Professional Documents
Culture Documents
WORLD ECONOMIC
OUTLOOK
October 1999
A Survey by the Staff of the
International Monetary Fund
I N T E R N AT I O N A L M O N E TA RY F U N D
Wa s h i n g t o n , D C
84-640155
338.544309048-dc19
AACR 2 MARC-S
Library of Congress
8507
Published biannually.
ISBN 1-55775-839-5
Price: US$36.00
(US$25.00 to full-time faculty members and
students at universities and colleges)
recycled paper
Contents
Page
Assumptions and Conventions
vii
viii
Preface
ix
3
9
11
15
19
23
27
29
36
36
43
54
62
72
74
77
81
84
88
92
92
95
107
113
127
127
133
iii
CONTENTS
136
136
145
150
152
Statistical Appendix
156
Assumptions
Data and Conventions
Classification of Countries
List of Tables
Output (Tables 17)
Inflation (Tables 813)
Financial Policies (Tables 1421)
Foreign Trade (Tables 2226)
Current Account Transactions (Tables 2732)
Balance of Payments and External Financing (Tables 3337)
External Debt and Debt Service (Tables 3843)
Flow of Funds (Table 44)
Medium-Term Baseline Scenario (Tables 4546)
156
156
157
167
169
180
188
197
205
217
228
238
243
Boxes
1.1 Australia and New Zealand: Divergences, Prospects, and Vulnerabilities
1.2 Policy Assumptions Underlying the Projections for Selected
Advanced Economies
1.3 Comparing G-7 Fiscal PositionsWho Has a Debt Problem?
1.4 Oil Price Assumptions and the World Economic Outlook
1.5 The Regional Economic Impact of the Kosovo Crisis
2.1 The Emerging Market Crises and South Africa
2.2 Capital Flows to Emerging Market Economies: Composition
and Volatility
2.3 Structural Reforms in Latin America: The Case of Argentina
2.4 Malaysias Response to the Financial Crisis: How Unorthodox Was It?
2.5 Financial Sector Restructuring in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
and Thailand
2.6 Counting the Costs of the Recent Crises
4.1 The Effects of Downward Rigidity of Nominal Wages
on (Un)employment: Selected Simulation Results
4.2 The Effects of a Zero Floor for Nominal Interest Rates on Real Output:
Selected Simulation Results
4.3 Recent Episodes of Negative Inflation
4.4 Global Liquidity
6.1 Africa and World Trends in Military Spending
6
13
16
24
30
40
49
52
54
60
64
98
102
108
118
138
Tables
1.1 Overview of the World Economic Outlook Projections
1.2 Selected Economies: Current Account Positions
1.3 Advanced Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices,
and Unemployment
1.4 Major Industrial Countries: General Government Fiscal
Balances and Debt
1.5 Selected Developing Countries: Real GDP and Consumer Prices
1.6 Countries in Transition: Real GDP and Consumer Prices
1.7 Developing and Transition Economies: Y2K Scenario Results
iv
2
4
10
12
20
28
34
Contents
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
5.1
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
43
44
58
62
68
69
70
74
87
90
91
94
106
112
122
123
129
141
144
146
148
149
Figures
1.1 Global Indicators
1.2 Financing Conditions for Emerging Markets
1.3 Selected European Countries, Japan, and the United States: Indicators
of Consumer and Business Confidence
1.4 Y2K Interest Rate Spike
2.1 Selected Emerging Market Economies: Short-Term Interest Rates
2.2 Selected Emerging Market Economies: Bilateral U.S. Dollar
Exchange Rates
2.3 Emerging Market Economies: Equity Prices
2.4 Selected Emerging Market Countries: Eurobond Yield Spreads and
Brady Bond Spreads
2.5 Selected Emerging Market Economies: Real GDP
2.6 Selected Asian and Latin American Economies: Real Effective
Exchange Rates
2.7 Selected East Asian and Latin American Countries: Bank Credit to the
Private Sector and Total External Debt, 1998
2.8 Selected East Asian Countries: Progress with Corporate
Sector Restructuring
3.1 United States, the Euro Area, and Japan: Economic Performance Indicators
3.2 United States, the Euro Area, and Japan: Vintages of Potential Output
Growth and Output Gaps
3.3 United States, the Euro Area, and Japan: Output Per Employee and
Per Head of Population
3
5
15
32
37
38
39
42
46
47
48
59
72
73
76
CONTENTS
vi
77
78
79
80
83
84
86
88
89
92
95
100
111
114
115
116
117
127
128
130
137
143
246
A number of assumptions have been adopted for the projections presented in the World
Economic Outlook. It has been assumed that real effective exchange rates will remain constant
at their average levels during July 26August 16, 1999 except for the bilateral rates among the
European exchange rate mechanism (ERM) currencies, which are assumed to remain constant
in nominal terms; that established policies of national authorities will be maintained (for specific assumptions about fiscal and monetary polices in industrial countries, see Box 1.2); that
the average price of oil will be $16.70 a barrel in 1999 and $18.00 a barrel in 2000, and remain
unchanged in real terms over the medium term; and that the six-month London interbank offered rate (LIBOR) on U.S. dollar deposits will average 5.4 percent in 1999 and 6.1 percent in
2000. These are, of course, working hypotheses rather than forecasts, and the uncertainties surrounding them add to the margin of error that would in any event be involved in the projections. The estimates and projections are based on statistical information available in early
September 1999.
The following conventions have been used throughout the World Economic Outlook:
...
between years or months (for example, 199798 or JanuaryJune) to indicate the years
or months covered, including the beginning and ending years or months;
between years or months (for example, 1997/98) to indicate a fiscal or financial year.
vii
This report on the World Economic Outlook is available in full on the IMFs Internet site,
www.imf.org. Accompanying it on the website is a larger compilation of data from the WEO
database than in the report itself, consisting of files containing the series most frequently requested by readers. These files may be downloaded for use in a variety of software packages.
Inquiries about the content of the World Economic Outlook and the WEO database should
be sent by mail, electronic mail, or telefax (telephone inquiries cannot be accepted) to:
World Economic Studies Division
Research Department
International Monetary Fund
700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20431, U.S.A.
E-mail: weo@imf.org
Telefax: (202) 623-6343
viii
Preface
The projections and analysis contained in the World Economic Outlook are an integral element of the IMFs ongoing surveillance of economic developments and policies in its member
countries and of the global economic system. The IMF has published the World Economic
Outlook annually from 1980 through 1983 and biannually since 1984.
The survey of prospects and policies is the product of a comprehensive interdepartmental review of world economic developments, which draws primarily on information the IMF staff
gathers through its consultations with member countries. These consultations are carried out in
particular by the IMFs area departments together with the Policy Development and Review
Department and the Fiscal Affairs Department.
The country projections are prepared by the IMFs area departments on the basis of internationally consistent assumptions about world activity, exchange rates, and conditions in international financial and commodity markets. For approximately 50 of the largest economies
accounting for 90 percent of world outputthe projections are updated for each World
Economic Outlook exercise. For smaller countries, the projections are based on those prepared
at the time of the IMFs regular Article IV consultations with those countries or in connection
with the use of IMF resources; for these countries, the projections used in the World Economic
Outlook are incrementally adjusted to reflect changes in assumptions and global economic
conditions.
The analysis in the World Economic Outlook draws extensively on the ongoing work of the
IMFs area and specialized departments, and is coordinated in the Research Department under
the general direction of Michael Mussa, Economic Counsellor and Director of Research. The
World Economic Outlook project is directed by Flemming Larsen, Deputy Director of the
Research Department, together with Graham Hacche, Assistant Director for the World
Economic Studies Division.
Primary contributors to the current issue include Francesco Caramazza, John H. Green,
Maitland MacFarlan, Peter Sturm, Luis Cato, Mark De Broeck, Luca Ricci, Ranil Salgado,
Cathy Wright, and Harm Zebregs; and Robert Sharer, Marc Auboin, and Bradley McDonald of
the Trade Policy Division of the Policy Development and Review Department who prepared
Chapter V. Other contributors include Sanjeev Gupta, Richard Hemming, Kalpana Kochhar,
Arvind Subramanian, Steven Symansky, Subhash Thakur, and Andrew Tweedie. The Fiscal
Analysis Division of the Fiscal Affairs Department computed the structural budget and fiscal
impulse measures. Gretchen Byrne, Mandy Hemmati, Yutong Li, and Anthony G. Turner provided research assistance. Allen Cobler, Nicholas Dopuch, Isabella Dymarskia, Yasoma
Liyanarchchi, Olga Plagie, and Irim Siddiqui processed the data and managed the computer
systems. Susan Duff, Caroline Bagworth, and Lisa Nugent were responsible for word processing. James McEuen of the External Relations Department edited the manuscript and coordinated production of the publication.
The analysis has benefited from comments and suggestions by staff from other IMF departments, as well as by Executive Directors following their discussion of the World Economic
Outlook on September 1 and 3, 1999 (see Annex). However, both projections and policy considerations are those of the IMF staff and should not be attributed to Executive Directors or to
their national authorities.
ix
I
World Economic Outlook and the
Challenges of Global Adjustment
been the mildest of the four slowdowns in the world
economy in the past three decades, even though some
countries have suffered particularly severe recessions
(Figure 1.1).
However, a great deal of uncertainty still attaches to
the world economic outlook for the next couple of
years. It is clear that the U.S. expansion has played a
critically important role in moderating the global
slowdown;1 but it is also clear that to forestall a buildup of domestic inflationary pressures and to contain
the external current account deficit, the rate of growth
in the United States will need to slow. The staffs baseline projections assume a soft landinga slowing of
growth to sustainable rates with little friction or disruptionbut this cannot be taken for granted. The
generously valued stock market, the sharp decline in
household saving in recent years into negative territory, high business capital outlays, the heavy reliance
on foreign saving, and the high exchange value of the
dollar relative to medium-term fundamentals all point
to strains and imbalances that may lead to a more
abrupt slowing of domestic demand. This in turn raises
the question of whether demand in Japan and the euro
area will strengthen sufficiently to compensate for a
slowdown in the United States and to support activity
at home and globally. A strengthening of economic
conditions outside the United States would help to improve the U.S. current account balance, but it would
also tend to reduce international investors appetite for
dollar-denominated assets; it might thus increase the
risk of a sharp correction in the dollar relative to the
other major currencies, a risk arising from the imbalances in current accounts among the United States,
Japan, and the euro area (Table 1.2). These imbalances
might also further increase trade tensions.
If growth were to weaken significantly in the United
States without offsets in Japan and Europe, there would
also be reason for concern about the sustainability of
the recoveries underway in the Asian economies recently in crisis, and much of Latin America would be
particularly vulnerable under such a scenario. While
conditions in emerging financial markets have im-
lobal economic and financial conditions have improved markedly after the turbulence in emerging
markets in 199798, which gave rise to fears of a
widespread credit crunch and global recession, and
most of the economies recently in crisis have begun to
recover. But many challenges remain to be addressed
to ensure that these recoveries are sustainable, and to
foster stronger and more stable growth in the world
economy in the next decade. There is particular reason
for concern about the unbalanced pattern of growth
observed recently among the major industrial countries and about the economic and financial consequences worldwide if the eventual demand slowdown
in the United States turns out to be sharper than is generally expected at present. While the return to broad
price stability remains an important policy achievement, macroeconomic instability has persisted in
much of the world economy, continuing to pose challenges for, and in many ways making new demands
on, economic policies.
The world economy appears to be on the mend following the global slowdown in 1998 in the wake of the
Asian crisis and the further bouts of financial turbulence and contagion associated with the Russian and
Brazilian crises. Financial market confidence has been
returning in most of the emerging market economies
affected by the crises, allowing monetary conditions to
ease and setting the stage for economic recovery. For
all the Asian crisis economies, growth projections for
1999 have been revised up significantly, and the economic downturns in Brazil and Russia have been shallower than expected earlier. Oil prices have recovered,
and declines in many other commodity prices have
been arrested, providing relief for some commodityexporting countries affected by the ripple effects of the
slowdown. There has also been an upward revision of
growth in Japan, where there was a significant rise in
activity in the first half of 1999 following the steep contraction during 199798. And the projected strengthening of growth in Europe seems to be materializing,
while the impressive U.S. expansion has continued,
amid few signs of emerging price or wage pressures.
The many upward revisions to the earlier projections now point to global growth of about 3 percent in
1999, #/4 of 1 percentage point higher than in the May
1999 World Economic Outlook (Table 1.1). Global
growth thus appears to have bottomed out at 2!/2 percent in 1998, in what the projections suggest will have
Differences from
May 1999
Projections
________________
1999
2000
1997
1998
World output
Advanced economies
Major industrial countries
United States
Japan
Germany
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Canada
Other advanced economies
Memorandum
Industrial countries
Euro area
Newly industrialized Asian economies
4.2
3.2
2.9
3.9
1.4
1.8
2.3
1.5
3.5
4.0
4.2
2.5
2.2
2.2
3.9
2.8
2.3
3.2
1.3
2.2
3.1
2.1
3.0
2.8
2.6
3.7
1.0
1.4
2.5
1.2
1.1
3.6
3.5
3.5
2.7
2.4
2.6
1.5
2.5
3.0
2.4
2.4
2.6
3.6
0.7
0.8
0.7
0.4
2.4
0.1
0.3
0.3
0.4
1.0
1.0
0.1
0.4
0.4
0.4
1.2
0.3
0.1
0.0
0.3
0.1
0.2
3.0
2.4
5.8
2.4
2.8
1.8
2.6
2.1
5.2
2.5
2.8
5.1
0.6
0.1
3.1
0.3
0.1
0.6
Developing countries
Africa
Asia
China
India
ASEAN-41
Middle East and Europe
Western Hemisphere
Brazil
5.8
3.1
6.6
8.8
5.5
3.6
4.5
5.3
3.7
3.2
3.4
3.7
7.8
5.8
9.8
3.2
2.2
0.1
3.5
3.1
5.3
6.6
5.7
1.4
1.8
0.1
1.0
4.8
5.0
5.4
6.0
5.5
3.6
3.1
3.9
4.0
0.4
0.1
0.6
0.0
0.5
2.5
0.2
0.6
2.8
0.1
0.1
0.3
1.0
0.4
0.6
0.2
0.4
0.3
Countries in transition
Central and eastern Europe
Excluding Belarus and Ukraine
Russia
Transcaucasus and central Asia
World trade volume (goods and services)
Imports
Advanced economies
Developing countries
Countries in transition
Exports
Advanced economies
Developing countries
Countries in transition
Commodity prices
Oil2
In SDRs
In U.S. dollars
Nonfuel3
In SDRs
In U.S. dollars
Consumer prices
Advanced economies
Developing countries
Countries in transition
Six-month LIBOR (in percent) 4
On U.S. dollar deposits
On Japanese yen deposits
On euro deposits
2.2
3.0
3.4
0.9
2.5
9.9
0.2
2.2
2.3
4.6
2.2
3.6
0.8
1.0
1.7
0.0
2.0
3.7
2.8
3.3
4.0
2.0
2.9
6.2
1.7
1.0
1.3
7.0
0.2
0.1
0.3
0.4
0.6
2.0
0.2
0.4
9.2
11.4
7.0
4.8
1.3
2.9
5.9
1.1
2.7
5.9
7.2
8.2
0.9
1.5
2.5
0.2
0.4
2.0
10.3
11.4
5.0
3.2
4.9
5.9
3.0
2.4
2.7
6.2
5.6
7.2
0.2
2.2
3.7
0.6
0.1
0.6
0.2
5.4
31.2
32.1
27.2
27.7
7.4
7.8
36.4
36.0
6.0
5.6
2.0
3.3
13.5
14.8
7.6
7.2
3.0
3.4
2.7
3.2
1.1
1.6
2.1
9.2
28.2
1.5
10.3
20.9
1.4
6.7
39.3
1.8
5.8
18.1
0.0
1.9
1.6
0.1
1.7
5.7
5.8
0.7
3.5
5.5
0.6
3.7
5.4
0.2
3.0
6.1
0.2
3.5
0.2
0.0
0.0
0.9
0.1
0.4
Note: Real effective exchange rates are assumed to remain constant at the levels prevailing during July
26August 16, 1999.
1Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand.
2Simple average of spot prices of U.K. Brent, Dubai, and West Texas Intermediate crude oil. The average
price of oil in U.S. dollars a barrel was $13.07 in 1998; the assumed price is $16.70 in 1999 and $18.00 in
2000.
3Average, based on world commodity export weights.
4London interbank offered rate.
Macroeconomic Stability and the Forces of Globalization: Lessons from the 1990s
proved since the Brazilian crisis, some emerging market economies remain fragile and vulnerable to shifts in
market sentiment. In fact, sentiment toward emerging
markets has remained more adverse than in most of
199697 and much of 1998, with yield spreads remaining wide and volatile for many countries, reflecting the greater recognition of the risks attached to
emerging market investments (Figure 1.2).
An additional risk factor relates to potential financial market reactions to actual or perceived Y2K compliance problems in emerging markets (see the
Appendix to this Chapter). To contain the risk of capital flow reversals triggered by uncertainty about potential Y2K-related difficulties, it is essential that
countries be fully transparent both about their preparedness and about contingency plans to cope with
any system failure in sensitive areas.
Many problems and risks therefore remain. Global
adjustment of uneven growth and payments imbalances
is now perhaps the key challenge, and it is the theme
running through much of this report. The achievement
of a soft landing in the United States, sustained recoveries in the emerging market economies recently in crisis and in Japan, and a sustained strengthening of
growth in Europe, as in the staffs baseline projections,
are clearly feasible, but there is also a serious risk of
worse scenarios. Economic policies will have an important bearing on the outcome and on the degree of
macroeconomic and financial stability that will be associated with the adjustment process.
Real Commodity
Prices
(1990 = 100)
400
300
6
Average, 197098
Non-oil
commodity
prices
200
100
2
Oil prices
1970 75 80 85 90 95 2000
Interest Rate 2
(percent)
1970 75 80 85 90 95 2000
Inflation
Developing countries
(consumer prices,
median)
20
15
3
10
0
3
6
1970 75 80 85 90 95 2000
Advanced
economies
(GDP deflator)
1970 75 80 85 90 95 2000
1Shaded areas indicate IMF staff projections. Aggregates are computed on the basis of purchasing-power-parity (PPP) weights unless
otherwise indicated.
2GDP-weighted average of ten-year (or nearest maturity) government bond yields less inflation rates for the United States, Japan,
Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Excluding
Italy prior to 1972.
quent expansion will become the countrys longest period of sustained growth on record if it continues
through early next year. Other economies have also
enjoyed comparatively strong and stable growth in the
1990s, including Australia (see Box 1.1), China, India,
Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Taiwan
Province of China. Nevertheless, in surprisingly many
industrial and emerging market countries, economic
performance in the 1990s has tended to be weak or unstable or both.
It is unclear whether macroeconomic instability
generally has been increasing. However, the mere fact
that it has remained pervasive may be considered surprising given the general improvement in macroeconomic policies in most countries compared with the
two preceding decadessuggested, in particular, by
declines in inflation and better containment of fiscal
imbalancesand the substantial progress worldwide
with structural reforms that have increased the scope
for market forces to guide the allocation of resources
within and across countries. Why, then, has the frequency of crises and episodes of macroeconomic instability not clearly diminished?
Analysis of the role of any particular factors in contributing to changes in economic performance is generally difficult because typically many changes occur
simultaneously, and this has been the case in the
1990s. The global economic and financial system
today is dramatically different in many respects from
that of the 1980s or any earlier period. Four of the
most significant changes are the following:
First, as a major policy achievement, world inflation
has been brought down to its lowest level in 40 years.
Associated with this, the dispersion of inflation rates
across countries has also diminished. These developments reflect the strengthened international consensus
among monetary authorities on the need to focus on the
goal of low inflationa consensus fostered by experience of the alternative and also by peer pressure and
demonstration effects among countries. The strengthening of fiscal discipline in many countries has also
contributed to monetary discipline and the decline in
actual and expected inflation. Although hard to substantiate or measure, it seems likely that factors such as
trade liberalization, extensive deregulation in many industries, the privatization of many state-owned enterprises, the reduced willingness of governments to bail
out uncompetitive enterprises and sectors, and enhanced information about price developments across
countries have also been contributing to the general
convergence toward price stability worldwide.
The effect on inflation of this last set of factors
which operate essentially on the price level rather than
its rate of changemay be expected to wane over
time, and it remains to be seen if price stability will be
maintained on a lasting basis. But at least for the moment, low inflation has reduced the risk of one potential source of cyclical instabilitythe emergence of
(Percent of GDP)
1997
1998
1999
2000
Advanced economies
United States
Japan
Germany
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Canada
1.8
2.2
0.1
2.8
2.8
0.8
1.6
2.6
3.2
0.2
2.8
1.7
0.2
1.8
3.5
3.4
0.0
2.6
1.6
1.3
1.0
3.5
3.1
0.2
2.8
1.7
1.6
0.9
Australia
Austria
Finland
Greece
Hong Kong SAR1
Ireland
Israel
Korea
New Zealand
Norway
Singapore
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan Province of China
3.1
2.4
5.6
2.6
3.2
2.5
3.4
1.7
7.1
5.2
15.7
0.4
2.8
8.9
2.7
4.8
2.1
5.8
2.7
0.7
0.9
0.7
12.5
6.1
0.8
20.9
0.2
1.9
8.4
1.3
6.0
1.8
5.3
2.3
1.5
0.6
2.6
5.9
6.7
0.6
21.1
0.6
1.1
8.0
2.6
5.2
1.5
5.4
2.4
2.4
0.4
2.8
3.4
5.8
3.2
20.4
0.7
1.4
8.3
3.0
1.7
1.3
1.2
1.4
7.2
4.1
4.1
2.8
5.4
3.8
4.8
0.2
1.3
1.8
5.1
1.9
4.9
5.6
5.3
0.2
1.5
2.0
1.4
0.9
1.9
4.9
4.3
2.7
6.2
3.4
4.5
3.0
1.0
4.0
12.9
3.8
8.4
2.7
2.0
11.1
1.6
12.8
0.9
2.0
0.1
4.0
3.8
4.3
2.6
1.3
3.6
3.5
1.3
2.4
11.7
2.3
14.3
2.7
2.2
4.6
0.6
8.8
0.6
3.7
0.8
3.6
3.1
3.3
3.7
1.1
3.5
3.7
1.5
0.7
5.1
3.0
5.5
1.7
0.8
4.6
0.8
5.9
1.8
2.7
6.0
13.3
2.1
5.1
10.2
3.0
0.7
10.1
2.7
1.9
8.7
4.8
9.5
12.1
4.2
0.8
10.1
3.0
1.5
8.2
5.5
8.4
11.1
6.5
7.8
4.9
2.3
1.9
9.2
5.1
7.7
9.9
6.5
4.8
2.3
1.8
Memorandum
Euro area
Developing countries
Algeria
Argentina
Brazil
Cameroon
Chile
China
Cte dIvoire
Egypt
India
Indonesia
Malaysia
Mexico
Nigeria
Pakistan
Philippines
Saudi Arabia
South Africa
Thailand
Turkey
Uganda
Countries in transition
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland2
Russia
Slovak Republic
Ukraine
1Data
Macroeconomic Stability and the Forces of Globalization: Lessons from the 1990s
price pressures in the late stages of an economic upswing that ultimately necessitate a significant tightening of monetary conditions. In fact, the concerns of
monetary authorities in some countries recentlyfor
example, China and Japanhave focused on the risk
of falling prices, or deflation (see Box 4.3). This may
also add to macroeconomic instability, partly owing to
the reduced ability of monetary policy to stabilize output at negative inflation rates because of the difficulties of pushing nominal interest rates below zero.
But even while inflation in product markets (for example, CPI inflation) has been very subdued, asset
prices have continued to display considerable volatility, with a number of significant spikes since the mid1980s. This volatility in asset prices (especially stock
market and real estate prices) has contributed significantly to macroeconomic instability in several countries, raising anew questions about the weight monetary authorities should attach in their policy decisions
to asset market developments.
The second striking development of the 1990s is the
rapid international integration of financial markets that
has followed the general trend toward financial market
liberalization in the industrial countries in the 1970s and
1980s and the reduction in capital and exchange controls
in emerging market countries more recently. As a result,
the 1990s have witnessed private capital flows to emerging market countries unprecedented in scale (relative to
economic activity) at least since the first world war. The
secular rise in gross capital flows can be explained to a
large extent by market integration and the appetite of international investors for high yields and portfolio diversification. However, the large flows into emerging market countries during the buildup to the recent emerging
market crises, in gross and, more particularly, net terms,
also reflected, in part, unsustainable developments in the
recipient countries (including explicit and implicit exchange rate guarantees), together with a low demand for
capital in Japan and western Europe associated with the
weakness of activity in those economies in much of the
1990s. Following the Asian crisis, a growing share of
Japans and Europes saving surpluses has flowed into
the United States. This suggests, somewhat paradoxically, that strong cyclical recoveries in Europe, Japan,
and the Asian emerging market economies might make
it more difficult for the U.S. expansion to sustain its momentum.
Third, as illustrated by the last point, economic and
financial linkages and policy transmission mechanisms across countries have become more complex in
the 1990s, warranting a further reassessment of key relationships. Historically, the developing countries
economic cycle was mostly positively correlated with
that of the industrial countries due to the impulses
transmitted through trade and commodity prices. In
the early 1990s, however, when the industrial countries went through successive episodes of cyclical
weakness, growth actually accelerated in many emerg-
Indonesia/IMF
agreement
Attack on
Revised
Mexican Hong Kong SAR
currency
program
Thai
agreement
with IMF
Mexico
devalues
Brazil
floats
currency
Revised
Brazil
program
Russia
devalues
24
20
16
12
Thailand
devalues
Announcement of IMF/U.S.
financial package for Mexico
1994
95
96
97
Korea/
IMF
agreement
98
Sep. 10,
99
400
Total issuance
300
200
Asia
100
Western Hemisphere
1994
95
96
97
98
Sep. 10,
99
Box 1.1. Australia and New Zealand: Divergences, Prospects, and Vulnerabilities
New Zealand, of almost 30 percent between 1993 and
mid-1997, which worsened net exports. Furthermore,
share prices in Australia largely maintained their earlier
gains during and after 1997, supporting private sector
confidence and demand, while in New Zealand, the stock
market fell sharply after mid-1997losing around onethird of its value in the following year before a more recent correction.
Looking ahead, output in Australia is projected to grow
by 4 percent in 1999 and 3 percent in 2000. The slowdown in 1999 is attributable mainly to weaker private investment, especially in the mining sector as a result of
low commodity prices, and also to a much-reduced contribution from stockbuilding (which provided 1.7 percentage points of growth in 1998). The further slowing in
2000 reflects a broader-based decrease in consumption
growth, partly offset by a pickup in exports (especially
tourism receipts, including for the 2000 Olympic Games).
An increase is expected in inflation in 2000 associated
with the introduction of a new value added-type goods
and services tax (GST), but inflation excluding the GST
effect is expected to be around the middle of the Reserve
Bank of Australias medium-term target of 23 percent.
In New Zealand, growth has resumed after the recession in the first half of 1998supported by a substantial
easing in monetary conditionsand is projected to reach
around 2!/2 percent in 1999 and 3!/4 percent in 2000.
Improvements in household and business confidence have
contributed to a pickup in consumption and investment,
while export growth has been underpinned by improvements in export markets and the 20 percent decline in the
real effective exchange rate since mid-1997. Inflation is
expected to remain below 2 percent.
The main area of vulnerability in both economies is in
their external imbalances. Current account deficits are
projected to increase to about 6 percent of GDP in
Australia in 1999, and closer to 7 percent in New
Zealand, before declining in 2000 (see figure). Persistent
deficits have generated a high level of net external liabilitiesamounting to around 60 percent of GDP in
Australia and nearly 100 percent of GDP in New Zealand.
Reflecting this, net investment income outflows have
been equivalent to around 34 percent of GDP in
Australia in recent years, and 78 percent of GDP in New
Macroeconomic Stability and the Forces of Globalization: Lessons from the 1990s
4
2
Australia
Goods and services
0
2
4
Net investment income
1990
92
94
Current account
96
98
2000
4
2
Current account
0
2
4
New Zealand
1Shaded
92
94
6
8
10
96
98
2000
6
8
10
1See, for example, the discussions of current account sustainability in the World Economic Outlook of May 1998 (Box 8, pp.
8687) and May 1999 (pp. 3844).
their most difficult challenges: there is inevitably uncertainty about whether a rise in
asset prices is in fact sustainable, since it may
have arisen from a lasting change in wealthholders portfolio preferences or a lasting rise
in the rate of return on capital; and furthermore, the effect of monetary tightening on
asset prices is uncertain. Moreover, acting to
slow or arrest a run-up in asset prices that may
be generally popular is likely to be politically
difficult, particularly for central banks whose
independence is based on a mandate to control
CPI inflation. But such action may be necessary to minimize the risks of macroeconomic
and financial instability that may carry greater
costs. And it should be viewed as symmetrical
to the responsibility of monetary authorities to
provide liquidity and ease monetary conditions
in the face of sharp declines in asset prices that
threaten disruption of the financial and payment system. Fiscal policy may also have a
role, of course, when asset markets are overheating; and, especially when capital inflows
are already exerting upward pressure on the
exchange rate, it may be preferable to tighten
fiscal policy to dampen demand pressures.
Taken together, developments in the global economy
in the 1990s and the hypotheses to which they give rise
are not particularly reassuring. They point to a global
economic and financial system with great potential for
allocating resources more efficiently within and among
countries, but also with a potential for excesses to develop in asset markets and the private sector, and therefore for recurrent macroeconomic instability even
when macroeconomic policies are reasonably well disciplined, as in the 1990s. Despite the success in taming
inflation, and also the success of many countries in
putting their public finances on a sounder footing, the
task of macroeconomic stabilization has not gone away
and in some respects may even have become more demanding, as illustrated by the dilemmas and challenges
now facing policymakers around the globe.
Table 1.3. Advanced Economies: Real GDP, Consumer Prices, and Unemployment
(Annual percent change and percent of labor force)
Real GDP
______________________________
Consumer Prices
_____________________________
Unemployment
______________________________
1997
1998
1999
2000
1997
1998
1999
2000
1997
1998
1999
2000
Advanced economies
Major industrial countries
United States
Japan
Germany
France
Italy
United Kingdom1
Canada
3.2
2.9
3.9
1.4
1.8
2.3
1.5
3.5
4.0
2.2
2.2
3.9
2.8
2.3
3.2
1.3
2.2
3.1
2.8
2.6
3.7
1.0
1.4
2.5
1.2
1.1
3.6
2.7
2.4
2.6
1.5
2.5
3.0
2.4
2.4
2.6
2.1
2.0
2.3
1.7
1.5
1.3
1.7
2.8
1.4
1.5
1.3
1.6
0.6
0.6
0.7
1.7
2.7
1.0
1.4
1.4
2.2
0.4
0.4
0.5
1.5
2.3
1.5
1.8
1.7
2.5
0.0
0.8
1.1
1.6
2.2
1.7
6.8
6.5
4.9
3.4
9.9
12.5
11.7
5.7
9.2
6.7
6.2
4.5
4.1
9.4
11.6
11.8
4.7
8.3
6.5
6.2
4.3
5.0
9.1
11.3
11.7
4.8
8.0
6.5
6.4
4.5
5.8
8.6
10.7
11.4
5.3
8.1
4.2
3.7
3.6
3.0
1.8
2.5
3.1
5.6
3.2
3.8
10.7
4.8
2.1
4.0
3.8
2.9
2.6
3.3
2.9
5.6
3.7
3.9
8.9
5.7
3.5
3.4
2.6
1.4
3.2
2.0
1.3
3.6
3.3
3.0
7.5
3.5
3.6
3.5
2.5
2.5
3.0
2.5
1.5
3.8
3.6
3.2
7.0
4.4
2.4
1.9
2.2
1.5
0.5
1.2
2.2
1.2
5.4
2.2
1.5
1.4
2.5
1.8
2.0
0.9
0.1
0.8
1.7
1.3
4.5
2.8
2.4
1.0
1.4
2.1
2.3
1.1
0.2
0.7
2.5
1.3
2.3
2.3
2.0
0.7
2.1
2.1
2.1
1.2
1.0
0.9
2.5
2.3
2.2
2.2
2.0
1.4
7.8
20.8
5.5
9.4
8.0
4.4
7.7
12.6
10.3
6.7
9.8
3.4
8.1
18.8
4.1
9.5
6.5
4.7
6.3
11.4
10.1
5.0
7.7
3.1
7.5
15.7
3.6
9.2
5.4
4.3
6.0
10.3
10.3
4.6
6.5
2.9
6.9
14.0
3.7
9.2
5.1
4.2
6.2
9.2
10.2
4.6
6.2
2.8
Switzerland
Norway
Israel
Iceland
1.7
4.3
2.7
5.4
2.1
2.1
2.0
5.1
1.2
1.0
1.7
5.6
1.9
2.8
3.0
4.7
0.5
2.6
9.1
1.8
0.1
2.3
5.4
1.7
0.8
2.3
5.5
3.5
1.0
2.3
4.6
3.2
5.2
4.1
7.7
3.7
3.9
3.2
8.6
3.0
3.0
3.6
9.3
1.7
2.9
4.0
8.8
1.7
Korea
Australia2
Taiwan Province of China
Hong Kong SAR
Singapore
New Zealand2
5.0
3.9
6.8
5.3
9.0
2.1
5.8
5.1
4.9
5.1
0.3
0.3
6.5
4.0
5.0
1.2
4.5
2.6
5.5
3.0
5.1
3.6
5.0
3.3
4.4
1.7
0.9
5.7
2.0
1.7
7.5
1.6
1.7
2.6
0.3
1.5
0.7
1.8
1.0
3.1
0.2
1.3
2.8
3.8
1.2
1.0
0.6
1.9
2.6
8.5
2.7
2.2
1.8
6.6
6.8
8.0
2.8
4.7
3.2
7.5
7.0
7.2
3.0
6.1
4.3
7.2
6.0
7.0
2.7
5.4
4.2
7.0
2.6
2.4
2.7
2.8
2.0
2.1
2.7
2.8
1.8
1.6
1.4
1.2
1.3
1.0
1.5
1.3
10.4
11.7
9.6
10.9
9.1
10.3
8.8
9.7
Memorandum
European Union
Euro area
1Consumer
2Consumer
prices are based on the retail price index excluding mortgage interest.
prices excluding interest rate components; for Australia, also excluding other volatile items.
fold and interrelated. One is that significant inflationary pressures could emerge and prompt a substantial
monetary tightening. The second is that the dollar,
whose exchange value is well above the levels estimated to be consistent with medium-term fundamentals, could come under downward pressure, perhaps
because investors become more wary of the United
States increasing external debt or find more attractive
havens for their investments in other economies that
may be enjoying renewed growth. Marked depreciation of the dollar would increase price pressures, potentially leading again to a substantial rise in interest
rates. The third risk, of a significant decline in stock
market prices, could be associated with either of the
first two, or it could materialize independently as a result of a reassessment by investors of profit prospects
or equity valuations. As with the increases in interest
rates in the other risk scenarios, it would tend to lead
to a more abrupt slowdown of private spending and
growth than in the baseline projections, with an associated correction of the private sectors unprecedented
shortfall recently of saving relative to investment. The
fourth risk is that a large tax cut could further boost
private consumption, while crowding out private investment and net exports through higher interest rates
and a stronger dollar. While these developments
might add further momentum to the expansion in the
short run, they would exacerbate existing imbalances
and increase the risk of a harder landing later on.
How can policies help to minimize these risks? It is
mainly the task of monetary policy to prevent a rise in
inflation, through forward-looking policy actions. The
Federal Reserves actions to raise short-term interest
rates in June and August, which partly reversed the
cuts that played an important role in helping to stabilize international financial markets late last year, were
appropriate steps. Together with the increases in
longer-term interest rates in recent months, this will
10
help to slow the growth of domestic demand. But further steps may well be needed to prevent the emergence of inflationary pressures. It will therefore be important for the Federal Reserve to continue to be
forward-looking in its conduct of policy, to respond
again promptly if domestic demand growth fails to
abate or if prospective inflationary pressures persist, to
be particularly alert to repercussions in the economy
of the rise in the stock market as well as to any sign
that it is broadening to a wider range of asset prices,
and to provide consistent signals to financial markets
of its intention to rein in demand growth. It is through
such forward-looking actions that the risks of further
overheating and a hard landing are most likely to be
minimized.
Fiscal policy has also helped to restrain demand
growth in the current expansion, as can be inferred
from the budgets swing into surpluswhich is likely
to reach about 1!/2 percent of GDP in 1999 in terms of
the general government balance, compared with a
deficit of 3!/2 percent of GDP in 1993.3 Continuing
budget surpluses are projected on the basis of current
policies, and their realization will be important not
only to contribute to demand restraint given the economys cyclical position and the external deficit, but
also to prepare for the increase in unfunded liabilities
associated with population aging in the decades ahead
(Box 1.2). By contrast, eating into the surpluses
through tax cuts or spending increases would exacerbate the risk of overheating. The maintenance of surpluses would also provide more room for a moderate
easing of fiscal policy to help stabilize the economy in
the event of a sharp slowdown in domestic demand.
The strong U.S. expansion has contributed importantly to Canadas recent robust growth performance.
Growth in Canada has exceeded potential for most of
the period since mid-1996, and following the slowdown of late 1997 and early 1998 associated with the
Asian crisis and weakness of commodity prices, it has
strengthened again. Unemployment has recently fallen
to below 8 percent, its lowest level for a decade, while
core consumer price inflation has remained close to
the lower end of the 13 percent target range. There
has been further progress in reducing the public sector
debt burden, and the strengthening of the public finances will allow the automatic stabilizers to be used
in the event of a significant slowdown. Signs that the
economic expansion is gaining strength and that inflation has bottomed out may point to a need for a gradual move back to a somewhat less accommodative
monetary stance, though the anticipated slowdown in
U.S. growth would lessen potential inflation risks.
3Of the 5.2 percentage points of GDP decline in the fiscal deficit
since 1993, approximately two-thirds is due to policy actions (Table
1.4).
11
Table 1.4. Major Industrial Countries: General Government Fiscal Balances and Debt1
(Percent of GDP)
198292
Major industrial countries
Actual balance
Output gap
Structural balance
United States
Actual balance
Output gap
Structural balance
Net debt
Gross debt
Japan
Actual balance
Output gap
Structural balance
Net debt
Gross debt
Memorandum
Actual balance excluding
social security
Structural balance excluding
social security
Germany2
Actual balance
Output gap
Structural balance
Net debt
Gross debt
France
Actual balance
Output gap
Structural balance
Net debt3
Gross debt
Italy
Actual balance
Output gap
Structural balance
Net debt
Gross debt
United Kingdom
Actual balance
Output gap
Structural balance
Net debt
Gross debt
Canada
Actual balance
Output gap
Structural balance
Net debt
Gross debt
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2004
3.0
0.9
2.6
4.3
2.7
3.0
3.5
2.2
2.4
3.4
2.3
2.4
2.7
1.7
1.9
1.2
1.2
0.6
0.8
1.3
0.2
1.0
1.0
0.5
0.6
0.8
0.1
0.8
0.4
0.7
2.9
1.7
2.4
39.3
53.5
3.6
3.6
2.2
54.2
68.5
2.3
2.8
1.2
54.9
67.8
1.9
3.2
0.8
54.5
67.9
0.9
2.5
0.0
54.1
67.9
0.4
1.3
0.8
51.4
65.9
1.3
0.1
1.3
48.4
62.1
1.6
0.9
1.3
45.0
57.7
2.0
0.8
1.7
41.5
53.2
2.3
0.4
2.2
27.6
35.4
0.3
0.2
0.0
18.4
68.0
1.6
0.4
1.5
5.2
75.1
2.3
1.7
1.8
7.7
82.2
3.6
1.9
3.0
13.0
89.7
4.2
1.1
4.6
16.4
94.4
3.4
0.4
3.5
19.5
101.1
5.3
4.1
3.8
30.5
117.9
7.3
4.2
5.7
37.6
127.8
7.1
3.7
5.6
44.3
137.2
1.4
1.1
1.8
52.2
149.9
3.3
4.8
5.1
6.5
6.8
5.9
7.5
9.5
9.3
4.1
3.4
4.7
4.7
6.0
7.1
6.0
6.5
8.5
8.4
4.4
2.1
1.3
1.6
22.0
41.3
3.1
0.2
3.0
35.5
48.0
2.4
0.0
2.3
40.6
50.2
3.2
0.3
3.0
49.4
58.3
3.4
1.6
2.3
52.1
60.8
2.6
1.9
1.3
52.8
61.5
2.0
1.8
0.7
52.4
61.1
1.9
2.4
0.4
51.9
60.6
1.1
2.0
0.0
50.9
59.6
0.3
0.0
0.3
44.6
53.3
2.4
0.3
2.6
19.4
31.5
5.9
3.8
3.4
34.4
45.2
5.8
3.0
3.7
40.2
48.3
5.5
2.7
3.6
43.6
52.5
4.1
3.3
1.9
46.3
55.4
3.0
3.2
0.9
48.1
57.8
2.7
2.2
1.3
48.4
58.2
2.4
2.1
1.1
48.9
58.7
1.8
1.4
0.9
48.7
58.5
0.1
0.0
0.1
45.7
55.4
10.9
0.3
10.9
77.4
84.7
9.4
2.6
8.2
111.8
118.1
9.1
2.5
7.9
117.2
123.8
7.7
1.1
7.0
116.6
123.2
7.0
2.0
6.0
116.0
122.5
2.8
2.3
1.7
113.8
120.1
2.7
2.8
1.5
112.4
118.7
2.4
3.4
1.0
109.6
115.7
1.6
2.8
0.4
104.3
110.2
0.1
0.1
0.1
89.2
94.2
2.4
1.1
1.7
34.4
55.0
8.0
4.0
4.8
32.7
61.8
6.8
2.2
4.4
33.0
59.4
5.8
1.1
4.6
39.1
64.5
4.4
0.9
3.7
41.6
64.8
2.1
0.6
2.1
43.9
65.8
0.3
0.6
0.3
44.8
65.8
0.4
1.1
0.5
42.9
62.6
0.6
0.9
0.1
41.9
61.0
0.7
0.0
0.6
36.0
51.2
5.3
0.9
4.8
36.1
68.4
7.6
4.3
4.6
66.2
98.8
5.6
2.1
4.1
68.7
99.4
4.3
1.9
3.1
70.2
102.2
1.8
2.9
0.1
69.8
101.8
0.8
1.9
1.8
65.5
97.7
0.9
1.4
1.6
62.3
95.8
1.5
0.3
1.7
57.8
90.0
1.2
0.2
1.3
54.3
85.2
1.8
0.1
1.8
39.5
65.7
Note: The budget projections are based on information available through mid-September 1999. The specific assumptions for each country
are set out in Box 1.2.
1The output gap is actual less potential output, as a percent of potential output. Structural balances are expressed as a percent of potential output. The structural budget balance is the budgetary position that would be observed if the level of actual output coincided with potential output. Changes in the structural budget balance consequently include effects of temporary fiscal measures, the impact of fluctuations in interest
rates and debt-service costs, and other noncyclical fluctuations in the budget balance. The computations of structural budget balances are based
on IMF staff estimates of potential GDP and revenue and expenditure elasticities (see the October 1993 World Economic Outlook, Annex I).
Net debt is defined as gross debt less financial assets of the general government, which include assets held by the social security insurance system. Debt data refer to end of year; for the United Kingdom they refer to end of March. Estimates of the output gap and of the structural budget balance are subject to significant margins of uncertainty.
2Data before 1990 refer to west Germany. For net debt, the first column refers to 198692. Beginning in 1995, the debt and debt-service obligations of the Treuhandanstalt (and of various other agencies) were taken over by the general government. This debt is equivalent to 8 percent
of GDP, and the associated debt service to !/2 of 1 percent of GDP.
3Figure for 198292 is average of 198493.
12
Box 1.2. Policy Assumptions Underlying the Projections for Selected Advanced Economies
For 2000 and the medium term, the IMF staffs projections incorporate the effects of the income tax reform
package approved by Parliament in March 1999, and assume implementation of the governments fiscal consolidation and tax reform package announced in June 1999.
bined with the resumed purchase of long-term government bonds by the Trust Fund Bureau, have helped to
lower long-term interest rates since February, although
they have risen again since May as hopes of recovery
have encouraged expectations that monetary policy
will start to be tightened sooner than earlier thought.
The main monetary policy levers still available involve
liquidity injections to the banking system through, for
example, open-market operations, and exchange market intervention. The Bank of Japan has expanded the
range and maturities of assets it purchases to inject liquidity, and there is scope for further moves in this direction, provided that funds are supplied only to creditworthy entities and that they do not ease pressures for
13
Switzerland. The 1999 projections are based on the official budget, adjusted for slower growth and extraordinary expenditures. The projections for 200001 are in line
with present official estimates and incorporate announced
fiscal measures to balance the Confederations budget by
2001. Beyond 2001, the general governments structural
budget balance is assumed to remain unchanged.
Monetary policy assumptions are based on the established framework for monetary policy in each country. In
most cases this implies a nonaccommodative stance over
the business cycle, so that official interest rates will firm
when economic indicators suggest that inflation will rise
above its acceptable rate or range, and ease when indicators suggest that prospective inflation will not exceed the
acceptable rate or range, that prospective output growth is
below its potential rate, and that the margin of slack in the
economy is significant. On this basis, the London interbank offered rate (LIBOR) on six-month U.S. dollar deposits is assumed to average 5.4 percent in 1999 (20 basis
points more than projected in the May 1999 World
Economic Outlook) and 6.1 percent in 2000. The projected path for U.S. dollar short-term interest rates reflects the assumption that the Federal Reserve will raise
the target federal funds rate by in total 75 basis points before the end of the first quarter of 2000, which is consistent with market expectations in early August. The rate on
six-month Japanese yen deposits is assumed to average
0.2 percent in 1999 (the same as in the May 1999 World
Economic Outlook) and also in 2000. The rate on sixmonth euro deposits is assumed to average 3.0 percent in
1999 and 3.5 percent in 2000. Changes in interest rate assumptions compared with the May 1999 World Economic
Outlook are summarized in Table 1.1.
14
pressures for restructuring. In this regard, the authorities need to use the leverage provided by public capital participation in banks to promote consolidation, ensure a focus on core profitability, and push through
changes in ownership and management when needed.
Progress also has to be made in reprivatizing nationalized banks, or at least their marketable assets.
Other reforms in the financial services sector are generally well-advanced, although direct public sector involvement in the provision of financial services (for example through the post office savings system) needs to
be reduced, and tighter supervision along with pressures for reform need to be applied to the troubled life
insurance industry. Corporate sector restructuring
should be helped by measures introduced in June 1999
to provide greater scope for debt-equity swaps by banks
and ease the way for large-scale mergers. Improvements in the bankruptcy code will be considered by the
Diet later in 1999, and further reforms are also being
considered for the legal framework and tax system to
encourage firms to implement restructuring measures,
and to facilitate ownership changes. Progress in other
areas has been uneven. Firms in manufacturing appear
to be generally well-advanced in improving their balance sheets, whereas among firms oriented to the domestic market the lack of competition is slowing restructuring and discouraging business start-ups. Thus,
only limited progress has been made with deregulation
and liberalization in the transportation, telecommunications, retail, and agriculture sectors, which continue to
be largely shielded from foreign competition.
20
15
Consumer Confidence
10
United States
(left scale)
United Kingdom
(right scale) 2
100
90
5
10
Germany
(right scale) 2
80
70
15
20
60
50
France
(right scale) 2
40
30
60
1990
91
92
93
94
Business Confidence
96
97
98
United Kingdom
(right scale) 2
Germany
(right scale) 2
40
35
30
France
(right scale) 2
Japan
(right scale)
25
20
1990
91
92
93
35
Aug.
99
60
50
40
50
45
30
United States
(left scale)
55
95
25
94
95
96
97
98
30
20
10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Aug.
99
Sources: Consumer confidencefor the United States, the Conference Board; for European countries, the European Commission.
Business confidencefor the United States, the U.S. Department of
Commerce, Purchasing Managers Composite Diffusion Index; for
European countries, the European Commission; for Japan, Bank of
Japan.
1Indicators are not comparable across countries.
2Percent of respondents expecting an improvement in their situation
minus percent expecting a deterioration.
15
The fiscal policy advice that the IMF gives member countries depends on both longer-term debt sustainability considerations and short-term aggregate demand conditions.
In many cases, there is no ambiguity about the appropriate advice, at least in qualitative terms. There are instances, however, where longer-term and short-term considerations point to conflicting advice. Japan has recently
been a case in point, with the IMF recommending significant short-term fiscal stimulus to counter weakness in
aggregate demand, even though Japan is among the most
indebted of the major industrial countries. A high level of
gross debt and a rapidly aging population suggest that
long-term sustainability is a key issue in Japan, and that
there is a need to return to fiscal consolidation as soon as
conditions permit. However, other debt indicators, and in
particular net debt rather than gross debt, point to Japans
debt position being less worrisome. This box discusses
the debt indicators that are used to assess debt sustainability in formulating fiscal policy advice. Estimates for
1998 are reported in the table for the G-7 countries.
Gross debt refers to the governments stock of outstanding financial liabilities. According to this indicator, Italy and Japan are the most indebted G-7
Gross debt
Net debt including social security assets
Net debt excluding social security assets2
Overall balance including social security
Overall balance excluding social security
Structural balance including social security
Canada
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
United
Kingdom
United
States
95.8
62.3
62.3
58.2
48.4
48.4
61.1
52.4
52.4
118.7
112.4
112.4
117.9
30.5
79.1
62.2
42.4
42.4
62.1
48.4
56.1
0.9
2.9
1.6
2.7
2.6
1.3
2.0
2.3
0.7
2.7
1.3
1.5
5.3
7.5
3.8
0.3
...
0.3
1.3
1.7
1.3
1All
data are from the World Economic Outlook database unless it is indicated otherwise.
security assets are assumed to be zero in countries with pay-as-you-go social security systems. For Japan and the United States,
data on social security assets are taken from official sources.
2Social
estimated to be consistent with medium-term fundamentalsalthough probably not inconsistent with current cyclical conditionsand the euro may be expected to strengthen further in the period ahead as
growth in the area picks up and the U.S. economy
slows. This prospective appreciation is reflected in interest differentials favoring assets denominated in
most non-euro currencies except the yen and the Swiss
franc.
Monetary conditions in the euro area are clearly
supportive of recovery at present. Moreover, given the
still significant margin of slack in the area as a whole
and its dampening effect on inflation, official interest
16
on this measure, the second most indebted G-7 country behind Italy (where net debt was 112 percent of
GDP both including and excluding social security).
For other G-7 countries, this debt indicator is in the
range of 4065 percent of GDP.
An alternative approach would be to add net future
public pension liabilitiesequal to the present value
of future pension liabilities less the assets of the public pension systemto net debt excluding social security to produce a comprehensive measure of net
debt including future public pension liabilities.
The most up-to-date, comparable estimates of future
public pension liabilities for G-7 countries are those
of Chand and Jaeger (1996).1 However, these refer to
the period 19952020, and therefore do not reflect
significant public pension reforms undertaken since
1995 or the impact of different demographic developments across G-7 countries after 2020. For these
reasons, it would be inappropriate to report a comprehensive measure of net debt based on these estimates. But broadly speaking, future public pension
liabilities are at present significantly higher in
France, Germany, and Japan than in other G-7 countries, in each case exceeding 100 percent of GDP according to Chand and Jaeger. Italy and Japan would
remain the most indebted G-7 countries using the
comprehensive measure of net debt, although it is
unclear which of these countries would have the
larger debt.
2004
180
Gross Debt
120
60
Canada
France Germany
Italy
Japan
United United
Kingdom States
0
180
120
60
Canada
France Germany
Italy
Japan
United United
Kingdom States
0
180
120
60
Canada
A significant shortcoming of all the debt indicators discussed above is that they ignore the implications of the
projected profile of fiscal deficits for future levels of debt.
As the table also indicates, the G-7 countries start with
very different fiscal balances and cyclical positions and,
according to WEO projections, these will not evolve in
the same way across countries. The figure shows how
gross debt, net debt including social security, and net debt
France Germany
Italy
Japan
United United
Kingdom States
17
18
Emerging Market Economies in Asia and Latin America: Ensuring Sustainable Recoveries
19
Table 1.5. Selected Developing Countries: Real GDP and Consumer Prices
(Annual percent change)
Real GDP
_______________________________
Consumer Prices1
_______________________________
1997
1998
1999
2000
1997
1998
1999
2000
5.8
3.2
3.5
4.8
9.2
10.3
6.7
5.8
4.1
3.5
3.7
4.4
6.2
5.3
4.3
4.0
3.1
1.1
5.1
6.0
4.2
2.1
2.0
3.1
2.5
6.7
3.5
5.4
5.2
3.4
4.7
5.0
5.4
4.6
1.5
6.3
1.9
0.5
5.0
3.3
5.1
5.5
3.1
4.6
4.4
5.5
5.5
2.1
0.6
0.5
0.7
5.5
3.9
5.5
7.0
5.0
5.4
4.8
5.8
6.0
3.5
5.1
3.3
3.5
5.2
5.1
6.5
7.0
11.1
6.8
5.2
5.6
28.8
11.2
1.0
8.5
8.6
46.7
16.1
3.7
7.8
8.7
6.2
2.8
4.5
19.3
6.6
2.7
10.0
6.9
17.0
12.6
3.6
5.8
9.0
5.3
2.0
2.5
10.0
5.0
2.0
12.5
6.5
16.9
7.8
3.6
5.0
6.9
5.0
2.0
2.5
6.4
5.0
2.5
12.5
5.5
9.0
5.1
3.5
5.0
5.2
5.1
4.6
4.9
5.6
4.5
5.8
5.3
8.0
4.4
7.7
3.6
5.9
2.7
4.3
2.5
6.6
5.2
8.8
5.5
4.7
7.7
1.2
5.2
1.3
8.2
3.7
4.8
7.8
5.8
13.7
6.7
3.3
0.5
9.4
3.5
5.3
4.5
6.6
5.7
0.8
2.4
3.1
2.2
4.0
3.5
5.4
4.5
6.0
5.5
2.6
6.5
4.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
4.8
4.8
2.8
7.2
6.6
2.7
12.5
6.0
5.6
3.2
8.0
7.9
0.8
13.0
59.6
5.3
7.8
9.7
8.1
7.7
3.1
7.9
1.5
6.5
22.7
3.0
6.1
8.5
0.5
7.6
3.5
7.0
1.5
7.2
5.7
2.4
6.5
6.0
2.0
6.0
4.5
5.0
3.0
1.3
2.5
2.7
7.6
3.2
5.4
1.7
2.2
2.2
1.6
2.8
1.8
6.0
1.0
2.0
1.1
2.0
1.2
3.1
5.4
2.5
2.5
0.7
1.1
2.6
23.1
6.2
17.3
3.0
0.7
0.4
85.7
23.6
3.8
22.0
4.5
0.5
0.2
84.6
18.3
3.7
15.0
1.9
0.9
1.5
60.4
13.1
4.0
10.0
2.8
1.7
1.1
38.2
Western Hemisphere
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Guatemala
Mexico
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela
5.3
8.1
3.7
7.6
2.8
8.2
3.5
4.1
7.0
7.2
5.1
5.9
2.2
3.9
0.1
3.4
0.6
7.3
0.4
4.9
4.6
0.7
4.5
0.7
0.1
3.0
1.0
0.4
0.0
7.0
7.0
3.9
3.0
3.0
2.0
7.6
3.9
1.5
4.0
5.5
2.6
7.0
1.5
4.5
5.0
5.5
2.5
1.6
13.2
0.8
6.0
6.1
18.5
8.3
30.6
7.1
20.6
8.5
19.8
50.0
10.6
0.9
3.8
5.1
18.7
4.8
36.1
7.5
16.7
7.3
10.8
35.8
9.8
0.8
4.6
4.0
11.7
7.8
55.1
6.5
17.1
4.4
6.0
24.4
7.6
0.6
4.8
3.3
10.8
4.2
36.2
6.0
11.2
5.3
3.0
17.3
Developing countries
Median
Africa
Algeria
Cameroon
Cte dIvoire
Ghana
Kenya
Morocco
Nigeria
South Africa
Sudan
Tanzania
Tunisia
Uganda
SAF/ESAF countries2
CFA countries
Asia
Bangladesh
China
India
Indonesia
Malaysia
Pakistan
Philippines
Thailand
Vietnam
1In accordance with standard practice in the World Economic Outlook, movements in consumer prices are
indicated as annual averages, rather than as December/December changes during the year as is the practice
in some countries.
2African countries that had arrangements, as of the end of 1997, under the IMFs Structural Adjustment
Facility (SAF) or Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF).
20
Emerging Market Economies in Asia and Latin America: Ensuring Sustainable Recoveries
21
22
and restructure the banking sector are essential to return Colombia to a path of sustainable growth.
For Africa as a whole, projected growth has been revised down slightly, with GDP now expected to grow
by around 3 percent in 1999 and 5 percent in 2000.
However, this aggregate picture masks the fact that
Algeria and many of the smaller countriesincluding
Cameroon, Cte dIvoire, Ghana, Mozambique, Sudan,
Tanzania, Tunisia, and Ugandahave been performing rather well in macroeconomic terms: growth of
45!/2 percent is projected for most of these countries
in 1999, with some further strengthening expected in
2000, and inflation has generally been held at low-tomoderate single-digit levels. This relatively strong performance may be attributed in part to continued appropriate macroeconomic policies and, in some cases,
markedly more favorable weather conditions. For
Ghana, Mozambique, and Uganda, their recent strong
performance is a continuation of sustained growth
since the early 1990s. In Algeria, fiscal and monetary
policies were tightened in 1999 to counter the deterioration in the external environment caused by the decline in oil prices, and an extensive program of structural reforms has been implemented since 1995. In
Tunisia, consistently strong growth is projected to continue in 1999 and 2000, driven by strong export performance and supported by fiscal consolidation and a
flexibly managed exchange rate regime.
On the other hand, economic activity has been
much weaker in three of the other largest African
economies. In South Africa, growth is expected to
strengthen somewhat in 1999 following the slowdown
in 1998, supported by renewed financial market confidence, much lower interest rates, and improved
prospects for exports (especially to Asia). While further modest reductions in interest rates may be appropriate as inflation continues to decline and a firm fiscal position is maintained, the scope for interest rate
declines is limited by the need to safeguard the external position and thus help reduce the net open forward
position of the Reserve Bank. This would reduce the
South African risk premium and boost the trend rate
of growth. Rapid implementation of structural reforms would also underpin prospects for stronger
growth in 2000 and over the medium term. GDP in
Nigeria is projected to grow by only !/2 of 1 percent in
1999, combined with budget and current account
deficits of around 8 percent and 14 percent of GDP,
respectively. While these adverse developments are
partly attributable to lower oil prices in 1998 and
early 1999 and the subsequent sharp reduction in oil
production associated with lower OPEC quotas
non-oil GDP is expected to increase by 3 percent in
1999 compared with a 4 percent decline in oil GDP
slippages in fiscal and monetary policies in the first
quarter of 1999 have exacerbated the situation. These
problems have since been partially corrected, with
higher oil prices also improving export and public
sector revenues. However, to revive economic growth
over the medium term, there is a need for further fis-
23
Box 1.4. Oil Price Assumptions and the World Economic Outlook
judgmental or model-based. Near-term projectionsup
to eight quarters aheadare determined by futures quotations, averaged over five trading sessions to reduce any
undue impact of day-to-day volatility.1 Beyond eight
quarters, prices in the baseline are assumed constant in
real terms, using as a deflator the projection for export
unit values for manufactured goods from the most recent
World Economic Outlook.
The oil price assumption used in this World Economic
Outlook was set on August 18, 1999 along with other
global economic assumptions such as prices for other
commodities, exchange rates, and interest rates for the
major currencies. The baseline oil price for 1999, $16.70,
reflects actual prices during the first seven months of the
year, including a low of less than $11 a barrel in February,
and the prices in futures markets (in the five trading days
prior to August 18) for oil to be delivered through the remaining months of the year (see first figure). The assumption for 2000, $18.00, is based entirely on futures
prices and reflects the downward slope in the term structure of futures prices for delivery through the year.
After the global economic assumptions for the World
Economic Outlook were set in mid-August, spot and nearterm future oil prices rose to $23 a barrel in midSeptember. This change in market conditions, if sustained,
would suggest an upward revision to the oil price baseline
of about 7 to 8 percent for 19992000 if a revision were
to be made at the time of writing. The revision in 2001 is
in the 3 to 4 percent range; it is smaller because of the tendency for futures prices at longer delivery dates to be less
influenced by day-to-day shifts in the spot market and anchored more, albeit loosely, to past average oil prices.
A change in the price of oil affects the world economy
through several channels and review of these can provide
an indication of how the macroeconomic projections may
be affected by a revised assumption. The following analysis and accompanying tables and figures assume a 10 percent increase in the price of oil, about the same increase
that has occurred in markets since the baseline assumption was set.
A rise in oil prices would cause a transfer of income
from oil consumers to oil producers. For instance, if
oil prices increase by 10 percent, or about $2 a barrel at current prices, oil-producing countries would
gain about $16 billion in export revenue, if the price
The price of oil has continued to fluctuate widely in recent years (see first figure). After reaching a peak of
nearly $25 a barrel in early 1997, oil prices fell sharply,
to below $11 a barrel in early 1999, as the global economic slowdown weakened oil demand at the same time
global production continued to increase. Since March
1998, there have been efforts by oil-producing countries
to raise prices by constraining supply. These efforts
proved unsuccessful until they were intensified in March
1999, around the time that global demand for oil began to
pick up. Oil prices subsequently rose sharply, and pushed
above $21 a barrel in August. With this recent rise, petroleum prices are now above their 10-year average.
As with other commodity prices, the future path of oil
prices is an essential assumption underlying projections
in the World Economic Outlook. The methodology used
to set the oil price assumption is technical rather than
30
1.0
27
0.5
24
0.0
21
18
0.5
Oil prices
(right scale; U.S. dollars a barrel)
1.0
1.5
1984
86
88
90
92
94
15
96
98
26
Assumption 3
1996
1997
1998
12
1999
2000
2001
24
22
20
18
16
14
12
10
cal consolidation, reductions in the high rate of inflation compared with other countries in the region, and
determined implementation of the new governments
plans for privatization, deregulation, and other structural reforms. Weak growth in Morocco in 1999 is
partly the result of a drought-related decline in agri-
24
20
Oil-Exporting Countries
15
10
5
A
sia
Tr
e c an
on s i
om tio
ie n
A s
e c dv
on an
om ce
ie d
s
em W
isp este
he r n
re
H
A
fri
c
W
or
ld
M
a n i dd
d le
Eu E
ro ast
pe
CPI Inflation
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.2
Oil-Importing Developing
Countries2
Africa
Asia
Western Hemisphere
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.3
Oil-Importing Countries
Real GDP
Major Industrial Countries
United States
Japan
Euro area
United Kingdom
Canada
0
5
10
15
A
sia
Tr
ec an
on si
om tio
ie n
A s
ec dv
on an
om ce
ie d
s
em W
isp este
he rn
re
fri
ca
A
M
an idd
d le
Eu E
ro ast
pe
W
or
ld
20
15
10
5
0
5
10
15
A
sia
Tr
ec an
on si
om tio
ie n
A s
ec dv
on an
om ce
ie d
s
em W
isp este
he rn
re
H
a
fri
c
A
M
an idd
d le
Eu E
ro ast
pe
W
or
ld
Total Effect
rise were to be sustained for a full year and the volume of oil trade were unchanged (see second figure).
