219. G.R. No.

114151 September 17, 1998

MAURICIA ALEJANDRINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G. GAVIOLA, RTC-9, CEBU CITY, and LICERIO P.
NIQUE, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
1
of the Court of Appeals which ruled that the trial court, in an
action for quieting of title, did not act in excess of jurisdiction when it issued an order for the segregation of
property, after the finality of its decision.

Questioned in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision

The facts show that the late spouses Jacinto Alejandrino and Enrica Labunos left their six children named
Marcelino, Gregorio, Ciriaco, Mauricia, Laurencia and Abundio a 219-square-meter lot in Mambaling, Cebu City
identified as Lot No. 2798 and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 19658. Upon the demise of the
Alejandrino spouses, the property should have been divided among their children with each child having a share
of 36.50 square meters. However, the estate of the Alejandrino spouses was not settled in accordance with the
procedure outlined in the Rules of Court.
Petitioner Mauricia (one of the children) allegedly purchased 12.17 square meters of Gregorio's share, 36.50
square meters of Ciriaco's share and 12.17 square meters of Abundio's share thereby giving her a total area of
97.43 square meters, including her own share of 36.50 square meters. It turned out, however, that a third party
named Licerio Nique, the private respondent in this case, also purchased portions of the property, to wit: 36.50
square meters from Laurencia, 36.50 square meters from Gregorio "through Laurencia," 12.17 square meters
from Abundio also "through Laurencia" and 36.50 square meters from Marcelino or a total area of Laurencia" and
36.50 square meters from Marcelino or a total area of 121.67 square meters of the Alejandrino property. 2
However, Laurencia (the alleged seller of most of the 121.67 square meters of the property) later questioned the
sale in an action for quieting of title and damages against private respondent Nique. It was docketed as Civil Case
No. CEB-7038 in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 9 presided by Judge Benigno G. Gaviola. In due
course, the lower court rendered a decision on November 27, 1990 disposing of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of defendant and against plaintiff, dismissing the complaint filed by
plaintiff against defendant, and on the Counterclaim and prayer of defendant in its Answer, the Court hereby declares defendant
as the owner in fee simple of the share of plaintiff Laurencia Alejandrino and the shares of Marcelino, Gregorio and Abundio, all
surnamed Alejandrino, of the parcel of land known as Lot No. 2798 and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 19658 which 4
shares totals an area of 146 square meters more or less; and the Court further Orders plaintiff to:
1. Vacate the premises subject of the complaint and surrender the property to defendant to the extent of the
4 shares aforementioned;
2. Pay the defendant the amount of P15,000.00 as litigation and necessary expenses; the sum of
P10,000.00 as reimbursement for attorney's fees; the sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages and
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
3. Plus costs.
SO ORDERED.

Laurencia appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals under CA-G.R. CV No. 33433 but later withdrew the
same. 4 On April 13, 1992, the Court of Appeals considered the appeal withdrawn in accordance with Rule 50 of
the Rules of Court. 5
Meanwhile, herein petitioner Mauricia Alejandrino filed on May 5, 1992 before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch VII, a complaint for redemption and recovery of properties with damages against private respondent
Nique that was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-11673. Adelino B. Sitoy, Laurencia's counsel in Civil Case No.
CEB-7038, filed Civil Case No. CEB-11673 for petitioner Mauricia.
The amended complaint in the latter case dated May 17, 1992 alleged that private respondent Nique never
notified petitioner Mauricia of the purchase of 121.67 square meters of the undivided Lot No. 2798 nor did he give
petitioner Mauricia the preemptive right to buy the area as a co-owner of the same lot. As such co-owner,
petitioner Mauricia manifested her willingness to deposit with the court the amount of P29,777.78, the acquisition
cost of the portion purchased by private respondent Nique. Petitioner Mauricia also alleged that she demanded
from private respondent the area of around 24.34 square meters that the latter had "unduly, baselessly and
maliciously claimed as his own but which, as part of Lot No. 2798, actually belongs to her." The amended
complaint prayed that petitioner Mauricia be allowed to redeem the area of 121.67 square meters under the
redemption price of P29,777.78 and that private respondent Nique be ordered to execute the necessary
documents for the redemption and the eventual transfer of certificate of title to her. The amended complaint
further prayed for the return to petitioner Mauricia of the 24.34-square-meter portion of the lot and for damages
amounting to P115,000 and attorney's fees of P30,000.

On August 2, 1993, the lower court granted the motion to admit the amended complaint and forthwith ordered the
defendant therein to file an amended answer.
In Civil Case No. CEB-7038 in the meantime, private respondent filed a motion for the segregation of the 146square-meter portion of the property that had been declared by the trial court as his own by virtue of purchase. On
May 6, 1993, the trial court issued an order the pertinent portions of which read as follows:
ORDER
For resolution is a "Motion to Order Segregation of 146 Square Meters In Lot No. 2798" dated January 15, 1993 filed by defendant
and the "Opposition" thereto dated February 2, 1992 by plaintiff. Movant-defendant also filed a rejoinder dated February 15, 1993
to the Opposition.
After going over the allegations in the motion, the opposition thereto and the rejoinder as well as the records of the case,
particularly the decision rendered by this Court and the Order dated October 28, 1992, denying the motion for reconsideration filed
by plaintiffs and allowing the issuance of a writ of execution, the Court is inclined to Grant the instant motion.
xxx xxx xxx
In addition thereto, the Court makes the following observation:
1. Plaintiff (oppositor) has a total share of 146 square meters. This is admitted by her in her complaint (par. 4
thereof). In the decision rendered by this Court, this share now belongs to defendant movant by way of sale.
The decision of this Court has long become final.
2. The total area of the land is 219 sq. meters (par. 2 of complaint), thus, the share of Mauricia Alejandrino is
only 73 square meters.
3. As early as June 10, 1983, Mauricia Alejandrino and Laurencia Alejandrino had entered into an
"Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate" whereby they agreed to divide the land subject of this case with
Laurencia Alejandrino owning 146 square meters in the frontage and Mauricia Alejandrino owning 75 square
meters in the back portion (Exh. '16', Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, par. 1) (emphasis supplied), and that
the parties assure each other and their successor in interest that a right of way of two meters is granted to
each party by the other permanently (Exh. '16', par. 2). This partition is signed by the parties and their
witnesses. Although not notarized, it is certainly valid as between the parties, Maurecia (sic) Alejandrino,
being an immediate party, may not renege on this.
4. Since the share of defendant Licerio P. Nique is specifically known to be 146 square meters, and that its
location shall be on the "frontage" of the property while the 73 square meters of Maurecia (sic) Alejandrino
shall be at the back portion, then, the Court cannot see its way clear, why the 146 sq. meters share of
defendant may not be segregated.
5. The contention by oppositor that the "segregation of defendant's share of 146 sq. meters from Lot No.
2798 was not decreed in the judgment" is a rather narrow way of looking at the judgment. Paragraph 1 of
the dispositive portion of the judgment by this Court, Orders plaintiff to "vacate the premises subject of the
complaint and surrender the property to defendant to the extent of the 4 shares aforementioned." The 4
shares of Laurencia Alejandrino of 146 sq. meters can be segregated because Laurencia and Maurecia had
already executed an extrajudicial partition indicating where their respective shares shall be located (Exh.
'16'). To deny the segregation is to make the decision of this Court just about valueless is not altogether
useless. The matter of allowing the segregation should be read into the decision.
The bottomline is still that plaintiff Laurencia, despite the fact that the decision of this Court had long become final; and despite the
fact that she even withdraw (sic) her appeal, she still is enjoying the fruits of the property to the exclusion of the rightful owner.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby Grants the motion. The defendant Licerio Nique may proceed to segregate his 2146 (sic) sq.
meters from Lot No. 2798 covered by TCT. No. 19658, by having the same surveyed by a competent Geodetic Engineer, at the
expense of movant-defendant.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner Mauricia questioned this order of the lower court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction filed before the Court of Appeals. In due course, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition in a Decision promulgated on August 25, 1993.
The Court of Appeals stated that, in issuing the questioned order of May 6, 1993, the respondent court was
merely performing its job of seeing to it that "execution of a final judgment must conform to that decreed in the
dispositive part of the decision." It ratiocinated thus:
. . . . In ordering the segregation of the 146 square meters, respondent Judge correctly referred to the text of the decision to
ascertain which portion of the land covered by TCT No. 19658 was actually sold by Laurencia Alejandrino (sister of herein
petitioner Mauricia) to private respondent Nique. The respondent Judge did not err in relying upon Exhibit '16', the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement, dated June 10, 1983, mentioned in page 3 of the Decision. Pertinent portion of Exhibit '6' reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, the above-named parties-heirs hereby stipulates (sic), declare and agree as follows:
1. That the parties have agreed to divide the parcel of land with Laurencia Alejandrino owning 146 square meters in the frontage
and Mauricia Alejandrino 73 square meters in the back portions;
2. That the parties mutually and reciprocally assure each other and their successor of interest (sic) that a right of way of two
meters is granted to each party to the other permanently. (emphasis supplied, Annex '1', Comment, p. 65, Rollo).

duly signed by herein petitioner and witnessed by private respondent Nique. It readily reveals that when Laurencia subsequently
sold her shares to herein private respondent, per the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 29, 1986 (Exhs. 'B' and '10'), the
parties must have referred to the 146 square meters in the frontage described in said document, Exhibit '16'. Laurencia had no
authority to sell more, or, less, than that agreed upon in the extrajudicial settlement between her and herein petitioner Mauricia.
Insofar as the latter is concerned, she is estopped from claiming that said extrajudicial settlement was a fatally defective
instrument because it was not notarized nor published. What is important is that private respondent personally knew about
Laurencia and Mauricia's agreement because he was a witness to said agreement and he relied upon it when he purchased the
146 square meters from Laurencia.
It cannot be validly claimed by petitioner that she was deprived of her property without due process of law considering that private
respondent is merely segregating the portion of the land actually sold to him by Laurencia Alejandrino and it does not affect the 73
square meters that properly pertain to petitioner.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has ruled that where there is ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion
of a decision the court may clarify such ambiguity by an amendment even after the judgment had become final, and for this
purpose it may resort to the pleadings filed by the parties, the court's finding of facts and conclusions of law as expressed in the
body of the decision (Republic Surety and Insurance Co., Inc., et al., vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 152 SCRA 309). The
assailed order, in effect, clarifies the exact location of the 146 square meters pursuant to Exhibit '16'. Respondent court did not act
7
in excess of its jurisdiction. Hence, writs of certiorari and prohibition do not lie in this case.

Petitioner Mauricia filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' decision. However, on February
15, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied the same for lack of merit "there being no new ground or compelling reason
that justifies a reconsideration" of its Decision. 8
In the instant petition for review on certiorari, petitioner assails the decision of the Court of Appeals, contending
that the lower court acted beyond its jurisdiction in ordering the segregation of the property bought by private
respondent as the same was not decreed in its judgment, which had long become final and executory. Petitioner
argues that partition of the property cannot be effected because private respondent is also a defendant in Civil
Case No. CEB-11673. She asserts that Exhibit 16, the extrajudicial settlement of estate referred to in the
questioned order of the lower court, was not discussed in the decision of the lower court and even if it were, she
could not be bound thereby considering that she was not a party litigant in Civil Case No. CEB-7038. She
questions the validity of the deed of extrajudicial settlement because it was not notarized or published.
In his comment on the petition, private respondent alleges that although petitioner was not a party litigant in Civil
Case No. CEB-7038, she is estopped from questioning the decision in that case and filing the instant petition
because she had "knowledge of the existence of said case" where res judicata had set in. He adds that the instant
petition was filed in violation of Circular No. 28-91 on forum shopping "in that the Petitioner in the instant petition
whose counsel is also the counsel of plaintiff-appellant Laurencia Alejandrino in CA-G.R. CV No. . . ., had filed a
civil action Civil Case No. CEB-11673 . . . for "REDEMPTION & RECOVERY OF PROPERTIES WITH
DAMAGES", which is presently pending before Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City." He asserts that
the lower court did not exceed its jurisdiction and/or commit grave abuse of discretion in granting his motion for
segregation of the 146 square meters of the land involved that rightfully belonged to him in accordance with the
decision of the lower court. He charges counsel for petitioner with exhibiting "unethical conduct and practice" in
appearing as counsel for petitioner in Civil Case No. CEB-11673 after he had appeared for complainant Laurencia
in CA-G.R. CV No. 33433 or Civil Case No. CEB-7038.
Under the circumstances of this case, the ultimate issue that needs determination is whether or not as an heir of
the Alejandrino property, Laurencia may validly sell specific portions thereof to a third party.
Art. 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is,
before partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased. Under a
co-ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. 9 Each co-owner of
property which is held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same
with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners. The underlying rationale is that
until a division is made, the respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises,
together with his co-participants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and
enjoyment of the same. 10
Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully
settled and partitioned, 11 the law allows a co-owner to exercise rights of ownership over such inchoate right.
Thus, the Civil Code provides:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may
be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
With respect to properties shared in common by virtue of inheritance, alienation of a pro indiviso portion thereof is specifically governed by Article 1088
that provides:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one
month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
In the instant case, Laurencia was within her hereditary rights in selling her pro indiviso share in Lot No. 2798. However, because the property had not
yet been partitioned in accordance with the Rules of Court, no particular portion of the property could be identified as yet and delineated as the object of
the sale. Thus, interpreting Article 493 of the Civil Code providing that an alienation of a co-owned property "shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to (the seller) in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership, the Court said:

. . . (p)ursuant to this law, a co-owner has the right to alienate his pro-indiviso share in the co-owned property even without the consent of the other coowners. Nevertheless, as a mere part owner, he cannot alienate the shares of the other co-owners. The prohibition is premised on the elementary rule
that "no one can give what he does not have" (Nemo dat quod non habet). Thus, we held in Bailon-Casilao vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 78178, April
15, 1988, 160 SCRA 738, 745), viz:
. . . since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of
the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer
a co-owner of the property.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of possession of the thing owned in
common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the
2
common property of the co-owners who possessed and administered it.

The legality of Laurencia's alienation of portions of the estate of the Alejandrino spouses was settled in Civil Case
No. CEB-7038. The decision in that case had become final and executory with Laurencia's withdrawal of her
appeal. When private respondent filed a motion for the segregation of the portions of the property that were
adjudged in his favor, private respondent was in effect calling for the partition of the property. However, under the
law, partition of the estate of a decedent may only be effected by (1) the heirs themselves extrajudicially, (2) by
the court in an ordinary action for partition, or in the course of administration proceedings, (3) by the testator
himself, and (4) by the third person designated by the testator. 13
The trial court may not, therefore, order partition of an estate in an action for quieting of title. As there is no
pending administration proceedings, the property of the Alejandrino spouses can only be partitioned by the heirs
themselves in an extrajudicial settlement of estate. However, evidence on the extrajudicial settlement of estate
was offered before the trial court and it became the basis for the order for segregation of the property sold to
private respondent. Petitioner Mauricia does not deny the fact of the execution of the deed of extrajudicial
settlement of the estate. She only questions its validity on account of the absence of notarization of the document
and the non-publication thereof.
On extrajudicial settlement of estate, Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:
If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate
among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they
disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action for partition. . . . .
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner
provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated
therein or had no notice thereof.
14

that can bind third parties.

However, this formal requirement appears to be superseded by the substantive provision of the Civil Code
that states:
Notarization of the deed of extrajudicial settlement has the effect of making it a public document

Art. 1082. Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a
partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.
By this provision, it appears that when a co-owner sells his inchoate right in the co-ownership, he expresses his intention to "put an end to indivision
among (his) co-heirs." Partition among co-owners may thus be evidenced by the overt act of a co-owner of renouncing his right over the property
regardless of the form it takes. In effect, Laurencia expressed her intention to terminate the co-owner by selling her share to private respondent.
Moreover, the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate reflected the intention of both Laurencia and petitioner Mauricia to
physically divide the property. Both of them had acquired the shares of their brothers and therefore it was only the two of them that needed to settle the
estate. The fact that the document was not notarized is no hindrance to its effectivity as regards the two of them. The partition of inherited property need
not be embodied in a public document. In this regard, Tolentino subscribes to that opinion when he states as follows:
. . . . We believe, however, that the public instrument is not essential to the validity of the partition. This is not one of those
contracts in which form is of the essence. The public instrument is necessary only for the registration of the contract, but not for its
validity. The validity of an oral contract among the heirs, terminating the co-ownership, has been recognized by the Supreme
Court in a decision . . . (where) that tribunal said: "An agreement among the heirs that a certain lot should be sold and its
proceeds paid to one of them is a valid oral contract, and the same has the force of law between the parties from and after the
original assent thereto, and no one of them may withdraw or oppose its execution without the consent of all".
In a still later case, the Supreme Court held that "partition among heirs or renunciation of an inheritance by some of them is not
exactly a conveyance for the reason that it does not involve transfer of property from one to the other, but rather a confirmation or
ratification of title or right to property by the heir renouncing in favor of another heir accepting and receiving the inheritance."
Hence, the court concluded, "it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an oral agreement for distribution of the estate
15
among themselves."

