in the tenth clause should be placed under the trusteeship and should
be perpetually administered by the trustees and a certain percentage
of the income from the trust estate should be deposited in a bank and
should be devoted for the purposes specifically indicated in the clauses
12, 13 and 24.

The wishes of the testatrix constitute the law. Her will must be
given effect. This is even if there could be an element of uncertainty
insofar as the ascertainment thereof is concerned. This Court so
emphatically expressed it in a decision rendered more than sixty years
ago. Thus, respect for the will of a testator as [an] expression of his
last testamentary disposition, constitutes the principal basis of the
rules which the law prescribes for the correct interpretation of all of the
clauses of the will; the words and provision therein written must be
plainly construed in order to avoid a violation of his intentions and real
purpose. The will of the testator clearly and explicitly stated must be
respected and complied with as an inviolable law among the parties in
interest. Such is the doctrine established by the Supreme Court of
Spain, constantly maintained in a great number of decisions.

Hence, this petition, positing the following issues:

1.
WHETHER THE TRUSTEESHIP OVER THE PROPERTIES LEFT BY
DOA MARGARITA RODRIGUEZ CAN BE DISSOLVED APPLYING ARTICLES
867 AND 870 OF THE CIVIL CODE.

2.
WHETHER THE LOWER COURT IS CORRECT IN STATING THAT THE
ABOVE-CITED PROVISIONS OF THE CIVIL CODE FINDS NO APPLICATION
IN THE PRESENT MOTION TO DISSOLVE THE TRUST CREATED BY THE
TESTATRIX.

3.
CONCOMITANT THERETO, [WHETHER] THE LOWER COURT [IS]
CORRECT IN APPLYING ARTICLE 1013 PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE CIVIL
CODE.730[11]

Before we delve into the foregoing issues, it is noteworthy

that the present petition, albeit captioned as a petition for
certiorari, is actually a petition for review on certiorari, raising
only pure questions of law. On more than one occasion, we have
allowed erroneously labeled actions based on the averments
contained in the petition or complaint. 731[12] Thus, we now
730[11] Petitioners Memorandum, rollo, p. 98.
731[12] Benguet State University v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 169637, June 8,
2007, 524 SCRA 437, 444.

disregard the incorrect designation and treat this as a petition for

review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The petition is impressed with merit.

The issues being intertwined, we shall discuss them jointly.

Quite categorical from the last will and testament of the

decedent

is

the

creation

of

perpetual

trust

for

the

administration of her properties and the income accruing

therefrom, for specified beneficiaries. The decedent, in Clause 10
of her will, listed a number of properties to be placed under
perpetual administration of the trust. In fact, the decedent
unequivocally forbade the alienation or mortgage of these
properties.

In

all,

the

decedent

did

not

contemplate

the

disposition of these properties, but only sought to bequeath the

income derived therefrom to various sets of beneficiaries.

On this score, we held in Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals732[13]

that the perpetual prohibition was valid only for twenty (20)
years. We affirmed the CAs holding that the trust stipulated in the
732[13] Supra note 5.

decedents will prohibiting perpetual alienation or mortgage of the

properties violated Articles 867 and 870 of the Civil Code.
However, we reversed and set aside the CAs decision which
declared that that portion of the decedents estate, the properties
listed in Clause 10 of the will, ought to be distributed based on
intestate succession, there being no institution of heirs to the
properties covered by the perpetual trust.

As previously quoted, we reached a different conclusion and

upheld the trust, only insofar as the first twenty-year period is
concerned. We refrained from forthwith declaring the decedents
testamentary disposition as void and the properties enumerated
in Clause 10 of the will as subject to intestate succession. We held
that, in the interim, since the twenty-year period was then still
upon us, the wishes of the testatrix ought to be respected.

Thus, at present, there appears to be no more argument that

the trust created over the properties of the decedent should be
dissolved as the twenty-year period has, quite palpably, lapsed.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the RTC ruled otherwise and

held that: (a) only the perpetual prohibition to alienate or
mortgage is declared void; (b) the trust over her properties

stipulated by the testatrix in Clauses 12, 13 and 24 of the will

remains valid; and (c) the trustees may dispose of these
properties in order to carry out the latters testamentary
disposition.

We disagree.

Apparent from the decedents last will and testament is the

creation of a trust on a specific set of properties and the income
accruing therefrom. Nowhere in the will can it be ascertained that
the decedent intended any of the trusts designated beneficiaries
to inherit these properties. The decedents will did not institute
any heir thereto, as clearly shown by the following:
1.

Clause 2 instructed the creation of trust;

2.

Clause 3 instructed that the remaining income from

specified properties, after the necessary deductions for expenses,

including the estate tax, be deposited in a fund with a bank;
3.

Clause 10 enumerated the properties to be placed in

trust for perpetual administration (pangasiwaan sa habang

panahon);

4.

Clauses 11 and 12 directed how the income from the

properties ought to be divided among, and distributed to the

different beneficiaries; and
5.

Clause 24 instructed the administrators to provide

medical support to certain beneficiaries, to be deducted from the

fund deposits in the bank mentioned in Clauses 2 and 3.

Plainly, the RTC was mistaken in denying petitioners motion

to dissolve and ordering the disposition of the properties in Clause
10 according to the testatrixs wishes. As regards these properties,
intestacy should apply as the decedent did not institute an heir
therefor. Article 782, in relation to paragraph 2, Article 960 of the
Civil Code, provides:

Art. 782. An heir is a person called to the succession either by

the provision of a will or by operation of law.

xxxx

Art. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:

xxxx

(2)
When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of
all the property belonging to the testator. In such case, legal
succession shall take place only with respect to the property of which
the testator has not disposed;

xxx

We find as erroneous the RTCs holding that paragraph 4, 733

[14]

Article 1013 of the same code specifically allows a perpetual

trust, because this provision of law is inapplicable. Suffice it to

state that the article is among the Civil Code provisions on
intestate succession, specifically on the State inheriting from a
decedent, in default of persons entitled to succeed. Under this
article, the allowance for a permanent trust, approved by a court
of law, covers property inherited by the State by virtue of
intestate

succession.

testamentary

provision

The

article

which

did

does
not

not

cure

institute

void

an

heir.

Accordingly, the article cannot be applied to dispose of herein

decedents properties.
733[14] Art. 1013. After the payment of debts and charges, the personal property shall be
assigned to the municipality or city where the deceased last resided in the Philippines, and the
real estate to the municipalities or cities, in which the same is situated.
xxxx
The court, at the instance of an interested party, or on its own motion, may order the
establishment of a permanent trust, so that only the income from the property shall be used.

We are not unmindful of our ruling in Palad, et al. v.

Governor of Quezon Province, et al.734[15] where we declared,
thus:

Article 870 of the New Civil Code, which regards as void any
disposition of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable
for more than 20 years, is not violated by the trust constituted by the
late Luis Palad; because the will of the testator does not interdict the
alienation of the parcels devised. The will merely directs that the
income of said two parcels be utilized for the establishment,
maintenance and operation of the high school.

Said Article 870 was designed to give more impetus to the

socialization of the ownership of property and to prevent the
perpetuation of large holdings which give rise to agrarian troubles. The
trust herein involved covers only two lots, which have not been shown
to be a large landholding. And the income derived therefrom is being
devoted to a public and social purpose the education of the youth of
the land. The use of said parcels therefore is in a sense socialized.
There is no hint in the record that the trust has spawned agrarian
conflicts.735[16]

In this case, however, we reach a different conclusion as the

testatrix specifically prohibited the alienation or mortgage of her
734[15] No. L-24302, August 18, 1972, 46 SCRA 354.

735[16] Id. at 243-244.

properties which were definitely more than the two (2) properties
in the aforecited case. The herein testatrixs large landholdings
cannot be subjected indefinitely to a trust because the ownership
thereof would then effectively remain with her even in the
afterlife.

In light of the foregoing, therefore, the trust on the testatrixs

properties must be dissolved and this case remanded to the lower
court to determine the following:
1.

The

properties

listed

in

Clause

10

of

the

will,

constituting the perpetual trust, which are still within reach and
have not been disposed of as yet; and
2.

The intestate heirs of the decedent, with the nearest

relative of the deceased entitled to inherit the remaining

properties.

One final note. To obviate confusion, we clarify that the

petitioners, although correct in moving for the dissolution of the
trust after the twenty-year period, are not necessarily declared as
intestate heirs of the decedent. Our remand of the case to the
RTC

means

that

the

probate

court

should

now

make

determination of the heirship of the intestate heirs of the

decedent where petitioners, and all others claiming to be heirs of

the decedent, should establish their status as such consistent

with our ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Hon. del Rosario.736[17]

WHEREFORE,

premises

considered,

the

petition

is

GRANTED. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch

4 in SP. PROC. No. 51872 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trust
approved by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4 in SP.
PROC. No. 51872 is DISSOLVED. We ORDER the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 4 in SP. PROC. No. 51872 to determine the
following:

1.

the properties listed in Clause 10 of Doa Margarita

Rodriguezs will, constituting the perpetual trust, which are still

within reach and have not been disposed of as yet; and
2.

the intestate heirs of Doa Margarita Rodriguez, with the

nearest relative of the decedent entitled to inherit the remaining

properties.

SO ORDERED.

736[17] G.R. No. 146818, February 6, 2006, 481 SCRA 556.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICONAZARIO

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were

reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13,

the Division Chairperson's
conclusions in the above
consultation before the case
opinion of the Courts Division.

Article VIII of the Constitution and

Attestation, I certify that the
Decision had been reached in
was assigned to the writer of the

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

THIRD DIVISION

SERAFIN, RAUL, NENITA,

NAZARETO, NEOLANDA, all
surnamed NARANJA, AMELIA

G.R. No. 160132

NARANJA-RUBINOS, NILDA
NARANJA-LIMANA, and NAIDA
NARANJA-GICANO,
Present:

Petitioners,

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

- versus -

Chairperson,
COURT OF APPEALS, LUCILIA P.
BELARDO, represented by her
Attorney-in-Fact, REBECCA
CORDERO, and THE LOCAL
REGISTER OF DEEDS, BACOLOD
CITY,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

Respondents.
Promulgated:

April 17, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This petition seeks a review of the Court of Appeals (CA)

Decision737[1] dated September 13, 2002 and Resolution 738[2]
dated September 24, 2003 which upheld the contract of sale
executed by petitioners predecessor, Roque Naranja, during his
lifetime, over two real properties.

Roque Naranja was the registered owner of a parcel of land,

denominated as Lot No. 4 in Consolidation-Subdivision Plan (LRC)
Pcs-886, Bacolod Cadastre, with an area of 136 square meters
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-18764.
Roque was also a co-owner of an adjacent lot, Lot No. 2, of the
same subdivision plan, which he co-owned with his brothers,
Gabino and Placido Naranja. When Placido died, his one-third
share was inherited by his children, Nenita, Nazareto, Nilda, Naida
and Neolanda, all surnamed Naranja, herein petitioners. Lot No. 2
737[1] Penned by Associate Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili, with Associate Justices
Edgardo P. Cruz and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; rollo, pp. 62-72.

738[2] Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino, with Associate Justices Edgardo P.
Cruz and Sergio L. Pestao, concurring; rollo, pp. 31-32.

is covered by TCT No. T-18762 in the names of Roque, Gabino and

the said children of Placido. TCT No. T-18762 remained even after
Gabino died. The other petitioners Serafin Naranja, Raul Naranja,
and Amelia Naranja-Rubinos are the children of Gabino. 739[3]

The two lots were being leased by Esso Standard Eastern,

Inc. for 30 years from 1962-1992. For his properties, Roque was
being paid P200.00 per month by the company.740[4]

In 1976, Roque, who was single and had no children, lived

with his half sister, Lucilia P. Belardo (Belardo), in Pontevedra,
Negros Occidental. At that time, a catheter was attached to
Roques body to help him urinate. But the catheter was
subsequently removed when Roque was already able to urinate
normally. Other than this and the influenza prior to his death,
Roque had been physically sound.741[5]

739[3] CA rollo, p. 90.

740[4] Id. at 91.

741[5] Id. at 90-91.

Roque had no other source of income except for the P200.00

monthly rental of his two properties. To show his gratitude to
Belardo, Roque sold Lot No. 4 and his one-third share in Lot No. 2
to Belardo on August 21, 1981, through a Deed of Sale of Real
Property which was duly notarized by Atty. Eugenio Sanicas. The
Deed of Sale reads:

I, ROQUE NARANJA, of legal age, single, Filipino and a resident of

Bacolod City, do hereby declare that I am the registered owner of Lot
No. 4 of the Cadastral Survey of the City of Bacolod, consisting of 136
square meters, more or less, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-18764 and a co-owner of Lot No. 2, situated at the City of Bacolod,
consisting of 151 square meters, more or less, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-18762 and my share in the aforesaid Lot No. 2
is one-third share.

That for and in consideration of the sum of TEN THOUSAND

PESOS (P10,000.00), Philippine Currency, and other valuable
consideration, receipt of which in full I hereby acknowledge to my
entire satisfaction, by these presents, I hereby transfer and convey by
way of absolute sale the above-mentioned Lot No. 4 consisting of 136
square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18764 and
my one-third share in Lot No. 2, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-18762, in favor of my sister LUCILIA P. BELARDO, of legal age,
Filipino citizen, married to Alfonso D. Belardo, and a resident of
Pontevedra, Negros Occidental, her heirs, successors and assigns.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 21 st

day of August, 1981 at Bacolod City, Philippines.

(SGD.)

ROQUE NARANJA742[6]

Roques copies of TCT No. T-18764 and TCT No. T-18762 were
entrusted to Atty. Sanicas for registration of the deed of sale and
transfer of the titles to Belardo. But the deed of sale could not be
registered because Belardo did not have the money to pay for the
registration fees.743[7]

Belardos only source of income was her store and coffee

shop. Sometimes, her children would give her money to help with
the household expenses, including the expenses incurred for
Roques support. At times, she would also borrow money from
Margarita Dema-ala, a neighbor. 744[8] When the amount of her
loan reached P15,000.00, Dema-ala required a security. On
November 19, 1983, Roque executed a deed of sale in favor of
Dema-ala, covering his two properties in consideration of the
P15,000.00 outstanding loan and an additional P15,000.00, for a
total of P30,000.00. Dema-ala explained that she wanted Roque
to execute the deed of sale himself since the properties were still

742[6] Records, p. 22.

743[7] CA rollo, p. 91.
744[8] Id.

in his name. Belardo merely acted as a witness. The titles to the

properties were given to Dema-ala for safekeeping. 745[9]

Three days later, or on December 2, 1983, Roque died of

influenza. The proceeds of the loan were used for his treatment
while the rest was spent for his burial. 746[10]

In 1985, Belardo fully paid the loan secured by the second

deed of sale. Dema-ala returned the certificates of title to Belardo,
who, in turn, gave them back to Atty. Sanicas. 747[11]

Unknown to Belardo, petitioners, the children of Placido and

Gabino Naranja, executed an Extrajudicial Settlement Among
Heirs748[12] on October 11, 1985, adjudicating among themselves
Lot No. 4. On February 19, 1986, petitioner Amelia NaranjaRubinos, accompanied by Belardo, borrowed the two TCTs,
together with the lease agreement with Esso Standard Eastern,
745[9] Id. at 92.
746[10] Id.
747[11] Id.
748[12] Records, p. 19.

Inc., from Atty. Sanicas on account of the loan being proposed by

Belardo to her. Thereafter, petitioners had the Extrajudicial
Settlement Among Heirs notarized on February 25, 1986. With
Roques copy of TCT No. T-18764 in their possession, they
succeeded in having it cancelled and a new certificate of title, TCT
No. T-140184, issued in their names.749[13]

In 1987, Belardo decided to register the Deed of Sale dated

August 21, 1981. With no title in hand, she was compelled to file a
petition with the RTC to direct the Register of Deeds to annotate
the deed of sale even without a copy of the TCTs. In an Order
dated June 18, 1987, the RTC granted the petition. But she only
succeeded in registering the deed of sale in TCT No. T-18762
because TCT No. T-18764 had already been cancelled. 750[14]

On December 11, 1989, Atty. Sanicas prepared a certificate

of authorization, giving Belardos daughter, Jennelyn P. Vargas, the
authority to collect the payments from Esso Standard Eastern, Inc.
But it appeared from the companys Advice of Fixed Payment that
payment of the lease rental had already been transferred from
749[13] CA rollo, p. 92.

750[14] Id. at 93.

Belardo to Amelia Naranja-Rubinos because of the Extrajudicial

Settlement Among Heirs.

On June 23, 1992, Belardo,751[15] through her daughter and

attorney-in-fact,
reconveyance

Rebecca
with

Cordero,

damages.

The

instituted

suit

complaint

prayed

for
that

judgment be rendered declaring Belardo as the sole legal owner

of Lot No. 4, declaring null and void the Extrajudicial Settlement
Among Heirs, and TCT No. T-140184, and ordering petitioners to
reconvey to her the subject property and to pay damages. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 7144.

Subsequently,

petitioners

also

filed

case

against

respondent for annulment of sale and quieting of title with

damages, praying, among others, that judgment be rendered
nullifying the Deed of Sale, and ordering the Register of Deeds of
Bacolod City to cancel the annotation of the Deed of Sale on TCT
No. T-18762. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 7214.

On March 5, 1997, the RTC rendered a Decision in the

consolidated cases in favor of petitioners. The trial court noted
that the Deed of Sale was defective in form since it did not
751[15] Lucilia Belardo died on November 11, 1993.

contain a technical description of the subject properties but

merely indicated that they were Lot No. 4, covered by TCT No. T18764 consisting of 136 square meters, and one-third portion of
Lot No. 2 covered by TCT No. T-18762. The trial court held that,
being defective in form, the Deed of Sale did not vest title in
private respondent. Full and absolute ownership did not pass to
private respondent because she failed to register the Deed of
Sale. She was not a purchaser in good faith since she acted as a
witness to the second sale of the property knowing that she had
already purchased the property from Roque. Whatever rights
private respondent had over the properties could not be superior
to the rights of petitioners, who are now the registered owners of
the parcels of land. The RTC disposed, thus:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:

1.

Dismissing Civil Case No. 7144.

2.

Civil Case No. 7214.

a)
Declaring the Deed of Sale dated August 21,
1981, executed by Roque Naranja, covering his one-third (1/3)
share of Lot 2 of the consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs886, being a portion of the consolidation of Lots 240-A, 240-B,
240-C and 240-D, described on plan, Psd-33443 (LRC) GLRO
Cad. Rec. No. 55 in favor of Lucilia Belardo, and entered as Doc.
No. 80, Page 17, Book No. XXXVI, Series of 1981 of Notary Public

Eugenio Sanicas of Bacolod City, as null and void and of no force

and effect;

b)
Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City to
cancel Entry No. 148123 annotate at the back of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-18762;

c)
Ordering Lucilia Belardo or her successors-ininterest to pay plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 as attorneys
fees, the amount of P500.00 as appearance fees.

Counterclaims in both Civil Cases Nos. 7144 and 7214 are

hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.752[16]

On September 13, 2002, the CA reversed the RTC Decision.

The CA held that the unregisterability of a deed of sale will not
undermine its validity and efficacy in transferring ownership of
the properties to private respondent. The CA noted that the
records were devoid of any proof evidencing the alleged vitiation
of Roques consent to the sale; hence, there is no reason to
invalidate the sale. Registration is only necessary to bind third
parties, which petitioners, being the heirs of Roque Naranja, are
not. The trial court erred in applying Article 1544 of the Civil Code
to the case at bar since petitioners are not purchasers of the said
752[16] Rollo, p. 179.

properties. Hence, it is not significant that private respondent

failed to register the deed of sale before the extrajudicial
settlement among the heirs. The dispositive portion of the CA
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision dated March 5, 1997 in Civil Cases

Nos. 7144 and 7214 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu
thereof, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Civil Case No. 7214 is hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of

cause of action.

2. In Civil Case No. 7144, the extrajudicial settlement executed

by the heirs of Roque Naranja adjudicating among themselves Lot No.
4 of the consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs 886 of the Bacolod
Cadastre is hereby declared null and void for want of factual and legal
basis. The certificate of title issued to the heirs of Roque Naranja
(Transfer Certificate of [T]i[t]le No. T-140184) as a consequence of the
void extra-judicial settlement is hereby ordered cancelled and the
previous title to Lot No. 4, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18764, is
hereby ordered reinstated. Lucilia Belardo is hereby declared the sole
and legal owner of said Lot No. 4, and one-third of Lot No. 2 of the
same consolidation-subdivision plan, Bacolod Cadastre, by virtue of the
deed of sale thereof in her favor dated August 21, 1981.

SO ORDERED.753[17]

753[17] Id. at 71-72.

The CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on

September 24, 2003.754[18] Petitioners filed this petition for
review, raising the following issues:

1.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COURT OF

APPEALS IS CORRECT IN IGNORING THE POINT RAISED BY
[PETITIONERS] THAT THE DEED OF SALE WHICH DOES NOT
COMPL[Y] WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ACT NO. 496 IS [NOT]
VALID.

2.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED DEED OF SALE [OF REAL

PROPERTIES] IS VALID CONSIDERING THAT THE CONSENT OF
THE LATE ROQUE NARANJA HAD BEEN VITIATED; x x x THERE [IS]
NO CONCLUSIVE SHOWING THAT THERE WAS CONSIDERATION
AND THERE [ARE] SERIOUS IRREGULARITIES IN THE
NOTARIZATION OF THE SAID DOCUMENTS.755[19]

In

her

Comment,

private

respondent

questioned

the

Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping attached to

the Petition for Review, which was signed by a certain Ernesto
Villadelgado without a special power of attorney. In their reply,
petitioners remedied the defect by attaching a Special Power of
Attorney signed by them.

754[18] Supra note 2.

755[19] Rollo, p. 141.

Pursuant to its policy to encourage full adjudication of the

merits of an appeal, the Court had previously excused the late
submission of a special power of attorney to sign a certification
against forum-shopping.756[20] But even if we excuse this defect,
the petition nonetheless fails on the merits.

The Court does not agree with petitioners contention that a

deed of sale must contain a technical description of the subject
property in order to be valid. Petitioners anchor their theory on
Section 127 of Act No. 496,757[21] which provides a sample form
of a deed of sale that includes, in particular, a technical
description of the subject property.

To be valid, a contract of sale need not contain a technical

description of the subject property. Contracts of sale of real
property have no prescribed form for their validity; they follow the
general rule on contracts that they may be entered into in
whatever form, provided all the essential requisites for their
validity are present.758[22] The requisites of a valid contract of
756[20] St. Michael School of Cavite, Inc. v. Masaito Development Corporation, G.R.
No. 166301, February 29, 2008, 547 SCRA 263; Novelty Phils., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 458 Phil. 36 (2003).
757[21] LAND REGISTRATION ACT.
758[22] CIVIL CODE, Art. 1356.

sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code are: (1) consent or
meeting of the minds; (2) determinate subject matter; and (3)
price certain in money or its equivalent.

The failure of the parties to specify with absolute clarity the

object of a contract by including its technical description is of no
moment. What is important is that there is, in fact, an object that
is determinate or at least determinable, as subject of the contract
of sale. The form of a deed of sale provided in Section 127 of Act
No. 496 is only a suggested form. It is not a mandatory form that
must be strictly followed by the parties to a contract.

In the instant case, the deed of sale clearly identifies the

subject properties by indicating their respective lot numbers, lot
areas, and the certificate of title covering them. Resort can
always be made to the technical description as stated in the
certificates of title covering the two properties.