Oil-importing countries would see their import bills
rise by the same amount. On a regional basis, countries in the Middle East would gain about $10 billion,
or about 2 percent of their aggregate GDP. Other regions would see smaller gains. Oil-importing advanced economies would pay the bulk of the higher
25
Estimated Impact on
Government Revenue
(percent of GDP)
Overall balance
(percent of GDP)
Africa
Algeria
Angola
Cameroon
Congo, Rep. of
Gabon
Nigeria
18.4
75.0
25.3
68.5
58.9
77.8
0.8
17.4
1.4
10.3
5.0
5.7
1.4
6.0
0.4
1.2
1.4
1.9
Asia
Brunei Darussalam
80.0
16.2
6.4
55.4
8.1
54.0
59.8
74.1
57.6
67.2
39.3
5.1
1.2
2.7
13.4
1.4
9.2
6.5
3.2
1.1
0.1
1.1
1.4
1.3
0.6
1.0
0.8
Western Hemisphere
Mexico
Trinidad and Tobago
Venezuela
34.7
11.2
69.3
1.1
0.7
2.4
0.4
0.4
1.2
Countries in Transition
Kazakhstan
Russia
10.0
4.0
7.5
7.9
0.2
0.1
and Venezuela, a rise in oil prices could not only increase export earnings and real incomes, but also
lower external borrowing costs on the assumption
that higher oil prices would reduce the risk premia
charged these countries as their expected future export earnings rose. The impact on GDP in oil-exporting countries would depend on how the increase
in oil prices came about: if it is due to a rise in world
demand, then oil production and therefore total GDP
could increase compared to the base case; if it is due
to a reduction in supply, oil production and GDP
could fall below baseline levels. In the current conjuncture, the oil production restrictions put in place
have lowered overall output.
In oil-importing developing countries, higher world
oil prices would raise domestic prices, and in the
account of lower oil output. In Egypt, growth is expected to remain relatively strong in 1999, with inflation stable around 4 percent. Some recent develop-
26
After a Decade of Transition: Widening Gaps Between Strong and Weak Performers
27
1998
1999
2000
2.2
0.2
0.8
3.5
3.0
3.4
7.0
11.4
30.0
7.0
6.5
3.7
2.2
2.3
8.0
8.3
18.0
3.5
2.3
1.8
1.0
1.7
8.0
2.0
8.0
1.5
2.0
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
0.3
10.6
4.6
6.5
7.3
2.3
4.0
5.1
3.8
5.1
1.5
1.3
6.8
6.9
6.5
Slovenia
Ukraine
Countries in transition
Median
Central and eastern Europe
Excluding Belarus and Ukraine
Albania
Belarus
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Croatia
Russia
Transcaucasus and central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Mongolia
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Consumer Prices
_______________________________________
1997
1998
1999
2000
2.8
28
21
39
18
3.7
3.3
4.0
8.0
0.0
14.0
4.0
2.5
15
37
39
32
64
14
1,082
4
10
18
15
21
73
10
22
6
8
21
9
7
320
5
1
4
6
16
6
6
250
3
4
3
0.0
0.5
3.7
2.0
0.5
1.5
5.0
4.5
4.0
4.0
8
11
18
8
9
11
8
14
5
5
3
4
9
2
2
5
3
8
3
3
2.9
8.6
4.8
7.3
4.4
4.0
5.0
3.7
3.5
0.7
3.0
1.0
5.0
2.5
4.9
2
12
15
155
6
1
8
12
59
7
2
28
7
40
9
2
6
5
17
7
4.6
3.0
3.9
1.7
3.0
2.5
3.8
0.0
8
16
8
11
5
26
5
15
0.9
4.6
0.0
2.0
15
28
88
23
2.5
3.1
5.8
11.0
2.0
9.9
2.2
7.2
10.0
2.9
2.5
2.0
2.0
3.5
3.8
2.0
1.5
2.7
2.9
5.0
2.8
5.0
3.0
3.5
37
14
4
7
17
26
15
9
1
4
7
12
16
3
5
22
7
32
15
8
4
5
11
16
4.0
1.7
25.9
2.4
3.5
5.3
5.0
3.3
3.5
5.5
18.5
2.1
4.0
6.0
1.0
2.0
37
88
84
71
9
43
17
29
9
15
27
28
6
7
54
22
Taking recent developments into account and assuming the implementation of a coherent stabilization and
reform program, IMF staff now project zero growth in
1999 as a whole, followed by growth of 2 percent in
2000 (Table 1.6). Major policy challenges still lie
ahead. The recently approved IMF program includes a
fiscal plan to deliver a 2 percent primary surplus, and to
meet this target, along with other macroeconomic objectives, full implementation of a wide range of reform
measures is needed. Without such action, the fiscal position would again deteriorate, pressures for increased
central bank funding of the deficit could increase, and
the fragile economic situation could quickly deteriorate.
There has been some, albeit limited, progress with
banking sector reforms: a bank restructuring agency has
been set up, and the authorities have revoked the licenses of 6 of the 18 large Moscow-based banks.
Indeed, many of the large banks are insolvent, a few
have been closed, and there appears to have been widespread asset-stripping from problem banks. While the
legal frameworks for bankruptcies and for the opera-
28
29
3This
30
critical imports, or cause price spikes. Possible demand effects include precautionary behavior induced
by the anticipation of potential supply disruptions,
which may lead consumers and businesses to stockpile
goods before the end of this year and subsequently reduce inventories early next year. Additional demand
effects could come from the purchases of computers
and computer services as enterprises and government
31
7.0
6.5
August
1999
September
1999
6.0
June
1999
5.5
March
1999
Oct.
Nov. Dec.
1999
Jan.
Feb.
Mar.
Jul. Aug.
5.0
1Each curve represents the forward interest rates implied by prevailing U.S. LIBOR rates at the beginning of the month indicated for
instruments with duration of one to twelve months.
32
rate and emerging market bond spreads has been attributed to Y2K concerns by some analysts, although
other factors are clearly also important. The effects of
uncertainty on financial markets underscore the importance of full disclosure whenever possible and the
need to plan for contingencies, even when countries
are thought to be well prepared for the technical aspects of Y2K.
Central banks have already developed or are developing contingency plans to correct or minimize potential disruptions in the financial sector. Generally, central banks hold a large reserve of banknotes to meet
public demand in peak periods (such as during holiday
seasons) and for unusual circumstances (such as bad
weather) and also provide liquidity to the banking sector, particularly under extraordinary situations, in their
role as lenders of last resort. In preparation for Y2K,
many central banks are in the process of building stocks
of banknotes should the public respond to potential
Y2K problems by hoarding cash, and are planning to
provide additional liquidity to the banking sector
through existing or special facilities should it be needed
to ensure the normal operations of credit markets.
For example, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority
will increase banknotes in reserve to HK$150 billion
(compared to a circulation of about HK$90 billion),
the Bank of Japan to 40 trillion yen (compared to a circulation of about 56 trillion yen), the Swedish
Riksbank to 90 billion kronor (compared to a circulation of about 80 billion kronor), while the U.S. Federal
Reserve is increasing its reserve stock of currency by
$50 billion to a total of $200 billion (compared to a
circulation outside of banks of about $475 billion).
In addition, the U.S. Federal Reserve has announced
a Century Date Change Special Liquidity Facility that
will provide exceptional, but temporary financing
(with no restrictions on the use and duration of loans
from October 1, 1999 to April 7, 2000, but with an interest rate surcharge of 150 basis points) to depository
institutions to ensure adequate liquidity to meet any
unusual demands in the period around the century date
change, while a number of central banks in emerging
market countries, such as El Salvador, Hungary, India,
and Korea, have announced similar special liquidity
facilities. Many other central banks plan to monitor
credit market developments particularly carefully
around year end and, if needed, are prepared to respond effectively and quickly by providing additional
liquidity to financial institutions. Many central banks
have also developed backup plans to ensure the proper
operation of payment and settlements systems, in case
of Y2K failures outside the financial system, including
disruptions in power and communications.
As mentioned earlier, multilateral agencies are also
developing plans to minimize potential disruptions because of the impact of Y2K. At the IMF, in recent
months the staff has been trying to assess the potential
economic and financial consequences of the computer
33
Standard
Impact
______________________
GDP growth
Inflation
Fiscal balance
(percent of GDP)
Current account
(percent of GDP)
Reserves
(percent of total reserves)
Deviation
_____________________
1999
2000
1999
2000
0.2
0.3
0.1
1.9
1.2
0.3
0.4
0.4
0.2
0.8
1.1
1.2
0.1
0.0
0.5
1.3
6.7
13.0
7.8
13.5
34
cially through potential turbulence in financial markets. In such cases, there could be a need for the IMF
to provide supplementary financial assistance to help
alleviate pressure on a countrys foreign reserves, enhance confidence, and limit contagion.
Against this background, the IMF has established a
temporary lending facility designed to provide shortterm financing to countries facing Y2K-related balance
of payments difficulties. The new Y2K Facility, which
is set to expire on March 31, 2000, will make available
funds for six months at a surcharge of 300 basis points
above the standard IMF interest rate (and, if necessary,
for an additional six months at a 350 basis point surcharge) to countries facing balance of payments pressures that can be distinguished as Y2K-related. Access
is limited to 50 percent of a countrys quota unless
there are exceptional circumstances. To make use of
the facility, countries will need to demonstrate that
they are pursuing generally sound economic policies,
are cooperating with the Fund, and are moving vigorously to deal with their Y2K problems. The facility
provides additional assurance to member countries and
investors that any pressures in international financial
markets in response to perceived Y2K problemsthat
may or may not materializewill be contained.
35
II
From Crisis to Recovery in the Emerging
Market Economies
been less severe than feared, but considerable uncertainties remain about contagion in Latin America and
about the speed and strength of the recovery in the region. Some countries in the region have continued to
show considerable vulnerability, partly reflecting longstanding fiscal and external imbalances that have been
exacerbated during the crises. Among the transition
countries, even the more advanced reformers in central
and eastern Europe have been affected by the recent
crises, the Russian turmoil in particular, but they have
shown some resilience. The vulnerabilities of the slow
reformers have, by contrast, been openly exposed, underscoring the growing divergences in economic performance among the transition countries.
This chapter focuses on the countries that were at
the center of the recent crises in emerging markets
the east Asian countries, Russia, and Brazilas well
as the countries which have been most affected by
spillover effects from the crises, those in Latin
America and among the transition economies in particular. While this chapter also delves into the experience of some countries which have weathered the recent crises reasonably wellincluding the interesting
case of South Africa (Box 2.1)other emerging market economies that have also suffered from spillover
effects are not covered beyond a brief discussion of
significant domestic financial market developments
since the spring.
36
(Percent)
Interest rates in most emerging market countries have come down
significantly since the Brazilian crisis.
50
50
Indonesia1
40
30
20
Thailand
Philippines
Taiwan
Province
of China
40
Hong Kong
SAR
30
Singapore
20
Korea
10
10
Malaysia
1996
97
98
Sep. 10,
99
1996
97
30
20
Sep. 10,
99
50
50
40
98
Brazil
Mexico
40
India 2
South
Africa
China
Pakistan
30
20
Chile
10
10
0
Argentina
1996
50
97
98
Sep. 10,
99
1996
97
98
0
Sep. 10,
99
Russia 3
40
30
Hungary
Poland
20
10
0
Czech Republic
1996
97
98
Sep. 10,
99
37
II
Malaysia
Taiwan
Province
of China
Thailand
Indonesia
1996
97
98
Sep. 10,
99
110
China
100
90
India
80
70 South Africa
60
Pakistan
50
40
1996
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
Korea
Philippines
97
98
Sep. 10,
99
1996
97
98
Sep. 10,
99
Argentina1
Mexico
Chile
Brazil
1996
97
98
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
Sep. 10,
99
Czech Republic
Poland
Hungary
Russia
1996
97
98
Sep. 10,
99
1Pegged
1Stock market prices in U.S. dollar terms are measured by the corresponding composite, regional, and country IFC Investable
Indices.
38
140
Latin America
100
80
Middle East
and Africa
Developing
countries
(IFC composite)
Asia
20
1996
97
98
Sep. 10,
99
39
II
20
18
Exchange Rates
(percent a year unless
otherwise noted)
130
Official
interest rate
(left scale)
120
110
16
14
12
Sep. Dec.
1997
Mar.
Jun.
Sep.
Dec.
98
100
Yield on long-term
government bonds
(left scale)
Mar. Jun.
99
90
NOFP
24
(right scale; billions
of U.S. dollars)
22
Gold price in
U.S. dollars
(left scale)
100
20
90
18
80
16
Share prices
in local currency
(left scale)
70
60
Sep. Dec.
1997
Mar.
Jun.
Sep.
98
Dec.
Mar. Jun.
99
14
12
1 The NOFP is defined as net forward foreign exchange liabilities less net international spot reserves.
40
41
II
2500
Korea
(Nov./2003)
Indonesia
(Aug./2006)
2000
1500
Philippines
(Oct./2016)
1000
500
Thailand (Apr./2007)
1998
Sep. 10,
99
3000
2500
Brazil
2000
Venezuela
1500
1000
500
Argentina
1998
Mexico
Sep. 10,
99
42
1999
_______________________________
1996
1997
1998
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
July
Aug.
Total
Asia
Europe
Middle East and Africa
Western Hemisphere
218.4
118.5
21.3
15.5
63.1
286.1
127.5
37.5
30.8
90.3
148.5
34.1
36.1
13.7
64.6
39.5
7.1
7.5
3.3
21.7
50.9
14.1
12.7
2.4
21.8
30.5
5.5
9.9
4.9
10.2
27.2
7.5
6.1
3.2
10.5
32.6
11.9
3.1
4.4
13.2
49.7
15.3
7.8
6.8
19.8
14.6
7.1
4.8
0.7
3.4
6.7
3.9
4.8
3.5
1.6
Bond issues
Asia
Western Hemisphere
Other regions
101.9
43.1
47.2
11.6
128.1
45.5
54.4
28.2
77.7
11.5
38.3
27.9
25.3
2.7
14.8
7.8
28.0
6.7
13.3
8.1
14.1
0.3
5.1
8.7
10.3
1.8
5.2
3.3
21.8
7.0
10.8
4.1
25.5
6.3
13.1
7.1
6.1
2.4
3.2
0.6
3.4
1.7
1.1
0.6
9.4
9.4
10.0
9.8
0.2
0.5
0.5
0.1
0.1
0.4
0.4
Loan commitments
Asia
Western Hemisphere
Other regions
90.7
56.2
12.3
22.2
123.2
58.9
30.9
33.4
60.4
17.7
26.1
16.6
11.0
2.5
6.9
1.5
18.7
5.0
8.5
5.2
16.2
5.2
5.0
6.0
14.2
4.9
5.3
4.0
8.4
3.5
2.2
2.7
17.6
5.1
6.7
5.8
3.4
2.3
0.1
0.9
2.2
1.1
0.4
0.6
Equity issues
Asia
Western Hemisphere
Other regions
16.4
9.8
3.7
3.0
24.8
13.2
5.1
6.5
9.9
4.4
0.2
5.3
3.1
1.7
1.4
3.7
1.9
0.1
1.7
0.2
0.1
0.2
2.8
0.7
2.0
2.4
1.4
0.2
0.8
6.6
5.6
0.9
5.1
2.4
0.1
2.6
1.2
1.0
0.2
0.1
43
II
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Total
Net private capital flows2
Net direct investment
Net portfolio investment
Other net investment
Net official flows
Change in reserves3
118.1
31.5
24.7
62.0
36.0
51.2
120.6
35.3
55.6
29.7
23.1
58.8
176.3
57.9
98.7
19.6
19.1
70.3
143.4
84.7
104.9
46.3
8.6
64.0
192.9
93.0
38.3
61.7
28.8
118.0
213.8
113.5
74.0
26.4
17.9
108.7
148.8
142.6
66.7
60.5
24.4
74.2
66.2
132.4
27.1
93.3
43.6
49.9
68.3
118.5
21.6
71.8
9.4
51.1
118.5
128.4
40.2
50.1
2.4
76.1
Memorandum
Current account4
85.1
75.4
115.7
73.3
85.8
92.1
77.2
42.0
24.7
45.2
Africa
Net private capital flows2
Net direct investment
Net portfolio investment
Other net investment
Net official flows
Change in reserves3
6.1
2.1
2.0
6.1
9.1
3.0
3.4
0.6
1.3
1.6
12.1
0.3
9.7
1.9
1.6
9.4
8.3
2.2
3.5
2.3
2.3
1.2
13.5
5.6
2.6
2.1
6.6
6.1
11.7
0.7
9.2
4.7
3.1
1.4
0.2
10.1
19.4
7.4
4.1
7.9
4.7
14.2
13.2
4.8
6.6
1.7
2.2
2.5
11.7
8.4
2.4
0.9
4.8
1.4
18.3
8.7
4.7
4.8
3.5
8.2
Memorandum
Current account4
7.4
10.3
11.6
11.9
16.1
6.2
7.1
18.8
18.8
15.2
24.8
6.2
3.2
15.4
4.4
8.3
29.0
7.3
6.4
15.3
2.0
18.1
31.8
7.6
17.2
7.0
0.6
20.6
36.1
8.8
9.9
17.4
0.3
6.1
60.6
7.5
17.4
35.7
0.7
18.3
62.9
8.4
20.3
34.2
4.6
5.4
22.1
10.3
12.9
45.3
30.4
30.5
29.6
9.7
7.3
32.0
20.2
52.1
18.1
9.4
4.5
32.0
4.5
39.9
8.2
8.4
5.6
22.2
0.6
29.9
Memorandum
Current account4
25.2
16.1
13.5
23.2
40.5
53.4
24.3
68.8
49.3
29.4
7.4
8.3
2.0
1.2
6.5
31.5
9.4
8.4
2.6
20.4
8.3
7.8
24.6
26.3
4.5
6.2
7.9
17.9
27.7
38.8
1.1
12.2
10.2
48.3
30.2
41.1
6.1
4.7
6.0
26.9
39.3
45.8
8.3
1.8
4.1
43.6
25.4
50.9
11.8
13.8
0.4
46.5
14.7
46.9
12.3
49.2
7.3
17.6
11.5
32.2
12.8
30.8
4.1
2.3
4.9
34.7
8.5
21.3
2.9
17.4
23.7
14.0
8.2
16.8
16.2
17.8
43.9
43.2
26.2
26.4
Asia5
Crisis countries6
Net private capital flows2
Net direct investment
Net portfolio investment
Other net investment
Net official flows
Change in reserves3
Memorandum
Current account4
late June in response to strong exchange rate pressures. In contrast with most of Latin America, Mexico
has weathered the international financial turmoil well
over the past two years, and output continued to
expand in the first half of 1999, albeit at a decelerating pace.
The divergences in cyclical patterns between and
within the two regions stem not only from the differences in the timing of their financial crises and
in contagion, but also from a number of other factors
relating to the economic characteristics of the countries concerned. A first set of factors pertains to
differences in financial and trade linkages and external competitiveness. In Asia, a relatively high degree of openness to foreign trade and close intra-regional trade linksimportant contributors to the
regions successful growth recordexacerbated the
effects of financial market contagion on economic ac-
44
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
65.7
1.2
10.8
53.7
3.9
3.9
38.8
0.9
14.9
22.9
1.2
9.0
29.1
4.1
8.8
16.1
2.2
1.0
16.1
6.0
9.0
1.1
1.5
1.8
8.0
5.4
2.4
0.1
1.5
9.1
6.4
2.0
1.8
2.6
1.1
20.9
17.0
2.8
3.7
10.4
0.8
19.7
10.3
2.6
8.6
16.3
1.1
11.5
17.4
3.8
6.5
7.1
1.7
6.8
11.1
9.5
6.2
4.7
2.0
5.1
Memorandum
Current account4
64.2
26.7
31.1
7.2
5.4
5.1
3.3
20.9
8.9
9.2
Western Hemisphere
Net private capital flows2
Net direct investment
Net portfolio investment
Other net investment
Net official flows
Change in reserves3
24.1
11.3
14.7
2.0
2.7
17.4
55.7
13.9
30.3
11.4
1.7
22.6
61.4
12.0
61.1
11.7
0.7
21.3
44.1
23.4
61.8
41.1
3.4
4.2
46.7
23.1
4.6
18.9
21.1
25.5
79.7
38.9
37.9
2.9
14.1
28.1
86.1
51.3
36.2
1.4
8.4
14.5
73.8
48.1
39.7
14.0
4.1
12.9
47.2
42.8
12.0
7.7
4.8
6.7
62.7
43.1
23.6
4.0
0.1
4.1
Memorandum
Current account4
16.9
34.5
45.8
51.6
37.0
38.7
66.7
89.1
56.5
56.5
Countries in transition
Net private capital flows2
Net direct investment
Net portfolio investment
Other net investment
Net official flows
Change in reserves3
9.9
2.4
12.3
9.3
13.0
3.1
4.2
0.1
1.1
3.6
1.6
19.7
6.0
8.7
5.0
0.7
9.3
15.9
5.4
20.6
10.1
10.5
6.4
44.8
13.6
13.3
17.8
9.1
37.6
16.3
13.7
19.1
16.4
2.4
0.6
23.1
19.8
21.5
18.3
8.2
9.8
13.2
20.3
9.0
16.1
10.8
2.1
21.6
21.9
9.0
9.3
1.9
7.4
29.7
23.9
8.6
2.8
1.1
11.5
4.9
1.7
5.4
3.8
2.9
16.7
26.3
25.1
16.1
20.2
Memorandum
Current account4
1Net capital flows comprise net direct investment, net portfolio investment, and other long- and short-term net investment flows, including
official and private borrowing. Emerging markets include developing countries, countries in transition, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan Province of
China, and Israel. No data for Hong Kong SAR are available.
2Because of data limitations, other net investment may include some official flows.
3A minus sign indicates an increase.
4The sum of the current account balance, net private capital flows, net official flows, and the change in reserves equals, with the opposite
sign, the sum of the capital account and errors and omissions.
5Includes Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan Province of China. No data for Hong Kong SAR are available.
6Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand.
7Includes Israel.
ness of world copper prices.7 In Mexico, exports account for a higher share of GDP (about 27 percent),
but over 80 percent of the total is traded within
NAFTA. Pulled by buoyant demand in the U.S. and
Canada, Mexicos exports have continued to grow
through 1998 and the first half of 1999.
The second set of factors that helps explain the
different recovery patterns is the strength of economic
fundamentals at the onset of the crisis. In most of
Asia, relatively strong fiscal positions allowed
governments to pursue counter-cyclical policies in
7Between 1996 and the first quarter of 1999, copper prices declined by 39 percent in U.S. dollar terms; they are projected to decline further in the second half of 1999, but to gradually recover in
2000. For an analysis of the impact of copper prices on the Chilean
economy, see Antonio Spilimbergo, Copper and the Chilean
Economy: 19601998, IMF Working Paper 99/57 (Washington:
International Monetary Fund, April 1999).
45
II
20
Indonesia
China
15
10
5
0
15
10
5
0
5
10
15
20
5
10
15
20
20
1994
95
96
97
98
99:
Q2
1994
95
96
97
98
99:
Q2
95
96
97
98
99:
Q2
20
Thailand
Korea
Malaysia
1994
15
10
5
0
15
10
5
0
5
10
15
20
5
10
15
20
20
15
10
5
0
5
10
15
20
1994
95
96
97
98
99:
Q2
95
95
96
97
98
99:
Q2
96
97
98
99:
Q2
1994
1994
95
96
97
98
99:
Q2
Mexico
Brazil
Argentina
1994
1994
95
96
46
97
98
99:
Q2
1994
95
96
97
98
99:
Q2
20
15
10
5
0
5
10
15
20
Figure 2.6. Selected Asian and Latin American Economies: Real Effective Exchange Rates1
(June 1997 = 100)
Real effective exchange rates in Asia remain below precrisis levels.
120
120
Indonesia
China
100
100
80
80
60
120
1994
95
96
97
98
Aug.
99
1994
95
96
97
98
Aug.
99
95
96
97
98
60
Aug.
99
120
Thailand
Korea
Malaysia
1994
100
100
80
80
60
120
1994
95
96
97
98
Aug.
99
1994
95
96
97
98
Aug.
99
95
96
97
98
60
Aug.
99
120
Mexico
Brazil
Argentina
1994
100
100
80
80
60
1994
95
96
97
98
Aug.
99
1994
95
96
97
47
98
Aug.
99
1994
95
96
97
98
60
Aug.
99
II
China1
Hong Kong SAR2
Indonesia
Korea
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore3
Thailand
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Mexico
20
40 60
48
Box 2.2. Capital Flows to Emerging Market Economies: Composition and Volatility
Net international capital flows (private and official) to
emerging market economies have increased sharply in
absolute terms since the 1970s (see figure). The increased
supply of foreign financing has enlarged the resources
available to these countries for capital accumulation and
economic growth. On the other hand, the increase in net
capital flows to emerging market economies has rendered
the recipients more vulnerable to volatility in these flows.
The financial crises that have erupted in emerging market
economies in recent years have again raised the question
of whether large exposure to international capital flows,
in particular short-term flows, should be avoided because
of their volatile nature.
The theoretical distinction between short-term and
long-term capital flows is usually intended to differentiate between flows that are easily reversible and sensitive
to fluctuations in expected risk-adjusted international
yield differentialsflows that are sometimes referred to
as speculative or hot moneyand flows that are not
easily reversible and that are determined more by longerterm fundamentals. In practice, in balance of payments
statistics, the distinction between short-term and longterm flowsa distinction drawn for other net investments, which excludes foreign direct investment (FDI)
and portfolio flowsis based on the maturity of the instrument or asset involved, with short-term flows relating
to instruments with a maturity of less than one year.1
However, such a definition fails to capture the notional
distinction between short- and long-term flows: thus
short-term loans are often rolled over repeatedly. And
there is some debate in the literature about whether portfolio or short-term capital flows are more volatile than
FDI and other long-term flows. 2 Thus although the usual
categories of capital flow may give useful information
about the maturity and type of the underlying assets, they
may be of limited use in distinguishing between volatile
and more stable flows. To illustrate, the table shows some
summary statistics measuring the mean and volatility of
net capital flows in recent decades. It indicates that while
FDI has in most cases been the least volatile category of
160
140
120
100
Western
80
Hemisphere
60
ASEAN-4
Countries
40
plus Korea1
in transition
20
0
20
Billions of U.S. Dollars
(period averages)
Africa
1970s 80s 90s 70s 80s 90s 70s 80s 90s 70s 80s 90s 70s 80s 90s
FDI
Portfolio
Percent of GDP
(period averages)
Other Long-term
Short-term
ASEAN-4
plus Korea1
Western
Hemisphere Countries
in transition
All developing
Africa
countries
5
4
3
2
1
0
1For ASEAN-4
preciation-inflation spiral, monetary policy was tightened in a number of Asian countries between late
1997 and early 1998. But once it became clearer that
49
II
Number of
Mean
_________________
Standard deviation
__________________
of variation2
_________________
sign changes
__________________
1980s
1980s
1980s
1980s
1990s
1990s
1990s
1990s
(Ratio)
FDI
Developing countries
Africa
ASEAN-4 plus Korea
Latin America
Transition economies
0.4
0.3
0.6
0.7
0.0
1.5
0.9
1.1
1.5
1.3
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.2
0.0
0.6
0.5
0.3
0.8
0.8
0.3
0.6
0.5
0.3
...
0.4
0.5
0.2
0.5
0.6
0
2
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
1
Portfolio
Developing countries
Africa
ASEAN-4 plus Korea
Latin America
Transition economies
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.1
0.0
1.0
0.1
0.9
1.8
1.5
0.1
0.1
0.3
0.3
0.0
0.6
0.3
0.9
1.0
1.2
0.7
0.8
1.0
5.3
...
0.6
2.8
0.9
0.6
0.8
0
2
4
2
0
0
3
2
0
2
1.3
2.9
2.0
1.5
0.2
0.5
2.5
1.0
0.3
0.4
0.5
1.0
2.0
1.7
0.2
1.2
1.6
3.0
1.0
1.4
0.4
0.3
1.0
1.2
1.4
2.4
0.7
3.1
3.7
3.4
0
0
2
1
3
3
0
1
4
7
Of which:
Other long-term5
Developing countries
Africa
ASEAN-4 plus Korea
Latin America
Transition economies
1.2
2.6
1.5
1.5
0.5
0.2
2.3
0.0
0.3
0.3
0.5
1.0
1.1
1.1
0.3
0.8
1.8
1.3
1.1
1.4
0.4
0.4
0.7
0.8
0.5
3.6
0.8
...
3.5
5.4
1
0
2
1
0
4
0
5
6
2
Short-term
Developing countries
Africa
ASEAN-4 plus Korea
Latin America
Transition economies
0.2
0.3
0.5
0.0
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.9
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.5
1.1
1.3
0.1
0.6
2.2
3.3
0.6
0.4
2.5
1.7
2.4
...
0.3
2.2
9.8
3.5
...
2.6
4
3
2
4
0
1
4
1
1
7
1.9
3.0
2.9
2.2
0.2
3.0
3.6
3.0
3.0
2.4
0.4
1.0
2.2
1.9
0.3
1.0
1.0
3.2
0.9
1.5
0.2
0.3
0.8
0.9
1.3
0.3
0.3
1.1
0.3
0.6
0
0
2
0
1
0
0
1
0
2
1Categories of capital flow are in accordance with Balance of Payments Manual: Fifth Edition (Washington, DC: International
Monetary Fund, 1993).
2Standard deviation divided by mean.
3Is a residential category including financing from official and private sources. Instruments in this category are usually not traded in
secondary markets, in contrast to instruments classified with portfolio investment.
4The ASEAN-4 countries are Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand.
5Includes financing from official and private sources.
serves recovered, successive cuts in central bank target rates followed. In Korea, by mid-1999 the Central
Banks call rate had been lowered to around 5 percent
50
credibility in macroeconomic policy, and the substantial progress in banking sector restructuring. Similarly
in Thailand, the overnight interbank rate has fallen
51
II
The severe macroeconomic crises in Latin America during the 1980s brought into sharp relief the need for deepseated reforms to restore fiscal and monetary discipline
and increase reliance on market mechanisms for resource
allocation. Starting in the late 1980s, most countries in
the region embarked on ambitious reform agendas, which
ranged from streamlining the public sector and liberalizing foreign trade and financial markets, to increasing the
flexibility of labor markets and improving governance.
Since then substantial progress has been made in downsizing the state through deregulation and privatization,
lowering trade barriers, and promoting the internationalization of domestic capital markets. Total factor productivity has risen significantly in most reformed countries,
in some cases drastically reversing previous trends toward stagnation of per capita income levels.1
Notwithstanding these advances, the reform agenda in
most of Latin America is far from complete. Close
scrutiny of particular reform areas across different countries indicates that the reform process has been quite uneven: progress in labor market reform and in key areas of
fiscal reform has lagged behind considerably in most
cases, while progress with banking sector reforms has
been far more substantial in some countries than others.2
Argentina is one of the countries where structural reforms have advanced the most. Having started in
1989/90, the reform process gained momentum from
1991 with the introduction of a currency board arrangementthe centerpiece of the governments stabilization
1For evidence on the correlation between structural reforms
and the growth of total factor productivity, see Pablo Fajnzylber
and Daniel Lederman, Economic Reforms and Total Factor
Productivity Growth in Latin America and the Caribbean,
19501995: An Empirical Note, World Bank, Policy Research
Working Paper 2114 (Washington: 1998).
2For a broad review of recent progress in these different reform areas across Latin America and the Caribbean, see
Norman Loyaza and Luisa Palacios, Economic Reform and
Progress in Latin America and the Caribbean (Washington:
World Bank, 1997). For a review of advances in trade reforms
across the region in the 1990s, see Claudio Loser and Martine
Guerguil, Trade and Trade Reform in Latin America and the
Caribbean in the 1990s, Journal of Applied Economics, Vol. II
(1999), pp. 6196.
52
0.1 percent surplus last year.9 In Argentina, the projected increase in central government deficit to 1.8 percent of GDP in 1999, from 1.3 percent in 1998, represents a significant tightening of the fiscal stance given
the sizable contraction of economic activity. In Brazil,
there has been a sharp rise in interest expenditures
stemming from the combination of higher interest
rates in the past year and the composition of the countrys public debt, which makes interest payments very
sensitive to changes in short-term interest rates and the
exchange value of the U.S. dollar. A number of new
revenue and spending measures have therefore been
needed to secure an increased primary surplus, and this
has imparted a negative fiscal impulse to the economy.
In Mexico, despite the projected slowdown in economic activity in 1999, the government deficit is budgeted to remain unchanged at 1.3 percent of GDP, entailing some tightening in the stance of policy.
9Figures are based on staff projections which treat the use of the
copper stabilization fund as a financing item, rather than an abovethe-line component as in the official figures.
53
II
Box 2.4. Malaysias Response to the Financial Crisis: How Unorthodox Was It?
The imposition of capital controls in Malaysia in
September 1998they were partially relaxed in
February 1999has been characterized by many observers as marking the choice of a distinctly different
and unorthodox response to the Asian financial crisis.
This box examines the differences in Malaysias policy
approach and in the macroeconomic outcomes to date.
It concludes that, with the exception of the capital controls, the policies implemented in Malaysia were broadly
similar to those in the other crisis countries. Likewise,
while yield spreads for Malaysia have remained higher,
relative to Korea and Thailand, than before the imposition of controls, and capital inflows have been relatively subdued, macroeconomic developments to date
in Malaysia and the other crisis countries have been
broadly similar, making it difficult to identify, at least in
the short time that has elapsed since the imposition of
the controls, any effects that they may have had. This
may be considered not altogether surprising, both because capital outflows had abated markedly by the time
the controls were imposed, and because the effects of
such controls can usually be judged only over a longer
period.
Thus, in comparison with Asia, where both monetary and fiscal policies have been clearly countercyclical since the middle of 1998, in Latin America,
partly because of the constraints imposed by less
favorable initial fundamentals, there has only been
limited scope for macroeconomic policies to support aggregate demand and speed up economic
recovery.
54
Structural Reform Requirements in Crisis-Hit Asian Economies: Conditions for a Durable Recovery
Inflation
(percent)
16
12
50
National Saving
(percent of GDP)
Indonesia 1
Malaysia
Korea
Philippines
50
40
30
20
95
1994
20
Korea
96
97
98
1994
95
Indonesia
1200
96
97
10
98
160
1500
140
Indonesia
Philippines
Malaysia
Korea
80
Thailand
Philippines
Aug.
99
95
96
97
98
Industrial Production
(percent change
from a year
earlier)
Korea
10
20
10
0
Malaysia
100
300
Thailand
1994
120
Malaysia
900
1998
Korea
Philippines
Malaysia
60
Malaysia
600
Thailand
70
Indonesia
1800
30
80
Thailand
Thailand
40
External Debt
(percent of GDP)
Indonesia
Philippines
10
20
Thailand
Philippines
Korea
1998
Aug.
99
60
30
1998
Aug.
99
Sources: Deutsche Bank, Asian Economic Weekly; IMF staff estimates; and WEFA, Inc.
1In 1998, Indonesias inflation reached 59.6 percent.
55
II
In many respects, the evolution of key economic variables has been similar across the crisis countries. Growth
declined sharply in 1998, but since the fourth quarter of
1998, there have been signs of recovery, of varying
strengths, in all of them. Reflecting the collapse of
domestic demand, inflationary pressures have been all but
nonexistent (except in Indonesia, where they have abated
markedly in recent months), notwithstanding the very large
nominal exchange rate depreciations between mid-1997
and mid-1998. Private sector credit growth fell sharply in
all cases in 1998, and is only very recently showing signs
of revival in Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia.
In the fourth quarter of 1998, signs of returning investor confidence began to emerge in all countries. Bond
spreads, which peaked in August for Korea, Thailand,
and the Philippines and in September for Malaysia and
Indonesia, have since come down, although, in contrast to
the period prior to the imposition of capital controls, the
premium for Malaysia is higher than that for Thailand
and Korea. The exchange rates in all the countries stabi-
56
Structural Reform Requirements in Crisis-Hit Asian Economies: Conditions for a Durable Recovery
57
II
Korea
Malaysia
Thailand
Capitalization
NPLs/Total loans1
NPLs/GDP
Provisions/NPLs2
System capitalization2
55
22
22
29
16
23
13
29
24
35
43
12
52
53
25
15
Financial Restructuring
NPLs sold to AMC/Total NPLs
Average discount of NPL purchase3
51
100
42
55/97
23
40
...
...
System recapitalization/GDP
Of which: Public funds
System recapitalization/Est. recap. requirement4
35
33
8
8
31
2
2
40
14
7
51
5
93
66
4
59
44
12
9
18
17
57
30
75
14
15
14
7
>20
>20
16
12
13
Sources: Data provided by country authorities; Fund staff estimates; and Merrill Lynch, Asia-Pacific
Banks: Progress in Bank Restructuring, February 23, 1999.
1Includes nonperforming loans (NPLs) sold to asset management companies (AMCs), to better reflect the
magnitude of the problem prior to balance sheet restructuring. In Indonesia, for example, NPLs on banks
balance sheets fell to 41 percent of total loans, and 11 percent of GDP, after some NPLs were transferred to
the IBRA. For Korea, the NPL figure is based on market sources. For Thailand, the figure is for commercial banks.
2Figures for Korea and Thailand are for commercial banks only.
3In Korea, the KAMC acquired unsecured loans at a discount of 97 percent and secured loans at a discount of 55 percent.
4Estimated recapitalization requirements include recapitalization already undertaken; these are official estimates for Malaysia, and staff estimates for Korea and Thailand.
5Data for Indonesia in this and following rows are as of end-July, after the formation of Bank Mandiri
(see Box 2.5).
6For Korea, intervened institutions are those under rehabilitation and excludes the numerous but relatively small Credit Unions and Mutual Savings institutions. For Malaysia and Thailand, they comprise recapitalized institutions.
7For Korea, this figure excludes the numerous but relatively small Credit Unions and Mutual Savings
institutions.
8For Indonesia, this figure and those in the next two rows represent shares of total liabilities. The percentages add up to over 100 because some intervened institutions have subsequently been merged or closed.
For Malaysia, the figure is proxied from the share of institutions loans in the system total.
9For Korea, these figures are for commercial banks only (sourced from Merrill Lynch) and are not directly
comparable to the number of merged, intervened, and closed institutions above, which include merchant
banks and insurance companies.
Corporate Restructuring
In contrast with the progress in the financial sector,
corporate restructuring is at a relatively early stage in
58
Structural Reform Requirements in Crisis-Hit Asian Economies: Conditions for a Durable Recovery
Corporate debt
pending restructuring
50
40
30
20
10
Malaysia
Korea
Thailand
59
II
Box 2.5. Financial Sector Restructuring in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand
newed effort is now being made to improve loan collection from the banks major debtors in order to offset these
costs to the extent possible.
In Korea, the rehabilitation and consolidation of the
banking sector are generally well advanced, although the
full extent of the problem is still uncertain because of ongoing corporate restructuring. As demonstrated by the recent near-bankruptcy of Daewoo, corporate weaknesses
pose risks to the system. Five of the 26 commercial banks
that operated at end-1997 have been closed, and the rest
(including those that were nationalized and others receiving public support) are engaged in various forms of restructuring, including mergers and raising additional capital. Operational changes are substantial, involving a 25
percent reduction in the workforce, salary reductions, and
branch closures. Negotiations have been underway since
late-1998 for the sale of two nationalized banks; there
have been difficulties in reaching final agreement with
prospective foreign buyers, but a terms of agreement for
the sale of Korea First Bank was signed in September
1999. The main area of policy attention now is with the
nonbank financial intermediaries (such as investment
trust companies), which accounted for just under one-half
of financial sector assets at end-1997 and are heavily exposed to large chaebols such as Daewoo. The 11 remaining merchant banks (of the original 30) are all under rehabilitation plans approved by the Financial Supervisory
Commission, as are all the investment trust companies
and 16 of the remaining 45 insurance companies. Public
funds equivalent to 16 percent of GDP have so far been
allocated for financial restructuring, although the eventual resources required could be substantially above this
In Indonesia, the program for recapitalizing private sector banks has been completed. Under an agreement
reached in April 1999, seven large private banks have
been recapitalized on the basis of an interim 4 percent
capital adequacy ratio (with one further expected), private owners contributing 20 percent of the funds required
and the authorities the rest (in return for a corresponding
equity share). The remaining 74 smaller private banks
have been assessed by the authorities as adequately capitalized, although around one-quarter of owners and managers failed the fit and proper test and are being replaced. Progress is slower in the case of the seven state
banks and the 12 banks taken over by the Indonesian
Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA). These two groups
account for around 75 percent of total deposits, and 90
percent of the estimated $40 billion negative net worth of
the domestic banking system at end-March 1999. Four of
the state banks were merged on July 31, and recapitalization of the new institutionwhich has a market share of
around 30 percentis intended in 1999 as its downsizing
and other restructuring proceeds. Strategic decisions concerning the other three state banks are expected in
August. The estimated costs of rehabilitating the banking
sector have risen since earlier in the year as a result of
higher estimates of nonperforming loans, lower loan recovery rates, and operating losses, but now seem to have
stabilized. Overall, bonds totaling some $68 billion
(around 45 percent of GDP) may need to be issued for the
recapitalization of banks and resolution of closed institutions. The budgetary cost for 1999/2000 is estimated at 3
percent of GDP but, including quasi-fiscal items, the
gross fiscal cost could be nearly double this level. A re-
Social Policies
The strengthening of social support systems in the
crisis-hit Asian economies has been motivated primarily by the need to combat the rise in poverty and ensure a minimum level of support for those worst affected by the economic downturn.12 As discussed in
Box 2.6, the crisis has resulted in significant output
losses, which in turn have contributed to increases in
unemployment. In addition, social expenditures can
play a longer-term role in supporting stabilization and
adjustmentfor example, by reducing some of the uncertainties associated with structural change and job
loss, and increasing economic flexibility against future
macroeconomic shocks.
60
Structural Reform Requirements in Crisis-Hit Asian Economies: Conditions for a Durable Recovery
Korea is the only crisis-hit country with an unemployment insurance system, and the potential coverage
of its scheme has been doubled to around 70 percent of
wage earners through extensions of eligibility to employees of small firms and to part-time workers. The
duration of benefits has also been lengthened and
qualifying periods for coverage shortened.
A further important development is the increase in
employment-generating schemes. In Korea, funding for
nearly half a million jobs has been provided by local
governments and public corporations, with 150,000
jobs taken up in the final quarter of 1998; Korea and
Indonesia are expanding special credit schemes for
small enterprises, with Indonesia also introducing temporary, community-based employment programs; and
Thailand is increasing funding available for temporary
employment in such areas as construction and infrastructure rehabilitation. Attention is also being given to
investment in human capital and infrastructure. Health
and education spending has been increased throughout
the region, and public pension schemes are being developed in Indonesia and extended in Korea.
61
II
1998
Estimated
1997
1999
Projected
3.5
0.8
4.5
47.6
21.8
43.9
14.6
11.0
16.6
27.7
84.4
11.4
87.8
45.0
52.7
(Percent of GDP)
Public sector
Federal government
Overall balance (commitment)
Primary balance
Revenue
Of which: cash
Expenditure
Interest (cash)
Noninterest
8.4
2.5
12.5
9.2
20.9
5.9
15.0
7.1
2.5
12.3
10.0
19.0
4.7
14.3
5.9
1.3
10.7
9.0
15.6
4.0
11.6
5.2
2.1
13.0
13.0
15.1
4.3
10.8
90.6
72.8
3.9
17.5
17.0
136.1
32.6
89.0
77.4
3.0
15.9
15.4
134.6
30.9
74.7
56.8
2.5
17.5
19.9
152.4
48.7
73.6
45.3
14.4
18.6
21.9
157.5
90.1
2.0
2.2
2.0
3.7
(Units as indicated)
Memorandum
Nominal GDP (billions of rubles)
Nominal GDP (billions of U.S. dollars)
Exchange rate (rubles per US$, period average)
2,146.0
417.4
5.1
2,522.0
435.5
5.8
2,685.0
313.0
9.7
4,100.0
174.8
...
62
Russia and Neighboring Countries in Transition: Prospects for Recovery and Reform
broadly stagnated owing to extraction and transportation constraints. Output in major sectors other than
industry, including agriculture and construction, in
the first half of 1999 remained lower than a year earlier. As a result, real GDP in the first half of 1999 was
1 percent lower than a year earlier. Both macroeconomic stability and prospects for sustained recovery
remain at risk unless further progress is made in addressing the fiscal and structural problems that were
the root causes of the August 1998 crisis.
The authorities have also taken steps to restart the
operation of the domestic fixed income markets and to
avoid a further deterioration in relations with international creditors. A final conversion scheme for the domestic treasury bills that were frozen in the August
1998 debt restructuring was adopted in March 1999,
and a reorganization of the treasury bill market completed in June. As a result of these steps, by the end of
June the face value of outstanding treasury bills had
been reduced by more than one-third (more than twothirds when adjusted for inflation) and their average
maturity extended to around 2#/4 years from less than 1
year just prior to the 1998 restructuring. However, the
domestic treasury bill market remains highly illiquid
and secondary market yields, at more than 60 percent
in early September, very high; reflecting these unfavorable conditions, the government has not returned to
the market to raise new financing. In the context of the
treasury bill conversion scheme, incentives were provided to major companies to issue domestic currency
corporate debt instruments, opening the perspective of
a revival of the corresponding market. But overall,
among the domestic financial markets, only the equity
market has as yet resumed activities on a substantial
scale, with broad investor interest, including among
banks, contributing to the sharp rally in Russian equity
prices during 1999.
Some progress was also made on the external debt
front. The authorities continued their dialogue with
major international creditors, following the announcement in late 1998 that the country would be unable to
make payments on Soviet-era debt but would fully
honor debts incurred by the Russian sovereign. The dialogue has been successful in avoiding a formal default toward Paris or London Club creditors, although
Russia has effectively failed in recent months to make
a series of scheduled payments to both groups of creditors.13 In the middle of June, in the context of the
Cologne summit, the major industrial country members of the Paris Club announced their support for a restructuring (but not partial write-off) of the Soviet debt
owed to official creditors, and an agreement to
reschedule around $8 billion of this debt was reached
63
II
15
30
Asian crisis
Indonesia
Korea
Malaysia
Thailand
82
27
39
57
into surplus, in part due to the tight financing constraint since the government has lost access to new financing in domestic and international financial markets. However, federal revenues remained low as a
percent of GDP, and the authorities have failed to
benefit fully from the financial gains in the energy
sector stemming from the ruble depreciation and
higher energy prices. Also, recent cuts in noninterest
expenditures have been mainly ad hoc (including
through a less than full adjustment of wages and pensions to inflation) rather than being based on the comprehensive expenditure reduction plan introduced in
early 1998. Interest expenditures, and hence the size
of the overall deficit, have been kept artificially low
as interest payments have been rescheduled and interest charges on debt held by the central bank have been
maintained at below market rates. Finally, and most
importantly, the authorities have continued to fail to
64
Russia and Neighboring Countries in Transition: Prospects for Recovery and Reform
18
15
12
9
6
3
0
18
15
12
9
6
3
0
18
15
12
9
6
3
0
Malaysia
Indonesia
1990
92
94
96
98
1990
Thailand2
1990
92
92
94
96
98
Korea
94
96
98
1990
Brazil
1990
92
96
98
1990
1990
92
94
96
98
92
94
96
98
1990
92
94
96
98
Mexico
92
94
96
98
1990
92
9
6
3
0
18
15
12
Argentina
Chile
94
18
15
12
94
96
98
9
6
3
0
18
15
12
9
6
3
0
1Shaded
21998
65
II
19791989
_______________________
Mean
Standard
deviation
Mean
Standard
deviation
19891999
_________________________
Mean
Standard
deviation
Asia
HongKong SAR
Indonesia
Korea
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
Taiwan POC
Thailand
6.3
5.1
7.5
6.4
3.7
7.8
7.8
6.6
4.3
4.6
3.7
3.5
3.4
3.8
9.9
3.6
7.0
5.2
7.5
5.6
1.9
7.1
7.8
7.1
3.9
2.7
4.1
3.1
5.2
3.9
2.7
2.9
3.2
4.2
5.4
6.2
2.6
6.9
5.8
5.0
3.6
7.3
4.4
5.0
2.3
3.0
0.9
5.8
Latin America
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Mexico
2.1
4.8
3.9
4.6
6.9
5.0
5.7
3.7
1.0
2.8
3.4
2.2
4.9
4.6
7.2
4.3
4.2
1.7
6.4
3.2
4.7
3.0
3.3
3.6
nating recourse to tax offsets; and prioritizing expenditures and controlling spending commitments made by
ministries and agencies. While the authorities must
give new impetus to a broad range of reforms, the highest priority should be given to bank restructuring and
steps to address the nonpayment problem.
The Russian crisis has had significant spillover effects on neighboring countries in transition. These effects have been most pronounced in the countries that
66
Russia and Neighboring Countries in Transition: Prospects for Recovery and Reform
67
II
dollar are in the 3080 percent range, broadly according to the importance of each countrys precrisis trade
links with Russia. In all cases, the depreciations have
led to sizable upturns in inflation. Armenia and, with
some adjustment to the value of its currency in early
July, Azerbaijan and also the Baltic countries have
maintained their currency regimes in the wake of the
crisis, and their exchange rates have appreciated
sharply versus the ruble, while remaining broadly stable against the U.S. dollar. Declines in domestic currency prices of imports from Russia and other CIS
countries have put downward pressure on inflation in
these five countries, in Azerbaijan in particular, where
consumer prices in August were around 9 percent
lower than 12 months earlier.
In most CIS countries, both exports and imports remain well below precrisis levels. In the first half of
1999, exports in U.S. dollar terms were down by 20
percent or more compared with the same period of
1998 in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, and Ukraine,
mainly reflecting the sharp contraction in import demand in Russia and their currencies real appreciations against the ruble. Estonia and Latvia recorded
declines in exports of more than 10 percent, and
Lithuaniathe Baltic country with the highest precrisis trade exposure to Russiaof around 25 percent in
this period.15 The decline in trade flows has in turn
had a negative impact on activity in industry and the
transit sector. As a result, real GDP fell in Kazakhstan
and Ukraine by around 3 percent, and in Moldova by
more than 5 percent, in the first half of 1999 yearon-year. In the Baltics, all three countries have had
contractions in real GDP in the first half of 1999 compared with the first half of 1998, with the largest
declines in Estonia, by around 4 percent, and in
Lithuania, by around 5 percent.
Apart from its macroeconomic impact, the Russian
crisis has also affected neighboring CIS and Baltic
countries banking sectors and financial markets, their
access to international financial markets, and the pace
of market-oriented reform more generally. Losses on
assets with exposure to Russia and deposit withdrawals induced by declines in confidence have led
to widespread banking problems that, except in the
Baltic countries, have still to be addressed effectively.
The development of domestic financial markets has
suffered a setback as well. Prices and turnover in the
equity markets of the Baltics and Ukraine have been
depressed, while activity in the fledgling equity
markets elsewhere in the CIS has virtually dried up.
Except in the Baltics, domestic real interest rates
have remained high, with negative consequences
for the development of money and treasury bill
Average Growth
5.5
2.2
4.2
3.1
3.2
2.1
6.0
5.9
4.3
4.0
6,839
12,479
7,607
10,202
5,557
6,437
7,658
9,817
14,305
8,989
Southeastern Europe
Albania
Bulgaria
Macedonia, FYR of
Romania
Average
5.7
2.1
0.4
0.2
1.1
2,860
4,776
4,432
5,646
4,428
Russia
4.2
6,474
5.7
2.9
0.2
3.1
4.2
1.3
9.5
6.3
11.1
10.0
0.4
3.3
2,162
2,211
6,131
3,330
4,300
2,336
1,927
884
3,169
3,248
2,117
2,892
CIS
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Moldova
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Average
Mongolia
3.7
...
Memorandum
EU15
Japan
U.S.A.
2.5
1.1
3.4
20,031
23,979
30,057
15In
68
Russia and Neighboring Countries in Transition: Prospects for Recovery and Reform
FDI
Per Capita1
Annual Growth
of Fixed
Investment
Broad Money
to GDP Ratio
Private
Sector Credit
to GDP Ratio
3.0
3.5
3.3
3.5
2.9
3.0
3.4
3.3
3.2
3.2
393
818
555
1,113
646
318
321
144
530
538
4.1
6.2
10.1
6.9
8.8
7.8
14.3
9.1
11.2
8.7
32
72
28
43
27
21
36
68
39
41
33
60
24
23
11
13
15
36
29
27
Southeastern Europe
Albania
Bulgaria
Macedonia, FYR of
Romania
Average
2.5
2.6
2.7
2.6
2.6
103
140
58
208
127
...
6.2
4.2
1.6
0.1
50
32
13
25
30
4
13
28
11
14
Russia
2.7
92
15.2
19
10
CIS
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Moldova
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Average
2.3
1.8
1.8
2.2
2.4
2.8
2.5
1.7
1.3
2.2
2.2
2.1
64
406
42
37
312
69
113
16
108
43
23
112
8.0
32.6
7.0
12.7
15.4
15.4
13.2
...
...
18.4
4.2
1.3
10
21
24
5
11
14
17
11
9
16
16
15
8
2
11
4
10
8
8
5
...
4
26
9
Mongolia
...
39
23
11
1.02
the crisis has slowed the overall pace of structural reform. The taste for reform measures that involve
short-term costs but only medium-term benefits has
weakened in view of the lower short-term growth
prospects and reduced access to financial markets
which could smooth the impact of reforms on demand. In fact, pressures for backslidingincluding
the reimposition of price controls on basic commodities and the reintroduction of protectionist arrangementshave intensified.
The economic record of the Baltics and the CIS
countries in the wake of the August 1998 crisis illustrates the importance of two factors in particular in
shaping the spillovers from the Russian crisistrade
exposure and the pace of structural reform. The pronounced weakening in export and output performance
in the Baltics and most CIS countries in late 1998 and
69
II
Labor Productivity
in Industry1
6.8
12.8
29.7
21.9
15.3
26.9
18.6
12.2
8.6
9.2
8.5
7.9
11.0
9.4
5.4
9.9
6.5
7.1
13.5
8.3
12.9
4.1
4.8
12.1
...
2.0
3.2
5.6
8.4
3.6
5.3
1.2
9.5
1.8
32.3
3.3
7.8
11.1
8.0
8.4
22.0
1.0
5.5
13.9
1.1
4.0
1.2
3.4
14.3
3.2
1.2
12.0
1.1
5.0
Average
5.1
2.7
Mongolia
6.7
9.42
Outstanding bank liabilities relative to GDP are an indicator of the financial sectors overall size, while
bank credit to the private sector relative to GDP is a
proxy for the information, monitoring, and risk management services provided by the sector.18 The
199498 averages for both variables show financial
sector development to be still in its initial stages outside central and eastern Europe.
Institutional reform, corporate restructuring, and financial sector development are all expected to improve productivity and international competitiveness.
70
Russia and Neighboring Countries in Transition: Prospects for Recovery and Reform
71
II
72
III
Growth Divergences in the United States,
Europe, and Japan: Trend or Cyclical?
GDP Growth
United States
4
2
0
Euro area
1990
91
92
93
Japan
94
95
96
97
2
98
99
4
14
Unemployment Rate
12
10
Euro area
United States
6
4
2
Japan
1990
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
0
6
CPI Inflation
5
Euro area
4
3
United States
2
1
0
Japan
1990
91
1Shaded
72
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
Growth Divergences in the United States, Europe, and Japan: Trend or Cyclical?
United States
2.8
Output Gap
2.7
2
2.6
2.5
2.4
2.3
2.2
1990 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
1990
92
94
96
98
Euro Area
3.3
Output Gap
3.0
2.7
0
2.4
2
2.1
1.8
1990 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
1990
92
94
96
98
Japan
5
Output Gap
0
2
1
0
1990 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
4
6
1990
92
94
96
98
73
III GROWTH DIVERGENCES IN THE UNITED STATES, EUROPE, AND JAPAN: TREND OR CYCLICAL?
(Percent)
198089
United States
Actual output growth
Estimates of potential output growth
IMF staff estimate
Structural VAR model
Time trend
Production function
Estimated contributions of:
Labor force
Capital stock
Total factor productivity
Euro area
Actual output growth
Estimates of potential output growth
IMF staff estimate
Structural VAR model
Time trend
Production function
Estimated contributions of:
Labor force
Capital stock
Total factor productivity
Japan2
Actual output growth
Estimates of potential output growth
IMF staff estimate
Structural VAR model
Time trend
Production function
Estimated contributions of:
Labor force
Capital stock
Total factor productivity
199098
2.7
2.5
2.8
3.3
2.8
2.9
2.7
2.9
2.6
2.6
1.1
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.8
0.9
2.3
2.0
2.4
2.4
2.3
2.2
2.4
2.1
2.1
2.0
0.3
0.9
1.0
0.2
0.8
1.0
3.8
1.0
3.6
3.4
3.9
3.6
2.1
0.8
1.5
2.6
0.7
1.8
1.1
0.3
1.2
1.1
1Structural and actual fiscal balances differ because the ratio of actual expenditures to output tends to fall, while the revenue ratio rises,
when an economy is operating above its trend path. Similar adjustments are made to imports and exports (using output gap estimates
for partner countries) to construct structural external balances.
2For other methods see Charles Adams and David T. Coe, A
Systems Approach to Estimating the Natural Rate of Unemployment
and Potential Output for the United States, IMF Staff Papers (June
1990), pp. 23293. Stefan Gerlach and Frank Smets, Output Gaps
and Monetary Policy in the EMU Area, European Economic
Review, No. 43 (1999), pp. 80112, utilize an unobserved components model that provides an estimate of the uncertainty attached to
the output gap estimate itself.
3The production function, or growth accounting framework, is
based on Robert Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate
Production Function, The Review of Economics and Statistics,
Vol. 39, No. 3 (August 1957), pp. 31220. Robert E. Hall and
Charles I. Jones, Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More
Output Per Worker Than Others? NBER Working Paper 6564
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic
Research, May 1998) use a similar model to explain cross-country
differences in productivity levels. See also Michael T. Kiley,
Computers and Growth with Costs of Adjustment: Will the Future
Look Like the Past? (unpublished; Washington: Federal Reserve
Board of Governors, July 1999) for a discussion of growth accounting with adjustment costs.
74
5The
75
III GROWTH DIVERGENCES IN THE UNITED STATES, EUROPE, AND JAPAN: TREND OR CYCLICAL?
Euro area
Japan
70000
50000
30000
20000
10000
1965
70
75
80
85
90
95
2000
50000
30000
20000
10000
1965
70
75
80
85
90
95
2000
5000
76
(Figure 3.3, lower panel). The difference can be explained by the rise in unemployment and the lower
labor force participation rates in Europe, which together lower the ratio of employed persons to the total
population so that even if the levels of output per employee were the same across countries, output per
head of population would be lower. Participation rates
rose in the United States and Japan between the 1970s
and the 1990s to about 80 percent, but remained
roughly stable at 65 percent in the euro area. Labor
market institutions, high tax rates, and generous welfare and early retirement provisions probably play an
important role in explaining Europes lower participation rates.
Current expansion
1983:Q11990:Q2
1975:Q21979:Q4
10
Output Growth
8
6
4
2
0
2
1
11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33
11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33
4
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1
2
14
CPI Inflation
12
10
8
6
4
2
14For
11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33
77
III GROWTH DIVERGENCES IN THE UNITED STATES, EUROPE, AND JAPAN: TREND OR CYCLICAL?
lysts. Buoyant demand has also been maintained during a period of fiscal consolidation when the primary
structural deficit was being reduced (by 1!/2 percent of
potential output from 1995 to 1998, Figure 3.5). The
strength of consumer demand reflects sustained employment growth and rising real income, but also a decline in the household saving ratefrom 6 percent at
the start of the expansion in 1993, to zero and below
during 1998that has been attributed to rising equity
prices and access to consumer credit by an increasing
number of households. The crises in emerging markets
and weak demand in Japan and Europe have contributed to buoyant bond and equity markets, providing business with lower-cost financing. The weak international environment has further helped to contain
inflation, thereby forestalling a monetary tightening.
These fortuitous effects appear to have offset the negative impact on U.S. exports (Figure 3.6). From 1997,
a large share of the rapid growth of domestic demand
was met by an increasing external deficit as the dollar
appreciated in real effective terms and growth lagged
in partner countries.
How the rise in demand has been met without a rise
in inflation is a subject of considerable debate: a rise
in net imports (and an associated increase in capital inflows) is part of the explanation, but there also may
have been developments in the economy that have
lifted potential output or potential output growth.17
Several hypotheses have been advanced, including the
possibility that a series of fortuitous developments
have temporarily suppressed inflation.
Potential output growth may have risen. The new
economics or new paradigm hypothesis argues that
the higher rates of labor productivity growth observed
in 199698 are likely to be permanent and will make
possible a sustained increase in potential output
growth, maybe to 3 percent a year or more. The main
reasons given for this rise are new information technologies, new cost-cutting management practices that
foster continuous productivity improvements, and related efforts by firms to seek greater efficiencies in response to labor shortages and increased competition.
While there is a certain appeal to the claim that these
new technologies and practices are bringing considerable benefits, for example with just-in-time inventory
control, the link to the observed productivity pickup
has yet to be proved.
Potential output growth did not slow in the early
1990s as previously estimated, nor has it increased recently. At least until recently, many economists believed that potential growth slowed around 1990, but
new data suggest otherwise. Rather, the slowdown in
productivity growth observed in the early and mid-
General Government
Structural Budget Balance
(percent of potential GDP)
180
Real Effective
Exchange Rate
(1990 = 100)
160
140
120
100
10
8
1990
92
94
96
98 99
1990
92
94
96
80
98 99:
Q2
Current Account
(percent of GDP)
Long-term
4
2
Short-term
0
2
400
300
1990
92
94
96
98 99:
Q2
1990
92
96
98 99
6
3
200
100
0
94
Output gap
1990
92
94
96
98 99:
Q2
1990 92
94
96
98 99
11999 data for structural budget balance, current account, and output
gaps reflect IMF staff projections.
2The estimated relative output gap is the output gap in the United
States less a weighted average of output gaps in the other major industrial countries.
78
1990s now seems transitory or cyclical, perhaps reflecting the relative weakness of the initial phase of
expansion following the 199091 recession. This may
have given the false impression that there had been a
permanent slowdown in productivity and potential
output growth. In 199698, however, the pace of productivity increases picked up, so that the declines in
long-term potential growth estimated earlier are no
longer evident in the data.18 Such considerations have
led to a revision this year in the IMF staffs estimate of
potential growth to about 2#/4 percent a year from 2!/4
percent previously. It is enough of an increase in potential growth to imply that the U.S. economy was operating with spare capacity through much of the 1990s
and only closed the output gap in 1998 (see Figure
3.2). The revised assumption can explain the recent
combination of high growth with low inflation.
Demographic shifts have lowered unemployment
and generated a one-time shift in potential supply. The
argument here is that the decline in the unemployment
rate to 4!/4 percent in 199899 has not caused a pickup
in inflation because the NAIRU has fallen. A recent
study has raised the possibility that as the postwar
baby-boom generation has aged, the overall unemployment rate at a given level of labor market tightness
has declined as the numerous members of this group
have moved into older age cohorts, which typically
have experienced lower rates of unemployment.19 This
may help to explain how the unemployment rate has
fallen to a 30-year low and suggests that the level of
potential output has increased accordingly even
though the underlying growth rate of potential may not
have increased.
Wage and price behavior has changed. In 1996,
Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan cited evidence
that workers were worried about job security and for
this reason were willing to accept smaller wage increases at given levels of labor market tightness, but in
February 1999, he noted that job security concerns no
longer seemed able to explain favorable wage developments.20 Recent work by IMF staff concludes that
wage behavior, as measured by Phillips curve estimates, has not changed in the past few years, and attributes the low rates of consumer price inflation in
United States
12
Current
9
May 1997
6
3
1994
95
96
97
98
99
2000
01
02
0
15
Euro area
12
Current
9
6
May 1997
3
1994
95
96
97
98
99
2000
01
02
0
15
Japan
12
Current
9
6
May 1997
3
1994
95
96
97
98
99
2000
01
02
79
III GROWTH DIVERGENCES IN THE UNITED STATES, EUROPE, AND JAPAN: TREND OR CYCLICAL?