The deed of extrajudicial settlement executed by Mauricia and Laurencia evidence their intention to partition the
property. It delineates what portion of the property belongs to each other. That it was not notarized is immaterial in
view of Mauricia's admission that she did execute the deed of extrajudicial settlement. Neither is the fact that the
trial court only mentioned the existence of such document in its decision in Civil Case No. CEB-7028. That
document was formally offered in evidence and the court is deemed to have duly considered 16 it in deciding the
case. the case. The court has in its favor the presumption of regularity of the performance of its task that has not
been rebutted by petitioner Mauricia. Neither may the fact that the other heirs of the Alejandrino spouses, named
Marcelino, Gregorio, Ciriaco and Abundio did not participate in the extrajudicial settlement of estate affect its
validity. In her amended complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-11673, petitioner Mauricia herself admitted having
acquired by purchase the rights over the shares of her brothers.

On the part of Laurencia, the court found that she had transmitted her rights over portions she had acquired from
her brothers to private respondent Nique. The sale was made after the execution of the deed of extrajudicial
settlement of the estate that private respondent himself witnessed. The extrajudicial settlement of estate having
constituted a partition of the property, Laurencia validly transferred ownership over the specific front portion of the
property with an area of 146 square meters.
The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in issuing the order for the segregation of the property. In so
doing, it was merely reiterating the partition of the property by petitioner Mauricia and her sister Laurencia that
was embodied in the deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate. The order may likewise be deemed as a
clarification of its decision that had become final and executory. Such clarification was needed lest proper
execution of the decision be rendered futile.
The Court finds no merit in the issue of forum shopping raised by private respondent. Forum shopping exists
where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata
in the other. 17 Because the judgment in Civil Case No. CEB-7028 is already final and executory, the existence of
res judicata is determinative of whether or not petitioner is guilty of forum shopping. For the principle of res
judicata to apply, the following must be present: (1) a decision on the merits; (2) by a court of competent
jurisdiction; (3) the decision is final; and (4) the two actions involve identical parties, subject matter and causes of
action. 18 The fourth element is not present in this case. The parties are not identical because petitioner was not
impleaded in Civil Case No. CEB-7028. While the subject matter may be the same property, of the Alejandrino
spouses, the causes of action are different. Civil. Case No. CEB-7028 is an action for quieting of title and
damages while Civil Case No. CEB-11673 is for redemption and recovery of properties.
It appears moreover, that private respondent's argument on forum shopping is anchored on the fact that counsel
for both plaintiffs in those two cases is one and the same, thereby implying that the same counsel merely wanted
to prevail in the second case after having failed to do so in the first. The records show, however, that Laurencia
executed an affidavit 19 consenting to the appearance of her counsel in any case that petitioner Mauricia might file
against private respondent. She affirmed in that affidavit that she could be included even as a defendant in any
case that petitioner Mauricia would file because she "fully agree(d)" with whatever cause of action Mauricia would
have against private respondent. Such a statement can hardly constitute a proper basis for a finding of forum
shopping, much less evidence of misconduct on the part of counsel. As noted earlier, the two cases have different
causes of action and the two plaintiffs who would have conflicting claims under the facts of the case actually
presented a united stand against private respondent. If there is any charge that could be leveled against counsel,
it is his lack of thoroughness in pursuing the action for quieting of title. As counsel for plaintiff therein, he could
have impleaded petitioner Mauricia knowing fully well her interest in the property involved in order to avoid
multiplicity of suits. However, such an omission is not a sufficient ground for administrative sanction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
220. & 224 G.R. No. L-29541 January 27,1989
CARLOS GABILA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PABLO PEREZ, RAMON PEREZ & MERCEDES PEREZ, defendants-appellees.
Isidra M. Ampig for plaintiff-appellant.
Castillo Law Offices for defendants-appellees.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao dated January 21, 1961 dismissing
plaintiff-appellant's complaint, which the Court of Appeals certified to this Court because only a question of law is
involved.
On September 16, 1948, in the City of Davao, defendants-appellees Pablo, Ramon and Mercedes, all surnamed
Perez, executed in favor of plaintiff-appellant Carlos Gabila, a Deed of Sale of a parcel of land registered in the
name of their deceased father Mariano Perez under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 899 of the Registry of Deeds
of Davao, which they inherited upon his demise. The deed of Sale (Exh. A) reads:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This CONTRACT, made and executed in the place and date mentioned hereinbelow by and
between PABLO PEREZ, married; RAMON PEREZ, married, Filipina citizen, and MERCEDES
PEREZ, married, Filipino, all of legal age, and all residents of Bunawan, Davao City, Philippines,
hereinafter referred to as the VENDORS, and CARLOS S. GABILA, also of legal age, married to

Leonarda P. Gabila and a resident of Ponciano St., Davao City, Philippines, hereinafter referred to
as the VENDEE, witnesseth:
WHEREAS, the VENDORS are the owners of one parcel of agricultural land situated in Bunawan,
City of Davao, Philippines, with all the improvements, which is more particularly bounded and
described as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot No. 603 of the cadastral survey of Davao, Cadastral Case No. 1, G.L.R.O.
Cadastral Record No. 317), situated in the municipality of Davao. Bounded on the NW and NE,
by Lot No. 511; on the SE, by the Licanan River and Lot No. 602; and on the W, by Lot No. 502
and the Bunawan River, containing an area of eighty-one thousand nine hundred and three
square meters (81,903), more or less.
their ownership thereto being evidenced by transfer Certificate of Title No. 899 of the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Davao, issued in the name of the deceased, MARIANO PEREZ, the father
of the VENDORS, who died on October 11, 1942 and the herein vendors inherited said land from
their deceased father, being the legitimate children;
WHEREAS, the VENDEE has agreed to purchase the above- described property and the
VENDORS have agreed to sell the same to the VENDEE, subject to the terms and conditions
hereinbelow specified;
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the sum of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (P2,500.00) Philippine Currency, to be paid in the manner hereinbelow specified, the
VENDORS hereby sell, transfer and convey unto the said VENDEE, his heirs, executors,
administrators and assigns, the above-described one parcel of land, together with the buildings
and improvements thereon, belonging to the VENDORS, the aforementioned sum of P2,500.00
shall be paid in the manner as follows:
a) P l,500.00 Philippine Currency, upon the signing of this contract;
b) The balance of P1,000.00, Philippine Currency, to be paid in ten (10) monthly installments of
ONE HUNDRED PESOS (P100.00) each the first installment to become due and payable on
October 14, 1948, and the succeeding monthly installments to be paid on the same date every
month thereafter until the total amount is fully paid.
It is hereby agreed, covenanted and stipulated by and between the parties hereto that the
Vendors will execute immediately an Extra-Judicial Partition of all the properties of their deceased
father, and pay the corresponding estate and inheritance taxes so that the above-described title
could be cancelled and in its stead a new transfer Certificate of title be issued in favor of the
Vendee.
It is finally agreed, covenanted and stipulated that immediately upon the execution of this
document, the VENDEE takes immediate possession of the property sold and will harvest the
improvements inside of this land.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have hereunto set their hands this 16th day of
September, 1948 at Davao City, Philippines. (Italics ours.) (p. 1, Folder of Exhibits.)
The Deed of Sale was duly signed and ratified before Notary Public Isidro Bastida of Davao City on the same
date, September 16, 1958, and possession of the land was immediately delivered to the vendee. The monthly
installments of the price of the sale were completely paid in due time. However, the vendors took no steps to
comply with their promise to execute an extrajudicial partition of their father's properties so that his title to the land
in question can be transferred in their names and from them, to the vendee Gabila.
So, on August 28, 1958, Gabila filed this action praying that the defendants be ordered:
1) To execute an extra-judicial partition of all the properties of their deceased father or otherwise
settle his estate and pay the corresponding estate and inheritance taxes, and execute the
requisite instruments for the registration and transfer of the title to him; and
2) To pay him Pl,000 as attorney's fees and expenses of the suit, plus costs.
The defendants alleged in their Answer that the deed of sale was intended merely to guarantee a loan of P2,500
contracted by one of the defendants; that Mercedes Perez, one of the vendors, was a minor when the deed of
sale was made; that the deed of sale was not approved by the Secretary of Agriculture; and, that the
consideration of P2,500 was unconscionable.
In Reply, the plaintiff alleged that at the time of the execution of the deed of sale, Mercedes Perez stated that she
was of age, and plaintiff had no reason to doubt that statement. But, assuming that she was under age at the
time, she ratified the sale by her failure to repudiate it in due time; that the allegation that the deed was only a

guarantee for a P2,500 loan was not true because a part of the purchase price was paid to the defendants in ten
(10) monthly installments; that the price agreed upon in 1948 was fair and reasonable; and, that the approval of
the sale by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resource was not necessary.
After several continuances, the case was set for trial on November 12, 1960. Neither defendants nor their counsel
appeared despite due notice. For that reason, the lower court allowed the plaintiff to adduce evidence ex parte
before a commissioner.
On January 21, 1961, the trial court rendered the assailed decision, dismissing the complaint. It held that the
defendants could not be ordered to execute an extrajudicial partition of all the properties of their deceased father
because the properties to be partitioned are not Identified in the complaint, and, the defendants can no longer
partition the land described in TCT No. 899, because it has been sold to the plaintiff. The court held that the
extrajudicial partition of the property should have been done at the time of the sale, in the same instrument
(Record on Appeal, pp. 20-21).
The appeal is meritorious. This action is not one for specific performance of the sale of the property to the
appellant, for the sale had been consummated by the payment of the price to the vendors-appellees as stipulated
in the deed, and by the delivery of the peaceful possession of the land to the plaintiff-vendee. What the plaintiff
seeks merely is the transfer of the title of the land in his name.
It is indubitable that the appellant, as vendee of the land, has a right to receive, and the appellees the
corresponding obligation to transfer to him, not only the possession and enjoyment of the land but also the
certificate of title. The trial court recognized that right of the appellant, but it professed to be helpless to enforce it.
In dismissing his complaint and, in effect, denying him a remedy, the trial court forgot a maxim which is as old as
the law itself. Ubi jus ibi remedium. Where there is a right, there is a remedy (Ballentine's Law Dictionary, 1948
Ed., p. 1307).
The defendants-appellees, as the only legal heirs of their father, the deceased Mariano Perez, became the
owners of the property in question upon his demise. The rights to the succession were transmitted to them from
the moment of his death (Art. 77, Civil Code).
Their sale to the appellant of the property described in TCT No. 899, which they inherited from their father put an
end to their co-ownership over it (Art. 1082 Civil Code). Consequently there is no further need for them to partition
it, the purpose of partition being to separate, divide, and assign a thing held in common among those to whom it
may belong (Art. 1079, Civil Code). The trial court correctly observed that the defendants-appellees may no
longer partition the land in question because they had already sold it.
A careful examination of the deed of sale (Exh. A) reveals that it also serves the purpose of an affidavit of
adjudication of the lot in question to the defendants-appellees as heirs of the former owner Mariano Perez. Their
declaration therein that the registered owner of the land described in TCT No. 899 Mariano Perez, who died on
October 11, 1942, is the father of the vendors, that "the vendors inherited said land from their deceased father,
being the legitimate children" and that "the Vendors are the owners" of said land (Exh. A) is, in effect, an
adjudication of the land to themselves. Such adjudication renders the stipulation in the deed of sale that "the
Vendors will execute immediately an Extrajudicial Partition of all the properties of their deceased father" (Exhibit
A-1), superfluous and unnecessary. It may be overlooked or deemed not written at all.
All that needs to be done now is to register on the TCT No. 899 of the late Mariano Perez the deed of sale (Exh.
A) which may also be treated as an affidavit of adjudication of the land to the vendors in order that their father's
title may be cancelled and a new one can be issued to their vendee, Carlos Gabila.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby set aside. The defendants-appellees, they have not done so yet,
are ordered to surrender and/or deliver TCT No. 899 to the plaintiff-appellant in order that the latter may present it
to the Register of Deeds of Davao for cancellation upon the registration of the Deed of Sale dated September 16,
1948 made in his favor by the appellees. The Register of Deeds of Davao shall thereupon cancel said TCT No.
899 of the late Mariano Perez and issue a new title in the name of the plaintiff-appellant Carlos Gabila, subject to
a lien in favor of any deprived heirs under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. The defendants-appellees are ordered to
pay the estate and inheritance taxes, if any, and they should present proof of such payment to the Register of
Deeds within sixty (60) days after the finality of this decision.
SO ORDERED.
221. G.R. No. L-32344

March 31, 1930

VIVENCIO LEGASTO, special administrator of the Intestate estate of Sabina Almadin, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIA VERZOSA, ET AL, defendants-appellants.
Felipe Agoncillo for appellants.
Guevara, Francisco and Recto for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:

This is an appeal taken by the defendants, Maria Verzosa et al., from the judgment of the Court of First Instance
of Laguna, the dispositive part whereof is as follows:
Wherefore, the court hereby orders the defendants to deliver to the plaintiff, as administrator of the estate
of Sabina Almadin, the parcels of land described in paragraph 7 of this amended complaints (reply) dated
January 5, 1929, as said paragraph is amended on pages, excluding the lots described in certificates to
title Nos. 6557, 6558 and 6559 of the Laguna registry of deeds, which are hereby declared to be the
absolute property of Victoria Verzosa, wife to Jose Carasco. Without express pronouncement as to costs.
In support of their appeal, the appellants assign the following alleged errors as committed by the court below in its
decision, to wit:
1. he court below erred in ordering the defendants to make delivery of the property in litigation to the
plaintiff as special administrator of the decedent Sabina Almadin's intestate estate.
2. The court below erred in holding that public instruments 2, 31, 42, and 73, are deeds of gift of the
property in litigation made by Sabina Almadin to the defendants.
3. The court below erred in holding that said donation is void per se, inasmuch as it does not appear upon
said documents that the defendants accepted and acknowledged it acceptance to the donor, Sabina
Almadin.
4. The court below erred in denying the defendants' motion for a new trial.
5. The court below erred in failing to hold that the defendants are the sole and lawful owners of the
property in litigation.
The relevant facts proved at the trial which are essential to the solution of the questions raised by the instant
appeal are as follows:
On May 13, 1925, Sabina Almadin executed a will (Exhibit A-2), devising certain parcels of land belonging to her,
to her four nieces, Maria Verzosa, Oliva Verzosa, Toribia Verzosa, and Ruperta Palma, daughters of her sister
Catalina Almadin, designating the parcels to be given to each.
On August 8, 1925, Sabina Almadin partitioned her property among her aforesaid sister and nieces, executing a
deed to her niece, Maria Verzosa, assigning and making over to her three parcels of her land therein described
(Exhibit 2). On September 23, 1925, Maria Verzosa and Sabina Almadin appeared before the deputy provincial
assessor and municipal secretary of Bian, Laguna, and made two sworn statements, Exhibits 3 and 5, wherein
the former stated that she had purchased the parcels of land described in the assignment Exhibit 2, from Sabina
Almadim, and the latter in turn declared that she had sold them to Maria Verzosa, and that said vendee had
already claimed them as her property for the payment of the land tax.
On the same day, August 8, 1925, Sabina Almadin executed a deed (Exhibit 31) in favor of her niece Oliva
Verzosa, assigning to her two parcels of land described in said instrument, and on October 14, 1925, assignor
and assignee appeared before the aforesaid deputy provincial assessor and municipality secretary of Bian,
Laguna, and subscribed two sworn statements (Exhibits 32 and 34), the former stating that she had sold the two
parcels of land described in the deed of assignment, Exhibit 31, to the latter, and the latter in turn stating that she
had purchased of the former the same parcels of land, the ownership of which has already been claimed by Oliva
Verzosa by a tax declaration in her own name on September 25, and October 13, 1925, respectively.
On the said day August 8, 1925, Sabina Almadin executed a deed, Exhibit 45, in favor of her niece Toribia
Verzosa, assigning to her the four parcels of land therein described; and September 23, 1923, assignor and
assignee appeared before the aforesaid deputy provincial assessor and municipal secretary of Bian, Laguna,
and subscribed a sworn statement, Exhibit 48, the former stating that she has sold to Toribia Verzosa the parcel of
land described therein (Exhibit 45), bearing tax registry No. 9765, and the latter stating that she had purchased
said parcel of the former and declared it to be her own property for the payment of the land tax.
Again on the said day, August 8, 1925, Sabina Almadin executed a deed (Exhibit 73) to her niece Ruperta Palma
assigning to her three parcels of land described therein; and on September 23, 1925, assignor and assignee
appeared before the deputy provincial assessor and municipal secretary of Bian, Laguna, and subscribed two
sworn statements (Exhibit 74 and 76) wherein the former stated that she had sold to the latter the parcels of land
described in the deed of assignment (Exhibit 73) and the latter stated that she had purchased said parcels of the
former, and had declared them to be her own property for the payment of the land tax (Exhibits 75 and 77).
The assignees, Maria Verzosa, Toribia Verzosa, Oliva Verzosa, and Ruperta Palma, took possession of their
respective parcels thus ceded by Sabina Almadin, and have to this day been cultivating them as exclusive owners
thereof.
Sabina Almadin passed away on February 22, 1926 and on March 12th the same year, her sister, Catalina
Almadin, presented by Attorney Federico Marino, propounded her will, Exhibit A-2, mentioned above, for probate.
By virtue of the decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Laguna on December 22, 1926 (Exhibit A-4),

