POLI REV

The balancing of interests test requires that a determination must first be made
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved
by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Clear and Present Danger Test
The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has
a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored.
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its
being well-nigh inevitable.

trwo theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights
of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance
must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless
there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which
permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established
between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and

detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of

type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on
the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.

POLI REV
The balancing of interests test requires that a determination must first be made
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved
by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Clear and Present Danger Test
The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has
a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored.
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its
being well-nigh inevitable.

trwo theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights
of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance
must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless

there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which
permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established
between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of
type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on
the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
POLI REV
The balancing of interests test requires that a determination must first be made
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved
by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Clear and Present Danger Test
The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has
a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored.
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its
being well-nigh inevitable.

trwo theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights
of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance

must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless
there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which
permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established
between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of
type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on
the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
POLI REV
The balancing of interests test requires that a determination must first be made
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved
by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Clear and Present Danger Test
The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has
a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored.
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its
being well-nigh inevitable.

trwo theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights
of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance
must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless
there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which
permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established
between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of
type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on
the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
POLI REV
The balancing of interests test requires that a determination must first be made
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved
by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Clear and Present Danger Test
The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has

a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored.
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its
being well-nigh inevitable.

trwo theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights
of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance
must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless
there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which
permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established
between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of
type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on
the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
POLI REV
The balancing of interests test requires that a determination must first be made
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved
by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Clear and Present Danger Test

The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has
a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored.
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its
being well-nigh inevitable.

trwo theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights
of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance
must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless
there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which
permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established
between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of
type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on
the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
POLI REV

The balancing of interests test requires that a determination must first be made
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved
by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Clear and Present Danger Test
The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has
a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored.
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its
being well-nigh inevitable.

trwo theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights
of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance
must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless
there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which
permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established
between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of
type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on

the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
POLI REV
The balancing of interests test requires that a determination must first be made
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved
by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Clear and Present Danger Test
The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has
a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored.
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its
being well-nigh inevitable.

trwo theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights
of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance
must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless
there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which

permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established

between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of
type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on
the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
POLI REV
The balancing of interests test requires that a determination must first be made
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved
by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Clear and Present Danger Test
The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has
a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored.
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its
being well-nigh inevitable.

trwo theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights
of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance
must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless

there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which
permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established
between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of
type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on
the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
POLI REV
The balancing of interests test requires that a determination must first be made
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved
by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Clear and Present Danger Test
The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has
a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored.
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its
being well-nigh inevitable.

trwo theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights
of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance

must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless
there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which
permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established
between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of
type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on
the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
POLI REV
The balancing of interests test requires that a determination must first be made
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved
by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Clear and Present Danger Test
The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has
a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored.
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its
being well-nigh inevitable.

trwo theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights
of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance
must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless
there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which
permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established
between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of
type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on
the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
POLI REV
The balancing of interests test requires that a determination must first be made
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved
by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Clear and Present Danger Test
The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has

a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored.
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its
being well-nigh inevitable.

trwo theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights
of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance
must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless
there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which
permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established
between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of
type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on
the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
POLI REV
The balancing of interests test requires that a determination must first be made
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved
by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Clear and Present Danger Test

The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has
a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored.
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its
being well-nigh inevitable.

trwo theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights
of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance
must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless
there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which
permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established
between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of
type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on
the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
POLI REV

The balancing of interests test requires that a determination must first be made
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved
by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Clear and Present Danger Test
The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has
a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored.
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its
being well-nigh inevitable.

trwo theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights
of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance
must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless
there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which
permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established
between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of
type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on

the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
POLI REV
The balancing of interests test requires that a determination must first be made
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved
by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Clear and Present Danger Test
The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has
a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored.
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its
being well-nigh inevitable.

trwo theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights
of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance
must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless
there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which

permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established

between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of
type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on
the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
POLI REV
The balancing of interests test requires that a determination must first be made
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved
by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Clear and Present Danger Test
The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has
a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored.
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its
being well-nigh inevitable.

trwo theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights
of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance
must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless

there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which
permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established
between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of
type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on
the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
POLI REV
The balancing of interests test requires that a determination must first be made
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved
by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Clear and Present Danger Test
The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has
a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored.
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its
being well-nigh inevitable.

trwo theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights
of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance

must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless
there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which
permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established
between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of
type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on
the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
POLI REV
The balancing of interests test requires that a determination must first be made
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved
by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Clear and Present Danger Test
The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has
a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored.
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its
being well-nigh inevitable.

trwo theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights
of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance
must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless
there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which
permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established
between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of
type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on
the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
POLI REV
The balancing of interests test requires that a determination must first be made
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved
by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Clear and Present Danger Test
The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has

a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored.
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its
being well-nigh inevitable.