6
Consumer price index,
excluding food and energy
Consumer price
index, services
0
Tradable goods
(PPI, finished goods)
1991
92
93
94
Consumer price
index, total
95
96
97
98
Jul.
99
80
sign policies on the assumption that temporary or onetime changes in the economic environment have
played an important role. Fourth, a cautious approach
is indicated by the adverse consequences of the overheated economies that went unrecognized in the late
1980s and early 1990s in Japan, the United Kingdom,
and the Nordic countries. Finally, the high rates of
growth in the United States in the 1920s and again in
the 1960s were considered by some at the time to
augur new golden ages of prosperity. This of course
did not prove to be the case, and there are many compelling reasons to think that the recent expansion will
be no different.26
81
III GROWTH DIVERGENCES IN THE UNITED STATES, EUROPE, AND JAPAN: TREND OR CYCLICAL?
In terms of the expenditure components, the recession in Japan is accounted for largely by a pronounced
weakening of business and residential investment.
Business investment has fallen by about 20 percent
from its peak in the early 1990s, while the decline in
residential investment is even more pronounced, with
a drop of more than 30 percent between 1990 and
1998. An important factor contributing to weak investment has been the stock adjustment following the
rapid capital accumulation during the asset price bubble period. After the bubble burst in 1990 and as the
economy subsequently slowed, many firms were confronted with substantial excess capacity. Estimates
suggest that even though investment has declined significantly in the 1990s, the ratio of net business capital to potential output is still above its trend prior to the
bubble years.27
Investment spending has also been depressed by
high levels of corporate debt, particularly in the real
estate and construction sectors, and other non-manufacturing sectors. Firms in these sectors had borrowed
heavily on the basis of expectations about economic
growth that were not fulfilled. Their financial situation
worsened markedly and their ability to obtain funds
for new investment or working capital became seriously limited. On the other hand, balance sheets of
large manufacturers have improved since 199192,
and in addition, many of these companies have access
to international capital markets where they can raise
funds directly.
Recent problems in the banking system have contributed to tight funding conditions, especially for
small and medium-sized enterprises that rely on banks
for finance. This appears to have constrained the supply of credit even to many creditworthy firms. In addition to holding back fixed capital projects, it may also
have contributed to limits on firms access to working
capital, thereby hindering production and the ability of
some firms to take advantage of new business opportunities.28
The drop in private consumption by about 1 percent
in 1998 also contributed to the downturn. Important
causes of this decline appear to include a decline in
labor earnings and concerns about future employment
prospects related partly to concerns that corporate restructuring would reduce job opportunities in the future. Further, albeit mild, declines in asset prices may
also have dampened consumer demand. The pickup in
private consumption in the first two quarters of 1999 is
82
180
Real Effective
Exchange Rate
(1990 = 100)
160
140
120
100
1990
92
94
96
98 99
1990
92
94
96
80
98 99:
Q2
Current Account
(percent of GDP)
(percent a year)
8
4
6
2
Long-term
4
2
0
Short-term
1990
92
94
96
98 99:
Q2
1990
92
94
96
98 99
Nikkei 225
100 (1990: Q1 = 100)
2
6
3
80
60
40
Output gap
20
0
1990
92
94
96
98 99:
Q2
1990
92
94
96
98 99
11999 data for structural budget balance, current account, and output gaps reflect IMF staff projections.
2The real interest rates exclude the effect of the April 1997 valueadded tax (VAT) increase.
3The estimated relative output gap is the output gap in Japan less a
weighted average of output gaps in the other major industrial countries.
83
III GROWTH DIVERGENCES IN THE UNITED STATES, EUROPE, AND JAPAN: TREND OR CYCLICAL?
180
Real Effective
Exchange Rate
(1990 = 100)
160
140
120
100
1990
92
10
94
96
98 99
8
6
1990
92
94
96
80
98 99:
Q2
Current Account
(percent of GDP)
Long-term
Europes growth performance in the 1990s, especially in the major continental countries in the second
half of the decade, has been weak in comparison to the
United States, and has been somewhat weaker than average growth in the 1980s, as is illustrated by data for
the euro area (Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.9). Unemployment has continued the trend rise that started in the
1970s, and the cyclical recovery in 199798 has only
made a small dent in joblessness. Weak demand
growth appears to explain why output growth slowed
in the 1990s, as staff estimates of potential growth are
unchanged from the 1980s to the 1990s (Table 3.1).
However, longer-run supply factors are important in
explaining slower growth in Europe compared to the
United States.
2
2
Short-term
0
2
1990
92
94
96
98 99:
Q2
1990
92
94
96
98 99
DAX, Germany
(1990: Q1 = 100)
4
6
3
200
Output gap
100
0
1990
92
94
96
98 99:
Q2
1990
92
94
96
98 99
6
32For a detailed analysis of these issues, as well as the full range
of estimated benefits of deregulation see Ichiro Oishi and
Christopher Towe, Governance, Deregulation, and Economic
Performance, in JapanSelected Issues, IMF Staff Country Report
No. 98/113 (Washington: IMF, 1998), pp. 14663. This paper also
presents estimates of the possible output gains from structural reform. These vary widely, from 2!/2 percent to almost 19 percent, depending on the study and assumptions made.
11999 data for structural budget balance, current account, and output gaps reflect IMF staff projections.
2The estimated relative output gap is the output gap in euro area
less a weighted average of output gaps in the other major industrial
countries.
84
proved the primary structural balance by about 9 percent of GDP. In addition, restrictive monetary policies
were necessary at the beginning of the decade to reduce inflation and again in 199495 to gain early reentry into the ERM. Structural impediments to faster
growth, including rising tax rates, an inefficient welfare system, and labor market rigidities have also contributed to Italys below average performance in the
1990s. The causes of Italys slowdown in the second
half of 1998 and early 1999 remain somewhat unclear,
especially given the large declines in interest rates associated with the convergence of monetary conditions
and inflation rates with the lower rates prevailing in
Germany and France. As in Germany, the shock to external demand stemming from the crises in emerging
markets was an important contributor to the slowdown
(see below). In addition, the slowdown in domestic demand, especially business investment, may have reflected a tendency for firms to delay investment projects until the full effects of monetary union and
interest rate convergence could be assessed. The
lagged effects of the earlier fiscal tightening, as well as
uncertainties about future fiscal and structural policies, may also have weakened demand.
In France, growth performance was weak in the
early 1990s, but it improved in the second half of the
decade, to an average annual rate of 2!/2 percent, and
was stronger than in Germany or Italy over this period.
While the recovery in France is far from complete, it
nevertheless has been somewhat more vigorous than in
Germany or Italy for several reasons. First, the degree
of fiscal consolidation in France in the 1990s was less
than in the other countrieson the order of 2!/4 percent of GDP, compared to 3#/4 percent in Germany and
9 percent in Italy. Second, wage moderation over
much of the 1990s has boosted Frances competitiveness within the euro area (Statistical Appendix Table
10). Third, construction has been picking up in France,
while Germany has experienced an unwinding of the
high levels of building activity that followed unification. Finally, consumer confidence and hence demand
has been more robust in France than Germany, in part
due to somewhat more effective labor market policies
in France that has added jobs in the second half of the
1990s while employment has declined in Germany.
While the cut in working hours now being implemented in France may help to raise productivity, it will
also act as a constraint on the level of potential output
and therefore the sustainable level of output in the
medium term.
The 199899 growth slowdown in Germany and
Italy also appears to have been steeper than in France,
perhaps because the composition of these countries
exports left Germany and Italy more vulnerable to the
financial crises in Asia and Russia. About 20 percent
of German exports in 1997 went to emerging markets
in east Asia and eastern Europe, compared to about 12
percent in France. And the impact of these crises on
85
III GROWTH DIVERGENCES IN THE UNITED STATES, EUROPE, AND JAPAN: TREND OR CYCLICAL?
Unemployment Rate
26
26
Spain
22
22
18
Belgium
14
10
6
2
18
Italy
Finland
14
France
Ireland
Netherlands
10
Germany
Portugal
1993
95
97
99
1993
95
Austria
97
99
CPI Inflation
7
6
7
Portugal
Italy
5
Spain
Belgium
Germany
3 Netherlands
2
1
0
2
France
Finland
1993
1Shaded
95
Ireland
97
Austria
99
1993
95
97
99
86
structural balance
________________
1998
Change,
199598
Change,
199598
1998
Change,
199598
Germany
France
Italy
United Kingdom
0.7
1.3
1.5
0.3
2.2
2.3
5.6
4.3
2.2
1.6
6.0
2.6
2.0
1.9
2.1
4.4
4.6
4.8
4.9
5.5
2.3
2.8
7.3
2.7
4.0
4.1
3.1
2.9
0.2
1.7
3.9
2.5
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
Greece
Ireland
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
1.8
0.1
0.1
1.5
2.5
0.8
1.4
2.4
1.3
4.1
3.1
2.8
1.6
2.6
7.7
2.0
1.9
2.2
4.0
10.0
1.2
7.3
2.3
3.4
6.6
3.4
2.6
1.0
2.4
7.1
2.7
1.3
1.0
3.7
4.0
0.5
1.1
0.6
2.7
10.4
4.7
4.7
4.9
4.8
7.8
4.7
4.8
4.1
4.8
5.0
2.4
2.6
3.4
4.0
7.7
3.5
2.4
5.9
6.4
5.2
3.9
3.8
3.2
3.4
3.3
2.3
2.8
1.3
3.1
5.2
1.6
2.1
3.0
4.3
3.3
3.4
2.4
4.6
3.5
2.6
87
III GROWTH DIVERGENCES IN THE UNITED STATES, EUROPE, AND JAPAN: TREND OR CYCLICAL?
from new information technologies, as may be happening in the United States currently.
Finland
Spain
3.0
Portugal
Germany
Austria
Italy
France
Netherlands
5000
10000
15000
20000
2.5
Belgium
25000
3.5
2.0
1.5
30000
88
Household Saving
(percent of disposable income)
20
Euro area
15
Japan
10
5
United States
1980 82
84
86
88
90
92
94
96
98 2000 02
04
40
35
Japan
30
25
Euro area
20
15
United States
1980 82
1Shaded
89
84
86
88
90
92
94
96
98 2000 02
04
10
III GROWTH DIVERGENCES IN THE UNITED STATES, EUROPE, AND JAPAN: TREND OR CYCLICAL?
Second Year
Third Year
Fourth Year
Fifth Year
1.2
0.8
0.6
0.3
0.2
1.9
3.3
1.8
1.5
3.5
2.3
0.8
3.1
2.3
0.3
2.5
2.1
0.5
2.3
2.1
79.0
0.9
0.1
0.4
10.3
173.0
1.8
0.8
0.6
6.8
235.0
2.3
0.4
1.7
3.1
280.0
2.7
0.1
2.4
0.9
282.0
2.6
0.5
2.4
5.5
1.2
0.7
0.1
0.6
1.3
0.9
0.4
1.4
1.4
0.2
1.4
1.8
0.1
1.3
1.9
8.0
0.4
0.8
0.4
10.8
40.0
0.7
0.6
0.8
8.8
72.0
1.0
0.7
1.2
6.5
100.0
1.2
0.7
1.3
4.2
111.0
1.3
0.7
1.5
2.2
1.1
0.4
0.4
0.8
1.1
1.2
0.5
1.6
1.8
0.1
2.0
2.3
0.7
2.2
2.4
3.0
0.7
1.2
0.4
15.8
44.0
1.3
0.7
12.1
74.0
1.7
0.7
0.6
8.2
92.0
1.9
0.6
1.0
4.5
90.0
1.8
0.3
1.8
0.8
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.3
1.2
1Baseline
is taken from the World Economic Outlook database, with shocks starting in 2000. The scenario models an increase in U.S. consumers preference for saving and declines in equity prices, especially
in the United States.
90
Second Year
Third Year
Fourth Year
Fifth Year
0.3
0.7
0.8
0.8
0.8
1.0
0.3
0.2
1.1
0.6
0.2
1.0
0.8
0.2
1.1
0.9
1.1
1.0
17.0
0.2
0.8
0.3
10.0
46.0
0.5
0.1
0.2
8.0
62.0
0.6
0.2
0.1
6.5
76.0
0.7
0.3
0.1
5.3
89.0
0.8
0.4
0.2
4.1
0.6
1.1
0.3
1.4
2.0
1.3
1.3
2.1
1.6
1.1
2.0
1.6
0.9
1.9
1.5
15.0
0.1
0.8
1.4
3.8
3.0
0.2
0.3
2.0
3.5
5.0
0.2
0.2
2.0
3.8
13.0
0.3
0.2
1.7
4.0
24.0
0.4
0.2
1.6
4.1
0.8
1.5
0.8
1.4
2.3
1.2
1.7
2.7
11.5
2.1
3.0
1.8
2.5
3.3
1.9
14.0
0.6
0.1
0.4
3.4
31.0
0.9
0.1
0.4
1.1
44.0
1.0
0.4
1.3
51.0
1.1
0.1
1.0
3.0
57.0
1.1
0.2
1.0
4.3
0.1
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.6
1Baseline
is taken from the World Economic Outlook database, with shocks starting in 2000. The scenario models a shift in investor preference away from U.S. dollar assets; an increase in money supply
growth in Europe and Japan; and higher productivity growth in Japan and Europe.
fected. This longer-run result is predicated on structural measures in Europe and Japan that would raise
productivity and thus potential output.
Even in the more favorable accelerated adjustment
scenario the adjustment process that assumes that U.S.
exports pick up and domestic demand slows in tandem
need not be smooth as outlined above. It is possible,
for example, that investors, fearing a pickup in inflation or a drop in output growth, would shift funds out
of the United States quickly, causing a sharp drop in
equity markets and a loss of confidence. Demand
could fall sharply and inflation rise with the higher import prices. The implications for domestic output,
91
IV
Safeguarding Macroeconomic Stability
at Low Inflation
12
10
8
6
4
Standard deviation
2
1970
92
75
80
85
90
95
98
1An alternative to inflation targeting that has received considerable attention in the economic literature is nominal income targeting, but it has not been explicitly adopted by any central bank, perhaps because it is more difficult to explain to the public.
2Japan, like other major central banks, also began to pay more attention to money growth rates, but instead of announcing targets
for money growth it announced forecasts.
93
IV
Table 4.1. Selected Countries: Measurement Bias in the Consumer Price Index
(Percent)
Total
Range
Canada
Germany
Japan
United Kingdom
United States1
0.50
0.75
0.501.50
0.90
0.352.00
0.350.80
1.10
0.801.60
Sources: Allan Crawford, Measurement Biases in the Canadian CPI: An Update, Bank of Canada
Review, pp. 2856 (Spring 1998); Johannes Hoffmann, Problems of Inflation Measurement in Germany,
Deutsche Bundesbank, Economic Research Group, Discussion Paper No. 1/98 (1998); Shigenori
Shiratsuka, Measurement Errors in Japanese Consumer Price Index, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,
Working Paper No. 99-2 (1999); Alistair W.F. Cunningham, Measurement Bias in Price Indices: An
Application to the UKs RPI, Bank of England, Working Paper No. 47 (1996); Advisory Commission to
Study the Consumer Price Index, Toward a More Accurate Measure of the Cost of Living, final report to
the Senate Finance Committee (1996).
1In recent years a number of methodological changes, including the use of updated expenditure weights,
have reduced the measurement bias.
ward bias in the measurement of consumer price inflation it could be argued that the targeted rate of inflation should be some small positive rate rather than
zero (Table 4.1). On analytical grounds too, having to
do with nominal rigidities and the efficacy of countercyclical monetary policy, it could be argued that the
optimal rate of inflation is a small positive rate. From
the announced target ranges for inflation by the countries with explicit inflation targetsranges that typically lie between between 1 and 3 percentit would
appear that the authorities generally agree with this assessment.
Maintaining reasonable price stability does not
mean maintaining a stable price index on a short-term
basisthat is, on a monthly or even a quarterly basis.
First of all, it is not possible to do so because many
factors affect prices on a day-to-day basis and monetary policy is not so precise a tool that it could accomplish the task. Control of inflation requires both that
the central bank be able to forecast its future path and
that the impact of policy changes on that path be
known (or estimated) with some precision. However,
as is the case with other economic variables, inflation
is quite difficult to forecast with any degree of precision, including at short horizons of one quarter. And
the relationship between monetary policy instrumentstypically a very short-term interest rateand
inflation varies considerably over time and is difficult
to estimate precisely.9
Secondly, even if monetary policy could eliminate
short-run fluctuations in inflation, it would not be desirable to do so, since attempts to do so would require
sharp fluctuations in short-term interest rates, creating
increased volatility in money markets and exchange
rates and risking instability in financial markets. Even
the achievement of reasonable stability of inflation on
a yearly basis may not be feasible at all times. Indeed,
the best that realistically can be achieved is reasonable
94
Zero
percent
inflation
Average productivity
increase: 2 percent
in both cases
(both distributions
have a standard
deviation of 2
percentage points)
5 3 1
95
Eight
percent
inflation
3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
Nominal wage increase (percent)
Frequency
Region of
declining
nominal
wages
IV
vided by David Laidler who points out that the classical economists were well aware of price and particularly wage stickiness, while Keynes himself treats
itmuch like the classical economists before him
as a fact of life, which is, however, not central to his
analysis.11
Some analysts and policymakers have concluded
that a moderate positive rate of inflation will facilitate
labor market adjustment by allowing declines in real
wages even if nominal wages are rigid downward.12
Underlying this argument is an assumption of some
degree of money illusion in the wage negotiation
process, which is inconsistent with the assumption of
rational behavior underlying conventional economic
analysis. However, seemingly irrational behaviorincluding incidence of apparent money illusion in various guisesis not uncommon in practice, and often
constitutes a rational response to imperfect information, adjustment costs, and other market imperfections.13 The hypothesis of downward rigidity of nominal wages can therefore not be rejected a priori as
based on unrealistic assumptions, but becomes a legitimate object of empirical investigation.
Survey results for the United States do indeed
document a certain reluctance by employers to reduce
nominal wages and by employees to accept such
reductions. This resistance to declining nominal
wages is overcome usually only where the survival of
the firm is threatened by bankruptcy or other severe
circumstances. A common explanation given for such
behavior is that a cut in real wages brought about by
a reduction in the nominal wage (at zero inflation)
is considered unfair by a significantly larger percentage of persons than an equivalent reduction in
the real wage brought about by a nominal wage
96
20A summary of their findings on nominal wage rigidity is presented in Table 3 of their paper. All studies reviewed show an asymmetry of wage changes about the mean and, with the exception of
evidence from the PSID data set, they all find that reductions in
nominal wages are infrequentmuch more so than could be expected on the basis of normally distributed wage changes.
Concerning the PSID data set, the authors argue that the high incidence of nominal wage cuts reported in this survey can be accounted
for by measurement error. Cf. Akerlof et al., The Macroeconomics
of Low Inflation.
21The discontinuity of the wage change distribution at zero is
extensively documented in a recent paper by Beth Anne Wilson,
Wage Rigidity: A Look Inside the Firm (unpublished;
Washington: Federal Reserve Board, April 1999). The research reported in this paper supports the contention by Akerlof et al. that
downward nominal wage rigidity is widespread and important.
97
IV
10
8
Inflation
2
0
7
8
Unemployment rate
2
10
98
(Percentage points)
(Percentage points)
11
Actual
10
7
Three percent inflation target
10 12
Year
14
10
1924 29 34 39 44 49 54 59 64 69 74 79 84 89 94
16
18
20
0
5
Simulated
Unemployment rate
10
5
Simulated
15
Actual
Actual
Simulated
Simulated
1924 29 34 39 44 49 54 59 64 69 74 79 84 89 94
1Dynamic
15
20
10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
and measures the distortions in unit labor costs introduced by downward nominal wage rigidity. Estimating
this equation on data from 1954 to 1995 and using the resulting parameter estimates to simulate alternative stabilization paths serves to illustrate both the increase in the
cost of adjustment and the permanently higher equilibrium unemployment rate entailed if policymakersstarting from an inflation rate of 6 percentaim at zero rather
than 3 percent steady state inflation under conditions of
downward nominal wage rigidity (see second figure).
The ability of the rigidity augmented Phillips curve to
replicate actual data does not differ greatly from the performance of conventional Phillips curve estimates within
the estimation period (195495). This is because during
that period average wage increases were large enough to
make the rigidity constraint largely inoperative. However,
in out-of-sample simulations covering the interwar depression years, the rigidity augmented Phillips curve replicates
the actual inflation/unemployment experience quite
closely, a test which standard models assuming a vertical
long-run Phillips curve tend to fail (see third figure).7
While the authors recognize that their simulation results are subject to considerable uncertainty, they nevertheless consider that these results provide sufficient evidence to strongly support the idea that the optimal
inflation rate in the United States is a small (but positive)
number. In particular they emphasize that a proper analysis of the optimal rate of inflation requires not only that
the transitory costs of reducing inflation be compared
with the permanent gains of reducing inflation to zero (by
removing inflation distortions), but that the cost calculations need to take account of the permanent costs of
downward nominal wage rigidity and the resulting increase in the equilibrium rate of unemployment at zero
inflation. The authors also argue that this downward
wage rigidity provides a useful safety net against deflationary spirals, and that policymakersrather than aiming at eliminating this downward nominal wage rigidityshould accommodate it by choosing a proper
(nonzero) inflation target.
7According to the standard model, the substantial labor market slack persisting during the depression should not only have
brought inflation to zero (which it did), but also have induced
99
IV
In a different context it has been argued that these effects are not negligible.25 However, a comprehensive
study of the net benefits (or costs) of low inflation, including all the separate effects studied in isolation, is
still outstanding, explaining why the question of what
constitutes the optimal rate of inflation remains controversial.
Zero Interest Rate Floors and the Effectiveness of
Monetary Policy
(Percent a year)
Nominal rates remained well above zero in all countries (except Japan
and Switzerland) throughout the period, while real rates were negative
only in periods of high inflation.
Nominal short-term
interest rate
20 United States
Real short-term
interest rate
20
Japan1
10
10
10
10
(imin = 1.02)
20
1957
67
77
87
20 Germany
(imin = 0.03)
99: 1957
Q2
67
77
87
20
99:
Q2
10
10
10
10
(imin = 2.25)
20
1957
67
77
87
20 United Kingdom
(imin = 3.05)
99: 1957
Q2
67
77
87
20
99:
Q2
20
Switzerland
10
10
10
20
1957
25For an estimate of welfare gains from more efficient cash management at zero inflation, see Alexander L. Wolman, Staggered
Price Setting and the Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates,
Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Vol. 84,
No. 4 (Fall 1998), pp. 124. Extensive research on permanent welfare gains from reducing distortions in private saving/consumption
decisions resulting from the interaction of taxation and inflation is
referred to in Martin Feldstein, The Costs and Benefits of Price
Stability. This volume contains estimates for the permanent level
gains in GDP when inflation is reduced from 2 to zero percent, and
compares these gains with transitory losses entailed by the shift to
price stability for four countries (Germany, Spain, the United
Kingdom, and the United States). The results reported imply large
net gains for the U.S., Germany, and Japan, and a somewhat smaller
net gain for the U.K. The analysis, however, does not address the
issue of permanent losses due to downward rigidity of nominal
wages when inflation is reduced to zero analyzed by Akerlof et al.,
nor does it take into account the constraints on monetary policy resulting from zero inflation.
26The zero floor to nominal interest rates is a consequence of the
existence of government issued currency with a zero nominal interest rate and the fact that the non-pecuniary returns to currency exceed those of other financial assets. In principle the effective interest rate floor could be reduced below zero by taxing currency. See
Willem H. Buiter and Nikolas Panigirtzoglou, Liquidity Traps
How to Avoid Them and How to Escape Them (unpublished;
London: Bank of England, March 1999).
27Real interest rates are defined as the nominal interest rates
minus the (expected) rate of inflation. In practice, ex post real interest rates are computed as the difference between observed nominal
interest and inflation rates. This leaves open the question whether
real interest rates can actually be negative if inflation is fully anticipated; while this seems possible for short-term (policy-determined)
interest rates, it appears less plausible for long-term rates on which
policy exerts only a limited influence.
20
France
10
(imin = 3.18)
67
77
87
(imin = 0.09)
99: 1957
Q2
67
77
87
20
99:
Q2
100
28As discussed above, real rates of interest could reach such low
negative levels only because of high rates of inflation. It has been argued that the easy monetary conditions implied by the negative real
interest rates in the 1970s constituted a policy error, which entailed
a steep rise in inflation. Arguably, a more appropriate response to the
oil price shock would have been a policy geared towards preventing
a rise in inflation expectations and supportive of rapid structural adjustment, rather than expansionary demand management. The cost
of this error continued to be paid in the stabilization recession of
the early 1980s, when the Medium-Term Strategy was formulated
by industrial countries, signaling a shift in policy.
29More recently negative rates of inflation (and rapidly falling
nominal interest rates) have been experienced in some other
economies as well (e.g., Sweden, Australia, China, Hong Kong
SAR), suggesting that the issues discussed here may become relevant for other countries as well.
101
IV
Box 4.2. The Effects of a Zero Floor for Nominal Interest Rates on Real Output:
Selected Simulation Results
This box presents some selected results from recent
studies of how the effectiveness of monetary policy can
be affected by low target rates of inflation in conjunction
with the inability of reducing nominal interest rates
below zero. While the empirical research discussed is
based on U.S. data, the qualitative lessons provided are
applicable more generally. And given the compactness of
the simulation model used, even for the United States the
results should be considered illustrative rather than providing reliable quantitative estimates.1
The rational expectations models used for this analysis have a similar structure,2 comprising equations for
aggregate demand and a forward-looking wage-price determination mechanism. A policy-determined nominal
short-term interest rate is set according to a monetary
policy reaction function, responding to the output gap
and the deviation of actual from targeted inflation, or
in the case of the FM studythe deviation of nominal
GDP from its target level. The long-term real interest
rate, which influences aggregate demand, is derived
from a forward-looking (rational expectations) term
structure equation adjusted for inflation expectations.
Prices are determined as a markup on wages, and the latter are determined in an overlapping contract model, taking account of past wage contracts, expected future wage
settlements, the rate of inflation (both past and anticipated), and the expected output gap over the duration of
the contract. Both models concentrate exclusively on the
interest rate transmission channel of monetary policy,
thereby probably overestimating the importance of the
1
0
2
2
0
1
1998
00
02
04 05:
Q4
1998
00
02
04 05:
Q4
1.0
Output Gap
4
0.5
3
2
1
0.5
0
1
1998
00
02
04 05:
Q4
1998
00
02
04
1.0
05:
Q4
interest rate in steady state (e.g., by pushing up the natural rate of growth), or by picking a sufficiently high
target inflation rate, so that the sum of the two exceeds
effective. On the other hand, to the extent that policy responses tend
to be more cautious the less certain policymakers are about the nature of the underlying shock to be offset, or about the ultimate effect
of changes in policy instruments, increased uncertainty in these
areas tends to reduce the probability that the constraint becomes
binding, but raises the risk that policy reactions are too timid.
102
The first figure depicts two representative simulation results from the OW study, showing how the zero nominal
interest rate floor becomes a binding constraint on expansionary monetary policy when policymakers target a zero
inflation rate in case of an adverse demand shock (top panels of the figure) and in the case of a beneficial wage shock
(bottom panels). In response to the adverse demand shock
at the low target (and thus steady state) inflation rate, monetary authorities cannot lower the policy rate by as much
as indicated by the policy reaction function because the
policy rate attains its zero floor (panel 1). This in turn prevents the real long-term rate from falling as much as implied by a normal (i.e., unconstrained) policy response.
Consequently, monetary policy is unable to provide the desired demand stimulation, resulting in a larger temporary
decline in inflation and output than desired (panel 2). It is
interesting to note that the zero interest rate constraint inflicts the largest losses in output (relative to the unconstrained case) not in case of a negative demand shock, but
in case of a beneficial wage shock (e.g., an autonomous
decline in wages). In this case inflation would fall and
monetary policy could be eased to reap some of the benefits of the positive supply shock in the form of increased
output. But the zero interest rate floor prevents monetary
policy from easing sufficiently (panel 3): real long term
rates will rise rather than fall, causing demand and thus
output to decline rather than increase (panel 4).
More generally, the zero interest rate floor will hamper
monetary policy from pursuing its stabilization objectives whenever the economy experiences shocks for
which the central bank would aim at a real interest rate
sufficiently low so as to require a nominal rate lower than
zero. As a result, the variability of the arguments in the
objective functiontypically some measure of output
and inflationwill increase. This implies a deterioration
in the policy efficiency frontier, characterized by the
trade-off between the standard deviations of the output
gap and inflation, respectively, subject to a maximum
variability of the instrument variable (the policydetermined short-term interest rate). These relationships
are summarized in the second figure, which depicts the
deterioration in the efficiency frontier when a zero rate of
inflation is targeted.
The authors use stochastic simulations to gauge the impact of the zero inflation target on the level of output,
subjecting the model to a large number of shocks mod-
0.7
Efficiency frontier
with zero inflation
target
0.6
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Standard deviation of output gap
0.4
0.8
0.3
1.0
103
IV
104
Deflation Concerns
In the last year or two, with inflation approaching
zero in some countries and price levels declining in
others (Box 4.3), a concern has been expressed by
some that countries may become caught in a deflationary spiral from which it is difficult to escape.
Clearly, once reasonable price stability is achieved
there is an increased likelihood that a downturn in economic activity could result in deflation. And if price
stability were to be maintained over the long run,
cyclical episodes of price declines would presumably
not be uncommon. One difficulty in assessing the consequences of deflation today is that until recently there
have been no significant episodes of deflation in the
post-World War II period.
Concerns about deflation are deeply colored by the
experience of the interwar Great Depression, when
39The United States in the last quarter of the 19th century provides
a good example of an economy that was able to grow rapidly in an
environment of sustained moderate price declines. Between 1875
and 1900, a period during which the United States industrialized
rapidly, prices fell on average by 1 percent per year, while real output grew at an average annual rate of a little over 4 percentsee
James Bullard, Deflation and Economic Growth, The Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, National Economic Trends, March 1998,
p. 1. It should be noted, however, that periods during which prices
were declining faster than trend were periods during which industrial production was declining as well. It should also be recalled that
this was a period of considerable macroeconomic turbulence, with
large fluctuations in prices and output around their trends. For instance, the period from 1890 to 1897, dubbed the disturbed years
by Friedman and Schwartz, witnessed three recessions.
40This point was emphasized by John Maynard Keynes, A Tract
on Monetary Reform (London: Macmillan, 1924).
37Of course, fiscal expansion will not crowd out private expenditures through interest rate effects in the case of a liquidity trap.
38As noted, a decisive advantage of public consumption and investment expenditure over monetary policy is that the former does
not rely on indirect incentive effects but can raise aggregate demand
directly. It may therefore be necessary to resort to fiscal demand
management if monetary policy should indeed turn out to be ineffective in stimulating demand. The current situation in Japan seems
to be a case in point, though the high debt/GDP ratio already attained and its projected further increase may limit the credibility and
thus the effectiveness of further fiscal stimulus. A good part of the
policy debate between monetarists and Keynesians is about how
likely it is for monetary policy ever to be ineffective, and how effective expansionary fiscal policy will be when expansionary monetary policy has proved ineffective.
105
IV
Nondeflation Periods
____________________
Prices
Output
Prices
3.7
3.7
2.0
1.1
1.2
3.0
4.7
4.2
2.8
3.5
3.0
1.2
1.8
4.0
2.1
1.3
1.4
1.1
1.6
2.0
2.8
1.7
Output
Memorandum:
Years of Deflation
4.4
2.7
2.6
1.6
2.2
1.9
4.6
2.1
3.3
3.0
2.8
5
4
8
2
14
8
3
8
12
10
7
7.3
6.6
7.1
3.7
3.4
4.1
6.6
2.6
4.2
3.5
4.9
8
8
4
5
8
9
4
5
8
7
7
18821913
United States
Japan2
Germany
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Canada
Belgium
Sweden
Denmark
Average
1.4
4.4
1.8
0.2
1.4
1.0
1.1
1.5
2.2
1.8
1.7
192339
United States
Japan3
Germany
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Canada
Belgium
Sweden
Denmark
Average
4.2
6.7
6.4
5.8
5.4
3.1
6.2
5.6
3.0
5.0
5.1
United States
Japan4
Germany
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Canada
Belgium
Sweden
Denmark
Average
1.6
4.2
6.1
5.5
2.3
3.8
3.3
5.8
4.1
3.8
0.9
2.2
1.9
1.1
0.6
8.6
1.1
2.7
2.3
1.0
1.8
5.7
1.6
10.2
6.1
1.9
0.6
8.7
1.5
3.0
4.1
1.8
6.3
1.6
11.1
6.1
1.9
0.6
9.6
1.5
2.9
4.4
7.3
7.9
7.1
4.4
3.4
4.1
6.6
2.7
4.2
3.5
5.1
4
6
0
2
4
4
0
2
4
4
4
106
the authorities charged with achieving that goal, and private agents
perceptions of the conduct of policy and how these influence their
expectations and actionssee David Laidler, The Exchange Rate
Regime and Canadas Monetary Order, Bank of Canada Working
Paper 99-7 (Ottawa, March 1999).
49On Japans experience see Tamim Bayoumi, The Morning
After: Explaining the Slowdown in Japanese Growth in the 1990s,
Working Paper 99/13 (Washington: IMF, January 1999).
107
IV
Change3
Country
Algeria
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Barbados
Belize
Brazil
Brunei Darussalam
Bulgaria
Cameroon
Canada
Central African Republic
China
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Congo, Republic of
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Hong Kong SAR
Israel
Japan
Kuwait
Macedonia, FYR
Maldives
Mali
New Zealand
Niger
Nigeria
Norway
Oman
Qatar
Rwanda
Period2
Price Index
GDP deflator
CPI (monthly)
CPI (monthly)
CPI (quarterly)
GDP deflator
GDP deflator
CPI (monthly)
CPI
CPI (monthly)
GDP deflator
CPI (monthly)
CPI (monthly)
GDP deflator
CPI
CPI
CPI (monthly)
GDP deflator
GDP deflator
CPI
GDP deflator
CPI (monthly)5
CPI (monthly)
CPI (monthly)
GDP deflator
CPI (monthly)
CPI
CPI
CPI (quarterly)
CPI (monthly)
GDP deflator
GDP deflator
GDP deflator
GDP deflator
CPI (monthly)
199798
8/986/99
3/989/98
Q1/97Q3/97
199798
199798
9/974/99
199798
6/9811/98
199798
5/986/99
5/971/98
199798
199798
199798
4/9712/97
199798
199798
199597
199798
5/986/99
12/983/99
10/972/99
199698
2/981/99
199798
199697
Q3/98Q1/99
8/982/99
199798
199798
199698
199697
12/975/99
Price
(percent)
2.8
1.7
12.7
0.7
5.7
5.4
3.9
0.9
1.0
0.2
5.1
6.8
0.6
1.9
0.8
30.4
16.9
0.9
8.6
15.1
4.3
1.4
1.2
14.1
3.5
1.4
0.4
1.1
7.2
6.4
0.4
15.2
9.7
6.9
Memorandum: 1999
Consumer
Price Inflation4
(percent)
5.3
0.8
2.7
1.8
5.5
1.0
2.5
2.0
4.6
1.0
1.5
2.0
1.5
2.4
1.5
40.0
7.4
5.5
3.6
2.0
3.1
5.5
0.4
0.9
2.0
2.3
2.5
1.3
3.0
12.5
2.3
0.3
2.6
0.5
sential element of macroeconomic stability. The distortionary and harmful effects of inflation are well
known. By distorting relative price signals, increasing
uncertainty about future prices, and generally reducing
108
(concluded)
Country
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Singapore
Sweden
Syrian Arab Republic
Thailand
Uganda
Price Index
Period2
Price Change3
(percent)
Memorandum: 1999
Consumer
Price Inflation4
(percent)
GDP deflator
CPI (monthly)
CPI (monthly)
CPI (monthly)
CPI
CPI (monthly)
CPI (monthly)
199798
9/985/99
11/9710/98
9/9712/98
199798
8/986/99
1/987/98
13.4
2.9
1.7
1.4
1.2
1.6
6.3
1.5
2.0
0.2
0.2
2.5
0.5
5.0
Source: CPI (consumer price index) from IMF, International Financial Statistics, or IMF staff estimates and GDP deflator from WEO
database.
1During 199699.
2Starting and ending periods of price index decline in years, quarters, or months according to data availability.
3Price change is calculated as the percent change of the price index (second column of this table) between the first date and the last
date of the period (third column) and reflects the period yielding the maximum decrease in the price index.
4IMF staff projections for annual consumer price inflation.
5Composite consumer price index.
197079
198089
199099
199799
Annual data
CPI
All countries
Industrial countries
Nonindustrial countries
8.4
0.9
11.9
1.9
0.0
2.4
4.2
1.3
4.8
4.0
1.0
4.6
4.0
2.2
4.4
GDP deflator
All countries
Industrial countries
Nonindustrial countries
14.6
0.7
16.6
9.4
0.0
10.7
10.8
2.3
12.0
5.9
5.1
6.0
7.3
6.8
7.3
PPI/WPI
All countries
Industrial countries
Nonindustrial countries
12.9
11.9
13.6
3.8
3.1
4.2
9.8
13.9
7.7
13.9
26.5
8.0
25.8
40.5
18.9
Monthly data
CPI
All countries
Industrial countries
Nonindustrial countries
12.2
1.5
16.8
3.2
0.0
4.1
5.7
2.0
6.6
5.5
1.9
6.2
7.1
3.8
7.7
PPI/WPI
All countries
Industrial countries
Nonindustrial countries
15.3
12.1
17.7
4.7
4.3
5.0
10.0
15.1
6.5
16.6
29.2
9.8
25.0
41.8
17.3
Source: CPI (consumer price index) and PPI/WPI (producer or wholesale price index) from IMF, International Financial Statistics,
and GDP deflator from WEO database.
1Observations (country-periods) when year-on-year inflation was negative as a percent of all available observations. For example, for
the first (upper-left) cell in the table, there were 67 instances where countries had negative CPI inflation in a given year during 196069
out of 796 available observations (country-years).
109
IV
110
policy-induced recessions.58 Indeed, during the current U.S. expansion, the inflation rate has declined,
which is unlike any other expansion in the postwar period. In contrast to the U.S. experience, the Japanese
economy has been in a slump through most of the
1990s, while for the euro area as a whole unemployment rates have remained persistently high and there is
no evidence that cyclical fluctuations in output have
moderated. Indeed, the uneven growth among the
three major currency areas and growing trade imbalances have raised concerns about macroeconomic stability in the years ahead. More broadly, considering
the string of emerging market financial crises, there is
little to suggest that macroeconomic instability in the
world economy has diminished.
It would be inappropriate, however, to assign exclusive importance to policies and exogenous shocks in
explaining economic fluctuations. Economic expansions do not necessarily result in excessive inflation to
be countered by tight monetary policy; nor do increases in official interest rates to dampen a boom necessarily cause or explain recessions. Rather, at the core
of business cycles stand endogenous interacting movements in business profits, investment, and credit.59
This does not mean that policies do not play a role in
alleviating or contributing to recessions; but the view
that market economies are inherently stable and that it
is excessively stimulatory policies that first cause excesses to develop and then belatedly curtail them, engendering a downturn in real activity, clearly do not
fully reflect international experience.
A second aspect of the relationship between price
stability and macroeconomic stability has come to the
fore in recent years, as central banks have increasingly focused on price stability as the main, or even
the sole, long-run goal of monetary policy. The concern has arisen whether such a narrow focus might
compromise the stability of the financial system. The
concern is that in the absence of a perceived threat to
its inflation goal, a central bank may fail to respond in
a timely manner to developments that may place the
financial system at risk of instability. An alternative
view maintains, in contrast, that price level instability
can exacerbate financial instability, which might then
result in economic instability more broadly. A monetary policy directed at maintaining price stability,
therefore, would enhance both financial and economic stability.
Underlying this alternative view is the notion that
price instability leads to inefficient lending because it
increases the uncertainty faced by both borrowers and
Inflation
10
0
Output gap
5
1970
1Data
111
75
80
85
90
95
99
IV
Index at
peak year
Starting Year
Peak year
Industrial countries
Finland
Ireland
Japan
Spain
1981
1982
1982
1983
1989
1989
1989
1989
527
320
427
389
Finland
Ireland
Norway
United States
1992
1992
1982
1980
1998
1998
1997
1998
447
544
863
477
Emerging markets
Israel
Korea
Malaysia
Mexico
Thailand
1988
1983
1986
1988
1986
1993
1989
1996
1994
1994
407
608
378
528
646
Trough year
Index at
trough year
1992
1992
1992
1992
240
227
210
247
1996
1992
1998
1995
1998
202
308
157
344
130
flation. But it may not be the maintenance of price stability per se that engenders booms in asset prices.
Rather, booms in asset prices tend to be associated, in
a mutually reinforcing manner, with relatively long
economic expansions which breed overconfidence,
overborrowing, overinvestment, and overconsumption.
In turn, long expansions are associated with relatively
low inflation. Rising equity prices help to keep the expansion going by lowering the cost of capital, which
spurs investment, and, through wealth effects, by raising consumption. They may also channel part of the
monetary growth into the demand for stocks, which
may restrain the rise in prices of goods and services
and accentuate the rise in equity prices.61 Business expansions, especially long expansions, ultimately give
rise to imbalances that make them unsustainable. The
difficult task of policy is to forestall the speculative excesses in asset prices, especially in equity and real estate prices, that sometimes develop during long expansions by preventing the overexpansion of credit that
feeds asset price bubbles.
Table 4.3 summarizes medium-term developments
in equity markets in selected industrial countries and
emerging market economies over the past two
decades, singling out periods of rapidly rising equity
prices and those of significant price falls. The following features stand out: typically periods of rising equity prices are prolonged, coinciding with periods of
rapid output growth and moderate or declining inflation. In both industrial countries and emerging market
61Zarnowitz,
112
economies, periods of equity price increases have usually been accompanied by large capital inflows, rapid
expansion of domestic demandoften in the form of
investment boomsand a deteriorating external balance. The contraction of equity prices is usually rather
sudden and often coincides with, or leads to, a significant deterioration in the real economy. However, not
all periods of significant equity price rises are followed by a disruptive correction.
What leads to a sudden reversal to prolonged rises in
equity prices during a boom? The empirical evidence
suggests that it occurs when monetary conditions
tighten significantly, either because monetary authorities react to the manifestation of actual or prospective
inflationary pressures, or because of large swings in
transborder capital flows, as was the case in Mexico in
1994 and Thailand in 1997.
Monetary policyand demand management policies in generalseem a blunt instrument to prevent
large swings in asset prices from adversely affecting
the real economy, or from preventing such swings in
asset prices in the first place. It is therefore important
to recall the role of prudential regulations and supervision of the financial sector in preventing asset price
behavior from threatening macroeconomic stability.
Part of their task is to limit the tendency of easy monetary conditions to entail asset price inflation, and to
reduce adverse repercussions of substantial declines in
asset prices on the balance sheets of private businesses
(including banks and other financial institutions) and
households alike. The 1988 Capital Accord reached
among members of the Bank for International
Settlements in Basel constitutes a major supranational
effort to safeguard the stability of the international
banking system. By establishing risk-adjusted minimum capital requirements the Accord aims to prevent
excessive risk taking as international competition
among banks intensifies. However, experience with
the Accord has revealed that some of its features lead
to procyclical bank lending behavior, and this is one of
the reasons why it is currently under review by the
Basel Committee.62
Not every asset price collapse needs to entail a recession, as witnessed by the experience of the 1987
stock market crash. The initial magnitude of the
October 1987 stock market collapse was comparable
to that of 1929, and like the latter it extended around
the globe. But the policy reaction in 1987 was very
different from that in 1929, with central banks taking
seriously their roles as lenders of last resort in response to a sudden surge in liquidity preference, and
governments worldwide refrained from interfering
with free world trade in order to protect the domestic
63Calculated price increases for the U.S. stock market are percent
changes for the monthly averages of the S&P 500 index.
64Valuation measures are generally not comparable across countries because of differences in accounting practices, tax laws, the
relative importance of cross shareholding, and the structure and operation of financial markets.
65Although stock prices in Japan have generally declined in recent
years, they have risen sharply in recent months.
113
IV
100
1987 crash
80
1929 crash
60
Index1
GDP
Output Developments
120
110
1987 crash
100
90
1929 crash
80
70
1928/86 1929/87 1930/88 1931/89 1932/90 1933/91
40
20
Sep. 1928
Aug. 1986
Sep. 1929
Aug. 1987
Sep. 1930
Aug. 1988
Sep. 1931
Aug. 1989
114
1500
1000
Japan
500
500
200
100
50
United States
200
100
Japan
15
1960
70
80
90
99:
Q2
1960
70
80
90
99:
Q2
1500
1000
1000
500
500
200
100
50
50
Germany
Germany
200
France
100
France
15
1960
50
70
80
90
99:
Q2
80
90
99:
Q2
1500
1000
Sweden
500
United
Kingdom
200
100
some supply shocks, such as a discovery of natural resources, the induced wealth effect may also lead to excess demand
and inflation in the near term because the increase in demand may
precede the increase in supply.
69See, for example, Bank for International Settlements, The Role
of Asset Prices in the Formulation of Monetary Policy (1998); B.S.
Lee, Causal Relations Among Stock Returns, Interest Rates, Real
Activity, and Inflation, Journal of Finance, Vol. 47 (1992); and
Martha Staff-McCluer, Stock Market Wealth and Consumer
Spending (unpublished; Washington: Federal Reserve System,
Board of Governors, 1998). For evidence that the wealth effect from
equity prices has increased in the United States in recent years, perhaps because household equity holdings have increased and market
capitalization has grown larger than nominal output, see Vincent R.
Reinhart, Equity Prices and Monetary Policy in the United States,
in BIS, The Role of Asset Prices in the Formulation of Monetary
Policy.
70
Sweden
1000
500
68For
1960
200
United
Kingdom
50
100
15
1960
50
70
80
90
99:
Q2
1960
70
80
90
99:
Q2
115
IV
Price-Earnings Ratios
Price-Dividend Ratios
250
200
60
Japan
150
Japan
40
100
United
States
20
United
States
1965 70 75 80 85 90 95 99:
Q2
35
Price-Earnings Ratios
1965 70 75 80 85 90 95 99:
Q2
Price-Dividend Ratios
50
0
80
30
25
Germany
60
Germany
20
40
15
10
5
20
France
1965 70 75 80 85 90 95 99:
Q2
35
France
Price-Earnings Ratios
1965 70 75 80 85 90 95 99:
Q2
Price-Dividend Ratios
80
30
25
Sweden
Sweden
20
60
40
15
10
5
20
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
0
1965 70 75 80 85 90 95 99:
Q2
1965 70 75 80 85 90 95 99:
Q2
116
(Percent of GDP)
Net private financial balances have turned negative in several
countries, leading to concerns of a sharp correction, as occurred
in some countries in the past.
Net private saving
12
Australia
12
Canada
12
12
1960
12
70
80
90
99
Denmark
1960
70
80
90
12
New
Zealand
12
1960
12
99
70
80
90
99
Ireland
1960
70
80
90
12
99
12
United States
12
1960
70
80
90
99
1960
70
80
90
12
99
117
IV
12
12
France
Finland
12
1960
12
70
80
90
99
1960
70
80
90
12
99
12
Japan
Germany
12
1960
12
70
80
90
99
1960
70
80
90
99
12
United Kingdom
Sweden
12
12
1960
12
70
80
90
99
1960
70
80
90
99
may also be a result of permanent shocks to these fundamental variables. Examples of these permanent
shocks include higher future productivity growth (and
thereby expected dividend growth) and lower ex ante
118
20
Short-Term Rates
15
Nominal
10
5
Real
0
1980
82
84
86
88
90
92
94
96
99:
Q1
20
Long-Term Rates
15
Nominal
10
5
Real
0
1980
82
84
86
88
90
92
94
96
99:
Q1
2
1
0
1
2
1980
82
84
86
88
90
92
94
96
99:
Q1
119
IV
14
12
10
8
6
4
Narrow money 2
Broad money
1980
82
84
86
88
90
92
94
96
99:
Q1
14
12
10
8
6
Nominal GDP
4
Broad money
1980
82
84
86
88
90
2
92
94
96
99:
Q1
0
8
6
4
2
0
2
4
1980
82
84
86
88
90
92
94
96
99:
Q1
particular, an increase in the proportion of the population that is in the prime earning and saving portion
of the lifecycle. If these explanations are correct, the
unusually large run-up in stock prices in recent years
120
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
10
20
30
40
100
80
60
40
20
0
20
40
60
80
United States
100
80
60
40
20
0
20
40
60
80
Japan
Equity prices1
(left scale)
Excess money
growth
(right scale)
Equity prices
(left scale)
1980
82
84
86
88
90
92
94
96
Equity prices
(left scale)
1980
1980
82
84
86
88
90
92
94
96
Equity prices
(left scale)
82
84
86
88
90
92
94
96
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1
2
3
4
98 99:
Q2
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
4
6
8
98 99:
Q2
10
8
6
4
2
0
2
4
6
8
98 99:
Q2
confidence and result in overly optimistic assessments of future stock market returns and volatility,
thereby leading investors to underestimate the inherent risks in equities and leading to some stock price
121
IV
Dividend
Yield
Real GDP
Growth
Real
Interest Rate3
Inflation
Rate
Equity
Premium4
3.1
3.9
2.4
2.3
1.0
4.5
3.5
2.4
2.0
2.5
1.9
2.9
2.1
2.6
5.0
4.2
4.1
3.5
2.5
3.6
3.9
4.4
4.7
2.7
7.8
1.9
5.7
4.3
0.5
1.7
0.8
0.7
1.4
3.2
2.4
Canada
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
United Kingdom
United States
Current5
Canada
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
United Kingdom
United States
Potential
Overvaluation
Canada
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
United Kingdom
United States
Dividend
Yield
Potential
GDP Growth6
Real
Interest Rate3
Inflation
Rate
Implied
Equity
Premium7
Implied Expected
Real Dividend
Growth8
1.7
2.2
1.3
2.1
0.8
2.9
1.3
2.4
2.3
2.1
1.8
2.1
2.5
2.7
4.7
3.8
3.2
2.7
0.4
2.2
3.3
0.5
0.3
0.5
1.4
0.1
2.3
1.7
0.5
0.7
0.3
1.3
2.5
3.3
0.8
3.4
3.3
2.6
1.3
1.0
2.5
4.3
Implied Equity
Premium Reduction9
1.1
1.0
0.6
0.6
1.1
0.1
1.6
1.0
1.0
0.5
0.5
1.1
0.0
1.6
1These illustrative calculations are based on the Gordon equation (described in the text), which incorporates several simplying assumptions, including constant interest rate, equity premium, and expected dividend growth.
2Geometric averages for 198099 (through first quarter 1999 or most recent data available).
3Nominal 10-year or longer government bond deflated using the CPI.
4Calculated using the historical averages of the dividend yield, real interest rate, inflation rate, and real
GDP growth (as a proxy for expected real dividend growth).
5First quarter 1999, except fourth quarter 1998 for the real interest rate in France and Japan.
6IMF staff estimates.
7Calculated using the current values for the dividend yield, real interest rate, inflation rate, and potential
real GDP growth (as a proxy for expected real dividend growth).
8Calculated using the historical average of equity premium and the current values for the dividend yield,
real interest rate, and inflation rate.
9Historical equity premium less implied equity premium.
10Implied real dividend growth less potential GDP growth.
122
Table 4.5. Selected Countries: Correlation of Equity Price Inflation and Goods Price Inflation1
(Percent)
Contemporaneous
Equity lagged one year
Equity lagged two years
Equity lagged three years
All
Industrial2
Canada
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
United
Kingdom
United
States
14.3
5.8
0.1
1.4
11.6
2.9
19.7
3.8
20.2
5.9
0.5
6.2
33.9
42.1
20.0
9.9
3.9
2.8
1.9
4.8
14.5
14.3
25.6
11.9
8.7
28.4
9.4
0.8
35.8
20.4
12.2
15.9
77These illustrative calculations are based on the Gordon equation, which employs several simplifying assumptions, including
constant interest rates, equity premiums, and expected dividend
growth.
78Based on the Gordon equation, the implied price overvaluation
is an increasing function of the implied excess expected real dividend growth or the implied reduction in the equity premium. Similar
results can be found in Mike Kennedy, Angel Palerm, Charles
Pigott, and Flavia Terribile, Asset Prices and Monetary Policy,
OECD Working Paper No. 188 (Paris), and IMF, International
Capital Markets (1999).
79Jeremy J. Siegel, Stocks for the Long Run (New York: McGrawHill, 1998).
80Another explanation is that tax codes that are not fully indexed
for inflation affect the after-tax return to investors by lowering real
after-tax corporate profits, dividends, and capital gains when inflation is high.
81A recent study for the United States finds that the negative correlation between equity valuations and expected inflation stems
from the fact that a rise in expected inflation coincides with both
lower expected real earnings growth and higher required real returnssee Steven A. Sharpe, Stock Prices, Expected Returns, and
Inflation(Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, April 1999).
123
IV
84This may create moral hazard, but moral hazard can be limited
with effective supervision and regulation. Also, see Mark Gertler,
Marvin Goodfriend, Otmar Issing, and Luigi Spaventa, Asset Prices
and Monetary PolicyFour Views (London: Centre for Economic
Policy Research, 1998) for views on why asset price inflation is less
of a concern when there is goods price stability.
85Armen A. Alchian and Benjamin Klein, On a Correct Measure
of Inflation, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 5 (1973),
advocate using an intertemporal cost of living index (ICLI) to properly reflect changes in the purchasing power of money. A price index
based on the ICLI was developed and computed for Japan by
Hiroshi Shibuya, Dynamic Equilibrium Price Index: Asset Price
and Inflation, Bank of Japan Monetary and Economic Studies,
Vol. 10, No. 1 (1992), pp. 95109, and Shigenori Shiratsuka, Asset
Price Fluctuation and Price Indices, Bank of Japan, Institute for
Monetary and Economic Studies, Discussion Paper No. 99E21,
July 1999.
86The optimal weight for each type of asset in these broader indices will depend on the impact of asset prices on current and future
economic activity.
87The intuition here is that changes in asset prices have differing
impacts on economic activity over time depending on the underlying causes affecting the asset prices. Therefore, the optimal weights
for each asset vary over time.
124
international competition and domestic structural reforms that remove barriers to competitive pricing. In
the case of positive supply developments, the concern
is that resistance to deflation might result in excessive
monetary expansion which in the first instance might
be reflected in asset price inflation, especially equity
prices, rather than in consumer prices. Fear of precipitating a sharp drop in equity prices might then deter
the central bank from tightening policy until financial
imbalances and inflationary pressures have clearly
surfaced.
The solution to this dilemma, however, is not to
abandon price stability as a long-run goal of monetary
policy, nor to redefine price stability more broadly to
include asset prices. First of all, permanent increases
in the economy-wide rate of growth of productivity are
unlikely to be so large as to imply a rate of deflation
that if not resisted would adversely affect consumer
and business sentiment, and lead to a contraction in
demand and real activity. Deflations associated with
positive supply developments are likely to be mild and
temporary. Secondly, redefining price stability more
broadly to include asset prices would not be particularly helpful: not only because of the difficulty of constructing and applying such a price index, but also because directly focusing monetary policy on asset
prices can be destabilizing. While in retrospect it may
seem clear that monetary policy mistakes were made
during past episodes of rapidly rising asset prices, it is
not at all clear that the mistakes occurred because central banks focused on the wrong price index. A forward-looking monetary policy will take into account
the effect of asset price movements on future inflation,
but precisely how policy settings should be adjusted in
response to asset price developments is not always
clear, in part because the leading indicator properties
of asset prices are not well established.
The critical issues facing policymakers are: When
should they be concerned about the behavior of asset
prices? And how should they act? Two situations may
be distinguished. One is a sharp break in asset prices
that generates turbulence in financial markets and
threatens to disrupt the financial systemfor instance,
the stock market crashes in October 1987. In these circumstances there is no question that central banks
should respond to the asset price declines by supplying the needed liquidity. The other situation is a persistent buildup of asset prices, during which there is
little evidence of inflationary pressures, but that
threatens to destabilize economic activity and financial markets in the event of a crash. In this case there
may be reasons to presume that inflationary pressures
are mounting but they are being temporarily offset by
benign influences. There may also be reasons to believe that the buildup in asset prices carries an increased risk of a crash. In this case too central banks
need to act. The response of policy to asset price
movements should be symmetricalthat is, policy
125
IV
tors of inflationary pressuresthat is, measures of inflation in goods and services pricesmay not provide
sufficiently unambiguous signals at low inflation rates
to allow policymakers to rely primarily or exclusively
on them in gauging the extent of imbalances that may
be developing in an economy as the expansion matures. Central banks cannot ignore the implications for
the economy of large changes in asset prices, particularly when they may signal deviations from fundamentalsnotwithstanding the fact that these deviations will be difficult (or even impossible) to measure.
Monetary authorities should attempt to ascertain the
underlying reasons for the changes in asset prices and
determine their relationship to current and future economic activity. In particular, central banks should examine asset price inflation in light of other developing
imbalances that can be suddenly reversed, including
external and private sector financial balances as well
as growth in money and credit aggregates that persistently exceeds growth in nominal output by a large
margin. Monetary policy should not target or attempt
to stabilize asset prices, but neither can it neglect the
consequences for economic and financial stability of
asset price movements and unsustainable balance
sheet developments.
126
V
Trends and Issues in the Global
Trading System
180
Least developed
countries
160
Industrial countries
140
120
100
Countries in
transition
1990
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
80
127
Policy Trends
10
8
6
4
2
Countries
in transition
Africa
Middle East
Western
and Europe Hemisphere
Asia
128
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
41.4
59.0
8.9
18.7
3.8
42.2
58.7
11.1
19.3
5.8
43.7
59.5
14.0
19.1
7.8
45.8
56.2
18.5
20.0
9.8
48.0
56.8
19.2
22.7
10.5
46.2
63.5
20.3
23.0
11.8
47.6
62.8
22.7
22.9
10.4
49.1
62.1
24.8
22.1
10.0
51.0
62.5
24.8
20.6
10.0
Unilateral Liberalization
In the mid- to late-1980s and early 1990s, unilateral
liberalization reflected a major shift in attitudes in developing, newly industrialized, and transition economies away from inward-looking policies of importsubstitution that had earlier characterized their
policymaking. To a large extent, the change was
caused by recognition of the economic inefficiencies
and anti-export bias which those policies had produced. Unilateral trade reform has generally been proportional to the initial degree of restrictiveness, with
the transition being most evident in Latin America and
central and eastern Europe, followed by southeast
Asia. Some progress in the same direction has been
made in south Asia and Africa, albeit to a lesser degree. Many of the reforms, particularly in Latin
America, eastern Europe, and Africa, have been implemented in the context of programs supported by the
IMF and the World Bank.2
Central and South American countries have implemented substantial reforms on a unilateral basis, with
trade liberalization having become a symbol of economic progress. Chile pioneered reforms in the late
1970s, and trade liberalization took hold more broadly
from the mid-1980s, with early reformers, such as in
Mexico and Bolivia, followed in the late 1980s and
early 1990s by the majority of other Latin American
and Caribbean countries. The initial focus was on the
elimination of nontariff barriers (NTBs), which covered up to 100 percent of tariff lines in central
American countries and 60 percent in South American
countries in the mid-1980s, and which have been reduced to less than 10 percent of tariff lines in most
3Tariff data for Latin America are drawn from Crisis and Reform
in Latin America, World Bank, 1998.
4Impressively, Peru reduced average tariffs from 110 percent to 15
percent in two years (199092), and Colombia from 34 percent to
12 percent in one year (199091).
129
Services
160
Manufactures
140
Agriculture
120
Mining
100
1990
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
80
130
cultural and services sectors, and Switzerland has removed many of its NTBs, prompted by the creation of
the European Single Market and Switzerlands consequent need to maintain competitiveness vis--vis
European Union firms. Broadly speaking, however,
trade reform in these countries has been driven by regional initiatives and by the multilateral liberalization
process. The latter has focused particularly on advanced sectors, particularly telecommunications and
information technology. Agriculture remains highly
restrictive and implementation of the Uruguay Round
Agreement on Textiles has been heavily backloaded.
Regional Initiatives
The 1990s were marked by a substantial expansion
in the scope and number of regional trade agreements.
By 1999, there were more than 100 RTAs in force, and
others are under negotiation. Nearly all countries participate in at least one agreement. Often, such agreements are aimed at wider geopolitical objectives, such
as strengthening political relations or security with
neighboring countries. Their impact on world trade is
a complex issue. On the one hand, some RTAs have
provided powerful motivation for structural reforms in
member countries (for example, the EU and NAFTA),
and some have offered a means for countries to take
their first steps toward the broader process of integration into the world economy (for instance, Vietnams
experience with ASEAN). In many cases, progress
made in eliminating intraregional barriers to trade has
facilitated access not only for members but also for
third countries. In some areas, such as technical regulations and standards, regional processes have
achieved faster and deeper liberalization than has been
possible at the multilateral level. At the same time, certain aspects of regionalism cause concern, particularly
when tariff preferences are granted to regional members; where complex rules of origin have been imposed to safeguard regional preferences (frequently
the case in sensitive sectors such as automobiles and
textiles); and where the accession of new members has
led to increases in tariffs by existing members. In addition, powerful regional groupings may discourage
smaller member countries from adopting more liberal
trade policies unilaterally.
Regional integration has the greatest benefits when it
is outward-oriented, i.e., based on nondiscrimination
and transparency, and is complementary to liberalization on a Most Favored Nation basis. This is the case
for the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
agreement, whose members have committed themselves to extending any trade liberalization they agree
among themselves on an MFN basis. In some other regional groupings, such as ASEAN, members have been
careful to reduce preferential and MFN tariffs concurrently, so that margins of preference for regional suppliers have remained constant and relatively limited. In
131
tegration is also developing in south Asia, with the recent signature of an FTA between India and Sri Lanka.
RTAs have featured increasingly strongly in trade
liberalization in Africa during the 1990s. In west and
central Africa, countries in both monetary zones are
seeking to establish closer integration with fellow
members while opening up to the rest of the world.
Thus in the West African Economic and Monetary
Union, member countries have reduced external tariffs
and extended bilateral preferences in preparation for
the establishment of a common external tariff in
January 2000. Various groupings have proliferated in
southern and eastern Africa, sometimes with overlapping memberships, and conflicting rules and administrative procedures.5 Overlapping regional groupings
may increase confusion and uncertainty, and the complexity of doing business for foreign investors. This
makes it even more important that reductions in external tariffs are priority actions for all the RTAs.
132
of protection in areas of interest to developing countries, particularly agriculture, textiles and clothing,
footwear, and some consumer goods. Given that the
recovery of emerging market economies depends
largely on a pickup of exports, which in turn depends
significantly on open markets in these products,
progress in these areas would be generally beneficial.
Progress would also reinforce the case for liberal trade
policies in developing countries. In this regard, only a
comprehensive set of multilateral trade negotiations
can generate the kinds of trade-off that will help developing, including the least developed, countries to
feel that they are full participants in the negotiations.
one-fifth of world trade, or $1,300 billion. Services account for about 60 percent of world output, averaging
some two-thirds in high-income countries and onethird in low-income countries. Despite the slowdown
of the last two years, trade in services has grown at an
average rate of 7 percent a year since the beginning of
the decade, slightly exceeding the growth of merchandise trade. The flow of foreign direct investment (FDI)
in services has grown even faster than cross-border
trade. The participation of developing countries increased in the recent WTO Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) negotiations on basic telecommunications and financial services, and the liberalization of
services markets entails major benefits for all participants, both developed and developing. Opening to foreign competition and presence is the source of major
productivity gains, by creating incentives for restructuring inefficient activities and attracting fresh foreign
capital. The gains from increased services trade spread
beyond the services sector to benefit the entire economy, as services constitute important inputs in the production of goods.