affirmed by this court on appeal (Exhibit D), said will was not admitted to probate. 1 Vivencio Legasto, then, the
special administrator appointed by said Court of First Instance of Laguna to take charge of Sabina Almadin's
estate, filed the complaint which originated this case, claiming the delivery of the parcels of land described in
paragraph 7 of this aforesaid complaint as amended. The first question to decide in the instant appeal is whether
the partition made by Sabina Almadin of her property among her nieces, the defendants and appellants herein,
was valid enforceable.
Article 1056 of the Civil Code Provides:
ART. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his property by an act inter vivos, or by will, such
partition shall stand in so far as it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs.
The Supreme Court of Spain, in a decision rendered on June 13, 1903, laid down the following doctrine:
Considering that the language of article 1056 cannot be interpreted to mean that a person may, by acts
inter vivos, partition his property referred to in the section wherein said article is found, without the
authority of a testament containing an expression of his last will, or the authority of law, for, otherwise, a
partition thus made would be tantamount to making a will in a manner not provided for, authorized, nor
included in the chapter referring to testaments, and especially, to the forms thereof, which is entirely
different from the legal consequences of a free disposition made by parents during their lifetime, whereby
they give to their children the whole or a part of their property;
Considering that, inasmuch as the second paragraph of article 1271 makes reference to the aforesaid
article, in providing that no contracts may be entered into with respect to future inheritances except those
the object of which is to make a division inter vivos of the estate in accordance with article 1056, it is
evident that said difference likewise leads to the conclusion that a partition thus made should be on the
basis of a testemantary or legal succession and should be made a conformity with the fundamental rules
thereof and the order of the heirs entitled to the estate, because neither of the two provisions could be
given a wider meaning or scope than that they simply provide for the division of the estate during the
lifetime of the owner, which, otherwise, would have to be done upon the death of the testator in order to
carry into effect the partition of the estate among the persons interested.
Manresa comments on the same article as follows:
A distinction must be made between the disposition of property and its division; and the provision of article
1056 authorizing the testator to dispose of his property by acts inter vivos or by last will, must be
understood in accordance with this distinction. The idea is to divide the estate among the heirs
designated by the testator. This designation constitutes the disposition of the properties to take effect after
his death, and said act must necessarily appear in the testament because it is the expression of the
testator's last will and must be surrounded by appropriate formalities. Then comes the second part, to wit,
the division in conformity with that disposition, and the testator may make this division in the same will or
in another will, or by an act inter vivos. With these words the law, in article 1056 as well as in article 1057,
which we shall hereafter examine, makes allusion to the forms or manner of making the partition and not
to the effects thereof, which means that, for the purposes of partition the formal solemnities which must
accompany every testament or last will are not necessary. Neither is it necessary to observe the special
formalities required in case of donations, because it is not a matter of disposing gratuitously of properties,
but of dividing those which already have been legally disposed of.
It is thus seen that both the Spanish Supreme Court and the learned and authoritative commentator, Manresa, are
of opinion that a testator may, by an act inter vivos, partition his property, but he must first make a will with all the
formalities provided for by law. And it could not be otherwise, for without a will there can be no testator; when the
law, therefore, speaks of the partition inter vivos made by a testator of his property, it necessarily refers to that
property which he has devised to his heirs. A person who disposes of his property gratis inter vivos in not called a
testator, but a donor. In employing the word "testator," the law evidently desired to distinguish between the one
who freely donates his property in life and one who disposes of it by will to take effect his death.
Sabina Almadin must have been aware of the necessity of a prior will, since before making the partition of her
property among her nieces, the defendants herein, she executed a will giving to each of them the same parcels of
land which she later transferred to them gratuitously.
Now, then, section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 625. Allowance necessary, and conclusive as to execution. No will shall pass either the real or
personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed in the Court of First Instance, or by appeal to the
Supreme Court; and the allowance by the court of a will of real and personal estate shall be conclusive as
to its due execution.
As Sabina Almadin's will was disallowed for the reason that it did not contain all the essential requisites provided
by law for its validity, can the aforesaid partition of her estate made by said testatrix among her nieces be deemed
valid? Certainly not; for it is an indispensable condition precedent to a testator partitioning his estate inter vivos
that he have made a valid will disposing of said estate among his heirs; and if this will be declared null and void,
the partition made by the testator in pursuance of its provisions is likewise null and void, for where these

provisions cease to exist, the partition made in conformity therewith also becomes null and void, as the cessation
of the cause implies the cessation of the effect.
And since Sabina Almadin's will is null and void for lack of the legal requisites, consequently, the partition which
she made of her estate among her nieces the defendants-appellants herein, during her lifetime is likewise null and
void.
The second question to be decided is whether or not the conveyances made by Sabina Almadin of the parcels of
land in litigation, in favor of her nieces, respectively, by virtue of the instruments Exhibits 2, 31, 47 and 73 can be
considered valid and enforceable.
Article 633 of the Civil Code provides that in order that a donation of real property be valid, it must be made by
public instrument, in which the property donated must be specifically described, and that the acceptance may be
made in the same deed of gift or in a separate instrument, but in the latter case notice thereof should be given the
donor in due form, and a note to that effect inserted in both instruments.
There is no question that the documents Exhibits 2, 31, 42, and 73 contain all the requisites for public
instruments. However, they do not show the acceptance of the respective donees.
It is contended that the sworn statements Exhibits 3, 5, 32, 34, 48, 74 and 76 signed by Sabina Almadin in which it
appears that she has assigned to each of her nieces, respectively, the parcels of land in litigation, and wherein
each of said nieces states that she has purchased the same parcels of land from her aunt Sabina Almadin,
constitute a gift and an acceptance at the same time.
But it appears that said sworn statements before a sale and not to a gift and cannot, therefore, be considered as
public instruments of gifts showing the acceptance of the donees.
It is also contended that said sworn statements constitute separate deeds of acceptance; but even if that were so,
there is still lacking the legal requisite of notification in due form to the donor of the donee's acceptance, and the
annotation thereof in the deed of gift and in the instrument of acceptance. The formal notice calls for the agency of
the same notary who authenticated the acceptance and he should under his authority make the annotation of said
notice, as indicated (5 Manresa, pp. 120, 121).
Furthermore, the aforesaid sworn statements are not deeds transferring title but mere acknowledgments made
under oath of the fact of the transfer, required by the law in order that the provincial assessor may make the
proper transfer of the tax declarations of the vendor to the vendee, where the transfer has not been recorded in
the registry of deeds.
In view of all the foregoing, we are of opinion and so hold: (1) That the partition made by a testator inter vivos in
pursuance of a will which has been disallowed is null and void; and (2) that the gift of realty made in a public
instrument which fails to show the acceptance, or wherein the formal notice of the acceptance is either not given
to the donor or else not noted in the deed of gift and in the separate acceptance, is null and void.
Wherefore, finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed in its entirety, with costs
against the appellants. So ordered.
222. G.R. No. L-68282 November 8, 1990
RAQUEL CHAVEZ, GERARDO GIMENEZ and MANUELA BUENAVISTA VDA. DE CHAVEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (4th Civil Cases Division), ANTONIO CHAVEZ, ROSARIO
CHAVEZ and CONCEPCION CHAVEZ, respondents.
Edmundo A. Narra for petitioners.
Jose L. Lapak for respondents.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated March 26, 1984 of the Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. CV-64708 which (1)
annulled the sale made by Manuela Buenavista of her property in favor of the spouses Raquel Chavez and Gerardo Gimenez (Exh. 2) and the
subsequent sale by said spouses of the same property to Pepito Ferrer, and (2) declared that the earlier deeds of sale (Exhs. A, B, C and D) signed by
Manuela and her children constituted a valid partition of the land, subject to her lifetime usufruct. The Court of Appeals thereby reversed the decision
dated December 21, 1971 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Branch 1.
The land in question is the paraphernal property of petitioner Manuel Buenavista (defendant in Civil Case No. 1934 of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Norte) who had six (6) children, named Antonio, Rosario, Concepcion, Raquel, Presentacion and Floserpina. The first three were the
plaintiffs and the last three, with their mother, were the defendants in Civil Case No. 1934.
On July 11, 1958, Presentacion Chavez, with the conformity of her mother, Manuela Buenavista, executed a deed of sale whereby she sold her 1/6
undivided share of the land in question to her sister, Concepcion Chavez, for P 450.

Two years later, on May 2, 1960, Floserpina Chavez, with the conformity of her mother, also sold her 1/6 undivided share of the same land to her sister,
Concepcion, for the same price of P450. On May 19, 1960, Raquel, with the conformity of her mother, likewise sold her undivided 1/6 share of the same
property to Concepcion Chavez for P600. Having acquired the shares of Presentacion, Floserpina and Raquel, Concepcion thereby became the owner
of a total undivided 4/6 share of the land in question with Antonio and Rosario as owners of the remaining 2/6 shares.
In all the documents, the following stipulation appears:
Na ang nasabing lupa o pag-aari ay ipinamana na sa amin ng aming ina, ang nasabing Manuela Buenavista, kung kaya ito ay
hatiin naming anim (6) na mga magkakapatid, bagama't hindi pa namin naisasagawa ang paghihiwatig o partition; ako bilang isa
sa anim na magkakapatid ay may karapatan sa isang ikaanim (1/6) na bahagi ng nasabing lupa, gayon pa man ang kasunduan
sa nasabing pagkamana namin ay samantalang nabubuhay pa ang aming ina, siya ang magkakandili at makikinabang sa
nasabing pag-aari. (p. 14, Rollo.)
meaning that the owner, Manuela Buenavista, had assigned or distributed to her children, in equal pro-indiviso shares, her paraphernal property
situated at Sitio Langas, Barrio Calangcawan Norte, Vinzons, Camarines Norte, with an area of 4.1163 hectares more or less under Tax Declaration No.
9303 and assessed at P1,630.00. The owner, however, reserved for herself the possession of the land and the enjoyment of the fruits during her
lifetime.
Despite the transfers or assignments her children had executed with her conformity ten years earlier, Manuela Buenavista, on August 27, 1968, signed
a "Bilihang Patuluyan ng Lupa" of the entire property in favor of her daughter, Raquel Chavez, and her husband, Gerardo Jimenez. On October 7, 1968,
Antonio, Rosario and Concepcion filed Civil Case No. 1934 against their mother Manuela and their sister Raquel. Thereupon, Manuela sold the entire
property to Pepito Ferrer, on February 4, 1969 (Exh. F) with right to repurchase. Ferrer was later sued as an additional defendant in Civil Case No.
1934.
After the trial, judgment was rendered by the trial court dismissing the complaint, dissolving the preliminary injunction it had previously issued, and
ordering the plaintiffs to pay the costs. The court did not award damages.
The plaintiffs, Antonio, Rosario and Concepcion, appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 64708-R).
On March 26, 1984, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, we reverse and set aside the appealed decision and render another one declaring the deeds of sale in favor of
Raquel Chavez and Gerardo Jimenez (Exh. 2) and the sale in favor of defendant-appellee Pepito Ferrer as null and void ab initio,
and declaring further that the documents (Exhs. A, B, C and D) are evidence of a valid partition of the land in question by and
between Manuela Buenavista and her children, subject to her right of usufruct during her lifetime, without pronouncement as to
damages and costs. (p. 17, Rollo.)
On April 5, 1984, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration alleging among others:
3. That the late Manuela Buenavista Vda. de Chavez, one of the defendants-appellees, was found lately to have executed during
her lifetime a LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT ... and there is now a pending petition for probate of said last will and testament
before the Municipal Trial Court of Vinzons, Camarines Norte;
xxx xxx xxx
6. In the case at bar, even granting that the late Manuela Buenavista's execution of the documents referred to as Exhibits A, B, C
and D are valid, nevertheless its validity ceases from the time that she executed the Last Will and Testament . . . because the
execution of the Last Will invalidates the former act of the said Manuela Buenavista;
7. That the Last will and Testament . . . which his now pending probate in the Municipal Trial Court of Vinzons, Camarines Norte,
will finally affect the property hence, there is a ground for this motion for reconsideration and/or to suspend the decisionpending final outcome of the probate of the last will and testament of the late Manuela Buenavista. (pp. 88-89, Rollo.)
Private respondents opposed the Motion for Reconsideration asserting that the partition inter vivos which had been implemented long before the
execution of the said Last Will and Testament could not be revoked by the later instrument; that the supposed Last Will and Testament was executed on
December 11, 1969, more than one year after the filing of the complaint for annulment on October 9, 1968, when said Manuela Buenavista was already
senile and not of disposing mind; that while Manuela Buenavista was able to sign with her own hand the several Deeds of Sale, the supposed Last Will
and Testament bears her thumbmark only; that Manuela Buenavista had no more property to dispose of by will on December 11, 1969, when she
supposedly executed her Last Will and Testament.
On June 28, 1984, the Appellate Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
In their petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, the petitioners allege:
(l) That the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) erred in declaring valid the deeds of sale (Exhs. A, B, C and D) as
a partition by an act inter vivos considering that examining the said exhibits will reveal that it is not a testament amounting to a will
of Manuela Buenavista;
(2) That the Intermediate Appellate Court erred in ruling against Article 1347 of the New Civil Code. (p. 126, Rollo.)
We find those contentions not well-taken.
Article 1080 of the New Civil Code allows a person to make a partition of his estate either by an act inter vivos or by will and such partition shall be
respected insofar as it does not prejudice the legitimate of the compulsory heirs. While the law prohibits contracts upon future inheritance, the partition
by the parent, as provided in Art. 1080, is a case expressly authorized by law (Art. 1347, par. 2, Civil Code of the Phil. by Padilla, 1987 Edition, p. 744.)
Art. 1080 of the Civil Code clearly gives a person two options in making a partition of his estate; either by an act inter vivos or by WILL. When a person
makes a partition by will, it is imperative that such partition must be executed in accordance with the provisions of the law on wills; however, when a
person makes the partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, such partition may even be oral or written, and need not be in the form of a will, provided
that the partition does not prejudice the legitime of compulsory heirs.
In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions may be sustained on the ground of estoppel of the parties to
assert the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parol partition as to which possession in severalty was taken
and acts of individual ownership were exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and
effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the parties as between each other to hold their respective parts in severalty.

A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by
taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the
partition. (Hernandez vs. Andal, et al., 78 Phil. 196, 203.)
In the instant case, the respondent appellate court declared the Deeds of Sale executed by Presentacion, Floserfina and Raquel, all surnamed Chavez
(Exhs. A, B, and C) in favor of Concepcion Chavez as evidence of a valid partition of the land in question by and between Manuela Buenavista and her
children as she not only gave her authority thereto but also signed the sales. The Deeds of Sale (Exhs. A, B, and C) are not contracts entered into with
respect to feature inheritance but a contract perfected and consummated during the lifetime of Manuela Buenavista who signed the same and gave her
consent thereto. Such partition inter vivos, executed by the property owner herself, is valid.
.... As the defendants freely participated in the partition, they are now estopped from denying and repudiating the consequences of
their own voluntary acts. It is a general principle of law that no one may be permitted to disavow and go back upon his own acts,
or to proceed contrary thereto. (Joaquin vs. Mitsumine 34 Phil. 858.)
Where a piece of land has been included in a partition, and there is no allegation that the inclusion was effected through improper
means or without the petitioner's knowledge, the partition barred any further litigation on said title and operated to bring the
property under the control and jurisdiction of the court for proper disposition according to the tenor of the partition... They cannot
attack the partition collaterally ... (Ralla vs. Judge Untalan, 172 SCRA 858, 865, citing the case of Torres vs. Encarnacion and De
Borja, No. L-4681, July 31, 1951, 89 Phil. 678.)
As well argued by counsel for the respondents in their memorandum, it would be unjust and inequitable to allow Manuela Buenavista Vda. de Chavez to
revoke the sales she herself authorized as well as the sale she herself executed in favor of her son only to execute a simulated sale in favor of her
daughter Raquel who had already profited from the sale she made of the property she had received in the partition inter vivos; it would run counter to
the doctrine that "no person should be allowed to unjustly enrich herself at the expense of another."
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. No. CV-64708, the same is affirmed in toto. The petition for
review is dismissed for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