trwo theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights
of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance
must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless
there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which
permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established
between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of
type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on
the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
POLI REV
The balancing of interests test requires that a determination must first be made
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved
by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Clear and Present Danger Test

The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has
a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored.
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its
being well-nigh inevitable.

trwo theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights
of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance
must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless
there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which
permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established
between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of
type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on
the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
POLI REV

The balancing of interests test requires that a determination must first be made
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved
by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Clear and Present Danger Test
The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has
a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored.
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its
being well-nigh inevitable.

trwo theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights
of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance
must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless
there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which
permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established
between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of
type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on

the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
POLI REV
The balancing of interests test requires that a determination must first be made
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved
by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Clear and Present Danger Test
The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has
a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored.
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its
being well-nigh inevitable.

trwo theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights
of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance
must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless
there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which

permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established

between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of
type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on
the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
POLI REV
The balancing of interests test requires that a determination must first be made
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved
by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Clear and Present Danger Test
The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has
a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored.
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its
being well-nigh inevitable.

trwo theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights
of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance
must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless

there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which
permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established
between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of
type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on
the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
POLI REV
The balancing of interests test requires that a determination must first be made
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved
by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Clear and Present Danger Test
The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has
a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored.
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its
being well-nigh inevitable.

trwo theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights
of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance

must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless
there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which
permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established
between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of
type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on
the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
POLI REV
The balancing of interests test requires that a determination must first be made
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved
by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Clear and Present Danger Test
The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has
a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored.
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its
being well-nigh inevitable.

trwo theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights
of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance
must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless
there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which
permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established
between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of
type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on
the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
POLI REV
The balancing of interests test requires that a determination must first be made
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved
by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Clear and Present Danger Test
The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has

a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored.
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its
being well-nigh inevitable.

trwo theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights
of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance
must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless
there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which
permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established
between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of
type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on
the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
POLI REV
The balancing of interests test requires that a determination must first be made
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved
by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Clear and Present Danger Test

The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has
a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored.
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its
being well-nigh inevitable.

trwo theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights
of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance
must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless
there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which
permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established
between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of
type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on
the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
POLI REV

The balancing of interests test requires that a determination must first be made
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved
by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Clear and Present Danger Test
The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has
a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored.
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its
being well-nigh inevitable.

trwo theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights
of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance
must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless
there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which
permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established
between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of
type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on

the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
POLI REV
The balancing of interests test requires that a determination must first be made
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved
by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Clear and Present Danger Test
The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has
a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored.
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its
being well-nigh inevitable.

trwo theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights
of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance
must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless
there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which

permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established

between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of
type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on
the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
POLI REV
The balancing of interests test requires that a determination must first be made
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved
by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Clear and Present Danger Test
The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has
a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored.
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its
being well-nigh inevitable.

trwo theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights
of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance
must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless

there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which
permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established
between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of
type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on
the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
POLI REV
The balancing of interests test requires that a determination must first be made
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved
by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Clear and Present Danger Test
The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has
a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored.
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its
being well-nigh inevitable.

trwo theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights
of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance

must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless
there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which
permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established
between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of
type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on
the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
POLI REV
The balancing of interests test requires that a determination must first be made
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved
by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Clear and Present Danger Test
The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has
a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored.
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its
being well-nigh inevitable.

trwo theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights
of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance
must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless
there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which
permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established
between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of
type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on
the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
POLI REV
The balancing of interests test requires that a determination must first be made
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved
by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Clear and Present Danger Test
The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has

a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored.
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its
being well-nigh inevitable.

trwo theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights
of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance
must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless
there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which
permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established
between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of
type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on
the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
POLI REV
The balancing of interests test requires that a determination must first be made
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved
by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Clear and Present Danger Test

The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has
a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored.
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its
being well-nigh inevitable.

trwo theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights
of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance
must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless
there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which
permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established
between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of
type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on
the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
POLI REV

The balancing of interests test requires that a determination must first be made
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved
by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Clear and Present Danger Test
The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has
a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored.
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its
being well-nigh inevitable.

trwo theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights
of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance
must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless
there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which
permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established
between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of
type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on

the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
POLI REV
The balancing of interests test requires that a determination must first be made
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved
by some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
Clear and Present Danger Test
The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule - that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has
a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but must also be present.
There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression
complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be
reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored.
Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its
being well-nigh inevitable.

trwo theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights
of similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between
freedom of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the "clear and
present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. The first as interpreted in
a number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance
must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before
the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
"substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in
constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words maybe published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless
there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration
of justice.

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either

or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which

permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established

between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance
conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of
type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on
the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that
the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.