Preparations for the services negotiations that will
be launched at Seattle are underway. The main focus
of the negotiations will be the improvement of access
conditionsthe Agreement speaks of achieving a
progressively higher level of liberalization. This
means improving the quality of existing commitments
(through the removal of limitations now contained in
members schedules) and including new sectors. The
basis for negotiations will be the schedules negotiated
in the Uruguay Round plus the further commitments
which have been undertaken in subsequent negotiations and in the accession of new members. There will
clearly be interest in extending commitments in a
number of sectors where relatively few commitments
were made in the Uruguay Round: distribution, construction, education, and health services are among
these, as is maritime transport, on which there is a specific agreement to resume the negotiations suspended
in 1996. Further liberalization in basic telecommunications and financial services is also expected.
The new services negotiations will also cover a
number of systemic issues relating to the GATS. An
Annex to the GATS provides for the review and renegotiation of current exemptions from MFN treatment.
There is also a commitment to consider extending the
coverage of the Agreement in the air transport sector,
where at present the great bulk of the industry is explicitly excluded. It is also clear that the ongoing negotiations on emergency safeguard measures, subsidies, and government procurement of services, on
which the Agreement contains no disciplines at present, will be continued in the new Round, with improved chances of bringing them to conclusion.
Agriculture is the other key area of the built-in
agenda. Through the Uruguay Round Agreement, agriculture became subject to strengthened and opera-
133
134
the current system under the WTO is a major improvement, it has also proved to be sluggish and inefficient. This has made it particularly costly for developing countriesespecially the least developed
among themto participate in dispute settlement. The
review of the WTO dispute settlement system should
aim at improving the implementation of rulings to ensure a better participation of the developing, and particularly the least developed, countries.
prospect for negotiations in the near future. In the absence of a multilateral consensus on competition issues, bilateral cooperation in dealing with anticompetitive practices is developing slowly and carefully.
The WTO participates in the international effort to
improve global governance by seeking to draw up
rules on transparency in government procurement.
Some WTO members are working toward having
an agreement ready for adoption at Seattle, but there is
a possibility that work on transparency issues will still
be required in the course of the negotiations. Although
enhanced transparency would, in itself, help to improve the cost-effectiveness of procurement decisions
and market access for trading partners, the absence of
multilateral rules on overt forms of discrimination
against foreign supplies and suppliers will remain one
of the major gaps in the multilateral trading system unless agreement can also be reached on tackling this aspect in the context of future negotiations.14
The WTO needs to accelerate its accession process if
it is to become a truly universal organization. Since its
creation in 1995, membership has increased by seven
countries15 to a total of 135. Thirty candidates are currently negotiating accession.16 The start of a new Round
adds urgency to the process, since it is desirable that as
many of the worlds trading nations as possible participate in the negotiations. The WTO accession process is
technically complex, placing particular strains on least
developed country applicants. Also, political factors,
varying demands on applicants, hard bargaining strategies, and in some cases slow implementation of reforms
by the applicants themselves have increased the length
of negotiations. The fastest accessions usually take
three to four years, yet accession negotiations for China
have been dragging on for 13 years. This is particularly
unfortunate given the rapidly growing weight of China
in world output (12 percent in 1998, second largest after
the United States) and world exports (3.1 percent, ninth
in the rank of world exporters). It is to be hoped that
agreement can be reached at the Seattle Conference to
streamline the accession process, without compromising on its basic requirements.17
New Issues
In addition to the built-in agenda, the Seattle
Conference will take stock of progress on work mandated by the WTOs 1996 and 1998 Ministerial
Conferences. This includes the issues of trade and investment, trade and competition, and government procurement. Issues such as trade facilitation, electronic
commerce, and trade and the environment will also be
addressed in Seattle.
Since the interruption of OECD negotiations on a
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), some
countries have pushed for negotiations on a WTObased investment code, building on the analytical work
undertaken in the WTO Working Group on the
Relationship between Trade and Investment and the
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, the
first WTO Agreement containing rules on the treatment
of FDI (albeit not fully implemented yet). However,
many developing countries have shown clear opposition to these proposals, and have been reluctant even to
extend the mandate of the WTO Working Group to
avoid being drawn into unwarranted negotiations. The
future of the Working Group, as well as possible improvements to the Agreement on Trade-Related
Investment Measures, will be major issues of the upcoming talks. The rapid development of FDI flows,
particularly to developing countries, has created a need
for more comprehensive rules in this domain. Major investors are seeking greater stability and transparency in
host countries policies, and, in their absence, the number of disputes linked to investment conditions (in particular investment incentives) has tended to increase.
Clearly, bilateral investment treaties leave scope for
discrimination and country-specific provisions.
The challenges posed for regulatory authorities by
globalization also underlie discussions on the relationship between trade and competition. While the relevant WTO Working Group has highlighted the complementarity between trade liberalization and antitrust
enforcement, Members do not agree on the need for
worldwide competition rules at this stage.13 In this
context, the Round will have to decide on the continued existence of the WTO Working Group, with little
13So far, two-thirds of WTO membership do not even have competition regulation, although several members deny that regulating
in this domain is necessary.
135
VI
Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa: Performance,
Impediments, and Policy Requirements
age real per capita income in 1998 was roughly unchanged from its level in 1970 (Figure 6.1). This average performance masks significant differences across
countries, however, and is strongly affected by developments in the two largest economies, South Africa
and Nigeria, which in 1998 together accounted for almost 30 percent of the regions total output (in terms
of purchasing power parities). Out of the 47 SSA
countries,2 the nine fastest growing economies
achieved average annual growth of 3.1 percent in real
per capital incomes over the past 30 years. In the nine
slowest growing economies, real per capita income
contracted by 2 percent a year on average, owing in
some cases to armed conflicts and political instability.3
In fact, SSA had by far the worst performance among
developing country regions: the Middle East and
Europe regions as well as Latin America experienced
real per capita income growth of 12 percent a year on
average during 197098, while in Asia, at 4.7 percent
a year, growth was well above the world average of
2.4 percent.
In the second half of the 1990s, average real per
capita income growth in SSA rose to 1.5 percent,
partly reflecting policy improvements, including in the
context of programs supported by the IMF and the
World Bank.4 In several countries average annual
growth exceeded 3 percent,5 sometimes reflecting special circumstances such as recovery from armed conflict (Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Rwanda) or the
exploitation of recently discovered oil reserves
(Equatorial Guinea). Some other countries, however,
hen recent turmoil in financial markets disrupted economies across the globe, the countries of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) were adversely affected through trade and the decline in commodity
prices induced by the crises. But there was little impact on their financial markets or on the financing conditions facing them, with the exception of South
Africa (see Box 2.1). These countries were in effect
largely immune to financial contagion because of the
low degree of international integration and underdevelopment of their financial markets. These same factors, however, from a longer-term perspective, have
also hampered economic growth in the region.
Although growth performance has improved in the
second half of the 1990s, it remains fragile and, in
most countries, insufficiently strong to significantly
reduce the dire levels of poverty that are prevalent.
This chapter explores some of the main sources of the
disappointing growth performance of the SSA countries, discusses areas where reforms are needed to increase growth, and considers the potential contribution
of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt
relief initiative.
2Eritrea has been omitted from the sample for lack of data availability.
3Throughout the chapter, high- and low-growth countries are defined by the top and bottom quintile of the distribution, respectively,
when SSA countries are ranked by their 197098 average rate of increase in real income per capita. The first group comprises
Botswana, Congo, Equatorial Guinea (even excluding the spectacular oil-induced growth since 1996), Guinea, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Seychelles, and Swaziland, while the second group
consists of Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti,
Liberia, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, and Zambia. The
remaining countries constitute the medium-growth group. The average growth rates dividing the three groups are 0.75 and +0.93 percent per annum.
4For the role of ESAF programs in enhancing growth by promoting macroeconomic stability, external viability, and structural reforms, see The ESAF at Ten Years.
5Angola, Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Malawi,
Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda.
136
12
8
All Groups
12
Sub-Saharan Africa
Western
Hemisphere
Asia
8
Medium
High
Low
8
1970 75
80
85
90
95
1970 75
80
85
90
95
Total Investment
(percent of GDP)
40
All Groups
40
Sub-Saharan Africa
Asia
35
Middle East
and Europe
30
35
High
30
Medium
25
25
20
20
15
Sub-Saharan
Africa
10
5
1970 75
80
15
Western
Hemisphere
85
90
95
Low
1970 75
80
85
10
90
95
Saving
(percent of GDP)
35
All Groups
30
Sub-Saharan Africa
30
Asia
Middle East
and Europe
25
25
High
20
6Burundi,
Sub-Saharan
Africa
1985
137
Medium
Western
Hemisphere
5
0
20
15
15
10
35
10
5
Low
0
90
95
1985
90
95
VI
12
10
Middle East
8
6
Countries in transition
Africa
Advanced economies
4
2
Asia
Western Hemisphere
1990
92
94
96
98
138
(Percent of GDP)
3.4
All countries
3.2
IISS 1
3.0
0.5
WEO 3
0.0
2.6
0.5
2.4
1.0
2.2
1990
92
94
1.0
2.8
ACDA2
SIPRI 4
Africa
World
96
98
2.0
Health care
Military
1The
1.5
0
1
2
3
Total government Education
expenditures
Health care
1990 for all regions from 6.7 per 1,000 population to 5.7
per 1,000 population, except in the newly industrialized
Asian countries. Countries in Africa and the Western
Hemisphere have the smallest armed forces as a share of
population. In the 45 African countries in our sample, the
size of the armed forces fell from 3.9 per 1,000 population
in 1990 to 3.3 per 1,000 population in 1995.
Military
African
HIPCs
Health care
Military
2
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
139
VI
10
15
20
All countries
Africa
IMF
program
countries1
IMF
program
countries
in Africa1
African
HIPCs
25
10Health and education are both sources and outcomes of economic growth. Clearly they affect the productivity of the labor force
and thus per capita income. On the other hand, the higher the per
capita income, the easier it will be to provide the population with
health and education services, and the higher the demand for such
services.
11It is estimated that in 1997 21 million SSA inhabitants were infected with HIV/AIDS, i.e., about 3.4 percent of the total SSA population and 7.8 percent of the regional labor force. UNAIDS and
WHO, Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic (New York:
United Nations, 1998).
12See Bloom and Sachs, Geography, Demography, and
Economic Growth in Africa.
9The HIPC Initiative entails a coordinated action by the international financial community, including multilateral institutions, to reduce the external debt burden of heavily indebted
poor countries to sustainable levels following the implementation of sound economic policies in the context of IMF- and
World Bank-supported programs. The Summit of G-7
Finance Ministers held in Kln in 1999 has recently called for
broadening the scope of the HIPC framework to provide
deeper and faster debt relief.
10Data are available for 14 African HIPCs in a sample of 31
countries with IMF-supported programs for more than two
years.
140
Table 6.1. Sub-Saharan Africa and Other Developing Country Groups: Education and Health
Secondary
School Enrollment1
___________________________
1970
1995
197095
Illiteracy Rate
___________________________
1970
1997
197097
51
...
26
69
71
46
24
...
13
38
42
26
36
...
18
52
56
34
24
80
28
24
7
31
61
106
52
64
27
67
59
71
70
33
45
41
45
57
55
13
6
9
Memorandum
CFA: unweighted average3
81
54
67
Asia
Advanced economies
Western Hemisphere
Middle East and Europe
Sub-Saharan Africa
World
1995
197095
45
94
44
49
19
51
82
102
100
68
50
83
112
103
112
97
77
104
107
103
106
91
74
100
38
25
18
29
17
17
59
49
64
90
72
84
88
72
72
20
17
50
67
70
1997
197097
Asia
Advanced economies
Western Hemisphere
Middle East and Europe
Sub-Saharan Africa
World
56
71
61
53
44
59
67
77
70
67
51
67
63
74
65
60
48
63
95
22
84
134
137
98
48
6
32
49
91
56
69
13
56
87
112
76
46
44
42
55
52
48
52
49
46
132
138
155
78
87
114
96
110
134
Memorandum
CFA: unweighted average3
42
50
47
146
92
117
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (regional groupings may differ from WEO classifications).
11995=1994 for sub-Saharan Africa and for Western Hemisphere; 1970=1975 for advanced economies.
21995=1994 for sub-Saharan Africa; 1970=1975 for advanced economies and for Western Hemisphere.
3Communaut Financire Africaine and Coopration Financire en Afrique.
Physical investment, in particular private fixed capital formation, remains low in SSA. The ratio of total
fixed investment to GDP has actually declined gradually over the past 30 years, to 17.5 percent of GDP in
the second half of the 1990s from 20 percent in
197074 (see Figure 6.1), while private fixed investment has averaged 1112 percent of GDP since 1970
with only a modest upward trend. These aggregate figures conceal large differences among countries within
the region. High-growth countries have relatively high
investment ratios that have been rising, with total and
private investment reaching 32 and 25 percent of GDP,
respectively, in the second half of the 1990s, while in
the same period total and private investment ratios in
the low-growth countries averaged 10 and 5 percent,
respectively. Investment in SSA also appears to have
141
VI
142
60 All groups
40
30
60
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Western
Hemisphere
50
50
Low
40
Middle East
and Europe
30
20
20
10
10
High
0
10
1970 75
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Asia
Medium
0
10
80
85
90
95
1970 75
80
85
90
95
Fiscal Balance
(percent of GDP)
2 All groups
Sub-Saharan
0
Africa
Western
Hemisphere
Sub-Saharan Africa
0
High
Asia
6
Medium
8
10
1985
143
90
95
8
10
Low
Middle East
and Europe
12
14
12
1985
90
95
14
VI
Table 6.2. Sub-Saharan Africa and Other Developing Country Groups: External Performance
Openness1
_______________________________________
199094
199598
197098
Asian NIEs3
Asia
Advanced economies
Western Hemisphere
Middle East and Europe
Sub-Saharan Africa
World
60.1
21.3
19.3
14.2
31.4
27.8
19.4
68.4
24.4
21.9
15.7
32.2
31.6
22.4
60.3
15.3
18.8
13.6
32.8
28.2
19.7
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
52.8
30.6
34.7
59.0
32.8
34.0
53.7
29.5
35.2
1.2
1.4
17.5
1.1
1.1
6.7
2.3
3.1
19.5
Memorandum
SSA: unweighted average4
CFA: unweighted average
35.6
30.8
38.1
37.8
35.4
34.1
4.3
1.0
2.1
1.0
6.1
1.0
199598
197598
Asian NIEs3
Asia
Advanced economies
Western Hemisphere
Middle East and Europe
Sub-Saharan Africa
World
...
2.8
...
3.0
5.3
0.6
...
1.3
2.3
...
3.6
1.5
3.0
...
1.4
1.5
...
2.3
0.3
1.7
...
...
1.8
...
1.1
0.5
0.8
...
...
2.8
...
2.4
0.8
1.9
...
...
0.9
...
0.8
0.3
0.8
...
3.0
2.5
2.1
9.3
4.1
0.3
4.7
2.3
1.6
4.4
1.5
1.2
7.8
1.9
3.3
2.5
0.7
0.9
Memorandum
SSA: unweighted average4
CFA: unweighted average
2.5
1.4
4.4
7.7
2.6
3.8
2.0
2.2
3.3
4.7
1.1
1.2
Source: IMF WEO database; and World Bank, World Development Indicators for Foreign Exchange Black Market Premium (regional groupings differ slightly from WEO classifications).
1Average ratio of exports and imports of goods and services to GDP.
2The maximum ratio of market to official exchange rate has been set to 100.
3Hong Kong SAR, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan Province of China.
4Sub-Saharan Africa.
144
programs, and the increasing confidence of international investors that SSA countries would pursue pertinent reforms, but also as a result of the recent strengthening of growth prospects.
via cumbersome industrial and trade licensing procedures as well as restrictions on the issuance of work
permits for expatriates. Further progress in these, as
well as the following, areas is essential.
Following independence from colonial rule, leadership in many SSA countries questioned the efficiency
and fairness of market economies and the importance
of comparative advantage, and introduced extensive
controls on prices, exchange rates, distribution systems and, more generally, on the sectoral allocation of
resources. The agricultural sector was often effectively
discriminated against by the imposition of price and
exchange rate controls, the creation of public monopolies for the marketing of agricultural goods, and the
inadequate provision of rural infrastructure. The industrial sector, in most countries dominated by inefficient public enterprises, was often implicitly subsidized by import-substitution policies, by the rents
derived from public monopolies, and by the artificial
suppression of agricultural prices, but nevertheless
failed to flourish, as the resulting distortions entailed
inefficient investment and chronic mismanagement.
In the 1990s many of these policies have been reversed and many distortions eliminated, as price controls have been reduced, agricultural marketing liberalized, large public monopolies eliminated, and many
public enterprises privatized. The full effects of this
greater reliance on market mechanisms will not be felt
for several years, while further efforts are still needed
to provide the right incentives for an efficient allocation of resources.
23For a detailed analysis of employment and remuneration policies in SSA countries, see Ian Lienert and Jitendra Modi, A
Decade of Civil Service Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa, Working
Paper 97/179 (Washington: IMF, December 1997). Regarding the
importance of remuneration policies in avoiding and reversing the
brain-drain phenomenon, see Nadeem Ul Haque and Jahangir Aziz,
The Quality of Governance: Second Generation Civil Service
Reform in Africa, Working Paper 98/164 (Washington: IMF,
November 1998).
24Note, however, that recent evidence on the determinants of corruption and growth indicates that the corruption process in SSA is
little different from elsewhere, once the structure of the economy
and institutional characteristics are taken into account. See Sergio
P. Leite and Jens Weidmann, Does Mother Nature Corrupt?
Natural Resources, Corruption, and Economic Growth, Working
Paper 99/85 (Washington: IMF, July 1999).
145
VI
Table 6.3. Sub-Saharan Africa and Other Developing Country Groups: Quality of Governance,
Institutions, and Public Services
(010, higher=better quality)1
Quality of
Extent of Government Ethnic
Political
Bureaucracy Corruption
Stability
Tensions Violence
198498
198498
198498
198498 198498
Law and
Order
198498
Risk of
Risk of
Contract
Expropriation Repudiation
198497
198497
Asian NIEs2
Asia
Advanced economies
Western Hemisphere
Middle East and Europe
Sub-Saharan Africa
World
7.3
4.6
8.7
4.2
4.8
4.1
5.4
6.9
4.3
8.3
4.6
4.7
4.6
5.5
6.5
5.0
6.5
4.9
5.7
4.8
5.4
7.5
4.5
8.2
7.1
5.9
4.9
6.4
9.0
6.0
8.7
5.8
5.7
5.5
6.6
7.4
5.0
8.7
4.8
5.4
4.4
5.8
8.3
6.3
7.9
5.7
6.2
5.3
6.3
9.1
6.0
9.2
6.0
5.9
4.8
6.4
4.3
4.6
3.0
5.9
4.7
3.5
5.5
5.0
3.8
5.7
5.1
3.9
6.4
5.7
4.5
5.1
4.6
3.6
5.6
5.7
4.3
5.3
5.2
3.4
Memorandum
CFA: unweighted average3
4.5
4.3
4.9
5.4
6.0
4.4
5.7
5.3
Armed conflicts, political instability, and civil wars reduce the expected profitability of investments, by increasing the risk that capital assets will be destroyed
and economic activities interrupted. Government instability introduces uncertainty about economic and
other policies. The persistence of nonelected governments in some countries tends to increase government
intervention and corruption.
All these factors tend to reduce the overall efficiency of the economy and discourage domestic and
foreign investment. According to surveys, highgrowth SSA countries have tended to score somewhat
better on most of these factors, both in the past 15
years and more recently (Table 6.3).25 But SSA countries as a whole have ranked substantially worse than
other regional groups in recent years, especially relative to the advanced economies and fast-growing developing and newly industrialized economies of Asia.
While these findings may partly reflect an interdependence between economic performance on the one
146
28 Gelbard and Leite, Measuring Financial Development in SubSaharan Africa. The index of overall financial development encompasses measures of the competitiveness of financial markets, the degree of financial liberalization, the quality of financial institutions
services, the extent of financial integration with foreign markets,
and the availability of monetary policy instruments.
147
VI
Table 6.4. Sub-Saharan Africa and Other Developing Country Groups: Infrastructure Indicators
Growth Rate
of Telephone Lines
per Employee
___________________
199597
197097
11
111
63
32
21
103
81
216
182
92
62
180
24
143
89
52
36
127
29
3
15
14
10
2
12
4
7
8
7
4
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
20
12
11
39
32
19
23
20
14
20
10
4
12
7
1
21
9
8
33
15
14
29
14
12
Memorandum
SSA: unweighted average1
CFA: unweighted average2
13
11
31
28
20
17
11
17
7
13
10
7
18
15
16
11
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (regional groupings may differ from the WEO classifications).
1Sub-Saharan Africa.
2Communaut Financire Africaine and Coopration Financire en Afrique.
sector participation, including through the privatization of state-owned enterprises. This strategy has succeeded in improving the development, management,
and efficiency of infrastructure services and seems
likely to be an important ingredient of future infrastructure policies.
The Debt Problem and the HIPC Debt
Relief Initiative
In the past 30 years, the foreign indebtedness of
most SSA countries has risen alarmingly. The total external debt of the region rose from almost $9 billion in
1971 (or 14 percent of area GNP) to $107 billion in
1985 (56 percent of GNP) and to $220 billion in 1997
(68 percent of GNP).32 By the mid-1980s, external
debt had already risen to high levels for many countries. In 1985, 24 SSA countries (out of 47) had nominal debt-to-export ratios above 250 percent, and 22
countries had debt service-to-export ratios above 20
percent (Table 6.5).33 The creditors were mostly official: excluding South Africa, only one-quarter of external debt was owed to private creditors and most of
that was guaranteed by the public sector of the borrowing country.
148
Sub-Saharan Africa
Debt
to GNP
1985
Debt to
Exports
1985
Debt-Service
to Exports
1985
Debt
to GNP
1997
Debt to
Exports
1997
NPV of Debt
to Exports1
1997
56
171
18
68
202
13
...
...
106
79
121
356
437
479
20
23
19
113
120
151
325
506
517
11
16
14
92
83
126
217
389
349
Memorandum
SSA: unweighted average2
CFA: unweighted average3
SSA HIPC: unweighted average4
92
91
108
432
241
572
22
21
27
124
106
162
474
294
635
15
12
18
92
79
114
347
214
469
High indebtedness aggravated the situation, as debtservice costs claimed a rising share of export earnings
and limited the fiscal resources available for productive expenditure. It also discouraged investment (especially foreign), both because of the resulting lack of infrastructure, and because of the effects of the actual
and expected burden of taxation.37 Moreover, it reduced the amount of financial assistance available to
finance new projects, as almost a third of financial aid
provided to SSA countries is estimated to have been
devoted to the servicing of past loans.38
Official aid was not always based on economic criteria relating either to need, such as low levels of income per capita and inability to find alternative foreign resources, or to policy performance. In fact,
official aid was often driven by political and strategic
consideration,39 especially during the cold war, and including the support of former colonies. Much official
aid has been tied to the purchase of goods and services
produced by the donor country and sold at uncompetitive prices.40 Empirical evidence suggests that coun-
149
VI
150
Only if combined with domestic efforts can international support reduce the external debt burden,
allow countries to gain the confidence of world financial markets, and restore their ability to borrow under normal conditions to finance sustainable growth.
Such policies will improve the economic environment for private sector activity, by improving political
and economic stability, enhancing social capital, and
providing the right incentives for stimulating the accumulation of productive physical and human capital. At
the same time, the implementation of such measures
may well increase the amount of official development
assistance, as donor countries become more convinced
of its beneficial effects.
At the turn of the millennium, the HIPC Initiative
could provide the right incentive for a concerted regional implementation of the long but essential agenda
necessary to bring Africa on to a path of sustainable
growth in the context of globalized trade and financial
markets.
151
Annex
Summing Up by the Chairman1
major industrial countries. Directors also acknowledged the uncertain but potentially significant impact
of the Y2K problem, including the possibility of capital outflows from vulnerable economies in the coming months.
152
exchange rate arrangements, and willingness to introduce firm budgetary measures to limit fiscal slippages.
As a result, these countries have shown greater resilience to external shocks.
In considering growth prospects for the Middle East
and Africa, Directors agreed that the recent increase in
oil prices was helping to improve the fiscal positions
and external balances of several economies, although
others continued to be adversely affected by ongoing
weaknesses in non-oil commodity prices. Directors
urged countries to build on the recent progress with
fiscal consolidation and structural reforms, including
efforts at diversifying the economies of oil exporting
countries. Directors also expressed concern about the
humanitarian and economic difficulties being experienced by Turkey as a result of the recent earthquake.
Directors welcomed the recent improvements in
policy implementation and growth performance
among many of the smaller countries in sub-Saharan
Africa, noting, however, that further efforts are necessary to improve the environment for profitable investment and growth. In this regard, they stressed the importance of promoting political stability and reducing
the occurrence of armed conflicts. In view of the secular decline in non-oil commodity prices, priority
should also be attached to creating incentives aimed at
diversifying production toward manufacturing and services. Directors also attached importance to improving
access for these countries exports to markets in the advanced economies. They concurred that highly indebted sub-Saharan African countries should take full
and prompt advantage of the opportunity offered by
the HIPC Initiative to intensify and press ahead with
reforms while benefiting from debt reduction.
153
against the other major currencies and a major correction in U.S. equity markets.
Directors were encouraged by evidence that growth
divergences among the major industrial economies
had narrowed somewhat during the first half of 1999.
They welcomed the sharp pickup in demand in Japan
in the first quarter, signs that the anticipated recovery
in the euro area is on track, and the moderation
albeit limitedof demand growth in the United States
in the second quarter of 1999. They cautioned, nevertheless, that these initial indications of convergence do
not confirm that a smooth adjustment path has yet
been established.
While welcoming the skillful management of monetary policy by the U.S. Federal Reserve, many
Directors agreed that if the recent slowdown in the
U.S. economy were not sustained, the authorities
would need to consider further increases in short-term
interest rates to contain inflation pressures. Indeed, a
few Directors felt that monetary policy had been insufficiently tight in the face of the continued surge in
the stock market and the unsustainable growth in domestic demand resulting from the run-up in asset
prices. Most Directors, however, considered that the
current monetary policy stance was appropriate, especially given the recent increases in interest rates and
the absence of clear evidence of rising inflation. Some
pointed in particular to the risks that further monetary
tightening in the United States could pose to the still
fragile recoveries in many emerging market economies. Several Directors believed that the recent period of high growth, low inflation, and low unemployment in the United States could be attributed to
fundamental and sustainable changes in the economy.
Several others, however, suggested that these positive
recent developments were better explained by a series
of transitory and special factors that had stimulated demand and put downward pressure on certain important
prices. This group of Directors warned against an
overly sanguine assessment of the economys recent
performance and prospectsincluding the surge in
asset priceswhich could lead to a delay in monetary
tightening. Directors generally agreed that risks of
overheating in the U.S. economy would be exacerbated if prospective budget surpluses led to substantial
tax cuts or increases in public spending. Some speakers noted that, in the event of a downturn, the strong
fiscal position would provide substantial room to
maneuver.
Turning to developments in Japan, Directors noted
that the exceptionally rapid growth recorded in the
first quarter was one of a number of signs that the
economy may be emerging from recession, but agreed
that the economic situation remained fragile. Most
Directors concurred that, notwithstanding the longerterm need for fiscal consolidation, the supportive
stance of fiscal policy should be maintained until a recovery in private sector confidence and demand was
more clearly established, and they welcomed the recent announcement of a forthcoming supplementary
fiscal package. But several other Directors questioned
the potential benefits from continued expansionary fiscal packages, pointing to their implications for Japans
already high debt-to-GDP ratio and emphasizing the
growing medium-term challenges that Japan faces in
the fiscal area. Directors agreed with the supportive
stance of monetary policy, noting that the Bank of
Japans zero interest rate policy would remain appropriate until deflationary concerns dissipated. A number of Directors suggested that the recent appreciation
of the yen was consistent with the improved economic
outlook and with the adjustment over time required in
global current account imbalances, although some expressed concern that further substantial appreciation
could jeopardize the prospects for economic recovery
both in Japan and in other crisis-hit economies in Asia.
All Directors concurred that the key requirement for
enduring recovery in Japan was the pursuit of structural reforms. Priorities include the effective implementation of the framework now in place to rehabilitate and strengthen the banking sector, and further
improvements in the tax system, legal framework, and
competitive environment to promote enterprise restructuring and improve corporate governance.
Directors welcomed the indications of stronger
growth in western Europe, noting the role played by
the better external environment, improved business
confidence, and lower interest rates in the euro area
and in several other European countries. Directors
agreed that the recent strengthening in the euro relative
to the dollar, partially offsetting its earlier decline, represented a move consistent with medium-term fundamentals and would not threaten prospects for stronger
growth. Nevertheless, some Directors considered that
the outlook for sustained recovery in the major continental countries was not robust, and a few saw some
scope for a further cut in interest rates if recovery in
Europe were to fall short of expectations. Other
Directors, however, thought that the present balance of
risks appeared to be on the upside, with the possibility
of a stronger than currently expected upturn. Several
Directors suggested that more rapid fiscal consolidation was needed in most European economies in order
to reduce oppressive tax burdens, lower public debt,
and prepare for the fiscal pressures arising from population aging. Directors agreed that the other main policy challenge in Europe is to address structural rigidities, particularly in view of the high level of structural
unemployment in much of the euro area.
154
significant progress has also been made in reducing inflation to low rates in most developing and transition
economies. They agreed that this success in curtailing
inflation was mainly the result of determined and prolonged policy efforts, reflecting the widespread public
perception that high and volatile inflation is detrimental to sustainable economic growth and development.
However, Directors noted that, while the establishment of reasonable price stability is necessary to safeguard macroeconomic stability, it is not sufficient.
Indeed, the frequency and severity of financial crises
during the 1990s indicates that safeguarding macroeconomic stability requires policy attention well beyond the maintenance of price stability for currently
produced goods and services.
With inflation in industrial countries averaging
about 1!/2 percent, and with a number of countries having adopted explicit inflation targets, the question of
what constitutes reasonable price stability, and how to
maintain it, has gained increased relevance for the
conduct of monetary policy. Directors agreed that attempts to eliminate short-run fluctuations in inflation
would be neither desirable nor practical. The best that
can be achieved is reasonable price stability over the
medium terma goal usually consistent with the policy objective of output stabilization over the course of
the business cycle. Directors further recognized that
the conduct of monetary policy at low rates of inflation
required careful analysis of, among other things, the
effects of nominal rigidities on economic performancein particular, the implications of resistance to
reductions in nominal wages for equilibrium output,
and of the zero floor to nominal interest rates for the
effectiveness of monetary policy. Some Directors expressed the view that further detailed analysis in these
areas is required. Several speakers pointed to the dangers resulting from deflationary expectations becoming ingrained, and to the current difficulties in Japan in
trying to stimulate economic activity when official interest rates have been effectively reduced to zero in an
environment of mild deflation.
Some Directors argued that the threats to macroeconomic stability from price declines would differ
greatly depending on whether the price declines originated from widespread and rapid technical progress or
whether they were caused by persistent aggregate demand deficiencies, and that this difference was relevant for economic policy because the former reason
for price declines need not pose difficulties.
One of the most difficult questions related to the
conduct of monetary policy at present, Directors
155
Statistical Appendix
1 euro =
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
40.3399
1.95583
166.386
6.55957
0.787564
1,936.27
40.3399
2.20371
13.7603
200.482
5.94573
Belgian francs
Deutsche mark
Spanish pesetas
French francs
Irish pounds
Italian lire
Luxembourg francs
Netherlands guilders
Austrian schillings
Portuguese escudos
Finnish markkaa
Assumptions
Real effective exchange rates for the advanced
economies are assumed to remain constant at their average levels during the period July 26August 16,
1999. For 1999 and 2000, these assumptions imply average U.S. dollar/SDR conversion rates of 1.362 and
1.367, respectively.
Established policies of national authorities are assumed to be maintained. The more specific policy assumptions underlying the projections for selected advanced economies are described in Box 1.2.
It is assumed that the price of oil will average
$16.70 a barrel in 1999 and $18.00 a barrel in 2000. In
the medium term, the oil price is assumed to remain
unchanged in real terms.
With regard to interest rates, it is assumed that the
London interbank offered rate (LIBOR) on six-month
U.S. dollar deposits will average 5.4 percent in 1999
and 6.1 percent in 2000; that the three-month certificate of deposit rate in Japan will average 0.2 percent in
1999 and in 2000; and that the three-month interbank
156
Classification of Countries
Summary of the Country Classification
The country classification in the World Economic
Outlook divides the world into three major groups: advanced economies, developing countries, and countries in transition.3 Rather than being based on strict
criteria, economic or otherwise, this classification has
evolved over time with the objective of facilitating
analysis by providing a reasonably meaningful organization of data. A few countries are presently not included in these groups, either because they are not
IMF members, and their economies are not monitored
by the IMF, or because databases have not yet been
compiled. Cuba and the Democratic Peoples Republic
of Korea are examples of countries that are not IMF
members, whereas San Marino, among the advanced
economies, is an example of an economy for which a
database has not been completed. It should also be
noted that, owing to lack of data, only three of the former republics of the dissolved Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Croatia, the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, and Slovenia) are included in
the group composites for countries in transition.
Each of the three main country groups is further divided into a number of subgroups. Among the advanced economies, the seven largest in terms of GDP,
collectively referred to as the major industrial countries, are distinguished as a subgroup, and so are the 15
current members of the European Union, the 11 members of the euro area, and the four newly industrialized
Asian economies. The developing countries are classified by region, as well as into a number of analytical
and other groups. A regional breakdown is also used
for the classification of the countries in transition.
Table A provides an overview of these standard groups
in the World Economic Outlook, showing the number
of countries in each group and the average 1998 shares
of groups in aggregate PPP-valued GDP, total exports
of goods and services, and population.
3As used here, the term country does not in all cases refer to a
territorial entity that is a state as understood by international law and
practice. It also covers some territorial entities that are not states, but
for which statistical data are maintained on a separate and independent basis.
157
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Table A. Classification by World Economic Outlook Groups and Their Shares in Aggregate GDP, Exports
of Goods and Services, and Population, 19981
(Percent of total for group or world)
Number of
Countries
GDP
Exports of Goods
and Services
Advanced
economies
World
______________________
100.0
55.4
80.2
44.4
37.5
20.8
13.4
7.4
9.1
4.5
6.2
3.4
5.6
3.1
6.0
3.3
3.3
1.8
19.8
11.0
Advanced
economies
World
_____________________
100.0
77.9
63.3
49.3
17.8
13.8
8.3
6.5
11.9
9.3
7.4
5.7
6.1
4.8
7.2
5.6
4.7
3.6
36.7
28.6
Population
Advanced economies
Major industrial countries
United States
Japan
Germany
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Canada
Other advanced economies
Memorandum
Industrial countries (former definition)
European Union
Euro area
Newly industrialized Asian economies
28
7
21
23
15
11
4
93.8
35.9
28.0
5.7
52.0
19.9
15.5
3.2
Developing
countries
World
______________________
Developing countries
Regional groups
Africa
Sub-Sahara
Excluding Nigeria and South Africa
Asia
China
India
Other Asia
Middle East and Europe
Western Hemisphere
Analytical groups
By source of export earnings
Fuel
Nonfuel
Manufactures
Primary products
Services, income, and private transfers
Diversified
By external financing source
Net creditor countries
Net debtor countries
Official financing
Private financing
Diversified financing
Net debtor countries by
debt-servicing experience
Countries with arrears and/or
rescheduling during 199397
Other net debtor countries
Other groups
Heavily indebted poor countries
Least developed countries
Middle East and north Africa
Countries in transition
Central and eastern Europe
Excluding Belarus and Ukraine
Russia
Transcaucasus and central Asia
1The
87.4
51.7
41.1
12.0
68.1
40.3
32.0
9.3
Developing
countries
World
_____________________
100.0
17.7
Advanced
economies
World
____________________
100.0
74.5
29.5
13.8
8.9
6.3
6.2
6.4
3.3
25.5
15.6
11.6
4.6
2.2
1.4
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.5
4.0
90.9
40.5
31.4
8.5
14.2
6.3
4.9
1.3
Developing
countries
World
____________________
100.0
77.5
128
100.0
39.8
51
48
46
27
25
17
33
8.3
6.0
3.6
57.5
30.1
11.0
16.3
11.7
22.5
3.3
2.4
1.4
22.8
12.0
4.4
6.5
4.7
8.9
10.2
7.7
4.0
45.9
17.5
3.7
24.7
19.2
24.8
1.8
1.4
0.7
8.1
3.1
0.7
4.4
3.4
4.4
15.4
13.9
10.2
67.4
27.4
21.3
18.6
6.4
10.8
11.9
10.8
7.9
52.2
21.2
16.5
14.5
5.0
8.4
17
111
6
40
39
26
9.7
90.3
55.3
5.1
3.8
26.0
3.9
35.9
22.0
2.0
1.5
10.3
16.6
83.4
39.3
6.5
4.4
33.3
2.9
14.8
7.0
1.2
0.8
5.9
6.9
93.1
57.4
12.0
4.2
19.5
5.3
72.2
44.5
9.3
3.3
15.1
7
121
62
34
25
2.8
97.2
9.4
64.8
23.0
1.1
38.7
3.7
25.8
9.1
10.1
89.9
8.1
63.6
18.2
1.8
16.0
1.4
11.3
3.2
0.8
99.2
21.2
45.1
32.9
0.6
76.9
16.4
34.9
25.5
60
61
23.4
73.8
9.3
29.3
22.0
67.9
3.9
12.0
26.8
72.4
20.8
56.1
40
46
21
4.1
4.4
11.6
1.6
1.8
4.6
4.6
2.8
17.2
0.8
0.5
3.0
13.2
13.4
7.4
10.2
10.4
5.7
28
18
16
9
Countries
in
transition
World
______________________
100.0
4.8
56.5
2.7
45.8
2.2
33.9
1.6
9.5
0.5
Countries
in
transition
World
_____________________
100.0
4.4
63.5
2.8
54.1
2.4
29.4
1.3
7.1
0.3
GDP shares are based on the purchasing-power-parity (PPP) valuation of country GDPs.
158
Countries
in
transition
World
____________________
100.0
6.9
44.9
3.1
29.8
2.1
36.6
2.5
18.6
1.3
Classification of Countries
Euro Area
Newly Industrialized
Asian Economies
Other
Countries
France
Germany
Italy
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
Greece
Ireland
Austria
Belgium
Finland
Ireland
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Canada
Japan
United States
1On
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Australia
Iceland
Israel
New Zealand
Norway
Switzerland
July 1, 1997, Hong Kong was returned to the Peoples Republic of China and became a Special Administrative Region of China.
Developing Countries
The group of developing countries (128 countries)
includes all countries that are not classified as advanced economies or as countries in transition, together with a few dependent territories for which adequate statistics are available.
The regional breakdowns of developing countries in
the World Economic Outlook conform to the IMFs
International Financial Statistics (IFS) classificationAfrica, Asia, Europe, Middle East, and Western
Hemispherewith one important exception. Because
all of the developing countries in Europe except
Cyprus, Malta, and Turkey are included in the group of
countries in transition, the World Economic Outlook
classification places these three countries in a combined Middle East and Europe region. In both classifications, Egypt and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya are included in this region, not in Africa. Three additional
regional groupingstwo of them constituting part of
Africa and one a subgroup of Asiaare included in
the World Economic Outlook because of their analytical significance. These are sub-Sahara, sub-Sahara
excluding Nigeria and South Africa, and Asia excluding China and India.
The developing countries are also classified according to analytical criteria and into other groups. The
analytical criteria reflect countries composition of export earnings and other income from abroad, a distinction between net creditor and net debtor countries,
and, for the net debtor countries, financial criteria
based on external financing source and experience
with external debt servicing. Included as other
groups are currently the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs), the least developed countries, and
Middle East and north Africa (MENA). The detailed
composition of developing countries in the regional,
analytical, and other groups is shown in Tables C
through E.
159
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Fuel
Manufactures
Primary Products
Services,
Income, and
Private Transfers
Diversified
Source of
Export Earnings
Africa
Sub-Sahara
Angola
Congo,
Rep. of
Gabon
Nigeria
North Africa
Algeria
Botswana
Burundi
Central African
Rep.
Chad
Congo, Democratic
Rep. of
Cte dIvoire
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Namibia
Niger
Rwanda
So Tom and
Prncipe
Somalia
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Benin
Burkina Faso
Cape Verde
Comoros
Djibouti
Eritrea
Gambia, The
Lesotho
Mozambique, Rep. of
Seychelles
Cameroon
Kenya
Mauritius
Senegal
Sierra Leone
South Africa
Morocco
Tunisia
Asia
Brunei
Darussalam
China
India
Malaysia
Pakistan
Thailand
Cambodia
Myanmar
Papua New Guinea
Solomon Islands
Vietnam
Bhutan
Fiji
Kiribati
Maldives
Marshall Islands
Micronesia,
Federated States of
Nepal
Samoa
Tonga
Vanuatu
Afghanistan,
Islamic State of
Bangladesh
Indonesia
Lao Peoples
Democratic
Rep.
Philippines
Sri Lanka
Cyprus
Egypt
Jordan
Lebanon
Yemen, Rep. of
Malta
Syrian Arab Rep.
Turkey
160
Classification of Countries
Table C (concluded)
Fuel
Manufactures
Primary Products
Services,
Income, and
Private Transfers
Diversified
Source of
Export Earnings
Western Hemisphere
Trinidad and
Tobago
Venezuela
Brazil
Bolivia
Chile
Guyana
Honduras
Nicaragua
Peru
Suriname
Argentina
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominica
Ecuador
Guatemala
Mexico
Netherlands
Antilles
Uruguay
6See Anthony R. Boote and Kamau Thugge, Debt Relief for LowIncome Countries: The HIPC Initiative, Pamphlet Series, No. 51
(Washington: IMF, December 1997).
161
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Net Creditor
Countries
Official
financing
Private
financing
Diversified
financing
Africa
Sub-Sahara
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Rep.
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Democratic Rep. of
Congo, Rep. of
Cte dIvoire
Djibouti
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mozambique, Rep. of
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
So Tom and Prncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Somalia
South Africa
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
North Africa
Algeria
Morocco
Tunisia
162
Classification of Countries
Table D (continued)
Net Debtor Countries
____________________________________________
By main external financing source
____________________________________________
Countries
Net Creditor
Countries
Official
financing
Private
financing
Diversified
financing
Asia
Afghanistan, Islamic State of
Bangladesh
Bhutan
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
China
Fiji
India
Indonesia
Kiribati
Lao Peoples Democratic Rep.
Malaysia
Maldives
Marshall Islands
Micronesia, Federated States of
Myanmar
Nepal
Pakistan
Solomon Islands
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Tonga
Vanuatu
Vietnam
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Malta
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Syrian Arab Rep.
Turkey
Western Hemisphere
Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Bahamas, The
Barbados
Belize
Bolivia
163
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Table D (concluded)
Net Debtor Countries
____________________________________________
By main external financing source
____________________________________________
Countries
Net Creditor
Countries
Official
financing
Private
financing
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominica
Dominican Rep.
Ecuador
El Salvador
Grenada
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Diversified
financing
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Netherlands Antilles
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Suriname
of the former Soviet Union, and Mongolia. The transition country group is divided into three regional subgroups: central and eastern Europe, Russia, and
Transcaucasus and central Asia. The detailed country
composition is shown in Table F.
One common characteristic of these countries is the
transitional state of their economies from a centrally
administered system to one based on market principles.
Another is that this transition involves the transformation of sizable industrial sectors whose capital stocks
164
Classification of Countries
Heavily Indebted
Poor Countries
Least Developed
Countries
Africa
Sub-Sahara
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Rep.
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Democratic Rep. of
Congo, Rep. of
Cte dIvoire
Djibouti
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mozambique, Rep. of
Niger
Rwanda
Somalia
Sudan
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
North Africa
Algeria
Morocco
Tunisia
Asia
Afghanistan, Islamic State of
Bangladesh
Bhutan
Cambodia
Kiribati
Lao Peoples Democratic Rep.
Maldives
Myanmar
Nepal
165
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Table E (concluded)
Heavily Indebted
Poor Countries
Countries
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Vanuatu
Vietnam
Least Developed
Countries
Iraq
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Syrian Arab Rep.
Western Hemisphere
Bolivia
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Nicaragua
Russia
Lithuania
Macedonia, former Yugoslav Rep. of
Moldova
Poland
Romania
Slovak Rep.
Slovenia
Ukraine
Yugoslavia, Federal Rep. of
(Serbia/Montenegro)
Russia
166
Transcaucasus
and Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Rep.
Mongolia
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
List of Tables
List of Tables
Page
Output
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
169
170
171
173
175
176
179
Inflation
8. Summary of Inflation
9. Advanced Economies: GDP Deflators and Consumer Prices
10. Advanced Economies: Hourly Earnings, Productivity, and Unit Labor Costs
in Manufacturing
11. Developing Countries: Consumer Prices
12. Developing Countriesby Country: Consumer Prices
13. Countries in Transition: Consumer Prices
180
181
182
183
184
187
Financial Policies
14. Summary Financial Indicators
15. Advanced Economies: General and Central Government Fiscal Balances
and Balances Excluding Social Security Transactions
16. Advanced Economies: General Government Structural Balances
17. Advanced Economies: Monetary Aggregates
18. Advanced Economies: Interest Rates
19. Advanced Economies: Exchange Rates
20. Developing Countries: Central Government Fiscal Balances
21. Developing Countries: Broad Money Aggregates
188
189
191
192
193
194
195
196
Foreign Trade
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
197
199
200
201
203
205
206
207
208
210
212
167
217
219
221
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
225
227
228
230
231
234
235
237
Flow of Funds
44. Summary of Sources and Uses of World Saving
238
168
243
244
Output: Summary
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
1.8
2.5
2.7
4.0
3.8
4.3
4.2
2.5
3.0
3.5
3.4
3.2
Advanced economies
3.1
2.4
1.2
2.0
1.3
3.2
2.6
3.2
3.2
2.2
2.8
2.7
United States
European Union
Japan
2.9
2.4
4.0
2.7
2.0
1.3
0.9
1.7
3.8
2.7
1.1
1.0
2.3
0.4
0.3
3.5
2.9
0.6
2.3
2.5
1.5
3.4
1.7
5.0
3.9
2.6
1.4
3.9
2.7
2.8
3.7
2.0
1.0
2.6
2.7
1.5
4.6
3.9
2.7
3.5
4.1
5.8
5.0
4.2
4.6
1.1
4.0
3.8
Developing countries
4.2
5.5
4.9
6.7
6.5
6.8
6.1
6.6
5.8
3.2
3.5
4.8
Regional groups
Africa
Asia
Middle East and Europe
Western Hemisphere
2.5
6.9
2.8
1.6
2.9
7.3
3.5
3.3
1.8
6.6
2.7
3.9
0.2
9.5
7.1
3.3
0.7
9.3
3.9
3.9
2.4
9.6
0.7
4.9
3.0
9.1
3.7
1.5
5.9
8.2
4.7
3.6
3.1
6.6
4.5
5.3
3.4
3.7
3.2
2.2
3.1
5.3
1.8
0.1
5.0
5.4
3.1
3.9
Analytical groups
By source of export earnings
Fuel
Nonfuel
1.4
4.7
2.8
5.8
4.8
4.9
6.3
6.7
1.4
7.2
0.2
7.5
2.5
6.6
3.8
6.9
3.4
6.0
2.2
3.4
3.9
2.9
5.0
0.6
4.4
3.5
4.5
4.5
3.0
5.5
3.7
6.1
4.7
5.0
4.9
3.9
6.0
2.5
8.7
6.6
3.0
7.8
5.1
3.8
6.6
2.6
7.9
4.7
1.7
6.9
3.5
7.7
6.3
1.3
6.3
3.9
6.4
7.0
3.0
6.7
5.8
6.7
6.9
3.1
5.8
3.1
6.5
5.2
2.0
3.3
3.7
4.0
0.9
0.1
3.6
3.3
3.6
3.9
2.0
4.8
4.5
4.9
4.8
2.1
5.5
3.0
6.5
1.9
6.1
2.4
8.3
2.7
8.0
3.3
8.2
4.0
7.1
3.9
7.6
4.2
6.4
2.0
3.7
1.3
4.4
4.1
5.1
Countries in transition
2.2
3.2
7.6
13.8
7.1
7.1
0.5
0.3
2.2
0.2
0.8
2.8
...
...
...
...
1.4
0.7
5.7
3.7
9.9
10.7
5.4
7.0
8.5
5.0
19.4
14.4
3.7
0.3
10.4
9.6
2.9
3.2
11.6
10.4
1.6
5.6
2.4
4.4
1.6
3.7
3.4
1.6
3.0
3.4
0.9
2.5
2.2
2.3
4.6
2.2
1.0
1.7
2.0
3.3
4.0
2.0
2.9
3.0
3.2
2.8
2.7
3.8
1.6
2.1
2.9
10.8
1.4
3.6
11.4
0.9
2.9
8.1
3.8
3.8
1.8
2.9
4.4
1.9
3.4
4.6
3.1
3.7
4.1
3.5
3.0
3.5
3.7
2.8
3.7
1.8
3.0
4.4
3.7
2.4
1.9
1.5
1.8
3.6
3.1
0.4
2.9
7.7
1.3
4.1
14.0
0.6
4.5
6.5
2.5
4.9
6.4
1.9
4.4
0.5
2.5
4.9
2.6
4.2
2.2
1.6
1.5
0.3
2.2
1.9
0.7
2.1
3.1
2.7
3.0
2.2
0.5
0.7
1.0
2.8
2.7
3.5
3.3
1.8
2.5
2.9
15,580
18,922
27,811
34,727
28,868 29,655
33,646 35,714
29,493
37,870
29,236
39,103
30,186
40,714
31,743
43,052
Memorandum
23,888 23,927
27,015 28,473
GDP.
169
24,801 26,315
29,915 31,768
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Ten-Year Averages
___________________
198190 19912000 1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999 2000
1998
1999
2000
Real GDP
Advanced economies
3.1
2.4
1.2
2.0
1.3
3.2
2.6
3.2
3.2
2.2
2.8
2.7
...
...
...
2.9
2.9
4.0
2.3
2.2
2.7
1.3
1.9
0.8
0.9
3.8
5.0
1.8
2.7
1.0
2.2
1.1
2.3
0.3
1.1
2.8
3.5
0.6
2.3
2.2
2.3
1.5
1.7
3.0
3.4
5.0
0.8
2.9
3.9
1.4
1.8
2.2
3.9
2.8
2.3
2.6
3.7
1.0
1.4
2.4
2.6
1.5
2.5
2.0
4.3
3.0
1.3
2.6
3.1
1.9
2.2
2.5
2.5
2.4
2.8
2.4
2.2
2.7
2.8
1.8
1.4
2.0
2.4
0.8
1.4
1.5
1.9
1.2
0.8
0.1
0.9
1.3
0.9
2.3
2.3
2.8
2.2
4.4
4.7
2.1
2.9
2.8
2.8
1.6
0.9
2.6
1.7
2.3
1.5
3.5
4.0
3.2
1.3
2.2
3.1
2.5
1.2
1.1
3.6
3.0
2.4
2.4
2.6
2.8
0.3
1.1
2.8
2.7
2.1
1.0
3.5
3.0
2.1
2.6
2.4
3.7
3.0
2.2
1.9
2.0
2.2
2.0
3.1
1.6
2.9
3.6
4.6
3.4
2.4
2.6
1.8
1.5
2.2
2.4
2.0
2.2
2.5
6.5
4.9
2.9
2.3
2.3
1.6
1.1
3.4
1.4
5.9
3.1
2.3
1.9
5.4
2.5
0.7
2.0
1.5
1.4
1.3
1.3
3.2
0.7
1.9
3.3
5.8
2.0
1.2
0.8
1.5
2.2
0.5
0.8
0.6
1.6
1.4
2.6
8.5
4.5
2.1
3.2
2.6
3.9
2.4
5.8
3.7
2.0
2.4
5.8
4.1
4.3
2.9
2.3
2.3
3.7
1.7
3.0
3.9
2.1
2.4
9.5
3.5
3.9
2.4
3.1
1.3
1.3
2.0
3.3
4.1
2.4
3.6
7.7
3.5
4.2
3.7
3.6
3.0
1.8
2.5
3.1
5.6
3.2
3.8
10.7
4.8
2.1
4.0
3.8
2.9
2.6
3.3
2.9
5.6
3.7
3.9
8.9
5.7
3.5
3.4
2.6
1.4
3.2
2.0
1.3
3.6
3.3
3.0
7.5
3.5
3.6
3.5
2.5
2.5
3.0
2.5
1.5
3.8
3.6
3.2
7.0
4.4
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
Switzerland
Norway
Israel
Iceland
2.1
2.4
3.5
2.7
0.7
3.3
4.4
2.9
0.8
3.1
5.7
1.1
0.1
3.3
6.8
3.3
0.5
2.7
3.4
1.0
0.5
5.5
6.9
3.6
0.5
3.8
6.8
1.0
0.3
4.9
4.7
5.6
1.7
4.3
2.7
5.4
2.1
2.1
2.0
5.1
1.2
1.0
1.7
5.6
1.9
2.8
3.0
4.7
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
Korea
Australia
Taiwan Province of China
Hong Kong SAR
Singapore
New Zealand
9.1
3.4
7.9
6.5
7.0
1.6
5.4
3.5
6.1
3.6
7.2
2.5
9.2
1.0
7.6
5.1
7.1
1.7
5.4
2.6
6.8
6.3
6.6
0.9
5.5
3.8
6.3
6.1
12.8
5.1
8.3
5.0
6.5
5.4
11.4
5.9
8.9
4.4
6.0
3.9
8.2
4.0
6.8
4.0
5.7
4.5
7.5
3.1
5.0
3.9
6.8
5.3
9.0
2.1
5.8
5.1
4.9
5.1
0.3
0.3
6.5
4.0
5.0
1.2
4.5
2.6
5.5
3.0
5.1
3.6
5.0
3.3
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
2.9
2.4
2.4
2.2
2.0
1.9
0.8
1.7
2.4
1.7
1.1
1.4
1.0
0.4
0.9
2.9
2.9
2.5
2.3
2.5
2.4
3.0
1.7
1.5
3.0
2.6
2.4
2.4
2.7
2.8
2.6
2.0
2.1
2.5
2.7
2.8
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
8.2
5.5
8.0
6.0
6.3
7.5
7.3
6.2
5.8
1.8
5.2
5.1
...
...
...
France
Italy
United Kingdom3
Canada
Other advanced economies
Spain
Netherlands
Belgium
Sweden
Austria
Denmark
Finland
Greece4
Portugal
Ireland
Luxembourg
Memorandum
Industrial countries
European Union
Euro area
Newly industrialized Asian
economies
Real total domestic demand
Advanced economies
3.1
2.4
0.9
1.9
1.0
3.3
2.5
3.2
2.9
2.5
3.5
2.7
...
...
...
3.0
3.1
4.1
1.8
2.3
3.0
1.1
1.9
0.4
1.6
2.9
4.8
1.8
2.8
0.4
2.9
1.0
2.9
0.1
1.1
2.9
3.9
1.0
2.2
2.0
2.1
2.3
1.7
3.1
3.6
5.7
0.3
2.8
4.2
0.1
1.0
2.8
5.0
3.5
2.6
3.3
4.7
1.3
2.1
2.5
2.9
1.2
2.2
2.8
5.3
3.2
2.6
3.2
4.3
2.0
2.0
2.5
2.6
2.4
2.6
2.4
2.3
3.1
3.0
1.4
1.2
2.3
2.1
0.6
2.1
0.9
1.4
0.2
0.5
0.8
0.9
2.2
4.5
2.2
1.4
3.0
2.1
3.4
3.2
1.8
2.2
1.8
1.7
0.9
0.2
3.1
1.6
0.9
2.5
3.8
5.7
3.7
2.5
3.6
2.2
2.6
1.8
2.5
3.5
2.8
2.3
2.7
2.0
3.5
1.7
2.7
1.1
2.7
1.8
1.7
4.2
2.7
2.7
2.8
1.3
3.6
3.2
3.1
2.4
1.0
4.8
4.5
3.7
3.6
0.9
4.4
3.8
...
...
...
2.9
2.4
2.3
2.3
1.9
1.8
0.5
1.8
2.5
1.7
1.1
1.3
0.7
1.6
2.4
3.0
2.6
2.4
2.2
2.2
2.2
3.0
1.4
1.0
2.9
2.3
2.0
3.1
3.5
3.5
3.3
2.6
2.6
2.5
2.7
2.7
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
7.8
5.2
9.1
6.4
5.9
8.3
7.5
6.4
4.2
8.1
6.7
6.4
...
...
...