223. G.R. No. L-3404

April 2, 1951

ANGELA I. TUASON, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ANTONIO TUASON, JR., and GREGORIO ARANETA, INC., defendants-appellees.
Alcuaz & Eiguren for appellant.
Araneta & Araneta for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
In 1941 the sisters Angela I. Tuason and Nieves Tuason de Barreto and their brother Antonio Tuason Jr., held a
parcel of land with an area of 64,928.6 sq. m. covered by Certificate of Title No. 60911 in Sampaloc, Manila, in
common, each owning an undivided 1/3 portion. Nieves wanted and asked for a partition of the common property,
but failing in this, she offered to sell her 1/3 portion. The share of Nieves was offered for sale to her sister and her
brother but both declined to buy it. The offer was later made to their mother but the old lady also declined to buy,
saying that if the property later increased in value, she might be suspected of having taken advantage of her
daughter. Finally, the share of Nieves was sold to Gregorio Araneta Inc., a domestic corporation, and a new
Certificate of Title No. 61721 was issued in lieu of the old title No. 60911 covering the same property. The three
co-owners agreed to have the whole parcel subdivided into small lots and then sold, the proceeds of the sale to
be later divided among them. This agreement is embodied in a document (Exh. 6) entitled "Memorandum of
Agreement" consisting of ten pages, dated June 30, 1941.
Before, during and after the execution of this contract (Exh. 6), Atty. J. Antonio Araneta was acting as the attorneyin-fact and lawyer of the two co-owners, Angela I. Tuason and her brother Antonio Tuason Jr. At the same time he
was a member of the Board of Director of the third co-owner, Araneta, Inc.
The pertinent terms of the contract (Exh. 6) may be briefly stated as follows: The three co-owners agreed to
improve the property by filling it and constructing roads and curbs on the same and then subdivide it into small
lots for sale. Araneta Inc. was to finance the whole development and subdivision; it was prepare a schedule of
prices and conditions of sale, subject to the subject to the approval of the two other co-owners; it was invested
with authority to sell the lots into which the property was to be subdivided, and execute the corresponding
contracts and deeds of sale; it was also to pay the real estate taxes due on the property or of any portion thereof
that remained unsold, the expenses of surveying, improvements, etc., all advertising expenses, salaries of
personnel, commissions, office and legal expenses, including expenses in instituting all actions to eject all tenants
or occupants on the property; and it undertook the duty to furnish each of the two co-owners, Angela and Antonio
Tuason, copies of the subdivision plans and the monthly sales and rents and collections made thereon. In return
for all this undertaking and obligation assumed by Araneta Inc., particularly the financial burden, it was to receive
50 per cent of the gross selling price of the lots, and any rents that may be collected from the property, while in the
process of sale, the remaining 50 per cent to be divided in equal portions among the three co-owners so that each
will receive 16.33 per cent of the gross receipts.
Because of the importance of paragraphs 9, 11 and 15 of the contract (Exh. 6), for purposes of reference we are
reproducing them below:
(9) This contract shall remain in full force and effect during all the time that it may be necessary for the
PARTY OF THE SECOND PART to fully sell the said property in small and subdivided lots and to fully

collect the purchase prices due thereon; it being understood and agreed that said lots may be rented
while there are no purchasers thereof;
(11) The PARTY OF THE SECOND PART (meaning Araneta Inc.) is hereby given full power and authority
to sign for and in behalf of all the said co-owners of said property all contracts of sale and deeds of sale of
the lots into which this property might be subdivided; the powers herein vested to the PARTY OF THE
SECOND PART may, under its own responsibility and risk, delegate any of its powers under this contract
to any of its officers, employees or to third persons;
(15) No co-owner of the property subject-matter of this contract shall sell, alienate or dispose of his
ownership, interest or participation therein without first giving preference to the other co-owners to
purchase and acquire the same under the same terms and conditions as those offered by any other
prospective purchaser. Should none of the co-owners of the property subject-matter of this contract
exercise the said preference to acquire or purchase the same, then such sale to a third party shall be
made subject to all the conditions, terms, and dispositions of this contract; provided, the PARTIES OF
THE FIRST PART (meaning Angela and Antonio) shall be bound by this contract as long as the PARTY
OF THE SECOND PART, namely, the GREGORIO ARANETA, INC. is controlled by the members of the
Araneta family, who are stockholders of the said corporation at the time of the signing of this contract
and/or their lawful heirs;
On September 16, 1944, Angela I. Tuason revoked the powers conferred on her attorney-in-fact and lawyer, J.
Antonio Araneta. Then in a letter dated October 19, 1946, Angela notified Araneta, Inc. that because of alleged
breach of the terms of the "Memorandum of Agreement" (Exh. 6) and abuse of powers granted to it in the
document, she had decided to rescind said contract and she asked that the property held in common be
partitioned. Later, on November 20, 1946, Angela filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila asking
the court to order the partition of the property in question and that she be given 1/3 of the same including rents
collected during the time that the same including rents collected during the time that Araneta Inc., administered
said property.
The suit was administered principally against Araneta, Inc. Plaintiff's brother, Antonio Tuason Jr., one of the coowners evidently did not agree to the suit and its purpose, for he evidently did not agree to the suit and its
purpose, for he joined Araneta, Inc. as a co-defendant. After hearing and after considering the extensive evidence
introduce, oral and documentary, the trial court presided over by Judge Emilio Pea in a long and considered
decision dismissed the complaint without pronouncement as to costs. The plaintiff appealed from that decision,
and because the property is valued at more than P50,000, the appeal came directly to this Court.
Some of the reasons advanced by appellant to have the memorandum contract (Exh. 6) declared null and void or
rescinded are that she had been tricked into signing it; that she was given to understand by Antonio Araneta
acting as her attorney-in-fact and legal adviser that said contract would be similar to another contract of
subdivision of a parcel into lots and the sale thereof entered into by Gregorio Araneta Inc., and the heirs of D.
Tuason, Exhibit "L", but it turned out that the two contracts widely differed from each other, the terms of contract
Exh. "L" being relatively much more favorable to the owners therein the less favorable to Araneta Inc.; that Atty.
Antonio Araneta was more or less disqualified to act as her legal adviser as he did because he was one of the
officials of Araneta Inc., and finally, that the defendant company has violated the terms of the contract (Exh. 6) by
not previously showing her the plans of the subdivision, the schedule of prices and conditions of the sale, in not
introducing the necessary improvements into the land and in not delivering to her her share of the proceeds of the
rents and sales.
We have examined Exh. "L" and compared the same with the contract (Exh. 6) and we agree with the trial court
that in the main the terms of both contracts are similar and practically the same. Moreover, as correctly found by
the trial court, the copies of both contracts were shown to the plaintiff Angela and her husband, a broker, and both
had every opportunity to go over and compare them and decide on the advisability of or disadvantage in entering
into the contract (Exh. 6); that although Atty. Antonio Araneta was an official of the Araneta Inc.; being a member
of the Board of Directors of the Company at the time that Exhibit "6" was executed, he was not the party with
which Angela contracted, and that he committed no breach of trust. According to the evidence Araneta, the
pertinent papers, and sent to her checks covering her receive the same; and that as a matter of fact, at the time of
the trial, Araneta Inc., had spent about P117,000 in improvement and had received as proceeds on the sale of the
lots the respectable sum of P1,265,538.48. We quote with approval that portion of the decision appealed from on
these points:
The evidence in this case points to the fact that the actuations of J. Antonio Araneta in connection with the
execution of exhibit 6 by the parties, are above board. He committed nothing that is violative of the
fiduciary relationship existing between him and the plaintiff. The act of J. Antonio Araneta in giving the
plaintiff a copy of exhibit 6 before the same was executed, constitutes a full disclosure of the facts, for
said copy contains all that appears now in exhibit 6.
Plaintiff charges the defendant Gregorio Araneta, Inc. with infringing the terms of the contract in that the
defendant corporation has failed (1) to make the necessary improvements on the property as required by
paragraphs 1 and 3 of the contract; (2) to submit to the plaintiff from time to time schedule of prices and
conditions under which the subdivided lots are to be sold; and to furnish the plaintiff a copy of the
subdivision plans, a copy of the monthly gross collections from the sale of the property.

The Court finds from the evidence that he defendant Gregorio Araneta, Incorporated has substantially
complied with obligation imposed by the contract exhibit 6 in its paragraph 1, and that for improvements
alone, it has disbursed the amount of P117,167.09. It has likewise paid taxes, commissions and other
expenses incidental to its obligations as denied in the agreement.
With respect to the charged that Gregorio Araneta, Incorporated has failed to submit to plaintiff a copy of
the subdivision plains, list of prices and the conditions governing the sale of subdivided lots, and monthly
statement of collections form the sale of the lots, the Court is of the opinion that it has no basis. The
evidence shows that the defendant corporation submitted to the plaintiff periodically all the data relative to
prices and conditions of the sale of the subdivided lots, together with the amount corresponding to her.
But without any justifiable reason, she refused to accept them. With the indifferent attitude adopted by the
plaintiff, it was thought useless for Gregorio Araneta, Incorporated to continue sending her statement of
accounts, checks and other things. She had shown on various occasions that she did not want to have
any further dealings with the said corporation. So, if the defendant corporation proceeded with the sale of
the subdivided lots without the approval of the plaintiff, it was because it was under the correct impression
that under the contract exhibit 6 the decision of the majority co-owners is binding upon all the three.
The Court feels that recission of the contract exhibit 6 is not minor violations of the terms of the
agreement, the general rule is that "recission will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach of the
contract, but only for such breaches as are so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the
parties in making the agreement" (Song Fo & Co. vs. Hawaiian-Philippine Co., 47 Phil. 821).
As regards improvements, the evidence shows that during the Japanese occupation from 1942 and up to 1946,
the Araneta Inc. although willing to fill the land, was unable to obtain the equipment and gasoline necessary for
filling the low places within the parcel. As to sales, the evidence shows that Araneta Inc. purposely stopped selling
the lots during the Japanese occupantion, knowing that the purchase price would be paid in Japanese military
notes; and Atty. Araneta claims that for this, plaintiff should be thankfull because otherwise she would have
received these notes as her share of the receipts, which currency later became valueles.
But the main contention of the appellant is that the contract (Exh. 6) should be declared null and void because its
terms, particularly paragraphs 9, 11 and 15 which we have reproduced, violate the provisions of Art. 400 of the
Civil Code, which for the purposes of reference we quote below:
ART. 400. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain a party to the community. Each may, at any time,
demand the partition of the thing held in common.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a specified length of time, not exceeding ten
years, shall be valid. This period may be a new agreement.
We agree with the trial court that the provisions of Art. 400 of the Civil Code are not applicable. The contract
(Exh., 6) far from violating the legal provision that forbids a co-owner being obliged to remain a party to the
community, precisely has for its purpose and object the dissolution of the co-ownership and of the community by
selling the parcel held in common and dividing the proceeds of the sale among the co-owners. The obligation
imposed in the contract to preserve the co-ownership until all the lots shall have been sold, is a mere incident to
the main object of dissolving the co-owners. By virtue of the document Exh. 6, the parties thereto practically and
substantially entered into a contract of partnership as the best and most expedient means of eventually dissolving
the co-ownership, the life of said partnership to end when the object of its creation shall have been attained.
This aspect of the contract is very similar to and was perhaps based on the other agreement or contract (Exh. "L")
referred to by appellant where the parties thereto in express terms entered into partnership, although this object is
not expressed in so many words in Exh. 6. We repeat that we see no violation of Art. 400 of the Civil Code in the
parties entering into the contract (Exh. 6) for the very reason that Art. 400 is not applicable.
Looking at the case from a practical standpoint as did the trial court, we find no valid ground for the partition
insisted upon the appellant. We find from the evidence as was done by the trial court that of the 64,928.6 sq. m.
which is the total area of the parcel held in common, only 1,600 sq. m. or 2.5 per cent of the entire area remained
unsold at the time of the trial in the year 1947, while the great bulk of 97.5 per cent had already been sold. As well
observed by the court below, the partnership is in the process of being dissolved and is about to be dissolved, and
even assuming that Art. 400 of the Civil Code were applicable, under which the parties by agreement may agree
to keep the thing undivided for a period not exceeding 10 years, there should be no fear that the remaining 1,600
sq. m. could not be disposed of within the four years left of the ten-years period fixed by Art. 400.
We deem it unnecessary to discuss and pass upon the other points raised in the appeal and which counsel for
appellant has extensively and ably discussed, citing numerous authorities. As we have already said, we have
viewed the case from a practical standpoint, brushing aside technicalities and disregarding any minor violations of
the contract, and in deciding the case as we do, we are fully convinced that the trial court and this Tribunal are
carrying out in a practical and expeditious way the intentions and the agreement of the parties contained in the
contract (Exh. 6), namely, to dissolve the community and co-ownership, in a manner most profitable to the said
parties.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. There is no pronouncement as to costs.

So ordered.
225. G.R. No. 80821

February 21, 1991

GREGORIO FAVOR, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PRUDENCIO FAVOR HEIRS: EUFEMIO FAVOR and AGUSTIN
FAVOR, respondents.
Leo Diocos for petitioner.
Saludario O. Sonjaco for private respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
It is sad when brother is pitted against brother in a bitter controversy over property left them by a common
forebear. The ancestor must be turning in his grave to see that the bonds of blood that used to unite his children
have turned into a rope of sand.
The deceased father in this case was Regino Favor, who left three sons and several parcels of land in his name.
Before the property could be divided among the three brothers, one of them died with neither wife nor children.
Only the surviving brothers, Gregorio and Prudencio (or Florencio), are involved in this litigation.
The dispute arose in 1972 when Gregorio filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental
against his older brother Prudencio for partition of the following properties they had inherited from their father:
(a) A parcel of land, Lot No. 5288 of Dumaguete Cadastre, situated at Barrio Cantil-i, covered by O.C.T.
No. 3266-A of the land records of Dumaguete City, with Tax Declaration No. 8-11, and assessed at
P250.00; (Exh. B)
(b) A parcel of land, Lot No. 5272 of Dumaguete Cadastre, situated at Barrio Cantil-i covered by O.C.T.
No. 598 of the land records of Dumaguete City, with Tax Declaration No. 8-12, and assessed at
P1,270.00;
(c) A parcel of land, Lot No. 4114 of Bacong Cadastre, situated at Barrio Balayag-Manok, covered by
O.C.T. No. G.V. 7291 of the land records of Negros Oriental, with Tax Declaration No. 1857, and
assessed at P200.00;
(d) A parcel of land, situated at Barrio Bongbong, Valencia, Negros Oriental, covered by Tax Declaration
No. 8851 and assessed at P30.00 with the following boundaries:
N Leon W 40.00 meters;
E Eusebio Favor 30.00 meters;
S Procopio Abong 40.00 meters;
W Procopio Abong 30.00 meters;
containing an area of 1,200 square meters, more or less; and
(e) A parcel of land, situated at Barrio Bong-ao, Valencia, Negros Oriental, covered by Tax Declaration
No. 3639 and assessed at P110.00 square meters, more or less.
Florencio's reaction was to move to dismiss the complaint for lack of a cause of action. He contended that the
properties mentioned in the complaint had already been partitioned under a Compromise Agreement concluded
between Gregorio and him on October 4, 1948, and acknowledged before the justice of the peace of Luzuriaga,
Negros Oriental.
The Compromise Agreement was reproduced in the motion as follows:
That, whereas, we are the true and absolute owners of certain parcels of land situated in the
Municipalities of Bacong, Luzuriaga and Dumaguete, Negros Oriental, which parcels of land we have
inherited from our deceased father, Regino Favor;
That, whereas, we have voluntarily agreed to divide the aforesaid real property between ourselves with
terms and conditions more specifically stated hereunder;

Now, therefore, for and in consideration of the above premises, we have covenanted and agreed, and by
these presents do hereby covenant and agree:
First, that the parcel of land situated in the Municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental, which had been
subsequently divided and surveyed shall remain our property in accordance with the Cadastral Survey of
Bacong Negros Oriental;
Second That Prudencio Favor shall become the exclusive owner of that parcel of land situated on the
boundary between Dumaguete and Luzuriaga, and which parcel of land is covered by a Free Patent
under Original Certificate of Title Numbered 19443 in the Office of the Register of Deeds in and for the
Province of Negros Oriental, and also of that certain parcel of land situated in Barrio Bong-Bong,
Municipality of Luzuriaga, Negros Oriental. . . .
Third That Gregorio Favor shall become the exclusive owner of that certain parcel of land situated in
Barvio Cantil-i, Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, under a certificate of Torrens Title in the name of our
deceased brother, Hilario Favor; and
Fourth, that upon the signing of this agreement, Prudencio Favor shall pay to Gregorio Favor the sum of
One Hundred Fifty Pesos (P150.00) Philippine Currency.
The motion to dismiss was denied, and Prudencio reiterated the same defense in his answer. Gregorio filed an
amended complaint in which he prayed, in addition to the partition, for the invalidation of the Compromise
Agreement on the ground of fraud and mistake.
At the trial, Gregorio testified that the greater portion of his father's properties were in the possession of
Prudencio, who was occupying 16,794 square meters as against the 3,789 square meters left to him. He also
assailed the Compromise Agreement, claiming that he had signed it under the mistaken impression that it was a
mortgage receipt for P150.00 and not a partition. He alleged that he could not read or speak English and that he
was defrauded into signing the document by the defendant.
For his part, Prudencio narrated under oath that after the death of their father and later of their brother Hilario, he
and Gregorio verbally partitioned their inheritance, but in 1948 Gregorio asked for a new partition. He refused.
Gregorio then filed a complaint against him which was, however, withdrawn after they signed the Compromise
Agreement. He insisted that the agreement was a valid and binding document that justified the dismissal of the
new complaint.
(On November 20, 1983, while the case was pending, Prudencio died and was substituted by his legal heirs,
Eufemio and Agustin Favor, the herein private respondents.)
On January 6, 1984, Judge Pedro Gabaton of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete, rendered judgment
declaring the Compromise Agreement null and void, ordering partition of the disputed properties, and awarding
the plaintiff damages and attorney's fees. On appeal, this decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals, 1 which
held the Compromise Agreement to be valid and binding and ordered the dismissal of the complaint.
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the respondent court is faulted for
upholding the Compromise Agreement and not applying the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code sustaining the
right of the petitioner as co-owner to the partition of the properties in dispute.
(Gregorio died on April 14,1988, and is hereby substituted as petitioners herein by his wife, Melodia, and their
children, Jesus, Calixto, Fernando, Leonardo, Cirilo, Gregorio and Lope.)
We must observe at the outset that although denominated a Compromise Agreement, the document in question is
deemed a deed of partition under Article 1082 of the Civil Code, which categorically provides as follows:
Every act which is intended to put an end to in division among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is
deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any
other transaction.
As for its validity, we agree with the respondent court that the Compromise Agreement must be upheld, the
challenge to it not having been substantiated. A public instrument enjoys the presumption of validity that has not
been overcome by the petitioner in this case with the full, clear and convincing evidence we have consistently
required in similar cases. 2 The document appears to have been duly notarized, and by the then justice of the
peace, and ex officio notary public, of the town where it was executed. Although it was written in English and
precisely because of this we can suppose that its contents were sufficiently explained to the parties thereto,
who both claimed to be illeterate That claim is believable in Prudencio, who declared he was a farmer and merely
affixed his thumbmark to the document, but it is not as credible with respect to Gregorio, who actually signed the
agreement.
Gregorio was in fact a businessman and even ran for the position of barangay captain,3 for which the ability to
read and write is prescribed as an indispensable qualification. It is worth noting that he also signed his complaint
of February 15, 1972, and its verification as well, 4 but in the petition he filed with this Court after the