On the alleged nullity of the deed of sale, we hold that

petitioners failed to submit sufficient proof to show that Roque
executed the deed of sale under the undue influence of Belardo or
that the deed of sale was simulated or without consideration.

notarized

document

carries

the

evidentiary

weight

conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and

documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their
favor the presumption of regularity. It must be sustained in full
force and effect so long as he who impugns it does not present
strong, complete, and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity on
account of some flaws or defects provided by law. 759[23]

Petitioners allege that Belardo unduly influenced Roque, who

was already physically weak and senile at that time, into
executing the deed of sale. Belardo allegedly took advantage of
the fact that Roque was living in her house and was dependent on
her for support.

There is undue influence when a person takes improper

advantage of his power over the will of another, depriving the
latter of a reasonable freedom of choice. 760[24] One who alleges
any defect, or the lack of consent to a contract by reason of fraud
or undue influence, must establish by full, clear and convincing
evidence, such specific acts that vitiated the partys consent;
759[23] Herbon v. Palad, G.R. No. 149542, July 20, 2006, 495 SCRA 544, 556.
760[24] CIVIL CODE, Art. 1337.

otherwise,

the

latters

presumed

consent

to

the

contract

prevails.761[25] For undue influence to be present, the influence

exerted must have so overpowered or subjugated the mind of a
contracting party as to destroy his free agency, making him
express the will of another rather than his own. 762[26]

Petitioners adduced no proof that Roque had lost control of

his mental faculties at the time of the sale. Undue influence is not
to be inferred from age, sickness, or debility of body, if sufficient
intelligence remains.763[27] The evidence presented pertained
more to Roques physical condition rather than his mental
condition. On the contrary, Atty. Sanicas, the notary public,
attested that Roque was very healthy and mentally sound and
sharp at the time of the execution of the deed of sale. Atty.
Sanicas said that Roque also told him that he was a Law
graduate.764[28]

761[25] Heirs of Sevilla v. Sevilla, 450 Phil. 598, 603 (2003).

762[26] Carpo v. Chua, G.R. Nos. 150773 and 153599, September 30, 2005, 471
SCRA 471, 482.
763[27] Loyola v. Court of Appeals, 383 Phil. 171, 185 (2000).

764[28] TSN, December 7, 1993, pp. 28-29.

Neither was the contract simulated. The late registration of

the Deed of Sale and Roques execution of the second deed of sale
in favor of Dema-ala did not mean that the contract was
simulated. We are convinced with the explanation given by
respondents witnesses that the deed of sale was not immediately
registered because Belardo did not have the money to pay for the
fees. This explanation is, in fact, plausible considering that
Belardo could barely support herself and her brother, Roque. As
for the second deed of sale, Dema-ala, herself, attested before
the trial court that she let Roque sign the second deed of sale
because the title to the properties were still in his name.

Finally, petitioners argue that the Deed of Sale was not

supported by a consideration since no receipt was shown, and it is
incredulous that Roque, who was already weak, would travel to
Bacolod City just to be able to execute the Deed of Sale.

The Deed of Sale which states receipt of which in full I

hereby

acknowledge

to

my

entire

satisfaction

is

an

acknowledgment receipt in itself. Moreover, the presumption that

a contract has sufficient consideration cannot be overthrown by a
mere assertion that it has no consideration. 765[29]
765[29] Saguid v. Security Finance, Inc., G.R. No. 159467, December 9, 2005, 477
SCRA 256, 270.

Heirs

are

bound

by

contracts

entered

into

by

their

predecessors-in-interest.766[30] As heirs of Roque, petitioners are

bound by the contract of sale that Roque executed in favor of
Belardo. Having been sold already to Belardo, the two properties
no longer formed part of Roques estate which petitioners could
have

inherited.

The

deed

of

extrajudicial

settlement

that

petitioners executed over Lot No. 4 is, therefore, void, since the
property subject thereof did not become part of Roques estate.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.

The Court of Appeals Decision dated September 13, 2002 and
Resolution dated September 24, 2003 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

766[30] CIVIL CODE, Art. 1311; Santos v. Lumbao, G.R. No. 169129, March 28, 2007,
519 SCRA 408, 430.

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIAMARTINEZ

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

Associate Justice

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were

reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13,

the Division Chairperson's
conclusions in the above
consultation before the case
opinion of the Courts Division.

Article VIII of the Constitution and

Attestation, I certify that the
Decision had been reached in
was assigned to the writer of the

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

SECOND DIVISION

IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE

G.R. No. 169144

PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL

OF RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH
PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT
OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR,
MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and
BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS,
Petitioners,

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus -

NACHURA,
ABAD,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO,* JJ.

ERNESTO PALAGANAS,
Respondent.

Promulgated:

** Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta,

per raffle dated January 24, 2011.

January 26, 2011

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the probate before Philippine court of a will executed
abroad by a foreigner although it has not been probated in its place of execution.

The Facts and the Case

On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became
a naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will
and testament she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C.
Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the
Philippines and in the U.S.

On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother

of Ruperta, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition

for the probate of Rupertas will and for his appointment as special administrator of
her estate.767[1] On October 15, 2003, however, petitioners Manuel Miguel
Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of
Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Rupertas will should not be
probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and
Benjamin added that, assuming Rupertas will could be probated in the Philippines, it
is invalid nonetheless for having been executed under duress and without the
testators full understanding of the consequences of such act. Ernesto, they claimed,
is also not qualified to act as administrator of the estate.

Meantime, since Rupertas foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and Sergio, were on
separate occasions in the Philippines for a short visit, respondent Ernesto filed a
motion with the RTC for leave to take their deposition, which it granted. On April, 13,
2004 the RTC directed the parties to submit their memorandum on the issue of
whether or not Rupertas U.S. will may be probated in and allowed by a court in the
Philippines.

On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order: 768[2] (a) admitting to probate
Rupertas last will; (b) appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the
request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the
Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto.

767[1] Docketed as Special Proceedings 112-M-2003, Branch 10, RTC of Malolos,

Bulacan.
768[2] Rollo, pp. 73-77.

Aggrieved by the RTCs order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin appealed to
the Court of Appeals (CA),769[3] arguing that an unprobated will executed by an
American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines.

On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a decision, 770[4] affirming the assailed order of
the RTC,771[5] holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will, subject
to respondent Ernestos submission of the authenticated copies of the documents
specified in the order and his posting of required bond. The CA pointed out that
Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate and
allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be probated in the
Philippines. The present case, said the CA, is different from reprobate, which refers
to a will already probated and allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by different
rules or procedures. Unsatisfied with the decision, Manuel and Benjamin came to
this Court.

The Issue Presented

The key issue presented in this case is whether or not a will executed by a foreigner
abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has not been previously
probated and allowed in the country where it was executed.

The Courts Ruling

769[3] CA-G.R. CV 83564.

770[4] Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes and concurred in by Associate
Justices Rebecca De Guia Salvador and Fernanda Lampas Peralta.
771[5] Rollo, pp. 26-39.

Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin maintain that wills executed by foreigners

abroad must first be probated and allowed in the country of its execution before it
can be probated here. This, they claim, ensures prior compliance with the legal
formalities of the country of its execution. They insist that local courts can only
allow probate of such wills if the proponent proves that: (a) the testator has been
admitted for probate in such foreign country, (b) the will has been admitted to
probate there under its laws, (c) the probate court has jurisdiction over the
proceedings, (d) the law on probate procedure in that foreign country and proof of
compliance with the same, and (e) the legal requirements for the valid execution of
a will.

But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners
abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the
countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our
jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is
abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country.772[6]

In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province
where he has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee
named in the will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time
after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will
allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.

772[6] CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Art. 816.

Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must
show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names,
ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or
decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the
name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been
delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional
facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his
death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, the estate he left in such province. 773[7] The rules do not require
proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of
its execution.

In insisting that Rupertas will should have been first probated and allowed by the
court of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the
procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or reauthentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different
from that probate where the will is presented for the first time before a competent
court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary
to petitioners stance, since this latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it
cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local court
acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its
jurisdiction over the matter can be established.

Besides, petitioners stand is fraught with impractically. If the instituted heirs

do not have the means to go abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good as
depriving them outright of their inheritance, since our law requires that no will shall
773[7] Cuenco v. Court of Appeals, 153 Phil. 115, 133 (1973); Herrera, Remedial
Law, Vol. III-A, Rex Bookstore, 1996 ed., p. 46.

pass either real or personal property unless the will has been proved and allowed by
the proper court.774[8]

Notably, the assailed RTC order of June 17, 2004 is nothing more than an initial
ruling that the court can take cognizance of the petition for probate of Rupertas will
and that, in the meantime, it was designating Ernesto as special administrator of
the estate. The parties have yet to present evidence of the due execution of the will,
i.e. the testators state of mind at the time of the execution and compliance with the
formalities required of wills by the laws of California. This explains the trial courts
directive for Ernesto to submit the duly authenticated copy of Rupertas will and the
certified copies of the Laws of Succession and Probate of Will of California.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Court of
Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CV 83564 dated July 29, 2005.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

774[8] CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Art. 838; RULES OF COURT, Rule 75, Sec. 1.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had

been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Today is Tuesday, October 25, 2016

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD Division
G.R. No. 165748

September 14, 2011

HEIRS OF POLICRONIO M. URETA, SR., namely: CONRADO B. URETA, MACARIO B. URETA, GLORIA
URETA-GONZALES, ROMEO B. URETA, RITA URETA-SOLANO, NENA URETA-TONGCUA, VENANCIO B.
URETA, LILIA URETA-TAYCO, and HEIRS OF POLICRONIO B. URETA, JR., namely: MIGUEL T. URETA,
RAMON POLICRONIO T. URETA, EMMANUEL T. URETA, and BERNADETTE T. URETA, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF LIBERATO M. URETA, namely: TERESA F. URETA, AMPARO URETA-CASTILLO, IGNACIO F.

URETA, SR., EMIRITO F. URETA, WILKIE F. URETA, LIBERATO F. URETA, JR., RAY F. URETA, ZALDY F.
URETA, and MILA JEAN URETA CIPRIANO; HEIRS OF PRUDENCIA URETA PARADERO, namely:
WILLIAM U. PARADERO, WARLITO U. PARADERO, CARMENCITA P. PERLAS, CRISTINA P. CORDOVA,
EDNA P. GALLARDO, LETICIA P. REYES; NARCISO M. URETA; VICENTE M. URETA; HEIRS OF
FRANCISCO M. URETA, namely: EDITA T. URETA-REYES and LOLLIE T. URETA-VILLARUEL; ROQUE M.
URETA; ADELA URETA-GONZALES; HEIRS OF INOCENCIO M. URETA, namely: BENILDA V. URETA,
ALFONSO V. URETA II, DICK RICARDO V. URETA, and ENRIQUE V. URETA; MERLINDA U. RIVERA;
JORGE URETA; ANDRES URETA, WENEFREDA U. TARAN; and BENEDICT URETA, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 165930
HEIRS OF LIBERATO M. URETA, namely: TERESA F. URETA, AMPARO URETA-CASTILLO, IGNACIO F.
URETA, SR., EMIRITO F. URETA, WILKIE F. URETA, LIBERATO F. URETA, JR., RAY F. URETA, ZALDY F.
URETA, and MILA JEAN URETA CIPRIANO; HEIRS OF PRUDENCIA URETA PARADERO, namely:
WILLIAM U. PARADERO, WARLITO U. PARADERO, CARMENCITA P. PERLAS, CRISTINA P. CORDOVA,
EDNA P. GALLARDO, LETICIA P. REYES; NARCISO M. URETA; VICENTE M. URETA; HEIRS OF
FRANCISCO M. URETA, namely: EDITA T. URETA-REYES and LOLLIE T. URETA-VILLARUEL; ROQUE M.
URETA; ADELA URETA-GONZALES; HEIRS OF INOCENCIO M. URETA, namely: BENILDA V. URETA,
ALFONSO V. URETA II, DICK RICARDO V. URETA, and ENRIQUE V. URETA; MERLINDA U. RIVERA;
JORGE URETA; ANDRES URETA, WENEFREDA U. TARAN; and BENEDICT URETA,Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF POLICRONIO M. URETA, SR., namely: CONRADO B. URETA, MACARIO B. URETA, GLORIA
URETA-GONZALES, ROMEO B. URETA, RITA URETA-SOLANO, NENA URETA-TONGCUA, VENANCIO B.
URETA, LILIA URETA-TAYCO, and HEIRS OF POLICRONIO B. URETA, JR., namely: MIGUEL T. URETA,
RAMON POLICRONIO T. URETA, EMMANUEL T. URETA, and BERNADETTE T. URETA, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
These consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure assail the
April 20, 2004 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its October 14, 2004 Resolution2 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 71399,
which affirmed with modification the April 26, 2001 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Kalibo, Aklan (RTC)
in Civil Case No. 5026.
The Facts
In his lifetime, Alfonso Ureta (Alfonso) begot 14 children, namely, Policronio, Liberato, Narciso, Prudencia, Vicente,
Francisco, Inocensio, Roque, Adela, Wenefreda, Merlinda, Benedicto, Jorge, and Andres. The children of Policronio (Heirs
of Policronio), are opposed to the rest of Alfonsos children and their descendants (Heirs of Alfonso).
Alfonso was financially well-off during his lifetime. He owned several fishpens, a fishpond, a sari-sari store, a passenger
jeep, and was engaged in the buying and selling of copra. Policronio, the eldest, was the only child of Alfonso who failed to

finish schooling and instead worked on his fathers lands.

Sometime in October 1969, Alfonso and four of his children, namely, Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia, and Francisco, met at
the house of Liberato. Francisco, who was then a municipal judge, suggested that in order to reduce the inheritance taxes,
their father should make it appear that he had sold some of his lands to his children. Accordingly, Alfonso executed four (4)
Deeds of Sale covering several parcels of land in favor of Policronio,4 Liberato,5 Prudencia,6 and his common-law wife,
Valeriana Dela Cruz.7 The Deed of Sale executed on October 25, 1969, in favor of Policronio, covered six parcels of land,
which are the properties in dispute in this case.
Since the sales were only made for taxation purposes and no monetary consideration was given, Alfonso continued to own,
possess and enjoy the lands and their produce.
When Alfonso died on October 11, 1972, Liberato acted as the administrator of his fathers estate. He was later succeeded
by his sister Prudencia, and then by her daughter, Carmencita Perlas. Except for a portion of parcel 5, the rest of the parcels
transferred to Policronio were tenanted by the Fernandez Family. These tenants never turned over the produce of the lands to
Policronio or any of his heirs, but to Alfonso and, later, to the administrators of his estate.
Policronio died on November 22, 1974. Except for the said portion of parcel 5, neither Policronio nor his heirs ever took
possession of the subject lands.
On April 19, 1989, Alfonsos heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition,8 which included all the lands that were
covered by the four (4) deeds of sale that were previously executed by Alfonso for taxation purposes. Conrado, Policronios
eldest son, representing the Heirs of Policronio, signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in behalf of his co-heirs.
After their fathers death, the Heirs of Policronio found tax declarations in his name covering the six parcels of land. On
June 15, 1995, they obtained a copy of the Deed of Sale executed on October 25, 1969 by Alfonso in favor of Policronio.
Not long after, on July 30, 1995, the Heirs of Policronio allegedly learned about the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
involving Alfonsos estate when it was published in the July 19, 1995 issue of the Aklan Reporter.
Believing that the six parcels of land belonged to their late father, and as such, excluded from the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition, the Heirs of Policronio sought to amicably settle the matter with the Heirs of Alfonso. Earnest efforts proving
futile, the Heirs of Policronio filed a Complaint for Declaration of Ownership, Recovery of Possession, Annulment of
Documents, Partition, and Damages9 against the Heirs of Alfonso before the RTC on November 17, 1995 where the
following issues were submitted: (1) whether or not the Deed of Sale was valid; (2) whether or not the Deed of ExtraJudicial Partition was valid; and (3) who between the parties was entitled to damages.
The Ruling of the RTC
On April 26, 2001, the RTC dismissed the Complaint of the Heirs of Policronio and ruled in favor of the Heirs of Alfonso in
a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the preponderance of evidence tilts in favor of the defendants, hence the instant case is
hereby DISMISSED.

The counterclaims are likewise DISMISSED.

With costs against plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC found that the Heirs of Alfonso clearly established that the Deed of Sale was null and void. It held that the Heirs of
Policronio failed to rebut the evidence of the Heirs of Alfonso, which proved that the Deed of Sale in the possession of the
former was one of the four (4) Deeds of Sale executed by Alfonso in favor of his 3 children and second wife for taxation
purposes; that although tax declarations were issued in the name of Policronio, he or his heirs never took possession of the
subject lands except a portion of parcel 5; and that all the produce were turned over by the tenants to Alfonso and the
administrators of his estate and never to Policronio or his heirs.
The RTC further found that there was no money involved in the sale. Even granting that there was, as claimed by the Heirs
of Policronio, 2,000.00 for six parcels of land, the amount was grossly inadequate. It was also noted that the aggregate area
of the subject lands was more than double the average share adjudicated to each of the other children in the Deed of ExtraJudicial Partition; that the siblings of Policronio were the ones who shared in the produce of the land; and that the Heirs of
Policronio only paid real estate taxes in 1996 and 1997. The RTC opined that Policronio must have been aware that the
transfer was merely for taxation purposes because he did not subsequently take possession of the properties even after the
death of his father.
The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, on the other hand, was declared valid by the RTC as all the heirs of Alfonso were
represented and received equal shares and all the requirements of a valid extra-judicial partition were met. The RTC
considered Conrados claim that he did not understand the full significance of his signature when he signed in behalf of his
co-heirs, as a gratutitous assertion. The RTC was of the view that when he admitted to have signed all the pages and
personally appeared before the notary public, he was presumed to have understood their contents.
Lastly, neither party was entitled to damages. The Heirs of Alfonso failed to present testimony to serve as factual basis for
moral damages, no document was presented to prove actual damages, and the Heirs of Policronio were found to have filed
the case in good faith.
The Ruling of the CA
Aggrieved, the Heirs of Policronio appealed before the CA, which rendered a decision on April 20, 2004, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The appealed Decision, dated 26 April 2001, rendered by Hon.
Judge Dean R. Telan of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 9, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION:
1.) The Deed of Sale in favor of Policronio Ureta, Sr., dated 25 October 1969, covering six (6) parcels of land
is hereby declared VOID for being ABSOLUTELY SIMULATED;
2.) The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, dated 19 April 1989, is ANNULLED;
3.) The claim for actual and exemplary damages are DISMISSED for lack of factual and legal basis.

The case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for the proper partition of ALFONSO URETAS Estate in accordance
with Rule 69 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. No costs at this instance.
SO ORDERED.
The CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that the Deed of Sale was void. It found the Deed of Sale to be absolutely simulated
as the parties did not intend to be legally bound by it. As such, it produced no legal effects and did not alter the juridical
situation of the parties. The CA also noted that Alfonso continued to exercise all the rights of an owner even after the
execution of the Deed of Sale, as it was undisputed that he remained in possession of the subject parcels of land and enjoyed
their produce until his death.
Policronio, on the other hand, never exercised any rights pertaining to an owner over the subject lands from the time they
were sold to him up until his death. He never took or attempted to take possession of the land even after his fathers death,
never demanded delivery of the produce from the tenants, and never paid realty taxes on the properties. It was also noted
that Policronio never disclosed the existence of the Deed of Sale to his children, as they were, in fact, surprised to discover
its existence. The CA, thus, concluded that Policronio must have been aware that the transfer was only made for taxation
purposes.
The testimony of Amparo Castillo, as to the circumstances surrounding the actual arrangement and agreement between the
parties prior to the execution of the four (4) Deeds of Sale, was found by the CA to be unrebutted. The RTCs assessment of
the credibility of her testimony was accorded respect, and the intention of the parties was given the primary consideration in
determining the true nature of the contract.
Contrary to the finding of the RTC though, the CA annulled the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition due to the incapacity of one
of the parties to give his consent to the contract. It held that before Conrado could validly bind his co-heirs to the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition, it was necessary that he be clothed with the proper authority. The CA ruled that a special power of
attorney was required under Article 1878 (5) and (15) of the Civil Code. Without a special power of attorney, it was held that
Conrado lacked the legal capactiy to give the consent of his co-heirs, thus, rendering the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
voidable under Article 1390 (1) of the Civil Code.
As a consequence, the CA ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for the proper partition of the estate, with the option
that the parties may still voluntarily effect the partition by executing another agreement or by adopting the assailed Deed of
Partition with the RTCs approval in either case. Otherwise, the RTC may proceed with the compulsory partition of the
estate in accordance with the Rules.
With regard to the claim for damages, the CA agreed with the RTC and dismissed the claim for actual and compensatory
damages for lack of factual and legal basis.
Both parties filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration, which were denied by the CA for lack of merit in a
Resolution dated October 14, 2004.
In their Motion for Reconsideration, the Heirs of Policronio argued that the RTC violated the best evidence rule in giving
credence to the testimony of Amparo Castillo with regard to the simulation of the Deed of Sale, and that prescription had set
in precluding any question on the validity of the contract.