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Canada
Other advanced economies
Memorandum
Industrial countries
European Union
Euro area
Newly industrialized Asian
economies
1From
170
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
3.2
2.6
1.6
2.4
1.7
2.9
2.6
2.9
2.8
2.8
3.5
2.7
3.1
3.2
3.7
2.1
2.4
3.0
1.6
2.0
1.1
0.6
2.5
5.6
2.2
2.8
2.1
2.9
1.6
2.9
1.2
2.5
3.3
1.9
1.0
2.3
2.7
2.1
1.9
2.6
3.2
2.9
0.9
2.5
3.4
1.0
0.7
3.0
4.9
1.1
1.8
3.5
5.0
1.9
2.5
2.4
2.8
1.7
2.3
2.6
2.6
3.4
2.9
1.8
1.5
2.3
2.2
1.4
2.9
0.9
1.4
1.4
1.3
0.4
1.8
0.2
2.6
3.0
1.8
1.4
2.2
2.9
3.1
1.7
2.2
1.7
2.1
2.0
0.5
3.6
2.5
0.9
2.6
4.0
4.2
3.8
1.7
2.7
2.8
2.5
1.8
1.9
2.5
2.6
2.3
2.1
2.5
3.5
3.4
3.5
3.3
1.9
4.2
3.9
3.8
3.7
1.8
3.9
3.7
3.0
2.5
2.4
2.4
2.0
1.9
1.2
2.8
3.3
2.2
1.7
2.0
1.4
0.1
0.7
2.5
1.9
1.5
2.3
1.9
2.0
2.6
1.9
1.5
2.6
2.1
1.7
3.1
2.9
2.9
3.5
2.5
2.6
2.5
2.5
2.6
7.9
5.5
7.8
6.9
7.1
8.1
6.9
6.4
5.4
3.1
5.0
5.3
Advanced economies
2.5
1.3
2.0
1.5
0.8
1.0
0.7
1.6
1.0
1.1
1.6
1.4
2.3
2.6
2.5
1.2
1.0
0.7
1.8
1.1
1.5
1.0
2.0
0.5
1.2
0.1
2.0
5.0
0.5
0.3
2.4
0.1
0.9
0.4
2.4
2.4
0.5
0.3
3.3
1.5
1.1
0.7
1.9
1.3
0.7
1.3
1.5
0.6
0.9
1.1
0.7
0.1
1.5
1.5
0.8
0.8
1.5
1.6
1.5
0.5
2.3
2.5
0.9
2.5
1.8
0.4
1.4
0.3
2.8
1.7
2.9
2.8
3.4
0.6
0.5
1.0
3.4
0.2
0.8
0.1
1.1
0.8
1.4
1.2
2.1
1.6
0.5
2.6
1.4
1.7
1.1
1.2
0.5
1.4
0.5
1.1
1.3
1.0
1.7
1.5
2.0
4.0
1.0
1.5
1.2
3.0
0.1
3.5
2.2
4.3
2.9
2.0
1.3
1.6
3.5
2.0
1.9
1.8
1.2
2.3
2.0
2.3
1.2
1.3
1.3
1.8
2.3
2.2
1.3
2.4
3.0
0.6
0.9
1.2
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.7
0.6
0.4
1.2
1.6
1.6
0.8
0.4
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.6
1.9
1.4
1.5
1.5
1.2
6.3
3.3
7.4
6.2
3.6
1.0
2.0
7.4
3.4
1.6
0.6
0.1
Advanced economies
3.3
3.2
1.6
1.7
0.1
4.4
4.1
6.0
4.6
4.2
5.5
3.8
3.1
2.6
5.2
1.6
3.2
5.3
0.1
1.7
2.4
6.6
3.3
6.0
2.1
5.2
1.5
4.5
0.1
5.1
2.0
4.5
3.9
6.6
0.8
4.0
3.3
5.0
1.7
0.7
6.2
7.8
11.1
0.9
4.2
7.2
1.9
0.6
4.7
9.6
8.8
1.8
6.0
9.0
0.4
3.5
3.6
4.7
0.3
2.8
2.3
1.8
4.3
3.9
0.7
0.7
2.8
3.3
1.0
8.7
3.5
2.8
1.4
0.7
1.3
6.7
10.9
0.8
2.7
1.3
0.1
3.6
7.4
2.5
6.0
2.9
1.9
0.5
2.3
4.9
6.5
0.1
0.9
7.5
13.9
4.2
3.5
9.9
3.6
5.2
3.1
5.3
8.5
4.2
4.1
4.0
3.9
4.4
3.6
2.0
0.1
1.0
6.4
7.4
5.4
6.1
2.1
3.3
4.6
3.1
2.6
2.3
3.1
1.9
1.6
2.4
2.0
1.5
0.6
0.2
0.5
5.7
6.8
4.1
2.5
2.2
3.7
3.6
3.3
5.9
2.1
1.1
4.6
3.3
2.3
5.0
5.4
4.3
5.8
4.7
4.6
3.6
4.1
4.0
8.8
5.2
11.4
6.1
6.9
9.8
9.7
7.3
4.7
9.2
0.2
7.1
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Canada
Other advanced economies
Memorandum
Industrial countries
European Union
Euro area
Newly industrialized Asian
economies
Public consumption
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Canada
Other advanced economies
Memorandum
Industrial countries
European Union
Euro area
Newly industrialized Asian
economies
Gross fixed capital formation
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Canada
Other advanced economies
Memorandum
Industrial countries
European Union
Euro area
Newly industrialized Asian
economies
171
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Table 3 (concluded)
Ten-Year Averages
___________________
198190 19912000
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
3.1
2.4
1.1
2.0
1.1
2.8
2.5
3.4
2.7
2.5
3.6
2.7
3.0
3.0
4.0
1.8
2.3
3.1
1.2
2.0
0.6
1.3
2.7
4.7
1.9
2.7
0.9
3.7
1.0
2.7
0.3
1.0
2.4
3.3
1.1
2.0
2.1
2.6
2.1
1.3
3.2
3.6
5.3
0.5
2.4
3.8
0.1
0.5
2.8
5.2
3.3
1.4
3.7
5.2
1.4
2.4
2.5
3.0
1.3
2.0
2.4
2.4
3.0
3.0
1.5
1.1
2.2
2.0
1.3
2.3
0.4
0.8
0.8
0.6
0.3
1.0
0.7
3.8
1.8
0.6
1.3
1.2
2.7
2.8
1.5
2.0
1.9
0.8
1.6
1.0
3.5
2.4
0.8
1.7
3.5
4.9
3.3
2.0
3.6
2.7
2.8
2.1
2.9
3.4
2.8
2.5
2.6
2.3
3.7
3.2
3.4
2.4
1.3
4.2
4.3
4.1
3.9
1.5
3.3
3.6
2.9
2.4
2.3
2.3
1.8
1.8
0.7
2.1
2.7
1.8
1.4
1.7
0.7
1.1
1.7
2.5
1.8
1.6
2.2
2.0
1.9
3.1
1.8
1.4
2.6
2.0
1.6
3.0
3.0
2.9
3.6
2.9
2.8
2.6
2.7
2.7
7.9
5.1
8.9
6.2
6.5
7.7
7.3
7.0
4.9
4.9
2.9
5.3
Advanced economies
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.5
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.5
0.7
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.5
0.6
0.2
0.3
0.1
0.5
0.2
0.4
0.1
0.4
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.1
0.5
0.1
0.1
0.1
1.1
0.3
0.5
0.3
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.7
0.1
0.5
0.5
0.6
0.1
0.5
0.1
1.5
0.7
0.4
0.8
1.7
0.8
0.7
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.9
0.7
0.8
0.4
0.7
0.1
0.8
0.3
0.7
0.3
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.5
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.5
0.9
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.4
0.1
0.5
0.7
0.5
0.8
0.8
0.2
0.3
0.1
0.4
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.4
0.2
0.5
0.6
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.5
0.6
0.3
0.5
0.7
3.1
3.2
0.9
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Canada
Other advanced economies
Memorandum
Industrial countries
European Union
Euro area
Newly industrialized Asian
economies
Stock building2
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Canada
Other advanced economies
Memorandum
Industrial countries
European Union
Euro area
Newly industrialized Asian
economies
Foreign balance2
Advanced economies
0.1
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.4
0.8
0.1
0.2
0.5
0.1
0.4
0.2
0.3
0.5
0.6
0.9
0.5
0.1
0.6
0.6
0.1
0.7
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.5
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.8
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.5
0.5
0.1
0.4
1.4
0.8
0.8
1.4
0.6
0.3
0.8
1.1
0.2
0.6
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.5
0.1
0.4
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.2
0.8
1.3
0.2
0.9
0.2
0.8
0.4
0.9
3.7
0.1
0.9
0.2
0.2
0.9
1.5
0.3
0.7
1.0
1.0
0.6
0.7
0.5
0.1
1.4
0.9
0.3
1.7
0.4
1.1
2.1
1.0
0.1
0.6
2.1
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.4
0.6
0.2
0.2
0.1
1.0
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.7
1.2
0.6
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.5
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.3
1.2
1.4
0.1
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.6
0.1
0.4
0.5
0.8
0.8
0.6
0.8
0.7
0.5
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.7
0.4
1.2
0.6
0.6
0.8
0.1
0.1
1.7
6.2
0.7
0.7
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Canada
Other advanced economies
Memorandum
Industrial countries
European Union
Euro area
Newly industrialized Asian
economies
1Data
2Changes
172
Table 4. Advanced Economies: Unemployment, Employment, and Real Per Capita GDP
(Percent)
Ten-Year Averages1
___________________
198190 19912000
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Unemployment rate
Advanced economies
7.0
6.9
6.5
7.2
7.6
7.4
7.0
7.1
6.8
6.7
6.5
6.5
6.9
7.1
2.5
7.3
6.7
5.6
3.4
8.2
6.5
6.9
2.1
5.5
7.1
7.5
2.2
6.6
7.2
6.9
2.5
7.9
7.0
6.1
2.9
8.4
6.7
5.6
3.1
8.2
6.7
5.4
3.3
8.9
6.5
4.9
3.4
9.9
6.2
4.5
4.1
9.4
6.2
4.3
5.0
9.1
6.4
4.5
5.8
8.6
9.3
10.1
9.0
9.4
11.4
11.3
7.3
9.6
9.4
10.9
7.8
10.4
10.3
10.7
9.6
11.3
11.6
10.1
10.3
11.2
12.3
11.1
9.4
10.4
11.7
11.6
8.1
9.5
12.4
11.6
7.4
9.7
12.5
11.7
5.7
9.2
11.6
11.8
4.7
8.3
11.3
11.7
4.8
8.0
10.7
11.4
5.3
8.1
7.2
18.4
8.2
9.7
2.4
2.7
9.1
4.8
7.5
7.4
14.6
1.5
7.8
19.6
5.6
9.0
6.5
4.0
9.0
12.4
9.7
5.6
11.3
2.6
6.5
16.3
5.5
6.6
2.9
3.4
10.2
6.6
7.7
4.1
14.7
1.4
7.3
18.4
5.4
7.3
5.3
3.4
10.9
11.7
8.7
4.1
15.2
1.6
8.6
22.7
6.5
8.8
8.2
4.0
12.0
16.4
9.7
5.5
15.5
2.1
8.7
24.2
7.6
10.0
8.0
3.8
11.9
16.6
9.6
6.8
14.1
2.7
8.2
22.9
7.1
9.9
7.7
3.9
10.0
15.4
10.0
7.2
12.1
3.0
8.1
22.2
6.6
9.7
8.0
4.3
8.6
14.6
10.3
7.3
11.5
3.3
7.8
20.8
5.5
9.4
8.0
4.4
7.7
12.6
10.3
6.7
9.8
3.4
8.1
18.8
4.1
9.5
6.5
4.7
6.3
11.4
10.1
5.0
7.7
3.1
7.5
15.7
3.6
9.2
5.4
4.3
6.0
10.3
10.3
4.6
6.5
2.9
6.9
14.0
3.7
9.2
5.1
4.2
6.2
9.2
10.2
4.6
6.2
2.8
Switzerland
Norway
Israel
Iceland
0.6
3.1
6.5
0.9
3.7
4.7
8.7
3.3
1.1
5.5
10.6
1.5
2.5
5.9
11.2
3.0
4.5
5.9
10.0
4.4
4.7
5.4
7.8
4.8
4.2
4.9
6.9
5.0
4.7
4.8
6.7
4.3
5.2
4.1
7.7
3.7
3.9
3.2
8.6
3.0
3.0
3.6
9.3
1.7
2.9
4.0
8.8
1.7
Korea
Australia
Taiwan Province of China
Hong Kong SAR
Singapore
New Zealand
3.5
7.7
2.0
2.7
3.4
5.4
3.6
8.9
2.1
3.2
2.8
7.9
2.3
9.6
1.4
1.8
1.9
10.3
2.4
10.8
1.5
2.0
2.7
10.3
2.8
10.9
1.4
2.0
2.7
9.5
2.4
9.8
1.5
1.9
2.6
8.2
2.0
8.5
1.8
3.2
2.7
6.3
2.0
8.6
2.6
2.8
2.0
6.1
2.6
8.5
2.7
2.2
1.8
6.6
6.8
8.0
2.8
4.7
3.2
7.5
7.0
7.2
3.0
6.1
4.3
7.2
6.0
7.0
2.7
5.4
4.2
7.0
7.3
9.2
9.6
7.2
9.9
10.6
6.8
8.4
8.7
7.6
9.4
9.5
8.0
10.7
10.9
7.9
11.1
11.7
7.5
10.7
11.4
7.5
10.7
11.7
7.2
10.4
11.7
6.8
9.6
10.9
6.6
9.1
10.3
6.6
8.8
9.7
3.0
3.2
2.0
2.1
2.3
2.1
2.1
2.2
2.5
5.4
5.7
5.0
Advanced economies
1.3
0.7
0.1
0.1
1.0
1.1
1.0
1.4
1.1
1.0
0.8
1.2
1.8
1.2
0.5
0.6
1.3
0.3
0.5
0.1
0.9
1.9
1.7
0.1
0.7
1.1
1.9
1.5
0.2
1.8
0.9
2.3
0.1
0.7
0.8
1.5
0.1
0.4
0.8
1.4
0.5
1.3
1.3
2.2
1.1
1.3
0.9
1.5
0.6
0.8
1.5
1.0
0.1
0.6
0.9
0.3
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.8
1.7
0.5
0.2
1.3
0.2
1.4
3.6
1.9
0.6
1.1
2.8
0.6
1.2
4.1
0.7
1.4
0.1
1.6
0.8
2.1
0.8
0.6
1.7
1.6
0.3
0.5
1.9
1.2
0.2
0.4
1.8
1.9
2.1
1.1
1.2
2.8
1.6
1.1
2.4
1.5
0.7
0.3
1.8
1.4
1.2
0.8
0.1
0.3
1.3
2.1
1.7
1.8
1.7
1.9
1.6
1.2
0.6
0.5
0.6
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.1
1.1
0.3
1.6
1.4
0.2
2.0
2.3
0.8
0.3
0.7
1.0
0.7
0.5
0.9
0.6
0.3
1.3
0.6
0.4
1.2
1.5
1.6
0.9
1.0
1.2
0.7
0.8
1.0
2.4
2.0
2.4
1.9
1.8
2.6
2.1
2.0
2.3
0.5
2.1
2.1
France
Italy4
United Kingdom
Canada
Other advanced economies
Spain
Netherlands
Belgium
Sweden
Austria
Denmark
Finland
Greece
Portugal
Ireland
Luxembourg
Memorandum
Industrial countries
European Union
Euro area
Newly industrialized Asian
economies
Growth in employment
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Canada
Other advanced economies
Memorandum
Industrial countries
European Union
Euro area
Newly industrialized Asian
economies
173
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Table 4 (concluded)
Ten-Year Averages1
___________________
198190 19912000
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2.4
1.8
0.4
1.3
0.6
2.5
1.9
2.5
2.6
1.6
2.2
2.1
2.2
1.9
3.4
2.0
1.6
1.8
1.1
1.6
2.0
3.4
4.2
1.1
1.6
0.7
1.5
0.5
1.2
1.8
2.2
2.5
0.4
2.1
1.6
1.3
1.3
1.4
2.3
2.5
4.6
0.5
2.3
3.0
1.2
1.7
1.7
3.0
3.0
2.3
2.0
2.8
0.8
1.5
1.9
1.7
1.3
2.6
1.9
2.1
2.5
1.6
1.4
1.4
1.6
1.2
0.4
1.1
2.2
3.1
0.8
1.1
0.3
0.2
1.7
0.5
2.1
1.2
2.4
1.9
4.0
3.6
1.7
2.7
2.4
1.5
1.2
0.7
2.3
0.5
1.9
1.2
3.2
2.9
2.8
1.3
2.0
2.0
2.1
1.2
0.9
2.5
2.7
2.5
2.2
1.6
3.1
2.6
2.0
1.9
1.2
3.7
3.5
3.1
3.5
1.5
2.9
3.0
2.2
2.1
2.1
1.6
1.7
1.7
0.1
1.2
1.9
1.1
0.8
1.2
0.4
0.6
1.0
2.3
2.6
2.2
1.7
2.1
2.1
2.4
1.5
1.3
2.4
2.4
2.2
1.9
2.5
2.6
2.1
1.8
2.0
2.0
2.6
2.7
6.8
4.4
6.9
5.0
5.3
6.1
5.8
4.8
4.9
2.6
4.2
4.2
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Canada
Other advanced economies
Memorandum
Industrial countries
European Union
Euro area
Newly industrialized Asian
economies
1Compound
annual rate of change for employment and per capita GDP; arithmetic average for unemployment rate.
projections for unemployment have been adjusted to reflect the new survey techniques adopted by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics in January 1994.
3Data through 1991 apply to west Germany only.
4New series starting in 1993, reflecting revisions in the labor force surveys and the definition of unemployment to bring data in line with those of other advanced economies.
2The
174
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
4.2
5.5
4.9
6.7
6.5
6.8
6.1
6.6
5.8
3.2
3.5
4.8
2.5
2.3
2.9
2.9
1.8
1.7
0.2
0.7
1.5
2.4
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.9
5.5
3.1
3.9
3.4
2.7
3.1
2.9
5.0
4.7
2.8
6.9
5.3
2.8
1.6
3.4
7.3
4.4
3.5
3.3
1.3
6.6
6.5
2.7
3.9
0.1
9.5
6.6
7.1
3.3
1.3
9.3
6.1
3.9
3.9
2.3
9.6
6.7
0.7
4.9
4.9
9.1
7.5
3.7
1.5
5.7
8.2
6.6
4.7
3.6
4.7
6.6
3.6
4.5
5.3
3.7
3.7
5.4
3.2
2.2
4.4
5.3
2.3
1.8
0.1
5.5
5.4
4.0
3.1
3.9
1.4
6.3
2.1
2.8
7.1
4.7
4.8
5.7
3.2
6.3
8.6
3.5
1.4
9.3
4.7
0.2
9.7
5.2
2.5
8.7
6.7
3.8
7.7
5.6
3.4
6.5
5.8
2.2
4.8
3.3
5.1
3.4
2.9
5.5
5.6
4.3
3.0
3.8
3.6
0.4
4.5
4.0
4.5
3.0
4.3
3.2
4.5
3.6
2.7
4.5
5.8
4.7
5.3
4.8
5.2
1.2
5.0
3.7
0.6
4.4
3.5
4.5
4.5
3.0
5.5
3.7
6.1
4.7
5.0
4.9
3.9
6.0
2.5
8.7
6.6
3.0
7.8
5.1
3.8
6.6
2.6
7.9
4.7
1.7
6.9
3.5
7.7
6.3
1.3
6.3
3.9
6.4
7.0
3.0
6.7
5.8
6.7
6.9
3.1
5.8
3.1
6.5
5.2
2.0
3.3
3.7
4.0
0.9
0.1
3.6
3.3
3.6
3.9
2.0
4.8
4.5
4.9
4.8
2.1
5.5
3.0
6.5
1.9
6.1
2.4
8.3
2.7
8.0
3.3
8.2
4.0
7.1
3.9
7.6
4.2
6.4
2.0
3.7
1.3
4.4
4.1
5.1
2.5
3.0
2.4
3.7
4.3
3.3
0.9
2.2
3.0
1.4
2.4
6.1
1.7
3.6
2.1
2.6
3.1
2.5
5.5
6.3
2.1
5.7
5.6
4.7
5.0
5.0
3.1
4.1
4.4
3.7
4.9
5.1
2.4
5.7
5.3
3.8
1.9
3.6
2.9
4.1
4.5
4.9
4.4
4.9
4.2
1.5
1.9
3.1
0.6
5.0
0.4
0.5
0.3
5.7
0.8
1.5
1.0
4.8
0.9
1.9
2.3
7.7
0.3
1.2
1.9
7.5
1.5
2.0
0.2
8.0
2.2
3.1
1.1
7.5
1.5
1.1
3.3
6.6
5.8
0.7
0.5
5.1
2.3
4.2
0.9
2.2
0.7
0.5
0.6
3.9
0.6
1.5
2.5
4.0
0.7
2.3
Regional groups
Africa
Sub-Sahara
Excluding Nigeria and
South Africa
Asia
Excluding China and India
Middle East and Europe
Western Hemisphere
Analytical groups
By source of export earnings
Fuel
Manufactures
Nonfuel primary products
Services, income, and
private transfers
Diversified
Other groups
Heavily indebted poor countries
Least developed countries
Middle East and north Africa
Memorandum
Real per capita GDP
Developing countries
Regional groups
Africa
Asia
Middle East and Europe
Western Hemisphere
175
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
2.5
1.8
0.2
0.7
2.4
3.0
5.9
3.1
3.4
2.3
2.1
1.1
10.9
2.8
1.2
0.7
4.7
7.4
10.0
1.6
1.0
4.0
3.0
2.5
2.2
27.0
3.5
2.0
0.8
1.1
1.4
4.4
3.4
1.2
3.9
11.3
4.6
4.7
4.0
3.8
11.7
5.5
6.9
6.0
1.1
6.6
5.7
7.8
4.8
4.7
0.2
4.5
6.0
6.2
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
4.5
3.3
2.6
2.0
5.0
5.0
3.8
34.1
0.6
10.4
0.7
3.1
18.4
6.4
2.4
5.9
3.2
87.9
0.3
1.8
3.7
2.5
12.7
4.9
5.7
7.3
3.3
2.2
6.0
0.9
8.4
5.0
2.6
3.3
3.7
0.4
5.1
2.2
5.7
4.1
4.5
5.0
3.6
4.8
6.8
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Congo, Rep. of
Cte dIvoire
Djibouti
2.4
0.7
5.2
1.0
0.3
5.4
8.4
2.4
0.5
8.5
10.5
2.6
0.2
0.2
3.0
13.5
1.0
0.2
3.9
5.3
3.9
5.5
2.0
2.9
3.9
0.7
4.0
7.1
3.6
0.4
0.9
6.3
6.8
3.7
5.7
1.9
6.0
0.7
1.0
5.0
3.5
5.4
0.8
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia, The
2.2
...
1.9
1.6
3.4
3.6
...
4.7
6.1
2.2
17.0
...
5.1
3.3
4.4
7.1
2.5
13.4
2.4
6.1
6.8
9.8
3.5
3.4
3.8
16.2
2.9
6.1
7.0
3.4
27.8
6.8
10.9
5.1
5.3
71.2
7.9
5.9
5.3
0.8
22.0
3.0
1.0
2.1
9.9
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
2.1
3.1
2.4
4.3
4.6
5.3
2.4
5.1
1.4
4.1
3.9
3.5
1.1
0.8
4.6
5.0
4.9
2.1
0.4
3.7
3.8
4.0
3.2
2.6
3.7
4.5
4.4
4.4
4.4
6.0
3.5
4.6
4.6
4.1
9.7
4.2
4.8
5.4
2.1
4.1
4.6
4.6
28.1
1.5
5.4
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
...
0.5
2.2
2.0
4.5
...
6.3
8.7
0.9
2.6
...
1.2
7.3
8.4
1.7
...
2.1
9.7
2.4
5.5
...
10.2
2.2
4.6
...
1.7
15.4
6.4
4.5
...
2.1
9.0
4.0
4.7
...
3.7
4.9
6.7
4.8
...
3.9
3.1
3.6
3.5
Mauritius
Morocco
Mozambique, Rep. of
Namibia
Niger
4.9
3.9
0.1
0.6
6.4
6.9
4.9
5.7
2.5
4.8
4.0
8.1
9.5
6.5
6.7
1.0
8.7
2.0
1.4
4.3
10.4
7.5
6.7
4.0
3.5
6.6
4.3
3.4
2.6
5.1
12.1
7.1
2.9
3.4
5.5
2.0
11.3
1.8
3.3
5.6
6.3
12.0
1.7
8.4
Nigeria
Rwanda
So Tom and Prncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
2.0
2.2
1.5
2.5
3.6
6.0
4.3
1.2
0.4
2.7
2.6
6.6
0.7
2.2
6.9
2.2
8.3
1.1
2.2
6.5
0.6
49.5
2.2
2.9
0.8
2.6
32.8
2.0
5.5
0.6
6.4
15.8
1.5
5.2
4.7
3.1
12.8
1.0
5.0
4.3
1.9
9.5
2.7
5.7
2.3
Sierra Leone
Somalia
South Africa
Sudan
Swaziland
0.8
...
1.5
2.5
6.6
8.0
...
1.0
7.0
2.5
9.6
...
2.1
5.2
1.3
0.1
...
1.2
2.8
3.3
3.5
...
3.2
5.3
3.5
10.0
...
3.1
4.4
3.0
5.0
...
4.2
4.7
3.6
20.2
...
2.5
6.7
3.7
0.7
...
0.5
5.0
2.0
Tanzania
Togo
Tunisia
Uganda
Zambia
3.3
1.1
3.6
3.6
1.0
2.1
0.7
3.9
1.0
0.6
4.0
7.8
3.1
1.7
1.2
16.4
2.2
8.4
6.8
1.6
16.8
3.3
5.3
8.6
3.6
6.8
2.4
10.5
4.3
4.5
9.7
7.0
8.1
6.4
3.5
4.3
5.4
5.2
3.5
3.3
1.0
5.1
5.5
2.0
Zimbabwe
4.4
5.5
9.0
1.3
6.8
0.6
7.3
3.2
1.6
Algeria
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
176
Table 6 (continued)
Average
198190
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
Asia
6.9
6.6
9.5
9.3
9.6
9.1
8.2
6.6
3.7
...
4.3
7.6
...
...
...
4.1
3.9
4.0
9.1
...
4.8
4.4
1.1
4.8
...
4.2
5.0
0.5
7.5
...
4.7
5.1
1.8
7.0
...
5.3
6.9
3.0
7.7
...
5.1
6.0
3.6
7.0
...
5.2
5.7
4.1
1.0
...
4.8
4.6
1.0
1.0
China
Fiji
India
Indonesia
Kiribati
9.1
2.5
5.9
5.4
9.2
1.5
1.7
8.9
6.9
14.2
4.8
4.2
7.2
1.6
13.5
3.5
5.1
7.3
0.8
12.6
4.2
7.2
7.5
7.2
10.5
2.4
8.0
8.2
6.5
9.6
3.3
7.4
8.0
2.6
8.8
3.6
5.5
4.7
3.3
7.8
4.0
5.8
13.7
6.1
5.6
6.0
10.2
...
...
4.0
8.6
7.6
0.1
4.3
7.0
7.8
6.3
0.1
1.2
5.9
8.3
6.2
5.4
5.7
8.1
9.3
6.6
2.7
0.9
7.1
9.4
7.2
1.9
1.3
6.9
8.6
6.5
13.1
0.5
6.5
7.7
6.2
5.3
3.8
5.0
6.7
6.0
4.3
2.8
1.3
4.8
6.0
1.5
1.7
0.7
4.6
5.5
9.5
0.6
9.7
3.3
7.8
11.8
0.3
5.9
8.2
1.9
16.6
2.1
6.8
3.5
3.9
4.4
4.4
7.2
5.3
5.1
2.9
4.7
7.0
4.0
5.0
3.5
5.8
7.0
1.9
1.2
5.4
5.2
7.0
4.0
3.3
3.8
0.5
12.9
1.2
4.3
7.9
1.6
2.4
3.0
4.6
8.1
6.4
4.1
9.5
4.3
8.2
0.3
1.7
2.0
6.9
8.5
3.7
0.1
5.2
5.6
8.6
5.0
6.8
7.7
5.5
8.8
4.8
6.1
0.6
3.8
5.5
1.4
1.6
0.5
6.4
1.3
4.4
1.3
1.0
5.0
9.4
1.5
2.8
5.9
4.3
6.0
0.7
8.6
4.5
8.1
1.3
8.8
3.8
9.5
3.5
9.3
2.7
8.2
2.1
3.5
2.8
2.7
7.1
3.9
0.7
3.7
4.7
4.5
3.2
Bahrain
Cyprus
Egypt
Iran, Islamic Republic of
Iraq
2.1
6.2
5.9
3.1
3.0
4.6
0.5
3.2
10.6
62.9
7.8
9.6
3.3
6.1
29.2
8.3
0.7
1.6
2.1
2.4
5.9
2.9
0.9
2.1
5.8
2.5
2.9
6.7
3.1
2.2
5.0
5.5
3.1
2.5
5.0
3.0
10.0
2.1
5.0
5.4
1.7
12.0
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Malta
2.3
2.7
5.8
1.2
3.7
2.3
41.0
38.2
12.0
5.9
17.0
77.4
4.5
4.2
6.7
5.8
34.2
7.0
0.1
4.0
7.6
8.4
8.0
0.9
5.0
3.9
1.0
6.5
1.1
7.3
1.0
2.1
4.0
2.0
3.2
1.3
2.5
4.0
2.6
3.7
2.2
2.2
3.0
2.6
3.1
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Syrian Arab Republic
Turkey
8.6
1.9
0.5
2.2
5.2
6.0
0.4
8.4
7.1
0.8
8.5
9.3
2.8
10.6
5.0
6.1
0.4
0.6
5.0
7.7
3.8
2.3
0.5
7.7
4.7
4.8
1.1
0.5
5.8
8.1
2.9
10.0
1.4
1.8
6.9
6.4
15.5
2.7
1.2
7.6
2.9
11.5
1.6
5.4
2.8
0.6
...
0.2
0.3
2.7
4.9
0.9
2.9
2.2
0.5
6.1
8.6
10.1
5.6
2.4
5.2
0.4
2.7
177
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Table 6 (concluded)
Average
198190
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
Western Hemisphere
1.6
3.9
3.3
3.9
4.9
1.5
3.6
5.3
2.2
6.7
1.2
2.8
0.9
4.8
2.7
10.5
2.7
3.9
3.1
0.4
10.3
2.0
5.7
10.2
5.5
6.3
1.7
0.8
3.3
6.2
5.8
0.9
4.0
1.8
5.0
2.8
0.3
2.9
3.3
5.1
5.5
4.2
4.1
2.0
3.3
8.1
3.0
3.0
3.5
3.8
3.9
2.2
4.9
3.1
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
0.1
1.5
3.1
3.4
2.8
5.3
1.0
8.0
2.0
2.3
1.6
0.5
12.3
4.0
7.7
4.3
4.9
7.0
5.4
6.3
4.7
5.9
5.7
5.8
4.5
4.7
4.2
10.6
5.2
2.4
4.7
2.8
7.4
2.0
0.6
4.2
3.7
7.6
2.8
3.7
4.7
0.1
3.4
0.6
6.2
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Grenada
5.4
2.4
2.1
0.1
5.6
0.7
1.0
5.0
3.6
3.6
2.1
8.0
3.6
7.4
1.1
0.8
3.0
2.0
7.4
1.2
1.8
4.3
4.4
6.0
3.3
1.4
4.8
2.4
6.4
3.1
3.3
7.3
1.9
1.8
3.5
1.8
8.2
3.5
4.1
3.6
2.5
7.3
0.4
3.2
3.6
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
0.9
2.5
0.5
2.4
3.1
3.7
6.0
4.8
3.3
0.8
4.8
7.8
13.2
5.6
1.8
3.9
8.2
2.4
6.2
1.3
4.0
8.5
8.3
1.4
1.0
4.9
5.0
4.4
4.3
3.0
7.9
2.7
3.7
1.9
4.1
6.2
1.1
4.9
2.4
4.9
1.5
3.0
5.0
1.9
Mexico
Netherlands Antilles
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
1.9
0.1
1.4
1.4
2.8
4.2
1.8
0.2
9.4
2.5
3.6
3.7
0.4
8.2
1.8
2.0
0.3
0.2
5.5
4.1
4.4
2.4
3.3
2.9
3.1
6.2
4.2
1.8
4.7
5.2
2.4
4.5
2.4
1.3
7.0
3.0
4.5
4.4
3.5
4.6
3.0
5.0
4.0
3.5
Peru
St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Suriname
0.8
5.8
6.8
6.4
0.8
2.9
3.9
2.3
0.6
2.9
1.6
3.5
7.1
7.5
4.0
6.4
7.0
2.0
0.2
9.5
13.1
4.8
2.1
2.4
5.4
7.3
3.9
4.1
7.6
7.1
2.5
6.3
1.4
1.6
6.7
7.2
7.0
2.1
2.1
5.6
0.7
3.8
2.9
4.0
1.9
2.9
0.5
0.9
2.7
3.2
9.7
1.7
7.9
6.1
1.4
3.0
0.3
3.6
6.3
2.4
3.8
1.8
4.0
3.5
5.3
0.2
3.5
5.1
5.9
3.2
4.5
0.7
1For
many countries, figures for recent years are IMF staff estimates. Data for some countries are for fiscal years.
178
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
...
9.9
8.5
3.7
2.9
1.6
1.6
3.0
2.2
Albania
Belarus
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Croatia
1.2
...
...
2.1
...
28.0
1.2
...
11.7
...
7.2
9.7
...
7.3
...
9.6
7.0
...
1.5
8.0
9.4
13.2
...
1.7
5.9
8.9
10.4
21.2
2.2
6.8
9.1
2.9
69.0
10.9
6.0
7.0
11.4
30.0
7.0
6.5
8.0
8.3
18.0
3.5
2.3
Czech Republic
Czechoslovakia, former
Estonia
Hungary
Latvia
...
2.1
...
1.1
...
...
15.9
7.9
11.9
11.1
...
8.5
21.6
3.1
35.2
0.6
...
8.2
0.6
16.1
2.7
...
1.8
2.9
2.1
6.4
...
4.3
1.5
0.3
3.8
...
4.0
1.3
3.3
0.3
...
10.6
4.6
6.5
2.3
...
4.0
5.1
3.8
Lithuania
Macedonia, former Yugoslav Rep. of
Moldova
Poland
Romania
...
...
...
0.2
0.6
5.7
...
17.5
7.0
12.9
21.3
...
29.7
2.6
8.8
16.2
9.1
1.2
3.8
1.5
9.8
1.8
31.2
5.2
4.0
3.3
1.2
1.4
7.0
7.2
4.7
0.8
7.8
6.0
3.9
7.3
1.5
1.3
6.8
6.9
5.1
2.9
8.6
4.8
7.3
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Ukraine
Yugoslavia, former
...
...
...
0.3
...
...
10.6
17.0
...
...
17.0
34.0
3.7
2.8
14.2
...
4.9
5.3
22.9
...
6.9
4.1
12.2
...
6.6
3.5
10.0
...
6.5
4.6
3.0
...
4.4
3.9
1.7
...
Russia
...
5.4
19.4
10.4
11.6
2.4
3.4
0.9
4.6
...
7.0
14.4
9.6
10.4
4.4
1.6
2.5
2.2
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
...
...
...
...
...
12.4
0.7
20.6
11.0
7.8
52.6
22.7
44.8
5.3
13.9
14.1
23.1
25.4
9.2
15.5
5.4
19.7
11.4
12.6
20.1
6.9
11.8
2.4
8.2
5.4
5.8
1.3
10.5
0.5
7.1
3.1
5.8
11.0
2.0
9.9
7.2
10.0
2.9
2.5
2.0
Mongolia
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
5.3
...
...
...
9.2
7.1
4.7
0.5
9.5
28.9
5.3
11.1
3.0
11.1
10.0
2.3
2.3
21.4
18.8
4.2
6.3
12.5
8.2
0.9
2.6
4.4
7.7
1.6
4.0
1.7
25.9
2.4
3.5
5.3
5.0
3.3
1Data for some countries refer to real net material product (NMP) or are estimates based on NMP. For many countries, figures for recent years are IMF
staff estimates. The figures should be interpreted only as indicative of broad orders of magnitude because reliable, comparable data are not generally available. In particular, the growth of output of new private enterprises or of the informal economy is not fully reflected in the recent figures.
179
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
GDP deflators
Advanced economies
5.6
2.3
4.5
3.3
2.8
2.3
2.3
1.8
1.7
1.3
1.2
1.7
United States
European Union
Japan
4.5
6.6
1.9
2.3
2.8
0.3
4.0
5.4
2.7
2.8
4.3
1.7
2.6
3.4
0.6
2.4
2.6
0.2
2.3
2.9
0.6
1.9
2.5
1.4
1.9
1.8
0.1
1.0
1.9
0.3
1.5
1.6
0.2
2.3
1.7
0.4
10.0
3.0
5.6
3.9
3.8
3.3
3.4
3.0
2.3
1.7
1.1
2.2
Advanced economies
5.6
2.6
4.7
3.5
3.1
2.6
2.6
2.4
2.1
1.5
1.4
1.8
United States
European Union
Japan
4.7
6.3
2.1
2.7
2.8
0.9
4.2
5.1
3.3
3.0
4.5
1.7
3.0
3.8
1.2
2.6
3.0
0.7
2.8
3.2
0.1
2.9
2.5
0.1
2.3
1.8
1.7
1.6
1.4
0.6
2.2
1.3
0.4
2.5
1.5
10.1
3.3
6.5
4.1
3.5
3.3
3.6
3.3
2.6
2.7
1.2
2.2
Developing countries
39.0
23.3
43.2
32.8
47.3
51.8
22.1
14.6
9.2
10.3
6.7
5.8
15.1
7.1
19.2
145.4
21.5
8.2
24.6
63.5
24.6
8.3
28.0
173.9
32.5
7.6
25.1
110.8
30.6
10.7
25.3
209.0
37.3
15.9
31.4
208.9
33.2
12.8
35.6
35.9
25.9
8.2
24.2
22.4
11.1
4.8
23.1
13.2
8.7
8.0
23.6
10.6
9.0
3.1
18.3
9.8
6.9
3.5
13.1
7.6
Analytical groups
By source of export earnings
Fuel
Nonfuel
13.3
43.8
22.3
23.5
21.3
46.5
22.8
34.3
26.1
50.2
32.0
54.3
42.1
20.0
30.4
12.9
15.3
8.6
14.6
9.9
12.4
6.3
9.7
5.4
2.3
40.6
18.3
60.8
10.0
3.0
24.0
16.7
30.2
12.0
6.1
44.7
25.6
61.7
16.7
3.2
34.0
22.3
45.8
12.3
4.2
49.0
22.5
71.9
10.8
3.4
53.7
27.3
78.3
11.4
5.0
22.7
22.2
26.6
13.1
2.4
15.0
16.2
16.3
11.0
1.3
9.4
10.2
10.0
7.7
1.1
10.6
8.7
7.6
20.5
2.0
7.0
8.1
5.7
10.3
1.9
5.9
6.6
5.4
6.9
84.4
23.7
64.8
11.7
150.1
15.8
114.3
11.9
217.4
13.0
235.4
17.1
42.7
16.6
23.4
12.3
12.0
8.7
10.3
10.7
10.2
6.0
7.8
5.3
11.5
123.0
94.1
646.6
602.0
266.9
126.8
40.6
28.2
20.9
39.3
18.1
...
...
...
...
83.9
40.5
163.9
199.4
94.9
277.2
98.0
102.3
92.7 1,353.0
97.0
938.2
356.5
152.6
80.3
45.3
895.9
302.0
1,224.0 1,671.8
74.6
25.1
190.1
248.7
32.0
23.2
47.8
64.1
36.7
38.8
14.7
36.5
17.8
15.3
27.7
15.3
21.3
8.8
88.4
16.1
15.9
6.4
23.4
15.3
6.2
9.4
1.9
2.4
7.9
164.8
2.5
10.0
40.1
2.1
7.0
24.1
1.7
6.2
14.9
1.6
5.3
10.0
1.4
4.3
8.0
1.9
4.0
5.9
Regional groups
Africa
Asia
Middle East and Europe
Western Hemisphere
Countries in transition
Central and eastern Europe
Excluding Belarus and Ukraine
Russia
Transcaucasus and central Asia
Memorandum
Median inflation rate
Advanced economies
Developing countries
Countries in transition
4.0
12.1
101.4
3.2
9.9
839.5
180
3.0
9.3
472.3
2.4
10.6
131.6
Ten-Year Averages
___________________
198190 19912000 1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999 2000
1998
1999
2000
GDP deflators
Advanced economies
5.6
2.3
4.5
3.3
2.8
2.3
2.3
1.8
1.7
1.3
1.2
1.7
...
...
...
4.7
4.5
1.9
2.8
2.0
2.3
0.3
2.2
4.1
4.0
2.7
3.9
2.9
2.8
1.7
5.0
2.4
2.6
0.6
3.7
1.9
2.4
0.2
2.5
1.9
2.3
0.6
2.0
1.5
1.9
1.4
1.0
1.4
1.9
0.1
0.7
1.1
1.0
0.3
1.1
1.2
1.5
0.2
0.7
1.6
2.3
0.4
1.1
1.0
0.9
1.3
1.6
2.0
0.1
0.9
1.6
2.3
0.4
1.4
6.3
10.6
6.4
5.0
1.6
3.9
3.1
1.4
3.3
7.6
6.7
2.7
2.1
4.5
4.0
1.3
2.5
3.9
2.8
1.5
1.5
3.5
1.5
1.1
1.6
5.0
2.5
2.3
1.2
5.2
3.3
1.6
0.9
2.6
2.9
0.8
0.8
2.8
2.7
0.6
1.0
2.0
2.2
1.4
0.8
1.7
2.8
1.5
0.9
2.6
2.6
0.7
0.9
2.1
3.0
2.3
0.7
1.6
3.1
1.4
9.5
9.3
2.0
4.5
7.7
3.9
5.9
7.2
18.2
17.9
7.1
3.4
3.4
3.9
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.3
1.9
1.9
9.2
5.7
3.3
1.8
6.4
7.1
2.7
3.1
7.6
3.7
2.5
1.6
19.8
12.3
1.8
2.2
4.9
6.9
2.3
3.7
1.0
4.3
2.2
1.0
14.8
10.6
2.8
2.9
4.3
4.3
1.9
4.0
2.6
2.8
0.5
1.8
14.5
7.1
5.2
0.9
3.8
4.0
2.3
2.3
2.4
2.8
1.4
2.0
11.2
6.1
1.7
5.5
3.7
4.8
1.7
1.5
3.6
2.3
1.4
3.6
9.8
5.6
2.7
1.0
2.9
3.2
1.7
1.6
1.4
1.7
2.2
0.6
7.9
2.4
2.3
0.4
2.5
2.1
2.0
1.4
1.2
1.6
1.8
2.0
6.9
3.0
3.5
2.4
2.4
2.3
2.0
1.9
1.1
1.0
1.4
2.7
5.0
4.6
5.6
1.7
1.6
2.3
2.1
1.5
0.8
1.4
2.9
1.9
2.3
3.0
4.3
0.7
2.2
2.1
2.2
1.3
1.1
1.1
2.4
2.2
1.6
2.7
3.3
1.3
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
Switzerland
Norway
Israel
Iceland
3.9
6.2
92.7
32.9
1.8
1.9
10.2
3.7
6.0
2.4
20.6
7.8
2.7
0.4
12.3
3.6
2.7
2.1
11.6
2.5
1.6
0.2
12.7
2.0
1.1
3.1
8.9
2.7
0.4
4.3
11.2
1.9
0.1
2.7
8.9
3.4
1.1
0.4
7.1
5.9
0.9
2.8
4.7
4.0
1.3
2.8
5.2
3.4
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
Korea
Australia
Taiwan Province of China
Hong Kong SAR
Singapore
New Zealand
7.0
7.5
3.0
8.1
3.0
10.2
5.6
1.6
2.4
4.9
1.7
1.4
10.9
2.6
3.8
9.2
3.8
1.0
7.6
1.4
3.9
9.7
1.4
1.7
7.1
1.4
3.5
8.5
3.4
2.6
7.7
0.9
1.9
6.9
2.9
1.6
7.1
1.5
1.9
2.6
2.7
2.6
3.9
2.0
2.7
5.9
1.2
1.9
3.1
1.4
1.9
7.1
1.3
0.1
5.3
0.3
2.0
1.1
1.1
1.3
1.0
1.0
1.4
3.5
1.3
0.1
2.8
3.1
1.3
2.4
0.3
1.8
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
5.1
6.6
6.4
2.1
2.8
2.7
4.3
5.4
4.9
3.1
4.3
4.3
2.6
3.4
3.5
2.0
2.6
2.7
2.1
2.9
2.9
1.6
2.5
2.2
1.5
1.8
1.5
1.2
1.9
1.7
1.3
1.6
1.4
1.7
1.7
1.4
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
5.7
4.3
8.0
6.4
5.9
5.4
4.6
3.6
3.2
3.2
0.6
2.1
...
...
...
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Canada
Other advanced economies
Spain
Netherlands
Belgium
Sweden
Austria
Denmark
Finland
Greece
Portugal
Ireland
Luxembourg
Memorandum
Industrial countries
European Union
Euro area
Newly industrialized Asian
economies
Consumer prices
Advanced economies
5.6
2.6
4.7
3.5
3.1
2.6
2.6
2.4
2.1
1.5
1.4
1.8
...
...
...
4.8
4.7
2.1
2.6
2.3
2.7
0.9
2.3
4.3
4.2
3.3
3.5
3.2
3.0
1.7
5.1
2.8
3.0
1.2
4.4
2.2
2.6
0.7
2.7
2.4
2.8
0.1
3.1
2.2
2.9
0.1
1.2
2.0
2.3
1.7
1.5
1.3
1.6
0.6
0.6
1.4
2.2
0.4
0.4
1.7
2.5
0.8
1.2
1.5
0.5
0.3
1.4
2.5
1.1
0.6
1.7
2.4
0.5
0.8
6.3
9.8
6.1
5.9
1.7
3.6
3.2
1.8
3.2
6.3
6.8
5.6
2.4
5.3
4.7
1.5
2.1
4.6
3.0
1.8
1.7
4.1
2.4
0.2
1.8
5.2
2.8
2.2
2.1
3.9
3.0
1.6
1.3
1.7
2.8
1.4
0.7
1.7
2.7
1.0
0.5
1.5
2.3
1.5
1.1
1.6
2.2
1.7
0.3
1.6
3.0
1.1
0.6
1.5
2.1
2.1
1.4
1.6
2.3
1.2
9.3
3.5
6.3
4.9
4.1
4.1
3.6
3.2
2.4
2.5
1.4
2.1
...
...
...
5.1
6.3
6.2
2.4
2.8
2.6
4.5
5.1
4.4
3.3
4.5
4.4
2.9
3.8
3.7
2.3
3.0
3.0
2.5
3.2
3.2
2.2
2.5
2.3
2.0
1.8
1.6
1.3
1.4
1.2
1.4
1.3
1.0
1.7
1.5
1.3
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
5.2
4.2
7.5
5.9
4.6
5.7
4.6
4.3
3.4
4.4
0.3
1.9
...
...
...
France
Italy
United Kingdom4
Canada
Other advanced economies
Memorandum
Industrial countries
European Union
Euro area
Newly industrialized Asian
economies
1From
181
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Table 10. Advanced Economies: Hourly Earnings, Productivity, and Unit Labor Costs in Manufacturing
(Annual percent change)
Ten-Year Averages
___________________
198190 19912000
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Hourly earnings
Advanced economies
6.8
3.7
6.0
5.6
3.9
3.4
3.1
3.1
3.4
2.6
2.8
2.9
5.9
5.0
4.0
4.8
3.3
3.6
2.5
3.7
5.3
5.3
5.9
0.3
5.1
4.3
4.6
9.6
3.5
3.0
2.6
6.7
2.8
2.8
2.7
1.9
2.6
2.4
2.5
4.1
2.6
2.1
1.7
4.3
3.3
4.0
3.2
1.1
2.5
4.3
1.1
1.7
2.9
4.3
0.2
4.0
2.8
3.4
0.6
4.5
7.8
9.6
10.4
5.7
3.0
4.4
2.6
2.3
5.2
9.7
7.9
4.7
4.8
6.7
3.7
3.5
3.9
5.4
2.4
2.1
3.7
3.1
3.9
1.6
1.6
4.7
1.1
1.4
2.6
6.3
1.5
3.2
3.2
4.6
1.7
0.9
1.5
1.1
0.7
2.1
1.8
2.5
1.1
1.9
2.3
2.7
3.1
11.4
5.2
8.9
8.1
5.8
6.0
5.1
5.5
4.2
3.0
2.6
3.2
6.3
8.0
7.5
3.5
3.8
3.9
5.5
5.8
5.2
5.2
6.6
7.2
3.6
4.9
5.4
3.0
3.4
3.1
2.7
3.3
3.5
2.8
3.7
3.9
3.3
2.7
2.8
2.6
1.5
1.5
3.0
2.8
3.1
2.9
3.1
3.2
12.3
7.4
14.9
14.0
9.2
11.3
7.8
10.0
5.5
1.4
0.8
1.9
Advanced economies
3.2
3.0
2.4
2.8
1.9
4.8
3.6
3.0
4.3
2.0
2.9
1.8
3.1
2.8
2.9
2.9
2.8
3.6
1.1
4.5
2.3
2.2
1.5
5.3
2.8
5.1
3.7
1.0
1.6
2.2
0.7
2.8
4.5
3.0
3.4
8.5
3.4
3.9
4.8
4.2
3.0
4.0
3.7
5.2
4.3
4.7
4.8
6.9
1.9
4.1
4.2
4.8
2.9
4.7
0.5
3.0
1.7
1.9
0.8
3.5
3.9
2.2
5.6
2.5
3.9
2.3
1.7
1.2
1.7
2.9
0.6
4.4
4.4
3.5
4.3
0.4
0.6
2.5
3.4
9.0
6.0
4.2
3.8
3.9
3.6
2.6
0.2
2.9
0.1
3.3
0.6
6.4
3.4
2.1
4.7
1.0
3.3
1.5
2.9
0.7
0.8
1.6
3.1
2.0
1.0
1.0
3.5
3.5
2.7
2.8
3.5
6.5
4.3
3.1
4.1
2.4
3.0
2.3
3.1
3.5
3.2
2.8
2.9
3.5
2.1
2.6
2.6
2.7
2.9
2.7
1.9
2.3
2.2
4.8
7.4
8.0
3.4
2.8
3.9
2.9
1.6
2.6
4.2
3.9
5.2
2.0
2.1
3.2
2.8
1.7
2.2
1.7
1.9
2.5
8.0
5.5
7.8
4.2
3.4
6.4
8.0
6.6
6.1
2.6
5.6
4.4
Advanced economies
3.6
0.7
3.5
2.8
1.9
1.4
0.6
0.1
0.8
0.7
0.1
1.0
2.7
2.1
1.0
1.9
0.5
1.4
0.7
3.0
3.0
4.3
5.3
2.3
0.7
8.6
8.5
1.9
0.7
3.3
3.9
1.5
0.2
0.7
6.0
0.8
1.5
2.2
0.1
0.3
1.8
1.9
0.8
1.0
0.7
1.6
5.4
0.7
0.2
5.5
3.0
0.4
0.3
1.0
1.1
1.5
0.2
1.0
3.7
7.2
4.5
3.1
0.8
2.0
2.7
0.5
4.0
7.9
4.9
4.1
0.3
2.2
0.2
0.8
3.6
4.7
0.2
1.3
4.9
2.7
0.3
2.2
2.3
1.0
3.8
1.2
0.3
6.5
5.0
2.6
3.0
1.1
3.8
0.9
3.1
2.1
4.2
0.6
1.1
1.8
1.9
1.5
1.1
0.3
3.7
2.0
7.7
1.6
5.7
4.8
2.1
0.6
0.5
2.0
0.7
0.3
0.8
3.1
4.3
4.1
0.7
0.9
0.4
3.3
3.2
2.7
2.5
3.7
4.4
1.7
2.6
3.2
1.7
3.7
4.5
0.6
0.5
0.3
2.1
1.4
0.8
1.0
2.2
0.7
0.6
1.7
0.2
1.1
0.8
1.2
1.2
0.6
3.3
1.1
5.5
7.2
4.5
3.1
1.2
2.2
0.8
0.6
5.5
2.3
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Canada
Other advanced economies
Memorandum
Industrial countries
European Union
Euro area
Newly industrialized Asian
economies
Productivity
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Canada
Other advanced economies
Memorandum
Industrial countries
European Union
Euro area
Newly industrialized Asian
economies
Unit labor costs
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Canada
Other advanced economies
Memorandum
Industrial countries
European Union
Euro area
Newly industrialized Asian
economies
1Data
182
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
39.0
23.3
43.2
32.8
47.3
51.8
22.1
14.6
9.2
10.3
6.7
5.8
15.1
17.7
21.5
25.8
24.6
27.6
32.5
38.3
30.6
38.3
37.3
46.5
33.2
39.5
25.9
32.3
11.1
13.7
8.7
10.3
9.0
11.0
6.9
8.1
18.5
7.1
5.8
19.2
145.4
31.3
8.2
9.3
24.6
63.5
37.8
8.3
11.0
28.0
173.9
46.6
7.6
6.8
25.1
110.8
44.5
10.7
7.8
25.3
209.0
60.2
15.9
7.9
31.4
208.9
43.1
12.8
8.6
35.6
35.9
43.7
8.2
7.5
24.2
22.4
17.3
4.8
6.8
23.1
13.2
11.6
8.0
22.4
23.6
10.6
12.1
3.1
10.1
18.3
9.8
7.6
3.5
5.0
13.1
7.6
13.3
46.2
59.8
22.3
27.4
26.3
21.3
56.9
82.4
22.8
44.8
43.8
26.1
79.5
34.3
32.0
85.9
37.2
42.1
19.5
24.2
30.4
9.3
22.1
15.3
4.6
12.6
14.6
3.4
9.5
12.4
1.6
8.3
9.7
3.3
5.7
17.2
41.3
10.7
19.1
21.3
29.3
19.2
18.7
13.3
16.3
14.0
16.3
12.8
21.5
8.7
19.6
6.2
16.6
4.5
26.1
4.3
17.2
4.2
10.3
2.3
40.6
18.3
60.8
10.0
3.0
24.0
16.7
30.2
12.0
6.1
44.7
25.6
61.7
16.7
3.2
34.0
22.3
45.8
12.3
4.2
49.0
22.5
71.9
10.8
3.4
53.7
27.3
78.3
11.4
5.0
22.7
22.2
26.6
13.1
2.4
15.0
16.2
16.3
11.0
1.3
9.4
10.2
10.0
7.7
1.1
10.6
8.7
7.6
20.5
2.0
7.0
8.1
5.7
10.3
1.9
5.9
6.6
5.4
6.9
84.4
23.7
64.8
11.7
150.1
15.8
114.3
11.9
217.4
13.0
235.4
17.1
42.7
16.6
23.4
12.3
12.0
8.7
10.3
10.7
10.2
6.0
7.8
5.3
28.9
18.7
12.9
31.7
22.6
13.8
52.2
39.5
20.8
46.0
36.7
17.8
44.1
30.2
16.7
57.2
39.5
18.2
42.8
25.0
22.6
41.0
21.8
13.1
16.1
11.8
8.5
11.8
10.7
8.3
10.8
9.6
7.1
7.5
7.0
5.9
9.4
7.9
12.1
9.9
9.3
10.6
10.0
7.0
6.2
5.3
4.3
4.0
10.0
8.2
6.3
13.5
9.9
7.8
4.6
9.1
10.5
11.9
9.1
22.7
11.1
8.8
6.5
12.1
9.5
8.0
5.0
10.7
24.7
8.3
4.7
8.3
12.3
8.6
4.4
10.2
7.7
6.9
3.6
7.1
7.5
6.7
3.6
6.1
6.0
7.9
3.1
5.0
5.0
6.2
2.6
5.0
4.8
4.3
3.0
4.2
Regional groups
Africa
Sub-Sahara
Excluding Nigeria and
South Africa
Asia
Excluding China and India
Middle East and Europe
Western Hemisphere
Analytical groups
By source of export earnings
Fuel
Manufactures
Nonfuel primary products
Services, income, and
private transfers
Diversified
Other groups
Heavily indebted poor countries
Least developed countries
Middle East and north Africa
Memorandum
Median
Developing countries
Regional groups
Africa
Asia
Middle East and Europe
Western Hemisphere
183
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
Africa
15.1
24.6
32.5
30.6
37.3
33.2
25.9
11.1
8.7
Algeria
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
9.7
1.8
1.3
13.5
3.7
25.9
83.6
2.1
11.8
2.5
31.7
299.1
5.9
16.2
2.0
20.5
1,379.5
0.4
14.3
0.6
29.0
949.8
38.5
10.5
24.7
29.8
2,671.6
14.5
10.5
7.8
18.7
4,147.0
4.9
10.1
6.1
6.8
111.2
3.8
8.8
2.3
6.2
79.4
5.8
6.5
5.0
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
7.6
7.0
12.0
4.5
3.8
9.0
0.6
7.6
2.8
4.2
4.5
1.9
13.4
0.8
3.8
9.7
3.7
5.8
2.9
7.0
14.7
12.7
3.4
24.5
41.3
19.4
25.8
8.4
19.2
9.5
26.4
6.6
6.0
4.4
11.3
31.1
5.2
8.6
0.6
5.6
12.6
2.8
4.4
2.4
4.3
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
Congo, Rep. of
Cte dIvoire
Djibouti
3.2
60.9
6.6
4.9
4.6
1.7
2,154.4
1.6
1.6
6.8
1.4
4,129.2
3.9
4.2
3.4
2.0
1,893.1
4.9
2.1
4.4
25.3
23,760.5
42.9
26.0
6.5
7.1
541.8
8.6
14.3
4.5
1.4
616.8
10.2
2.7
2.6
1.0
198.5
8.3
5.6
2.4
1.0
29.1
4.8
4.5
2.0
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia, The
18.4
...
4.3
5.5
17.1
0.9
...
20.9
3.3
9.1
1.0
...
21.0
10.8
12.0
1.6
4.6
10.0
0.6
5.9
38.9
11.6
1.2
36.1
4.0
11.4
10.7
13.4
10.0
4.0
6.0
9.3
0.9
4.5
4.8
3.0
1.3
6.4
2.5
2.1
3.0
8.3
3.7
2.1
2.1
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
43.0
31.2
54.3
11.2
14.0
18.0
19.6
57.6
19.6
17.9
10.1
16.6
69.4
27.3
17.0
24.9
6.7
48.2
45.9
13.8
24.9
4.7
15.2
28.8
7.2
59.5
5.6
45.4
1.5
9.9
45.6
3.0
50.7
9.0
9.1
28.8
1.9
49.1
11.2
8.5
19.3
5.1
8.0
6.6
7.8
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
...
17.6
16.1
2.1
8.4
...
8.5
8.2
1.5
5.6
...
15.3
23.2
5.9
10.1
...
9.2
22.8
0.6
9.3
...
39.1
34.7
24.8
4.1
...
49.0
83.1
12.4
6.5
...
19.8
37.7
6.4
4.7
...
4.5
9.1
0.6
4.5
...
6.2
29.7
4.2
8.0
Mauritius
Morocco
Mozambique, Rep. of
Namibia
Niger
9.2
7.2
41.5
12.9
2.8
12.8
9.0
33.3
11.9
1.9
2.9
5.7
45.1
17.7
1.7
8.9
5.2
42.3
8.5
0.4
9.4
5.1
63.1
10.8
35.6
6.1
6.1
54.4
10.0
10.9
5.8
3.0
44.6
8.0
5.3
7.9
1.0
6.4
8.8
2.9
5.3
2.7
0.6
6.2
4.5
Nigeria
Rwanda
So Tom and Prncipe
Senegal
Seychelles
19.5
4.3
17.8
5.8
3.0
13.0
19.6
46.5
1.7
2.0
44.6
9.5
33.7
0.1
3.2
57.2
12.5
25.5
0.6
1.3
57.0
64.0
51.2
32.1
1.8
72.8
22.0
36.8
8.0
0.3
29.3
8.9
35.5
2.8
1.1
8.5
11.7
71.3
2.5
0.6
10.0
6.8
42.3
1.3
1.0
Sierra Leone
Somalia
South Africa
Sudan
Swaziland
67.9
...
14.7
13.6
13.0
102.7
...
15.2
123.6
11.0
65.5
...
13.9
117.6
8.1
22.2
...
9.7
101.3
11.2
24.2
...
9.0
115.5
13.9
26.0
...
8.6
68.4
12.3
23.1
...
7.4
132.8
6.4
14.9
...
8.6
46.7
7.2
35.5
...
6.9
17.0
8.0
30.5
3.7
8.3
109.2
45.5
28.0
0.2
8.2
20.8
97.7
21.9
1.6
5.8
42.2
165.7
23.6
0.1
4.0
30.0
183.3
37.1
35.3
4.6
6.5
54.6
26.5
15.8
6.3
6.1
34.9
21.0
4.6
3.8
7.5
43.1
16.1
5.3
3.7
7.8
24.4
12.6
1.0
3.6
5.8
24.5
13.9
23.3
42.1
27.6
22.2
22.6
21.4
18.8
32.3
Tanzania
Togo
Tunisia
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
184
Table 12 (continued)
Average
198190
Asia
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
7.1
8.3
7.6
10.7
15.9
12.8
8.2
4.8
8.0
...
10.3
9.1
...
...
...
6.3
13.3
1.6
197.0
...
3.5
16.0
1.3
75.0
...
3.1
8.9
4.3
114.3
...
6.3
8.1
2.4
0.5
...
7.7
10.7
6.0
7.7
...
4.5
7.0
2.0
6.8
...
4.8
7.0
1.7
8.0
...
7.9
7.0
14.8
6.9
7.1
8.9
8.6
3.0
3.6
6.1
13.9
9.4
6.1
6.4
8.2
11.8
7.5
4.2
14.7
6.5
6.4
9.7
6.1
24.3
4.9
10.2
8.5
5.3
16.7
5.2
10.2
9.4
4.1
8.4
0.6
9.0
7.9
1.5
2.8
7.2
6.6
2.2
0.8
2.2
13.0
59.6
4.7
43.1
3.2
4.8
...
...
13.4
2.6
14.7
4.0
4.0
9.8
4.7
16.8
10.3
5.0
6.3
3.5
20.1
5.0
6.0
6.8
3.7
3.4
5.6
4.0
19.4
3.4
5.5
8.3
4.0
13.0
3.5
6.2
9.6
4.0
19.3
2.7
7.2
4.8
3.0
81.0
5.3
5.0
4.0
3.0
Myanmar
Nepal
Pakistan
Papua New Guinea
Philippines
12.3
9.3
6.9
5.8
9.2
29.1
19.3
11.6
7.0
18.7
22.3
5.9
3.6
4.3
9.0
33.6
9.1
9.8
5.0
7.6
22.4
8.7
11.3
2.9
9.1
28.9
9.2
12.4
17.3
8.1
20.0
1.7
10.3
11.6
8.4
10.0
10.1
12.5
3.9
6.0
10.0
9.0
7.8
13.5
9.7
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Tonga
6.4
11.8
12.2
4.4
10.4
1.8
10.8
12.2
5.7
13.5
9.0
9.2
11.4
4.1
8.7
1.7
9.2
11.7
3.4
3.1
12.1
13.3
8.4
5.1
2.4
2.9
9.6
7.7
5.8
0.3
5.4
12.1
15.9
5.9
2.8
6.9
8.1
9.6
5.6
1.8
2.2
8.0
5.0
8.1
2.9
8.2
130.7
6.5
84.4
4.1
37.8
3.6
8.4
2.3
9.4
2.2
17.0
0.9
5.8
2.8
3.2
5.0
7.7
Vanuatu
Vietnam
Middle East and Europe
19.2
28.0
25.1
25.3
31.4
35.6
24.2
23.1
23.6
Bahrain
Cyprus
Egypt
Iran, Islamic Republic of
Iraq
1.9
4.9
17.4
18.4
21.5
1.0
5.0
19.5
20.7
263.8
6.5
21.1
24.4
12.8
2.1
4.9
11.2
22.9
68.0
0.4
4.7
9.0
35.2
44.7
3.1
2.6
9.4
49.4
208.4
0.2
3.0
7.0
23.1
34.5
1.0
3.6
6.2
17.3
45.0
0.2
2.2
3.8
22.0
45.0
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Malta
7.3
3.8
76.1
7.5
2.2
8.2
9.1
50.1
11.7
2.6
4.0
0.5
99.8
18.0
1.8
3.3
0.4
24.7
23.0
4.0
3.5
2.5
8.0
17.0
4.1
2.4
2.7
10.6
10.0
4.0
6.5
3.6
8.9
7.0
2.4
3.0
0.7
7.8
6.0
3.1
4.5
0.5
4.5
5.0
2.4
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Syrian Arab Republic
Turkey
1.8
3.6
0.2
21.7
45.6
4.6
4.4
4.6
19.0
66.0
1.0
3.1
0.4
3.4
70.1
1.1
0.9
0.8
23.6
66.1
0.7
1.3
0.6
7.9
106.3
1.1
3.0
5.0
1.2
93.7
0.3
2.5
0.9
1.6
82.3
0.8
2.6
0.4
1.9
85.7
0.9
2.6
0.2
0.4
84.6
4.2
...
5.5
44.9
6.9
50.6
5.0
62.3
3.9
71.8
4.4
62.5
3.6
27.3
4.4
6.3
3.1
9.0
185
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Table 12 (concluded)
Average
198190
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
Western Hemisphere
145.4
173.9
110.8
209.0
208.9
35.9
22.4
13.2
10.6
4.4
437.2
5.5
5.7
4.1
4.6
171.7
7.1
6.3
3.2
3.0
24.9
5.7
6.0
2.4
3.1
10.6
2.7
1.2
1.4
3.5
4.2
1.3
0.1
2.5
2.7
3.4
2.1
2.4
2.9
3.5
0.2
1.4
2.4
6.3
1.2
0.8
1.2
7.7
1.0
1.2
0.9
1.8
1.2
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
222.7
339.9
20.3
23.6
25.6
21.4
774.9
21.8
30.3
28.7
12.1
540.3
15.4
27.1
21.8
8.5
2,103.3
12.7
22.5
9.8
7.9
2,123.7
11.4
22.8
13.5
10.2
59.7
8.2
20.9
23.2
12.4
15.5
7.4
20.8
17.6
4.7
6.0
6.1
18.5
13.3
6.5
3.8
5.1
18.7
11.7
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Grenada
4.7
24.8
36.1
19.0
5.1
5.6
47.1
48.8
14.4
2.6
5.3
4.3
54.6
11.2
3.8
1.6
5.3
45.0
18.5
2.8
8.3
27.3
10.6
2.6
1.3
12.5
22.7
10.1
2.2
1.7
5.4
24.4
9.8
2.8
2.4
8.3
30.6
4.5
1.1
0.9
4.8
36.1
2.5
2.5
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
12.7
30.9
7.8
8.0
17.5
35.1
101.5
19.0
34.0
68.6
10.2
28.2
21.3
8.8
57.5
13.4
12.0
18.8
10.7
24.3
12.5
12.4
37.4
21.7
33.2
8.4
12.2
30.2
29.5
21.7
11.0
7.1
21.9
23.8
21.5
7.1
3.6
16.2
20.2
8.8
7.5
4.6
10.0
13.0
7.3
Mexico
Netherlands Antilles
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
65.1
3.7
559.3
1.8
21.7
22.7
3.8
7,755.3
1.4
24.2
15.5
1.5
40.5
1.8
15.2
9.8
1.9
20.4
0.5
18.2
7.0
1.9
7.7
1.3
20.5
35.0
2.7
11.2
0.9
13.4
34.4
3.5
6.8
1.3
9.8
20.6
3.5
5.7
1.3
8.3
16.7
3.5
5.0
0.6
7.0
Peru
St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Suriname
332.1
3.2
3.9
5.1
12.8
409.5
4.2
6.2
5.9
26.0
73.5
2.9
4.6
3.8
43.7
48.6
1.8
0.8
4.2
143.4
23.7
1.4
2.7
0.4
368.5
11.1
3.0
5.9
2.4
235.5
11.5
2.0
0.9
4.4
0.8
8.5
8.9
0.5
7.2
7.3
3.6
2.8
1.7
20.8
11.2
60.6
23.3
3.8
101.8
34.2
6.5
68.5
31.4
13.2
54.2
38.1
3.7
44.7
60.8
5.3
42.2
59.9
3.3
28.3
99.9
3.7
19.8
50.0
5.6
10.8
35.8
many countries, figures for recent years are IMF staff estimates. Data for some countries are for fiscal years.
186
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
...
94.9
277.2
356.5
152.6
74.6
32.0
36.7
17.8
Albania
Belarus
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Croatia
...
...
...
4.8
...
35.8
83.5
...
333.5
...
225.2
969.0
...
82.0
...
85.0
1,188.0
...
72.8
1,516.6
22.6
2,200.0
...
96.0
97.5
7.8
709.0
4.0
62.1
2.0
12.7
53.0
25.0
123.0
3.5
32.1
64.0
14.0
1,082.2
3.6
20.9
73.2
10.0
22.3
5.7
Czech Republic
Czechoslovakia, former
Estonia
Hungary
Latvia
...
2.3
...
10.7
...
...
59.0
210.6
34.8
124.4
...
11.0
1,069.0
22.8
951.3
20.8
...
89.0
22.4
109.1
10.0
...
47.7
18.8
35.8
9.1
...
28.9
28.3
25.1
8.8
...
23.1
23.5
17.6
8.5
...
11.2
18.3
8.4
10.6
...
8.2
14.3
4.7
Lithuania
Macedonia, former Yugoslav Rep. of
Moldova
Poland
Romania
...
...
...
71.8
11.6
224.7
...
162.0
70.3
161.1
1,021.0
...
1,276.0
43.0
210.4
410.4
338.6
788.5
35.3
256.1
72.1
126.4
329.6
32.2
136.7
39.5
16.2
30.2
27.9
32.3
24.7
2.5
23.5
19.9
38.8
8.8
1.5
11.8
15.1
154.8
5.1
0.6
7.7
12.0
59.1
...
...
...
144.9
...
...
91.2
117.4
...
...
1,210.0
6,146.6
23.0
32.9
4,734.9
...
13.4
21.0
891.2
...
9.9
13.5
376.4
...
5.8
9.9
80.2
...
6.1
8.4
15.9
...
6.7
8.0
10.6
...
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Ukraine
Yugoslavia, former
Russia
...
92.7
1,353.0
895.9
302.0
190.1
47.8
14.7
27.7
...
97.0
938.2
1,224.0
1,671.8
248.7
64.1
36.5
15.3
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
...
...
...
...
...