respondent court had found that he was literate he merely affixed his thumbmark to the verification. If his
purpose was to convince us that he really could not write, he has not succeeded.
To prove defect or lack of consent, the evidence must also be strong and not merely preponderant. 5 Gregorio's
claim that he was tricked by his brother into signing the Compromise Agreement, which he believed was only a
mortgage receipt, is not convincing enough for us. If any one was more likely to be deceived, it was not Gregorio
but the farmer Prudencio, who was less experienced than his brother in business matters and court litigations. It
was Gregorio and not Prudencio who filed the first complaint that led to the execution of the Compromise
Agreement and also the second complaint which is the subject of the present petition.
But while upholding the Compromise Agreement, we must also find that the complaint for partition should not
have been entirely dismissed by the respondent court. The reason is that there are still certain properties of
Regino Favor that have not been distributed between the brothers, as a close examination of the Compromise
Agreement will reveal. Thus:
1. The first parcel of land mentioned in the complaint, Lot 5288, covered by O.C.T. 3266-A, is the same lot
mentioned in the third provision of the Compromise Agreement "that certain parcel of land situated at
Barrio Cantil-i, Dumaguete, Negros Oriental under certificate of title in the name of our deceased brother
Hilario Favor . . ." and is adjudicated to Gregorio Favor.
2. The second parcel of land mentioned in the complaint, Lot 5272, covered by O.C.T. 598 in the name of
Prudencio Favor, is the first lot mentioned in the second provision of the Compromise Agreement "that
parcel of land situated on the boundary between Dumaguete and Luzuriaga and which parcel of land is
covered by a Free Patent under original certificate of title 19443 in the Office of the Register of Deeds in
and for the province of Negros Oriental . . . ." and is adjudicated to Prudencio Favor.
3. The third parcel of land mentioned in the complaint, Lot 4114, covered by O.C.T. O.V. 7291, is the
same lot mentioned in the first provision of the Compromise Agreement, "the parcel of land situated in the
municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental, which had been subsequently divided and surveyed shall remain
our property . . . .
4. The fourth parcel of land mentioned in the complaint, the lot at Barrio Bongbong, Valencia, Negros
Oriental, is the same lot mentioned in the second provision of the Compromise Agreement as "that certain
parcel of land situated at Barrio Bongbong, Luzuriaga (now Valencia), Negros Oriental" is adjudicated to
Prudencio Favor.
5. The fifth parcel of land mentioned in the complaint, the lot at Barrio Bongao, Valencia, Negros Oriental
is not mentioned in the Compromise Agreement.
There still remain two parcels of land that have not yet been partitioned, to wit, Lot 4114, which by agreement of
the brothers "shall remain our property," and the lot at Barrio Bongao, which was not included in the Compromise
Agreement as found by both the trial and the respondent courts. Partition of these lots is mandatory under Article
494 of the Civil Code, which provides as follows:
No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten
years, shall be valid.1wphi1 This term may be extended by a new agreement.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Article 1083 bolsters the above rule by declaring that:

Every co-heir has a right to demand the division of the estate unless the testator should have expressly
forbidden its partition, in which case the period of in division shall not exceed twenty years as provided in
Article 494. . . .
No such prohibition was made by Regino Favor, who died intestate. And as the Compromise Agreement was
entered into in 1948, the provision therein for the co-ownership of Lot 4114 is deemed to have expired in 1958, no
extension thereof having been established. Hence, these two lots must now be the subject of a separate partition
conformably to the prayer in the complaint.
We affirm the decision of the respondent court insofar as it upholds the Compromise Agreement partitioning three
of the parcels of land mentioned therein. We must modify it, however, insofar as it dismisses the complaint with
regard to the other properties inherited from Regino Favor which have not been partitioned so far.
WHEREFORE, Civil Case No. 5391 is remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 41, for
the partition, in accordance with Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, of the parcels of land mentioned in Paragraph 2,
sub-paragraphs (c) and (e) of the complaint. The rest of the challenged decision is AFFIRMED, with costs to be
shared by the petitioner and the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.
226. G.R. No. 108947 September 29, 1997
ROLANDO SANCHEZ, FLORIDA MIERLY SANCHEZ, ALFREDO T. SANCHEZ and MYRNA T. SANCHEZ,
petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ROSALIA S. LUGOD, ARTURO S. LUGOD, EVELYN LUGODRANISES and ROBERTO S. LUGOD, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is a petition for certiorari, in lieu of appeal, the proper remedy to correct orders of a probate court nullifying certain deeds of
sale and, thus, effectively passing upon title to the properties subject of such deeds? Is a compromise agreement partitioning
inherited properties valid even without the approval of the trial court hearing the intestate estate of the deceased owner?

The Case
These questions are answered by this Court as it resolves the petition for review on certiorari before us assailing the November 23, 1992 Decision
2

of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28761 which annulled the decision of the trial court and which
declared the compromise agreement among the parties valid and binding even without the said trial court's
approval. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, for the reasons hereinabove set forth and discussed, the instant petition is
GRANTED and the challenged decision as well as the subsequent orders of the respondent court
are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on
October 14, 1992 is made PERMANENT. The compromise agreement dated October 30, 1969 as
modified by the memorandum of agreement of April 13, 1970 is DECLARED valid and binding
upon herein parties. And Special Proceedings No. 44-M and 1022 are deemed CLOSED and
TERMINATED.
SO ORDERED. 5
The Antecedent Facts
The facts are narrated by the Court of Appeals as follows:
[Herein private respondent] Rosalia S. Lugod is the only child of spouses Juan C. Sanchez and
Maria Villafranca while [herein private respondents] Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn L. Ranises and
Roberto S. Lugod are the legitimate children of [herein private respondent] Rosalia.
[Herein petitioners] Rolando, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez, are the
illegitimate children of Juan C. Sanchez.
Following the death of her mother, Maria Villafranca, on September 29, 1967, [herein private
respondent] Rosalia filed on January 22, 1968, thru counsel, a petition for letters of administration
over the estate of her mother and the estate of her father, Juan C. Sanchez, who was at the time
in state of senility (Annex "B", Petition).
On September 30, 1968, [herein private respondent] Rosalia, as administratrix of the intestate
estate of her mother, submitted an inventory and appraisal of the real and personal estate of her
late mother (Annex "C", Petition).
Before the administration proceedings Special in Proceedings No. 44-M could formally be
terminated and closed, Juan C. Sanchez, [herein private respondent] Rosalia's father, died on
October 21, 1968.
On January 14, 1969, [herein petitioners] as heirs of Juan C. Sanchez, filed a petition for letters of
administration (Special Proceedings No. 1022) over the intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez,
which petition was opposed by (herein private respondent) Rosalia. 6
On October 30, 1969, however, [herein private respondent] Rosalia and [herein petitioners]
assisted by their respective counsels executed a compromise agreement (Annex "D", Petition)
wherein they agreed to divide the properties enumerated therein of the late Juan C. Sanchez.
On November 3, 1969, petitioner Rosalia was appointed by [the trial court], and took her oath as
the administratrix of her father's intestate estate.

On January 19, 1970, [herein petitioners] filed a motion to require administratrix, [herein private
respondent] Rosalia, to deliver deficiency of 24 hectares and or to set aside compromise
agreement (Annex "E", Petition).
Under date of April 13, 1970, (herein private respondent) Rosalia and [herein petitioners] entered
into and executed a memorandum of agreement which modified the compromise agreement
(Annex "F". Petition)
On October 25, 1979, or nine years later, [herein petitioners] filed, thru counsel, a motion to
require [herein private respondent] Rosalia to submit a new inventory and to render an
accounting over properties not included in the compromise agreement (Annex "G", Petition). They
likewise filed a motion to defer the approval of the compromise agreement (Annex "H", Ibid), in
which they prayed for the annulment of the compromise agreement on the ground of fraud.
On February 4, 1980, however, counsel for [herein petitioners] moved to withdraw his appearance
and the two motions he flied, Annex "G" and "H" (Annex "I", Petition).
On February 28, 1980, the [trial] court issued an order directing [herein private respondent]
Rosalia to submit a new inventory of properties under her administration and an accounting of the
fruits thereof, which prompted [herein private respondent] Rosalia to file a rejoinder on March 31,
1980 (Annex "K", Petition).
On May 12, 1980, [herein petitioners], thru new counsel, filed a motion to change administratrix
(Annex "L", Petition) to which [herein private respondent] Rosalia filed an opposition (Annex "M",
Ibid).
The parties were subsequently ordered to submit their respective position papers, which they did
(Annexes "N" and "O", Petition). On September 14, 1989, former counsel of (herein petitioners)
entered his re-appearance as counsel for (herein petitioners).
On the bases of memoranda submitted by the parties, the [trial court], this time presided by Judge
Vivencio A. Galon, promulgated its decision on June 26, 1991, the dispositive portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows by
declaring and ordering:
1. That the entire intestate estate of Maria Villafranca Sanchez under Special
Proceedings No. 44-M consists of all her paraphernal properties and one-half
(1/2) of the conjugal properties which must be divided equally between Rosalia
Sanchez de Lugod and Juan C. Sanchez;
2. That the entire intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez under Special Proceedings
No. 1022 consists of all his capital properties, one-half (1/2) from the conjugal
partnership of gains and one-half (1/2) of the intestate estate of Maria Villafranca
under Special Proceedings No. 44-M;
3. That one-half (1/2) of the entire intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez shall be
inherited by his only legitimate daughter, Rosalia V. Sanchez de Lugod while the
other one-half (1/2) shall be inherited and be divided equally by, between and
among the six (6) illegitimate children, namely: Patricia Alburo, Maria Ramuso
Sanchez, Rolando Pedro T. Sanchez, Florida Mierly T. Sanchez, Alfredo T.
Sanchez and Myrna T. Sanchez;
4. That all the Deed (sic) of Absolute Sales executed by Juan C. Sanchez and
Maria Villafranca in favor of Rosalia Sanchez Lugod, Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn S.
Lugod and Roberto S. Lugod on July 26, 1963 and June 26, 1967 are all
declared simulated and fictitious and must be subject to collation and partition
among all heirs;
5. That within thirty (30) days from finality of this decision, Rosalia Sanchez
Lugod is hereby ordered to prepare a project of partition of the intestate estate of
Juan C. Sanchez under Special Proceedings No. 1022 and distribute and deliver
to all heirs their corresponding shares. If she fails to do so within the said thirty
(30) days, then a Board of Commissioners is hereby constituted, who are all
entitled to honorarium and per diems and other necessary expenses chargeable
to the estate to be paid by Administratrix Rosalia S. Lugod, appointing the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) of Gingoog
City as members thereof, with the task to prepare the project of partition and
deliver to all heirs their respective shares within ninety (90) days from the finality
of said decision;

6. That within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision, Administratrix Rosalia
Sanchez Vda. de Lugod is hereby ordered to submit two (2) separate certified
true and correct accounting, one for the income of all the properties of the entire
intestate estate of Maria Villafranca under Special Proceedings No. 44-M, and
another for the properties of the entire intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez under
Special Proceedings No. 1022 duly both signed by her and both verified by a
Certified Public Accountant and distribute and deliver to her six (6) illegitimate
brothers and sisters in equal shares, one-half (1/2) of the net income of the
estate of Juan C. Sanchez from October 21, 1968 up to the finality of this
decision;
7. For failure to render an accounting report and failure to give cash advances to
the illegitimate children of Juan C. Sanchez during their minority and hour of
need from the net income of the estate of Juan C. Sanchez, which adversely
prejudiced their social standing and pursuit of college education, (the trial court)
hereby orders Rosalia Sanchez Vda. de Lugod to pay her six (6) illegitimate
brothers and sisters the sum of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos, as
exemplary damages, and also the sum of One Hundred Fifty Thousand
(P150,000.00) Pesos for attorney's fees;
8. Upon release of this decision and during its pendency, should appeal be made,
the Register of Deeds and Assessors of the Provinces and Cities where the
properties of Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca are located, are all ordered
to register and annotate in the title and/or tax declarations, the dispositive portion
of this decision for the protection of all heirs and all those who may be
concerned.
SO ORDERED.
[Herein private respondent] Rosalia filed a motion for reconsideration dated July 17, 1991 (Annex
"P", Petition) on August 6, 1991.
On August 13, 1991, [herein petitioners] filed a motion for execution and opposition to [herein
private respondent] Rosalia's motion for reconsideration (Annex "Q", Petition).
On September 3, 1991, [the trial court] issued an Omnibus Order (Annex "S", Petition) declaring,
among other things, that the decision at issue had become final and executory.
[Herein private respondent] Rosalia then filed a motion for reconsideration of said Omnibus Order
(Annex "T", Petition). Said [herein private respondent] was allowed to file a memorandum in
support of her motion (Annex "V", Petition).
On June 26, 1991, [the trial court] issued and Order denying petitioner Rosalia's motion for
reconsideration (Annex "W", Petition). 7
Thereafter, private respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari and
contended:
I
The [trial court] has no authority to disturb the compromise agreement.
II
The [trial court] has arbitrarily faulted [herein private respondent] Rosalia S. Lugod for alleged
failure to render an accounting which was impossible.
III
The [trial court] acted without jurisdiction in derogation of the constitutional rights of [herein
private respondents] Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn L. Ranises and Roberto S. Lugod when [the trial
court] decided to annul the deed of sale between the said [herein private respondents] and Juan
C. Sanchez without affording them their day in court.
IV
[The trial court judge] defied without rhyme or reason well-established and entrenched
jurisprudence when he determined facts sans any evidence thereon.
V

[The trial court] grossly misinterpreted [herein private respondent] Rosalia S. Lugod's right to
appeal. 8
For clarity's sake, this Court hereby reproduces verbatim the compromise agreement 9 of the parties:
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
COME NOW, the parties in the above-entitled case, motivated by their mutual desire to preserve and maintain harmonious relations
between and among themselves, for mutual valuable considerations and in the spirit of good will and fair play, and, for the purpose of this
Compromise Agreement, agree to the following:
1. That the deceased Juan C. Sanchez who died intestate on October 21, 1968 was legally married to Maria Villafranca de Sanchez, who
predeceased her on September 29, 1967, out of whose wedlock Rosalia Sanchez Lugod, Oppositor herein, was born, thus making her the
sole and only surviving legitimate heir of her deceased parents;
2. That the said deceased Juan C. Sanchez, left illegitimate children, Intervenors-Oppositors and Petitioners, respectively, herein namely;
(1) Patricio Alburo, born out of wedlock on March 17, 1926 at Cebu City, Philippines, to
Emilia Alburo;
(2) Maria Ramoso Sanchez, born out of wedlock on May 9, 1937 at Gingoog, Misamis
Oriental, now, Gingoog City, to Alberta Ramoso;
(3) (a) Rolando Pedro Sanchez, born on May 19, 1947,
(b) Florida Mierly Sanchez, born on February 16, 1949,
(c) Alfredo Sanchez, born on July 21, 1950, and
(d) Myrna Sanchez, born on June 16, 1952, all born out of wedlock to Laureta Tampus in
Gingoog City, Philippines.
3. That the deceased Juan C. Sanchez left the following properties, to wit:
I. SEPARATE CAPITAL OF JUAN C. SANCHEZ
NATURE, DESCRIPTION AND AREA ASSESSED VALUE
(1) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax. Decl. No. 06458, Cad. Lot No. 1041 C-2, located at Murallon, Gingoog City and bounded on the
North by Lot Nos. 1033, 1035, 1036, 1037, 1039, 1040, 1042 & 1043; South by Lot No. 1080, 1088, 1087 & 1084; East by Lot Nos. 1089,
1061 & 2319; West by Lot Nos. 954, 1038, 1057 & 1056, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO (183, 672) sq. ms. more or less.
P21,690.00
II. CONJUGAL PROPERTY OF JUAN C. SANCHEZ AND MARIA VILLAFRANCA DE SANCHEZ
(1) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06447, Cad. Lot No. 2745, C-7 located at Agay-ayan, Gingoog City and bounded on the
North by Lot Nos. 2744, 2742, 2748; South by Lot No. 2739; East by Lot No. 2746; West by Lot No. 2741, containing an area of
FOURTEEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED (14,700) sq. ms. more or less.
P1,900.00
(2) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06449, Cad, Lot No. 3271 C-7 located at Panyangan, Lanao, Gingoog City and bounded on
the North by Lot No. 3270; South by Lot Nos. 2900 & 3462; East by Panyangan River & F. Lumanao; and Part of Lot 3272; and West by
Samay Creek, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (104,600) sq. ms. more or less.
P11,580.00
(3) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06449, Cad. Lot No. 2319, Case 2, located at Murallon, Gingoog City and bounded on the
North by Lot No. 1061; South by Hinopolan Creek; East by Lot No. 1044; and West by Lot No. 1041, containing an area of THREE
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE (3,225) sq. ms. more or less.
(4) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06452, Cad. Lot No. 3272, C-7 Part 4 located at Panyangan, Lunao, Gingoog City and
bounded on the North by Lot Nos. 3270 & 3273; East by Panyangan River; South by Panyangan River; and West by Lot Nos. 3270 & 3271,
containing an area of FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (55,600) sq. ms. more or less, being claimed by Damian Querubin.
P2,370.00
(5) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06453, Cad. Lot No. 3270 Case 7, located at Sunog, Lunao, Gingoog City and bounded on
the North by Samay Creek & Lot 3267; South by Lot Nos. 3271 & 3272; East by Lot Nos. 3269 & 3273; and West by Samay Creek,
containing an area of FOUR HUNDRED EIGHT THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (483,600) sq. ms. more or less.
P61,680.00
(6) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06457, Cad. Lot No. 3273, C-7 Part 2 located at Panyangan, Lunao, Gingoog City and
bounded on the North by Lot No. 3269; South by Lot No. 3272; East by Panyangan River; and West by Lot No. 3270, containing an area of
THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED (34,300) sq. ms. more or less, being claimed by Miguel Tuto.
P3,880.00
(7) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 12000, Cad. Lot No. 2806, Case 7 located at Agayayan, Gingoog City and bounded on the
North by Agayayan River; South by Victoriano Barbac; East by Isabelo Ramoso; and West by Restituto Baol, containing an area of SIX
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY SIX (6,676) sq. ms. more or less.