The CA held that the oral testimony was admissible under Rule 130, Section 9 (b) and (c), which provides that evidence
aliunde may be allowed to explain the terms of the written agreement if the same failed to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto, or when the validity of the written agreement was put in issue. Furthermore, the CA found
that the Heirs of Policronio waived their right to object to evidence aliunde having failed to do so during trial and for raising
such only for the first time on appeal. With regard to prescription, the CA ruled that the action or defense for the declaration
of the inexistence of a contract did not prescribe under Article 1410 of the Civil Code.
On the other hand, the Heirs of Alfonso argued that the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition should not have been annulled, and
instead the preterited heirs should be given their share. The CA reiterated that Conrados lack of capacity to give his coheirs consent to the extra-judicial settlement rendered the same voidable.
Hence, the present Petitions for Review on Certiorari.
The Issues
The issues presented for resolution by the Heirs of Policronio in G.R. No. 165748 are as follows:
I.
Whether the Court of Appeals is correct in ruling that the Deed of Absolute Sale of 25 October 1969 is
void for being absolutely fictitious and in relation therewith, may parol evidence be entertained to
thwart its binding effect after the parties have both died?
Assuming that indeed the said document is simulated, whether or not the parties thereto including
their successors in interest are estopped to question its validity, they being bound by Articles 1412 and
1421 of the Civil Code?
II.
Whether prescription applies to bar any question respecting the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated 25 October 1969? Whether prescription applies to bar any collateral attack on the validity of the
deed of absolute sale executed 21 years earlier?
III.
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly ruled in nullifying the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition because
Conrado Ureta signed the same without the written authority from his siblings in contravention of
Article 1878 in relation to Article 1390 of the Civil Code and in relation therewith, whether the defense
of ratification and/or preterition raised for the first time on appeal may be entertained?
The issues presented for resolution by the Heirs of Alfonso in G.R. No. 165930 are as follows:
I.
Whether or not grave error was committed by the Trial Court and Court of Appeals in declaring the

Deed of Sale of subject properties as absolutely simulated and null and void thru parol evidence based
on their factual findings as to its fictitious nature, and there being waiver of any objection based on
violation of the parol evidence rule.
II.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that Conrado Uretas lack of capacity to
give his co-heirs consent to the Extra-Judicial Partition rendered the same voidable.
III.
Granting arguendo that Conrado Ureta was not authorized to represent his co-heirs and there was no
ratification, whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in ordering the remand of the case to the
Regional Trial Court for partition of the estate of Alfonso Ureta.
IV.
Since the sale in favor of Policronio Ureta Sr. was null and void ab initio, the properties covered therein
formed part of the estate of the late Alfonso Ureta and was correctly included in the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition even if no prior action for nullification of the sale was filed by the heirs of
Liberato Ureta.
V.
Whether or not the heirs of Policronio Ureta Sr. can claim that estoppel based on Article 1412 of the
Civil Code as well as the issue of prescription can still be raised on appeal.
These various contentions revolve around two major issues, to wit: (1) whether the Deed of Sale is valid, and (2) whether
the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition is valid. Thus, the assigned errors shall be discussed jointly and in seriatim.
The Ruling of the Court
Validity of the Deed of Sale
Two veritable legal presumptions bear on the validity of the Deed of Sale: (1) that there was sufficient consideration for the
contract; and (2) that it was the result of a fair and regular private transaction. If shown to hold, these presumptions infer
prima facie the transactions validity, except that it must yield to the evidence adduced.10
As will be discussed below, the evidence overcomes these two presumptions.
Absolute Simulation
First, the Deed of Sale was not the result of a fair and regular private transaction because it was absolutely simulated.
The Heirs of Policronio argued that the land had been validly sold to Policronio as the Deed of Sale contained all the

essential elements of a valid contract of sale, by virtue of which, the subject properties were transferred in his name as
evidenced by the tax declaration. There being no invalidation prior to the execution of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition,
the probity and integrity of the Deed of Sale should remain undiminished and accorded respect as it was a duly notarized
public instrument.
The Heirs of Policronio posited that his loyal services to his father and his being the eldest among Alfonsos children, might
have prompted the old man to sell the subject lands to him at a very low price as an advance inheritance. They explained that
Policronios failure to take possession of the subject lands and to claim their produce manifests a Filipino family practice
wherein a child would take possession and enjoy the fruits of the land sold by a parent only after the latters death.
Policronio simply treated the lands the same way his father Alfonso treated them - where his children enjoyed usufructuary
rights over the properties, as opposed to appropriating them exclusively to himself. They contended that Policronios failure
to take actual possession of the lands did not prove that he was not the owner as he was merely exercising his right to
dispose of them. They argue that it was an error on the part of the CA to conclude that ownership by Policronio was not
established by his failure to possess the properties sold. Instead, emphasis should be made on the fact that the tax
declarations, being indicia of possession, were in Policronios name.
They further argued that the Heirs of Alfonso failed to appreciate that the Deed of Sale was clear enough to convey the
subject parcels of land. Citing jurisprudence, they contend that there is a presumption that an instrument sets out the true
agreement of the parties thereto and that it was executed for valuable consideration,11 and where there is no doubt as to the
intention of the parties to a contract, the literal meaning of the stipulation shall control.12 Nowhere in the Deed of Sale is it
indicated that the transfer was only for taxation purposes. On the contrary, the document clearly indicates that the lands were
sold. Therefore, they averred that the literal meaning of the stipulation should control.
The Court disagrees.
The Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the finding of the CA that the Deed of Sale is null and void for being
absolutely simulated. The Civil Code provides:
Art. 1345. Simulation of a contract may be absolute or relative. The former takes place when the parties do not intend to be
bound at all; the latter, when the parties conceal their true agreement.
Art. 1346. An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when it does not prejudice a third
person and is not intended for any purpose contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy binds the
parties to their real agreement.
Valerio v. Refresca13 is instructive on the matter of simulation of contracts:
In absolute simulation, there is a colorable contract but it has no substance as the parties have no intention to be bound by it.
The main characteristic of an absolute simulation is that the apparent contract is not really desired or intended to produce
legal effect or in any way alter the juridical situation of the parties. As a result, an absolutely simulated or fictitious contract
is void, and the parties may recover from each other what they may have given under the contract. However, if the parties
state a false cause in the contract to conceal their real agreement, the contract is relatively simulated and the parties are still
bound by their real agreement. Hence, where the essential requisites of a contract are present and the simulation refers only
to the content or terms of the contract, the agreement is absolutely binding and enforceable between the parties and their
successors in interest.

Lacking, therefore, in an absolutely simulated contract is consent which is essential to a valid and enforceable contract.14
Thus, where a person, in order to place his property beyond the reach of his creditors, simulates a transfer of it to another, he
does not really intend to divest himself of his title and control of the property; hence, the deed of transfer is but a sham.15
Similarly, in this case, Alfonso simulated a transfer to Policronio purely for taxation purposes, without intending to transfer
ownership over the subject lands.
The primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract is the intention of the parties. If the words of a
contract appear to contravene the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail. Such intention is determined not
only from the express terms of their agreement, but also from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties.16 The
true intention of the parties in this case was sufficiently proven by the Heirs of Alfonso.
The Heirs of Alfonso established by a preponderance of evidence17 that the Deed of Sale was one of the four (4) absolutely
simulated Deeds of Sale which involved no actual monetary consideration, executed by Alfonso in favor of his children,
Policronio, Liberato, and Prudencia, and his second wife, Valeriana, for taxation purposes.
Amparo Castillo, the daughter of Liberato, testified, to wit:
Q: Now sometime in the year 1969 can you recall if your grandfather and his children [met] in your house?
A: Yes sir, that was sometime in October 1969 when they [met] in our house, my grandfather, my late uncle Policronio
Ureta, my late uncle Liberato Ureta, my uncle Francisco Ureta, and then my auntie Prudencia Ureta they talk[ed] about, that
idea came from my uncle Francisco Ureta to [sell] some parcels of land to his children to lessen the inheritance tax whatever
happened to my grandfather, actually no money involved in this sale.
Q: Now you said there was that agreement, verbal agreement. [W]here were you when this Alfonso Ureta and his children
gather[ed] in your house?
A: I was near them in fact I heard everything they were talking [about]
xxx
Q: Were there documents of sale executed by Alfonso Ureta in furtherance of their verbal agreement?
A: Yes sir.
Q: To whom in particular did your grandfather Alfonso Ureta execute this deed of sale without money consideration
according to you?
A: To my uncle Policronio Ureta and to Prudencia Ureta Panadero.
Q: And who else?
A: To Valeriana dela Cruz.
Q: How about your father?

A: He has.18
The other Deeds of Sale executed by Alfonso in favor of his children Prudencia and Liberato, and second wife Valeriana, all
bearing the same date of execution, were duly presented in evidence by the Heirs of Alfonso, and were uncontested by the
Heirs of Policronio. The lands which were the subject of these Deeds of Sale were in fact included in the Deed of ExtraJudicial Partition executed by all the heirs of Alfonso, where it was expressly stipulated:
That the above-named Amparo U. Castillo, Prudencia U. Paradero, Conrado B. Ureta and Merlinda U. Rivera do hereby
recognize and acknowledge as a fact that the properties presently declared in their respective names or in the names of their
respective parents and are included in the foregoing instrument are actually the properties of the deceased Alfonso Ureta and
were transferred only for the purpose of effective administration and development and convenience in the payment of taxes
and, therefore, all instruments conveying or affecting the transfer of said properties are null and void from the beginning.19
As found by the CA, Alfonso continued to exercise all the rights of an owner even after the execution of the Deeds of Sale.
It was undisputed that Alfonso remained in possession of the subject lands and enjoyed their produce until his death. No
credence can be given to the contention of the Heirs of Policrionio that their father did not take possession of the subject
lands or enjoyed the fruits thereof in deference to a Filipino family practice. Had this been true, Policronio should have
taken possession of the subject lands after his father died. On the contrary, it was admitted that neither Policronio nor his
heirs ever took possession of the subject lands from the time they were sold to him, and even after the death of both Alfonso
and Policronio.
It was also admitted by the Heirs of Policronio that the tenants of the subject lands never turned over the produce of the
properties to Policronio or his heirs but only to Alfonso and the administrators of his estate. Neither was there a demand for
their delivery to Policronio or his heirs. Neither did Policronio ever pay real estate taxes on the properties, the only payment
on record being those made by his heirs in 1996 and 1997 ten years after his death. In sum, Policronio never exercised any
rights pertaining to an owner over the subject lands.
The most protuberant index of simulation of contract is the complete absence of an attempt in any manner on the part of the
ostensible buyer to assert rights of ownership over the subject properties. Policronios failure to take exclusive possession of
the subject properties or, in the alternative, to collect rentals, is contrary to the principle of ownership. Such failure is a clear
badge of simulation that renders the whole transaction void. 20
It is further telling that Policronio never disclosed the existence of the Deed of Sale to his children. This, coupled with
Policronios failure to exercise any rights pertaining to an owner of the subject lands, leads to the conclusion that he was
aware that the transfer was only made for taxation purposes and never intended to bind the parties thereto.
As the above factual circumstances remain unrebutted by the Heirs of Policronio, the factual findings of the RTC, which
were affirmed by the CA, remain binding and conclusive upon this Court.21
It is clear that the parties did not intend to be bound at all, and as such, the Deed of Sale produced no legal effects and did
not alter the juridical situation of the parties. The Deed of Sale is, therefore, void for being absolutely simulated pursuant to
Article 1409 (2) of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:

xxx
(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;
xxx
For guidance, the following are the most fundamental characteristics of void or inexistent contracts:
1) As a general rule, they produce no legal effects whatsoever in accordance with the principle "quod nullum
est nullum producit effectum."
2) They are not susceptible of ratification.
3) The right to set up the defense of inexistence or absolute nullity cannot be waived or renounced.
4) The action or defense for the declaration of their inexistence or absolute nullity is imprescriptible.
5) The inexistence or absolute nullity of a contract cannot be invoked by a person whose interests are not
directly affected.22
Since the Deed of Sale is void, the subject properties were properly included in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of the
estate of Alfonso.
Absence and Inadequacy of Consideration
The second presumption is rebutted by the lack of consideration for the Deed of Sale.
In their Answer,23 the Heirs of Alfonso initially argued that the Deed of Sale was void for lack of consideration, and even
granting that there was consideration, such was inadequate. The Heirs of Policronio counter that the defenses of absence or
inadequacy of consideration are not grounds to render a contract void.
The Heirs of Policronio contended that under Article 1470 of the Civil Code, gross inadequacy of the price does not affect a
contract of sale, except as it may indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or some other
act or contract. Citing jurisprudence, they argued that inadequacy of monetary consideration does not render a conveyance
inexistent as liberality may be sufficient cause for a valid contract, whereas fraud or bad faith may render it either rescissible
or voidable, although valid until annulled.24 Thus, they argued that if the contract suffers from inadequate consideration, it
remains valid until annulled, and the remedy of rescission calls for judicial intervention, which remedy the Heirs of Alfonso
failed to take.
It is further argued that even granting that the sale of the subject lands for a consideration of 2,000.00 was inadequate,
absent any evidence of the fair market value of the land at the time of its sale, it cannot be concluded that the price at which
it was sold was inadequate.25 As there is nothing in the records to show that the Heirs of Alfonso supplied the true value of
the land in 1969, the amount of 2,000.00 must thus stand as its saleable value.
On this issue, the Court finds for the Heirs of Alfonso.

For lack of consideration, the Deed of Sale is once again found to be void. It states that Policronio paid, and Alfonso
received, the 2,000.00 purchase price on the date of the signing of the contract:
That I, ALFONSO F. URETA, x x x for and in consideration of the sum of TWO THOUSAND (2,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency, to me in hand paid by POLICRONIO M. URETA, x x x, do hereby CEDE, TRANSFER, and
CONVEY, by way of absolute sale, x x x six (6) parcels of land x x x.26 [Emphasis ours]
Although, on its face, the Deed of Sale appears to be supported by valuable consideration, the RTC found that there was no
money involved in the sale.27 This finding was affirmed by the CA in ruling that the sale is void for being absolutely
simulated. Considering that there is no cogent reason to deviate from such factual findings, they are binding on this Court.
It is well-settled in a long line of cases that where a deed of sale states that the purchase price has been paid but in fact has
never been paid, the deed of sale is null and void for lack of consideration.28 Thus, although the contract states that the
purchase price of 2,000.00 was paid by Policronio to Alfonso for the subject properties, it has been proven that such was
never in fact paid as there was no money involved. It must, therefore, follow that the Deed of Sale is void for lack of
consideration.
Given that the Deed of Sale is void, it is unnecessary to discuss the issue on the inadequacy of consideration.
Parol Evidence and Hearsay
The Heirs of Policronio aver that the rules on parol evidence and hearsay were violated by the CA in ruling that the Deed of
Sale was void.
They argued that based on the parol evidence rule, the Heirs of Alfonso and, specifically, Amparo Castillo, were not in a
position to prove the terms outside of the contract because they were not parties nor successors-in-interest in the Deed of
Sale in question. Thus, it is argued that the testimony of Amparo Castillo violates the parol evidence rule.
Stemming from the presumption that the Heirs of Alfonso were not parties to the contract, it is also argued that the parol
evidence rule may not be properly invoked by either party in the litigation against the other, where at least one of the parties
to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question and does not base a claim on the
instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby.29
Their arguments are untenable.
The objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at the proper time, as soon as the grounds therefor
become reasonably apparent, and if not so made, it will be understood to have been waived. In the case of testimonial
evidence, the objection must be made when the objectionable question is asked or after the answer is given if the
objectionable features become apparent only by reason of such answer.30 In this case, the Heirs of Policronio failed to timely
object to the testimony of Amparo Castillo and they are, thus, deemed to have waived the benefit of the parol evidence rule.
Granting that the Heirs of Policronio timely objected to the testimony of Amparo Castillo, their argument would still fail.
Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in his
pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution of
the written agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills.
[Emphasis ours]
Paragraphs (b) and (c) are applicable in the case at bench.
The failure of the Deed of Sale to express the true intent and agreement of the parties was clearly put in issue in the
Answer31 of the Heirs of Alfonso to the Complaint. It was alleged that the Deed of Sale was only made to lessen the payment
of estate and inheritance taxes and not meant to transfer ownership. The exception in paragraph (b) is allowed to enable the
court to ascertain the true intent of the parties, and once the intent is clear, it shall prevail over what the document appears to
be on its face.32 As the true intent of the parties was duly proven in the present case, it now prevails over what appears on the
Deed of Sale.
The validity of the Deed of Sale was also put in issue in the Answer, and was precisely one of the issues submitted to the
RTC for resolution.33 The operation of the parol evidence rule requires the existence of a valid written agreement. It is, thus,
not applicable in a proceeding where the validity of such agreement is the fact in dispute, such as when a contract may be
void for lack of consideration.34 Considering that the Deed of Sale has been shown to be void for being absolutely simulated
and for lack of consideration, the Heirs of Alfonso are not precluded from presenting evidence to modify, explain or add to
the terms of the written agreement.
The Heirs of Policronio must be in a state of confusion in arguing that the Heirs of Alfonso may not question the Deed of
Sale for not being parties or successors-in-interest therein on the basis that the parol evidence rule may not be properly
invoked in a proceeding or litigation where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the
written instrument in question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or
the relation established thereby. If their argument was to be accepted, then the Heirs of Policronio would themselves be
precluded from invoking the parol evidence rule to exclude the evidence of the Heirs of Alfonso.
Indeed, the applicability of the parol evidence rule requires that the case be between parties and their successors-in-interest.35
In this case, both the Heirs of Alfonso and the Heirs of Policronio are successors-in-interest of the parties to the Deed of Sale

as they claim rights under Alfonso and Policronio, respectively. The parol evidence rule excluding evidence aliunde,
however, still cannot apply because the present case falls under two exceptions to the rule, as discussed above.
With respect to hearsay, the Heirs of Policronio contended that the rule on hearsay was violated when the testimony of
Amparo Castillo was given weight in proving that the subject lands were only sold for taxation purposes as she was a person
alien to the contract. Even granting that they did not object to her testimony during trial, they argued that it should not have
been appreciated by the CA because it had no probative value whatsoever.36
The Court disagrees.
It has indeed been held that hearsay evidence whether objected to or not cannot be given credence for having no probative
value.37 This principle, however, has been relaxed in cases where, in addition to the failure to object to the admissibility of
the subject evidence, there were other pieces of evidence presented or there were other circumstances prevailing to support
the fact in issue. In Top-Weld Manufacturing, Inc. v. ECED S.A.,38 this Court held:
Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in an injunction suit (Parker v. Furlong, 62 P. 490) but, when
no objection is made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be considered and given the importance it deserves. (Smith v.
Delaware & Atlantic Telegraph & Telephone Co., 51 A 464). Although we should warn of the undesirability of issuing
judgments solely on the basis of the affidavits submitted, where as here, said affidavits are overwhelming, uncontroverted by
competent evidence and not inherently improbable, we are constrained to uphold the allegations of the respondents
regarding the multifarious violations of the contracts made by the petitioner.
In the case at bench, there were other prevailing circumstances which corroborate the testimony of Amparo Castillo. First,
the other Deeds of Sale which were executed in favor of Liberato, Prudencia, and Valeriana on the same day as that of
Policronios were all presented in evidence. Second, all the properties subject therein were included in the Deed of ExtraJudicial Partition of the estate of Alfonso. Third, Policronio, during his lifetime, never exercised acts of ownership over the
subject properties (as he never demanded or took possession of them, never demanded or received the produce thereof, and
never paid real estate taxes thereon). Fourth, Policronio never informed his children of the sale.
As the Heirs of Policronio failed to controvert the evidence presented, and to timely object to the testimony of Amparo
Castillo, both the RTC and the CA correctly accorded probative weight to her testimony.
Prior Action Unnecessary
The Heirs of Policronio averred that the Heirs of Alfonso should have filed an action to declare the sale void prior to
executing the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition. They argued that the sale should enjoy the presumption of regularity, and
until overturned by a court, the Heirs of Alfonso had no authority to include the land in the inventory of properties of
Alfonsos estate. By doing so, they arrogated upon themselves the power of invalidating the Deed of Sale which is
exclusively vested in a court of law which, in turn, can rule only upon the observance of due process. Thus, they contended
that prescription, laches, or estoppel have set in to militate against assailing the validity of the sale.
The Heirs of Policronio are mistaken.
A simulated contract of sale is without any cause or consideration, and is, therefore, null and void; in such case, no
independent action to rescind or annul the contract is necessary, and it may be treated as non-existent for all purposes.39 A

void or inexistent contract is one which has no force and effect from the beginning, as if it has never been entered into, and
which cannot be validated either by time or ratification. A void contract produces no effect whatsoever either against or in
favor of anyone; it does not create, modify or extinguish the juridical relation to which it refers.40 Therefore, it was not
necessary for the Heirs of Alfonso to first file an action to declare the nullity of the Deed of Sale prior to executing the Deed
of Extra-Judicial Partition.
Personality to Question Sale
The Heirs of Policronio contended that the Heirs of Alfonso are not parties, heirs, or successors-in-interest under the
contemplation of law to clothe them with the personality to question the Deed of Sale. They argued that under Article 1311
of the Civil Code, contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs. Thus, the genuine character of a
contract which personally binds the parties cannot be put in issue by a person who is not a party thereto. They posited that
the Heirs of Alfonso were not parties to the contract; neither did they appear to be beneficiaries by way of assignment or
inheritance. Unlike themselves who are direct heirs of Policronio, the Heirs of Alfonso are not Alfonsos direct heirs. For the
Heirs of Alfonso to qualify as parties, under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, they must first prove that they are either heirs or
assignees. Being neither, they have no legal standing to question the Deed of Sale.
They further argued that the sale cannot be assailed for being barred under Article 1421 of the Civil Code which provides
that the defense of illegality of a contract is not available to third persons whose interests are not directly affected.
Again, the Court disagrees.
Article 1311 and Article 1421 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, x x x
Art. 1421. The defense of illegality of contracts is not available to third persons whose interests are not directly affected.
The right to set up the nullity of a void or non-existent contract is not limited to the parties, as in the case of annullable or
voidable contracts; it is extended to third persons who are directly affected by the contract. Thus, where a contract is
absolutely simulated, even third persons who may be prejudiced thereby may set up its inexistence.41 The Heirs of Alfonso
are the children of Alfonso, with his deceased children represented by their children (Alfonsos grandchildren). The Heirs of
Alfonso are clearly his heirs and successors-in-interest and, as such, their interests are directly affected, thereby giving them
the right to question the legality of the Deed of Sale.
Inapplicability of Article 842
The Heirs of Policronio further argued that even assuming that the Heirs of Alfonso have an interest in the Deed of Sale,
they would still be precluded from questioning its validity. They posited that the Heirs of Alfonso must first prove that the
sale of Alfonsos properties to Policronio substantially diminished their successional rights or that their legitimes would be
unduly prejudiced, considering that under Article 842 of the Civil Code, one who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his
estate provided that he does not contravene the provisions of the Civil Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs. Having
failed to do so, they argued that the Heirs of Alfonso should be precluded from questioning the validity of the Deed of Sale.
Still, the Court disagrees.

Article 842 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 842. One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person
having capacity to succeed.
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with
regard to the legitime of said heirs.
This article refers to the principle of freedom of disposition by will. What is involved in the case at bench is not a disposition
by will but by Deed of Sale. Hence, the Heirs of Alfonso need not first prove that the disposition substantially diminished
their successional rights or unduly prejudiced their legitimes.
Inapplicability of Article 1412
The Heirs of Policronio contended that even assuming that the contract was simulated, the Heirs of Alfonso would still be
barred from recovering the properties by reason of Article 1412 of the Civil Code, which provides that if the act in which the
unlawful or forbidden cause does not constitute a criminal offense, and the fault is both on the contracting parties, neither
may recover what he has given by virtue of the contract or demand the performance of the others undertaking. As the Heirs
of Alfonso alleged that the purpose of the sale was to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes, they cannot take from the
Heirs of Policronio what had been given to their father.
On this point, the Court again disagrees.
Article 1412 of the Civil Code is as follows:
Art. 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a criminal offense, the following
rules shall be observed:
(1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has given by virtue of the contract,
or demand the performance of the others undertaking;
(2) When only one of the contracting parties is at fault, he cannot recover what he has given by reason of the contract, or ask
for the fulfillment of what has been promised him. The other, who is not at fault, may demand the return of what he has
given without any obligation to comply with his promise.
Article 1412 is not applicable to fictitious or simulated contracts, because they refer to contracts with an illegal cause or
subject-matter.42 This article presupposes the existence of a cause, it cannot refer to fictitious or simulated contracts which
are in reality non-existent.43 As it has been determined that the Deed of Sale is a simulated contract, the provision cannot
apply to it.
Granting that the Deed of Sale was not simulated, the provision would still not apply. Since the subject properties were
included as properties of Alfonso in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, they are covered by corresponding inheritance and
estate taxes. Therefore, tax evasion, if at all present, would not arise, and Article 1412 would again be inapplicable.
Prescription

From the position that the Deed of Sale is valid and not void, the Heirs of Policronio argued that any question regarding its
validity should have been initiated through judicial process within 10 years from its notarization in accordance with Article
1144 of the Civil Code. Since 21 years had already elapsed when the Heirs of Alfonso assailed the validity of the Deed of
Sale in 1996, prescription had set in. Furthermore, since the Heirs of Alfonso did not seek to nullify the tax declarations of
Policronio, they had impliedly acquiesced and given due recognition to the Heirs of Policronio as the rightful inheritors and
should, thus, be barred from laying claim on the land.
The Heirs of Policronio are mistaken.
Article 1410 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1410. The action for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.
This is one of the most fundamental characteristics of void or inexistent contracts.44
As the Deed of Sale is a void contract, the action for the declaration of its nullity, even if filed 21 years after its execution,
cannot be barred by prescription for it is imprescriptible. Furthermore, the right to set up the defense of inexistence or
absolute nullity cannot be waived or renounced.45 Therefore, the Heirs of Alfonso cannot be precluded from setting up the
defense of its inexistence.
Validity of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
The Court now resolves the issue of the validity of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition.
Unenforceability
The Heirs of Alfonso argued that the CA was mistaken in annulling the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition due to the incapacity
of Conrado to give the consent of his co-heirs for lack of a special power of attorney. They contended that what was
involved was not the capacity to give consent in behalf of the co-heirs but the authority to represent them. They argue that
the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition is not a voidable or an annullable contract under Article 1390 of the Civil Code, but
rather, it is an unenforceable or, more specifically, an unauthorized contract under Articles 1403 (1) and 1317 of the Civil
Code. As such, the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition should not be annulled but only be rendered unenforceable against the
siblings of Conrado.
They further argued that under Article 1317 of the Civil Code, when the persons represented without authority have ratified
the unauthorized acts, the contract becomes enforceable and binding. They contended that the Heirs of Policronio ratified the
Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition when Conrado took possession of one of the parcels of land adjudicated to him and his
siblings, and when another parcel was used as collateral for a loan entered into by some of the Heirs of Policronio. The Deed
of Extra-Judicial Partition having been ratified and its benefits accepted, the same thus became enforceable and binding
upon them.
The Heirs of Alfonso averred that granting arguendo that Conrado was not authorized to represent his co-heirs and there was
no ratification, the CA should not have remanded the case to the RTC for partition of Alfonsos estate. They argued that the
CA should not have applied the Civil Code general provision on contracts, but the special provisions dealing with succession
and partition. They contended that contrary to the ruling of the CA, the extra-judicial parition was not an act of strict

dominion, as it has been ruled that partition of inherited land is not a conveyance but a confirmation or ratification of title or
right to the land.46 Therefore, the law requiring a special power of attorney should not be applied to partitions.
On the other hand, the Heirs of Policronio insisted that the CA pronouncement on the invalidity of the Deed of ExtraJudicial Partition should not be disturbed because the subject properties should not have been included in the estate of
Alfonso, and because Conrado lacked the written authority to represent his siblings. They argued with the CA in ruling that a
special power of attorney was required before Conrado could sign in behalf of his co-heirs.
The Heirs of Policronio denied that they ratified the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition. They claimed that there is nothing on
record that establishes that they ratified the partition. Far from doing so, they precisely questioned its execution by filing a
complaint. They further argued that under Article 1409 (3) of the Civil Code, ratification cannot be invoked to validate the
illegal act of including in the partition those properties which do not belong to the estate as it provides another mode of
acquiring ownership not sanctioned by law.
Furthermore, the Heirs of Policronio contended that the defenses of unenforceability, ratification, and preterition are being
raised for the first time on appeal by the Heirs of Alfonso. For having failed to raise them during the trial, the Heirs of
Alfonso should be deemed to have waived their right to do so.
The Court agrees in part with the Heirs of Alfonso.
To begin, although the defenses of unenforceability, ratification and preterition were raised by the Heirs of Alfonso for the
first time on appeal, they are concomitant matters which may be taken up. As long as the questioned items bear relevance
and close relation to those specifically raised, the interest of justice would dictate that they, too, must be considered and
resolved. The rule that only theories raised in the initial proceedings may be taken up by a party thereto on appeal should
refer to independent, not concomitant matters, to support or oppose the cause of action.47
In the RTC, the Heirs of Policronio alleged that Conrados consent was vitiated by mistake and undue influence, and that he
signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition without the authority or consent of his co-heirs.
The RTC found that Conrados credibility had faltered, and his claims were rejected by the RTC as gratuitous assertions. On
the basis of such, the RTC ruled that Conrado duly represented his siblings in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition.
On the other hand, the CA annulled the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition under Article 1390 (1) of the Civil Code, holding
that a special power of attorney was lacking as required under Article 1878 (5) and (15) of the Civil Code. These articles are
as follows:
Art. 1878. Special powers of attorney are necessary in the following cases:
xxx
(5) To enter into any contract by which the ownership of an immovable is transmitted or acquired either gratuitously or for a
valuable consideration;
xxx

(15) Any other act of strict dominion.

Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been no damage to the
contracting parties:
(1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract;
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
These contracts are binding, unless they are annulled by a proper action in court. They are susceptible of ratification.
This Court finds that Article 1878 (5) and (15) is inapplicable to the case at bench. It has been held in several cases48 that
partition among heirs is not legally deemed a conveyance of real property resulting in change of ownership. It is not a
transfer of property from one to the other, but rather, it is a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property that an
heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance. It is merely a designation and
segregation of that part which belongs to each heir. The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition cannot, therefore, be considered as
an act of strict dominion. Hence, a special power of attorney is not necessary.
In fact, as between the parties, even an oral partition by the heirs is valid if no creditors are affected. The requirement of a
written memorandum under the statute of frauds does not apply to partitions effected by the heirs where no creditors are
involved considering that such transaction is not a conveyance of property resulting in change of ownership but merely a
designation and segregation of that part which belongs to each heir.49
Neither is Article 1390 (1) applicable. Article 1390 (1) contemplates the incapacity of a party to give consent to a contract.
What is involved in the case at bench though is not Conrados incapacity to give consent to the contract, but rather his lack
of authority to do so. Instead, Articles 1403 (1), 1404, and 1317 of the Civil Code find application to the circumstances
prevailing in this case. They are as follows:
Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or legal representation, or who
has acted beyond his powers;
Art. 1404. Unauthorized contracts are governed by Article 1317 and the principles of agency in Title X of this Book.
Art. 1317. No one may contract in the name of another without being authorized by the latter, or unless he has by law a right
to represent him.
A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond
his powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been
executed, before it is revoked by the other contracting party.
Such was similarly held in the case of Badillo v. Ferrer:
The Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale is not a voidable or an annullable contract under Article 1390 of the New Civil

Code. Article 1390 renders a contract voidable if one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to the contract or if the
contracting partys consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. x x x
The deed of extrajudicial parition and sale is an unenforceable or, more specifically, an unauthorized contract under Articles
1403(1) and 1317 of the New Civil Code.50
Therefore, Conrados failure to obtain authority from his co-heirs to sign the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in their behalf
did not result in his incapacity to give consent so as to render the contract voidable, but rather, it rendered the contract valid
but unenforceable against Conrados co-heirs for having been entered into without their authority.
A closer review of the evidence on record, however, will show that the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition is not unenforceable
but, in fact, valid, binding and enforceable against all the Heirs of Policronio for having given their consent to the contract.
Their consent to the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition has been proven by a preponderance of evidence.
Regarding his alleged vitiated consent due to mistake and undue influence to the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, Conrado
testified, to wit:
Q: Mr. Ureta you remember having signed a document entitled deed of extra judicial partition consisting of 11 pages and
which have previously [been] marked as Exhibit I for the plaintiffs?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Can you recall where did you sign this document?
A: The way I remember I signed that in our house.
Q: And who requested or required you to sign this document?
A: My aunties.
Q: Who in particular if you can recall?
A: Nay Pruding Panadero.
Q: You mean that this document that you signed was brought to your house by your Auntie Pruding Pa[r]adero [who]
requested you to sign that document?
A: When she first brought that document I did not sign that said document because I [did] no[t] know the contents of that
document.
Q: How many times did she bring this document to you [until] you finally signed the document?
A: Perhaps 3 times.
Q: Can you tell the court why you finally signed it?

A: Because the way she explained it to me that the land of my grandfather will be partitioned.
Q: When you signed this document were your brothers and sisters who are your co-plaintiffs in this case aware of your act to
sign this document?
A: They do not know.
xxx
Q: After you have signed this document did you inform your brothers and sisters that you have signed this document?
No I did not. 51
xxx
Q: Now you read the document when it was allegedly brought to your house by your aunt Pruding Pa[r]adero?
A: I did not read it because as I told her I still want to ask the advise of my brothers and sisters.
Q: So do I get from you that you have never read the document itself or any part thereof?
A: I have read the heading.
xxx
Q: And why is it that you did not read all the pages of this document because I understand that you know also how to read in
English?
A: Because the way Nay Pruding explained to me is that the property of my grandfather will be partitioned that is why I am
so happy.
xxx
Q: You mean to say that after you signed this deed of extra judicial partition up to the present you never informed them?
A: Perhaps they know already that I have signed and they read already the document and they have read the document.
Q: My question is different, did you inform them?
A: The document sir? I did not tell them.
Q: Even until now?
A: Until now I did not inform them.52

This Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the finding of the RTC that Conrados explanations were mere gratuitous
assertions not entitled to any probative weight. The RTC found Conrados credibility to have faltered when he testified that
perhaps his siblings were already aware of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition. The RTC was in the best position to judge
the credibility of the witness testimony. The CA also recognized that Conrados consent was not vitiated by mistake and
undue influence as it required a special power of attorney in order to bind his co-heirs and, as such, the CA thereby
recognized that his signature was binding to him but not with respect to his co-heirs. Findings of fact of the trial court,
particularly when affirmed by the CA, are binding to this Court.53
Furthermore, this Court notes other peculiarities in Conrados testimony. Despite claims of undue influence, there is no
indication that Conrado was forced to sign by his aunt, Prudencia Paradero. In fact, he testified that he was happy to sign
because his grandfathers estate would be partitioned. Conrado, thus, clearly understood the document he signed. It is also
worth noting that despite the document being brought to him on three separate occasions and indicating his intention to
inform his siblings about it, Conrado failed to do so, and still neglected to inform them even after he had signed the
partition. All these circumstances negate his claim of vitiated consent. Having duly signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition, Conrado is bound to it. Thus, it is enforceable against him.
Although Conrados co-heirs claimed that they did not authorize Conrado to sign the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in their
behalf, several circumstances militate against their contention.
First, the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition was executed on April 19, 1989, and the Heirs of Policronio claim that they only
came to know of its existence on July 30, 1995 through an issue of the Aklan Reporter. It is difficult to believe that Conrado
did not inform his siblings about the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition or at least broach its subject with them for more than
five years from the time he signed it, especially after indicating in his testimony that he had intended to do so.
Second, Conrado retained possession of one of the parcels of land adjudicated to him and his co-heirs in the Deed of ExtraJudicial Partition.
Third, after the execution of the partition on April 19, 1989 and more than a year before they claimed to have discovered the
existence of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition on July 30, 1995, some of the Heirs of Policronio, namely, Rita Solano,
Macario Ureta, Lilia Tayco, and Venancio Ureta executed on June 1, 1994, a Special Power of Attorney54 in favor of their
sister Gloria Gonzales, authorizing her to obtain a loan from a bank and to mortgage one of the parcels of land adjudicated
to them in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition to secure payment of the loan. They were able to obtain the loan using the
land as collateral, over which a Real Estate Mortgage55 was constituted. Both the Special Power of Attorney and the Real
Estate Mortgage were presented in evidence in the RTC, and were not controverted or denied by the Heirs of Policronio.
Fourth, in the letter dated August 15, 1995, sent by the counsel of the Heirs of Policronio to the Heirs of Alfonso requesting
for amicable settlement, there was no mention that Conrados consent to the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition was vitiated by
mistake and undue influence or that they had never authorized Conrado to represent them or sign the document on their
behalf. It is questionable for such a pertinent detail to have been omitted. The body of said letter is reproduced hereunder as
follows:
Greetings:
Your nephews and nieces, children of your deceased brother Policronio Ureta, has referred to me for appropriate legal action
the property they inherited from their father consisting of six (6) parcels of land which is covered by a Deed of Absolute

Sale dated October 25, 1969. These properties ha[ve] already been transferred to the name of their deceased father
immediately after the sale, machine copy of the said Deed of Sale is hereto attached for your ready reference.
Lately, however, there was published an Extra-judicial Partition of the estate of Alfonso Ureta, which to the surprise of my
clients included the properties already sold to their father before the death of said Alfonso Ureta. This inclusion of their
property is erroneous and illegal because these properties were covered by the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of their father
Policronio Ureta no longer form part of the estate of Alfonso Ureta. Since Policronio Ureta has [sic] died in 1974 yet, these
properties have passed by hereditary succession to his children who are now the true and lawful owners of the said
properties.
My clients are still entitled to a share in the estate of Alfonso Ureta who is also their grandfather as they have stepped into
the shoes of their deceased father Policronio Ureta. But this estate of Alfonso Ureta should already exclude the six (6)
parcels of land covered by the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Policronio Ureta.
My clients cannot understand why the properties of their late father [should] be included in the estate of their grandfather
and be divided among his brothers and sisters when said properties should only be divided among themselves as children of
Policronio Ureta.
Since this matter involves very close members of the same family, I have counseled my clients that an earnest effort towards
a compromise or amicable settlement be first explored before resort to judicial remedy is pursued. And a compromise or
amicable settlement can only be reached if all the parties meet and discuss the problem with an open mind. To this end, I am
suggesting a meeting of the parties on September 16, 1995 at 2:00 P.M. at B Place Restaurant at C. Laserna St., Kalibo,
Aklan. It would be best if the parties can come or be represented by their duly designated attorney-in-fact together with their
lawyers if they so desire so that the problem can be discussed unemotionally and intelligently.
I would, however, interpret the failure to come to the said meeting as an indication that the parties are not willing to or
interested in amicable settlement of this matter and as a go signal for me to resort to legal and/or judicial remedies to protest
the rights of my clients.
Thank you very much.56
Based on the foregoing, this Court concludes that the allegation of Conrados vitiated consent and lack of authority to sign in
behalf of his co-heirs was a mere afterthought on the part of the Heirs of Policronio. It appears that the Heirs of Policronio
were not only aware of the existence of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition prior to June 30, 1995 but had, in fact, given
Conrado authority to sign in their behalf. They are now estopped from questioning its legality, and the Deed of ExtraJudicial Partition is valid, binding, and enforceable against them.
In view of the foregoing, there is no longer a need to discuss the issue of ratification.
Preterition
The Heirs of Alfonso were of the position that the absence of the Heirs of Policronio in the partition or the lack of authority
of their representative results, at the very least, in their preterition and not in the invalidity of the entire deed of partition.
Assuming there was actual preterition, it did not render the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition voidable. Citing Article 1104 of
the Civil Code, they aver that a partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, but the

heirs shall be proportionately obliged to pay the share of the person omitted. Thus, the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
should not have been annulled by the CA. Instead, it should have ordered the share of the heirs omitted to be given to them.
The Heirs of Alfonso also argued that all that remains to be adjudged is the right of the preterited heirs to represent their
father, Policronio, and be declared entitled to his share. They contend that remand to the RTC is no longer necessary as the
issue is purely legal and can be resolved by the provisions of the Civil Code for there is no dispute that each of Alfonsos
heirs received their rightful share. Conrado, who received Policronios share, should then fully account for what he had
received to his other co-heirs and be directed to deliver their share in the inheritance.
These arguments cannot be given credence.
Their posited theory on preterition is no longer viable. It has already been determined that the Heirs of Policronio gave their
consent to the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and they have not been excluded from it. Nonetheless, even granting that the
Heirs of Policronio were denied their lawful participation in the partition, the argument of the Heirs of Alfonso would still
fail.
Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code is as follows:
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time
of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right
of representation.
Preterition has been defined as the total omission of a compulsory heir from the inheritance.1wphi1 It consists in the
silence of the testator with regard to a compulsory heir, omitting him in the testament, either by not mentioning him at all, or
by not giving him anything in the hereditary property but without expressly disinheriting him, even if he is mentioned in the
will in the latter case.57 Preterition is thus a concept of testamentary succession and requires a will. In the case at bench,
there is no will involved. Therefore, preterition cannot apply.
Remand Unnecessary
The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition is in itself valid for complying with all the legal requisites, as found by the RTC, to wit:
A persual of the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition would reveal that all the heirs and children of Alfonso Ureta were
represented therein; that nobody was left out; that all of them received as much as the others as their shares; that it
distributed all the properties of Alfonso Ureta except a portion of parcel 29 containing an area of 14,000 square meters, more
or less, which was expressly reserved; that Alfonso Ureta, at the time of his death, left no debts; that the heirs of Policronio
Ureta, Sr. were represented by Conrado B. Ureta; all the parties signed the document, was witnessed and duly acknowledged
before Notary Public Adolfo M. Iligan of Kalibo, Aklan; that the document expressly stipulated that the heirs to whom some
of the properties were transferred before for taxation purposes or their children, expressly recognize and acknowledge as a
fact that the properties were transferred only for the purpose of effective administration and development convenience in the
payment of taxes and, therefore, all instruments conveying or effecting the transfer of said properties are null and void from
the beginning (Exhs. 1-4, 7-d).58

Considering that the Deed of Sale has been found void and the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition valid, with the consent of all
the Heirs of Policronio duly given, there is no need to remand the case to the court of origin for partition.1vvph!1
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 165748 is DENIED. The petition in G.R. No. 165930 is GRANTED. The assailed
April 20, 2004 Decision and October 14, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71399, are hereby
MODIFIED in this wise:
(1) The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, dated April 19, 1989, is VALID, and
(2) The order to remand the case to the court of origin is hereby DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO*

Associate Justice
AT T E S T AT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes
*

Designated as additional member of the Third Division per Special Order No. 1028 dated June 21, 2011.

Penned by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona with Associate Justice B.A. Adefuin-De La Cruz and
Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion (now a member of this Court), concurring.
2

Penned by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona with Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes and Associate
Justice Arturo D. Brion (now a member of this Court), concurring.
3

Rollo (G.R. No. 165748), pp. 75-81.

Exhibit "G," records, p. 349.

Exhibit "5," id. at 526.

Exhibit "11," id. at 528.

Exhibit "6," id. at 527.

Exhibit "7," id. at 529-539.

Rollo (G.R. No. 165748), pp. 51-65.

10

Manila Banking Corporation v. Silverio, 504 Phil. 17, 25-26 (2005), citing Suntay v. Court of Appeals, 321
Phil. 809 (1995) and Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 3 (r) and (p).
11

Gatmaitan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76500, August 2, 1991, 200 SCRA 38.

12

Ascalon v. Court of Appeals, 242 Phil. 265 (1988).

13

G.R. No. 163687, March 28, 2006, 485 SCRA 494, 500-501; citing Loyola v. Court of Appeals, 383 Phil.
171 (2000), and Balite v. Lim, 487 Phil. 281 (2004).
14

Manila Banking Corporation v. Silverio, supra note 10 at 27, citing Peoples Aircargo and Warehousing
Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 850 (1998).
15

Tongoy v. Court of Appeals, 208 Phil. 95, 113 (1983); citing Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 127 Phil. 294, 301302 (1967).
16

17

Lopez v. Lopez, G.R. No. 161925, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 358, 367.

Rules of Court, Rule 133, Sec. 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the party
having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the

preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts
and circumstance of the case, the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the
probability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the
same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though
the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.
18

TSN, April 6, 1998, pp. 9-10.

19

Exhibit "7-d," records, p. 533.

20

Manila Banking Corporation v. Silverio, supra note 10 at 31, citing Suntay v. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil.
809 (1995); Santiago v. Court of Appeals, 343 Phil. 612 (1997); Cruz v. Bancom Finance Corporation, 429
Phil. 225 (2002); and Ramos v. Heirs of Ramos, 431 Phil. 337 (2002).
21

Samala v. Court of Appeals, 467 Phil. 563, 568 (2004).

22

Tongoy v. Court of Appeals, supra note 15; Manila Banking Corporation v. Silverio, 504 Phil. 17, 33
(2005).
23

Rollo (G.R. No. 165748), p. 69-70.

24

Morales Development Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 137 Phil. 307 (1969).

25

Acabal v. Acabal, 494 Phil. 528 (2005).

26

Exhibit "G," records, p. 349.

27

Rollo (G.R. No. 165748), p. 79; and TSN, April 6, 1998, p. 9.

28

Montecillo v. Reynes, 434 Phil. 456, 469 (2002); citing Ocejo Perez & Co. v. Flores, 40 Phil 921 (1920);
Mapalo v. Mapalo, 123 Phil. 979 (1966); Vda. de Catindig v. Roque, 165 Phil. 707 (1976); Rongavilla v.
Court of Appeals, 355 Phil. 721 (1998); and Yu Bu Guan v. Ong, 419 Phil. 845 (2001).
29

Lechugas v. Court of Appeals, 227 Phil. 310 (1986).

30

Rules of Court, Rule 132, Sec. 36.

31

Rollo (G.R. No. 165748), pp. 66-74.

32

Premier Insurance v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 225 Phil. 370, 381 (1986); citing Labasan v. Lacuesta,
175 Phil. 216 (1978).
33

Rollo (G.R No. 165748), p. 77.

34

Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol. V, pp. 208-209, [1999].

35

Lechugas v. Court of Appeals, 227 Phil. 310, 319 (1986).

36

Eugenio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103737, December 15, 1994, 239 SCRA 207.

37

People v. Parungao, 332 Phil. 917, 924 (1996).

38

222 Phil. 424, 437 (1985).

39

Ocejo Perez & Co. v. Flores, 40 Phil. 921 (1920); De Belen v. Collector of Customs, 46 Phil. 241 (1924);
Gallion v. Gayares, 53 Phil. 43 (1929); Escutin v. Escutin, 60 Phil. 922 (1934); Gonzales v. Trinidad, 67 Phil.
682 (1939); Portugal v. IAC, 242 Phil. 709 (1988).
40

Tongoy v. Court of Appeals, supra note 15.

41

Arsenal v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 227 Phil. 36, 46-47 (1986); Tolentiono, Civil Code of the
Philippines, Vol. IV, p. 643, [2002].
42

Sta. Romana v. Imperio, 122 Phil. 1001, 1007 (1965); Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. IV, p.
634, (2002).
43

Gonzales v. Trinidad, 67 Phil. 682, 683-684 (1939); Castro v. Escutin, 179 Phil. 277, 284 (1979).

44

Tongoy v. Court of Appeals, supra note 15; Manila Banking Corporation v. Silverio, 504 Phil. 17, 33
(2005).
45

Id.

46

Barcelona v. Barcelona, 100 Phil 251, 255 (1956).

47

Borbon II v. Servicewide Specialists, Inc., 328 Phil. 150, 160 (1996).

48

Barcelona v. Barcelona, 100 Phil. 251, 255 (1956); Maestrado v. Court of Appeals, 384 Phil. 418, 432
(2000); Castro v. Miat, 445 Phil. 282 297-298 (2003), citing Pada-Kilario v. Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 515
(2000).
49

Maestrado v. Court of Appeals, 384 Phil. 418, 432 (2000).

50

236 Phil. 438, 447-448 (1987).

51

TSN, October 1, 1997, pp. 4-6.

52

Id. at 8-11.

53

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines Inc. v. Macalinao, 491 Phil. 249, 255 (2005).

54

Exhibit "2," records, p. 524.

55

Exhibit "3," id. at 525.

56

Exhibit "A," id. at 335-336.

57

Neri v. Akutin, 72 Phil. 322, 325 (1914); Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 199 Phil. 640, 647 (1982).

58

Rollo (G.R. No. 165748), p. 80.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Baguio City

FIRST DIVISION

ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR,

G.R. No. 174489

SEBASTIAN M. BALTAZAR,
ANTONIO

L.

MANGALINDAN,
ROSIE M. MATEO,

Present:

NENITA A. PACHECO,
VIRGILIO REGALA, JR.,

CORONA,
Chairperson,

and RAFAEL TITCO,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

Petitioners,

C.J.,

BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and

- versus -

LORENZO LAXA,
Respondent.

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:
April 11, 2012

x-------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

It is incumbent upon those who oppose the probate of a will to

clearly establish that the decedent was not of sound and disposing
mind at the time of the execution of said will. Otherwise, the state is
duty-bound to give full effect to the wishes of the testator to distribute
his estate in the manner provided in his will so long as it is legally
tenable.775[1]

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari776[2] of the June

15, 2006 Decision777[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
80979 which reversed the September 30, 2003 Decision 778[4] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 52, Guagua, Pampanga in Special
Proceedings No. G-1186. The assailed CA Decision granted the
petition for probate of the notarial will of Paciencia Regala (Paciencia),
to wit:

775[1] Gonzales Vda. de Precilla v. Narciso, 150-B Phil. 437, 473 (1972).
776[2] Rollo, pp. 9-31.
777[3] CA rollo, pp. 177-192; penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and
concurred in by Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Vicente Q. Roxas.
778[4] Records, pp. 220-246; penned by Judge Jonel S. Mercado.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the appeal to be

impressed with merit, the decision in SP. PROC. NO. G-1186 dated 30
September 2003, is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered GRANTING
the petition for the probate of the will of PACIENCIA REGALA.