100.3
105.6
78.5
91.0
85.0
824.5
912.6
887.4
1,515.7
854.6
3,731.8
1,129.7
3,125.4
1,662.3
772.4
5,273.4
1,664.4
15,606.5
1,879.9
228.7
176.7
411.7
162.7
176.3
40.7
18.7
19.8
39.4
39.1
31.3
14.0
3.7
7.1
17.4
25.5
8.7
0.8
3.6
7.3
12.0
Mongolia
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
0.2
...
...
...
20.2
111.6
102.5
109.7
202.6
1,156.7
492.9
626.9
268.4
2,194.9
3,102.4
534.2
87.6
350.4
1,748.3
1,568.3
56.8
610.0
1,005.3
304.6
46.7
418.0
992.4
54.0
36.8
88.0
83.7
70.9
9.4
43.2
16.8
29.0
1For many countries, inflation for the earlier years is measured on the basis of a retail price index. Consumer price indices with a broader and more up-todate coverage are typically used for more recent years.
187
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Advanced economies
Central government fiscal balance1
Advanced economies
3.1
4.1
4.2
3.6
3.2
2.5
1.3
1.0
0.9
0.6
United States
European Union
Euro area
Japan
3.5
4.1
4.0
0.2
4.7
5.1
4.2
1.7
3.9
6.0
5.1
2.7
2.7
5.3
4.7
3.5
2.3
4.6
4.2
4.0
1.4
3.9
3.7
4.3
0.1
2.2
2.3
4.0
0.8
1.6
2.1
5.0
1.1
1.4
1.8
5.5
1.5
1.1
1.6
5.2
2.0
2.2
2.0
1.3
0.8
0.2
0.5
0.4
1.1
0.6
2.6
3.6
4.1
3.4
3.3
2.5
1.1
0.8
1.0
0.6
3.3
4.2
4.6
2.9
4.4
5.0
4.7
1.5
3.6
6.3
5.7
1.6
2.3
5.7
5.3
2.3
1.9
5.4
5.2
3.6
0.9
4.2
4.2
4.2
0.4
2.4
2.5
3.4
1.3
1.5
2.1
5.3
1.6
1.4
1.8
7.3
2.0
1.0
1.2
7.1
2.6
2.9
2.3
1.5
0.8
0.6
0.5
0.9
0.4
2.8
3.3
3.1
2.6
2.6
1.8
0.6
0.3
0.4
0.1
4.4
3.1
3.9
2.4
4.3
4.9
5.0
6.7
...
...
3.1
5.8
2.3
1.8
4.9
0.2
1.3
5.9
2.2
0.6
2.0
2.8
3.9
3.4
3.3
4.6
4.5
2.9
5.8
4.7
3.9
8.5
5.3
4.0
...
...
...
...
...
...
8.8
8.1
7.9
9.1
8.2
8.5
6.1
10.2
...
...
5.5
7.0
10.5
3.5
4.1
11.1
3.1
2.7
8.6
4.4
1.9
6.3
5.7
1.0
6.1
5.1
0.3
4.6
5.2
0.3
4.1
4.9
0.2
3.9
4.8
0.1
2.7
5.5
0.2
3.1
6.1
3.9
3.4
5.1
6.1
5.6
5.8
5.5
5.4
6.1
3.5
3.7
2.9
3.7
3.1
4.0
2.6
3.8
2.5
3.3
2.3
2.6
2.4
2.5
4.0
3.3
4.2
3.2
3.3
2.5
3.7
3.6
3.4
3.8
3.5
4.0
3.5
3.7
3.1
3.3
2.8
2.8
3.0
2.5
4.4
3.1
4.7
3.0
3.8
2.2
72.9
18.7
84.4
17.9
91.3
16.4
68.3
18.7
24.6
16.4
23.1
14.4
20.3
15.5
16.7
10.0
14.7
10.3
13.8
10.0
9.7
9.6
100.8
10.0
14.1
429.3
6.2
6.7
425.5
7.4
7.0
192.9
4.3
4.4
74.7
4.4
5.5
32.2
4.6
5.0
32.4
3.9
4.8
20.6
3.3
3.6
25.9
2.1
2.5
20.6
balance2
rates3
LIBOR
Developing countries
Countries in transition
Central government fiscal balance1
General government fiscal balance1
Growth of broad money
1In
percent of GDP.
percent of potential GDP.
3For the United States, three-month treasury bills; for Japan, three-month certificates of deposit; for LIBOR, London interbank offered rate on six-month
U.S. dollar deposits.
2In
188
Table 15. Advanced Economies: General and Central Government Fiscal Balances and Balances
Excluding Social Security Transactions1
(Percent of GDP)
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Advanced economies
2.6
3.6
4.1
3.4
3.3
2.5
1.1
0.8
1.0
0.6
2.7
3.3
2.9
3.1
3.7
4.4
1.5
2.5
4.3
3.6
1.6
3.1
3.5
2.3
2.3
2.4
3.4
1.9
3.6
3.2
2.7
0.9
4.2
3.4
1.2
0.4
3.4
2.6
0.8
1.3
5.3
2.0
1.0
1.6
7.3
1.9
0.6
2.0
7.1
1.1
2.2
10.0
2.2
7.2
3.9
9.5
6.0
8.0
5.9
9.4
8.0
7.6
5.8
9.1
6.8
5.6
5.5
7.7
5.8
4.3
4.1
7.0
4.4
1.8
3.0
2.8
2.1
0.8
2.7
2.7
0.3
0.9
2.4
2.4
0.4
1.5
1.8
1.6
0.6
1.2
2.5
4.3
2.9
6.3
1.1
3.0
2.4
1.1
11.5
6.0
2.3
1.9
3.0
4.0
3.9
7.1
7.5
2.0
2.2
5.5
12.8
2.9
2.4
0.8
3.4
6.7
3.2
7.3
11.8
4.2
2.8
7.1
13.8
6.1
2.3
1.6
2.9
6.1
3.8
4.9
11.0
5.0
2.4
5.8
10.0
6.0
1.7
2.8
2.6
7.0
4.0
3.8
7.9
5.1
2.3
4.4
10.6
5.7
2.1
1.9
1.4
4.4
2.0
3.1
3.6
3.7
1.0
3.0
7.5
3.3
0.3
2.5
0.6
2.5
0.9
1.6
1.8
1.9
0.1
1.6
4.0
2.5
1.1
1.7
0.9
1.7
0.9
0.9
1.9
2.1
1.0
1.5
2.4
2.3
2.4
0.6
1.1
1.5
0.8
1.0
2.0
2.0
2.5
3.0
1.7
1.7
2.7
0.9
0.6
1.0
0.5
0.6
2.0
1.9
2.1
4.1
1.5
1.5
2.6
0.8
Switzerland
Norway
Israel
Iceland
2.1
0.1
4.4
2.9
3.4
1.7
3.3
2.8
3.6
1.4
2.7
4.5
2.8
0.4
1.1
4.7
1.8
3.5
2.7
3.0
1.7
6.6
3.9
1.6
2.2
7.9
2.5
1.9
3.9
2.6
0.4
2.2
3.9
3.5
0.7
1.5
4.7
2.7
0.8
Korea4
Australia5
Taiwan Province of China
Hong Kong SAR
Singapore
New Zealand6
1.3
2.7
0.5
3.2
10.4
4.4
0.1
4.6
0.3
2.5
11.4
4.1
1.3
4.4
0.6
2.3
14.4
0.1
1.0
3.6
0.2
1.3
13.8
2.0
1.3
2.3
0.4
0.3
12.3
3.3
1.0
1.1
0.7
2.2
9.3
2.8
0.9
0.2
0.6
6.2
9.2
2.3
3.9
0.2
0.9
1.8
2.4
2.4
4.5
0.6
0.5
3.0
5.4
1.1
3.0
0.8
0.5
1.2
3.8
0.3
2.8
4.2
4.6
0.6
3.9
5.0
4.7
1.2
4.5
6.3
5.7
2.0
3.7
5.7
5.3
1.6
3.6
5.4
5.2
1.5
2.7
4.2
4.2
1.2
1.2
2.4
2.5
0.8
0.8
1.5
2.1
1.6
0.9
1.4
1.8
3.0
0.5
1.0
1.2
1.9
United States
Japan
Germany
5.5
0.8
3.8
6.3
2.0
2.5
5.3
4.8
3.4
4.1
5.1
2.6
3.6
6.5
2.9
2.5
6.8
3.1
2.1
5.9
2.8
1.7
7.5
2.3
1.5
9.5
2.2
1.3
9.3
1.3
France
Italy
Canada
1.9
6.4
5.4
3.3
5.2
5.9
4.6
5.4
5.4
5.0
4.5
3.4
4.8
5.7
2.2
3.6
5.2
0.4
2.5
0.8
3.0
2.6
1.3
2.9
2.5
1.9
3.3
2.0
2.9
2.6
France2
Italy
United Kingdom3
Canada
Other advanced economies
Spain
Netherlands
Belgium
Sweden
Austria
Denmark
Finland
Greece
Portugal
Ireland
Luxembourg
Memorandum
Industrial countries
European Union
Euro area
Newly industrialized Asian economies
Fiscal balance excluding social
security transactions
189
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Table 15 (concluded)
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Advanced economies
3.1
4.1
4.2
3.6
3.2
2.5
1.3
1.0
0.9
0.6
3.2
3.5
0.2
1.8
4.3
4.7
1.7
1.2
4.3
3.9
2.7
2.1
3.6
2.7
3.5
1.5
3.2
2.3
4.0
1.4
2.8
1.4
4.3
2.2
1.4
0.1
4.0
1.7
1.0
0.8
5.0
1.5
0.8
1.1
5.5
1.4
0.5
1.5
5.2
1.2
1.7
10.2
4.3
4.6
2.9
10.3
8.5
4.3
4.4
9.9
8.2
4.6
4.8
9.1
6.7
3.7
3.0
7.1
5.5
3.1
3.4
6.8
4.6
1.3
2.6
2.6
2.1
1.0
2.8
2.8
0.4
1.1
2.7
2.0
0.5
0.8
2.4
1.7
0.3
0.9
2.6
3.2
3.9
3.2
3.2
1.6
0.9
1.2
1.5
0.9
Memorandum
Industrial countries
European Union
Euro area
Newly industrialized Asian economies
3.2
4.1
4.0
0.4
4.3
5.1
4.2
0.3
4.5
6.0
5.1
0.4
3.8
5.3
4.7
0.7
3.4
4.6
4.2
0.8
2.7
3.9
3.7
0.7
1.4
2.2
2.3
0.4
1.0
1.6
2.1
1.8
0.8
1.4
1.8
3.1
0.5
1.1
1.6
2.2
France9
Italy
United Kingdom
Canada
1On
a national income accounts basis except as indicated in footnotes. See Box 1.2 for a summary of the policy assumptions underlying the projections.
for valuation changes of the foreign exchange stabilization fund.
3Excludes asset sales.
4Data include social security transactions (that is the operations of the public pension plan).
5Data exclude net advances (primarily privatization receipts and net policy-related lending).
6Data from 1992 onward are on an accrual basis and are not strictly comparable with previous cash-based data.
7Data are on a budget basis.
8Data are on a national income basis and exclude social security transactions.
9Data are on an administrative basis and exclude social security transactions.
2Adjusted
190
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Advanced economies
2.8
3.3
3.1
2.6
2.6
1.9
0.6
0.3
0.4
0.1
2.5
2.2
1.8
4.7
3.1
3.1
0.9
4.1
3.0
2.2
1.5
3.0
2.4
1.2
1.8
2.3
2.4
0.8
3.0
3.0
1.9
4.6
2.3
0.6
0.8
3.5
1.3
0.2
1.3
3.8
0.7
0.5
1.3
5.7
0.4
0.1
1.7
5.6
2.5
10.6
2.4
4.9
3.4
9.4
3.5
4.8
3.4
8.2
4.8
4.6
3.7
7.9
4.4
4.1
3.6
7.0
4.6
3.1
1.9
6.0
3.7
0.1
0.9
1.7
2.1
1.8
1.3
1.5
0.3
1.6
1.1
1.0
0.5
1.7
0.9
0.4
0.1
1.3
4.6
6.8
3.9
7.2
2.0
4.1
1.8
0.8
12.4
7.7
2.5
4.5
5.0
4.4
7.4
5.4
2.7
1.1
2.0
13.4
4.3
1.7
4.0
5.0
2.4
5.4
6.4
3.7
1.1
1.8
13.1
5.4
0.2
3.5
4.0
3.3
3.0
7.4
4.8
1.2
1.6
9.5
5.0
0.6
3.5
5.3
3.3
2.4
5.9
4.9
1.7
1.2
10.2
4.5
1.2
1.5
2.7
1.5
1.2
1.0
3.1
1.2
0.3
7.2
2.5
0.3
0.4
1.4
0.8
0.5
1.0
1.3
0.5
0.4
3.8
2.2
0.2
0.3
1.3
1.4
0.3
4.1
1.8
0.1
1.5
2.5
2.4
0.8
0.1
1.4
1.4
0.2
3.4
1.5
1.8
3.0
1.9
1.8
1.1
0.2
1.2
1.0
2.7
1.4
1.9
3.9
1.8
1.6
1.1
Structural balance2
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Canada
Other advanced economies
Spain
Netherlands
Belgium
Sweden
Austria
Denmark
Finland
Greece
Portugal
Ireland
Norway
Australia4
New Zealand5
Memorandum
European Union6
Euro area6
1.9
0.1
0.1
1.2
3.9
6.4
6.9
2.1
2.8
4.4
1.9
7.3
3.2
4.0
2.9
0.5
2.5
0.2
1.7
0.2
0.6
0.1
0.3
0.5
0.3
1.9
0.6
1.1
0.9
1.2
5.1
5.7
5.0
5.2
4.6
4.4
4.3
4.1
4.4
4.2
3.0
2.9
1.3
1.2
0.8
1.1
0.6
0.8
0.3
0.4
1On
191
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
Advanced economies
6.9
8.2
8.8
4.2
5.4
4.2
4.1
5.1
6.6
7.9
9.5
3.4
8.3
14.3
3.9
10.8
8.4
10.6
7.0
8.5
3.7
2.5
4.2
5.2
4.7
1.6
13.1
6.8
3.5
4.5
9.7
12.4
3.7
1.2
8.6
2.3
4.7
1.8
5.0
11.1
4.7
10.5
3.0
5.5
0.2
0.7
2.8
6.0
1.4
7.6
6.0
14.9
2.8
3.4
6.8
7.3
7.7
1.4
5.6
6.3
0.8
3.9
6.7
17.1
6.5
7.7
6.5
10.2
3.1
9.0
5.7
9.1
8.8
7.3
10.8
6.9
8.9
8.0
6.5
7.1
6.4
3.6
25.4
8.0
4.2
12.8
8.4
6.4
17.6
4.0
4.3
11.2
5.1
6.5
11.7
4.2
7.2
4.4
4.4
5.9
3.5
5.2
8.5
2.0
Advanced economies
4.4
3.1
3.9
2.4
4.3
4.9
5.0
6.7
3.6
3.1
2.3
6.3
2.2
1.8
0.2
7.6
2.8
1.3
2.2
10.9
1.7
0.6
2.8
1.6
3.8
3.9
3.3
3.6
4.2
4.6
2.9
8.7
4.7
5.8
3.9
3.6
6.4
8.5
4.0
7.3
2.0
5.8
5.7
4.6
5.1
0.1
2.7
3.0
2.9
3.8
4.9
3.0
1.8
1.0
4.2
2.7
4.6
1.9
9.9
3.8
3.3
3.8
9.6
2.1
2.0
9.0
5.7
1.5
2.7
5.6
8.3
1.7
8.6
7.2
9.1
6.3
7.4
8.6
6.9
8.1
3.9
5.8
20.3
2.6
4.9
16.1
3.5
5.9
15.5
1.9
2.0
17.0
4.0
3.4
12.8
4.6
4.5
11.4
4.8
4.7
11.7
6.1
5.3
21.3
Narrow money2
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Canada
Other advanced economies
Memorandum
Industrial countries
Euro area
Newly industrialized Asian economies
Broad money3
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Canada
Other advanced economies
Memorandum
Industrial countries
Euro area
Newly industrialized Asian economies
1Based
on end-of-period data.
except for the United Kingdom, where M0 is used here as a measure of narrow money; it comprises notes in circulation plus bankers operational deposits. M1 is generally currency in circulation plus private demand deposits. In addition, the United States includes travelers checks of nonbank issues and
other checkable deposits and excludes private sector float and demand deposits of banks. Japan includes government demand deposits and excludes float.
Germany includes demand deposits at fixed interest rates. Canada excludes private sector float.
3M2, defined as M1 plus quasi-money, except for Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom, for which the data are based on M2 plus certificates of deposit (CDs), M3, and M4, respectively. Quasi-money is essentially private term deposits and other notice deposits. The United States also includes money
market mutual fund balances, money market deposit accounts, overnight repurchase agreements, and overnight Eurodollars issued to U.S. residents by
foreign branches of U.S. banks. For Japan, M2 plus CDs is currency in circulation plus total private and public sector deposits and installments of Sogo
Banks plus CDs. For Germany, M3 is M1 plus private time deposits with maturities of less than four years plus savings deposits at statutory notice. For
Italy, M2 comprises M1 plus term deposits, passbooks from the Postal Office, and CDs with maturities of less than 18 months. For the United Kingdom,
M4 is composed of non-interest-bearing M1, private sector interest-bearing sterling sight bank deposits, private sector sterling time bank deposits, private
sector holdings of sterling bank CDs, private sector holdings of building society shares and deposits, and sterling CDs less building society holdings of
bank deposits and bank CDs and notes and coins.
2M1
192
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
7.7
5.7
7.5
8.9
6.3
3.6
4.6
9.4
4.7
3.0
3.0
7.4
4.5
4.2
2.1
5.3
5.4
5.9
1.2
4.4
4.4
5.3
0.4
3.2
4.2
5.5
0.4
3.1
4.3
5.4
0.4
3.3
...
4.8
0.0
...
9.5
12.7
11.5
9.0
10.7
14.5
9.4
6.6
8.6
10.5
5.9
4.6
5.6
8.8
5.5
5.1
6.3
10.7
6.7
6.9
3.7
8.6
6.0
4.3
3.3
6.6
6.6
3.3
3.4
4.8
7.2
4.9
...
...
5.3
4.6
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
2.5
Advanced economies
8.1
6.9
5.4
4.9
5.2
4.1
4.0
4.0
3.8
7.6
5.5
7.0
9.3
6.1
3.5
4.1
9.5
4.6
3.1
2.7
7.2
4.4
4.4
1.9
5.3
4.7
5.7
1.0
4.5
3.7
5.1
0.3
3.3
3.7
5.2
0.3
3.3
3.6
4.9
0.2
3.5
3.8
5.4
0.0
2.7
9.2
12.7
11.5
8.8
9.5
14.5
9.5
6.6
7.2
10.5
5.9
4.8
5.3
8.8
5.5
5.5
4.5
10.7
6.7
7.1
3.3
8.6
6.0
4.2
3.3
6.6
6.9
3.2
3.7
4.8
7.4
4.7
2.5
2.5
5.3
4.9
11.0
10.6
8.7
7.4
7.3
6.1
5.7
5.7
4.1
8.0
10.8
10.5
6.8
11.0
11.1
5.3
8.3
8.6
4.8
6.4
6.3
5.0
6.4
6.1
3.9
4.9
4.6
3.8
4.6
4.1
3.7
4.5
3.9
3.7
3.2
2.8
11.5
9.8
8.4
8.9
9.0
8.7
9.6
10.2
4.9
Advanced economies
8.7
8.0
6.6
7.2
6.8
6.1
5.4
4.5
5.3
8.3
7.9
6.3
8.5
7.5
7.0
5.1
7.9
6.2
5.9
4.0
6.4
6.8
7.1
4.2
7.1
6.4
6.6
3.3
6.9
5.8
6.4
3.0
6.2
5.2
6.4
2.1
5.6
4.2
5.3
1.3
4.6
5.0
6.0
1.9
4.9
9.0
13.1
10.1
9.4
8.6
13.3
9.1
8.1
6.9
11.3
7.5
7.2
7.4
10.5
8.2
8.4
7.6
12.2
8.2
8.1
6.4
9.4
7.8
7.2
5.6
6.9
7.0
6.1
4.8
4.9
5.5
5.3
5.0
5.1
5.6
5.7
11.0
10.5
8.7
9.3
9.1
7.7
6.7
6.0
6.5
Memorandum
Industrial countries
European Union
Euro area
Newly industrialized Asian economies
8.6
10.3
10.1
15.0
7.8
9.9
9.8
13.6
6.5
8.2
8.1
10.9
7.1
8.4
8.2
11.1
6.7
8.6
8.5
11.0
6.0
7.3
7.1
9.7
5.3
6.1
5.9
10.5
4.3
4.9
4.7
12.0
5.0
5.2
5.0
11.4
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Canada
Other advanced economies
Memorandum
Industrial countries
European Union
Euro area
Newly industrialized Asian
economies
Long-term interest rate3
France
Italy4
United Kingdom
Canada
1For the United States, federal funds rate; for Japan, overnight call rate; for Germany, repurchase rate; for France, day-to-day money rate; for Italy, threemonth treasury bill gross rate; for the United Kingdom, base lending rate; for Canada, overnight money market financing rate; for the euro area, repurchase
rate.
2For the United States, three-month certificates of deposit (CDs) in secondary markets; for Japan, three-month CDs; for Germany, France, and the United
Kingdom, three-month interbank deposits; for Italy, three-month treasury bills gross rate; and for Canada, three-month prime corporate paper.
3For the United States, yield on ten-year treasury bonds; for Japan, over-the-counter sales yield on ten-year government bonds with longest residual maturity; for Germany, yield on government bonds with maturities of nine to ten years; for France, long-term (seven- to ten-year) government bond yield (Emprunts
dEtat long terme, TME); for Italy, secondary market yield on fixed-coupon (BTP) government bonds with two to four years residual maturity; for the
United Kingdom, yield on medium-dated (ten-year) government stock; and for Canada, average yield on government bonds with residual maturities of over
ten years.
4August 1999 data refer to yield on ten-year government bonds.
193
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
Exchange Rate
Assumption1
1999
134.7
...
1.66
5.64
1,241
1.76
1.15
126.7
...
1.56
5.29
1,232
1.76
1.21
111.2
...
1.65
5.66
1,574
1.50
1.29
102.2
...
1.62
5.55
1,612
1.53
1.37
94.1
...
1.43
4.99
1,629
1.58
1.37
108.8
...
1.50
5.12
1,543
1.56
1.36
121.0
...
1.73
5.84
1,703
1.64
1.38
130.9
...
1.76
5.90
1,736
1.66
1.48
115.3
1.07
1.83
6.14
1,813
1.61
1.50
103.9
1.87
34.1
6.05
11.7
6.40
4.04
182.3
144.5
0.62
102.4
1.76
32.1
5.82
11.0
6.04
4.48
191.1
135.0
0.59
127.3
1.86
34.6
7.78
11.6
6.48
5.71
229.3
160.8
0.68
134.0
1.82
33.5
7.72
11.4
6.36
5.22
242.7
166.0
0.67
124.7
1.61
29.5
7.13
10.1
5.60
4.37
231.7
151.1
0.62
126.7
1.69
31.0
6.71
10.6
5.80
4.59
241.0
154.2
0.63
146.4
1.95
35.8
7.63
12.2
6.60
5.19
273.2
175.3
0.66
149.4
1.98
36.3
7.95
12.4
6.70
5.34
295.5
180.1
0.70
155.8
2.06
37.8
8.23
12.9
6.97
5.57
306.1
187.7
0.74
Swiss franc
Norwegian krone
Israeli new sheqel
Icelandic krona
1.43
6.48
2.28
59.00
1.41
6.21
2.46
57.55
1.48
7.09
2.83
67.60
1.37
7.06
3.01
69.94
1.18
6.34
3.01
64.69
1.24
6.45
3.19
66.50
1.45
7.07
3.45
70.90
1.45
7.55
3.80
70.96
1.50
7.76
4.16
72.82
Korean won
Australian dollar
New Taiwan dollar
Hong Kong dollar
Singapore dollar
733.4
1.28
26.81
7.77
1.73
780.7
1.36
25.16
7.74
1.63
802.7
1.47
26.39
7.74
1.62
803.4
1.37
26.46
7.73
1.53
771.3
1.35
26.49
7.74
1.42
804.5
1.28
27.46
7.73
1.41
951.3
1.35
28.70
7.74
1.48
1,401.4
1.59
33.46
7.75
1.67
1,202.8
1.54
32.16
7.74
1.68
Spanish peseta
Netherlands guilder
Belgian franc
Swedish krona
Austrian schilling
Danish krone
Finnish markka
Greek drachma
Portuguese escudo
Irish pound
Percent change
from previous
assumption3
75.1
115.4
109.2
112.2
93.4
96.0
109.0
116.3
73.2
120.1
114.1
116.2
94.6
93.1
107.6
110.8
75.0
146.0
111.6
123.5
96.7
86.6
90.4
101.4
74.0
156.1
109.9
126.7
96.3
86.5
84.7
93.7
69.6
163.1
114.9
135.6
96.6
81.5
78.6
93.1
73.6
137.8
114.2
132.8
93.9
84.4
87.7
95.0
79.9
129.6
101.6
123.3
90.1
102.4
90.3
95.7
85.6
118.8
98.2
119.7
89.9
110.9
90.1
88.1
0.9
3.0
0.2
0.1
0.8
0.1
1.2
Spain
Netherlands
Belgium
Sweden
Austria
Denmark
Finland
Greece
Portugal
Ireland
118.2
91.0
95.5
107.0
89.6
106.8
95.7
97.9
120.4
79.1
122.3
92.8
97.2
107.7
90.1
108.0
78.2
96.8
134.3
78.0
113.0
94.0
99.3
81.9
90.7
109.2
66.3
94.0
132.3
71.6
105.8
93.8
101.6
79.5
88.8
107.7
69.7
96.1
130.8
68.1
104.5
95.4
106.4
78.2
86.0
110.4
77.8
102.3
135.8
65.2
107.7
91.9
103.8
86.3
82.2
107.4
72.8
108.8
134.8
63.6
105.8
86.5
99.5
81.8
78.3
104.9
69.2
115.5
130.3
60.7
108.3
85.7
101.4
79.0
77.4
104.4
68.8
113.0
127.8
55.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
1.0
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.3
Switzerland
Norway
118.3
101.4
113.1
100.7
114.2
99.6
124.2
100.7
131.8
108.1
131.2
112.2
125.7
117.4
130.4
116.5
0.1
0.5
Australia
New Zealand
102.5
111.0
96.6
100.2
89.3
99.3
94.1
103.1
93.7
107.0
109.7
116.2
113.8
118.4
101.8
101.5
1.3
2.0
1Average
exchange rates for the period July 26August 16, 1999. See Assumptions in the Introduction to the Statistical Appendix.
in U.S. dollars per currency unit.
3In nominal effective terms. Average July 26August 16, 1999 rates compared with May 14June 10, 1999 rates.
4Defined as the ratio, in common currency, of the normalized unit labor costs in the manufacturing sector to the weighted average of those of its industrial
country trading partners, using 198991 trade weights.
5An effective euro is used prior to January 1, 1999. See Box 5.5 in the World Economic Outlook, October 1998.
2Expressed
194
Developing countries
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
3.5
2.9
3.1
2.6
2.5
2.3
2.4
4.0
4.2
3.3
Regional groups
Africa
Sub-Sahara
Excluding Nigeria and
South Africa
Asia
Excluding China and India
Middle East and Europe
Western Hemisphere
3.6
4.9
5.5
7.0
6.6
6.9
4.9
5.4
3.3
3.1
2.7
2.8
2.3
3.2
4.2
4.5
3.5
3.9
2.1
2.0
6.8
2.9
1.8
11.8
0.1
9.2
2.8
1.9
6.1
0.3
6.6
2.8
1.8
7.7
0.2
5.6
2.4
1.2
5.8
0.8
4.3
2.3
0.8
4.1
1.9
3.8
2.0
1.0
4.0
1.7
3.6
2.5
1.9
3.3
1.6
3.6
3.7
3.1
6.3
3.6
3.0
4.3
4.4
5.2
3.7
2.1
4.1
4.1
4.4
1.1
Analytical groups
By source of export earnings
Fuel
Manufactures
Nonfuel primary products
Services, income, and private transfers
Diversified
7.4
2.6
4.3
13.1
1.7
5.7
2.7
4.6
4.1
1.7
7.9
2.5
4.3
3.8
2.1
6.9
2.1
3.0
3.1
1.8
3.8
2.5
2.1
2.0
2.1
1.4
2.4
1.9
2.2
2.4
0.9
2.7
1.7
2.1
2.5
6.1
4.2
2.2
2.6
3.3
3.6
4.6
2.7
2.2
4.3
2.0
3.5
1.9
2.1
3.8
21.3
2.8
5.1
1.2
5.9
12.8
2.6
5.2
1.4
4.3
10.8
2.9
5.7
1.8
4.5
9.2
2.4
4.8
1.4
4.1
5.5
2.4
3.4
1.9
3.2
3.0
2.2
3.6
1.8
2.8
0.6
2.4
3.6
1.9
3.5
6.5
3.9
4.6
3.6
4.4
5.1
4.2
4.1
3.8
5.2
3.7
3.3
3.2
2.7
4.9
3.6
2.5
2.8
2.4
3.7
2.6
3.0
2.2
2.5
2.3
1.8
2.4
1.8
2.7
4.7
3.7
3.9
4.3
1.3
3.9
7.8
6.6
10.9
9.9
6.8
5.9
7.6
5.7
7.6
6.0
5.5
5.8
4.3
4.1
4.1
3.8
3.7
2.6
3.6
3.3
1.5
3.6
3.9
4.8
3.1
3.9
2.8
2.4
3.5
2.3
3.7
3.7
4.0
3.8
3.3
2.6
2.5
3.3
3.2
2.5
4.3
4.5
6.9
1.2
5.5
4.6
4.3
1.8
6.0
4.0
7.2
1.6
5.3
2.9
7.1
1.0
3.7
3.4
4.1
1.8
4.8
2.7
3.5
1.4
2.5
2.0
2.7
1.7
3.2
3.0
6.4
2.5
3.2
3.4
4.1
2.6
2.4
2.7
2.9
1.9
Other groups
Heavily indebted poor countries
Least developed countries
Middle East and north Africa
Memorandum
Median
Developing countries
Regional groups
Africa
Asia
Middle East and Europe
Western Hemisphere
195
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
72.9
84.4
91.3
68.3
24.6
23.1
20.3
16.7
14.7
13.8
Regional groups
Africa
Sub-Sahara
Asia
Excluding China and India
Middle East and Europe
Western Hemisphere
29.6
33.8
23.3
23.8
26.5
227.6
33.1
38.4
22.7
20.3
26.1
276.0
28.9
33.7
27.4
21.8
26.2
299.4
42.7
53.6
24.8
18.7
38.8
161.9
25.4
31.1
23.3
22.2
32.8
22.4
22.2
25.9
21.8
19.7
33.8
20.7
18.1
19.3
18.2
17.3
25.7
21.1
17.1
18.4
17.9
20.5
27.0
11.6
16.3
18.6
14.9
14.1
19.6
12.4
11.7
12.4
13.6
13.7
13.9
14.3
Analytical groups
By source of export earnings
Fuel
Manufactures
Nonfuel primary products
Services, income, and private transfers
Diversified
18.2
132.3
81.7
25.1
50.7
18.6
210.0
56.7
21.3
31.9
21.0
262.5
47.9
19.7
27.9
23.9
148.9
53.8
16.2
32.7
20.1
24.6
33.3
13.9
25.9
21.3
18.9
28.8
11.5
28.9
17.4
15.3
24.1
14.0
27.7
12.7
11.8
15.3
9.6
26.4
10.8
13.0
18.2
8.1
18.4
9.0
13.2
14.2
9.3
16.7
8.1
78.6
38.4
114.4
20.5
2.4
92.2
37.8
133.4
21.9
2.7
100.0
32.9
144.6
22.0
3.5
74.1
39.1
95.9
25.1
6.0
26.0
23.7
27.7
20.9
6.2
24.3
18.5
25.5
22.0
6.7
21.1
15.3
22.1
20.0
3.4
17.5
17.0
15.8
24.1
3.6
15.4
15.1
15.2
16.1
3.5
14.4
12.2
14.8
13.9
172.8
37.5
290.5
28.3
374.3
28.6
233.1
29.5
29.6
24.4
21.2
25.7
19.0
22.2
12.7
20.1
14.9
15.7
14.3
14.4
56.3
55.8
16.9
62.6
54.7
15.0
52.6
45.8
15.8
73.7
46.0
12.4
42.8
30.3
14.0
35.7
24.8
13.1
24.2
20.2
11.3
19.7
17.7
10.3
21.1
18.3
6.9
16.0
16.0
7.3
18.7
17.9
16.4
18.7
16.4
14.4
15.5
10.0
10.3
10.0
13.4
21.5
14.9
33.7
12.5
18.1
13.9
25.1
14.6
19.6
10.3
17.0
31.1
18.7
10.0
18.3
16.2
17.2
10.0
20.3
14.4
15.8
8.6
15.3
16.2
16.5
11.0
15.5
8.9
14.5
6.4
10.0
10.4
13.5
5.0
9.8
10.0
13.0
8.0
9.1
Developing countries
Other groups
Heavily indebted poor countries
Least developed countries
Middle East and north Africa
Memorandum
Median
Developing countries
Regional groups
Africa
Asia
Middle East and Europe
Western Hemisphere
196
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
4.7
6.2
4.6
4.7
3.9
9.1
9.4
6.8
9.9
3.6
3.7
6.2
1.4
1.0
0.3
0.3
0.9
1.8
2.5
0.4
3.9
3.1
2.5
8.7
2.6
1.3
3.1
4.9
0.3
5.1
3.7
0.8
1.2
1.4
1.0
Volume of trade
Exports
Advanced economies
Developing countries
5.3
3.4
6.0
8.3
5.7
7.0
5.2
11.0
3.3
8.8
8.7
13.0
9.0
10.7
6.3
8.8
10.3
11.4
3.2
4.9
3.0
2.4
6.2
5.6
Imports
Advanced economies
Developing countries
5.7
2.5
6.0
7.7
3.3
9.8
4.7
10.9
1.6
11.4
9.7
7.3
8.9
11.3
6.5
8.3
9.2
11.4
4.8
1.3
5.9
1.1
5.9
7.2
Terms of trade
Advanced economies
Developing countries
0.8
2.7
0.2
0.8
0.8
5.0
0.8
2.6
0.6
0.5
0.2
0.2
0.2
2.7
0.3
0.7
0.5
0.9
1.2
6.6
0.8
1.5
0.3
1.2
4.6
6.4
5.1
4.6
4.0
10.0
10.4
6.0
10.5
3.9
3.9
6.2
1.4
1.0
0.6
0.7
1.5
2.3
2.1
0.8
4.3
3.5
2.4
0.1
8.9
2.8
1.2
3.3
6.4
1.2
5.7
4.3
1.1
1.5
1.5
1.2
3.2
4.6
0.7
0.3
2.4
0.8
0.4
15.7
5.7
3.5
1.7
0.1
5.7
11.8
1.8
3.1
5.0
13.4
10.2
7.9
8.4
3.1
18.4
1.2
7.8
5.4
3.3
1.5
32.1
14.8
1.4
27.7
7.2
0.9
7.8
3.4
2.7
5.0
1.1
0.4
2.5
0.9
1.2
16.4
6.5
0.6
4.5
2.8
4.9
11.1
2.7
0.5
7.3
10.6
4.0
1.8
2.3
1.2
23.7
3.3
2.7
0.2
2.0
0.1
31.2
13.5
1.8
27.2
7.6
0.5
7.4
3.0
4.2
3.6
0.3
0.9
1.2
0.4
2.4
13.4
3.1
1.2
6.2
4.5
4.8
2.0
13.1
2.0
6.0
12.2
0.1
2.0
1.6
0.6
21.6
1.5
5.2
7.9
10.3
0.1
31.0
13.4
3.7
24.7
9.4
0.2
7.1
2.8
Volume of trade
Exports
Advanced economies
5.4
6.1
5.6
4.6
2.9
9.5
9.4
5.8
11.1
3.8
2.8
6.0
Developing countries
Fuel exporters
Nonfuel exporters
2.5
0.3
5.3
8.3
4.4
9.5
6.3
3.2
7.9
10.1
10.2
10.1
8.5
5.9
9.6
12.9
5.7
15.5
14.7
3.6
18.0
5.8
5.9
5.8
12.4
6.1
14.3
4.6
5.9
2.4
0.6
2.8
6.1
3.6
6.6
Imports
Advanced economies
5.7
6.4
4.1
4.7
2.4
11.0
9.3
5.9
9.9
5.1
6.2
5.9
Developing countries
Fuel exporters
Nonfuel exporters
1.9
2.2
3.3
8.1
3.7
8.9
7.7
5.0
8.5
14.5
27.4
10.9
10.5
4.9
14.8
8.3
14.4
13.6
14.4
3.7
16.3
7.0
3.4
7.6
10.4
13.9
9.9
1.3
6.1
2.5
2.0
1.2
2.6
8.0
3.6
8.7
1.6
0.9
3.1
0.4
3.3
0.2
3.2
1.9
2.7
3.2
1.8
0.9
Developing countries
Fuel exporters
Nonfuel exporters
1.1
4.1
0.5
0.6
2.4
0.2
4.9
13.1
0.7
3.7
7.3
2.2
2.5
7.0
0.7
0.4
5.7
1.5
1.6
3.5
1.1
8.4
19.4
5.4
1.8
0.6
2.1
9.4
22.7
5.7
1.3
9.0
0.4
2.5
6.1
1.7
Trade in goods
World trade1
Volume
Price deflator
In U.S. dollars
In SDRs
197
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Table 22 (concluded)
Ten-Year Averages
___________________
198190 19912000
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Imports
Advanced economies
0.6
1.3
2.6
1.7
5.3
0.4
3.0
2.4
1.8
4.5
2.3
1.2
Developing countries
Fuel exporters
Nonfuel exporters
1.3
1.0
1.3
0.4
0.5
0.4
0.9
5.5
0.4
1.6
10.5
0.9
0.1
0.5
0.8
1.0
1.2
0.7
3.1
1.3
5.7
5.0
5.8
2.1
1.3
2.2
2.7
3.2
2.6
0.3
1.6
0.1
1.3
2.1
1.1
Terms of trade
Advanced economies
1.0
0.4
0.5
1.3
2.1
0.6
0.2
0.5
0.9
1.4
0.5
0.3
Developing countries
Fuel exporters
Nonfuel exporters
2.3
5.0
0.8
1.0
2.8
0.3
5.8
17.6
0.4
2.2
3.6
3.1
2.4
6.5
0.6
0.4
6.6
2.8
2.3
0.4
2.4
2.6
13.7
0.3
0.3
0.6
0.1
6.9
20.2
3.1
1.0
7.3
0.5
1.3
3.9
0.6
2,864
2,295
5,959
4,744
4,393
3,498
4,702
3,716
4,707
3,706
5,264
4,186
6,259
5,033
6,565
5,253
6,812
5,446
6,686
5,328
6,844
5,430
7,361
5,847
Memorandum
World exports in billions of
U.S. dollars
Goods and services
Goods
1Average of annual percent change for world exports and imports. The estimates of world trade comprise, in addition to trade of advanced economies and
developing countries (which is summarized in the table), trade of countries in transition.
2As represented, respectively, by the export unit value index for the manufactures of the advanced economies; the average of U.K. Brent, Dubai, and West
Texas Intermediate crude oil spot prices; and the average of world market prices for nonfuel primary commodities weighted by their 198789 shares in world
commodity exports.
198
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
0.7
0.8
5.7
0.1
1.8
13.4
8.4
1.2
3.3
14.8
7.2
3.4
Food
Beverages
Agricultural raw materials
Metals
Fertilizers
2.2
6.1
1.6
1.1
1.4
0.9
1.6
0.5
3.3
1.0
0.9
6.5
3.6
14.3
3.2
2.3
13.9
2.7
2.3
5.0
1.3
6.3
16.2
14.2
15.4
5.1
74.9
9.5
16.6
8.0
8.1
0.9
4.3
19.5
10.6
12.2
17.4
2.7
11.9
13.7
10.8
32.6
6.8
3.0
1.1
12.7
15.2
16.3
16.3
2.8
12.4
18.4
2.3
8.7
2.4
4.8
1.8
2.9
3.3
3.0
Advanced economies
0.2
0.5
6.0
2.0
3.1
8.4
6.8
2.8
6.2
14.2
2.9
3.8
Developing countries
2.0
0.7
3.4
2.8
3.0
18.7
7.9
4.7
3.0
16.2
11.0
3.1
2.3
2.4
2.3
2.4
0.2
1.8
0.8
1.0
0.2
0.5
1.4
1.4
5.3
5.8
0.5
0.3
6.2
4.9
6.5
6.7
3.2
4.5
5.6
6.2
2.8
4.6
10.4
11.9
11.2
3.3
21.6
22.6
13.7
14.5
14.6
23.0
6.3
5.9
8.7
8.8
13.1
7.6
6.3
7.8
4.7
5.9
2.7
4.0
8.8
9.7
6.9
7.5
3.2
10.4
14.7
16.1
15.0
14.9
10.6
18.3
12.5
13.5
6.0
5.7
7.0
15.0
2.8
3.5
2.8
2.8
2.1
3.6
1.7
2.6
1.3
1.0
0.5
1.6
11.1
0.5
6.6
1.1
1.0
5.1
16.7
7.6
3.7
11.3
12.0
23.5
6.6
7.9
11.6
9.5
1.9
10.4
3.4
1.9
7.9
16.9
15.2
16.3
8.2
11.4
15.2
3.5
2.7
5.7
2.0
1.9
1.6
0.1
6.8
3.4
8.1
2.6
0.3
1.6
17.9
24.3
9.6
5.5
5.9
3.4
2.8
5.4
13.1
17.4
10.5
8.0
2.5
2.0
0.9
2.0
1.8
2.1
2.1
1.9
0.7
0.9
0.9
0.2
18.0
3.4
3.9
3.1
3.8
2.9
2.8
8.7
2.6
1.1
6.3
3.0
0.5
2.8
5.4
25.2
18.6
24.0
16.5
21.0
18.8
7.9
7.5
8.4
6.8
13.6
4.7
8.1
3.3
6.0
4.2
2.9
9.1
2.5
0.5
14.7
16.2
15.4
16.8
15.2
6.8
11.0
10.7
12.9
5.9
3.8
3.1
2.8
3.4
2.4
2.0
2.0
1.0
0.4
4.2
2.8
5.2
0.8
0.5
5.8
19.7
17.9
6.2
9.1
2.5
6.2
8.6
1.3
16.7
15.8
12.8
9.4
2.6
3.5
2.8
1.1
1.3
0.6
1.5
0.7
5.6
6.2
3.7
8.1
9.3
7.8
6.5
1.6
11.7
28.6
29.7
14.4
5.3
10.5
14.4
10.2
13.1
12.6
13.2
0.8
16.0
19.9
4.8
14.5
11.9
5.0
3.8
3.5
0.1
2.9
24.1
3.2
12.1
17.6
0.3
15.7
19.37
0.4
1.7
19.04
3.5
11.8
16.79
5.7
5.0
15.95
3.1
7.9
17.20
10.2
18.4
20.37
3.1
5.4
19.27
7.8
32.1
13.07
1.5
27.7
16.70
1.4
7.8
18.00
0.9
Regional groups
Africa
Sub-Sahara
Asia
Excluding China and India
Middle East and Europe
Western Hemisphere
Analytical groups
By source of export earnings
Fuel
Manufactures
Primary products
Services, income, and
private transfers
Diversified
Other groups
Heavily indebted poor countries
Least developed countries
Middle East and north Africa
Memorandum
Average oil spot price2
In U.S. dollars a barrel
Export unit value of manufactures3
1Averages of world market prices for individual commodities weighted by 198789 exports as a share of world commodity exports and total commodity
exports for the indicated country group, respectively.
2Average of U.K. Brent, Dubai, and West Texas Intermediate crude oil spot prices.
3For the manufactures exported by the advanced economies.
199
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Table 24. Advanced Economies: Export Volumes, Import Volumes, and Terms of Trade
(Annual percent change)
Ten-Year Averages
___________________
198190 19912000
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
5.3
4.9
5.5
5.3
5.1
6.0
5.5
6.8
3.9
4.8
5.7
5.5
6.3
5.2
12.8
5.2
4.5
6.6
4.9
0.8
3.3
1.8
2.9
1.3
5.5
8.7
7.9
8.2
4.6
7.6
9.0
8.5
11.3
5.4
5.8
6.3
6.2
8.5
6.3
5.3
10.3
10.7
12.8
11.6
10.9
3.2
2.9
1.5
2.3
6.5
3.0
1.9
3.6
0.5
0.3
6.2
5.9
6.5
3.3
6.3
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Canada
Other advanced economies
3.9
4.8
3.5
5.6
6.3
5.2
4.9
4.9
8.0
7.0
4.1
2.5
0.2
2.3
6.0
4.9
6.5
4.1
7.9
6.4
0.4
8.0
3.9
10.9
5.9
6.0
10.1
9.2
13.1
10.1
6.3
12.7
9.5
9.0
9.8
5.2
1.5
7.5
5.8
6.4
12.6
5.0
8.6
8.5
9.6
6.3
1.2
2.0
8.2
3.9
1.6
2.0
0.9
8.4
4.8
6.4
5.8
5.7
6.2
6.8
4.9
4.6
4.7
11.2
5.6
5.4
5.6
9.4
5.0
4.9
6.0
12.5
4.4
3.3
3.3
11.7
2.1
1.2
0.5
12.1
8.1
8.7
8.4
12.4
8.1
8.0
7.8
15.2
6.1
5.3
5.0
7.4
10.3
9.7
9.9
10.0
3.7
5.4
6.0
0.3
2.6
2.2
2.6
5.8
6.0
6.2
6.4
7.5
Advanced economies
Major industrial countries
United States
Japan
Germany1
5.7
5.6
6.9
6.0
3.6
6.0
5.7
8.6
2.4
4.9
3.3
1.9
0.7
3.1
13.7
4.7
4.1
7.5
0.7
1.5
1.6
0.8
8.9
0.3
5.4
9.7
9.1
12.2
8.9
7.3
8.9
8.2
8.8
14.2
5.7
6.5
6.7
9.2
11.9
3.4
9.2
9.6
13.9
0.5
8.2
4.8
6.5
10.6
7.5
8.0
5.9
5.7
9.8
1.4
2.6
5.9
5.3
6.0
1.0
5.4
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Canada
Other advanced economies
4.2
5.2
5.6
6.5
5.9
3.9
4.0
5.3
7.0
6.5
3.0
1.4
5.0
3.2
5.9
1.2
4.7
6.8
6.2
5.8
3.5
10.3
3.2
7.4
3.0
6.7
10.3
5.4
8.3
10.8
5.1
10.4
5.5
6.2
10.3
3.0
1.3
9.1
5.8
6.2
8.1
10.0
9.2
14.6
8.5
7.9
6.1
8.4
5.8
1.9
1.9
4.5
5.2
8.2
6.3
6.0
5.5
6.0
5.0
7.0
5.3
4.5
4.4
10.9
5.7
5.0
5.0
8.9
2.0
4.0
6.1
15.6
3.8
3.3
2.9
12.5
0.3
3.2
4.4
11.2
9.1
7.9
8.1
13.9
8.1
7.0
7.1
15.0
6.3
4.3
3.5
7.7
9.5
9.0
8.8
7.5
7.0
8.2
8.2
9.4
5.6
4.4
4.3
8.2
5.4
6.0
6.1
9.3
Advanced economies
Major industrial countries
United States
Japan
Germany1
0.8
0.9
0.7
2.2
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.9
0.6
0.6
0.8
1.4
2.2
0.2
11.6
0.8
1.0
1.6
2.4
0.6
0.7
1.1
1.8
2.5
0.2
0.3
0.8
1.3
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.7
0.9
0.3
0.6
0.7
6.4
0.5
0.5
0.4
2.0
4.5
1.8
1.2
1.9
2.9
2.4
2.0
0.8
1.3
0.3
5.5
0.9
0.3
0.8
0.3
6.9
0.3
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Canada
Other advanced economies
0.5
1.5
0.1
0.3
0.5
0.2
0.4
0.8
0.4
0.1
0.7
3.9
1.3
1.9
0.3
1.0
0.5
1.7
0.6
0.6
1.2
2.8
0.3
1.9
0.3
0.3
0.5
2.0
0.7
0.1
1.3
1.6
2.5
2.8
0.1
1.5
2.3
1.0
2.3
0.3
0.4
0.1
2.5
1.1
0.7
0.4
1.6
2.7
3.3
1.0
0.9
3.4
1.2
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.5
0.4
Memorandum
Industrial countries
European Union
Euro area
Newly industrialized Asian economies
0.8
0.4
0.4
0.9
0.2
0.1
0.1
1.1
2.3
3.2
0.9
0.9
1.5
1.5
0.5
0.6
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.5
0.3
1.8
0.2
0.2
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.6
1.0
1.3
1.3
1.2
0.3
1.0
0.8
0.5
0.1
0.5
0.1
0.7
5.4
5.7
1.0
6.1
6.4
0.4
5.6
4.1
0.5
4.6
4.7
1.3
2.9
2.4
2.1
9.5
11.0
0.6
9.4
9.3
0.2
5.8
5.9
0.5
11.1
9.9
0.9
3.8
5.1
1.4
2.8
6.2
0.5
6.0
5.9
0.3
Memorandum
Industrial countries
European Union
Euro area
Newly industrialized Asian economies
Import volume
Memorandum
Industrial countries
European Union
Euro area
Newly industrialized Asian economies
Terms of trade
Memorandum
Trade in goods
Advanced economies
Export volume
Import volume
Terms of trade
1Data
200
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Developing countries
Value in U.S. dollars
Exports
Imports
0.8
2.7
7.2
8.3
0.8
9.6
7.7
13.9
4.6
9.4
15.3
9.8
23.1
20.6
9.5
8.1
8.2
6.7
7.2
5.3
3.9
2.6
9.0
9.5
Volume
Exports
Imports
2.5
1.9
8.3
8.1
6.3
7.7
10.1
14.5
8.5
10.5
12.9
8.3
14.7
14.4
5.8
7.0
12.4
10.4
4.6
1.3
2.4
2.0
6.1
8.0
0.7
1.7
0.6
0.5
4.1
1.8
0.9
1.3
3.3
1.0
2.1
1.7
7.7
5.3
3.8
1.1
3.5
3.2
10.7
4.1
1.8
0.7
2.9
1.6
Terms of trade
2.3
1.0
5.8
2.2
2.4
0.4
2.3
2.6
0.3
6.9
1.0
1.3
3.8
3.1
2.7
3.1
2.9
4.0
3.5
4.1
3.9
1.1
2.4
3.0
2.0
0.7
3.4
2.8
3.0
18.7
7.9
4.7
3.0
16.2
11.0
3.1
Africa
Value in U.S. dollars
Exports
Imports
0.7
0.1
2.4
3.9
3.4
1.9
0.9
7.0
5.5
3.8
3.5
5.2
18.5
20.1
11.3
1.6
1.9
3.2
13.5
1.0
4.7
4.2
11.5
6.5
Volume
Exports
Imports
1.0
0.2
3.8
4.2
4.2
1.5
0.3
4.5
1.2
0.3
3.0
4.3
9.3
12.0
7.6
4.4
6.0
6.5
1.4
3.7
2.5
4.0
6.6
4.7
0.7
1.0
1.1
0.2
6.9
0.6
0.5
2.3
6.6
3.9
0.6
1.0
8.9
7.3
3.7
2.3
3.6
3.1
12.6
4.2
2.5
0.7
5.0
1.7
Terms of trade
1.7
1.0
6.3
2.7
2.8
0.4
1.4
6.1
0.5
8.8
1.8
3.2
Sub-Sahara
Value in U.S. dollars
Exports
Imports
1.2
1.1
2.4
4.2
4.3
1.4
0.1
5.2
5.0
3.2
4.6
2.9
18.5
21.5
10.8
4.3
1.5
5.4
13.9
3.3
3.0
3.7
12.5
6.3
Volume
Exports
Imports
0.5
0.5
3.9
4.7
2.2
1.9
0.9
3.3
0.9
0.8
3.1
2.9
9.2
12.8
9.2
8.4
5.4
8.1
0.7
1.7
2.5
3.3
7.4
4.5
0.6
0.6
1.3
0.3
6.0
0.5
0.9
1.9
5.8
3.9
1.8
0.3
9.0
7.6
1.6
3.6
3.4
2.4
13.4
4.6
0.9
1.0
5.3
1.7
Terms of trade
1.1
1.0
5.6
2.7
1.9
1.4
1.3
5.4
1.0
9.3
3.5
Asia
Value in U.S. dollars
Exports
Imports
7.7
7.6
11.5
10.2
13.5
11.8
15.2
15.0
11.7
19.3
23.7
17.4
29.6
27.4
4.7
7.2
11.9
1.3
1.8
13.7
3.0
10.5
7.4
10.9
Volume
Exports
Imports
7.0
7.1
11.1
9.3
12.2
8.4
10.7
11.7
11.5
18.9
19.4
15.0
21.9
20.3
2.7
5.4
17.7
6.1
8.6
9.5
2.0
8.2
6.1
11.0
1.3
0.8
0.6
0.9
1.2
2.8
3.9
2.2
0.3
0.4
3.6
2.1
6.4
6.0
2.1
1.8
4.7
4.4
8.6
4.6
1.1
2.4
1.3
0.3
Terms of trade
0.5
0.3
1.5
1.7
0.1
1.5
0.4
0.3
0.3
4.2
1.3
0.9
Memorandum
Real GDP growth in developing
country trading partners
Market prices of nonfuel commodities
exported by developing countries
Regional groups
201
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Table 25 (concluded)
Ten-Year Averages
___________________
198190 19912000
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
6.4
8.0
10.6
8.1
15.3
14.1
15.4
10.0
12.6
14.1
18.5
19.3
22.2
26.9
6.2
6.4
7.1
0.8
3.4
22.6
4.9
7.6
9.0
14.3
Volume
Exports
Imports
6.0
8.2
10.2
7.0
14.7
10.4
9.7
7.8
11.4
13.0
15.0
17.0
13.8
17.9
3.4
4.3
10.3
1.8
11.9
17.9
3.7
5.1
8.5
15.3
1.1
0.3
0.6
1.3
0.6
3.6
5.4
2.5
1.3
1.1
3.1
2.0
7.3
7.6
2.7
2.1
2.8
2.4
12.3
5.7
1.3
3.1
0.6
0.5
Terms of trade
0.8
0.7
3.0
2.8
0.2
1.1
0.3
0.5
0.4
7.0
1.8
1.2
4.0
1.3
2.4
4.9
9.2
8.2
5.5
9.7
1.2
2.4
7.2
10.7
14.1
17.5
16.9
11.3
1.8
7.2
18.9
0.5
6.2
1.6
7.3
7.8
Volume
Exports
Imports
0.2
0.3
5.2
5.1
3.1
3.1
13.5
20.0
6.7
3.2
8.3
12.1
4.1
9.4
7.1
8.7
5.2
12.7
0.9
5.8
0.9
2.4
3.0
5.6
3.2
1.6
1.7
0.9
9.9
5.0
4.6
0.4
6.1
0.6
0.7
2.7
9.8
7.9
9.8
2.7
3.2
4.5
18.3
6.0
5.6
0.9
4.3
2.6
Terms of trade
4.8
2.6
14.2
4.2
5.5
3.3
1.7
6.9
1.4
13.1
4.7
1.6
3.1
0.4
7.8
10.8
1.1
16.5
4.7
21.1
5.9
8.0
15.6
18.5
21.8
10.7
11.5
10.6
10.4
18.8
4.6
3.8
3.7
6.5
12.3
9.4
4.4
1.5
9.0
11.0
4.0
19.4
12.7
19.8
10.3
10.3
12.1
18.1
13.9
8.5
9.9
10.2
12.2
18.9
2.9
5.8
4.3
4.8
8.1
6.4
0.2
3.5
0.4
0.2
2.2
2.3
4.5
1.1
4.0
2.0
3.2
0.4
7.3
1.1
1.7
0.2
1.6
7.2
1.8
0.2
1.8
4.0
2.8
3.2
0.2
0.1
5.5
2.1
2.8
6.2
1.4
1.6
5.5
1.6
1.2
Western Hemisphere
Value in U.S. dollars
Exports
Imports
Volume
Exports
Imports
Unit value in U.S. dollars
Exports
Imports
Terms of trade
202
Table 26. Developing Countriesby Source of Export Earnings: Total Trade in Goods
(Annual percent change)
Ten-Year Averages
___________________
198190 19912000
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Fuel
Value in U.S. dollars
Exports
Imports
4.4
1.2
1.2
3.6
11.4
11.5
3.0
12.0
3.5
6.1
1.8
11.3
13.5
12.8
20.6
3.9
1.2
8.9
24.7
1.4
9.7
0.5
10.1
5.6
Volume
Exports
Imports
0.3
2.2
4.4
3.7
3.2
5.0
10.2
27.4
5.9
4.9
5.7
14.4
3.6
3.7
5.9
3.4
6.1
13.9
6.1
0.6
1.2
3.6
3.6
3.7
1.4
2.3
0.5
12.3
6.4
4.6
7.9
7.8
1.4
3.3
3.5
9.6
9.2
14.3
0.5
4.6
4.0
23.8
4.6
9.5
2.1
6.5
2.5
Terms of trade
5.0
2.8
17.6
3.6
6.5
6.6
0.4
13.7
0.6
20.2
7.3
3.9
Nonfuel
Value in U.S. dollars
Exports
Imports
5.1
4.1
9.4
9.3
7.0
9.1
9.7
14.4
7.8
13.8
20.0
14.7
26.0
21.9
6.5
8.8
10.3
6.3
2.3
6.4
2.7
2.9
8.7
10.1
Volume
Exports
Imports
5.3
3.3
9.5
8.9
7.9
8.5
10.1
10.9
9.6
14.8
15.5
13.6
18.0
16.3
5.8
7.6
14.3
9.9
5.9
2.5
2.8
2.6
6.6
8.7
0.9
1.8
0.2
0.5
0.1
0.4
0.6
3.9
1.5
0.9
4.1
1.3
7.1
4.5
0.9
1.2
3.2
3.1
7.0
4.0
0.5
2.1
1.5
0.8
0.3
0.4
3.1
0.6
2.8
2.4
0.3
0.1
3.1
0.5
0.6
Manufactures
Value in U.S. dollars
Exports
Imports
8.7
6.6
10.9
10.4
12.1
11.8
14.7
13.4
11.1
21.3
24.3
18.3
29.1
31.8
3.0
5.6
11.1
1.7
2.7
11.8
2.3
7.6
7.8
10.0
Volume
Exports
Imports
8.6
5.1
10.4
9.9
10.1
9.4
11.1
10.4
12.2
22.2
19.7
16.5
21.7
24.5
1.3
3.4
18.5
7.6
3.8
7.5
1.8
6.8
6.1
8.8
0.2
1.7
0.5
0.4
1.8
1.8
3.1
1.8
1.0
0.7
3.8
1.5
6.1
6.1
1.8
2.1
6.2
5.3
6.1
4.9
0.5
0.8
1.8
1.2
1.5
0.1
1.3
0.3
2.3
0.3
0.9
1.2
0.2
0.6
1.5
0.9
7.0
7.8
0.6
4.0
4.1
10.8
0.1
4.4
18.6
11.2
25.5
25.5
5.6
10.3
9.5
7.0
6.0
1.1
4.4
0.2
10.7
8.8
Volume
Exports
Imports
1.5
0.4
7.7
7.4
5.0
4.9
6.0
8.4
6.0
5.8
9.0
10.3
8.1
16.1
11.4
8.0
12.8
9.6
1.9
3.7
8.3
0.8
9.3
7.4
1.3
1.9
0.5
0.5
3.6
0.3
1.6
2.1
5.1
1.6
8.8
0.7
16.1
7.6
4.8
2.2
2.6
2.1
7.6
4.2
3.7
0.8
1.3
1.6
0.6
1.0
3.3
3.6
3.6
8.0
8.0
6.8
0.5
3.6
3.0
0.3
Terms of trade
Terms of trade
Terms of trade
203
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Table 26 (concluded)
Ten-Year Averages
___________________
198190 19912000
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
0.1
2.1
6.8
6.8
4.4
4.3
1.7
3.3
5.9
9.0
9.5
3.6
24.3
16.8
5.3
8.9
8.2
5.5
0.4
4.5
3.6
5.8
11.4
7.0
Volume
Exports
Imports
1.3
0.1
8.5
5.1
5.0
7.5
38.1
12.3
2.8
4.5
8.0
9.1
11.7
14.3
3.4
9.6
7.3
3.3
8.5
2.8
5.5
8.2
5.3
3.1
3.2
3.4
2.7
24.0
2.7
10.3
27.4
3.0
4.5
3.2
3.1
12.5
3.0
4.5
5.5
0.6
1.7
3.5
3.8
1.0
0.1
3.3
1.5
0.1
0.6
27.4
29.6
1.4
6.5
9.2
1.0
1.1
0.3
1.1
1.8
Diversified
Value in U.S. dollars
Exports
Imports
3.9
3.4
8.4
9.0
3.4
8.7
6.5
18.7
5.8
9.3
15.8
13.6
22.1
10.9
11.8
12.7
9.7
12.2
1.2
3.2
2.8
1.8
9.2
11.2
Volume
Exports
Imports
4.4
3.4
8.9
9.0
6.6
8.8
7.3
17.1
7.8
11.6
12.1
11.9
15.5
7.3
11.2
13.7
9.4
13.3
9.7
0.1
3.0
2.0
6.7
9.5
1.2
1.3
0.2
0.1
3.0
0.6
1.3
1.8
2.0
3.4
1.9
6.0
2.5
0.7
0.9
0.3
0.9
8.5
3.0
0.6
2.4
1.7
0.1
0.3
3.0
1.9
0.2
1.4
3.4
1.6
1.2
5.7
0.6
0.7
Terms of trade
204
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Advanced economies
17.8
12.1
66.1
32.8
55.3
44.7
81.4
37.3
77.3
73.0
United States
Euro area
Japan
4.3
65.1
68.4
50.6
51.3
112.3
85.3
26.9
132.0
121.7
19.3
130.6
113.6
56.8
111.4
129.3
89.9
65.8
143.5
107.2
94.1
220.6
85.4
121.0
316.1
79.6
143.1
324.6
95.3
138.5
4.4
0.9
9.9
3.0
1.2
12.9
8.9
50.1
37.2
41.1
Memorandum
Industrial countries
Newly industrialized Asian economies
32.4
15.7
28.5
16.3
47.1
20.8
19.3
16.1
54.6
5.9
49.1
0.9
75.8
9.0
24.2
62.2
126.7
52.0
118.1
48.0
Developing countries
98.6
84.3
120.8
88.6
89.1
72.6
62.1
77.3
55.6
66.0
Regional groups
Africa
Asia
Middle East and Europe
Western Hemisphere
7.4
11.1
63.1
16.9
10.3
12.6
26.8
34.5
11.6
34.0
29.3
45.8
11.9
20.4
4.7
51.6
16.1
35.7
0.2
37.0
6.2
38.1
10.4
38.7
7.1
5.0
6.7
66.7
18.8
50.9
20.2
89.1
18.8
26.0
6.3
56.5
15.2
12.0
6.4
56.5
Analytical groups
By source of export earnings
Fuel
Nonfuel
60.1
38.5
30.3
54.0
24.1
96.7
4.9
83.7
2.8
91.9
31.7
104.2
22.0
84.1
24.2
53.1
5.0
50.6
3.1
69.0
49.3
49.3
13.6
21.9
13.7
15.8
68.5
14.5
41.7
12.3
13.4
107.4
17.8
74.4
15.2
6.8
81.8
15.1
49.2
17.6
3.1
92.2
17.7
50.4
24.1
13.0
85.6
13.9
47.2
24.6
12.0
74.1
13.5
38.8
21.8
12.0
65.2
17.8
35.3
12.1
2.8
58.4
21.0
23.7
13.7
6.5
72.5
17.0
35.9
19.6
24.7
24.5
20.1
48.5
29.4
78.0
16.7
65.1
39.6
52.7
25.5
60.1
43.1
31.0
66.4
1.1
49.3
9.1
44.2
28.2
Countries in transition
Central and eastern Europe
Excluding Belarus and Ukraine
Russia
Transcaucasus and central Asia
Total1
4.9
1.7
5.4
3.8
2.9
16.7
26.3
25.1
16.1
20.2
4.8
3.5
4.1
5.5
1.1
1.5
1.2
1.7
7.0
5.7
2.6
1.0
3.8
2.0
8.4
0.8
6.2
4.2
4.8
1.6
16.8
15.1
3.9
3.9
19.4
17.3
3.0
3.9
22.6
20.3
2.3
4.8
24.1
22.9
11.8
3.8
24.2
22.7
8.4
4.4
111.5
98.2
60.0
52.0
36.7
44.6
7.0
65.0
149.0
159.1
1.3
0.5
1.0
0.4
0.6
0.2
0.5
0.2
0.3
0.1
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.5
0.2
1.1
0.5
1.1
0.5
Memorandum
Emerging market countries, excluding
Asian countries in surplus2
94.5
83.4
102.3
75.3
75.6
73.4
110.7
159.8
106.9
111.1
1Reflects
errors, omissions, and asymmetries in balance of payments statistics on current account, as well as the exclusion of data for international organizations and a limited number of countries. See Classification of Countries in the introduction to this Statistical Appendix.