P380.00
(8) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 12924, Cad. Lot No. 1206 C-1 located at Cahulogan, Gingoog City and bounded on the
NW., by Lot No. 1209; SW., by Lot No. 1207; Eastby National Highway; and West by Lot No. 1207; containing an area of FOUR
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTEEN (4,513) sq. ms. more or less.
P740.00
(9) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 12925, Cad. Lot No. 5554, located at Tinaytayan, Pigsalohan, Gingoog City and bounded
on the North by Lot Nos. 5559 & 5558; South by Lot No. 3486; East by Lot No. 5555; and West by Lot No. 5355, containing an area of
EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT (18,528) sq. ms. more or less.
P320.00
(10) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 12926, Cad. Lot No. 5555 C-7 located at Tinaytayan, Pigsalojan, Gingoog City and
bounded on the North by Tinaytayan Creek & Lot Nos. 5557 & 5558; South by Lot Nos. 3486, 3487, 3488, 3491 & 3496; East by Cr. & Lot
No. 3496; and West by Lot No. 5554, containing an area of SEVENTY SEVEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY SIX (77,776)
sq. ms. more or less.
P1,350.00
(11) A Commercial Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06454, Cad. Lot No. 61-C-1 located at Guno-Condeza Sts., Gingoog City and bounded
on the North by Lot 64; South by Road-Lot 613 Condeza St; East by Lot Nos. 63, and 62; West by Road-Lot 614-Guno St., containing an
area of ONE THOUSAND FORTY TWO (1,042) sq. ms. more or less.
P9,320.00
(12) A Commercial Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06484, Lot No. 5, Block 2, located at Cabuyoan, Gingoog City and bounded on the
North by Lot No. 4, block 2; South by Lot No. 8, block 2; East by Lot No. 6, block 2, West by Subdivision Road, containing an area of FOUR
HUNDRED (400) sq. ms. more or less.
P12,240.00
(13) A Commercial Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 15798, Block No. 7-A-16-0 located at Cabuyoan, Gingoog City and bounded on the
North by Lot No. 7-A-16-0; South by Lot No. 7-16-0; East by Lot No. 7-A-18-Road; West by Lot No. 8, PSU-120704-Julito Arengo vs.
Restituto Baol, containing an area of TWO HUNDRED SIXTEEN (216) sq. ms. more or less.
P1,050.00
(14) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax, Decl. No. 06789, Cad. Lot No. 5157-C-7, located at Kiogat, Agayayan, Gingoog City and bounded
on the North by Lot No. 5158, 5159, 5156; South by SE-Steep Bank; East by NW, by Lot No. 5158, Villafranca, containing an area of
NINETY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED (96,200) sq. ms. more or less.
P3,370.00
III. PERSONAL ESTATE (CONJUGAL)
NATURE AND DESCRIPTION LOCATION APPRAISAL
1. Fifty (50) shares of stock
Rural Bank of Gingoog, Inc.
at P100.00 per share P5,000.00
2. Four (4) shares of Preferred Stock
with San Miguel Corporation 400.00
4. That, the parties hereto have agreed to divide the above-enumerated properties in the following manner, to wit:
(a) To Patricio Alburo, Maria Ramoso Sanchez, Roland Pedro T. Sanchez, Florida Mierly
Sanchez, Alfredo T. Sanchez and Myrna T. Sanchez, in equal pro-indiviso shares,
considering not only their respective areas but also the improvements existing thereon, to
wit:
Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. No. 06453, Cad. Lot No. 3270 Case 7, located at
Sunog, Lunao, Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Samay Creek & Lot 3267; South
by Lot Nos. 3271 and 3272; East by Lot Nos. 3269 & 3273; and West by Samay Creek,
containing an area of FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
(483,600) sq. ms. and assessed in the sum of P61,680.00.
(b) To Rosalia Sanchez Lugod all the rest of the properties, both real and personal,
enumerated above with the exception of the following:
(1) Two Preferred Shares of Stock in the San Miguel Corporation,
indicated in San Miguel Corporation Stock Certificate No. 30217,
which two shares she is ceding in favor of Patricio Alburo;
(2) The house and lot designated as Lot No. 5, Block 2 together with
the improvements thereon and identified as parcel No. II-12, lot
covered by Tax Decl. No. 15798 identified as Parcel No. II-13 in the
above enumerated, and Cad. Lot No. 5157-C-7 together with the
improvements thereon, which is identified as parcel No. II-14 of the
above-enumeration of properties, which said Rosalia S. Lugod is
likewise ceding and renouncing in favor of Rolando Pedro, Florida
Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez, in equal proindiviso shares;

5. That Rolando Pedro, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez hereby acknowledge to have received jointly and severally
in form of advances after October 21, 1968 the aggregate sum of EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE PESOS
(P8,533.94) and NINETY-FOUR CENTAVOS;
6. That the parties hereto likewise acknowledge and recognize in the indebtedness of the deceased Juan G. Sanchez and his deceased
wife Maria Villafranca Sanchez to the Lugod Enterprises, Inc., in the sum of P43,064.99;
7. That the parties hereto shall be responsible for the payment of the estate and inheritance taxes proportionate to the value of their
respective shares as may be determined by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and shall likewise be responsible for the expenses of survey
and segregation of their respective shares;
8. That Patricio Alburo, Maria Ramoso Sanchez, Roland Pedro Sanchez, Florida Mierly Sanchez, Alfredo Sanchez and Myrna Sanchez
hereby waive, relinquish and renounce, jointly and individually, in a manner that is absolute and irrevocable, all their rights and interests,
share and participation which they have or might have in all the properties, both real and personal, known or unknown and/or which may
not be listed herein, or in excess of the areas listed or mentioned herein, and/or which might have been, at one time or another, owned by,
registered or placed in the name of either of the spouses Juan C. Sanchez or Maria Villafranca de Sanchez or both, and which either one or
both might have sold, ceded, transferred, or donated to any person or persons or entity and which parties hereto do hereby confirm and
ratify together with all the improvements thereon, as well as all the produce and proceeds thereof, and particularly of the properties, real
and personal listed herein, as well as demandable obligations due to the deceased spouses Juan C. Sanchez, before and after the death of
the aforementioned spouses Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca de Sanchez, in favor of oppositor Rosalia S. Lugod;
9. That the expenses of this litigation including attorney's fees shall be borne respectively by the parties hereto;
10. That Laureta Tampus for herself and guardian ad-litem of her minor children, namely: Florida Mierly, Alfredo, and Myrna, all surnamed
Sanchez, hereby declare that she has no right, interest, share and participation whatsoever in the estate left by Juan C. Sanchez and/or
Maria Villafranca de Sanchez, or both, and that she likewise waives, renounces, and relinquishes whatever rigid, share, participation or
interest therein which she has or might have in favor of Rosalia S. Lugod;
11. That, the parties hereto mutually waive and renounce in favor of each other any whatever claims or actions, arising from, connected
with, and as a result of Special Proceedings Nos. 44-M and 1022 of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, Rosalia S. Lugod,
warranting that the parcel of land ceded to the other parties herein contains 48 hectares and 36 ares.
12. That, Rosalia S. Lugod shall assume as she hereby assumes the payment to Lugod Enterprises, Inc., of the sum of P51,598.93
representing the indebtedness of the estate of Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca de Sanchez and the advances made to Rolando
Pedro, Mierly, Alfredo, and Myna all surnamed Sanchez, mentioned in paragraphs 5 hereto agree to have letters of administration issued in
favor of Rosalia S. Lugod without any bond.
That Rosalia S. Lugod likewise agrees to deliver possession and enjoyment of the parcel of land herein ceded to petitioners and
intervenors immediately after the signing of this agreement and that the latter also mutually agree among themselves to have the said lot
subdivided and partitioned immediately in accordance with the proportion of one sixth (1/6) part for every petitioner and intervenor and that
in the meantime that the partition and subdivision is not yet effected, the administrations of said parcel of land shall be vested jointly with
Laureta Tampos, guardian ad litem of petitioners and Maria Ramoso, one of the intervenors who shall see to it that each petitioner and
intervenor is given one sixth (1/6) of the net proceeds of all agricultural harvest made thereon.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that the foregoing compromise agreement be approved.
Medina, Misamis Oriental, October 30, 1969.
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
PATRICIO ALBURO ROSALIA S. LUGOD
Intervenor-Oppositor Oppositor
(Sgd.)
MARIA RAMOSO SANCHEZ ASSISTED BY:
Intervenor-Oppositor
(Sgd.)
ASSISTED BY: PABLO S. REYES
R-101-Navarro Bldg.
(Sgd.) Don A. Velez St.
REYNALDO L. FERNANDEZ Cagayan de Oro City
Gingoong City
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
ROLANDO PEDRO T. SANCHEZ ALFREDO T. SANCHEZ
Petitioner Petitioner
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
FLORIDA MIERLY T. SANCHEZ MYRNA T. SANCHEZ
Petitioner Petitioner
(Sgd.)
LAURETA TAMPUS
For herself and as Guardian
Ad-Litem of the minors
Florida Mierly, Alfredo, and
Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez
ASSISTED BY:
TEOGENES VELEZ, JR.
Counsel for Petitioners
Cagayan de Oro City
The Clerk of Court
Court of First Instance
Branch III, Medina, Mis. Or.
Greetings:
Please set the foregoing compromise agreement for the approval of the Honorable Court today, Oct. 30, 1969.

(Sgd.) (Sgd.) (Sgd.)

PABLO S. REYES TEOGENES VELEZ, JR. REYNALDO L. FERNANDEZ

The Memorandum of Agreement dated April 13, 1970, which the parties entered into with the assistance of their
counsel, amended the above compromise. (It will be reproduced later in our discussion of the second issue raised
by the petitioners.)
The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution 10 dated September 4, 1992, initially dismissed private respondents' petition.
Acting, however, on a motion for reconsideration and a supplemental motion for reconsideration dated September
14, 1992 and September 25, 1992, respectively, 11 Respondent Court thereafter reinstated private respondents'
petition in a resolution 12 dated October 14, 1992.
In due course, the Court of Appeals, as earlier stated, rendered its assailed Decision granting the petition, setting
aside the trial court's decision and declaring the modified compromise agreement valid and binding.
Hence, this appeal to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The Issues
In this appeal, petitioners invite the Court's attention to the following issues:
I
The respondent court grossly erred in granting the petition for certiorari under Rule 65
considering that the special civil action of certiorari may not be availed of as a substitute for an
appeal and that, in any event, the grounds invoked in the petition are merely alleged errors of
judgment which can no longer be done in view of the fact that the decision of the lower court had
long become final and executory.
II
Prescinding from the foregoing, the respondent court erred in annulling the decision of the lower
court for the reason that a compromise agreement or partition as the court construed the same to
be, executed by the parties on October 30, 1969 was void and unenforceable the same not
having been approved by the intestate court and that the same having been seasonably
repudiated by petitioners on the ground of fraud.
III
The respondent court grossly erred in ignoring and disregarding findings of facts of the lower
court that the alleged conveyances of real properties made by the spouses Juan C. Sanchez and
Maria Villafranca just before their death in favor of their daughter and grandchildren, private
respondents herein, are tainted with fraud or made in contemplation of death, hence,
collationable.
IV
In any event, the respondent court grossly erred in treating the lower court's declaration of
fictitiousness of the deeds of sale as a final adjudication of annulment.
V
The respondent court grossly erred in declaring the termination of the intestate proceedings even
as the lower court had not made a final and enforceable distribution of the estate of the deceased
Juan C. Sanchez.
VI
Prescinding from the foregoing, the respondent court grossly erred in not at least directing
respondent Rosalia S. Lugod to deliver the deficiency of eight (8) hectares due petitioners under
the compromise agreement and memorandum of agreement, and in not further directing her to
include in the inventory properties conveyed under the deeds of sale found by the lower court to
be part of the estate of Juan C. Sanchez. 13
The salient aspects of some issues are closely intertwined; hence, they are hereby consolidated into three main
issues specifically dealing with the following subjects: (1) the propriety of certiorari as a remedy before the Court
of Appeals, (2) the validity of the compromise agreement, and (3) the presence of fraud in the execution of the
compromise and/or collation of the properties sold.
The Court's Ruling

The petition is not meritorious.

First Issue: Propriety of Certiorari
Before the Court of Appeals
Since private respondents had neglected or failed to file an ordinary appeal within the reglementary period,
petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals erred in allowing private respondent's recourse to Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. They contend that private respondents' invocation of certiorari was "procedurally defective." 14 They
further argue that private respondents, in their petition before the Court of Appeals, alleged errors of the trial court
which, being merely errors of judgment and not errors of jurisdiction, were not correctable by certiorari. 15 This
Court disagrees.
Doctrinally entrenched is the general rule that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. However, Justice
Florenz D. Regalado lists several exceptions to this rule, viz.: "(1) where the appeal does not constitute a speedy
and adequate remedy (Salvadades vs. Pajarillo, et al., 78 Phil. 77), as where 33 appeals were involved from
orders issued in a single proceeding which will inevitably result in a proliferation of more appeals (PCIB vs.
Escolin, et al., L-27860 and 27896, Mar. 29, 1974); (2) where the orders were also issued either in excess of or
without jurisdiction (Aguilar vs. Tan, L-23600, Jun 30, 1970, Cf. Bautista, et al. vs. Sarmiento, et al., L-45137,
Sept. 231985); (3) for certain special consideration, as public welfare or public policy (See Jose vs. Zulueta, et al.
16598, May 31, 1961 and the cases cited therein); (4) where in criminal actions, the court rejects rebuttal
evidence for the prosecution as, in case of acquittal, there could be no remedy (People vs. Abalos, L029039, Nov.
28, 1968); (5) where the order is a patent nullity (Marcelo vs. De Guzman, et al., L-29077, June 29, 1982); and (6)
where the decision in the certiorari case will avoid future litigations (St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. vs. Campos, et
al., L-38280, Mar. 21, 1975)." 16 Even in a case where the remedy of appeal was lost, the Court has issued the
writ of certiorari where the lower court patently acted in excess of or outside its jurisdiction, 17 as in the present
case.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is appropriate and allowable when the following
requisites concur: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 18 After a thorough review of the case at bar, we are convinced
that all these requirements were met.
As a probate court, the trial court was exercising judicial functions when it issued its assailed resolution. The said
court had jurisdiction to act in the intestate proceedings involved in this case with the caveat that, due to its limited
jurisdiction, it could resolve questions of title only provisionally. 19 It is hornbook doctrine that "in a special
proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court
cannot resolve with finality. This pronouncement no doubt applies with equal force to an intestate proceeding as in
the case at bar." 20 In the instant case, the trial court rendered a decision declaring as simulated and fictitious all
the deeds of absolute sale which, on July 26, 1963 and June 26, 1967, Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca
executed in favor of their daughter, Rosalia Sanchez Lugod; and grandchildren, namely, Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn
S. Lugod and Roberto S. Lugod. The trial court ruled further that the properties covered by the said sales must be
subject to collation. Citing Article 1409 (2) of the Civil Code, the lower court nullified said deeds of sale and
determined with finality the ownership of the properties subject thereof . In doing so, it clearly overstepped its
jurisdiction as a probate court. Jurisprudence teaches:
[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate
or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong
to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine
whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is not dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the
parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. 21
Furthermore, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it rendered its decision in disregard of the
parties' compromise agreement. 22 Such disregard, on the ground that the compromise agreement "was nor
approved by the court," 23 is tantamount to "an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act in contemplation and within the bounds of law. " 24
The foregoing issues clearly involve not only the correctness of the trial court's decision but also the latter's
jurisdiction. They encompass plain errors of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion, not merely errors of
judgment. 25 Since the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction, a petition for certiorari is certainly a proper remedy.
Indeed, it is well-settled that "(a)n act done by a probate court in excess of its jurisdiction may be corrected by
certiorari." 26
Consistent with the foregoing, the following disquisition by respondent appellate court is apt:
As a general proposition, appeal is the proper remedy of petitioner Rosalia here under Rule 109
of the Revised Rules of Court. But the availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not
constitute sufficient ground to [prevent] a party from making use of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari where appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient

(Echauz vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 381). Here, considering that the respondent court has
disregarded the compromise agreement which has long been executed as early as October, 1969
and declared null and void the deeds of sale with finality, which, as a probate court, it has no
jurisdiction to do, We deem ordinary appeal is inadequate. Considering further the [trial court's]
granting of [herein petitioners') motion for execution of the assailed decision, 27 [herein private
respondent] Rosalia's resort to the instant petition [for review on certiorari] is all the more
warranted under the circumstances. 28
We thus hold that the questioned decision and resolutions of the trial court may be challenged through a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. At the very least, this case is a clear exception to the
general rule that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal because the trial court's decision and resolutions
were issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, which may thus be challenged or attacked at any time. "A void
judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any
obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can
never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void; ' . . . it may be said to be a lawless thing which
can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.' " 29
Second Issue: Validity of Compromise Agreement
Petitioners contend that, because the compromise agreement was executed during the pendency of the probate
proceedings, judicial approval is necessary to shroud it with validity. They stress that the probate court had
jurisdiction over the properties covered by said agreement. They add that Petitioners Florida Mierly, Alfredo and
Myrna were all miners represented only by their mother/natural guardian, Laureta Tampus. 30
These contentions lack merit. Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise agreement as "a contract
whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already
commenced." Being a consensual contract, it is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties. Judicial
approval is not required for its perfection. 31 Petitioners' argument that the compromise was not valid for lack of
judicial approval is not novel; the same was raised in Mayuga vs. Court of Appeals, 32 where the Court, through
Justice Irene R. Cortes, ruled:
It is alleged that the lack of judicial approval is fatal to the compromise. A compromise is a
consensual contract. As such, it is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties to the
contract. (Hernandez v. Barcelon, 23 Phil. 599 [1912]; see also De los Reyes v. de Ugarte, 75
Phil. 505 [1945].) And from that moment not only does it become binding upon the parties (De los
Reyes v. De Ugarte, supra ), it also has upon them the effect and authority of res judicata (Civil
Code, Art. 2037), even if not judicially approved (Meneses v. De la Rosa, 77 Phil. 34 [1946]; Vda.
De Guilas v. David, 132 Phil. 241, L-24280, 23 SCRA 762 [May 27, 1968]; Cochingyan v. Cloribel,
L-27070-71 [April 22, 1977], 76 SCRA 361). (Emphasis found in the original.)
In the case before us, it is ineludible that the parties knowingly and freely entered into a valid compromise
agreement. Adequately assisted by their respective counsels, they each negotiated its terms and provisions for
four months; in fact, said agreement was executed only after the fourth draft. As noted by the trial court itself, the
first and second drafts were prepared successively in July, 1969; the third draft on September 25, 1969; and the
fourth draft, which was finally signed by the parties on October 30, 1969, 33 followed. Since this compromise
agreement was the result of a long drawn out process, with all the parties ably striving to protect their respective
interests and to come out with the best they could, there can be no doubt that the parties entered into it freely and
voluntarily. Accordingly, they should be bound thereby. 34 To be valid, it is merely required under the law to be
based on real claims and actually agreed upon in good faith by the parties thereto. 35
Indeed, compromise is a form of amicable settlement that is not only allowed but also encouraged in civil cases.
Article 2029 of the Civil Code mandates that a "court shall endeavor to persuade the litigants in a civil case to
agree upon some fair compromise."

36

In opposing the validity and enforcement of the compromise agreement, petitioners harp on the minority of Florida
Mierly, Alfredo and Myna. Citing Article 2032 of the Civil Code, they contend that the court's approval is necessary
in compromises entered into by guardians and parents in behalf of their wards or children. 37
However, we observe that although denominated a compromise agreement, the document in this case is
essentially a deed of partition, pursuant to Article 1082 of the Civil Code which provides that "[e]very act which is
intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition,
although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction."
For a partition to be valid, Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, requires the concurrence of the following
conditions: (1) the decedent left no will; (2) the decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left, all had been
paid; (3) the heirs and liquidators are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are represented by their judicial
guardian or legal representatives; and (4) the partition was made by means of a public instrument or affidavit duly
filed with the Register of Deeds. 38 We find that all the foregoing requisites are present in this case. We therefore
affirm the validity of the parties' compromise agreement/partition in this case.

In any event, petitioners neither raised nor ventilated this issue in the trial court. This new question or matter was
manifestly beyond the pale of the issues or questions submitted and threshed out before the lower court which are
reproduced below, viz.:
I Are the properties which are the object of the sale by the deceased spouses to
their grandchildren collationable?
II Are the properties which are the object of the sale by the deceased spouses to
their legitimate daughter also collationable?
III The first and second issues being resolved, how much then is the rightful
share of the four (4) recognized illegitimate children? 39
Furthermore, the 27-page Memorandum dated February 17, 1990 filed by petitioners before the Regional Trial
Court 40 readily reveals that they never questioned the validity of the compromise. In their comment before the
Court of Appeals, 41 petitioners based their objection to sad compromise agreement on the solitary "reason that it
was tainted with fraud and deception," zeroing specifically on the alleged fraud committed by private respondent
Rosalia S. Lugod. 42 The issue of minority was first raised only in petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the
Court of Appeals' Decision; 43 thus, it "is as if it was never duly raised in that court at all." 44 Hence, this Court
cannot now, for the first time on appeal, entertain this issue, for to do so would plainly violate the basic rule of fair
play, justice and due process. 45 We take this opportunity to reiterate and emphasize the well-settled rule that "(a)n
issue raised for the first time on appeal and not raised timely in the proceedings in the lower court is barred by
estoppel. Questions raised on appeal must be within the issues framed by the parties and, consequently, issues
not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." 46
The petitioners likewise assail as void the provision on waiver contained in No. 8 of the aforequoted compromise,
because it allegedly constitutes a relinquishment by petitioners of "a right to properties which were not known." 47
They argue that such waiver is contrary to law, public policy, morals or good custom. The Court disagrees. The
assailed waiver pertained to their hereditary right to properties belonging to the decedent's estate which were not
included in the inventory of the estate's properties. It also covered their right to other properties originally
belonging to the spouses Juan Sanchez and Maria Villafranca de Sanchez which have been transferred to other
persons. In addition, the parties agreed in the compromise to confirm and ratify said transfers. The waiver is valid
because, contrary to petitioners' protestation, the parties waived a known and existing interest their hereditary
right which was already vested in them by reason of the death of their father. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides
that "(t)he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent." Hence, there is no
legal obstacle to an heir's waiver of his/her hereditary share "even if the actual extent of such share is not
determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate." 48 At any rate, such waiver is consistent with the intent
and letter of the law advocating compromise as a vehicle for the settlement of civil disputes. 49
Finally, petitioners contend that Private Respondent Rosalia T. Lugod's alleged fraudulent acts, specifically her
concealment of some of the decedent's properties, attended the actual execution of the compromise agreement.
50
This argument is debunked by the absence of any substantial and convincing evidence on record showing fraud
on her part. As aptly observed by the appellate court:
[Herein petitioners] accuse [herein private respondent] Rosalia of fraud or deception by alleging,
inter alia, that the parcel of land given to them never conformed to the stated area, i.e., forty-eight
(48) hectares, as stated in the compromise agreement. We find this argument unconvincing and
unmeritorious. [Herein petitioners'] averment of fraud on the part of [herein private respondent]
Rosalia becomes untenable when We consider the memorandum of agreement they later
executed with [herein private respondent] Rosalia wherein said compromise agreement was
modified by correcting the actual area given to [herein petitioners] from forty-eight (48) hectares
to thirty-six (36) hectares only. If the actual area allotted to them did not conform to the 48 hectare
area stated in the compromise agreement, then why did they agree to the memorandum of
agreement whereby their share in the estate of their father was even reduced to just 36 hectares?
Where is fraud or deception there? Considering that [herein petitioners] were ably represented by
their lawyers in executing these documents and who presumably had explained to them the
import and consequences thereof, it is hard to believe their charge that they were defrauded and
deceived by [herein private respondent] Rosalia.
If the parcel of land given to [herein petitioners], when actually surveyed, happened to be different
in area to the stated area of 48 hectares in the compromise agreement, this circumstance is not
enough proof of fraud or deception on [herein private respondent] Rosalia's part. Note that Tax
Declaration No. 06453 plainly discloses that the land transferred to [herein petitioners] pursuant
to the compromise agreement contained an area of 48 hectares (Annex "A", Supplemental
Reply). And when [herein petitioners] discovered that the land allotted to them actually contained
only 24 hectares, a conference between the parties took place which led to the execution and
signing of the memorandum of agreement wherein [herein petitioners'] distributive share was
even reduced to 36 hectares. In the absence of convincing and clear evidence to the contrary, the
allegation of fraud and deception cannot be successfully imputed to [herein private respondent]
Rosalia who must be presumed to have acted in good faith. 51
The memorandum of agreement freely and validly entered into by the parties on April 13, 1970 and referred to
above reads:

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
The parties assisted by their respective counsel have agreed as they hereby agree:
1. To amend the compromise agreement executed by them on October 30, 1969 so as to include
the following:
a. Correction of the actual area being given to the petitioners and intervenors, all
illegitimate children of the late Juan C. Sanchez, forty-eight (48) hectares, thirtysix (36) ares as embodied in the aforementioned compromise agreement to
thirty-six (36) hectares only, thus enabling each of them to get six (6) hectares
each.
b. That the said 36-hectare area shall be taken from that parcel of land which is
now covered by O.C.T. No. 146 (Patent No. 30012) and the adjoining areas
thereof designated as Lot A and Lot C as reflected on the sketch plan attached to
the record of this case prepared by Geodetic Engineer Olegario E. Zalles
pursuant to the Court's commission of March 10, 1970 provided, however, that if
the said 36-hectare area could not be found after adding thereto the areas of said
lots A and C, then the additional area shall be taken from what is designated as
Lot B, likewise also reflected in the said sketch plan attached to the records;
c. That the partition among the six illegitimate children of the late Juan C.
Sanchez (petitioners and intervenors) shall be effective among themselves in
such a manner to be agreed upon by them, each undertaking to assume
redemption of whatever plants found in their respective shares which need
redemption from the tenants thereof as well as the continuity of the tenancy
agreements now existing and covering the said shares or areas.
d. The subdivision survey shall be at the expense of the said petitioners and
intervenors prorata.
e. That the administratrix agrees to deliver temporary administration of the area
designated as Lot 5 of the Valles Sketch Plan pending final survey of the said 36hectare area.
Cagayan de Oro City, April 13, 1970.
(Sgd.)
LAURETA TAMPOS
For herself and as Guardian
ad-litem of Rolando, Mierly,
Alfredo and Myrna, all
surnamed Sanchez
Assisted by:
(Sgd.)
TEOGENES VELEZ, Jr.
Counsel for Petitioners
(Sgd.)
ROSALIA S. LUGOD
Administratrix
Assisted by:
(Sgd.)
PABLO S. REYES
Counsel for Administratrix
(Sgd.)
MARIA RABOSO SANCHEZ
Intervenor 52
Not only did the parties knowingly enter into a valid compromise agreement; they even amended it when they
realized some errors in the original. Such correction emphasizes the voluntariness of said deed.
It is also significant that all the parties, including the then minors, had already consummated and availed
themselves of the benefits of their compromise. 53 This Court has consistently ruled that "a party to a compromise
cannot ask for a rescission after it has enjoyed its benefits." 54 By their acts, the parties are ineludibly estopped
from questioning the validity of their compromise agreement. Bolstering this conclusion is the fact that petitioners

questioned the compromise only nine years after its execution, when they filed with the trial court their Motion to
Defer Approval of Compromise Agreement, dated October 26, 1979. 55 In hindsight, it is not at all farfetched that
petitioners filed said motion for the sole reason that they may have felt shortchanged in their compromise
agreement or partition with private respondents, which in their view was unwise and unfair. While we may
sympathize with this rueful sentiment of petitioners, we can only stress that this alone is not sufficient to nullify or
disregard the legal effects of said compromise which, by its very nature as a perfected contract, is binding on the
parties. Moreover, courts have no jurisdiction to look into the wisdom of a compromise or to render a decision
different therefrom. 56 It is a well-entrenched doctrine that "the law does not relieve a party from the effects of an
unwise, foolish, or disastrous contract, entered into with all the required formalities and with full awareness of
what he was doing" 57 and "a compromise entered into and carried out in good faith will not be discarded even if
there was a mistake of law or fact, (McCarthy vs. Barber Steamship Lines, 45 Phil. 488) because courts have no
power to relieve parties from obligations voluntarily assumed, simply because their contracts turned out to be
disastrous deals or unwise investments." 58 Volenti non fit injuria.
Corollarily, the petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in deeming Special
Proceedings Nos. 44-M and 1022 "CLOSED and TERMINATED," arguing that there was as yet no order of
distribution of the estate pursuant to Rule 90 of the Rules of Court. They add that they had not received their full
share thereto. 59 We disagree. Under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, an order for the distribution of the
estate may be made when the "debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the
widow, and inheritance tax, if any," had been paid. This order for the distribution of the estate's residue must
contain the names and shares of the persons entitled thereto. A perusal of the whole record, particularly the trial
court's conclusion, 60 reveals that all the foregoing requirements already concurred in this case. The payment of
the indebtedness of the estates of Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca in the amount of P51,598.93 was
shouldered by Private Respondent Rosalia, who also absorbed or charged against her share the advances of
Rolando T. Lugod in the sum of P8,533.94, in compliance with Article 1061 of the Civil Code on collation. 61
Furthermore, the compromise of the parties, which is the law between them, already contains the names and
shares of the heirs to the residual estate, which shares had also been delivered. On this point, we agree with the
following discussion of the Court of Appeals:
But what the (trial court) obviously overlooked in its appreciation of the facts of this case are the
uncontroverted facts that (herein petitioners) have been in possession and ownership of their
respective distributive shares as early as October 30, 1969 and they have received other
properties in addition to their distributive shares in consideration of the compromise agreement
which they now assail. Proofs thereof are Tax Declarations No. 20984, 20985, 20986, 20987,
20988, 20989 and 20990 (Annexes "B" to "H", Supplemental Reply) in the respective names of
(herein petitioners), all for the year 1972. (Herein petitioners) also retained a house and lot, a
residential lot and a parcel of agricultural land (Annexes "I", "J" and "K", Ibid.) all of which were
not considered in the compromise agreement between the parties. Moreover, in the compromise
agreement per se, it is undoubtedly stated therein that cash advances in the aggregate sum of
P8,533.94 were received by (herein petitioners) after October 21, 1968 (Compromise Agreement,
par. 5) 62
All the foregoing show clearly that the probate court had essentially finished said intestate proceedings which,
consequently, should be deemed closed and terminated. In view of the above discussion, the Court sees no
reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals.
Third Issue: Fraud and Collation
Petitioners fault Respondent Court for not ordering Private Respondent Rosalia T. Lugod to deliver to them the
deficiency as allegedly provided under the compromise agreement. They further contend that said court erred in
not directing the provisional inclusion of the alleged deficiency in the inventory for purposes of collating the
properties subject of the questioned deeds of sale. 63 We see no such error. In the trial court, there was only one
hearing conducted, and it was held only for the reception of the evidence of Rosalia S. Lugod to install her as
administratrix of the estate of Maria Villafranca. There was no other evidence, whether testimonial or otherwise,
"received, formally offered to, and subsequently admitted by the probate court below"; nor was there "a trial on the
merits of the parries' conflicting claims." 64 In fact, the petitioners "moved for the deferment of the compromise
agreement on the basis of alleged fraudulent concealment of properties NOT because of any deficiency in the
land conveyed to them under the agreements." 65 Hence, there is no hard evidence on record to back up
petitioners' claims.
In any case, the trial court noted Private Respondent Rosalia's willingness to reimburse any deficiency actually
proven to exist. It subsequently ordered the geodetic engineer who prepared the certification and the sketch of the
lot in question, and who could have provided evidence for the petitioners, "to bring records of his relocation
survey." 66 However, Geodetic Engineer Idulsa did not comply with the court's subpoena duces tecum and ad
testificandum. Neither did he furnish the required relocation survey. 67 No wonder, even after a thorough scrutiny
of the records, this Court cannot find any evidence to support petitioners' allegations of fraud against Private
Respondent Rosalia.
Similarly, petitioners' allegations of fraud in the execution of the questioned deeds of sale are bereft of substance,
in view of the palpable absence of evidence to support them. The legal presumption of validity of the questioned
deeds of absolute sale, being duly notarized public documents, has not been overcome. 68 On the other hand,
fraud is not presumed. It must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, and not by mere conjectures or
speculations. We stress that these deeds of sale did not involve gratuitous transfers of future inheritance; these

were contracts of sale perfected by the decedents during their lifetime. 69 Hence, the properties conveyed thereby
are not collationable because, essentially, collation mandated under Article 1061 of the Civil Code contemplates
properties conveyed inter vivos by the decedent to an heir by way of donation or other gratuitous title.
In any event, these alleged errors and deficiencies regarding the delivery of shares provided in the compromise,
concealment of properties and fraud in the deeds of sale are factual in nature which, as a rule, are not reviewable
by this Court in petitions under Rule 45. 70 Petitioners have failed to convince us that this case constitutes an
exception to such rule. All in all, we find that the Court of Appeals has sufficiently addressed the issues raised by
them. Indeed, they have not persuaded us that said Court committed any reversible error to warrant a grant of
their petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
227. G.R. No. 179859