SO ORDERED.779[5]

Also assailed herein is the August 31, 2006 CA Resolution780[6]

which denied the Motion for Reconsideration thereto.

Petitioners call us to reverse the CAs assailed Decision and

instead affirm the Decision of the RTC which disallowed the notarial
will of Paciencia.

Factual Antecedents

Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will
and testament entitled Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia
Regala781[7] (Will) in the Pampango dialect on September 13, 1981.
779[5] CA rollo, p. 192.
780[6] Id. at 212.
781[7] Exhibit G, Folder of Exhibits, pp. 36-39.

The Will, executed in the house of retired Judge Ernestino G. Limpin

(Judge Limpin), was read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia
expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the
document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her
signature at the end of the said document on page 3782[8] and then on
the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.783[9]

The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba A. Limpin (Dra.
Limpin), Francisco Garcia (Francisco) and Faustino R. Mercado
(Faustino). The three attested to the Wills due execution by affixing
their signatures below its attestation clause784[10] and on the left
margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof,785[11] in the presence of Paciencia
and of one another and of Judge Limpin who acted as notary public.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia
bequeathed all her properties to respondent Lorenzo R. Laxa
(Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children Luna Lorella
Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa, thus:

782[8] Exhibit G-11, id. at 38.

783[9] Exhibits G-9, G-10, and G-11, id. at 36, 37 and 39.
784[10] Exhibit G-6, id at 38.
785[11] Exhibits G-4, G-5, and G-7, id. at 36, 37 and 39.

xxxx

Fourth - In consideration of their valuable services to me since then

up to the present by the spouses LORENZO LAXA and CORAZON F. LAXA, I
hereby BEQUEATH, CONVEY and GIVE all my properties enumerated in
parcels 1 to 5 unto the spouses LORENZO R. LAXA and CORAZON F. LAXA
and their children, LUNA LORELLA LAXA and KATHERINE LAXA, and the
spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa both of legal age, Filipinos,
presently residing at Barrio Sta. Monica, [Sasmuan], Pampanga and their
children, LUNA LORELLA and KATHERINE ROSS LAXA, who are still not of
legal age and living with their parents who would decide to bequeath since
they are the children of the spouses;

xxxx

[Sixth] - Should other properties of mine may be discovered aside

from the properties mentioned in this last will and testament, I am also
bequeathing and giving the same to the spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa and
Corazon F. Laxa and their two children and I also command them to offer
masses yearly for the repose of my soul and that of D[]a Nicomeda Regala,
Epifania Regala and their spouses and with respect to the fishpond situated
at San Antonio, I likewise command to fulfill the wishes of D[]a Nicomeda
Regala in accordance with her testament as stated in my testament. x x
x786[12]

The filial relationship of Lorenzo with Paciencia remains

undisputed. Lorenzo is Paciencias nephew whom she treated as her
own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treated Paciencia as

786[12] English Translation of the Last Will and Testament of Miss Paciencia Regala,
Exhibits H-1 and H-2, id. at 41-42.

his own mother.787[13] Paciencia lived with Lorenzos family in

Sasmuan, Pampanga and it was she who raised and cared for Lorenzo
since his birth. Six days after the execution of the Will or on
September 19, 1981, Paciencia left for the United States of America
(USA). There, she resided with Lorenzo and his family until her death
on January 4, 1996.

In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.

More than four years after the death of Paciencia or on April 27,
2000, Lorenzo filed a petition788[14] with the RTC of Guagua,
Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance
of Letters of Administration in his favor, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. G-1186.

There being no opposition to the petition after its due

publication, the RTC issued an Order on June 13, 2000 789[15] allowing
Lorenzo to present evidence on June 22, 2000. On said date, Dra.
Limpin testified that she was one of the instrumental witnesses in the
787[13] TSN dated April 18, 2001, pp. 2-6.
788[14] Records, pp. 1-3.
789[15] Id. at 13-14.

execution of the last will and testament of Paciencia on September

13, 1981.790[16] The Will was executed in her fathers (Judge Limpin)
home office, in her presence and of two other witnesses, Francisco
and Faustino.791[17] Dra. Limpin positively identified the Will and her
signatures on all its four pages.792[18] She likewise positively identified
the signature of her father appearing thereon.793[19] Questioned by
the prosecutor regarding Judge Limpins present mental fitness, Dra.
Limpin testified that her father had a stroke in 1991 and had to
undergo brain surgery.794[20] The judge can walk but can no longer
talk and remember her name. Because of this, Dra. Limpin stated that
her father can no longer testify in court.795[21]

The following day or on June 23, 2000, petitioner Antonio

Baltazar (Antonio) filed an opposition796[22] to Lorenzos petition.
Antonio averred that the properties subject of Paciencias Will belong
790[16] TSN dated June 22, 2000, p. 2.
791[17] Id. at 5.
792[18] Id. at 2-4.
793[19] Id. at 3.
794[20] Id. at 2.
795[21] Id. at 6.
796[22] Motion with Leave of Court to Admit Instant Opposition to Petition of
Lorenzo Laxa; records, pp. 17-18.

to Nicomeda Regala Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence,

Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo.797[23]

Barely a month after or on July 20, 2000, Antonio, now joined by

petitioners Sebastian M. Baltazar, Virgilio Regala, Jr., Nenita A.
Pacheco, Felix B. Flores, Rafael Titco, Rosie M. Mateo (Rosie) and
Antonio L. Mangalindan filed a Supplemental Opposition798[24]
contending that Paciencias Will was null and void because ownership
of the properties had not been transferred and/or titled to Paciencia
before her death pursuant to Article 1049, paragraph 3 of the Civil
Code.799[25] Petitioners also opposed the issuance of Letters of
Administration in Lorenzos favor arguing that Lorenzo was disqualified
to be appointed as such, he being a citizen and resident of the USA. 800
[26]

Petitioners prayed that Letters of Administration be instead issued

in favor of Antonio.801[27]
797[23] Id. at 17.
798[24] Id. at 25-28.

799[25] Article 1049. Acceptance may be express or tacit.x x x x

Acts of mere preservation or provisional administration do not imply an acceptance of the inheritance if, through
such acts, the title or capacity of an heir has not been assumed.

800[26] Records, p. 26.

801[27] Id. at 27.

Later still on September 26, 2000, petitioners filed an Amended

Opposition802[28] asking the RTC to deny the probate of Paciencias Will
on the following grounds: the Will was not executed and attested to in
accordance with the requirements of the law; that Paciencia was
mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its execution; that
she was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or
threats; that the execution of the Will had been procured by undue
and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some other
persons for his benefit; that the signature of Paciencia on the Will was
forged; that assuming the signature to be genuine, it was obtained
through fraud or trickery; and, that Paciencia did not intend the
document to be her Will. Simultaneously, petitioners filed an
Opposition and Recommendation803[29] reiterating their opposition to
the appointment of Lorenzo as administrator of the properties and
requesting for the appointment of Antonio in his stead.

On January 29, 2001, the RTC issued an Order804[30] denying the

requests of both Lorenzo and Antonio to be appointed administrator
since the former is a citizen and resident of the USA while the latters
802[28] Id. at 42-43.
803[29] Id. at 44-45.
804[30] Id. at 52.

claim as a co-owner of the properties subject of the Will has not yet
been established.

Meanwhile, proceedings on the petition for the probate of the

Will continued. Dra. Limpin was recalled for cross-examination by the
petitioners. She testified as to the age of her father at the time the
latter notarized the Will of Paciencia; the living arrangements of
Paciencia at the time of the execution of the Will; and the lack of
photographs when the event took place. 805[31]

Aside from Dra. Limpin, Lorenzo and Monico Mercado (Monico)

also took the witness stand. Monico, son of Faustino, testified on his
fathers condition. According to him his father can no longer talk and
express himself due to brain damage. A medical certificate was
presented to the court to support this allegation. 806[32]

For his part, Lorenzo testified that: from 1944 until his departure
for the USA in April 1980, he lived in Sasmuan, Pampanga with his
family and his aunt, Paciencia; in 1981 Paciencia went to the USA and
lived with him and his family until her death in January 1996; the
805[31] TSN dated January 18, 2001, pp. 2-4.
806[32] Id. at 5-6.

relationship between him and Paciencia was like that of a mother and
child since Paciencia took care of him since birth and took him in as
an adopted son; Paciencia was a spinster without children, and
without brothers and sisters; at the time of Paciencias death, she did
not suffer from any mental disorder and was of sound mind, was not
blind, deaf or mute; the Will was in the custody of Judge Limpin and
was only given to him after Paciencias death through Faustino; and he
was already residing in the USA when the Will was executed.807[33]
Lorenzo positively identified the signature of Paciencia in three
different documents and in the Will itself and stated that he was
familiar with Paciencias signature because he accompanied her in her
transactions.808[34] Further, Lorenzo belied and denied having used
force, intimidation, violence, coercion or trickery upon Paciencia to
execute the Will as he was not in the Philippines when the same was
executed.809[35] On cross-examination, Lorenzo clarified that Paciencia
informed him about the Will shortly after her arrival in the USA but
that he saw a copy of the Will only after her death.810[36]

As to Francisco, he could no longer be presented in court as he

already died on May 21, 2000.
807[33] TSN dated April 18, 2001, pp. 1- 28.
808[34] Id. at 9-15.
809[35] Id. at 16-17.
810[36] Id. at 24-25.

For petitioners, Rosie testified that her mother and Paciencia

were first cousins.811[37] She claimed to have helped in the household
chores in the house of Paciencia thereby allowing her to stay therein
from morning until evening and that during the period of her service
in the said household, Lorenzos wife and his children were staying in
the same house.812[38] She served in the said household from 1980
until Paciencias departure for the USA on September 19, 1981.813[39]

On September 13, 1981, Rosie claimed that she saw Faustino

bring something for Paciencia to sign at the latters house.814[40] Rosie
admitted, though, that she did not see what that something was as
same

was

placed

inside

an

envelope.815[41]

However,

she

remembered Paciencia instructing Faustino to first look for money

before she signs them.816[42] A few days after or on September 16,
1981, Paciencia went to the house of Antonios mother and brought
811[37] TSN dated November 27, 2002, p. 4.
812[38] Id. at 5.
813[39] TSN dated December 4, 2002, p. 8
814[40] Id. pp. 2-3.
815[41] Id. at 4.
816[42] Id.

with her the said envelope.817[43] Upon going home, however, the
envelope was no longer with Paciencia.818[44] Rosie further testified
that Paciencia was referred to as magulyan or forgetful because she
would sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then start looking for
it moments later.819[45] On cross examination, it was established that
Rosie was neither a doctor nor a psychiatrist, that her conclusion that
Paciencia was magulyan was based on her personal assessment,820
[46]

and that it was Antonio who requested her to testify in court.821[47]

In his direct examination, Antonio stated that Paciencia was his

aunt.822[48] He identified the Will and testified that he had seen the
said document before because Paciencia brought the same to his
mothers house and showed it to him along with another document on
September 16, 1981.823[49] Antonio alleged that when the documents

817[43] Id. at 7.
818[44] Id. at 8.
819[45] Id. at 9.
820[46] Id. at 10.
821[47] Id. at 11.
822[48] TSN dated January 7, 2003, p. 3.
823[49] Id. at 6-8.

were shown to him, the same were still unsigned. 824[50] According to
him, Paciencia thought that the documents pertained to a lease of
one of her rice lands,825[51] and it was he who explained that the
documents were actually a special power of attorney to lease and sell
her fishpond and other properties upon her departure for the USA,
and a Will which would transfer her properties to Lorenzo and his
family upon her death.826[52] Upon hearing this, Paciencia allegedly
uttered the following words: Why will I never [return], why will I sell all
my properties? Who is Lorenzo? Is he the only [son] of God? I have
other relatives [who should] benefit from my properties. Why should I
die already?827[53] Thereafter, Antonio advised Paciencia not to sign
the documents if she does not want to, to which the latter purportedly
replied, I know nothing about those, throw them away or it is up to
you. The more I will not sign them.828[54] After which, Paciencia left the
documents with Antonio. Antonio kept the unsigned documents
and eventually turned them over to Faustino on September 18,
1981.829[55]
824[50] Id. at 12.
825[51] Id. at 11.
826[52] Id. at 16.
827[53] Id. at 17.
828[54] Id.
829[55] Id at 18-19.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On September 30, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision 830[56]

denying the petition thus:

WHEREFORE, this court hereby (a) denies the petition dated April 24,
2000; and (b) disallows the notarized will dated September 13, 1981 of
Paciencia Regala.

SO ORDERED.831[57]

The trial court gave considerable weight to the testimony of

Rosie and concluded that at the time Paciencia signed the Will, she
was no longer possessed of sufficient reason or strength of mind to
have testamentary capacity.832[58]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

830[56] Records, pp. 220-246.
831[57] Id. at 246.
832[58] Id. at 245-246.

On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and granted the

probate of the Will of Paciencia. The appellate court did not agree with
the RTCs conclusion that Paciencia was of unsound mind when she
executed the Will. It ratiocinated that the state of being magulyan
does not make a person mentally unsound so [as] to render
[Paciencia] unfit for executing a Will.833[59] Moreover, the oppositors in
the probate proceedings were not able to overcome the presumption
that every

person

is of sound mind.

Further,

no

concrete

circumstances or events were given to prove the allegation that

Paciencia was tricked or forced into signing the Will.834[60]
Petitioners moved for reconsideration835[61] but the motion was
denied by the CA in its Resolution836[62] dated August 31, 2006.

Hence, this petition.

Issues
833[59] CA rollo, p. 185.
834[60] Id. at 188.
835[61] Id. at 193-199.
836[62] Id. at 212.

Petitioners come before this Court by way of Petition for Review

on Certiorari ascribing upon the CA the following errors:

I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED
THE PROBATE OF PACIENCIAS WILL DESPITE RESPONDENTS UTTER FAILURE
TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 11, RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT;

II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN MAKING
CONCLUSIONS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD;

III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
PETITIONERS FAILED TO PROVE THAT PACIENCIA WAS NOT OF SOUND MIND
AT THE TIME THE WILL WAS ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED837[63]

The pivotal issue is whether the authenticity and due execution

of the notarial Will was sufficiently established to warrant its
allowance for probate.

837[63] Rollo, p. 18.

Our Ruling

We deny the petition.

Faithful
compliance
formalities

with

the

laid down by law is apparent from

the face of the Will.

Courts are tasked to determine nothing more than the extrinsic

validity of a
Will in probate proceedings.838[64] This is expressly provided for in Rule
75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which states:

Rule 75
PRODUCTION OF WILL. ALLOWANCE OF WILL NECESSARY.

Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to execution.

No will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and
allowed in the proper court. Subject to the right of appeal, such
allowance of the will shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
838[64] Pastor, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 207 Phil. 758, 766. (1983).

Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to

whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. 839[65] These
formalities are enshrined in Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil
Code, to wit:

Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end
thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in
his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the
instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page
thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is
written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused
some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the
instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages
thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be
interpreted to them.

839[65] Id.

Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or
file another with the Office of the Clerk of Court.

Here, a careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful

compliance with the formalities laid down by law. The signatures of
the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary
public, are all present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation
clause explicitly states the critical requirement that the testatrix and
her instrumental witnesses signed the Will in the presence of one
another and that the witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in
the presence of the testator and of one another. In fact, even the
petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will may be
authentic although they question her state of mind when she signed
the same as well as the voluntary nature of said act.

The burden to prove that Paciencia

was of unsound mind at the time of
the execution of the will lies on the
shoulders of the petitioners.

Petitioners, through their witness Rosie, claim that Paciencia was

magulyan or forgetful so much so that it effectively stripped her of

testamentary capacity. They likewise claimed in their Motion for

Reconsideration840[66] filed with the CA that Paciencia was not only
magulyan but was actually suffering from paranoia.841[67]

We are not convinced.

We agree with the position of the CA that the state of being

forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as
to render him unfit to execute a Will. 842[68] Forgetfulness is not
equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Article 799 of the New
Civil Code states:

Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full
possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken,
unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause.

It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know
the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the
character of the testamentary act.
840[66] CA rollo, pp. 193-199.
841[67] Id. at 194-195.
842[68] Torres and Lopez de Bueno v. Lopez, 48 Phil. 772, 810 (1926); Sancho v.
Abella, 58 Phil.728, 732-733 (1933).

In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencias

forgetfulness, there is no substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would show that
Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the Will. On the other
hand, we find more worthy of credence Dra. Limpins testimony as to the soundness of
mind of Paciencia when the latter went to Judge Limpins house and voluntarily executed
the Will. The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning the testators mental
condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent. 843[69] More
importantly, a testator is presumed to be of sound mind at the time of the execution of the
Will and the burden to prove otherwise lies on the oppositor. Article 800 of the New Civil
Code states:

Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of
proof to the contrary.

The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making
his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator,
one month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person
who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid
interval.

843[69] Id. at 811.

Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known

to be insane one month or less before the making of the Will. Clearly,
thus, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind lies
upon the shoulders of petitioners. However and as earlier mentioned,
no substantial evidence was presented by them to prove the same,
thereby warranting the CAs finding that petitioners failed to discharge
such burden.

Furthermore, we are convinced that Paciencia was aware of the

nature of her estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of her
bounty and the character of the testamentary act. As aptly pointed
out by the CA:

A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was aware of the

nature of the document she executed. She specially requested that the
customs of her faith be observed upon her death. She was well aware of
how she acquired the properties from her parents and the properties she is
bequeathing to LORENZO, to his wife CORAZON and to his two (2) children.
A third child was born after the execution of the will and was not included
therein as devisee.844[70]

Bare allegations of duress or

influence of fear or threats, undue
and improper influence and pressure,
844[70] CA rollo, pp. 185-186.

fraud and trickery cannot be used as

basis to deny the probate of a will.

An essential element of the validity of the Will is the willingness

of the testator or testatrix to execute the document that will distribute
his/her earthly possessions upon his/her death. Petitioners claim that
Paciencia was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of
fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had been procured by
undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some
other persons for his benefit; and that assuming Paciencias signature
to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery. These are
grounded on the alleged conversation between Paciencia and Antonio
on September 16, 1981 wherein the former purportedly repudiated
the Will and left it unsigned.

We are not persuaded.

We take into consideration the unrebutted fact that Paciencia
loved and treated Lorenzo as her own son and that love even
extended to Lorenzos wife and children. This kind of relationship is not
unusual. It is in fact not unheard of in our culture for old maids or
spinsters to care for and raise their nephews and nieces and treat
them as their own children. Such is a prevalent and accepted cultural
practice that has resulted in many family discords between those

favored by the testamentary disposition of a testator and those who

stand to benefit in case of intestacy.

In this case, evidence shows the acknowledged fact that

Paciencias relationship with Lorenzo and his family is different from
her relationship with petitioners. The very fact that she cared for and
raised Lorenzo and lived with him both here and abroad, even if the
latter was already married and already has children, highlights the
special bond between them. This unquestioned relationship between
Paciencia and the devisees tends to support the authenticity of the
said document as against petitioners allegations of duress, influence
of fear or threats, undue and improper influence, pressure, fraud, and
trickery which, aside from being factual in nature, are not supported
by concrete, substantial and credible evidence on record. It is worth
stressing that bare arguments, no matter how forceful, if not based on
concrete and substantial evidence cannot suffice to move the Court
to uphold said allegations.845[71] Furthermore, a purported will is not
[to be] denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very
institution of testamentary succession will be shaken to its foundation,
for even if a will has been duly executed in fact, whether x x x it will
be probated would have to depend largely on the attitude of those
interested in [the estate of the deceased].846[72]
845[71] Gonzales Vda. de Precilla v. Narciso, supra note 1 at 445.
846[72] Id. at 474.

Court should be convinced by the

evidence presented before it that the
Will was duly executed.

Petitioners dispute the authenticity of Paciencias Will on the

ground that Section 11 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court was not
complied with. It provides:

RULE 76
ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE OF WILL
Section 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or accounted for where will
contested. If the will is contested, all the subscribing witnesses, and the notary in the case
of wills executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines, if present in the Philippines and
not insane, must be produced and examined, and the death, absence, or insanity of any of
them must be satisfactorily shown to the court. If all or some of such witnesses are
present in the Philippines but outside the province where the will has been filed, their
deposition must be taken. If any or all of them testify against the due execution of the
will, or do not remember having attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful credibility, the
will may nevertheless, be allowed if the court is satisfied from the testimony of other
witnesses and from all the evidence presented that the will was executed and attested in
the manner required by law.

If a holographic will is contested, the same shall be allowed if at least three (3)
witnesses who know the handwriting of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the
signature are in the handwriting of the testator; in the absence of any competent

witnesses, and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to.
(Emphasis supplied.)

They insist that all subscribing witnesses and the notary public
should have been presented in court since all but one witness,
Francisco, are still living.

We cannot agree with petitioners.

We note that the inability of Faustino and Judge Limpin to appear

and testify before the court was satisfactorily explained during the
probate proceedings. As testified to by his son, Faustino had a heart
attack, was already bedridden and could no longer talk and express
himself due to brain damage. To prove this, said witness presented
the corresponding medical certificate. For her part, Dra. Limpin
testified that her father, Judge Limpin, suffered a stroke in 1991 and
had to undergo brain surgery. At that time, Judge Limpin could no
longer talk and could not even remember his daughters name so that
Dra. Limpin stated that given such condition, her father could no
longer testify. It is well to note that at that point, despite ample
opportunity, petitioners neither interposed any objections to the
testimonies of said witnesses nor challenged the same on cross
examination. We thus hold that for all intents and purposes, Lorenzo

was able to satisfactorily account for the incapacity and failure of the
said subscribing witness and of the notary public to testify in court.
Because of this the probate of Paciencias Will may be allowed on the
basis of Dra. Limpins testimony proving her sanity and the due
execution of the Will, as well as on the proof of her handwriting. It is
an established rule that [a] testament may not be disallowed just
because the attesting witnesses declare against its due execution;
neither does it have to be necessarily allowed just because all the
attesting witnesses declare in favor of its legalization; what is decisive
is that the court is convinced by evidence before it, not necessarily
from the attesting witnesses, although they must testify, that the will
was or was not duly executed in the manner required by law.847[73]

Moreover, it bears stressing that [i]rrespective x x x of the

posture of any of the parties as regards the authenticity and due
execution of the will x x x in question, it is the mandate of the law that
it is the evidence before the court and/or [evidence that] ought to be
before it that is controlling.848[74] The very existence of [the Will] is in
itself prima facie proof that the supposed [testatrix] has willed that
[her] estate be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is
incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable, such desire be given
full effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected
847[73] Id. at 452.
848[74] Id. at 453.

thereby.849[75] This, coupled with Lorenzos established relationship

with Paciencia, the evidence and the testimonies of disinterested
witnesses, as opposed to the total lack of evidence presented by
petitioners apart from their self-serving testimonies, constrain us to
tilt the balance in favor of the authenticity of the Will and its
allowance for probate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June

15, 2006 and the Resolution dated August 31, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80979 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
849[75] Id. at 473.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is

hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-34760 September 28, 1973

SERAFIN MEDINA and ROSALIA M. DEL CARMEN, assisted by DOMINADOR DEL CARMEN, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBALES and BEDA GONZALES,
respondents.
Beltran, Beltran and Beltran for petitioners.
Jose S. Sarte and Felipe K. Medina for private respondent.