2All developing and transition countries excluding China, Hong Kong SAR, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China, and
Thailand.
205
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Advanced economies
Major industrial countries
United States
Japan
Germany
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Canada
Other advanced economies
Spain
Netherlands
Belgium-Luxembourg
Sweden
Austria
Denmark
Finland
Greece
Portugal
Ireland
Switzerland
Norway
Israel
Iceland
Korea
Australia
Taiwan Province of China
Hong Kong SAR1
Singapore
New Zealand
Memorandum
Industrial countries
European Union
Euro area
Newly industrialized Asian economies
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
17.8
14.4
4.3
68.4
17.1
12.1
16.0
50.6
112.3
13.5
66.1
17.2
85.3
132.0
9.0
32.8
8.5
121.7
130.6
22.5
37.3
51.0
220.6
121.0
3.6
77.3
142.5
316.1
143.1
0.2
73.0
146.1
324.6
138.5
5.5
6.2
26.6
14.8
22.4
3.8
29.2
17.8
21.0
9.2
8.1
15.9
21.8
7.4
13.0
2.2
13.0
10.9
25.1
5.9
4.4
20.5
39.8
0.9
3.3
39.4
32.5
10.3
10.3
40.6
20.1
2.4
11.0
37.2
18.7
18.9
6.4
41.7
21.2
22.7
5.7
3.4
20.0
7.7
4.7
4.7
0.6
2.0
6.7
3.4
0.7
0.3
3.8
21.3
7.4
6.6
7.8
0.6
4.1
5.1
2.0
0.5
48.9
5.8
13.6
11.2
3.8
1.2
4.7
1.1
2.4
0.1
1.8
41.3
6.6
17.9
12.6
1.6
2.9
2.7
1.1
0.5
2.2
1.5
50.8
0.2
23.8
14.2
6.3
5.4
1.9
5.4
2.8
0.2
1.7
51.1
0.2
22.9
14.1
6.6
4.8
3.1
5.2
3.2
4.5
2.0
60.3
2.3
22.2
14.0
6.5
5.0
0.9
6.9
3.1
5.5
1.9
88.3
1.4
20.9
12.0
4.6
4.4
2.4
7.5
3.2
7.2
0.8
65.2
3.8
21.5
10.8
2.7
3.9
2.0
6.9
2.9
8.3
0.6
73.1
4.7
23.8
11.7
3.6
3.3
1.2
7.5
3.0
8.6
0.4
10.6
5.1
1.1
0.3
15.1
2.9
0.1
0.2
19.5
3.5
1.8
17.5
3.2
2.5
0.1
21.4
4.9
5.2
0.1
22.0
10.6
5.3
0.1
22.9
8.0
3.4
0.1
22.1
1.2
0.7
0.5
20.9
0.9
2.5
0.5
22.1
4.8
2.9
0.4
8.3
11.2
13.1
6.1
4.9
0.9
3.9
11.2
8.5
5.8
5.9
1.1
1.0
9.8
7.0
8.6
4.2
0.5
3.9
17.2
6.5
2.1
11.4
1.1
8.5
19.6
5.5
5.5
14.4
1.8
23.0
15.8
11.0
1.6
14.5
2.7
8.2
12.7
7.7
5.5
15.0
4.6
40.0
17.6
3.5
1.1
17.6
3.2
23.6
23.6
7.4
2.5
18.6
3.7
15.2
21.5
9.4
4.1
19.2
3.3
32.4
86.0
65.1
15.7
28.5
74.8
51.3
16.3
47.1
9.5
26.9
20.8
19.3
20.9
19.3
16.1
54.6
56.3
56.8
5.9
49.1
95.3
89.9
0.9
75.8
121.9
107.2
9.0
24.2
86.8
85.4
62.2
126.7
58.5
79.6
52.0
118.1
72.0
95.3
48.0
Percent of GDP
United States
Japan
Germany
0.1
2.0
1.0
0.8
3.0
0.7
1.3
3.1
0.5
1.8
2.8
1.1
1.6
2.2
0.8
1.7
1.4
0.2
1.8
2.2
0.1
2.6
3.2
0.2
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.4
0.3
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Canada
0.5
2.3
1.4
3.8
0.3
2.4
1.7
3.6
0.7
0.8
1.7
3.9
0.6
1.3
0.2
2.3
0.7
2.3
0.5
0.8
1.3
3.2
0.1
0.5
2.8
2.8
0.8
1.6
2.8
1.7
0.2
1.8
2.6
1.6
1.4
1.0
2.8
1.7
1.6
0.9
Spain
Netherlands
Belgium-Luxembourg
Sweden
Austria
Denmark
Finland
Greece
Portugal
Ireland
3.6
2.7
2.4
1.9
0.4
1.5
5.4
3.8
0.9
0.7
3.5
2.3
3.0
3.0
0.3
2.8
4.7
2.0
1.0
1.2
4.4
5.2
2.0
0.6
3.4
1.3
2.6
0.1
3.7
1.3
5.3
5.4
0.8
1.5
1.8
1.1
0.5
2.5
2.7
6.0
5.2
2.6
2.4
1.1
4.2
2.4
0.1
2.6
5.8
5.2
2.5
2.1
1.7
4.1
2.6
4.2
2.8
0.4
6.1
5.8
2.8
2.4
0.5
5.6
2.6
5.4
2.5
0.2
5.5
4.8
1.9
2.1
1.4
5.8
2.7
6.7
0.9
0.6
5.6
4.3
1.1
1.8
1.1
5.3
2.3
7.5
0.6
0.7
5.9
4.5
1.4
1.5
0.7
5.4
2.4
7.4
0.4
Switzerland
Norway
Israel
Iceland
4.6
4.3
1.9
4.0
6.2
2.3
0.2
2.4
8.2
3.0
2.8
0.8
6.7
2.6
3.4
2.0
7.0
3.3
6.0
0.8
7.4
6.7
5.6
1.7
8.9
5.2
3.4
1.6
8.4
0.8
0.7
6.0
8.0
0.6
2.6
5.5
8.3
3.2
2.8
4.0
Korea
Australia
Taiwan Province of China
Hong Kong SAR1
Singapore
New Zealand
2.8
3.6
7.3
7.1
11.4
2.2
1.3
3.7
4.0
5.7
12.1
2.7
0.3
3.3
3.2
7.4
7.3
1.2
1.0
5.1
2.7
1.6
16.3
2.2
1.7
5.4
2.1
3.9
17.3
3.1
4.4
3.9
4.0
1.0
15.9
4.1
1.7
3.1
2.7
3.2
15.7
7.1
12.5
4.8
1.3
0.7
20.9
6.1
5.9
6.0
2.6
1.5
21.1
6.7
3.4
5.2
3.0
2.4
20.4
5.8
1Data
206
Exports
Imports
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2,789.1
2,800.6
2,989.6
2,965.0
2,938.0
2,849.2
3,308.0
3,234.8
3,943.7
3,855.2
4,065.3
4,006.1
4,167.8
4,098.6
4,128.5
4,064.9
4,1874
4,231.0
4,491.7
4,552.1
Trade balance
11.5
24.5
88.8
73.3
88.5
59.2
69.2
63.6
43.6
60.4
Services, credits
Services, debits
747.5
711.9
830.2
779.8
829.3
771.9
884.7
821.5
1,001.2
934.3
1,060.1
982.7
1,088.7
994.5
1,093.3
1,020.0
1,133.0
1,052.4
1,211.8
1,115.5
Balance on services
35.6
50.4
57.4
63.2
66.9
77.4
94.2
73.3
80.5
96.3
24.1
74.9
146.2
136.5
155.4
136.6
163.5
136.9
36.9
35.9
2.8
44.6
1.3
88.4
10.4
90.5
0.1
103.5
4.9
105.0
17.9
109.8
20.3
102.4
14.2
113.8
5.4
119.6
9.9
118.8
17.8
12.1
66.1
32.8
55.3
44.7
81.4
37.3
77.3
73.0
24.1
74.9
146.2
136.5
155.4
136.6
163.5
136.9
36.9
35.9
13.3
29.5
54.3
2.2
47.4
37.0
80.7
2.4
81.2
69.9
96.5
8.1
70.4
98.4
96.4
11.4
85.0
97.5
74.7
19.7
55.3
104.3
21.2
27.4
77.3
104.7
47.3
30.8
24.6
164.3
73.2
35.9
55.3
238.1
90.2
27.4
66.9
246.7
72.5
33.1
7.0
2.3
10.2
3.8
21.5
0.3
13.0
2.6
24.5
32.5
10.1
0.4
25.0
36.7
7.0
6.3
28.9
45.3
4.4
18.4
31.2
62.0
6.5
24.4
45.7
47.8
0.1
10.6
45.0
39.9
13.1
8.0
40.2
36.1
23.2
12.2
44.7
40.2
25.3
14.6
10.8
27.5
65.0
66.0
70.4
81.3
86.2
112.3
92.2
102.9
20.5
16.4
8.8
70.9
11.6
19.5
136.8
90.1
92.1
132.7
110.7
107.5
159.3
145.5
137.8
145.8
178.0
168.8
162.7
184.7
173.0
80.3
158.7
165.0
8.0
126.0
142.8
6.0
143.0
160.8
9.6
9.6
16.9
11.9
4.3
0.8
7.0
60.5
50.4
47.6
2.8
1.3
10.4
0.1
4.9
17.9
20.3
14.2
5.4
9.9
26.9
23.9
25.9
20.0
35.6
22.3
35.4
21.7
34.8
23.2
40.6
16.6
29.1
15.9
40.3
3.0
26.1
19.4
44.4
0.2
45.7
17.2
53.6
1.1
44.1
3.2
55.6
1.7
37.0
12.2
56.6
9.2
29.2
32.1
66.7
2.2
34.4
35.9
77.3
2.8
5.7
17.6
2.2
17.4
8.7
22.0
4.2
17.5
9.1
17.2
1.5
20.8
6.8
16.6
12.4
19.0
9.0
15.7
9.4
22.7
2.7
15.0
13.0
21.6
2.6
11.2
16.9
21.4
5.6
12.3
28.1
19.6
7.0
11.5
16.3
19.3
7.3
11.1
14.9
20.9
24.1
34.3
24.4
29.3
21.1
27.8
23.8
22.7
23.9
24.5
1.1
24.3
11.3
3.6
35.2
24.8
7.6
31.2
19.2
3.2
29.6
31.7
3.4
29.3
29.4
16.8
23.5
24.7
20.0
10.5
18.5
16.7
7.9
26.7
5.8
6.9
12.8
9.8
7.0
12.4
5.6
6.0
3.9
4.5
4.3
4.3
3.8
0.3
2.6
3.3
Income, net
Current transfers, net
Current account balance
Balance on goods and services
Advanced economies
Major industrial countries
United States
Japan
Germany
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Canada
Other advanced economies
Memorandum
Industrial countries
European Union
Euro area
Newly industrialized Asian
economies
Income, net
Advanced economies
Major industrial countries
United States
Japan
Germany
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Canada
Other advanced economies
Memorandum
Industrial countries
European Union
Euro area
Newly industrialized Asian
economies
207
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
98.6
84.3
120.8
88.6
89.1
72.6
62.1
77.3
55.6
66.0
7.4
8.6
10.3
9.8
11.6
10.6
11.9
8.7
16.1
11.9
6.2
6.9
7.1
9.8
18.8
16.8
18.8
17.5
15.2
14.0
10.4
11.1
20.6
63.1
16.9
10.4
12.6
16.1
26.8
34.5
10.0
34.0
20.6
29.3
45.8
7.2
20.4
24.5
4.7
51.6
8.8
35.7
39.3
0.2
37.0
8.9
38.1
40.4
10.4
38.7
9.3
5.0
24.4
6.7
66.7
11.9
50.9
22.7
20.2
89.1
12.0
26.0
18.4
6.3
56.5
11.0
12.0
7.3
6.4
56.5
Analytical groups
By source of export earnings
Fuel
Manufactures
Nonfuel primary products
Services, income, and
private transfers
Diversified
60.1
4.6
10.2
30.3
0.5
11.3
24.1
26.8
13.5
4.9
12.6
11.7
2.8
38.8
13.9
31.7
44.5
16.8
22.0
15.4
17.2
24.2
16.4
18.2
5.0
4.9
14.5
3.1
2.4
15.3
4.9
18.7
3.8
38.3
5.8
50.6
6.3
53.1
7.5
31.6
8.5
34.5
7.6
43.9
11.3
39.9
12.2
28.8
12.6
38.8
49.3
49.3
13.6
21.9
13.7
15.8
68.5
14.5
41.7
12.3
13.4
107.4
17.8
74.4
15.2
6.8
81.8
15.1
49.2
17.6
3.1
92.2
17.7
50.4
24.1
13.0
85.6
13.9
47.2
24.6
12.0
74.1
13.5
38.8
21.8
12.0
65.2
17.8
35.3
12.1
2.8
58.4
21.0
23.7
13.7
6.5
72.5
17.0
35.9
19.6
24.7
24.5
20.1
48.5
29.4
78.0
16.7
65.1
39.6
52.7
25.5
60.1
43.1
31.0
66.4
1.1
49.3
9.1
44.2
28.2
11.9
9.3
64.7
11.8
8.6
27.9
14.0
8.1
25.5
10.2
6.5
13.3
12.3
7.9
5.0
13.3
8.8
12.3
12.3
7.9
11.1
13.8
10.6
25.5
14.8
12.4
7.9
14.0
12.3
4.8
Other groups
Heavily indebted poor countries
Least developed countries
Middle East and north Africa
208
Table 30 (concluded)
Ten-Year Averages
___________________
198190 19912000
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
10.4
8.8
14.9
11.7
15.9
10.2
8.4
6.3
4.9
6.6
4.5
4.9
15.8
17.6
10.5
12.9
7.2
11.1
10.0
12.6
11.9
14.3
11.7
11.2
13.4
12.9
4.6
6.8
5.2
9.5
15.6
18.4
14.9
18.6
10.9
13.3
23.9
14.1
15.4
5.6
12.0
22.8
2.5
6.8
8.0
19.7
27.4
4.9
14.8
38.3
10.3
27.5
4.8
10.0
15.0
19.9
27.5
11.4
11.3
16.4
24.9
19.0
5.5
11.2
2.5
24.7
19.6
7.6
14.7
0.1
15.0
18.2
7.6
14.0
4.2
14.1
18.4
0.9
7.9
2.6
22.2
25.7
9.4
7.9
9.0
30.9
24.5
4.6
6.1
2.7
18.5
19.9
2.0
2.2
2.5
16.7
4.4
13.1
32.3
5.8
3.5
22.1
34.5
2.2
23.2
16.7
0.2
24.2
13.7
10.1
28.5
2.7
3.8
21.2
1.4
9.2
20.1
13.0
10.1
22.9
8.9
3.2
21.6
12.6
3.5
23.9
2.4
1.0
18.3
1.3
0.5
17.5
19.3
12.6
17.3
12.6
15.6
9.1
11.4
17.3
16.0
21.7
15.7
20.1
16.5
10.0
17.5
9.7
14.7
11.2
21.9
10.4
22.5
7.3
21.1
9.0
4.4
15.4
26.3
8.8
27.8
6.8
9.0
19.3
7.2
10.2
50.4
8.8
21.0
5.7
12.2
14.8
11.2
21.7
9.9
10.0
12.7
16.5
26.5
16.4
11.6
6.3
10.8
20.7
9.1
11.8
2.5
9.9
20.3
7.5
13.7
9.1
8.4
14.1
6.5
12.8
8.1
6.7
13.3
4.9
10.1
10.4
6.2
18.5
4.7
5.8
2.2
5.3
21.2
3.0
6.2
4.8
6.1
15.4
4.3
8.0
20.3
12.2
15.0
6.9
14.2
6.3
11.0
11.3
16.0
16.6
8.3
11.6
17.2
7.5
9.7
8.0
15.2
3.8
25.8
0.1
18.0
1.1
14.2
3.2
34.7
41.5
7.2
28.9
33.4
8.8
35.8
45.5
39.0
34.6
42.0
15.7
42.2
37.7
14.6
27.4
26.9
7.4
26.8
27.6
2.4
25.6
28.9
5.3
22.4
24.1
4.6
25.9
33.0
12.8
26.0
36.0
3.7
22.1
32.0
2.1
18.7
14.4
15.0
17.7
19.8
14.4
13.2
14.1
11.3
15.0
12.4
10.8
Regional groups
Africa
Sub-Sahara
Excluding Nigeria and
South Africa
Asia
Excluding China and India
Middle East and Europe
Western Hemisphere
Analytical groups
By source of export earnings
Fuel
Manufactures
Nonfuel primary products
Services, income, and
private transfers
Diversified
Other groups
Heavily indebted poor countries
Least developed countries
Middle East and north Africa
Memorandum
Median
Developing countries
209
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
546.7
531.0
589.0
604.6
616.2
661.5
710.3
726.6
874.4
876.0
957.4
946.8
1,035.9
1,010.2
961.0
956.6
998.8
981.2
1,088.2
1,074.1
15.7
15.6
45.3
16.3
1.6
10.6
25.7
4.4
17.6
14.1
Services, net
Balance on goods and services
56.9
41.2
50.7
66.3
49.0
94.3
41.0
57.3
50.5
52.1
51.1
40.5
58.2
32.4
49.1
44.7
32.8
15.3
34.4
20.3
Income, net
Current transfers, net
52.2
5.1
48.2
30.2
52.9
26.5
56.9
25.6
69.9
32.8
68.8
36.7
71.1
41.5
73.1
40.5
84.9
44.6
92.4
46.7
98.6
84.3
120.8
88.6
89.1
72.6
62.1
77.3
55.6
66.0
660.0
80.1
128.2
719.7
77.3
133.8
758.1
79.6
116.2
868.9
83.0
114.5
1,055.6
98.2
125.8
1,157.1
103.6
157.2
1,258.4
103.4
152.9
1,172.5
110.8
105.0
1,226.6
115.1
114.5
1,333.3
120.4
124.5
87.7
76.6
86.9
81.9
82.2
78.8
85.1
82.9
100.8
99.6
112.2
101.2
114.3
104.4
98.9
103.4
103.6
107.7
115.5
114.7
Trade balance
11.1
5.0
3.4
2.2
1.2
11.0
9.9
4.5
4.1
0.8
Services, net
Balance on goods and services
8.9
2.2
8.9
3.9
8.3
4.9
8.3
6.1
10.0
8.8
8.9
2.1
9.5
0.5
7.8
12.3
8.4
12.5
8.9
8.0
19.5
10.0
18.0
11.6
17.4
10.7
16.4
10.7
17.9
10.5
19.2
10.9
18.9
11.3
18.3
11.7
18.3
12.0
19.5
12.3
7.4
10.3
11.6
11.9
16.1
6.2
7.1
18.8
18.8
15.2
102.1
16.3
25.2
103.1
15.9
24.6
98.2
14.9
20.7
102.0
14.4
19.2
120.0
16.8
22.1
133.1
16.8
30.2
135.8
16.5
29.2
120.6
16.7
18.6
126.2
16.6
20.4
139.7
17.1
25.8
Asia
Exports
Imports
193.0
203.4
222.3
233.8
248.4
278.9
307.3
327.5
398.3
417.3
417.0
447.3
466.7
453.0
458.4
391.1
472.3
432.3
507.1
479.6
10.4
11.5
30.6
20.2
19.0
30.3
13.8
67.4
40.0
27.4
0.7
9.7
2.7
14.2
5.2
35.8
5.0
25.2
13.1
32.1
10.5
40.8
17.7
3.9
16.4
51.0
13.8
26.2
13.5
13.9
12.6
11.2
11.7
13.3
12.5
14.4
11.5
16.3
21.8
18.2
19.4
22.1
17.1
26.1
22.2
22.1
23.7
23.4
26.2
24.4
11.1
12.6
34.0
20.4
35.7
38.1
5.0
50.9
26.0
12.0
227.8
18.2
2.8
264.1
19.8
4.3
297.0
20.8
5.8
369.1
23.5
6.2
472.3
27.0
8.9
501.3
30.3
14.1
560.7
27.3
13.2
539.6
30.9
6.5
561.5
30.6
7.1
603.0
31.9
11.1
Developing countries
Exports
Imports
Trade balance
Income, net
Current transfers, net
Current account balance
Memorandum
Trade balance
Services, net
Balance on goods and services
Income, net
Current transfers, net
Current account balance
Memorandum
Exports of goods and services
Interest payments
Oil trade balance
210
Table 31 (concluded)
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
139.6
133.3
147.3
146.3
145.5
149.8
155.9
133.7
177.9
157.1
208.0
174.9
211.8
187.6
171.7
186.7
182.3
183.7
195.5
198.1
6.3
1.0
4.3
22.2
20.8
33.1
24.2
15.0
1.4
2.6
Services, net
Balance on goods and services
39.7
33.5
28.8
27.8
21.1
25.4
13.0
9.2
12.5
8.3
16.5
16.7
13.5
10.8
3.5
18.5
4.2
5.6
4.2
6.8
Income, net
Current transfers, net
7.9
37.5
8.5
7.6
6.3
10.2
1.1
14.9
3.0
11.6
5.6
11.9
7.7
11.7
8.7
10.4
8.5
9.2
9.4
9.0
63.1
26.8
29.3
4.7
0.2
10.4
6.7
20.2
6.3
6.4
164.7
10.4
91.1
178.7
8.3
99.3
179.1
9.5
89.2
188.8
9.0
88.2
216.1
10.7
97.5
248.8
10.8
118.9
260.8
11.3
116.8
224.4
11.7
81.3
234.4
12.4
88.6
251.9
12.7
94.8
Western Hemisphere
Exports
Imports
126.5
117.7
132.4
142.6
140.2
154.0
162.0
182.5
197.4
201.9
220.1
223.4
243.1
265.3
232.0
275.4
240.6
257.5
270.1
281.7
Trade balance
Services, net
Balance on goods and services
Income, net
Current transfers, net
Current account balance
8.7
10.2
13.8
20.5
4.6
3.2
22.2
43.5
16.9
11.6
9.0
0.3
10.3
20.4
14.4
28.2
14.6
35.1
14.9
19.5
15.2
18.4
17.5
39.7
21.4
64.9
6.5
23.4
7.8
19.4
28.0
11.3
27.0
12.9
29.3
11.7
30.0
13.5
33.3
15.7
35.8
15.5
42.8
15.8
41.3
17.1
51.5
18.4
56.0
19.0
16.9
34.5
45.8
51.6
37.0
38.7
66.7
89.1
56.5
56.5
165.3
35.2
14.8
173.8
33.2
14.2
183.8
34.3
12.2
209.0
36.0
13.4
247.2
43.7
15.2
274.0
45.7
22.3
301.2
48.3
20.1
287.8
51.5
11.6
304.5
55.5
12.5
338.7
58.7
14.9
Memorandum
Exports of goods and services
Interest payments
Oil trade balance
211
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
162.3
118.0
167.1
132.1
161.3
124.1
164.3
110.1
186.4
124.3
224.8
129.1
227.6
140.7
171.4
142.6
187.9
143.3
206.8
151.4
44.3
35.0
37.2
54.2
62.1
95.7
87.0
28.7
44.6
55.5
Services, net
Balance on goods and services
55.7
11.4
46.9
11.9
38.7
1.5
30.8
23.4
32.6
29.6
38.4
57.3
39.9
47.1
28.9
0.1
27.0
17.5
30.1
25.4
Income, net
Current transfers, net
3.3
52.0
1.2
19.7
1.1
21.5
4.4
23.9
4.4
22.4
3.5
22.2
2.3
22.7
1.4
22.6
0.7
21.9
1.0
21.3
60.1
30.3
24.1
4.9
2.8
31.7
22.0
24.2
5.0
3.1
173.9
11.2
132.3
182.1
11.7
139.4
176.3
12.0
125.2
179.9
11.2
123.0
204.2
13.9
137.7
242.8
13.9
172.4
247.8
13.4
170.4
191.6
13.8
118.0
209.5
13.9
129.7
229.2
15.1
143.9
Nonfuel exports
Exports
Imports
384.4
413.0
421.9
472.5
454.9
537.4
546.0
616.4
688.0
751.7
732.5
817.6
808.3
869.5
789.6
813.9
810.9
837.9
881.4
922.7
Trade balance
28.6
50.6
82.5
70.4
63.7
85.1
61.2
24.3
27.0
41.4
Services, net
Balance on goods and services
1.2
29.8
3.8
54.4
10.3
92.9
10.2
80.6
17.9
81.6
12.8
97.8
18.3
79.5
20.2
44.5
5.8
32.8
4.3
45.7
Income, net
Current transfers, net
55.6
46.9
49.4
49.9
51.8
48.0
52.5
49.5
65.4
55.2
65.3
58.9
68.8
64.2
71.7
63.1
84.2
66.5
91.3
68.0
38.5
54.0
96.7
83.7
91.9
104.2
84.1
53.1
50.6
69.0
486.1
68.9
4.0
537.6
65.6
5.6
581.8
67.6
9.0
689.0
71.8
8.5
851.4
84.3
12.0
914.3
89.7
15.2
1,010.6
90.0
17.5
980.9
97.0
12.9
1,017.1
101.2
15.2
1,104.1
105.3
19.5
176.7
171.3
202.7
194.3
225.3
235.6
280.0
278.8
361.4
367.5
372.2
388.0
413.5
394.7
402.5
348.3
411.6
374.9
443.9
412.4
5.5
8.4
10.3
1.2
6.1
15.8
18.8
54.2
36.8
31.5
Services, net
Balance on goods and services
0.8
6.3
1.9
6.6
4.4
14.7
4.1
2.9
11.9
18.1
6.8
22.6
11.8
7.0
7.1
47.1
0.2
36.6
0.8
32.2
20.1
9.2
18.9
11.8
23.9
11.8
23.4
13.7
37.1
16.3
40.9
19.0
44.5
22.1
49.1
18.4
51.8
20.1
55.9
21.3
4.6
0.5
26.8
12.6
38.8
44.5
15.4
16.4
4.9
2.4
204.8
20.7
7.5
236.2
21.6
8.1
265.1
23.5
9.3
330.0
24.3
9.3
420.7
28.9
12.7
438.7
33.6
18.0
486.5
31.1
16.6
470.9
34.2
10.9
486.5
34.4
11.4
525.5
35.4
13.4
Income, net
Current transfers, net
Current account balance
Memorandum
Exports of goods and services
Interest payments
Oil trade balance
212
Table 32 (continued)
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
36.5
38.8
38.0
43.0
38.0
44.9
45.1
50.0
56.5
62.7
59.7
69.2
65.3
74.0
61.4
73.2
64.1
73.0
71.0
79.4
Trade balance
2.4
5.0
6.9
4.9
6.1
9.4
8.6
11.8
8.9
8.4
Services, net
Balance on goods and services
4.1
6.4
4.8
9.9
4.8
11.7
4.3
9.2
5.5
11.6
5.8
15.3
6.4
15.0
6.0
17.7
5.3
14.2
5.7
14.2
10.0
6.2
9.0
7.5
8.7
7.0
10.0
7.5
9.9
7.6
10.4
8.9
10.7
8.5
9.7
9.1
9.9
9.6
10.8
9.7
10.2
11.3
13.5
11.7
13.9
16.8
17.2
18.2
14.5
15.3
44.3
9.0
3.9
46.8
9.1
3.4
47.2
8.9
2.9
55.4
8.8
3.0
69.1
9.5
3.9
73.1
9.0
4.8
79.5
9.2
5.0
76.2
9.5
4.5
79.1
9.6
4.6
87.4
9.7
4.5
14.5
36.8
14.2
38.0
15.1
41.4
16.5
42.9
20.5
50.1
21.6
54.5
23.4
57.5
23.3
60.1
24.1
63.6
26.9
68.1
Trade balance
22.3
23.7
26.3
26.3
29.5
32.9
34.1
36.8
39.5
41.2
Services, net
Balance on goods and services
7.2
15.1
7.8
15.9
8.1
18.2
10.2
16.2
10.7
18.8
12.8
20.1
13.4
20.8
11.5
25.3
13.1
26.4
15.0
26.2
3.2
13.4
0.8
12.9
1.1
13.6
2.3
12.2
1.7
13.1
1.1
12.7
1.0
14.1
0.9
15.0
1.3
15.5
1.7
15.3
4.9
3.8
5.8
6.3
7.5
8.5
7.6
11.3
12.2
12.6
31.4
6.3
33.4
3.6
0.6
36.2
3.5
0.8
39.9
3.3
1.2
45.5
3.4
1.4
48.6
3.2
1.5
51.6
3.1
2.2
51.5
3.0
2.7
54.3
3.2
3.5
59.5
3.3
3.6
156.7
166.2
166.9
197.2
176.5
215.5
204.4
244.8
249.5
271.4
279.0
306.0
306.1
343.3
302.4
332.4
311.0
326.4
339.7
362.8
Income, net
Current transfers, net
Current account balance
Memorandum
Income, net
Current transfers, net
Current account balance
Memorandum
Exports of goods and services
Interest payments
Oil trade balance
Diversified
Exports
Imports
9.5
30.3
39.0
40.4
21.9
27.0
37.2
30.0
15.4
23.2
Services, net
Balance on goods and services
Trade balance
5.1
14.5
5.0
35.2
9.2
48.2
12.0
52.4
11.2
33.1
12.9
39.8
13.5
50.7
18.6
48.6
13.4
28.8
14.4
37.6
Income, net
Current transfers, net
22.2
18.0
20.7
17.6
18.1
15.7
16.7
16.1
16.8
18.2
12.9
18.3
12.6
19.5
12.0
20.7
21.3
21.3
22.9
21.7
18.7
38.3
50.6
53.1
31.6
34.5
43.9
39.9
28.8
38.8
205.6
32.9
7.4
221.2
31.3
6.5
233.3
31.7
4.0
263.7
35.4
5.1
316.1
42.4
6.0
353.8
43.8
9.1
392.9
46.6
6.3
382.3
50.3
5.2
397.1
54.0
4.3
431.8
57.0
2.0
213
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Table 32 (continued)
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
455.3
473.0
492.1
535.0
520.1
593.0
612.0
661.5
761.9
804.3
825.6
871.0
900.9
930.1
858.3
875.7
885.0
900.6
966.6
990.2
17.7
42.9
72.9
49.5
42.4
45.4
29.2
17.4
15.6
23.6
Services, net
Balance on goods and services
13.8
31.4
17.6
60.5
22.7
95.5
21.2
70.7
29.0
71.5
23.9
69.4
30.3
59.5
29.6
47.0
15.0
30.6
14.5
38.2
Income, net
Current transfers, net
66.4
48.5
60.6
52.6
63.0
51.2
63.5
52.3
78.3
57.6
77.1
60.9
80.1
65.5
82.7
64.5
95.7
67.9
104.0
69.7
49.3
68.5
107.4
81.8
92.2
85.6
74.1
65.2
58.4
72.5
562.2
78.3
53.5
613.0
75.6
51.4
652.4
77.9
41.2
760.6
81.1
40.3
931.7
95.8
43.1
1,014.3
100.6
57.1
1,110.4
99.7
53.9
1,056.7
106.8
35.9
1,098.4
111.1
38.7
1,197.0
116.3
44.3
Official financing
Exports
Imports
51.5
62.0
51.6
66.7
51.0
68.5
55.2
71.0
67.1
86.0
77.4
93.7
80.6
95.7
74.4
96.5
76.5
101.5
86.1
106.9
Trade balance
10.5
15.1
17.4
15.8
18.9
16.4
15.1
22.0
25.0
20.8
Services, net
Balance on goods and services
5.0
15.4
4.6
19.6
4.5
21.9
4.6
20.4
5.6
24.5
5.4
21.8
6.3
21.4
4.5
26.6
5.0
30.0
4.9
25.7
Income, net
Current transfers, net
12.7
14.5
12.1
17.2
12.0
16.1
11.5
16.8
11.4
18.2
11.8
19.7
12.6
20.5
12.6
21.3
12.0
20.9
12.7
21.4
13.6
14.5
17.8
15.1
17.7
13.9
13.5
17.8
21.0
17.0
65.0
12.0
8.8
67.0
12.1
8.8
67.2
11.7
6.5
72.7
11.5
5.9
87.0
12.4
7.7
98.6
12.2
11.3
101.7
12.4
11.0
96.3
12.8
4.6
99.3
12.2
4.6
110.7
12.5
7.6
316.8
308.7
346.0
355.1
367.9
400.9
442.6
448.2
558.9
547.3
601.4
587.8
655.1
629.5
620.5
593.4
636.9
604.1
689.5
665.0
8.1
9.1
33.0
5.6
11.6
13.6
25.6
27.1
32.8
24.5
9.7
1.6
14.1
23.1
17.4
50.4
17.1
22.7
21.2
9.6
15.0
1.4
17.1
8.5
15.7
11.3
1.2
31.5
0.8
23.7
36.2
15.9
36.6
18.0
40.7
16.7
43.2
16.7
60.2
19.4
65.1
19.4
69.7
22.4
68.6
22.0
81.4
26.2
87.0
27.5
21.9
41.7
74.4
49.2
50.4
47.2
38.8
35.3
23.7
35.9
385.2
48.3
41.6
423.2
49.0
40.6
454.1
51.2
34.3
538.9
53.7
33.7
669.3
65.6
35.3
724.4
70.3
47.3
792.6
68.6
41.4
750.8
73.5
27.0
777.9
76.0
30.5
842.0
78.8
34.3
Memorandum
Exports of goods and services
Interest payments
Oil trade balance
214
Table 32 (continued)
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
87.0
102.3
94.5
113.3
101.1
123.6
114.3
142.4
135.9
171.0
146.8
189.5
165.2
204.9
163.4
185.8
171.6
195.0
191.0
218.4
Trade balance
15.3
18.8
22.5
28.1
35.1
42.6
39.7
22.5
23.4
27.3
Services, net
Balance on goods and services
0.9
14.4
1.0
17.8
0.8
23.2
0.4
27.7
2.3
37.4
3.5
46.2
6.9
46.6
9.3
31.8
8.7
32.1
8.8
36.1
Income, net
Current transfers, net
17.5
18.2
11.9
17.4
10.3
18.3
8.7
18.8
6.8
20.0
0.2
21.8
2.2
22.6
1.5
21.2
2.3
20.8
4.3
20.9
13.7
12.3
15.2
17.6
24.1
24.6
21.8
12.1
13.7
19.6
112.0
18.0
3.1
122.8
14.4
2.1
131.1
15.0
0.4
149.0
15.8
0.6
175.4
17.8
0.1
191.2
18.1
1.5
216.1
18.7
1.5
209.5
20.6
4.2
221.2
22.9
3.6
244.4
25.1
2.5
144.6
145.3
149.4
153.0
148.8
157.8
163.0
164.5
188.3
209.3
215.6
225.0
232.1
250.4
209.6
246.8
223.8
247.0
257.4
271.3
Diversified financing
Exports
Imports
0.6
3.6
9.0
1.6
20.9
9.4
18.3
37.2
23.2
13.9
Services, net
Balance on goods and services
Trade balance
11.2
11.9
11.4
15.0
13.5
22.5
11.0
12.6
15.9
36.8
15.0
24.4
21.1
39.3
20.2
57.4
15.1
38.3
15.7
29.6
Income, net
Current transfers, net
34.6
21.8
28.7
23.6
30.5
23.6
27.9
23.7
27.6
24.8
25.6
24.6
28.1
24.4
34.4
25.5
37.3
26.3
41.1
26.4
24.7
20.1
29.4
16.7
39.6
25.5
43.1
66.4
49.3
44.2
173.8
35.1
51.4
182.2
31.3
50.3
183.2
32.5
43.5
201.1
30.3
42.4
230.5
35.7
46.9
262.7
36.5
62.1
283.9
37.2
60.5
256.8
38.8
40.0
273.3
42.0
44.3
312.2
43.9
53.4
310.7
327.7
342.7
382.1
371.2
435.2
449.1
497.0
573.6
595.1
610.0
646.0
668.8
679.7
648.7
628.9
661.2
653.7
709.2
718.9
Trade balance
17.0
39.4
63.9
47.9
21.5
36.0
10.9
19.8
7.5
9.7
Services, net
Balance on goods and services
2.5
19.5
6.2
45.6
9.1
73.1
10.2
58.2
13.2
34.7
8.9
44.9
9.2
20.2
9.4
10.4
0.1
7.7
1.1
8.6
Income, net
Current transfers, net
31.7
26.7
31.9
29.0
32.5
27.6
35.6
28.7
50.7
32.8
51.5
36.3
52.0
41.2
48.3
39.0
58.3
41.6
63.0
43.3
24.5
48.5
78.0
65.1
52.7
60.1
31.0
1.1
9.1
28.2
388.4
43.2
2.1
430.8
44.3
1.2
469.2
45.4
2.3
559.5
50.9
2.1
701.2
60.1
3.8
751.6
64.1
5.0
826.5
62.5
6.6
799.9
68.0
4.2
825.2
69.1
5.6
884.8
72.5
9.1
215
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Table 32 (concluded)
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
26.6
29.8
26.7
31.5
25.9
32.9
29.5
34.8
36.5
42.4
42.0
48.4
44.9
49.7
42.7
50.7
45.7
54.2
51.4
57.9
Other groups
Heavily indebted poor countries
Exports
Imports
Trade balance
3.2
4.8
6.9
5.3
6.0
6.4
4.9
8.0
8.4
6.5
Services, net
Balance on goods and services
4.6
7.8
5.0
9.8
4.7
11.7
4.2
9.5
5.3
11.2
6.0
12.4
6.2
11.1
5.9
13.8
6.2
14.6
6.5
13.0
10.0
5.9
8.8
6.7
8.8
6.4
8.7
8.0
9.0
8.0
9.7
8.9
9.6
8.4
9.2
9.3
9.7
9.6
10.4
9.5
11.9
11.8
14.0
10.2
12.3
13.3
12.3
13.8
14.8
14.0
33.3
7.7
2.2
34.1
7.7
2.7
33.3
7.6
1.7
37.4
7.1
1.5
45.8
7.4
2.0
51.9
7.6
2.6
54.8
7.3
3.6
53.2
7.3
1.4
56.8
7.4
2.5
63.4
7.3
3.9
16.0
25.6
15.6
26.4
16.5
27.3
18.8
28.4
22.7
33.3
24.4
36.2
26.7
37.6
25.6
39.0
27.3
42.1
30.6
44.8
9.6
10.8
10.8
9.6
10.5
11.8
10.8
13.5
14.9
14.2
2.8
12.3
2.8
13.6
2.8
13.7
2.3
11.9
3.1
13.7
2.9
14.7
2.8
13.6
3.2
16.7
3.5
18.4
3.8
18.0
3.3
6.4
2.3
7.3
1.8
7.4
3.6
9.1
3.5
9.3
3.8
9.7
3.8
9.4
3.7
9.7
3.7
9.8
3.9
9.6
9.3
8.6
8.1
6.5
7.9
8.8
7.9
10.6
12.4
12.3
20.4
3.4
2.7
20.5
3.4
2.5
21.5
3.2
2.6
24.0
3.3
2.7
28.5
3.5
3.4
30.3
3.4
3.8
33.0
3.5
3.6
32.2
3.5
3.7
34.4
3.7
3.8
38.4
3.3
3.5
146.2
130.7
151.8
143.5
148.2
139.6
152.2
132.6
172.7
146.9
200.2
155.7
204.7
162.4
162.7
165.9
177.6
168.1
191.9
178.4
Income, net
Current transfers, net
Current account balance
Memorandum
Trade balance
Services, net
Balance on goods and services
Income, net
Current transfers, net
Current account balance
Memorandum
Exports of goods and services
Interest payments
Oil trade balance
Middle East and north Africa
Exports
Imports
15.5
8.2
8.6
19.6
25.8
44.5
42.3
3.1
9.5
13.5
Services, net
Balance on goods and services
Trade balance
45.7
30.2
34.3
26.1
27.4
18.9
17.7
1.9
18.3
7.6
21.5
23.0
22.2
20.1
14.8
17.9
11.8
2.3
13.0
0.5
Income, net
Current transfers, net
3.7
38.2
5.0
6.8
2.5
9.2
1.8
13.4
1.2
11.4
0.6
11.3
2.6
11.6
3.5
11.0
4.2
9.8
4.2
9.5
64.7
27.9
25.5
13.3
5.0
12.3
11.1
25.5
7.9
4.8
165.8
11.9
105.8
177.7
9.9
113.1
175.2
10.6
102.2
180.7
9.7
100.1
204.3
11.8
110.8
233.6
12.3
135.7
240.4
12.4
134.2
198.3
12.4
95.3
215.9
12.6
103.4
232.3
13.0
111.7
216
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
98.6
84.3
120.8
88.6
89.1
72.6
62.1
77.3
55.6
66.0
98.6
84.3
120.8
88.6
89.1
72.6
62.1
77.3
55.6
66.0
12.3
152.8
14.6
51.9
3.7
137.4
9.4
47.3
4.7
171.5
8.0
47.4
4.1
141.8
13.9
43.4
5.4
180.8
29.6
67.5
8.8
170.6
11.7
95.2
7.5
151.0
28.4
68.0
7.5
91.4
21.9
0.3
5.9
81.0
13.3
18.0
9.1
109.0
11.2
41.0
124.9
25.6
100.5
31.1
134.1
34.1
103.7
28.3
134.5
22.2
147.4
20.4
124.4
5.7
58.6
18.4
49.0
24.6
94.4
12.6
15.9
8.3
13.9
6.5
0.3
17.2
12.4
1.8
22.6
6.3
1.2
25.5
5.0
0.9
19.8
4.1
5.5
24.7
4.2
3.5
15.5
0.2
1.9
5.3
...
...
...
...
...
...
51.9
47.3
47.4
43.4
67.5
95.2
68.0
0.3
18.0
41.0
98.6
51.9
84.3
47.3
120.8
47.4
88.6
43.4
89.1
67.5
72.6
95.2
62.1
68.0
77.3
0.3
55.6
18.0
66.0
41.0
Developing countries
Balance of payments
Balance on current account
Balance on capital and
financial account
By balance of payments component
Capital transfers1
Net financial flows
Errors and omissions, net
Change in reserves ( = increase)
By type of financing flow
External financing
Balance on current account
Change in reserves ( = increase)2
Asset transactions, including
net errors and omissions3
Total, net external financing4
Non-debt-creating flows, net
Capital transfers1
Direct investment and portfolio
investment equity flows
Net credit and loans from IMF5
Net external borrowing6
Borrowing from official
creditors7
Borrowing from banks8
Other borrowing9
11.0
22.4
25.2
20.4
57.1
52.3
119.3
108.2
80.7
72.3
139.5
154.0
193.3
152.4
213.8
220.1
249.4
185.1
154.3
179.2
44.7
43.1
83.0
101.6
102.0
134.2
151.2
129.6
119.3
127.1
12.3
3.7
4.7
4.1
5.4
8.8
7.5
7.5
5.9
9.1
32.4
39.5
78.4
97.5
96.6
125.4
143.7
122.1
113.5
118.0
1.1
93.6
0.4
111.3
0.1
110.4
0.8
51.5
12.6
99.2
2.9
88.9
0.8
97.4
8.5
47.1
...
32.7
...
59.5
26.5
21.4
45.7
20.1
18.9
72.3
21.9
0.4
88.9
19.7
18.3
50.2
38.8
16.8
43.6
15.3
15.3
88.8
0.6
20.7
76.1
19.2
15.3
12.5
16.1
5.1
21.8
4.3
6.2
57.6
1.2
1.7
2.1
1.3
1.1
0.8
0.6
0.8
0.3
0.4
94.8
234.3
188.4
114.4
268.4
225.7
129.6
322.9
240.0
136.3
288.7
187.9
159.8
373.5
258.9
195.4
415.5
284.3
217.6
467.1
315.0
227.9
413.0
274.9
235.7
390.0
268.5
212.2
391.4
271.7
4.9
1.7
5.4
3.8
2.9
16.7
26.3
25.1
16.1
20.2
4.9
1.7
5.4
3.8
2.9
16.7
26.3
25.1
16.1
20.2
1.5
0.6
18.7
13.0
3.9
6.7
7.2
1.6
4.1
19.0
8.5
9.3
2.1
5.4
4.8
6.4
1.0
35.7
3.8
37.6
0.9
14.0
2.5
0.6
9.8
31.3
5.0
9.8
0.8
24.0
2.4
2.1
1.0
23.5
1.1
7.4
1.3
30.7
0.4
11.5
Memorandum
Balance on goods and services
in percent of GDP10
Scheduled amortization
of external debt
Gross external financing11
Gross external borrowing11
Countries in transition
Balance of payments
Balance on current account
Balance on capital and
financial account
By balance of payments component
Capital transfers1
Net financial flows
Errors and omissions, net
Change in reserves ( = increase)
217
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Table 33 (concluded)
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
32.2
14.4
17.6
20.9
8.6
23.3
14.8
17.4
24.7
15.8
8.8
8.5
33.1
3.0
23.9
3.4
3.2
20.3
23.8
7.8
0.1
0.2
2.9
7.3
2.4
9.5
2.1
2.1
16.7
3.1
14.8
12.4
0.2
26.7
1.0
0.9
8.5
0.3
1.9
0.7
1.9
...
...
...
...
...
...
13.0
1.6
9.3
6.4
37.6
0.6
9.8
2.1
7.4
11.5
4.9
13.0
1.7
1.6
5.4
9.3
3.8
6.4
2.9
37.6
16.7
0.6
26.3
9.8
25.1
2.1
16.1
7.4
20.2
11.5
19.4
9.8
1.7
5.0
18.3
4.6
15.6
14.0
12.5
10.6
External financing
Balance on current account
Change in reserves ( = increase)2
Asset transactions, including
net errors and omissions3
Total, net external
financing4
1.6
13.2
16.4
7.6
22.2
22.0
51.7
41.3
36.0
42.2
3.8
8.1
10.1
7.7
14.6
14.5
30.8
21.1
23.2
25.2
transfers1
1.5
3.9
4.1
2.1
1.0
0.9
9.8
0.8
1.0
1.3
2.3
4.2
6.0
5.6
13.6
13.6
21.0
20.3
22.2
23.9
2.4
4.6
1.6
3.6
3.7
2.6
2.4
2.5
4.7
2.9
3.7
3.7
2.5
18.5
5.5
14.7
...
13.9
...
18.2
9.3
6.1
7.8
3.6
1.2
1.2
0.7
7.4
4.2
10.5
4.2
3.8
9.1
1.7
13.6
2.4
2.9
3.2
8.2
4.9
5.4
10.8
3.1
0.8
1.9
0.9
11.1
1.1
2.0
15.2
0.6
0.3
1.9
0.4
0.6
2.0
2.7
2.6
1.4
1.8
32.9
34.5
28.3
31.0
44.1
34.5
26.3
42.7
28.9
26.6
34.2
24.1
28.6
50.9
31.5
29.2
51.1
32.9
24.5
76.2
43.0
33.0
74.3
47.7
36.3
72.3
50.2
39.6
81.8
57.8
Capital
Direct investment and portfolio
investment equity flows
Net credit and loans from
Net external borrowing6
IMF5
Memorandum
Balance on goods and services
in percent of GDP10
Scheduled amortization
of external debt
Gross external financing11
Gross external borrowing11
1Comprise debt forgiveness as well as all other identified transactions on capital account as defined in the fifth edition of the IMFs Balance of Payments
Manual (1993).
2Positioned here to reflect the discretionary nature of many countries transactions in reserves.
3Include changes in recorded private external assets (mainly portfolio investment), export credit, the collateral for debt-reduction operations, and balance
of payments net errors and omissions.
4Equals, with opposite sign, the sum of transactions listed above. It is the amount required to finance the deficit on goods and services, income, and current transfers; the increase in the official reserve level; the net asset transactions; and the transactions underlying net errors and omissions.
5Comprise use of IMF resources under the General Resources Account, Trust Fund, Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF), and Enhanced Structural
Adjustment Facility (ESAF). For further detail, see Table 37.
6Net disbursement of long- and short-term credits (including exceptional financing) by both official and private creditors.
7Net disbursements by official creditors (other than monetary authorities) based on directly reported flows and flows derived from statistics on debt stocks.
The estimates include the increase in official claims caused by the transfer of officially guaranteed claims to the guarantor agency in the creditor country, usually in the context of debt rescheduling.
8Net disbursements by commercial banks based on directly reported flows and on cross-border claims and liabilities reported in the International Banking
section of the IMFs International Financial Statistics.
9Includes primary bond issues and loans on the international capital markets. Since the estimates are residually derived, they also reflect any underrecording or misclassification of official and commercial bank credits above.
10This is often referred to as the resource balance and, with opposite sign, the net resource transfer.
11Net external financing/borrowing (see footnotes 4 and 6, respectively) plus amortization due on external debt.
218
Table 34. Developing Countriesby Region: Balance of Payments and External Financing1
(Billions of U.S. dollars)
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
7.4
3.0
10.3
0.3
11.6
2.2
11.9
5.6
16.1
0.7
6.2
10.1
7.1
14.2
18.8
2.5
18.8
1.4
15.2
8.2
9.7
12.1
10.2
1.3
3.2
5.7
4.1
6.4
5.4
4.2
20.0
22.0
24.1
18.7
20.0
22.0
25.4
27.7
25.6
27.5
3.9
0.2
15.9
9.1
3.5
3.3
2.3
0.2
20.0
12.1
1.6
6.3
4.3
0.2
19.6
8.3
4.0
7.3
4.1
0.9
13.7
13.5
3.6
3.4
4.5
0.8
14.7
11.7
2.5
5.6
11.2
0.6
10.2
0.2
0.2
9.7
11.6
0.5
14.3
4.7
1.1
20.0
8.1
0.5
20.1
2.2
1.0
18.9
11.5
...
14.1
4.8
0.6
9.9
16.6
...
11.5
3.5
0.3
15.3
15.2
11.4
15.6
15.6
18.0
11.6
16.9
15.7
14.2
14.9
9.4
19.0
14.7
14.4
15.3
5.0
16.5
5.7
14.8
1.5
8.6
1.6
9.8
0.9
10.6
2.1
8.7
3.5
11.9
1.9
6.9
7.2
9.8
9.6
16.8
3.2
17.5
1.9
14.0
7.2
2.3
3.8
2.6
0.3
3.5
5.8
6.9
6.9
5.4
4.2
12.5
12.7
15.4
12.5
17.3
19.9
26.3
26.9
24.8
25.4
3.4
9.1
6.5
0.1
2.8
1.2
11.4
9.8
3.2
4.9
3.2
0.7
11.5
5.6
0.1
5.9
3.0
0.5
9.0
7.0
0.6
1.3
3.8
0.6
12.9
6.8
0.9
5.3
10.2
0.1
9.7
0.3
0.6
9.3
9.9
0.5
16.9
1.2
1.2
19.3
6.4
0.3
20.8
3.2
0.7
18.2
9.6
...
15.0
4.8
0.5
9.6
14.9
...
10.8
4.6
0.5
14.9
7.7
10.4
6.3
15.0
9.3
11.6
10.8
10.0
11.6
9.2
7.5
14.4
15.7
11.2
14.7
4.0
15.8
5.2
12.7
1.3
11.1
27.1
12.6
14.7
34.0
26.3
20.4
40.3
35.7
33.5
38.1
39.7
5.0
29.1
50.9
23.0
26.0
17.7
12.0
24.8
Africa
Balance on current account
Change in reserves ( = increase)
Asset transactions, including
net errors and omissions
Memorandum
Net financial flows
Exceptional financing
Sub-Sahara
Balance on current account
Change in reserves ( = increase)
Asset transactions, including
net errors and omissions
Memorandum
Net financial flows
Exceptional financing2
Asia
Balance on current account
Change in reserves ( = increase)
Asset transactions, including
net errors and omissions
7.7
10.1
11.9
17.7
35.3
30.7
91.4
76.9
60.5
49.5
45.9
37.4
72.3
78.4
104.5
108.5
115.5
49.0
52.3
62.2
12.6
1.9
31.4
10.6
10.4
10.4
17.4
1.3
18.7
10.8
6.0
1.9
35.5
0.6
36.2
10.3
11.3
14.6
47.9
0.8
31.3
10.8
19.8
0.7
50.4
1.5
55.6
7.3
19.2
29.1
58.5
1.7
51.7
0.6
26.8
25.4
62.2
5.0
48.3
14.2
20.7
13.4
57.1
6.6
14.6
13.8
2.8
25.6
41.0
...
8.5
8.0
8.2
8.6
40.8
...
20.9
1.3
1.4
18.2
42.4
2.4
29.7
2.2
63.1
0.8
71.7
1.2
94.2
0.5
93.5
0.8
51.4
8.1
10.0
12.0
0.9
18.8
22.8
10.6
Memorandum
Net financial flows
Exceptional financing
219
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Table 34 (concluded)
Asia excluding China and India
Balance on current account
Change in reserves ( = increase)
Asset transactions, including
net errors and omissions
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
20.6
10.2
16.1
15.4
20.6
17.8
24.5
4.2
39.3
12.1
40.4
4.4
24.4
11.0
22.7
12.7
18.4
16.3
7.3
12.0
1.2
0.1
2.7
9.2
7.9
1.7
27.3
17.2
9.9
3.5
32.1
31.4
41.2
37.9
59.3
46.4
40.7
7.3
7.8
8.1
9.0
0.2
22.9
6.4
6.6
9.9
10.0
0.1
21.3
4.8
1.9
14.6
11.8
0.1
29.3
4.4
3.4
21.5
15.0
0.4
22.5
2.0
8.3
12.2
14.7
0.3
44.8
3.3
11.8
29.8
16.4
0.4
30.5
2.4
25.5
7.4
17.2
5.7
17.8
17.2
16.2
15.5
13.3
7.0
13.0
8.3
3.0
18.3
10.4
...
5.8
6.1
15.1
3.2
7.9
...
0.4
2.5
9.2
11.2
29.1
2.4
27.3
2.2
34.8
0.8
32.7
1.2
50.0
0.5
42.4
0.8
17.8
8.1
11.0
12.0
3.7
18.8
3.7
10.6
63.1
4.4
26.8
10.3
29.3
2.4
4.7
1.7
0.2
7.9
10.4
17.3
6.7
10.2
20.2
12.9
6.3
5.6
6.4
4.0
38.0
7.5
3.1
1.2
6.0
2.5
10.2
9.7
5.2
6.5
29.5
29.6
29.9
5.2
14.1
9.4
13.7
17.0
17.2
16.8
9.7
19.9
4.0
4.3
11.5
1.5
0.1
28.1
1.2
11.8
17.5
4.2
25.8
2.5
0.6
22.6
6.3
0.4
1.5
1.2
11.1
10.8
8.2
0.4
5.5
1.2
2.6
9.3
3.6
0.1
5.7
0.8
7.3
13.9
5.4
0.2
8.1
0.6
0.9
7.8
5.9
0.1
11.3
0.9
9.6
2.6
6.4
...
11.1
1.5
3.5
9.1
10.3
...
6.5
1.8
0.9
7.5
68.4
1.3
38.2
3.3
28.3
14.2
12.4
4.8
4.6
3.9
2.1
0.3
7.2
0.4
8.1
0.5
11.7
0.5
8.9
16.9
17.4
34.5
22.6
45.8
21.3
51.6
4.2
37.0
25.5
38.7
28.1
66.7
14.5
89.1
12.9
56.5
6.7
56.5
4.1
9.5
7.8
0.1
2.6
12.7
13.4
13.7
15.2
9.5
12.1
Memorandum
Net financial flows
Exceptional financing
Memorandum
Net financial flows
Exceptional financing
Western Hemisphere
Balance on current account
Change in reserves ( = increase)
Asset transactions, including
net errors and omissions
Total, net external financing
43.9
64.9
67.0
50.1
75.2
80.2
94.9
91.4
59.2
72.6
12.0
1.0
32.9
2.7
3.2
27.0
14.4
1.6
52.1
1.7
0.4
54.3
12.6
0.9
55.3
0.7
16.3
70.9
23.5
1.3
27.8
3.4
30.6
61.8
23.3
12.9
39.0
21.1
2.7
15.2
39.8
2.0
42.4
14.1
4.4
60.9
52.5
4.0
46.3
8.4
0.2
54.4
48.4
2.5
40.4
4.1
9.6
26.7
43.1
...
16.5
4.8
0.1
11.6
43.3
...
36.8
0.1
4.2
32.8
26.8
13.1
53.9
10.0
62.1
7.5
40.7
6.5
67.8
2.8
65.6
0.9
77.8
1.1
77.9
0.8
51.9
0.3
62.6
0.4
Memorandum
Net financial flows
Exceptional financing
1For
220
Table 35. Developing Countriesby Analytical Criteria: Balance of Payments and External Financing1
(Billions of U.S. dollars)
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
60.1
1.2
30.3
0.4
24.1
11.3
4.9
2.9
2.8
1.4
31.7
23.2
22.0
13.2
24.2
17.6
5.0
2.1
3.1
4.1
30.3
2.7
12.1
11.3
8.4
9.0
8.4
11.5
8.1
10.1
30.9
32.6
24.9
13.2
4.2
0.6
0.4
18.1
11.1
11.1
3.2
0.5
27.2
8.0
7.4
11.8
0.9
0.5
32.2
7.5
10.7
14.0
0.7
0.8
24.9
3.3
5.7
16.0
4.3
0.4
8.5
9.0
2.3
1.8
5.4
0.2
1.0
5.7
9.3
2.6
9.0
0.7
9.1
1.5
11.7
4.1
9.9
0.3
10.0
2.2
2.5
5.3
9.4
0.6
9.2
1.2
5.1
2.9
9.8
...
1.8
0.4
2.2
14.3
...
2.5
0.3
1.0
1.3
81.4
4.8
43.7
10.3
25.8
17.3
14.1
14.1
2.5
12.5
13.2
13.5
6.8
7.5
4.9
6.4
4.7
2.5
1.7
1.0
38.5
50.7
54.0
47.7
96.7
58.7
83.7
46.3
91.9
68.9
104.2
71.9
84.1
54.9
53.1
17.3
50.6
20.0
69.0
36.9
Memorandum
Net financial flows
Exceptional financing
Nonfuel
Balance on current account
Change in reserves ( = increase)
Asset transactions, including
net errors and omissions
19.3
19.8
13.1
9.1
48.7
43.3
110.9
96.7
72.6
62.2
108.5
121.4
168.4
139.1
209.5
219.5
249.8
167.1
143.2
168.1
35.0
0.6
72.9
18.5
13.9
40.5
34.6
86.7
12.5
8.2
66.0
55.9
0.6
112.0
18.5
6.0
99.4
77.6
1.2
62.8
10.7
16.0
68.1
80.9
12.8
115.8
33.1
26.0
56.7
104.0
3.6
119.1
13.8
27.1
105.8
121.8
1.2
126.9
2.7
23.3
100.9
110.1
9.1
47.9
18.0
10.2
19.7
92.2
...
48.3
16.1
4.7
37.0
96.7
...
78.2
4.0
7.2
75.0
71.4
20.8
93.6
20.8
145.6
16.8
127.6
14.2
183.3
9.6
183.9
6.9
157.8
1.8
86.5
12.0
76.3
22.0
107.4
11.6
49.3
1.4
15.8
4.5
13.4
7.8
6.8
3.2
3.1
1.0
13.0
7.5
12.0
7.8
12.0
11.3
2.8
1.0
6.5
2.3
Memorandum
Net financial flows
Exceptional financing
37.8
6.3
4.9
3.4
10.1
7.2
5.6
9.0
6.6
7.6
12.9
14.0
10.5
7.0
6.1
1.7
1.3
9.7
4.9
3.3
0.4
12.5
0.1
1.0
11.5
0.7
14.6
7.0
7.6
10.5
0.3
2.4
7.8
2.3
4.7
0.2
2.4
6.8
2.2
3.9
0.1
1.1
4.8
0.3
2.0
0.9
5.2
6.4
2.0
0.6
0.6
1.9
3.1
2.0
7.7
0.5
6.0
1.2
2.2
...
2.7
1.0
1.1
2.6
5.1
...
1.7
1.3
0.3
0.2
62.8
25.4
11.1
10.5
0.5
5.0
2.7
1.0
0.8
3.4
Memorandum
Net financial flows
Exceptional financing
221
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Table 35 (continued)
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
49.3
50.5
68.5
42.8
107.4
55.2
81.8
46.6
92.2
68.5
85.6
87.7
74.1
60.3
65.2
11.0
58.4
17.0
72.5
38.7
26.8
28.7
20.3
16.9
47.0
45.2
113.7
99.2
74.0
64.7
126.5
140.0
182.8
145.4
207.7
218.4
248.1
175.4
149.4
175.9
37.7
1.1
87.7
26.4
20.4
40.8
36.2
0.4
104.3
20.0
11.9
72.3
56.5
0.1
126.4
21.5
2.8
107.6
79.5
0.8
66.6
19.5
15.9
63.1
84.2
12.6
110.9
38.7
17.8
54.5
113.4
2.9
108.0
16.1
20.6
103.6
129.7
0.8
117.6
18.8
98.8
117.5
8.5
49.4
18.7
9.3
21.3
99.7
...
47.5
17.1
6.2
36.6
105.9
...
77.4
3.0
6.5
73.9
90.1
25.6
111.9
31.1
160.3
34.1
131.3
28.3
180.3
22.2
175.6
20.4
153.7
5.7
90.4
18.4
81.8
24.6
112.5
12.6
13.6
4.3
14.5
0.2
17.8
15.1
5.2
17.7
2.4
13.9
5.2
13.5
4.3
17.8
1.2
21.0
0.9
17.0
5.2
0.6
0.9
1.8
1.8
0.7
1.1
1.1
0.9
0.1
1.6
18.5
13.9
16.0
18.5
20.9
20.2
16.7
18.1
22.1
20.7
5.3
0.2
13.0
9.1
0.6
4.5
4.9
0.3
8.7
12.7
4.0
7.4
0.3
9.0
7.7
0.6
1.8
8.3
0.8
9.4
8.8
0.1
0.7
9.8
0.6
10.5
8.8
0.4
1.3
11.7
8.4
4.7
0.4
3.4
14.0
0.1
2.8
0.5
0.4
2.6
10.8
7.3
2.7
0.2
4.3
11.3
...
10.3
6.0
0.7
5.0
16.1
...