August 9, 2010

IN RE: PETITION FOR PROBATE OF LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF BASILIO SANTIAGO,
MA. PILAR SANTIAGO and CLEMENTE SANTIAGO, Petitioners,
vs.
ZOILO S. SANTIAGO, FELICIDAD SANTIAGO-RIVERA, HEIRS OF RICARDO SANTIAGO, HEIRS OF
CIPRIANO SANTIAGO, HEIRS OF TOMAS SANTIAGO, Respondents.
FILEMON SOCO, LEONILA SOCO, ANANIAS SOCO, URBANO SOCO, GERTRUDES SOCO AND HEIRS OF
CONSOLACION SOCO, Oppositors.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Basilio Santiago (Basilio) contracted three marriagesthe first to Bibiana Lopez, the second to Irene Santiago,
and the third to Cecilia Lomotan. Basilio and his first wife bore two offsprings, Irene and Marta, the mother of
herein oppositors Felimon, Leonila, Consolacion, Ananias, Urbano, and Gertrudes, all surnamed Soco.
Basilio and his second wife had six offsprings, Tomas, Cipriano, Ricardo, respondents Zoilo and Felicidad, and
petitioner Ma. Pilar, all surnamed Santiago.
Basilio and his third wife bore three children, Eugenia herein petitioner Clemente, and Cleotilde, all surnamed
Santiago.1
After Basilio died testate on September 16, 1973, his daughter by the second marriage petitioner Ma. Pilar filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan2 a petition for the probate of Basilios will, docketed as SP No.
1549-M. The will was admitted to probate by Branch 10 of the RTC and Ma. Pilar was appointed executrix.
The will contained the following provisions, among others:
4. Ang mga ari-arian ko na nasasaysay sa itaas ay INIWAN, IPINAGKAKALOOB, IBINIBIGAY, at IPINAMAMANA
ko sa aking mga nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng gaya ng sumusunod:
xxxx
c) ang aking anak na si Ma. Pilar ang magpapalakad at mamamahala ng balutan na nasa Santiago,
Malolos, Bulacan, na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(y);
d) Sa pamamahala ng bigasan, pagawaan ng pagkain ng hayop at lupat bahay sa Maynila, ang lahat ng
solar sa danay ng daang Malolos-Paombong na nasa Malolos, Bulacan, kasali at kasama ang palaisdaan
na nasa likuran niyon, ay ililipat sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente; ngunit ang kita ng palaisdaan ay
siyang gagamitin nila sa lahat at anomang kailangang gugol, maging majora o roperacion [sic], sa lupat
bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c);
e) Ang lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c) ay ililipat at ilalagay sa
pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente hindi bilang pamana ko sa kanila kundi upang pamahalaan at
pangalagaan lamang nila at nang ang sinoman sa aking mga anak sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan ko sa
habang panahon ay may tutuluyan kung magnanais na mag-aral sa Maynila o kalapit na mga lunsod x x
x.
f) Ang bigasan, mga makina at pagawaan ng pagkain ng hayop ay ipinamamana ko sa aking asawa,
Cecilia Lomotan, at mga anak na Zoilo, Ma. Pilar, Ricardo, Cipriano, Felicidad, Eugenia, Clemente, at
Cleotilde nang pare-pareho. Ngunit, sa loob ng dalawampong (20) taon mula sa araw ng aking
kamatayan, hindi nila papartihin ito at pamamahalaan ito ni Clemente at ang maghahawak ng salaping
kikitain ay si Ma. Pilar na siyang magpaparte. Ang papartihin lamang ay ang kita ng mga iyon matapos na

ang gugol na kakailanganin niyon, bilang reparacion, pagpapalit o pagpapalaki ay maawas na. Ninais ko
ang ganito sa aking pagmamahal sa kanila at pagaaring ibinubuhay ko sa kanila lahat, bukod sa yaon ay
sa kanila ding kapakinabangan at kabutihan.
g) Ang lahat ng lupa, liban sa lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila, ay ipinapamana ko sa aking nasabing
asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at mga anak na Tomas, Zoilo, Ma. Pilar, Ricardo, Cipriano, Felicidad, Eugenia,
Clemente at Cleotilde nang pare-pareho. Datapwat, gaya din ng mga bigasan, makina at gawaan ng
pagkain ng hayop, ito ay hindi papartihin sa loob ng dalawampong (20) taon mula sa aking pagpanaw, at
pamamahalaan din nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente. Ang mapaparte lamang ay ang kita o ani ng nasabing mga
pag-aari matapos bayaran ang buwis at/o patubig at iba pang mga gugol na kailangan. Si Ma. Pilar din
ang hahawak ng ani o salaping manggagaling dito. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) 3
The oppositors-children of Marta, a daughter of Basilio and his first wife, were, on their motion, allowed to
intervene.4
After the executrix-petitioner Ma. Pilar filed a "Final Accounting, Partition and Distribution in Accordance with the
Will,"5 the probate court approved the will by Order of August 14, 1978 and directed the registers of deeds of
Bulacan and Manila to register the certificates of title indicated therein. 6 Accordingly, the titles to Lot Nos. 786,
837, 7922, 836 and 838 in Malolos, Bulacan and Lot No. 8-C in Manila were transferred in the name of petitioners
Ma. Pilar and Clemente.7
The oppositors thereafter filed a Complaint-in-Intervention 8 with the probate court, alleging that Basilios second
wife was not Irene but a certain Maria Arellano with whom he had no child; and that Basilios will violates Articles
979-981 of the Civil Code.9
The probate court dismissed the Complaint-in-Intervention, citing its previous approval of the "Final Accounting,
Partition, and Distribution in Accordance with the Will." 10
The oppositors-heirs of the first marriage thereupon filed a complaint for completion of legitime before the Bulacan
RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 562-M-90,11 against the heirs of the second and third marriages.
In their complaint, oppositors-heirs of the first marriage essentially maintained that they were partially preterited by
Basilios will because their legitime was reduced.12 They thus prayed, inter alia, that an inventory and appraisal of
all the properties of Basilio be conducted and that Ma. Pilar and Clemente be required to submit a fresh
accounting of all the incomes of the properties from the time of Basilios death up to the time of the filing of Civil
Case No. 562-M-90.13
RTC-Branch 17 decided Civil Case No. 562-M-90 (for completion of legitime) in favor of the oppositors-heirs of
the first marriage.
On appeal (docketed as CA G.R. No. 45801), the Court of Appeals, by Decision of January 25, 2002, 14 annulled
the decision of RTC-Branch 17, holding that the RTC Branch 17 dismissal of the Complaint-in-Intervention in SP
No. 1549-M and its August 14, 1978 Order approving the probate of the will constitute res judicata with respect to
Civil Case No. 562-M-90.15 Thus the appellate court disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision in Civil Case No. 562-M-90
is hereby ANNULLED on the ground of res judicata. Let the Decree of Distribution of the Estate of Basilio
Santiago remain UNDISTURBED.
SO ORDERED.16 (emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
Oppositors-heirs of the first marriage challenged the appellate courts decision in CA G.R. No. 45801 by petition
for review, docketed as G.R. No. 155606, which this Court denied. 17 The denial became final and executory on
April 9, 2003.18
In the interregnum, or on October 17, 2000, respondent-heirs of the second marriage filed before the probate
court (RTC-Branch 10) a Motion for Termination of Administration, for Accounting, and for Transfer of Titles in the
Names of the Legatees.19 Citing the earlier quoted portions of Basilios will, they alleged that:
x x x x the twenty (20) year period within which subject properties should be under administration of [Ma.] Pilar
Santiago and Clemente Santiago expired on September 16, 1993.
Consequently, [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago should have ceased as such administrator[s] way
back on September 16, 1993 and they should have transferred the above said titles to the named legatees in the
Last Will and Testament of the testator by then. Said named legatees in the Last Will and Testament are no[ne]
other than the following:
xxxx

Said [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago should have also rendered an accounting of their administration
from such death of the testator up to the present or until transfer of said properties and its administration to the
said legatees.
x x x x20
Respondents prayed that petitioners be ordered:
1) To surrender the above-enumerated titles presently in their names to [the] Honorable Court and to
transfer the same in the names of the designated legatees in the Last Will and Testament, to wit:
1) asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at mga anak na
2) Tomas
3) Zoilo
4) Ma. Pilar
5) Ricardo
6) Cipriano
7) Felicidad
8) Eugenia
9) Clemente at
10) Cleotilde

(all surnamed SANTIAGO)

2) To peacefully surrender possession and administration of subject properties, including any and all
improvements thereon, to said legatees.
3) To render an accounting of their administration of said properties and other properties of the testator
under their administration, from death of testator Basilio Santiago on September 16, 1973 up to the
present and until possession and administration thereof is transferred to said legatees. 21
Opposing the motion, petitioners argued that with the approval of the Final Accounting, Partition and Distribution
in Accordance with the Will, and with the subsequent issuance of certificates of title covering the properties
involved, the case had long since been closed and terminated. 22
The probate court, finding that the properties in question would be transferred to petitioners Ma. Pilar and
Clemente for purposes of administration only, granted the motion, by Order of September 5, 2003, 23 disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Termination of Administration, for Accounting, and for
Transfer of Titles in the Names of the Legatees dated October 3, 2000 filed by some heirs of the testator Basilio
Santiago xxx is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the administratrix [sic] Ma. Pilar Santiago and Mr. Clemente
Santiago are hereby DIRECTED, as follows:
a.) To surrender the above-enumerated titles presently in their names to this Honorable Court and to
transfer the same in the names of the designated legatees in the Last Will and Testament, to wit: 1.)
asawa, Cecilia Lomotan at mga anak na 2.) Tomas 3). Zoilo 4.) Ma. Pilar 5.) Ricardo 6.) Cipriano 7.)
Felicidad 8.) Eugenia 9.) Clemente and 10.) Cleotilde all named SANTIAGO.
b.) To peacefully surrender possession and administration of subject properties including any and all
improvements thereon, to said legatees; and
c.) To render an accounting of their administration of subject properties, including any and all
improvements thereon, to said legatees; and
d.) To submit an accounting of their administration of the above-mentioned estate of the testator or all the
above said lots including the rice mill, animal feeds factory, and all improvements thereon from August 14,
1978 up to the present.
e.) To submit a proposed Project of Partition, indicating how the parties may actually partition or
adjudicate all the above said properties including the properties already in the name of all the said
legatees xxx.

x x x x.
Further, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan are hereby DIRECTED to cancel and consider as no force and effects
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-249177 (RT-46294) [Lot No. 786], T-249175 (RT-46295) [Lot No. 837], T249174 (RT-46296) [Lot No. 7922], T-249173 (RT-46297) [Lot No. 836], and T-249176 (RT-46293) [Lot No. 838] in
the names of Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago and to issue new ones in the lieu thereof in the names of
Cecilia Lomotan-Santiago, Tomas Santiago, Zoilo Santiago, Ma. Pilar Santiago, Ricardo Santiago, Cipriano
Santiago, Felicidad Santiago, Eugenia Santiago, Clemente Santiago, and Cleotilde Santiago.
Moreover, the Register of Deeds of Manila is hereby DIRECTED to cancel and consider as no force and effect
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 131044 [Lot No. 8-C] in the names of Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago
and to issue new ones in lieu thereof in the names of the Heirs of Bibiana Lopez, the Heirs of Irene Santiago, and
the Heirs of Cecilia Lomotan.
The Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by Filemon, Leonila, Ma. Concepcion, Ananias, Urbano and Gertrudes,
all surnamed Soco, dated December 3, 2002, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. 24
Respecting petitioners argument that the case had long been closed and terminated, the trial court held:
x x x x [I]t is clear from the Last Will and Testament that subject properties cannot actually be partitioned until after
20 years from the death of the testator Basilio Santiago x x x x. It is, therefore, clear that something more has to
be done after the approval of said Final Accounting, Partition, and Distribution. The testator Basilio Santiago died
on September 16, 1973, hence, the present action can only be filed after September 16, 1993. Movants cause of
action accrues only from the said date and for which no prescription of action has set in.
The principle of res judicata does not apply in the present probate proceeding which is continuing in character,
and terminates only after and until the final distribution or settlement of the whole estate of the deceased in
accordance with the provision of the will of the testator. The Order dated August 14, 1978 refers only to the
accounting, partition, and distribution of the estate of the deceased for the period covering from the date of the
filing of the petition for probate on December 27, 1973 up to August 14, 1978. And in the said August 14, 1978
order it does not terminate the appointment of petitioner[s] Ma. Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago as
executrix and administrator, respectively, of the estate of the deceased particularly of those properties which were
prohibited by the testator to be partitioned within 20 years from his death. Since then up to the present, Ma. Pilar
Santiago and Clemente Santiago remain the executor and administrator of the estate of the deceased and as
such, they are required by law to render an accounting thereof from August 14, 1978 up to the present; there is
also now a need to partition and distribute the aforesaid properties as the prohibition period to do so has elapsed.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)25
Petitioners, together with the oppositors, filed a motion for reconsideration, 26 which the probate court denied,
drawing them to appeal to the Court of Appeals which docketed it as CA G.R. No. 83094.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the probate court, 27 hence, the petition28 which raises the following
grounds:
I.
"CAN THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS REVERSE ITSELF"
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT BINDING ITSELF WITH ITS PREVIOUS DECISION
INVOLVING THE SAME PARTIES AND SAME PROPERTIES;
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RTC AS IT AGREED WITH THE RTC THAT
THIS CASE IS NOT BARRED BY RES JUDICATA;
C. IN C.A.-G.R. NO. 45801, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HELD THAT THERE WAS RES
JUDICATA; IN C.A.-G.R. CV NO. 83094, THERE WAS NO RES JUDICATA.
II.
"GRANTING THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS ALL THE COMPETENCE AND JURISDICTION TO
REVERSE ITSELF, STILL THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RTCS ORDER TO
TRANSFER THE MANILA PROPERTY COVERED BY TCT NO. 131004 TO THE NAMES OF CECILIA
LOMOTAN, TOMAS, ZOILO, MA. PILAR, RICARDO, CIPRIANO FELICIDAD, EUGENIA, CLEMENTE AND
CLEOTILDE, ALL SURNAMED SANTIAGO."29 (emphasis in the original)
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioners argument that the decision of the appellate court in the earlier CA-G.R. NO. 45801 (upheld by this
Court in G.R. No. 155606) constitutes res judicata to the subsequent CA G.R. No. 83094 (the subject of the
present petition for review) fails.

Res judicata has two aspects, which are embodied in Sections 47 (b) and 47 (c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure.30 The first, known as "bar by prior judgment," proscribes the prosecution of a second action upon the
same claim, demand or cause of action already settled in a prior action. 31 The second, known as "conclusiveness
of judgment," ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any
future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action. 32
Both aspects of res judicata, however, do not find application in the present case. The final judgment regarding
oppositors complaint on the reduction of their legitime in CA-G.R. NO. 45801 does not dent the present petition,
which solely tackles the propriety of the termination of administration, accounting and transfer of titles in the
names of the legatees-heirs of the second and third marriages. There is clearly no similarity of claim, demand or
cause of action between the present petition and G.R. No. 155606.
While as between the two cases there is identity of parties, "conclusiveness of judgment" cannot likewise be
invoked. Again, the judgment in G.R. No. 155606 would only serve as an estoppel as regards the issue on
oppositors supposed preterition and reduction of legitime, which issue is not even a subject, or at the very least
even invoked, in the present petition.
What is clear is that petitioners can invoke res judicata insofar as the judgment in G.R. No. 155606 is concerned
against the oppositors only. The records reveal, however, that the oppositors did not appeal the decision of the
appellate court in this case and were only impleaded pro forma parties.
Apparently, petitioners emphasize on the directive of the appellate court in CA G.R. No. 45801 that the decree of
distribution of the estate of Basilio should remain undisturbed. But this directive goes only so far as to prohibit the
interference of the oppositors in the distribution of Basilios estate and does not pertain to respondents
supervening right to demand the termination of administration, accounting and transfer of titles in their names.
Thus, the Order of September 5, 2003 by the probate court granting respondents Motion for Termination of
Administration, for Accounting, and for Transfer of Titles in the Names of the Legatees is a proper and necessary
continuation of the August 14, 1978 Order that approved the accounting, partition and distribution of Basilios
estate. As did the appellate court, the Court notes that the August 14, 1978 Order was yet to become final pending
the whole settlement of the estate. And final settlement of the estate, in this case, would culminate after 20 years
or on September 16, 1993, when the prohibition to partition the properties of the decedent would be lifted.
Finally, petitioners object to the inclusion of the house and lot in Manila, covered by TCT No. 131044, among
those to be transferred to the legatees-heirs as it would contravene the testators intent that no one is to own the
same.1avvphi1
The Court is not persuaded. It is clear from Basilios will that he intended the house and lot in Manila to be
transferred in petitioners names for administration purposes only, and that the property be owned by the heirs in
common, thus:
e) Ang lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c) ay ililipat at ilalagay sa
pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente hindi bilang pamana ko sa kanila kundi upang pamahalaan at
pangalagaan lamang nila at nang ang sinoman sa aking mga anak sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan ko sa
habang panahon ay may tutuluyan kung magnanais na mag-aral sa Maynila o kalapit na mga lunsod sa
medaling salita, ang bahay at lupang itoy walang magmamay-ari bagkus ay gagamitin habang panahon
ng sinomang magnanais sa aking kaapuapuhan na tumuklas ng karunungan sa paaralan sa Maynila at
katabing mga lunsod x x x x33 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
But the condition set by the decedent on the propertys indivisibility is subject to a statutory limitation. On this
point, the Court agrees with the ruling of the appellate court, viz:
For this Court to sustain without qualification, [petitioners]s contention, is to go against the provisions of law,
particularly Articles 494, 870, and 1083 of the Civil Code, which provide that the prohibition to divide a property in
a co-ownership can only last for twenty (20) years x x x x
xxxx
x x x x Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of the indivision of a property for more than twenty years, it
would be contrary to public policy to sanction co-ownership beyond the period expressly mandated by the Civil
Code x x x x34
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.