TEEHANKEE, J.:
In this review by certiorari of the appellate court's resolution dismissing the petition filed by petitioners challenging the lower court's orders
appointing private respondent Beda Gonzales as special administrator of the intestate estate of the decedent Agustin Medina, the Court
excludes the said special administrator from interfering in the possession and enjoyment of the harvests of the property known as "Bitukang
Manok" by petitioner Rosalia M. del Carmen to whom the said property had been sold, and full payment therefor received, by the estate
through Gonzales' predecessor with the approval of the lower court, which overruled Gonzales' opposition thereto as an assignee of some
heirs of the estate, and as one personally interested in the purchase of the property for himself.
The Court's action is based on the established doctrine that a person with an adverse conflicting interest is unsuitable for the trust reposed in
an administrator of an estate. Respondent Gonzales, whose appeal of the lower court's order of approval of the sale to the Court of Appeals
is pending, cannot be at the same time an appellant in his personal capacity opposing the sale of the property and an appellee representing
the estate and upholding the same sale as made by the estate through Gonzales' predecessor as special administrator with the due approval
and confirmation of the lower court. Since the estate proceedings have been pending for over 13 years now without the lower court once
having appointed a regular administrator, said court is directed to name a suitable person as regular administrator charged with the task of
accomplishing the administration of the estate with the utmost reasonable dispatch.
From the papers submitted with the petition, it appears that as noted by respondent court of first instance of Zambales, presided by Judge
1

wherein it approved and confirmed the deed of sale executed

on May 8, 1969 by then special administrator Demetrio Encarnacion of the intestate estate of the
decedent Agustin Medina covering the sale of its property known as "Bitukang Manok" for P24,000.00 to
petitioner Rosalia M. del Carmen, a daughter-heir of the decedent, the said intestate proceedings have
"already lasted for over ten (10) years now contrary to the spirit of the law in the settlement of estates the
Augusto M. Amores in an order dated March 6, 1970,

most expeditious way", and the said court expressed its "desire ... to terminate the proceedings once and
for all."
Respondent lower court, through its said order, overruled the opposition of therein oppositor-heir Uldarico
S. Medina and of assignee Beda J. Gonzales, private respondent herein, who claimed therein "to have an
interest over the estate on the ground that certain heirs have already sold their shares and/or interest over
the same in his favor" as being "without merit." It found Uldarico's interest as "confined solely to his desire
to partake of whatever share he has in the estate in the same way with that of the rest of the heirs." It
further held that respondent Beda J. Gonzales "could not ... claim a better right over that of the herein
vendee Rosalia Medina del Carmen in the deed of sale because the said Beda J. Gonzales is merely
subrogated, if at all, to the interests of the heirs concerned who according to the records, have received
more benefits from the estate even before its distribution as against that of the vendee, who according to
the records has never received anything yet from the estate." 2
In the same order, upon "suggestion and agreement of the parties" which the lower court "considered to
be well taken for the speedy termination of the instant proceedings," it designated its clerk of court, Atty.
Pastor de Castro, Jr. as "special administrator and to qualify immediately as such in lieu of special
administrator Demetrio Encarnacion." 3
No regular administrator to settle the estate once and for all appears to have ever been appointed by
respondent lower court during the period of over thirteen years that the estate has been pending
settlement.
Respondent Gonzales appealed respondent court's order of approval and confirmation of the sale of the
"Bitukang Manok" property as an interested party-assignee opposed to the sale executed by the estate of
the deceased Agustin Medina through its then special administrator Demetrio Encarnacion, later replaced
by the clerk of court, Atty. Pastor de Castro, Jr., as above stated, on his assertion that he had bought the
rights of the other heirs of the estate those of a majority of the heirs, according to his answer at bar.
The appeal is now pending in the Court of Appeals. 4
Almost a year later, in an order dated February 11, 1971, acting on the motion dated October 5, 1970 of
respondent Gonzales for appointment as regular administrator of the estate, respondent lower court
appointed him "not as a regular administrator but only as special administrator for the intestate estate of
the deceased Agustin Medina" and he qualified as such upon posting of the bond fixed in the amount of
P5,000.00 and replaced "judicial administrator Pastor de Castro, Jr." 5
An urgent motion dated March 22, 1971 to revoke Gonzales' appointment as special administrator on the
ground that "by said order, Beda Gonzales is now assuming the inconsistent positions of administering
the estate especially the Bitukang Manok property and at the same time appealing from the order
approving the sale of that property only for the purpose of enabling himself to buy and acquire that
property to the loss and prejudice of the estate contrary to law" 6 was denied by respondent lower court in
its order dated July 21, 1971. 7
In the same order of July 21, 1971, said court also rejected the petitioner Rosalia's petition dated May 5,
1971, for the appointment of a regular administrator as "very urgent and necessary" and proposing that
co-petitioner Serafin Medina, as heir and son and next of kin of the decedent, who has no adverse
interests in his favor and against the estate and is a qualified and competent resident of Olongapo City be
named as such, holding that:

... considering that whatever rights and interest the heirs may have over the estate now
under administration by Beda J. Gonzales could be amply protected since the said
special administrator has posted a bond in the amount of P5,000.00; considering further
that there is no showing that said administrator has been remiss in the performance of his
duties or violated the trust reposed on him as administrator; and in order not to delay any
further the termination of this proceeding which has lagged long enough, the Court finds
said petition of Serafin Medina to be without merit and the same is hereby denied and the
appointment of said J. Gonzales as special administrator is hereby retained. 8
Reconsideration having been denied by respondent lower court under its order of September 28, 1971,
petitioners instituted in the Court of Appeals an action for certiorari with preliminary injunction under date
of September 20, 1971, citing respondent Gonzales' conflicting interests as special administrator and as
"interested buyer ... persisting in objecting to the sale, in his desire to be the buyer (of the Bitukang
Manok property) despite Court approval, thereby causing the estate unnecessary delay and expense to
the prejudice of the other heirs" and his interference with and collection of the harvests of the said
property duly sold to petitioner Rosalia M. del Carmen, as well as pressing for the appointment instead of
petitioner Serafin Medina, as disinterested heir and next of kin, as administrator of the estate. 9
Respondent court of appeals, however, under its resolution of January 6, 1972, found the "petition
insufficient in substance to merit due course" and ordered the dismissal thereof, on the ground "(1) that it
is not disputed that the lower court has jurisdiction to appoint respondent Beda J. Gonzales as special
administrator; (2) that petitioners merely allege that the lower court had gravely abused its discretion
without any prima facie showing to this effect: (3) considering further that the lower court had considered
and resolved herein petitioners' objections to respondent Gonzales' continuation as such administrator, to
wit, [quoting the considerations stated in the lower court's order dated July 21, 1971, already quoted
hereinabove]; considering, finally, that it is well-settled that the actuations of the trial court should not be
disturbed except upon showing of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
tribunal, involving whimsical and/or capricious exercise of discretion."
Their motion for reconsideration of such dismissal having failed, petitioners instituted the present action
for review on February 23, 1972. The Court issued on February 29, 1972 a temporary restraining order
restraining respondent lower court and respondent Gonzales "from implementing (the lower court's)
orders dated February 11, 1971, July 21, 1971 and September 28, 1971 ... and from otherwise interfering
in the possession by the petitioner Rosalia M. del Carmen of a property known as "Bitukang Manok" of
the intestate estate of the deceased Agustin Medina ... and private respondent ... from interfering in the
cultivation and harvests or otherwise disturbing the possession of aforementioned property by said
petitioner." Upon the Court's giving due course to the petition per its resolution of March 24, 1972, it
ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to the same effect upon the posting of an injunction
bond of P2,000.00, and such writ was issued on May 29, 1972.
Insofar as the petition assails the appointment of respondent Gonzales as special administrator giving rise
to the anomalous situation "where in an appealed intestate case to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No.
49439-R, entitled "Intestate Estate of the Deceased Agustin R. Medina; Pastor de Castro, Jr. (now Beda
Gonzales) Special Administrator, versus Uldarico Medina and Beda J. Gonzales, Movant's) the appellate
and the appellant are one and the same person," the petition is manifestly meritorious and must be
granted.The sale to Rosalia of the Bitukang Manok property having been approved and confirmed by
respondent lower court over the personal opposition of said respondent on March 6, 1970 which approval
he appealed to the Court of Appeals, his subsequent appointment as special administrator of the estate a

year later under respondent lower court's order of February 11, 1971 created a clear conflict of interest
that could cause grave damage and prejudice to the estate and subject it to unnecessary suits.
With specific reference to the Bitukang Manok property as sold by the estate through Gonzales'
predecessor as special administrator and confirmed by the lower court, the same has passed to petitioner
Rosalia's ownership and possession since the court's confirmation of the sale on March 6, 1970 and the
estate makes no further claim against the same but on the contrary has defended the sale and Rosalia's
title thereto as the vendee thereof as against Gonzales' adverse opposition in the appeal brought by
Gonzales in his personal capacity. Yet now, as complained of by Rosalia, Gonzales by virtue of his
appointment, as special administrator a year later seeks in such other capacity to interfere with her in the
harvests of the property purportedly on behalf of the estate when in fact he is going against the official
stand of the estate which upholds the sale.
It is readily seen thereby that Gonzales has been placed in an unduly favored position where he may use
his position as special administrator to favor his personal interests as one interested in the purchase of
the property for himself, although he denies obliquely in his brief such personal interest with the statement
that "there is no evidence or pleading of record that (he) is interested in the acquisition for himself of the
Bitukang Manok property ... and it is a matter of record that having acquired the rights and interests of the
majority of the heirs, he had stepped into the shoes of such heirs, hence, his concern and interest to
protect the estate, as special administrator" 10 which is to say, to protect his claimed majority interest in
the estate, hence his insistence on opposing the sale.
Grave prejudice may thus be inflicted by him on petitioner Rosalia's as an heir as well as the other heirs
such as petitioner Serafin Medina because of the further delay (13 years now) in their receiving their
distributive shares of their father's estate (as against their co-heirs who have sold and assigned their
rights and shares in the estate to Gonzales) as well as to Rosalia as buyer because of Gonzales'
interference with her enjoyment of the property paid for in full by her since 1970.
Hence, the established doctrine that an administrator is deemed unsuitable and should be removed
where his personal interests conflict with his official duties, by virtue of the equally established principle
that an administrator is a quasi trustee, disqualified from acquiring properties of the estate, 11 and who
should be indifferent between the estate and claimants of the property except to preserve it for due
administration, and who should be removed when his interest conflicts with such right and duly. 12
As restated by the Court in Lim vs. Dias-Millares, 13 "(I)n this jurisdiction, one is considered to be
unsuitable for appointment as administrator when he has adverse interest of some kind of hostility to
those immediately interested in the estate.".
The Court noted from the questioned order of February 11, 1971 that respondent Gonzales was
designated special administrator in replacement of the lower court's clerk of court, Atty. Pastor de Castro,
Jr., who had been appointed as such in the earlier order of March 6, 1970. The Court does not look with
favor on such practice of clerks of court or other court employees being appointed as administrators of
estates of decedents pending settlement before the probate court. The objectivity and impartiality of such
clerks of court or other employees so appointed as administrators in discharging their regular functions
may be easily compromised by extraneous considerations. Furthermore, because of the administrator's
fees and compensation payable to them, it is not inconceivable that self-interest intrudes and consciously
or unconsciously, obstacles are placed against the prompt settlement and termination of the proceedings
in derogation of the primordial purpose of the law to strive to have the estate settled expeditiously and

promptly so that the benefits that may flow therefrom may be immediately enjoyed by the decedent's heirs
and beneficiaries. 14 Probate courts are therefore enjoined to desist from such practice of appointing their
clerks of court or other court employees as administrators or receivers of estates or the like.
On this consideration (the replacement of the clerk of court) and on the further consideration of the
specific and limited powers of special administrators and that their appointment merely temporary and
subsists only until a regular administrator is duly appointed (since Rule 80, section 1 provides for the
appointment of a special administrator as a caretaker only "when there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration by any cause") 15 the Court has resolved to allow the appointment of
respondent Gonzales as special administrator to stand, insofar as taking care of the other properties of
the estate are concerned, to the exclusion of the Bitukang Manok property already sold by the estate to
petitioner Rosalia del Carmen. (The said property shall pertain to said petitioner's possession and
enjoyment as the vendee thereof and in the event that the appellate courts find cause to set aside the
lower court's confirmation of the sale in her favor in the pending appeal of Gonzales in his personal
capacity, then shall be the time for the estate and/or the heirs to reclaim possession of the property upon
return to her of the purchase price paid by her).
The Court has finally noted that while the estate involved is not large and there seem to be no
complicated questions that have impeded its prompt settlement, and notwithstanding the lower court's
avowed desire to terminate the proceedings once and for all, the said estate proceedings have been
pending now for over thirteen years without the lower court once having appointed a regular administrator
in accordance with the Rules of Court to take charge of the settlement thereof and the distribution and
partition of the net estate to the heirs entitled thereto.
As time and again stated by the Court, while the provisions of the Rules of Court may be deemed
directory in nature, "the speedy settlement of the estates of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors
and those entitled to residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of
administration have been paid, is the ruling spirit of our probate law" 16 and "courts of first instance should
exert themselves to close up estate within twelve months from the time they are presented, and they may
refuse to allow any compensation to executors and administrators who do not actively labor to that end,
and they may even adopt harsher measures." 17
As in the cited jurisprudence, therefore, respondent lower court is directed to name a suitable person or
entity, who is competent and qualified and doesnot suffer from any proscribed conflict of interest, (and
preferably upon the common agreement of the heirs, to avoid any further bickerings) as regular
administrator charged with the task of accomplishing and terminating the administration of the estate with
the utmost reasonable dispatch, with a view to an early distribution of the net estate among the heirs and
persons entitled thereto.
ACCORDINGLY, the dismissal resolution of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified and in lieu thereof,
judgment is entered allowing the appointment of respondent Gonzales special administrator to stand,
insofar as taking care temporarily of the other properties of the estate are concerned, but to the exclusion
of the Bitukang Manok property previously sold by the estate to petitioner Rosalia M. del Carmen, who is
entitled to the enjoyment of said property as the vendee thereof.
The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore granted is hereby ordered liftedexcept as to the portion
thereof enjoining private respondent from interfering in the cultivation and harvests or otherwise disturbing

the possession of the Bitukang Manok property by petitioner Rosalia M. del Carmen which is hereby
made permanent.
Respondent lower court is ordered to implement the above directive of this Court to name a suitable
person as regular administrator charged with the task of accomplishing and terminating the administration
of the estate with the utmost reasonable dispatch and to submit a report of his action thereon to the Court
within thirty (30) days from notice of entry of this judgment.
Without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
Makalintal, Actg. C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., took no part.

Today is Tuesday, October 25, 2016

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 198680

July 8, 2013

HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON, CICERO YPON, WILSON
YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y. PEALOSA, PETITIONERS,
vs.
GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
TOLEDO CITY, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Branch 59 (RTC), through a petition for
review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising a pure question of law. In particular, petitioners assail the

July 27, 20112 and August 31, 20113 Orders of the RTC, dismissing Civil Case No. T-2246 for lack of cause of action.
The Facts
On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins,4 filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and
Reconveyance with Damages (subject complaint) against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso E.
Ypon" (Gaudioso), docketed as Civil Case No. T-2246.5 In their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno)
died intestate and childless on June 28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which were then covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-A.6 Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed
an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their
subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638,7 to the prejudice of petitioners who are Magdalenos
collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.8
In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b)
two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his passport.9 Further, by way of affirmative defense,
he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause of action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c)
the case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the petitioners have been judicially
declared as Magdalenos lawful heirs.10
The RTC Ruling
On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011 Order,11 finding that the subject complaint failed to state a cause
of action against Gaudioso. It observed that while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with Magdaleno in
a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration,12 this did not mean that they could already be
considered as the decedents compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact that he is
Magdalenos son and hence, his compulsory heir through the documentary evidence he submitted which consisted of: (a)
a marriage contract between Magdaleno and Epegenia Evangelista; (b) a Certificate of Live Birth; (c) a Letter dated
February 19, 1960; and (d) a passport.13
The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied on August 31, 2011 due to the counsels
failure to state the date on which his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliance was issued.14
Aggrieved, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T-2246,15 sought direct recourse to the Court
through the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core of the present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or not the RTCs dismissal of the case on the
ground that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action was proper.
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.16 It is well-settled that the

existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint.17 In this relation, a complaint is said to assert
a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the
relief prayed for.18Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same
should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants.19
As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs therein, alleged that they are the lawful heirs
of Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be declared null
and void and that the transfer certificates of title issued in the latters favor be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if
admitted to be true, would consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the rule that the determination
of a decedents lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special proceeding20 precludes the RTC, in an ordinary
action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA,21 the
Court, citing several other precedents, held that the determination of who are the decedents lawful heirs must be made in the
proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in
this case:
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper special
proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property.1wphi1 This must
take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial
court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a
special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a
party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that
the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right.
In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special
proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals x x x:
In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the
rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for
the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status of an illegitimate
child who claimed to be an heir to a decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this
case, was for the recovery of property.22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be dispensed
with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and
already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon,23
or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be reopened.24
In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence, there lies the need to
institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the parties involved, ultimately resulting to the
dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.
Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the same fails to state a cause of action, a

court cannot disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of the questions before it.25 Thus, concordant with
applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of ownership
and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In this light, it must be pointed out that the
RTC erred in ruling on Gaudiosos heirship which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and determined in the proper
special proceeding. As such, the foregoing pronouncement should therefore be devoid of any legal effect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 is hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice
to any subsequent proceeding to determine the lawful heirs of the late Magdaleno Ypon and the rights concomitant
therewith.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Perez, and Mendoza,* JJ., concur.

Footnotes
* Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1484 dated July 9, 2013.
1

Rollo, pp. 3-25.

Id. at 28-30. Penned by Judge Hermes B. Montero.

Id. at 31.

Id. at 32. The plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T-2246 are as follows: Francisca Y. Trilla, Elena Yntig, Cerelo
Ypon, Esterlita Y. Sereo, Alvaro Ypon, Rogelio Ypon, Simplico Ypon, Jr., Monaliza B. Judilla, Lilia B.
Quinada, Teodora A. Baron, Teofilo Ypon, Mauricio Ypon, Vicente Ypon, Pabling Ypon and Diega Ypon,
Erudita Baron, Cristobal Ypon, Elizabeth Ypon, Francisco Ypon, Lolita Y. Gamao, Egnacia Y. Cavada, Serafin
Ypon, Victor Ypon, Prudencio Ypon, Jr., Allan Ypon, Raul Ypon, Rey Rufo Ypon, Galicursi Ypon, Minda Y.
Libre, Moises Ypon, Jr., Bethoven Ypon, Divina A. Sanchez, Cicero Ypon, Minerva Ypon, Lucinita Ypon,
Crisolina Y. Tingal, Jessica Ypon, Nonoy Ypon, Wilson Ypon, Arthur Ypon, Yolanda Ypon, Lilia Y. Cordero,
Ester Y. Hinlo, Lydia Ypon, Percival Ypon, Esmeralda Y. Baron, Emelita Y. Chiong, Victor Ypon, Primitivo
Ypon, Jr., Pura Ypon, Ma. Nila Ypon, Roy Ipon, Eric Ypon, Henry Ypon, Felipa, Ypon, Felipa Ypon, Vivian
Ypon, Hilarion Pealosa, Angeles D. Libre, Clarita P. Lopez, Vicente Y. Pealosa, Jr., Columbus Y. Pealosa,
Jose Y. Pealosa, Alberto Y. Pealosa, Teodoro Y. Pealosa, Louella P. Madraga, Pomelo Y. Pealosa, and
Agnes P. Villora. (In boldface are the names of the plaintiffs who are also petitioners in this case.)
5

Id. at 32-39.

Id. at 33.

Id. at 34.

Id.

Id. at 53-54.

10

Id. at 54.

11

Id. at 28-30.

12

Id. at 69. Docketed as Sp. Pro. No. 608-T. Entitled "In Re: Petition for Issuance of Letter of Administration,
Minda Ypon Libre, Cristobal E. Ypon, and Agnes P. Veloria, petitioners v. City Registrar of Deeds and City
Assessor of the City of Toledo, respondents."
13

Id. at 30.

14

Id. at 31.

15

Based on the records, it appears that only petitioner Hinidino Y. Pealosa was not a complainant in Civil
Case No. T-2246.
16

See Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.

17

Peltan Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (CA), 336 Phil. 824, 833 (1997).

18

Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Judge, Regional Trial Court Davao City, Branch 8, G.R. No. 147058,
March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 272, 281.
19

The Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. v. CA, 274 Phil. 947, 955 (1991).

20

Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court partly provides:

SEC. 1. When order for distribution of reside made.
xxxx
If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as
the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard
and decided as in ordinary cases.

21

G.R. No. 150206, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 70.

22

Id. at 78-80.

23

Id. at 80-81. "[When] there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the contending parties as
their inheritance x x x [i]t would be more practical to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the
determination of the status of respondent as the sole heir x x x specially [when the parties to the civil case

had] voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of
heirship in these proceedings [and] the RTC [had] assumed jurisdiction over the same and consequently
rendered judgment thereon."
24

"Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a
putative heir has lost the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no
longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to
bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging
to the estate of the deceased." (Republic v. Mangotara, G.R. No. 170375, July 07, 2010, 624 SCRA 360, 443,
citing Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, G.R. No. 155555, August 16, 2005, 467 SCRA 184-189).
25

Peltan Development, Inc. v. CA, supra note 17, at 834.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Tuesday, October 25, 2016

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 174727

August 12, 2013

ANTIPOLO INING (DECEASED), SURVIVED BY MANUEL VILLANUEVA, TEODORA VILLANUEVAFRANCISCO, CAMILO FRANCISCO, ADOLFO FRANCISCO, LUCIMO FRANCISCO, JR., MILAGROS
FRANCISCO,* CELEDONIO FRANCISCO, HERMINIGILDO FRANCISCO; RAMON TRESVALLES,
ROBERTO TAJONERA, NATIVIDAD INING-IBEA (DECEASED) SURVIVED BY EDILBERTO IBEA, JOSEFA
IBEA, MARTHA IBEA, CARMEN IBEA, AMPARO IBEA-FERNANDEZ, HENRY RUIZ, EUGENIO RUIZ AND
PASTOR RUIZ; DOLORES INING-RIMON (DECEASED) SURVIVED BY JESUS RIMON, CESARIA RIMON
GONZALES AND REMEDIOS RIMON CORDERO; AND PEDRO INING (DECEASED) SURVIVED BY ELISA
TAN INING (WIFE) AND PEDRO INING, JR., PETITIONERS,
vs.
LEONARDO R. VEGA, SUBSTITUTED BY LOURDES VEGA, RESTONILO I. VEGA, CRISPULO M. VEGA,
MILBUENA VEGA-RESTITUTO, AND LENARD VEGA, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the latter and cannot become a co-owner of the
decedents property. Consequently, he cannot effect a repudiation of the co-ownership of the estate that was formed among
the decedents heirs.
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the March 14, 2006 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CV No. 74687 and its September 7, 2006 Resolution3 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.4
Factual Antecedents
Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela), is the owner of a 3,120-square meter parcel of land (subject
property) in Kalibo, Aklan covered by Original Certificate of Title No. (24071) RO-6305 (OCT RO-630). Leon and Rafaela
died without issue. Leon was survived by his siblings Romana Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria Roldan Ining (Gregoria),
who are now both deceased.
Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson, herein respondent Leonardo R. Vega (Leonardo)
(also both deceased). Leonardo in turn is survived by his wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M. Vega,
Milbuena Vega-Restituto and Lenard Vega, the substituted respondents.
Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six children: petitioners Natividad Ining-Ibea (Natividad), Dolores IningRimon (Dolores), Antipolo, and Pedro; Jose; and Amando. Natividad is survived by Edilberto Ibea, Josefa Ibea, Martha
Ibea, Carmen Ibea, Amparo Ibea-Fernandez, Henry Ruiz and Pastor Ruiz. Dolores is survived by Jesus Rimon, Cesaria
Rimon Gonzales and Remedios Rimon Cordero. Antipolo is survived by Manuel Villanueva, daughter Teodora VillanuevaFrancisco (Teodora), Camilo Francisco (Camilo), Adolfo Francisco (Adolfo), Lucimo Francisco, Jr. (Lucimo Jr.), Milagros
Francisco, Celedonio Francisco, and Herminigildo Francisco (Herminigildo). Pedro is survived by his wife, Elisa Tan Ining
and Pedro Ining, Jr. Amando died without issue. As for Jose, it is not clear from the records if he was made party to the
proceedings, or if he is alive at all.
In short, herein petitioners, except for Ramon Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and Roberto Tajonera (Tajonera), are Gregorias
grandchildren or spouses thereof (Gregorias heirs).
In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him as Romanas surviving heir, Leonardo filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan Civil Case No. 52756 for partition, recovery of ownership and
possession, with damages, against Gregorias heirs. In his Amended Complaint,7 Leonardo alleged that on several occasions,
he demanded the partition of the property but Gregorias heirs refused to heed his demands; that the matter reached the level
of the Lupon Tagapamayapa, which issued a certification to file a court action sometime in 1980; that Gregorias heirs
claimed sole ownership of the property; that portions of the property were sold to Tresvalles and Tajonera, which portions
must be collated and included as part of the portion to be awarded to Gregorias heirs; that in 1979, Lucimo Francisco, Sr.
(Lucimo Sr.), husband of herein petitioner Teodora, illegally claimed absolute ownership of the property and transferred in
his name the tax declaration covering the property; that from 1988, Lucimo Sr. and Teodora have deprived him (Leonardo)
of the fruits of the property estimated at P1,000.00 per year; that as a result, he incurred expenses by way of attorneys fees
and litigation costs. Leonardo thus prayed that he be declared the owner of half of the subject property; that the same be

partitioned after collation and determination of the portion to which he is entitled; that Gregorias heirs be ordered to execute
the necessary documents or agreements; and that he (Leonardo) be awarded actual damages in the amount of P1,000.00 per
year from 1988, attorneys fees of P50,000.00, and lawyers appearance fees of P500.00 per hearing.
In their Answer8 with counterclaim, Teodora, Camilo, Adolfo, Lucimo Jr. and Herminigildo claimed that Leonardo had no
cause of action against them; that they have become the sole owners of the subject property through Lucimo Sr. who
acquired the same in good faith by sale from Juan Enriquez (Enriquez), who in turn acquired the same from Leon, and
Leonardo was aware of this fact; that they were in continuous, actual, adverse, notorious and exclusive possession of the
property with a just title; that they have been paying the taxes on the property; that Leonardos claim is barred by estoppel
and laches; and that they have suffered damages and were forced to litigate as a result of Leonardos malicious suit. They
prayed that Civil Case No. 5275 be dismissed; that Leonardo be declared to be without any right to the property; that
Leonardo be ordered to surrender the certificate of title to the property; and that they be awarded P20,000.00 as moral
damages, P10,000.00 as temperate and nominal damages, P20,000.00 as attorneys fees, and double costs.
The other Gregoria heirs, as well as Tresvalles and Tajonera were declared in default.9
As agreed during pre-trial, the trial court commissioned Geodetic Engineer Rafael M. Escabarte to identify the metes and
bounds of the property.10 The resulting Commissioners Report and Sketch,11 as well as the Supplementary Commissioners
Report,12 were duly approved by the parties. The parties then submitted the following issues for resolution of the trial court:
Whether Leonardo is entitled to a share in Leons estate;
Whether Leon sold the subject property to Lucimo Sr.; and
Whether Leonardos claim has prescribed, or that he is barred by estoppel or laches.13
In the meantime, Leonardo passed away and was duly substituted by his heirs, the respondents herein.14
During the course of the proceedings, the following additional relevant facts came to light:
1. In 1995, Leonardo filed against petitioners Civil Case No. 4983 for partition with the RTC Kalibo, but the
case was dismissed and referred to the Kalibo Municipal Trial Court (MTC), where the case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 1366. However, on March 4, 1997, the MTC dismissed Civil Case No. 1366 for lack of
jurisdiction and declared that only the RTC can take cognizance of the partition case;15
2. The property was allegedly sold by Leon to Enriquez through an unnotarized document dated April 4,
1943.16 Enriquez in turn allegedly sold the property to Lucimo Sr. on November 25, 1943 via another private
sale document;17
3. Petitioners were in sole possession of the property for more than 30 years, while Leonardo acquired
custody of OCT RO-630;18
4. On February 9, 1979, Lucimo Sr. executed an Affidavit of Ownership of Land19 claiming sole ownership of
the property which he utilized to secure in his name Tax Declaration No. 16414 (TD 16414) over the property

and to cancel Tax Declaration No. 20102 in Leons name;20

5. Lucimo Sr. died in 1991; and
6. The property was partitioned among the petitioners, to the exclusion of Leonardo.21
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On November 19, 2001, the trial court rendered a Decision,22 which decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
Dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs right of action has long prescribed under Article 1141 of the New
Civil Code;
Declaring Lot 1786 covered by OCT No. RO-630 (24071) to be the common property of the heirs of Gregoria Roldan Ining
and by virtue whereof, OCT No. RO-630 (24071) is ordered cancelled and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Aklan is
directed to issue a transfer certificate of title to the heirs of Natividad Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share; Heirs of Dolores Ining,
one-fourth (1/4) share; Heirs of Antipolo Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share; and Heirs of Pedro Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share.
For lack of sufficient evidence, the counterclaim is ordered dismissed.
With cost against the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.23
The trial court found the April 4, 1943 and November 25, 1943 deeds of sale to be spurious. It concluded that Leon never
sold the property to Enriquez, and in turn, Enriquez never sold the property to Lucimo Sr., hence, the subject property
remained part of Leons estate at the time of his death in 1962. Leons siblings, Romana and Gregoria, thus inherited the
subject property in equal shares. Leonardo and the respondents are entitled to Romanas share as the latters successors.
However, the trial court held that Leonardo had only 30 years from Leons death in 1962 or up to 1992 within which to
file the partition case. Since Leonardo instituted the partition suit only in 1997, the same was already barred by prescription.
It held that under Article 1141 of the Civil Code,24 an action for partition and recovery of ownership and possession of a
parcel of land is a real action over immovable property which prescribes in 30 years. In addition, the trial court held that for
his long inaction, Leonardo was guilty of laches as well. Consequently, the property should go to Gregorias heirs
exclusively.
Respondents moved for reconsideration25 but the same was denied by the RTC in its February 7, 2002 Order.26
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Only respondents interposed an appeal with the CA. Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 74687, the appeal questioned the
propriety of the trial courts dismissal of Civil Case No. 5275, its application of Article 1141, and the award of the property
to Gregorias heirs exclusively.

On March 14, 2006, the CA issued the questioned Decision,27 which contained the following decretal portion:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this appeal is GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 8, Kalibo,
Aklan in Civil Case No. 5275 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the plaintiffs as successors-in-interest of Romana Roldan;
2. Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the defendants as successors-in-interest of Gregoria
Roldan Ining;
3. Ordering the defendants to deliver the possession of the portion described in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the
Commissioners Report (Supplementary) to the herein plaintiffs;
4. Ordering the cancellation of OCT No. RO-630 (24071) in the name of Leon Roldan and the Register of
Deeds of Aklan is directed to issue transfer certificates of title to the plaintiffs in accordance with paragraphs
8 and 9 of the sketch plan as embodied in the Commissioners Report (Supplementary) and the remaining
portion thereof be adjudged to the defendants.
Other claims and counterclaims are dismissed.
Costs against the defendants-appellees.
SO ORDERED.28
The CA held that the trial courts declaration of nullity of the April 4, 1943 and November 25, 1943 deeds of sale in favor of
Enriquez and Lucimo Sr., respectively, became final and was settled by petitioners failure to appeal the same. Proceeding
from the premise that no valid prior disposition of the property was made by its owner Leon and that the property which
remained part of his estate at the time of his death passed on by succession to his two siblings, Romana and Gregoria,
which thus makes the parties herein who are Romanas and Gregorias heirs co-owners of the property in equal shares,
the appellate court held that only the issues of prescription and laches were needed to be resolved.
The CA did not agree with the trial courts pronouncement that Leonardos action for partition was barred by prescription.
The CA declared that prescription began to run not from Leons death in 1962, but from Lucimo Sr.s execution of the
Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979, which amounted to a repudiation of his co-ownership of the property with
Leonardo. Applying the fifth paragraph of Article 494 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[n]o prescription shall run in
favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the coownership," the CA held that it was only when Lucimo Sr. executed the Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979 and
obtained a new tax declaration over the property (TD 16414) solely in his name that a repudiation of his co-ownership with
Leonardo was made, which repudiation effectively commenced the running of the 30-year prescriptive period under Article
1141.
The CA did not consider Lucimo Sr.s sole possession of the property for more than 30 years to the exclusion of Leonardo
and the respondents as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership either, stating that his exclusive possession of the property
and appropriation of its fruits even his continuous payment of the taxes thereon while adverse as against strangers, may
not be deemed so as against Leonardo in the absence of clear and conclusive evidence to the effect that the latter was ousted

or deprived of his rights as co-owner with the intention of assuming exclusive ownership over the property, and absent a
showing that this was effectively made known to Leonardo. Citing Bargayo v. Camumot29 and Segura v. Segura,30 the
appellate court held that as a rule, possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be adverse to the other co-owners but
will be held to benefit all, and that a co-owner or co-heir is in possession of an inheritance pro-indiviso for himself and in
representation of his co-owners or co-heirs if he administers or takes care of the rest thereof with the obligation to deliver
the same to his co-owners or co-heirs, as is the case of a depositary, lessee or trustee.
The CA added that the payment of taxes by Lucimo Sr. and the issuance of a new tax declaration in his name do not prove
ownership; they merely indicate a claim of ownership. Moreover, petitioners act of partitioning the property among
themselves to the exclusion of Leonardo cannot affect the latter; nor may it be considered a repudiation of the co-ownership
as it has not been shown that the partition was made known to Leonardo.
The CA held further that the principle of laches cannot apply as against Leonardo and the respondents. It held that laches is
controlled by equitable considerations and it cannot be used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud; it cannot be utilized to
deprive the respondents of their rightful inheritance.
On the basis of the above pronouncements, the CA granted respondents prayer for partition, directing that the manner of
partitioning the property shall be governed by the Commissioners Report and Sketch and the Supplementary
Commissioners Report which the parties did not contest.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration31 which the CA denied in its assailed September 7, 2006 Resolution.32
Hence, the present Petition.
Issues
Petitioners raise the following arguments:
I
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE GROUND THAT LUCIMO FRANCISCO REPUDIATED
THE CO-OWNERSHIP ONLY ON FEBRUARY 9, 1979.
II
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES. 33
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioners insist in their Petition and Reply34 that Lucimo Sr.s purchase of the property in 1943 and his possession thereof
amounted to a repudiation of the co-ownership, and that Leonardos admission and acknowledgment of Lucimo Sr.s
possession for such length of time operated to bestow upon petitioners as Lucimo Sr.s successors-in-interest the benefits
of acquisitive prescription which proceeded from the repudiation.

Petitioners contend that Leonardos inaction from Lucimo Sr.s taking possession in 1943, up to 1995, when Leonardo
filed Civil Case No. 4983 for partition with the RTC Kalibo amounted to laches or neglect. They add that during the
proceedings before the Lupon Tagapamayapa in 1980, Leonardo was informed of Lucimo Sr.s purchase of the property in
1943; this notwithstanding, Leonardo did not take action then against Lucimo Sr. and did so only in 1995, when he filed
Civil Case No. 4983 which was eventually dismissed and referred to the MTC. They argue that, all this time, Leonardo did
nothing while Lucimo Sr. occupied the property and claimed all its fruits for himself.
Respondents Arguments
Respondents, on the other hand, argue in their Comment35 that
For purposes of clarity, if [sic] is respectfully submitted that eighteen (18) legible copies has [sic] not been filed in this case
for consideration in banc [sic] and nine (9) copies in cases heard before a division in that [sic] all copies of pleadings served
to the offices concern [sic] where said order [sic] was issued were not furnished two (2) copies each in violation to [sic] the
adverse parties [sic] to the clerk of court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Kalibo, Aklan, Philippines; to the Honorable Court
of Appeals so that No [sic] action shall be taken on such pleadings, briefs, memoranda, motions, and other papers as fail
[sic] to comply with the requisites set out in this paragraph.
The foregoing is confirmed by affidavit of MERIDON F. OLANDESCA, the law secretary of the Petitioner [sic] who sent
[sic] by Registered mail to Court of Appeals, Twentieth Division, Cebu City; to Counsel for Respondent [sic] and to the
Clerk of Court Supreme Court Manila [sic].
These will show that Petitioner has [sic] violated all the requirements of furnishing two (2) copies each concerned party [sic]
under the Rule of Courts [sic].36
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr. had long been settled and had become final for failure of
petitioners to appeal. Thus, the property remained part of Leons estate.
One issue submitted for resolution by the parties to the trial court is whether Leon sold the property to Lucimo Sr.1wphi1
The trial court, examining the two deeds of sale executed in favor of Enriquez and Lucimo Sr., found them to be spurious. It
then concluded that no such sale from Leon to Lucimo Sr. ever took place. Despite this finding, petitioners did not appeal.
Consequently, any doubts regarding this matter should be considered settled. Thus, petitioners insistence on Lucimo Sr.s
1943 purchase of the property to reinforce their claim over the property must be ignored. Since no transfer from Leon to
Lucimo Sr. took place, the subject property clearly remained part of Leons estate upon his passing in 1962.
Leon died without issue; his heirs are his siblings Romana and Gregoria.
Since Leon died without issue, his heirs are his siblings, Romana and Gregoria, who thus inherited the property in equal
shares. In turn, Romanas and Gregorias heirs the parties herein became entitled to the property upon the sisters
passing. Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death.

Gregorias and Romanas heirs are co-owners of the subject property.

Thus, having succeeded to the property as heirs of Gregoria and Romana, petitioners and respondents became co-owners
thereof. As co-owners, they may use the property owned in common, provided they do so in accordance with the purpose for
which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from
using it according to their rights.37 They have the full ownership of their parts and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and may alienate, assign or mortgage them, and even substitute another person in their enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved.38 Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar
as his share is concerned.39 Finally, no prescription shall run in favor of one of the co-heirs against the others so long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.40
For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner.
Time and again, it has been held that "a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent
any clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other
co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof
is clear and convincing."41
From the foregoing pronouncements, it is clear that the trial court erred in reckoning the prescriptive period within which
Leonardo may seek partition from the death of Leon in 1962. Article 1141 and Article 494 (fifth paragraph) provide that
prescription shall begin to run in favor of a co-owner and against the other co-owners only from the time he positively
renounces the co-ownership and makes known his repudiation to the other co-owners.
Lucimo Sr. challenged Leonardos co-ownership of the property only sometime in 1979 and 1980, when the former executed
the Affidavit of Ownership of Land, obtained a new tax declaration exclusively in his name, and informed the latter before
the Lupon Tagapamayapa of his 1943 purchase of the property. These apparent acts of repudiation were followed later on
by Lucimo Sr.s act of withholding Leonardos share in the fruits of the property, beginning in 1988, as Leonardo himself
claims in his Amended Complaint. Considering these facts, the CA held that prescription began to run against Leonardo only
in 1979 or even in 1980 when it has been made sufficiently clear to him that Lucimo Sr. has renounced the co-ownership
and has claimed sole ownership over the property. The CA thus concluded that the filing of Civil Case No. 5275 in 1997, or
just under 20 years counted from 1979, is clearly within the period prescribed under Article 1141.
What escaped the trial and appellate courts notice, however, is that while it may be argued that Lucimo Sr. performed acts
that may be characterized as a repudiation of the co-ownership, the fact is, he is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is
not an heir of Gregoria; he is merely Antipolos son-in-law, being married to Antipolos daughter Teodora.42 Under the
Family Code, family relations, which is the primary basis for succession, exclude relations by affinity.
Art. 150. Family relations include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and

(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
In point of law, therefore, Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property; Teodora is. Consequently, he cannot validly effect a
repudiation of the co-ownership, which he was never part of. For this reason, prescription did not run adversely against
Leonardo, and his right to seek a partition of the property has not been lost.
Likewise, petitioners argument that Leonardos admission and acknowledgment in his pleadings that Lucimo Sr. was in
possession of the property since 1943 should be taken against him, is unavailing. In 1943, Leon remained the rightful
owner of the land, and Lucimo Sr. knew this very well, being married to Teodora, daughter of Antipolo, a nephew of Leon.
More significantly, the property, which is registered under the Torrens system and covered by OCT RO-630, is in Leons
name. Leons ownership ceased only in 1962, upon his death when the property passed on to his heirs by operation of law.
In fine, since none of the co-owners made a valid repudiation of the existing co-ownership, Leonardo could seek partition of
the property at any time.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed March 14, 2006 Decision and the September 7, 2006 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74687are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
AT T E S T AT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C AT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
*

Sometimes referred to as Milagrosa Francisco in some parts of the records.

Rollo , pp. 10-52.

CA rollo, pp. 97-107; penned by Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos and concurred in by Associate
Justices Enrico A. Lanzanas and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.
3

Id. at 136.

Id. at 113-120.

Exhibit "A," Folder of Exhibits for the Respondents. The property is alternately referred to in the various
pleadings and in the decisions of the trial and appellate courts as "Original Certificate of Title No. RO-630
(24071)," or "Original Certificate of Title No. RO-630 (2407)," or "Original Certificate of Title No. RO-630
(240710)," or "Original Certificate of Title No. 630."
6

Assigned to Branch 8.

Records, pp. 10-14.

Id. at 28-31.

See Order dated September 3, 1997, id. at 49.

10

See Order dated October 30, 1998, id. at 151.

11

Exhibits "5" and "5-1," Folder of Exhibits for the Respondents.

12

Exhibit "T," id.

13

See Pre-Trial Order dated August 4, 1999, records, pp. 192-193.

14

Id. at 198-199.

15

Id. at 12.

16

Exhibit "4," Folder of Exhibits for the Petitioners.

17

Exhibit "9," id.

18

Records, pp. 267-269, 271.

19

Exhibit "11," Folder of Exhibits for the Petitioners.

20

Exhibit "12," id.

21

Exhibit "15," id.

22

Records, pp. 262-279; penned by Judge Eustaquio G. Terencio.

23

Id. at 278-279.

24

Art. 1141. Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.
This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership and other
real rights by prescription.

25

Records, pp. 284-286.

26

Id. at 302.

27

CA rollo, pp. 97-107.

28

Id. at 106-107. Emphases in the original.

29

40 Phil. 857, 872 (1920).

30

247-A Phil. 449, 458 (1988).

31

CA rollo, pp. 113-120.

32

Id. at 136.

33

Rollo, p. 40

34

Id. at 278-281.

35

Id. at 259-275.

36

Id. at 272-273.

37

CIVIL CODE, Article 486.

Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he does so in accordance with the
purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or
prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their rights. The purpose of the co-ownership
may be changed by agreement, express or implied.

38

CIVIL CODE, Article 493.

Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage,
with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be alloted to him in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

39

CIVIL CODE, Article 494, first paragraph.

No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time
the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.

40

CIVIL CODE, Article 494, fifth paragraph.

No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long
as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

41

Robles v. Court of Appeals, 384 Phil. 635, 649-650 (2000).

42

Rollo, p. 294.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Tuesday, October 25, 2016

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 186332

October 23, 2013

PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES ERNESTO LOPEZ and FLORENTINA LOPEZ substituted by JOSEPH WILFRED JOVEN JOSEPH
GILBERT JOVEN and MARLYN JOVEN, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Planters Development Bank Planters Bank) to challenge
the July 30, 2007 amended decision2 and the February 5, 2009 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
61358.
The Factual Antecedents
Sometime in 1983, the spouses Emesto and Florentina Lopez applied for and obtained a real estate loan in the amount of
3,000,000.00 from Planters Bank. The loan was intended to finance the construction of a four-story concrete dormitory
building. The loan agreement4 dated May 18, 1983 provided that the loan is payable for fourteen (14) years and shall bear a
monetary interest at twenty-one percent (21%) per annum (p.a.). Furthermore, partial drawdowns on the loan shall be based
on project completion, and shall be allowed upon submission of job accomplishment reports by the project engineer. To
secure the payment of the loan, the spouses Lopez mortgaged a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T16233.5
On July 21, 1983, the parties signed an amendment to the loan agreement. Accordingly, the interest rate was increased to
twenty-three percent (23%) p.a. and the term of the loan was shortened to three years.6 On March 9, 1984, the parties
executed a second amendment to the loan agreement. The interest rate was further increased to twenty-five percent (25%)
p.a. The contract also provided that releases on the loan shall be subject to Planters Banks availability of funds.7
Meanwhile, the Philippine economy deteriorated as the political developments in the country worsened. The value of the
peso plunged. The price of the materials and the cost of labor escalated.8 Eager to finish the project, the spouses Lopez
obtained an additional loan in the amount of P1,200,000.00 from Planters Bank.
On April 25, 1984, they entered into a third amendment to the loan agreement. The amount of the loan and the interest rate
were increased to P4,200,000.00 and twenty-seven percent (27%) p.a., respectively. Furthermore, the term of the loan was
shortened to one year. The contract also provided that the remaining loan shall only be available to the spouses Lopez until
June 30, 1984.9 On the same date, the spouses Lopez increased the amount secured by the mortgage to P4,200,000.00.10 On
August 15, 1984, Planters Bank unilaterally increased the interest rate to thirty-two percent (32%) p.a.11
The spouses Lopez failed to avail the full amount of the loan because Planters Bank refused to release the remaining amount

of P700,000.00. On October 13, 1984, the spouses Lopez filed against Planters Bank complaint for rescission of the loan
agreements and for damages with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.12 They alleged that they could not continue
the construction of the dormitory building because Planters Bank had refused to release the remaining loan balance.
In defense, Planters Bank argued that the spouses Lopez had no cause of action. It pointed out that its refusal to release the
loan was the result of the spouses Lopezs violations of the loan agreement, namely: (1) non-submission of the
accomplishment reports; and (2) construction of a six-story building. As a counterclaim, Planters Bank prayed for the
payment of the overdue released loan in the amount of P3,500,000.00, with interest and damages.13
On November 16, 1984, Planters Bank foreclosed the mortgaged properties in favor of third parties after the spouses Lopez
defaulted on their loan.14
The RTC Ruling
In a decision15 dated August 18, 1997, the RTC ruled in Planters Banks favor. It held that the spouses Lopez had no right to
rescind the loan agreements because they were not the injured parties. It maintained that the spouses Lopez violated the loan
agreement by failing to submit accomplishment reports and by deviating from the construction project plans. It further
declared that rescission could not be carried out because the mortgaged properties had already been sold in favor of third
parties. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision provides:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendant-bank the amount
of Three Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P3,500,000.00) plus the 27% stipulated interest per annum commencing on
June 22, 1994 until fully paid minus the proceeds of the foreclosed mortgaged property in the auction sale.16 (emphasis ours)
Subsequently, the RTC amended17 its decision, upon Planters Banks filing of a Motion for Partial Reconsideration and/or
Amendment of the Decision dated August 18, 1997.18 It clarified that the interest rate shall commence on June 22, 1984, as
proven during trial, thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendant-bank the amount
of Three Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P3,500,000.00) plus the 27% stipulated interest per annum commencing on
June 22, 1984 until fully paid minus the proceeds of the foreclosed mortgaged property in the auction sale.19 (emphasis ours)
CA Ruling
The spouses Lopez died during the pendency of the case. On appeal to the CA, compulsory heirs Joseph Wilfred, Joseph
Gilbert and Marlyn, all surnamed Joven20 (respondents) substituted for the deceased Florentina Lopez.
On November 27, 2006, the CA reversed the RTC ruling.21 It held that Planters Banks refusal to release the loan was a
substantial breach of the contract. It found that the spouses Lopez submitted accomplishment reports. It gave weight to
Engineer Edgard Fianzas testimony that he prepared accomplishment reports prior to the release of the funds. Moreover,
Planters Banks appraisal department head, Renato Marayag, testified that accomplishment reports were a prerequisite for
the release of the loan.
It also declared that Planters Bank was estopped from raising the issue of the spouses Lopezs deviation from the
construction project. Planters Bank conducted several ocular inspections of the building from 1983 to 1987. Planters Bank

continuously released partial amounts of the loan despite its knowledge of the construction of a six-story building.
It further concluded that Planters Bank did not release the loan because the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)
lacked funds. Ma. Agnes Jopson Angeles, Planters Banks senior accountant for the marketing group, testified that Planters
Banks source of funds in real estate loans was DBP. According to the CA, Angeles admitted DBPs non-availability of
funds in her testimony. The dispositive ruling of the CA decision provides:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED in that the loan interest to be paid by plaintiff-appellant to defendantappellee is hereby reduced to 12% per annum computed from finality of this Decision until full payment of the amount of
P3.5 million, minus the proceeds of auction sale of the foreclosed mortgaged property.22
Subsequently, the respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. They sought clarification of the dispositive portion which
does not declare the rescission of the loan and accessory contracts. On the other hand, Planters Bank filed a Comment on
March 2, 2007, praying for the reinstatement of the RTC ruling. The CA re-examined the case and treated the comment as a
motion for reconsideration. It affirmed its previous decision but modified the dispositive portion, thus:
ACCORDINGLY, defendant-appellees motion for reconsideration is DENIED while plaintiffs-appellants motion for
reconsideration is PARTLY GRANTED. The dispositive part of Our Decision dated November 27, 2006 is hereby clarified
and corrected to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The loan agreement between the parties, including
all its accessory contracts, is declared RESCINDED.
Plaintiffs-appellants are ordered to return to defendant-appellee bank the amount of P2,885,830.56 with interest of twelve
percent (12%) per annum from the time this Decision becomes final and executory until it is fully paid.
Defendant-appellee bank is ordered to convey and restore to plaintiffs-appellants the foreclosed property.23 (emphases and
underscores supplied)
The CA also denied Planters Banks Motion for Reconsideration dated August 22, 2007, prompting it to file the present
petition.
The Petitioners Position
Planters Bank reiterates in its petition before this Court that the respondents had no cause of action. It posits that the spouses
Lopez violated the loan agreements for their failure to submit accomplishment reports and by constructing a six-story
building instead of a four-story building. It maintains that there was no estoppel because only one year and twenty days have
elapsed from the violation of the contract until the spouses Lopezs filing of the complaint. It argues that there must be an
unjustifiable neglect for an unreasonable period of time for estoppel to apply. It also avers that even assuming that it
breached the contract, it was only a slight breach because only P700,000.00 of the P4,200,000.00 loan was not released.
Moreover, it highlights that it cannot convey the foreclosed properties because they were already sold to third parties.24
Planters Bank also clarifies its date of receipt of the CA amended decision in a Manifestation dated March 13, 2009.25 It
states that it received the amended decision on August 7, 2007, as evidenced by the attached certifications from the Makati
and Manila Central Post Offices.

The Respondents Position

In their Comments,26 the respondents reiterate the CAs arguments. They also assert that the amended decision has already
become final and executory due to Planters Banks belated filing of a motion for reconsideration on August 22, 2007. They
point out that Planters Bank unequivocably stated in the pleadings that it received a copy of the amended decision on August
2, 2007. Furthermore, they aver that Planters Banks motion for reconsideration is a second motion for reconsideration
disallowed by the Rules of Court. They highlight that Planters Banks comment to the respondents motion for
reconsideration sought the reinstatement of the RTC ruling. Consequently, the comment is Planters Banks first motion for
reconsideration.
The Issues
This case presents to us the following issues:
1) Whether the CAs amended decision dated July 30, 2007 is final and executory;
2) Whether the spouses Lopez violated the loan agreement;
a) Whether the spouses Lopez submitted accomplishment reports, and
b) Whether the spouses Lopez deviated from the construction project;
3) Whether Planters Bank substantially breached the loan agreement; and
4) Whether the amount of awards rendered by the CA is proper.
The Courts Ruling
We reverse the CAs decision.
The CAs amended decision dated July 30, 2007 is not yet final and executory
Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides that if service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by an
affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with Section 7, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court and the registry
receipt issued by the mailing office. However, the presentation of an affidavit and a registry receipt is not indispensable in
proving service by registered mail. Other competent evidence, such as the certifications from the Philippine Post Office,
may establish the fact and date of actual service. These certifications are direct and primary pieces of evidence of
completion of service.27
We believe Planters Banks assertion that its motion for reconsideration dated August 22, 2007 was filed on time. The
Manila Central Post Offices certification states that the amended decision was only dispatched from the Manila Central Post
Office to the Makati Central Post Office on August 2, 2007.28 On the other hand, the Makati Central Post Offices
certification provides that Planters Banks actual receipt of the decision was on August 7, 2007.29 These certifications
conclusively show that Planters Banks counsel received the amended decision on August 7, 2007 and not on August 2,
2007.

There is also no merit to the respondents argument that Planters Banks motion for reconsideration is disallowed under
Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court.30 We point out in this respect that there is a difference between an amended
judgment and a supplemental judgment. In an amended judgment, the lower court makes a thorough study of the original
judgment and renders the amended and clarified judgment only after considering all the factual and legal issues. The
amended and clarified decision is an entirely new decision which supersedes or takes the place of the original decision. On
the other hand, a supplemental decision does not take the place of the original; it only serves to add to the original decision.31
In the present case, the CA promulgated an amended decision because it re-examined its factual and legal findings in its
original decision. Thus, Planters Bank may file a motion for reconsideration. The amended decision is an entirely new
decision which replaced the CAs decision dated November 27, 2006.
In sum, the amended decision is not yet final and executory because Planters Bank filed a motion for reconsideration on
time; its filing is allowed by the Rules of Court.
The spouses Lopez submitted accomplishment reports
We see no reason to disturb the CAs finding that the spouses Lopez religiously submitted accomplishment reports. The
evidence on record32 shows that Engr. Fianza submitted accomplishment reports from November 19, 1983 until June 9,
1984. Engr. Fianza also testified that he prepared these accomplishment reports.33 His testimony is corroborated by the
testimony of Marayag, Planters Banks appraisal department head.
This latter testimony shows that the spouses Lopez indeed submitted accomplishment reports.
Planters Bank is estopped from opposing the spouses Lopezs deviation from the construction project
We also affirm the CAs finding that Planters Bank is estopped from opposing the spouses Lopezs construction of a sixstory building. Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or
omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe that a particular thing is true, and to act upon such belief, he
cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it.
The concurrence of the following requisites is necessary for the principle of equitable estoppel to apply: (a) conduct
amounting to false representation or concealment of material facts or at least calculated to convey the impression that the
facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to assert; (b) intent, or at least
expectation that this conduct shall be acted upon, or at least influenced by the other party; and (c) knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the actual facts.
Inaction or silence may under some circumstances amount to a misrepresentation, so as to raise an equitable estoppel. When
the silence is of such a character and under such circumstances that it would become a fraud on the other party to permit the
party who has kept silent to deny what his silence has induced the other to believe and act on, it will operate as an estoppel.
This doctrine rests on the principle that if one maintains silence, when in conscience he ought to speak, equity will debar
him from speaking when in conscience he ought to remain silent.
The principle of equitable estoppel prevents Planters Bank from raising the spouses Lopezs violation of the loan agreement.
Planters Bank was already aware that the spouses Lopez were building six floors as early as September 30, 1983. Records
disclose that Planters Bank also conducted a series of ocular inspections.35 Despite such knowledge, the bank kept silent on

the violation of the loan agreement as Planters Bank still continued to release the loan in partial amounts to the spouses
Lopez. As the CA correctly pointed out, Planters Bank only raised this argument during trial a move that highly appears to
be an afterthought.
Planters Bank only committed a slight or casual breach of the contract
Despite our affirmation of the CAs factual findings, we disagree with the CAs conclusion that rescission is proper. Planters
Bank indeed incurred in delay by not complying with its obligation to make further loan releases.36 Its refusal to release the
remaining balance, however, was merely a slight or casual breach as shown below. In other words, its breach was not
sufficiently fundamental to defeat the object of the parties in entering into the loan agreement. The well-settled rule is that
rescission will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach of the contract. The question of whether a breach of contract is
substantial depends upon the attending circumstances.37
The factual circumstances of this case lead us to the conclusion that Planters Bank substantially complied with its obligation.
To reiterate, Planters Bank released P3,500,000.00 of the P4,200,000.00 loan. Only the amount of P700,000.00 was not
released. This constitutes 16.66% of the entire loan. Moreover, the progress report dated May 30, 1984 states that 85% of the
six-story building was already completed by the spouses Lopez.38 It is also erroneous to solely impute the non-completion of
the building to Planters Bank. Planters Bank is not an insurer of the buildings construction. External factors, such as the
steep price of the materials and the cost of labor, affected the erection of the building. More importantly, the spouses Lopez
took the risk that the project would not be finished when they constructed a six-story building instead of four-story structure.
Even assuming that Planters Bank substantially breached its obligation, the fourth paragraph of Article 1191 of the Civil
Code expressly provides that rescission is without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired the thing, in
accordance with Article 1385 of the Civil Code. In turn, Article 1385 states that rescission cannot take place when the things
which are the object of the contract are legally in the possession of third persons who did not act in bad faith.
In the present case, the mortgaged properties had already been foreclosed. They were already sold to the highest bidder at a
public auction. We recognize that transferees pendente lite are proper, but not indispensable, parties in this case, as they
would, in any event, be bound by the judgment against Planters Bank.39 However, the respondents did not overcome the
presumption that the buyers bought the foreclosed properties in good faith.40 The spouses Lopez did not cause the annotation
of notice of lis pendens at the back of the title of the mortgaged lot.41 Moreover, the respondents did not adduce any
evidence that would show that the buyers bought the property with actual knowledge of the pendency of the present case.
Furthermore, the spouses Lopezs failure to pay the overdue loan made them parties in default, not entitled to rescission
under Article 1191 of the Civil Code.
The estate of Florentina Lopez shall pay Planters Bank the amount of P3,500,000.00 with 12% monetary interest p.a. from
June 22, 1984 until full payment of the obligation
Planters Bank and the spouses Lopez undertook reciprocal obligations when they entered into a loan agreement. In
reciprocal obligations, the obligation or promise of each party is the consideration for that of the other. The mere pecuniary
inability of one contracting party to fulfill an engagement does not discharge the other contracting party of the obligation in
the contract.42 Planters Banks slight breach does not excuse the spouses Lopez from paying the overdue loan in the amount
of P3,500,000.00. Despite this finding, however, we cannot sustain the imposition of the interest rate in the loan contract.
We are aware that the parties did not raise this issue in the pleadings. However, it is a settled rule that an appeal throws the

entire case open for review once accepted by this Court. This Court has thus the authority to review matters not specifically
raised or assigned as error by the parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case.43
In the present case, Planters Bank unilaterally increased the monetary interest rate to 32% p.a. after the execution of the third
amendment to the loan agreement. This is patently violative of the element of mutuality of contracts. Our Civil Code has
long entrenched the basic principle that the validity of or compliance to the contract cannot be left to the will of one party.44
Even if we disregard the 32% p.a., the interest rate of 27% p.a. in the third amended agreement is still excessive. In Trade &
Investment Devt Corp. of the Phil. v. Roblett Industrial Construction Corp.,45 we lowered the interest resulting charge for
being excessive in the context of its computation period . We equitably reduced the interest rate from 18% p.a. to 12% p.a.
because the case was decided with finality sixteen years after the filing of the complaint. We noted that the amount of the
loan swelled to a considerably disproportionate sum, far exceeding the principal debt.
A parallel situation prevails in the present case. Almost 29 years have elapsed since the filing of the complaint in 1984. The
amount of the principal loan already ballooned to an exorbitant amount unwarranted in fact and in operation. While the
Court recognizes the right of the parties to enter into contracts, this rule is not absolute. We are allowed to temper interest
rates when necessary. We have thus ruled in several cases that when the agreed rate is iniquitous, it is considered as contrary
to morals, if not against the law. Such stipulation is void.46
The manifest unfairness caused to the respondents by this ruling and our sense of justice dictate that we judiciously reduce
the monetary interest rate. Our imposition of the lower interest rate is based on the demands of substantial justice and in the
exercise of our equity jurisdiction.
We thus equitably reduce the monetary interest rate to 12% p.a. on the amount due computed from June 22, 1984 until full
payment of the obligation. We point out in this respect that the monetary interest accrues under the terms of the loan
agreement until actual payment is effected47 for the reason that its imposition is based on the stipulation of the parties.48
In the present case, the lower courts found that the monetary interest accrued on June 22, 1984. Incidentally, the lower courts
also found that June 22, 1984 is also the spouses Lopezs date of default.
The estate of Florentina Lopez shall further be liable for compensatory interest at the rates of 12% p.a. from June 22, 1984
until June 30, 2013 and 6% p.a. from July 1, 2013 until the finality of this Decision
With respect to the computation of compensatory interest, Section 1 of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) Circular No. 799,
Series of 2013, which took effect on July 1, 2013, provides:
Section 1. The rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments,
in the absence of an express contract as to such rate of interest, shall be six percent (6%) per annum. [emphasis ours]
This provision amends Section 2 of Central Bank (CB) Circular No. 905-82, Series of 1982, which took effect on January 1,
1983. Notably, we recently upheld the constitutionality of CB Circular No. 905-82 in Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc.,
et al. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board, etc.49 Section 2 of CB Circular No. 905-82 provides:
Section 2. The rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments,
in the absence of express contract as to such rate of interest, shall continue to be twelve percent (12%) per annum. [emphasis

ours]
Pursuant to these changes, this Court modified the guidelines in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals50 in the
case of Dario Nacar v. Gallery Frames, et al.51 (Nacar). In Nacar, we established the following guidelines:
I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi- contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the
contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern in
determining the measure of recoverable damages.
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as
well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or
forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing.
Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the
absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from
judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount
of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest,
however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages, except when or until the demand can be
established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty,
the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil
Code), but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the
interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the
quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the
computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal
interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per annum from such
finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of
credit. And, in addition to the above, judgments that have become final and executory prior to July 1, 2013,
shall not be disturbed and shall continue to be implemented applying the rate of interest fixed therein.
[emphasis ours]
Since we declare void the monetary interest agreed upon by the parties, we impose a compensatory interest of 12% p.a.
which accrues from June 22, 1984 until June 30, 2013, pursuant to CB Circular No. 905-82.52 As we have earlier stated, June
22, 1984 is the spouses Lopezs established date of default. In recognition of the prospective application of BSP Circular No.
799, we reduce the compensatory interest of 12% p.a. to 6% p.a. from July 1, 2013 until the finality of this Decision.
Furthermore, the interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded, pursuant to Article 2212 of the
Civil Code.
The estate of Florentina Lopez shall further be liable for interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from the finality of this decision until
full payment of the obligation

Also, pursuant to the above-quoted Section 1 of BSP Circular No. 799, we impose an interest rate of 6% p.a. from the
finality of this Decision until the obligation is fully paid, the interim period being deemed equivalent to a forbearance of
credit.
Lastly, to prevent future litigation in the enforcement of the award, we clarify that the respondents are not personally
responsible for the debts of their predecessor. The respondents extent of liability to Planters Bank is limited to the value of
the estate which they inherited from Florentina Lopez.53 In our jurisdiction, "it is the estate or mass of the property left by
the decedent, instead of the heirs directly, that becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations which survive
after his death."54To rule otherwise would unduly deprive the respondents of their properties.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed amended decision dated July 30, 2007 and resolution dated February 5,
2009 of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED. Respondents Joseph Wilfred, Joseph Gilbert and Marlyn, all
surnamed Joven, are ordered to pay THREE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (1 3,500,000.00) with 12%
monetary interest per annum commencing on June 22, 1984 until fully paid; 12% compensatory interest per annum
commencing on June 22, 1984 until June 30, 2013; 6% compensatory interest per annum commencing on July 1 2013 until
the finality of this Decision; and 6% interest rate per annum commencing from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
The proceeds of the foreclosed mortgaged property in the auction sale shall be deducted from the principal of the loan from
the time payment was made to Planters Bank and the remainder shall be the new principal from which the computation shall
thereafter be made. Furthermore, the respondents' liability is limited to the value of the inheritance they received from the
deceased Florentina Lopez.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.*
Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES**
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
AT T E S T AT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

Chairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court s Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
*

Designated as Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose P. Perez, per Special Order No. 1567 dated
October 11 2013.
**

Designated as Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo, per Special Order No.
1564 dated October 11, 2013.
1

Dated February 24, 2009 and filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; rollo, pp. 3-30.

Id. at 34-65; penned by Presiding Justice Ruben T. Reyes, and concurred in by Associate Justices Juan Q.
Enriquez, Jr. and Vicente S. E. Veloso.
3

Id. at 67-69; penned by Associate Justice Arturo G. Tayag, and concurred in by Associate Justices Martin S.
Villarama, Jr. and Noel G. Tijam.
4

Id. at 76-85.

Id. at 86-87.

Id. at 91-93.

Id. at 96-98.

RTC rollo, Volume 3, p. 29.

Rollo, pp. 99-103.

10

Id. at 94-95.

11

Id. at 39.

12

RTC rollo, Volume 1, pp. 1-11.

13

Id. at 19-27.

14

Rollo, p. 104.

15

Id. at 161-165; penned by Judge Eriberto Rosario, Jr.

16

Id. at 164-165.

17

Id. at 172-173.

18

Id. at 166-171.

19

Id. at 173.

20

CA rollo, p. 116.

21

Rollo, pp. 175-203.

22

Id. at 202.

23

Rollo, pp. 64-65.

24

Supra note 1.

25

Rollo, pp. 221-225.

26

Id. at 270-282.

27

Cortes v. Valdellon, etc., et al., 162 Phil. 745, 753 (1976).

28

Rollo, p. 260.

29

Id. at 259.

30

Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 2. Second motion for reconsideration. No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment
or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained. [italics supplied]

31

Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Hon. Caluag and Nava, 120 Phil. 338, 342 (1964); and Lee v. Trocino, G.R. No.
164648, June 19, 2009, 590 SCRA 32, 37.
32

CA rollo, Volume 3, pp. 59-60, 67-69.

33

TSN, September 8, 1986, p. 13.

34

TSN, February 2, 1988, pp. 7-14

Q: What about the other documents you showed us?
A: I am familiar with this Progress Report.
Q: Specifically, what document are you referring to? I noted that these are xerox copies, who had that
xeroxed, will you tell the Court?
A: Our policy then at Credit Department is we required (sic) the borrower to submit a copy of
progress report to be prepared by the Engineer.
xxxx
Court: In other words, the Court will assume that the originals are in the possession of the bank. Atty.
Cruz: Yes, Your Honor, we admit.
Atty. Monsanto: Now, you mentioned progress reports. How many progress reports do you have in
your possession?
xxxx
A: Three (3). The first one is the Bill of Materials.
xxxx
Atty. Monsanto: At the time of the submission of these reports where were you connected then? A: I
was then the Head of the Appraisal Department.
xxxx
Q: I see. As Head of the Appraisal DepartmentBy the way, what is the job of the Appraisal
Department?
A: Primarily, assistance to account of officers in terms of loan managing and for disposal of assets.
Q: There be any project in progress what do you do as head of the Department of Appraisal?
A: We require the borrower to submit a Progress Report.
Q: That is Standard Operating Procedure?

A: Yes.
Q: How often do you normally require the submission of progress reports?
A: Everytime the client requests for a release.
Q: Before any further release is made by the bank there is a progress report required and it is only
upon the submission of this progress report and upon your satisfaction that you release funds to the
client, is that correct?
A: That is right. [emphases ours]
35

RTC rollo, Volume 3, pp. 157-159, 163-172.

36

Article 1169 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 1169. Those obliged to deliver or to do something incur in delay from the time the obligee
judicially or extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their obligation.
However, the demand by the creditor shall not be necessary in order that delay may exist:
(1) When the obligation or the law expressly so declare; or
(2) When from the nature and the circumstances of the obligation it appears that the designation of the
time when the thing is to be delivered or the service is to be rendered was a controlling motive for the
establishment of the contract; or
(3) When demand would be useless, as when the obligor has rendered it beyond his power to perform.
In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other does not comply or is not ready to
comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. From the moment one of the parties
fulfills his obligation, delay by the other begins. (1100a)

37

Ang v. Court of Appeals, 252 Phil. 292, 303 (1989).

38

RTC rollo, Volume 3, p. 167.

39

Santiago Land Devt. Corp. v. CA, 334 Phil. 741, 747-749 (1997).

40

RULES OF COURT, Section 2(p), Rule 131.

41

Id., Section 14, Rule 13.

42

Central Bank of the Phil. V. Court of Appeals, 223 Phil. 266, 273 (1985).

43

Aliling v. Feliciano, G.R. No. 185829, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 186, 199, citing Sociedad Europea de
Financiacion SA v. CA, G.R. No. 75787, January 21, 1991,193 SCRA 105, 114.
44

Article 1308 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 1308. The contract must bind both contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be left
to the will of one of them.

45

523 Phil. 362, 367 (2006).

46

Imperial v. Jaucian, 471 Phil. 484, 494-495 (2004); and Castro v. Tan, G.R. No. 168940, November 24,
2009, 605 SCRA 231, 237-238.
47

State Investment House, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90676, June 19, 1991, 198 SCRA 390, 398.

48

CIVIL CODE, Article 1956.

49

G.R. No. 192986, January 15, 2013.

50

G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994, 234 SCRA 78.

51

G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013.

52

In Castelo v. CA, 314 Phil. 1, 20 (1995), we explained:

Under Article 2209, the appropriate measure for damages in case of delay in discharging an obligation
consisting of the payment of a sum of money is the payment of penalty interest at the rate agreed upon
in the contract of the parties. In the absence of a stipulation of a particular rate of penalty interest,
payment of additional interest at a rate equal to the regular or monetary interest, becomes due and
payable. Finally, if no regular interest had been agreed upon by the contracting parties, then the
damages payable will consist of payment of legal interest which is six percent (6%) or, in the case of
loans or forbearances of money, twelve percent (12%) per annum. [italics supplied]

53

Article 1311 of the Civil Code provides:

Article 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case
where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by
stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property he received
from the decedent. [emphasis ours]

54

Desiderio P. Jurado, Comments and Jurisprudence on Obligations and Contracts 2002 ed., p 375.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

i[1] In Spl. Proc. No. 4689, Order dated 20 August 1993, Judge Bartolome M. Fanual, presiding.
ii[2] Petition, Annex D, Rollo, pp. 26-28.
iii[3] Petition, Annex E, Rollo, pp. 29-30.
iv[4] Petition, Annex F, Rollo, pp. 31-35.
v[5] Petition, Annex H, Rollo, pp. 38-46.
vi[6] Petition, Annex A, Rollo, p. 23.
vii[7] Petition, Annex Q, Rollo, pp. 96-100.
viii[8] Petition, Annex B, Rollo, p. 24.
ix[9] Petition filed on November 19, 1993, Rollo, pp. 9-22.
x[10] Uy v. Jardeleza, G. R. No. 109557, November 29, 2000.