5.4
5.4
0.4
10.4
12.6
12.0
8.6
15.1
11.7
11.3
17.0
10.6
15.2
9.7
15.0
9.6
12.6
2.6
12.3
9.4
17.3
8.6
12.9
4.3
21.9
34.1
41.7
31.2
74.4
40.5
49.2
30.2
50.4
59.4
47.2
72.2
38.8
42.5
35.3
0.5
23.7
11.5
35.9
32.8
Memorandum
Net financial flows
Exceptional financing
Official financing
Balance on current account
Change in reserves ( = increase)
Asset transactions, including
net errors and omissions
Memorandum
Net financial flows
Exceptional financing
Private financing
Balance on current account
Change in reserves ( = increase)
Asset transactions, including
net errors and omissions
25.3
37.8
28.9
17.7
41.6
43.7
114.9
103.8
73.9
66.5
81.3
110.7
143.8
97.1
151.4
163.0
196.2
138.6
109.0
135.2
20.2
1.2
62.3
12.2
16.7
33.4
25.9
1.9
86.7
3.2
13.4
70.1
41.7
0.4
102.5
6.4
1.6
97.6
61.7
0.2
35.6
7.7
23.8
51.7
60.4
13.7
77.2
28.9
8.3
40.0
82.6
1.0
81.5
7.3
0.5
89.4
102.9
1.5
94.8
10.7
1.4
104.1
96.0
2.5
40.1
10.8
4.8
24.6
76.8
...
32.7
8.2
0.7
25.2
78.5
...
64.2
3.1
6.6
54.5
60.5
13.5
89.3
12.1
126.9
18.3
87.0
14.5
135.9
10.6
132.0
4.3
107.1
2.1
58.5
2.0
47.3
0.3
80.8
0.5
Memorandum
Net financial flows
Exceptional financing
222
Table 35 (continued)
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
13.7
12.1
12.3
11.3
15.2
14.7
17.6
11.2
24.1
6.7
24.6
10.3
21.8
13.5
12.1
10.3
13.7
4.5
19.6
0.7
0.9
8.2
6.9
1.1
4.7
0.3
0.1
3.7
0.1
0.2
26.8
15.5
23.0
29.9
35.4
35.2
35.2
18.7
18.3
20.0
12.2
2.2
12.4
5.1
4.3
3.0
5.4
1.2
8.9
4.1
2.6
2.3
7.5
0.6
15.0
7.4
0.6
8.2
9.6
1.4
21.7
3.0
8.0
10.7
13.9
1.7
23.2
0.9
9.1
13.2
19.1
1.9
18.0
13.5
20.7
10.8
12.8
2.5
20.0
10.1
17.8
7.9
10.7
6.1
2.0
5.2
4.3
7.5
11.7
...
4.5
2.9
4.8
6.4
11.3
...
7.8
0.7
0.5
9.0
16.9
0.1
14.1
3.8
21.7
4.5
27.3
3.1
29.3
1.8
28.7
6.5
33.9
1.0
19.6
6.9
17.2
15.6
18.8
7.8
24.7
8.0
20.1
15.3
29.4
10.9
16.7
17.1
39.6
17.5
25.5
34.5
43.1
0.3
66.4
17.9
49.3
4.2
44.2
4.4
13.2
8.2
5.6
3.1
0.5
4.0
0.2
8.9
3.3
1.5
45.9
43.5
46.0
36.9
57.6
64.0
43.2
57.4
48.4
50.2
15.7
30.2
10.6
6.1
13.5
9.3
0.9
35.1
7.8
1.6
25.7
10.2
1.0
36.8
7.2
3.6
33.2
13.5
0.8
22.7
11.5
37.3
48.5
18.2
0.1
39.4
10.4
6.2
35.2
33.7
0.5
29.7
2.1
4.2
36.0
39.3
0.4
3.5
1.4
3.7
8.5
40.6
4.8
12.0
5.4
1.3
5.2
38.2
...
5.8
10.7
5.1
0.2
41.5
...
14.2
2.5
1.5
18.1
27.1
21.1
37.1
28.5
37.1
32.4
29.4
27.1
46.4
21.6
51.0
20.1
36.4
5.1
48.1
6.1
43.3
6.0
40.9
2.0
24.5
42.5
48.5
27.5
78.0
44.2
65.1
29.5
52.7
51.0
60.1
53.2
31.0
60.0
1.1
28.9
9.1
21.1
28.2
34.3
13.6
20.5
14.6
13.8
46.5
41.1
113.9
90.3
70.7
63.2
80.6
96.5
136.8
108.5
150.1
154.4
204.9
118.0
101.0
125.7
22.0
1.1
57.4
15.8
14.3
27.4
26.9
0.4
69.2
12.3
10.3
46.6
46.3
0.9
89.6
14.3
0.9
74.4
66.1
1.5
43.9
7.9
21.4
14.6
66.0
12.7
71.5
28.3
24.0
19.2
79.6
3.5
78.3
14.1
24.8
67.5
90.4
0.4
114.1
1.4
22.5
90.2
76.9
3.7
37.4
13.3
8.0
16.1
61.5
...
41.6
6.4
1.2
36.4
64.4
...
63.2
0.5
7.9
55.8
63.0
4.5
74.9
2.6
123.2
1.7
101.8
1.2
134.0
0.5
124.6
0.3
117.2
0.6
42.3
12.2
38.4
18.6
71.6
10.6
Diversified financing
Balance on current account
Change in reserves ( = increase)
Asset transactions, including
net errors and omissions
Total, net external financing
Non-debt-creating flows, net
Net credit and loans from IMF
Net external borrowing
From official creditors
From banks
Other
Memorandum
Net financial flows
Exceptional financing
Memorandum
Net financial flows
Exceptional financing
Memorandum
Net financial flows
Exceptional financing
223
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Table 35 (concluded)
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
11.9
1.0
11.8
0.2
14.0
1.8
10.2
2.6
12.3
1.7
13.3
4.2
12.3
1.4
13.8
0.4
14.8
1.0
14.0
1.2
Other groups
Heavily indebted poor countries
Balance on current account
Change in reserves ( = increase)
Asset transactions, including
net errors and omissions
1.0
1.2
2.3
0.5
0.2
1.7
1.8
0.3
0.1
1.5
13.8
10.4
9.9
12.3
14.2
15.8
11.9
13.7
15.7
13.7
4.5
0.1
9.3
4.9
1.1
3.3
3.8
6.7
5.5
0.3
0.9
5.9
0.2
4.3
3.4
0.9
5.3
0.5
6.5
4.9
1.0
0.5
7.0
0.6
6.6
5.9
0.7
0.1
13.0
0.3
2.5
0.5
0.8
2.2
9.6
2.3
0.4
1.0
3.7
7.7
0.2
5.8
2.5
0.7
4.0
8.6
...
7.0
4.4
0.2
2.8
12.7
...
1.3
4.2
1.1
6.6
8.8
10.9
7.4
12.1
6.7
10.2
10.3
9.8
10.0
8.4
8.4
11.6
8.3
0.5
8.7
1.7
11.7
4.1
6.0
1.5
9.3
1.6
8.6
0.6
8.1
1.5
6.5
2.4
7.9
1.6
8.8
2.6
7.9
1.6
10.6
0.7
12.4
0.8
12.3
1.0
0.4
0.9
0.4
1.4
0.3
0.6
0.1
1.0
Memorandum
Net financial flows
Exceptional financing
Least developed countries
Balance on current account
Change in reserves ( = increase)
Asset transactions, including
net errors and omissions
Total, net external financing
10.8
8.9
8.8
8.8
9.9
9.9
9.9
10.8
13.3
12.3
3.4
0.1
7.4
3.4
1.1
2.9
3.3
0.2
5.3
2.9
0.2
2.6
4.1
0.1
4.8
2.5
0.1
2.4
2.9
0.2
5.7
5.6
0.4
0.5
4.1
0.5
5.2
4.5
0.3
0.5
4.6
0.1
5.3
2.4
0.4
2.4
6.5
0.1
3.2
2.7
0.2
0.7
5.9
0.1
4.8
1.5
3.3
6.6
...
6.5
3.6
2.9
11.5
...
1.3
5.5
0.6
7.3
4.4
5.4
2.2
6.4
1.9
5.8
2.7
5.5
4.0
4.4
6.5
3.2
3.9
6.1
5.5
5.1
10.1
2.6
11.7
0.8
64.7
6.5
27.9
9.4
25.5
2.9
13.3
2.8
5.0
2.1
12.3
16.0
11.1
11.7
25.5
13.9
7.9
1.4
4.8
0.9
Memorandum
Net financial flows
Exceptional financing
Middle East and north Africa
Balance on current account
Change in reserves ( = increase)
Asset transactions, including
net errors and omissions
33.1
4.1
4.5
2.8
5.3
2.6
4.9
4.1
5.3
38.2
33.2
27.1
18.9
12.4
3.7
3.2
16.4
10.7
11.0
9.5
0.2
28.5
4.9
9.1
14.6
1.7
0.1
31.7
1.9
14.6
15.2
4.6
0.5
23.0
2.7
2.3
18.0
6.7
0.5
11.6
6.9
1.1
5.9
8.0
0.2
4.2
4.4
7.9
7.8
3.8
0.6
0.7
0.6
10.7
9.3
6.4
0.3
3.5
3.4
1.3
1.2
7.0
0.1
9.5
0.7
6.0
4.2
7.5
...
3.3
1.0
0.4
4.6
11.2
...
0.3
1.4
1.8
79.5
1.1
45.1
5.5
29.4
15.6
23.2
11.9
4.4
11.2
2.9
5.6
0.8
5.1
10.2
3.1
6.1
2.4
4.0
1.7
Memorandum
Net financial flows
Exceptional financing
1For
224
1992
1993
1994
1995
246.2
261.3
307.9
362.3
432.5
21.3
15.6
95.2
46.7
63.5
66.2
18.5
12.3
86.9
59.4
66.8
89.1
19.8
13.5
109.7
75.9
69.3
109.2
24.9
16.1
158.2
84.3
74.1
105.1
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
517.8
570.2
578.4
597.2
638.6
26.7
19.1
188.4
93.8
87.3
130.0
32.0
21.6
233.8
105.3
95.7
156.3
43.3
29.0
255.1
86.5
102.1
169.7
42.7
29.1
273.7
96.0
105.1
156.8
44.0
31.0
291.4
112.2
111.6
150.1
52.1
38.1
316.1
124.1
116.1
154.3
60.6
85.9
18.7
51.6
88.9
22.1
49.7
117.7
22.8
50.1
169.2
31.7
51.4
206.4
36.8
62.3
252.6
41.4
74.0
268.1
45.2
71.6
271.5
43.1
70.4
281.9
45.1
74.8
306.6
47.5
15.3
65.6
20.6
78.1
25.1
92.6
28.5
82.8
32.7
105.1
36.7
124.7
39.1
143.8
40.2
151.9
38.8
161.0
36.7
173.0
29.1
217.1
17.6
153.2
46.2
26.3
235.1
16.2
161.8
57.0
25.3
282.7
18.9
197.7
66.1
25.1
337.2
24.4
231.4
81.4
29.1
403.3
23.8
289.5
90.0
28.8
489.0
26.8
357.3
105.0
30.2
540.0
32.1
398.4
109.6
31.6
546.8
33.5
397.4
115.9
32.6
564.6
34.4
409.8
120.4
34.9
603.7
39.5
443.1
121.1
59.7
157.4
76.3
158.8
87.9
194.8
102.7
234.5
119.5
283.9
148.6
340.4
153.4
386.7
137.1
409.6
133.7
430.9
138.4
465.2
6.1
10.9
61.3
6.5
11.5
64.5
6.0
12.5
66.8
7.9
14.5
72.4
10.3
15.5
79.8
12.3
16.3
86.6
13.8
17.4
94.9
13.5
18.7
96.2
14.5
19.5
95.7
15.5
20.4
97.1
Other groups
Heavily indebted poor countries
Least developed countries
Middle East and north Africa
35.1
33.3
36.1
39.1
39.0
43.2
44.2
47.5
48.1
47.2
21.3
20.4
40.1
29.4
32.0
39.9
17.3
15.2
31.2
33.5
32.4
45.9
19.2
17.2
33.0
37.2
33.9
51.5
23.0
20.0
40.1
34.6
41.2
43.1
20.7
19.8
37.4
30.6
42.0
48.8
24.4
21.5
43.1
31.6
41.2
53.5
32.0
27.4
45.2
25.5
40.8
49.8
32.2
28.8
56.0
36.4
43.3
44.5
31.8
29.4
54.4
39.6
46.5
45.8
35.3
33.9
53.7
38.7
44.9
43.1
32.7
43.3
36.9
26.6
38.7
38.9
27.9
42.1
38.8
32.0
50.8
49.1
29.4
47.1
45.6
33.6
54.8
46.8
36.8
55.9
47.8
37.3
64.1
45.9
36.7
62.7
48.4
36.7
62.2
46.8
32.8
29.8
41.9
30.5
46.1
32.9
50.9
26.2
50.9
30.1
53.4
31.7
54.0
32.4
52.3
35.3
48.0
37.8
42.8
36.9
225
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Table 36 (concluded)
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
27.0
36.6
21.9
39.6
36.6
23.3
34.9
18.7
36.3
40.6
24.2
37.8
21.2
39.2
42.8
26.4
40.6
26.2
41.2
46.1
27.9
40.2
21.4
42.6
42.3
25.2
45.1
22.2
49.2
44.2
25.0
46.2
26.0
50.8
41.7
27.8
49.5
27.2
53.7
48.0
28.9
50.0
26.6
54.9
47.5
29.5
48.9
29.0
54.1
43.2
32.1
38.6
38.7
33.3
42.7
35.9
48.1
38.0
44.7
38.6
51.8
42.7
47.4
45.7
43.6
51.9
42.9
52.7
40.5
52.1
14.7
33.4
31.3
14.9
33.8
31.7
13.4
35.5
34.4
16.9
40.4
40.5
18.0
36.8
40.6
19.1
36.1
41.1
21.0
37.2
43.1
20.1
38.2
44.5
20.3
36.9
43.9
20.3
36.1
41.9
Other groups
Heavily indebted poor countries
Least developed countries
Middle East and north Africa
1In this table, official holdings of gold are valued at SDR 35 an ounce. This convention results in a marked underestimate of reserves for countries that have
substantial gold holdings.
2Reserves at year-end in percent of imports of goods and services for the year indicated.
226
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
0.3
0.1
0.1
11.3
5.2
11.3
5.2
1.9
1.1
0.4
0.1
0.8
12.6
2.9
0.8
8.5
0.6
0.3
2.4
1.0
0.1
1.2
0.2
1.9
0.2
1.0
0.2
1.3
0.1
0.1
1.6
0.2
0.7
0.6
0.1
0.9
0.9
0.5
0.8
0.4
0.4
1.3
0.8
0.6
1.5
0.3
0.4
12.9
0.6
0.1
1.7
0.4
0.1
2.0
0.5
0.5
5.0
5.7
0.2
4.0
0.5
0.3
6.6
7.0
0.1
2.5
1.9
2.6
0.5
0.5
1.4
0.3
0.5
0.9
0.8
0.1
0.1
0.4
0.9
0.2
0.2
1.2
0.4
0.7
1.5
0.2
0.3
1.7
0.6
4.9
0.3
0.5
0.1
0.6
0.1
1.0
0.1
0.7
0.5
0.1
13.7
2.3
0.2
0.7
0.2
4.0
1.9
0.8
0.5
1.6
1.1
0.2
1.2
2.2
0.4
0.3
1.9
1.2
0.1
0.3
0.4
0.6
0.8
0.8
0.2
1.4
12.6
0.6
13.7
1.7
2.9
1.0
1.9
0.8
0.1
1.5
2.5
8.5
2.5
6.1
0.1
2.0
1.1
0.9
0.4
1.0
0.9
0.8
1.5
0.1
12.7
0.5
3.5
0.4
0.4
4.8
3.7
0.3
0.4
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.5
0.5
0.2
0.5
0.6
0.5
0.2
0.3
0.1
0.6
0.1
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.1
Countries in transition
0.3
2.4
1.6
3.7
2.4
4.7
3.7
2.5
5.5
...
...
...
...
2.4
2.4
0.5
0.5
1.0
2.0
2.0
1.5
0.2
0.5
0.2
1.5
0.3
1.3
2.7
5.5
0.6
0.8
3.2
0.5
0.7
0.4
1.5
0.2
0.1
0.4
5.3
0.3
Total
Net credit provided under:
General Resources Account
Trust Fund
SAF/ESAF
1.885
0.365
0.688
2.520
0.069
1.070
0.644
0.733
3.374
0.060
0.253
0.594
0.014
0.998
15.633
0.015
1.619
0.291
0.325
14.355
0.007
0.179
18.811
0.001
0.363
29.028
0.296
3.363
31.821
0.226
4.499
31.217
0.217
5.041
34.503
0.157
5.285
37.276
0.153
6.634
53.275
0.141
8.342
51.824
0.137
8.392
62.703
0.121
8.049
84.961
0.126
8.777
Advanced economies
Newly industrialized Asian
economies
Developing countries
Regional groups
Africa
Sub-Sahara
Asia
Excluding China and India
Middle East and Europe
Western Hemisphere
Analytical groups
By source of export earnings
Fuel
Manufactures
Nonfuel primary products
Services, income, and
private transfers
Diversified
Other groups
Heavily indebted poor countries
Least developed countries
Middle East and north Africa
Memorandum
1Includes net disbursements from programs under the General Resources Account, Trust Fund, Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF), and Enhanced
Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF). The data are on a transactions basis, with conversions to U.S. dollar values at annual average exchange rates.
2Converted to U.S. dollar values at end-of-period exchange rates.
227
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
1,269.8
1,338.2
1,472.9
1,573.7
1,714.4
1,784.8
1,865.7
1,965.2
1,969.6
2,029.7
255.4
369.1
186.7
458.5
256.4
409.7
191.7
480.4
266.5
457.1
210.8
538.5
284.2
511.4
214.0
564.0
307.0
562.0
223.1
622.4
306.4
592.8
231.4
654.2
298.8
644.7
241.9
680.3
303.0
640.1
271.3
750.9
308.4
631.5
279.3
750.4
313.7
650.6
290.4
774.9
22.2
1,247.6
234.5
674.1
338.9
24.5
1,313.7
242.1
725.4
346.2
30.6
1,442.2
254.8
829.2
358.2
29.7
1,544.0
270.2
885.9
388.0
29.9
1,684.5
286.8
990.8
406.9
36.8
1,748.0
290.4
1,045.6
412.0
44.4
1,821.3
283.8
1,101.2
436.3
58.9
1,906.3
292.9
1,166.6
446.8
64.5
1,905.1
300.3
1,162.5
442.2
66.7
1,963.0
304.9
1,207.1
451.0
570.7
676.9
587.0
726.7
612.9
829.3
637.8
906.2
667.6
1,016.9
685.0
1,063.0
693.1
1,128.2
740.4
1,165.9
738.8
1,166.3
744.1
1,218.8
209.7
113.5
113.4
95.3
0.9
211.7
104.5
100.4
105.4
1.8
233.8
116.2
110.5
112.7
4.9
248.7
121.5
112.2
119.8
7.4
267.2
137.1
126.3
120.4
9.7
279.0
140.8
129.0
125.0
13.2
287.5
147.0
130.8
123.5
17.0
319.9
163.4
147.7
137.0
19.5
328.0
173.3
157.2
133.9
20.8
344.0
189.0
172.1
133.4
21.6
150.1
176.6
186.2
205.2
242.9
278.7
302.7
316.1
331.8
326.2
27.2
39.2
18.7
64.9
27.7
54.0
22.1
72.8
26.1
53.9
24.7
81.5
27.2
61.9
26.2
89.9
33.2
76.2
27.9
105.6
30.1
81.0
44.2
123.4
30.7
81.4
39.8
150.8
29.2
105.4
35.0
146.5
35.7
88.2
40.9
167.1
37.4
88.2
38.3
162.3
1.8
148.3
16.5
99.5
32.2
1.8
174.8
17.2
112.6
45.1
2.9
183.3
16.3
125.5
41.4
7.2
198.0
19.7
136.9
41.3
7.1
235.8
25.8
165.2
44.8
18.9
259.8
21.4
190.4
47.9
14.4
288.3
22.6
210.6
55.1
8.5
307.5
22.7
213.5
71.4
8.6
323.2
16.8
240.9
65.5
8.4
317.8
26.0
229.5
62.3
57.4
90.8
64.9
109.9
65.2
118.1
58.9
139.1
71.9
163.9
75.7
184.1
94.4
193.9
94.3
213.3
123.9
199.4
122.6
195.2
40.1
23.8
23.8
16.3
25.8
13.1
13.1
12.6
0.1
19.5
13.0
12.8
6.2
0.3
22.6
17.7
15.8
4.3
0.6
31.6
23.7
22.0
6.4
1.5
35.8
27.5
26.1
6.9
1.4
35.3
27.7
26.1
5.9
1.7
53.7
35.1
33.0
15.1
3.5
59.4
41.0
39.3
15.9
2.4
63.5
45.9
42.8
15.1
2.5
Debt-service payments1
Developing countries
Regional groups
Africa
Asia
Middle East and Europe
Western Hemisphere
Analytical groups
By external financing source
Net creditor countries
Net debtor countries
Official financing
Private financing
Diversified financing
Net debtor countries by debtservicing experience
Countries with arrears and/or
rescheduling during 199397
Other net debtor countries
Countries in transition
Central and eastern Europe
Excluding Belarus and Ukraine
Russia
Transcaucasus and central Asia
228
Table 38 (concluded)
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
192.4
185.9
194.3
181.1
162.4
154.2
148.3
167.6
160.6
152.2
250.1
162.0
113.3
277.3
248.6
155.1
107.3
276.5
271.3
153.9
117.7
293.0
278.6
138.6
113.4
269.9
255.8
119.0
103.2
251.8
230.2
118.3
93.0
238.8
220.0
115.0
92.8
225.9
251.2
118.6
120.9
260.9
244.4
112.5
119.1
246.5
224.6
107.9
115.3
228.8
22.7
221.9
361.1
175.0
302.6
22.9
214.3
361.4
171.4
281.9
29.0
221.1
379.3
182.6
273.2
27.4
203.0
371.6
164.4
260.4
24.1
180.8
329.6
148.0
231.9
25.8
172.3
294.5
144.3
215.5
30.0
164.0
279.0
138.9
201.9
50.9
180.4
304.1
155.4
213.2
50.4
173.4
302.4
149.4
199.9
48.9
164.0
275.4
143.4
184.6
328.3
174.3
322.1
168.7
334.5
176.8
317.1
162.0
289.6
145.0
260.8
141.4
244.1
136.5
288.3
145.8
270.4
141.3
238.3
137.8
106.9
116.4
159.1
154.8
2.5
129.9
110.2
126.1
183.4
17.1
129.0
114.2
132.0
171.1
36.2
122.9
107.1
116.9
156.1
60.8
103.4
92.9
100.3
126.6
61.8
98.9
87.1
95.8
121.6
75.1
96.7
83.9
89.3
119.7
89.9
109.7
87.2
91.3
156.2
117.3
110.3
88.2
91.1
160.9
117.7
106.2
87.0
89.3
151.3
117.7
22.7
24.5
24.6
23.6
23.0
24.1
24.1
27.0
27.0
24.5
26.6
17.2
11.4
39.3
26.9
20.4
12.4
41.9
26.5
18.1
13.8
44.4
26.7
16.8
13.8
43.0
27.6
16.1
12.9
42.7
22.6
16.2
17.8
45.1
22.6
14.5
15.3
50.1
24.2
19.5
15.6
50.9
28.3
15.7
17.4
54.9
26.8
14.6
15.2
47.9
1.9
26.4
25.4
25.8
28.8
1.6
28.5
25.6
26.6
36.7
2.8
28.1
24.3
27.6
31.6
6.6
26.0
27.1
25.4
27.7
5.7
25.3
29.6
24.7
25.5
13.2
25.6
21.7
26.3
25.1
9.7
26.0
22.2
26.6
25.5
7.4
29.1
23.5
28.4
34.1
6.7
29.4
16.9
31.0
29.6
6.1
26.5
23.5
27.3
25.5
33.0
23.4
35.6
25.5
35.6
25.2
29.3
24.9
31.2
23.4
28.8
24.5
33.2
23.5
36.7
26.7
45.3
24.2
39.3
22.1
20.4
24.4
33.4
26.4
15.9
13.8
16.5
21.9
1.0
10.8
12.8
15.3
9.4
2.4
11.1
15.6
16.4
5.6
4.8
12.2
16.1
17.5
6.7
9.5
12.7
17.0
19.4
6.7
7.8
11.9
15.8
17.8
5.7
9.2
18.4
18.8
20.4
17.2
20.9
20.0
20.9
22.7
19.1
13.7
19.6
21.1
22.2
17.2
13.8
Debt-service payments
Developing countries
Regional groups
Africa
Asia
Middle East and Europe
Western Hemisphere
Analytical groups
By external financing source
Net creditor countries
Net debtor countries
Official financing
Private financing
Diversified financing
Net debtor countries by debtservicing experience
Countries with arrears and/or
rescheduling during 199397
Other net debtor countries
Countries in transition
Central and eastern Europe
Excluding Belarus and Ukraine
Russia
Transcaucasus and central Asia
1Debt-service payments refer to actual payments of interest on total debt plus actual amortization payments on long-term debt. The projections incorporate
the impact of exceptional financing items.
2Total debt at year-end in percent of exports of goods and services in year indicated.
229
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Table 39. Developing Countriesby Region: External Debt, by Maturity and Type of Creditor
(Billions of U.S. dollars)
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
1,269.8
1,338.2
1,472.9
1,573.7
1,714.4
1,784.8
1,865.7
1,965.2
1,969.6
2,029.7
166.9
1,102.7
207.6
1,130.5
239.3
1,233.8
244.3
1,330.0
275.2
1,439.1
295.5
1,489.2
303.2
1,562.4
288.0
1,677.3
257.9
1,710.8
268.2
1,761.1
609.0
368.2
292.5
631.9
372.9
333.4
678.6
365.8
428.5
733.6
366.7
473.3
772.4
414.1
527.8
777.2
453.6
554.0
755.5
535.0
575.2
784.2
560.4
620.7
783.8
549.2
636.4
784.0
556.5
689.0
255.4
256.4
266.5
284.2
307.0
306.4
298.8
303.0
308.4
313.7
19.0
236.4
20.2
236.2
19.1
247.3
26.1
258.1
31.3
275.7
34.2
272.1
38.9
259.8
41.0
262.0
24.5
282.8
26.2
286.9
165.4
47.7
42.3
172.7
43.4
40.3
182.6
41.7
42.1
197.8
44.8
41.6
214.3
42.4
50.3
221.2
35.5
49.7
210.3
34.7
53.7
214.2
29.2
59.7
216.8
28.0
63.3
214.2
27.3
72.0
200.0
202.2
211.2
223.2
241.8
240.0
237.2
240.8
249.0
253.5
16.9
183.1
18.3
183.9
17.3
194.0
24.3
198.9
29.8
212.0
32.1
207.7
37.2
200.0
39.1
201.7
22.4
225.5
23.7
229.1
134.8
25.4
39.8
141.5
21.8
38.9
148.8
21.8
40.6
160.2
22.8
40.2
171.3
22.4
48.0
170.2
23.0
46.8
163.9
22.2
51.1
166.7
17.5
56.6
171.0
17.5
60.2
166.9
17.6
68.8
369.1
409.7
457.1
511.4
562.0
592.8
644.7
640.1
631.5
650.6
49.1
319.9
59.6
350.0
69.0
388.3
76.3
435.7
97.4
464.5
104.0
488.8
102.4
542.2
81.5
558.5
70.5
561.1
68.9
582.0
184.0
101.3
83.8
202.6
112.1
94.9
223.1
121.9
112.2
252.4
144.2
114.7
256.2
166.5
139.2
266.8
196.0
130.0
274.2
217.3
153.1
280.4
220.1
139.7
281.7
209.2
140.6
285.0
211.3
154.4
186.7
191.7
210.8
214.0
223.1
231.4
241.9
271.3
279.3
290.4
36.1
150.6
48.0
143.7
63.7
147.1
46.9
167.2
49.2
173.9
52.2
179.2
55.1
186.9
63.1
208.2
66.1
213.2
69.4
221.0
100.1
61.8
24.8
95.5
68.7
27.5
106.1
66.8
37.9
114.3
65.4
34.3
105.3
78.1
39.6
106.9
77.4
47.1
103.2
106.3
32.4
110.8
119.9
40.6
106.3
122.4
50.6
105.3
124.6
60.5
458.5
480.4
538.5
564.0
622.4
654.2
680.3
750.9
750.4
774.9
62.8
395.8
79.8
400.6
87.5
451.0
95.0
469.0
97.3
525.0
105.1
549.1
106.8
573.5
102.3
648.5
96.8
653.6
103.8
671.1
159.6
157.3
141.6
161.1
148.8
170.6
166.8
135.4
236.3
169.2
112.2
282.6
196.6
127.0
298.7
182.3
144.7
327.2
167.7
176.7
336.0
178.8
191.3
380.8
179.0
189.6
381.8
179.6
193.2
402.1
Developing countries
Total debt
By maturity
Short-term
Long-term
By type of creditor
Official
Banks
Other private
Regional groups
Africa
Total debt
By maturity
Short-term
Long-term
By type of creditor
Official
Banks
Other private
Sub-Sahara
Total debt
By maturity
Short-term
Long-term
By type of creditor
Official
Banks
Other private
Asia
Total debt
By maturity
Short-term
Long-term
By type of creditor
Official
Banks
Other private
Middle East and Europe
Total debt
By maturity
Short-term
Long-term
By type of creditor
Official
Banks
Other private
Western Hemisphere
Total debt
By maturity
Short-term
Long-term
By type of creditor
Official
Banks
Other private
230
Table 40. Developing Countriesby Analytical Criteria: External Debt, by Maturity and Type of Creditor
(Billions of U.S. dollars)
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
182.0
190.8
205.7
213.6
215.1
214.3
209.8
228.0
232.0
233.3
31.9
150.1
35.4
155.3
48.5
157.2
44.4
169.2
43.7
171.4
43.2
171.1
46.8
163.0
53.6
174.5
35.5
196.5
36.6
196.7
66.2
70.8
44.9
74.4
66.6
49.8
89.2
64.9
51.7
97.7
61.9
54.0
93.1
68.3
53.6
100.4
58.7
55.1
95.2
60.1
54.4
100.9
62.8
64.3
99.9
62.7
69.3
100.1
62.6
70.6
1,087.8
1,147.4
1,267.1
1,360.1
1,499.3
1,570.6
1,655.9
1,737.2
1,737.7
1,796.4
135.1
952.6
172.2
975.1
190.9
1,076.5
199.9
1,160.8
231.6
1,267.7
252.3
1,318.1
256.4
1,399.4
234.4
1,502.8
222.5
1,514.3
231.6
1,564.4
542.8
297.4
247.6
557.5
306.3
283.6
589.4
300.9
376.8
635.9
304.8
419.3
679.3
345.8
474.2
676.8
394.9
498.9
660.2
474.9
520.8
683.3
497.6
556.3
683.9
486.5
567.0
683.9
493.8
618.4
344.8
384.3
427.7
465.3
510.1
551.3
594.3
617.1
610.2
628.3
50.4
294.4
69.7
314.6
83.1
344.6
83.2
382.1
99.5
410.7
111.6
439.7
107.8
486.6
73.1
544.0
62.4
547.8
67.1
561.1
136.4
126.4
82.1
143.8
126.0
114.5
152.8
137.9
137.0
169.1
125.0
171.2
172.4
144.6
193.1
167.9
172.7
210.7
170.2
204.1
220.0
190.7
207.6
218.8
195.6
206.0
208.6
200.4
214.5
213.3
176.1
185.9
193.9
206.9
222.3
226.3
225.1
233.9
242.8
247.3
15.2
160.8
17.9
167.8
19.6
174.5
20.1
187.4
22.8
199.4
23.1
203.0
22.4
202.6
20.1
213.8
20.7
221.2
21.8
225.1
127.7
29.3
19.1
133.8
30.6
21.5
139.2
31.5
23.2
151.0
34.6
21.2
158.4
38.0
25.9
158.0
39.8
28.6
154.1
40.0
31.0
157.5
40.4
36.0
160.0
42.8
39.7
154.9
44.9
47.3
95.5
87.4
83.8
86.8
89.3
90.0
87.0
89.7
90.3
93.2
8.7
86.8
8.6
78.8
7.1
76.7
6.6
80.2
7.4
81.9
5.8
84.2
6.2
80.7
6.4
83.3
6.1
84.1
6.0
87.2
75.6
12.8
7.1
66.9
13.1
7.4
67.0
8.1
8.7
70.4
7.9
8.5
72.5
8.3
8.5
72.2
7.8
9.9
62.6
6.8
17.5
62.9
6.8
20.0
62.4
6.5
21.4
63.6
6.4
23.2
471.4
489.7
561.7
601.1
677.5
703.0
749.5
796.5
794.4
827.7
60.8
410.6
75.9
413.8
81.0
480.7
90.0
511.1
101.9
575.7
111.8
591.2
120.0
629.5
134.7
661.7
133.3
661.1
136.8
690.9
203.2
128.9
139.3
213.0
136.6
140.1
230.4
123.4
207.9
245.4
137.4
218.3
276.1
154.8
246.6
278.7
174.6
249.7
273.3
223.9
252.3
272.1
242.9
281.5
265.9
231.2
297.3
264.9
228.0
334.7
231
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Table 40 (continued)
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
22.2
24.5
30.6
29.7
29.9
36.8
44.4
58.9
64.5
66.7
5.5
16.7
8.4
16.0
14.6
16.1
14.7
15.0
12.2
17.7
11.8
25.1
11.8
32.6
14.7
44.2
15.3
49.3
16.1
50.6
2.5
18.7
1.0
2.8
20.8
0.8
4.1
21.1
5.5
5.2
18.7
5.7
5.7
14.2
10.1
7.9
17.2
11.7
9.2
22.5
12.7
11.4
28.1
19.4
10.3
30.0
24.2
9.2
30.8
26.7
1,247.6
1,313.7
1,442.2
1,544.0
1,684.5
1,748.0
1,821.3
1,906.3
1,905.1
1,963.0
161.5
1,086.0
199.2
1,114.4
224.8
1,217.7
229.7
1,315.0
263.0
1,421.5
283.7
1,464.1
291.4
1,529.8
273.3
1,633.1
242.7
1,661.5
252.1
1,710.5
606.5
349.5
291.5
629.1
352.0
332.6
674.5
344.7
423.0
728.4
348.0
467.6
766.8
399.9
517.8
769.3
436.4
542.3
746.2
512.5
562.6
772.8
532.3
601.2
773.5
519.2
612.1
774.8
525.7
662.3
234.5
242.1
254.8
270.2
286.8
290.4
283.8
292.9
300.3
304.9
11.0
223.4
14.4
227.6
17.9
237.1
22.3
248.6
26.0
260.8
30.0
260.2
33.8
249.9
36.2
256.7
19.7
279.8
22.1
282.3
193.7
27.7
13.2
205.7
23.0
13.4
215.9
21.5
17.4
232.3
22.3
15.7
246.4
23.1
17.3
246.9
23.7
19.8
237.3
24.5
22.0
242.3
25.3
25.3
245.3
23.8
31.0
240.7
23.8
40.1
674.1
725.4
829.2
885.9
990.8
1,045.6
1,101.2
1,166.6
1,162.5
1,207.1
116.6
557.5
148.4
577.0
170.0
659.2
164.8
721.0
186.2
804.7
200.6
845.1
203.2
898.0
183.9
982.7
173.8
988.7
181.6
1,025.5
211.4
243.9
218.8
220.6
245.4
259.4
245.2
243.7
340.3
263.4
240.0
382.5
288.6
280.6
421.6
284.7
297.5
463.4
269.9
354.2
477.1
300.6
369.3
496.8
300.4
364.5
497.6
305.7
371.1
530.3
338.9
346.2
358.2
388.0
406.9
412.0
436.3
446.8
442.2
451.0
33.8
305.1
36.3
309.9
36.8
321.4
42.6
345.4
50.9
356.0
53.1
358.9
54.4
381.9
53.2
393.6
49.2
393.1
48.4
402.6
201.4
78.0
59.6
202.8
83.6
59.8
213.4
79.5
65.3
232.7
85.8
69.4
231.7
96.2
78.9
237.7
115.3
59.1
239.0
133.8
63.5
229.9
137.8
79.1
227.8
130.9
83.5
228.4
130.7
91.9
232
Table 40 (concluded)
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
570.7
587.0
612.9
637.8
667.6
685.0
693.1
740.4
738.8
744.1
62.8
507.8
76.2
510.6
89.2
523.9
81.1
557.4
87.8
579.7
95.7
589.1
101.6
591.4
91.6
648.8
65.0
672.8
70.4
673.3
317.0
162.5
91.2
322.8
149.2
115.0
342.4
139.6
130.9
362.9
106.9
168.0
366.4
128.6
172.6
369.2
133.4
182.4
349.7
151.6
191.8
367.2
148.4
224.8
371.8
142.5
224.2
370.7
140.9
232.3
676.9
726.7
829.3
906.2
1,016.9
1,063.0
1,128.2
1,165.9
1,166.3
1,218.8
98.7
578.2
122.9
603.8
135.5
693.8
148.6
757.6
175.2
841.7
188.0
875.0
189.8
938.4
181.7
984.2
177.6
988.7
181.7
1,037.2
289.5
187.1
200.3
306.3
202.9
217.6
332.1
205.1
292.1
365.5
241.1
299.6
400.4
271.3
345.2
400.1
303.0
359.9
396.5
360.9
370.8
405.6
383.9
376.4
401.7
376.7
387.9
404.0
384.8
430.0
172.1
178.7
188.7
197.8
211.1
210.8
204.9
210.3
217.3
218.8
9.0
163.0
9.4
169.3
10.7
178.0
11.2
186.6
12.1
199.0
10.6
200.1
10.7
194.1
8.0
202.2
8.1
208.1
8.5
209.7
140.4
16.0
15.8
147.5
17.6
13.6
155.2
17.6
15.9
167.7
19.4
10.7
177.2
21.5
12.4
175.8
23.0
12.1
165.3
23.5
16.1
169.2
19.5
21.6
172.5
18.8
25.7
168.7
17.6
32.4
122.3
126.3
134.5
141.8
148.8
150.7
151.5
157.6
162.7
162.6
5.9
116.3
6.1
120.2
6.2
128.5
5.6
136.9
5.5
143.3
5.7
144.8
6.0
145.5
7.3
150.3
7.1
154.7
6.9
155.3
108.7
7.1
6.5
112.6
6.8
7.0
118.6
6.8
9.2
127.8
6.4
7.6
134.2
6.8
7.8
135.7
6.6
8.4
131.7
6.5
13.4
134.2
6.6
16.8
136.6
6.3
19.5
131.8
5.7
24.9
209.1
208.5
218.1
229.8
238.3
242.3
239.6
258.1
260.8
265.5
29.4
179.7
37.5
171.0
47.4
170.7
37.7
192.1
35.5
202.8
34.4
208.0
34.0
205.6
39.0
219.1
39.7
221.1
41.3
224.2
121.3
69.9
18.0
118.5
74.0
15.9
130.1
67.4
20.6
139.8
65.9
24.1
137.2
74.9
26.2
146.8
65.8
29.7
135.6
68.6
35.4
138.8
73.5
45.8
135.0
73.2
52.7
135.5
73.0
57.1
233
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
37.8
35.1
33.4
36.3
37.3
35.1
34.6
37.1
37.1
35.8
66.0
66.5
31.8
47.4
33.9
36.4
64.9
66.7
31.5
47.1
31.5
31.9
70.4
73.5
31.0
47.4
34.5
27.8
77.0
79.4
33.2
46.7
37.6
30.4
74.0
75.0
30.3
45.0
34.2
37.1
70.5
72.4
28.0
42.8
32.8
35.8
67.7
69.6
29.1
47.5
32.3
34.1
71.0
74.5
30.2
57.8
35.9
37.7
72.1
77.4
27.2
47.2
35.5
42.4
68.9
74.4
25.7
42.0
35.1
41.6
Analytical groups
By source of export earnings
Fuel
Manufactures
Nonfuel primary products
Services, income, and
private transfers
Diversified
38.2
25.2
79.3
36.8
24.0
76.3
42.9
20.3
74.6
46.2
24.0
70.6
40.9
24.5
61.9
36.9
23.6
56.1
33.7
24.4
49.4
37.2
25.6
48.8
36.0
26.7
47.6
34.8
25.6
43.6
83.9
40.1
68.9
37.2
58.6
39.7
52.6
40.7
52.6
46.1
49.5
44.5
44.4
44.3
42.7
50.5
40.1
48.5
38.3
47.4
10.7
39.6
81.6
30.1
54.7
10.8
36.7
82.3
27.5
52.9
13.4
34.5
90.0
25.8
52.5
12.6
37.6
91.7
29.0
51.3
11.9
38.7
84.4
31.4
47.7
13.2
36.4
78.7
30.0
43.7
15.3
35.7
75.7
29.3
45.0
21.5
38.0
77.0
30.9
51.8
21.8
38.0
77.5
31.9
45.4
21.3
36.6
74.0
31.1
42.4
52.6
32.8
46.2
31.4
37.5
32.6
43.0
34.6
44.9
35.5
41.8
33.6
39.3
33.7
41.9
35.9
45.8
34.4
42.8
33.6
95.3
73.0
43.4
93.5
69.0
38.9
91.8
67.1
42.0
89.5
62.8
43.6
82.3
57.5
41.6
72.1
51.9
38.4
61.2
45.7
36.3
57.2
43.0
39.0
53.2
39.6
37.1
47.5
35.0
35.8
Other groups
Heavily indebted poor countries
Least developed countries
Middle East and north Africa
1Debt
234
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
10.2
9.6
9.4
8.7
8.5
8.3
7.7
9.0
9.2
9.0
11.1
9.5
8.0
8.1
4.4
18.3
10.3
8.6
7.5
6.8
5.2
16.7
10.2
8.6
6.9
6.2
5.5
16.8
10.1
8.5
6.4
6.0
4.3
15.9
10.8
9.2
5.8
6.1
4.0
16.7
9.1
7.6
6.1
6.3
4.0
15.9
8.9
7.7
5.0
6.6
3.6
15.6
10.2
9.0
5.8
7.6
5.0
17.5
12.0
11.1
5.4
7.3
5.3
18.2
12.3
11.5
5.3
7.1
5.0
17.3
4.9
10.1
12.5
4.8
9.2
9.9
5.1
8.7
10.5
4.7
7.3
10.8
4.9
7.0
9.0
3.9
7.7
8.2
3.8
6.5
8.1
5.5
7.3
9.5
6.7
7.1
9.9
6.5
6.7
11.0
9.3
14.3
15.1
13.0
11.4
12.8
7.1
12.9
5.8
13.3
7.5
12.2
5.5
11.8
5.9
13.1
6.2
13.5
5.5
13.2
1.4
11.7
12.4
11.3
12.7
1.2
11.0
10.7
10.7
12.4
1.4
10.7
10.5
10.5
11.3
1.5
9.7
12.0
9.3
10.0
1.7
9.5
10.2
9.4
9.5
1.8
9.2
9.1
9.3
8.9
1.9
8.5
8.8
8.4
8.6
3.6
9.6
9.6
9.5
9.8
3.2
10.0
10.8
9.8
10.3
3.0
9.7
11.5
9.3
10.1
14.5
10.4
13.9
9.8
14.2
9.3
12.0
8.9
12.0
8.6
11.4
8.5
10.9
7.6
12.9
8.5
14.7
8.4
14.0
8.2
12.2
8.4
4.7
9.5
6.9
5.5
10.2
6.7
5.6
13.0
6.3
4.4
9.8
7.8
4.2
9.5
8.0
4.3
7.9
5.0
3.7
8.7
5.2
5.3
9.8
6.8
5.3
11.3
9.1
5.0
12.6
15.0
15.2
15.0
14.5
15.8
16.4
18.0
17.8
15.5
15.8
8.1
9.2
10.8
6.9
21.0
17.0
10.2
12.9
15.0
7.2
25.1
16.6
9.0
11.3
12.4
8.3
27.6
16.7
9.3
10.4
11.9
9.5
27.1
16.8
10.6
10.3
12.5
8.9
26.1
13.6
9.7
10.1
11.5
13.8
29.1
13.7
11.1
9.5
12.1
11.6
34.5
14.0
11.5
13.7
19.7
10.6
33.4
16.3
15.2
10.3
12.8
12.1
36.7
14.5
13.1
9.5
11.4
10.1
30.6
8.8
9.4
12.2
7.9
11.2
10.4
9.5
11.3
13.2
11.3
9.6
13.0
11.2
9.2
20.3
14.7
10.4
13.8
13.4
11.8
11.0
9.5
14.7
12.3
11.3
18.3
3.1
10.0
13.5
15.2
9.5
19.6
19.7
25.3
19.1
23.8
11.2
25.2
7.4
23.3
8.2
24.7
9.9
25.8
8.1
28.7
7.7
24.9
7.2
22.2
Interest payments2
Developing countries
Regional groups
Africa
Sub-Sahara
Asia
Excluding China and India
Middle East and Europe
Western Hemisphere
Analytical groups
By source of export earnings
Fuel
Manufactures
Nonfuel primary products
Services, income, and
private transfers
Diversified
Other groups
Heavily indebted poor countries
Least developed countries
Middle East and north Africa
Amortization2
Developing countries
Regional groups
Africa
Sub-Sahara
Asia
Excluding China and India
Middle East and Europe
Western Hemisphere
Analytical groups
By source of export earnings
Fuel
Manufactures
Nonfuel primary products
Services, income, and
private transfers
Diversified
235
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Table 42 (concluded)
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
0.5
14.7
13.4
14.6
16.1
0.4
17.6
15.7
15.9
24.3
1.4
17.5
14.3
17.1
20.3
5.2
16.3
15.3
16.1
17.8
4.0
15.8
19.5
15.3
16.1
11.5
16.4
12.7
16.9
16.2
7.9
17.5
13.4
18.2
17.0
3.8
19.5
13.9
18.9
24.3
3.5
19.5
6.1
21.2
19.3
3.2
16.9
12.9
17.9
15.4
18.7
13.0
22.0
15.7
21.5
15.9
17.4
16.0
19.2
14.7
17.4
16.0
22.3
15.8
23.8
18.1
30.6
15.8
25.6
13.9
12.7
10.5
10.4
10.9
10.4
9.7
11.9
9.3
11.4
13.4
8.6
12.0
22.1
9.6
10.9
9.3
8.9
15.1
8.9
5.8
12.4
9.3
8.0
9.4
0.9
13.8
10.3
14.9
12.5
9.2
Other groups
Heavily indebted poor countries
Least developed countries
Middle East and north Africa
1Excludes
236
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1.3
1.0
0.9
0.7
0.9
0.6
0.6
0.5
Regional groups
Africa
Sub-Sahara
Asia
Excluding China and India
Middle East and Europe
Western Hemisphere
1.2
1.1
1.0
0.8
0.1
3.0
1.1
0.9
0.5
0.5
2.7
1.1
0.7
0.3
0.3
2.6
0.8
0.5
0.5
0.2
1.5
2.5
2.8
0.4
0.2
0.1
1.6
0.4
0.3
0.4
0.2
0.1
1.6
0.9
0.7
0.2
0.2
1.9
1.0
0.7
0.2
0.2
0.1
1.1
Analytical groups
By source of export earnings
Fuel
Nonfuel
0.3
1.7
0.4
1.2
0.6
1.0
0.4
0.8
0.5
0.9
0.3
0.7
0.4
0.7
0.6
0.5
1.5
1.7
1.3
2.0
1.2
1.5
1.1
1.3
1.1
1.4
1.1
0.7
0.8
0.7
0.6
1.4
1.0
3.2
0.6
1.3
0.7
0.6
0.6
1.1
0.7
0.5
0.8
0.6
0.6
0.4
0.6
0.4
1.6
1.5
1.6
1.0
1.8
0.8
0.8
0.8
1.9
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.6
0.8
0.7
0.5
2.4
2.7
0.3
1.9
1.6
0.3
1.7
1.3
0.4
1.1
0.9
0.3
5.5
8.1
0.3
0.5
0.3
0.2
0.5
0.2
0.3
0.5
0.4
0.3
Countries in transition
0.1
0.4
0.4
1.2
1.4
0.8
0.6
1.0
0.2
0.3
0.8
0.9
0.7
0.8
0.1
1.9
2.3
0.2
0.1
2.3
2.6
0.3
0.3
0.8
0.8
1.0
0.3
0.4
0.4
1.0
0.4
0.6
0.5
1.9
1.0
8.767
2.430
6.337
8.056
2.288
5.768
7.633
2.315
5.319
8.337
1.791
6.546
12.737
2.777
9.960
9.491
2.260
7.231
9.957
2.171
7.786
8.745
2.468
6.299
Trust Fund
Interest
Repayments
0.070
0.001
0.069
0.063
0.003
0.060
0.015
0.014
0.015
0.015
0.007
0.007
0.001
0.001
SAF/ESAF
Interest
Repayments
0.021
0.021
0.055
0.022
0.033
0.151
0.025
0.126
0.330
0.024
0.306
0.585
0.033
0.552
0.747
0.043
0.703
0.863
0.037
0.827
0.781
0.034
0.841
Developing countries
Other groups
Heavily indebted poor countries
Least developed countries
Middle East and north Africa
Memorandum
1Excludes
advanced economies. Charges on, and repurchases (or repayments of principal) for, use of IMF credit.
237
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Average
20012004
23.2
24.1
22.6
23.7
22.2
23.7
23.1
23.8
23.6
24.1
23.5
23.9
23.9
23.9
23.3
23.2
23.3
23.5
23.3
23.5
23.6
24.1
Advanced economies
Saving
Private
Public
22.1
20.8
1.3
20.7
19.4
1.3
20.0
20.0
20.5
20.1
0.4
21.1
20.4
0.7
21.3
20.1
1.3
21.8
19.5
2.3
21.5
18.7
2.8
21.3
18.4
2.8
21.5
18.5
3.0
21.7
18.1
3.6
Investment
Private
Public
22.7
17.8
4.4
21.6
17.6
4.0
20.3
16.2
4.1
20.8
16.8
4.0
20.9
17.0
3.9
21.0
17.2
3.9
21.2
17.5
3.6
20.8
17.3
3.5
21.0
17.3
3.6
21.0
17.5
3.5
21.4
18.0
3.4
Net lending
Private
Public
Current transfers
Factor income
Resource balance
0.6
2.7
3.6
0.4
0.1
0.1
0.9
1.7
2.7
0.4
0.4
0.2
0.3
3.8
4.1
0.4
0.4
0.5
0.3
3.3
3.6
0.5
0.2
0.4
0.2
3.4
3.2
0.4
0.1
0.4
0.3
2.9
2.6
0.4
0.3
0.4
0.6
2.0
1.3
0.4
0.4
0.6
0.7
1.5
0.7
0.4
0.5
0.7
0.3
1.1
0.8
0.5
0.6
0.1
0.4
0.9
0.5
0.4
0.7
0.1
0.3
0.1
0.2
0.4
0.7
0.1
United States
Saving
Private
Public
19.6
18.0
1.6
16.3
15.8
0.6
14.5
14.9
0.5
15.5
14.8
0.7
16.3
15.2
1.1
16.6
14.5
2.1
17.3
14.1
3.3
17.2
12.8
4.4
16.9
12.3
4.6
17.2
12.4
4.8
17.4
12.4
5.0
Investment
Private
Public
20.7
16.8
3.3
18.4
14.9
3.5
16.5
13.4
3.1
17.5
14.5
3.0
17.4
14.4
3.0
17.8
14.8
3.0
18.4
15.5
2.9
18.8
16.1
2.8
18.9
16.1
2.8
18.9
16.1
2.7
19.0
16.3
2.7
Net lending
Private
Public
Current transfers
Factor income
Resource balance
1.1
1.5
2.6
0.4
0.5
1.3
2.0
0.9
2.9
0.4
0.4
2.0
2.0
1.6
3.6
0.6
0.3
1.1
1.9
0.3
2.3
0.6
1.4
1.0
0.9
1.9
0.5
0.8
1.3
1.1
0.2
0.9
0.6
0.8
1.4
1.0
1.4
0.4
0.5
0.8
1.3
1.6
3.3
1.7
0.5
0.8
1.9
2.0
3.8
1.8
0.5
1.2
2.7
1.7
3.7
2.0
0.4
1.4
2.6
1.6
3.9
2.3
0.4
1.2
2.4
European Union
Saving
Private
Public
21.3
21.2
0.1
20.2
20.6
0.4
18.7
21.9
3.3
19.5
22.4
2.9
20.3
22.8
2.6
20.3
22.3
2.0
21.1
21.6
0.5
21.2
20.9
0.3
21.2
20.4
0.8
21.6
20.2
1.3
22.1
20.2
1.9
Investment
Private
Public
21.8
17.9
4.0
21.3
18.0
3.3
19.0
15.9
3.1
19.5
16.6
2.9
19.8
17.1
2.7
19.2
16.7
2.5
19.4
17.1
2.4
20.1
17.8
2.3
20.4
18.0
2.4
20.7
18.3
2.4
21.1
18.6
2.4
Net lending
Private
Public
Current transfers
Factor income
Resource balance
0.5
3.4
3.9
0.7
0.7
0.8
1.1
2.7
3.8
0.4
1.3
0.6
0.3
6.0
6.3
0.6
0.9
1.2
5.8
5.8
0.7
0.7
1.4
0.4
5.7
5.3
0.6
0.6
1.7
1.1
5.6
4.5
0.6
0.2
2.0
1.6
4.5
2.9
0.6
2.2
1.1
3.1
2.0
0.7
1.8
0.8
2.3
1.6
0.7
1.4
0.9
2.0
1.1
0.7
1.6
1.0
1.6
0.6
0.6
0.1
1.5
Japan
Saving
Private
Public
31.3
27.8
3.5
33.0
25.1
7.8
32.8
25.8
6.9
31.4
25.9
5.5
30.7
25.9
4.9
31.4
26.9
4.5
31.0
27.0
4.0
29.7
27.4
2.3
28.8
28.0
0.8
28.6
28.3
0.3
28.1
25.1
3.0
Investment
Private
Public
30.5
21.4
9.1
30.2
23.4
6.8
29.7
21.1
8.6
28.7
20.0
8.6
28.6
20.0
8.6
30.0
21.2
8.7
28.7
20.9
7.8
26.5
18.6
7.9
25.9
17.3
8.6
25.5
17.6
7.9
25.9
19.1
6.9
Net lending
Private
Public
Current transfers
Factor income
Resource balance
0.9
6.5
5.6
0.1
0.1
0.8
2.8
1.7
1.1
0.1
0.6
2.3
3.1
4.7
1.6
0.1
0.9
2.3
2.8
5.9
3.1
0.1
0.9
2.1
2.1
5.8
3.7
0.2
0.8
1.5
1.4
5.7
4.2
0.2
1.2
0.5
2.3
6.0
3.8
0.2
1.3
1.1
3.2
8.7
5.5
0.2
1.5
1.9
2.9
10.7
7.8
0.3
1.1
2.1
3.1
10.7
7.6
0.3
1.7
1.6
2.1
6.0
3.9
0.2
1.7
0.7
238
Table 44 (continued)
Averages
__________________
197784 198592
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Average
20012004
...
...
...
35.1
27.6
7.5
33.7
26.4
7.3
33.4
25.9
7.5
33.5
26.2
7.3
32.7
25.8
6.9
32.4
25.7
6.7
32.6
25.3
7.3
32.8
26.1
6.7
33.0
26.5
6.4
33.2
27.5
5.7
Investment
Private
Public
...
...
...
28.9
22.6
6.3
31.2
24.2
7.0
31.7
24.9
6.8
32.5
25.7
6.8
32.0
25.3
6.7
30.7
24.1
6.6
23.5
16.5
7.0
26.7
19.6
7.1
27.9
21.0
6.9
29.5
22.9
6.7
Net lending
Private
Public
Current transfers
Factor income
Resource balance
...
...
...
...
...
...
6.2
5.0
1.2
0.1
0.4
5.6
2.4
2.2
0.2
0.3
2.1
1.7
1.0
0.7
0.6
1.1
1.0
0.5
0.5
0.3
1.1
0.2
0.7
0.5
0.2
0.3
1.2
0.2
1.7
1.6
0.1
0.1
1.4
0.5
9.1
8.9
0.2
0.3
1.1
7.7
6.1
6.4
0.3
0.1
1.0
5.1
5.1
5.5
0.4
0.3
1.0
4.3
3.7
4.6
0.9
0.2
1.0
2.8
Developing countries
Saving
Investment
Net lending
Current transfers
Factor income
Resource balance
23.3
24.4
1.1
0.9
1.5
1.6
23.4
25.2
1.9
1.0
1.6
1.3
25.5
28.6
3.2
1.3
1.5
2.9
26.9
28.2
1.3
1.1
1.1
1.3
27.4
28.9
1.5
1.1
1.5
1.0
26.9
28.0
1.1
1.2
1.5
0.8
27.3
27.8
0.5
1.3
1.6
0.2
26.4
26.6
0.2
1.2
1.5
0.1
26.3
27.1
0.8
1.3
1.8
0.2
26.0
26.8
0.9
1.3
1.8
0.4
26.1
27.4
1.3
1.2
1.8
0.7
0.9
0.1
0.9
0.6
1.8
1.2
2.8
2.0
3.1
1.8
3.3
2.1
4.6
1.7
3.1
0.4
2.3
0.3
2.4
0.8
2.0
0.9
22.3
25.0
2.7
1.8
3.6
4.2
17.4
20.9
3.5
3.4
5.0
1.9
15.0
20.5
5.5
4.2
6.0
3.7
15.8
20.8
5.0
4.2
5.6
3.6
15.4
20.5
5.0
3.7
5.3
3.5
17.6
19.0
1.4
3.5
4.8
0.1
17.6
19.3
1.8
3.7
4.9
0.6
15.9
21.2
5.3
3.9
4.8
4.4
15.9
21.6
5.7
3.8
4.8
4.8
17.5
21.6
4.0
3.7
4.8
2.9
19.4
23.0
3.6
3.5
4.5
2.6
1.0
0.4
1.5
0.2
2.4
1.5
1.7
0.4
0.3
3.7
3.0
3.0
3.3
0.8
0.2
0.2
0.4
1.9
1.7
1.4
1.1
Asia
Saving
Investment
Net lending
Current transfers
Factor income
Resource balance
25.4
25.6
0.1
1.2
0.9
2.2
28.1
29.4
1.3
0.8
0.4
1.7
32.5
34.6
2.1
1.0
0.6
2.5
33.5
33.9
0.4
1.0
0.4
1.1
33.4
34.6
1.2
1.0
1.2
1.0
32.5
33.6
1.1
1.1
0.8
1.4
33.3
32.7
0.7
1.3
1.0
0.4
33.2
30.3
2.8
1.1
1.1
2.8
32.5
31.2
1.3
1.1
1.0
1.2
31.1
30.3
0.8
1.1
0.9
0.6
30.2
30.3
0.1
1.0
1.0
4.8
2.1
1.1
0.8
2.5
1.6
4.6
3.3
4.2
2.0
3.8
2.1
6.5
1.9
5.3
1.2
3.7
0.6
3.4
1.0
2.6
1.0
26.5
25.1
1.3
0.7
0.7
1.3
19.3
23.2
3.9
0.3
0.2
4.4
19.4
24.1
4.7
0.8
0.1
5.4
22.5
21.7
0.8
0.3
1.2
24.2
23.8
0.5
0.1
0.6
20.6
20.0
0.6
0.2
0.7
1.2
21.1
20.9
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
18.7
21.8
3.2
0.2
3.3
18.9
21.6
2.7
0.5
1.1
2.1
19.3
21.8
2.5
0.5
0.7
2.3
20.0
22.8
2.8
0.6
1.1
2.3
4.8
2.1
0.2
0.4
0.4
0.7
1.1
0.9
1.9
1.6
2.2
2.5
2.2
1.0
0.6
1.5
0.8
0.5
0.6
0.2
0.8
0.4
Memorandum
Acquisition of foreign assets
Change in reserves
Regional groups
Africa
Saving
Investment
Net lending
Current transfers
Factor income
Resource balance
Memorandum
Memorandum
Acquisition of foreign assets
Change in reserves
Middle East and Europe
Saving
Investment
Net lending
Current transfers
Factor income
Resource balance
Memorandum
Acquisition of foreign assets
Change in reserves
239
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Table 44 (continued)
Averages
__________________
197784 198592
Western Hemisphere
Saving
Investment
Net lending
Current transfers
Factor income
Resource balance
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Average
20012004
19.2
22.2
3.0
0.3
3.4
0.1
19.6
20.8
1.1
1.0
3.3
1.2
17.5
21.3
3.8
1.0
2.3
2.4
18.6
21.5
2.9
0.9
1.7
2.1
19.1
20.8
1.6
1.1
1.6
1.2
19.5
21.4
1.9
1.1
2.2
0.7
18.7
21.9
3.2
1.0
2.2
1.9
17.1
21.6
4.5
1.1
1.9
3.6
18.0
21.3
3.3
1.2
3.1
1.3
19.0
22.2
3.2
1.1
3.3
1.1
20.6
23.5
2.9
1.1
3.0
1.0
1.3
0.3
0.9
0.4
0.8
1.0
0.4
2.1
1.7
2.5
1.7
1.8
1.0
0.1
0.7
0.2
0.4
0.9
0.2
1.1
0.7
30.5
25.6
4.9
2.4
1.7
5.7
20.1
22.8
2.7
2.9
0.4
0.2
19.0
24.3
5.3
2.1
1.4
1.8
22.0
21.8
0.2
2.5
1.8
4.4
23.5
23.4
0.1
2.4
1.8
4.3
23.5
18.0
5.5
2.0
1.9
9.4
23.0
19.7
3.3
1.8
1.5
6.7
17.5
21.8
4.3
2.1
1.3
1.0
18.1
21.5
3.4
1.8
2.6
1.0
19.7
21.2
1.5
1.5
2.3
2.4
20.6
22.6
2.0
1.0
2.3
1.3
5.1
1.6
0.2
0.4
0.1
2.0
2.7
0.1
0.4
5.5
4.5
3.2
2.2
1.5
2.7
0.3
1.0
1.7
0.8
1.2
0.5
21.5
24.1
2.6
1.6
1.9
2.6
23.9
25.6
1.7
1.6
1.9
1.4
26.3
29.2
2.9
1.7
1.5
3.1
27.5
29.0
1.5
1.5
1.1
1.9
27.9
29.5
1.6
1.5
1.5
1.6
27.3
29.2
1.9
1.6
1.4
2.0
27.8
28.7
0.9
1.6
1.6
1.0
27.3
27.1
0.2
1.6
1.5
0.2
27.2
27.7
0.5
1.6
1.8
0.3
26.6
27.4
0.8
1.6
1.7
0.7
26.7
27.9
1.2
1.4
1.7
0.9
0.5
0.3
1.1
0.7
2.0
1.6
2.8
2.2
3.4
2.0
3.1
1.9
4.8
1.6
3.5
0.7
2.6
0.5
2.5
0.8
2.1
0.9
38.3
26.0
12.3
8.3
1.8
18.7
16.2
20.3
4.1
12.0
7.9
17.5
22.1
4.7
11.4
7.4
0.7
18.3
20.1
1.8
12.2
4.9
5.5
21.5
20.1
1.4
10.5
4.6
7.4
23.1
18.9
4.2
9.1
3.1
10.2
24.5
20.5
4.0
8.8
3.6
9.2
16.4
21.7
5.3
9.6
4.6
0.3
17.3
19.5
2.2
8.6
1.9
4.6
17.8
18.6
0.8
8.1
2.2
5.0
18.5
19.0
0.5
7.0
2.5
4.1
12.3
2.0
3.4
1.3
2.4
3.8
0.5
1.6
3.0
0.8
5.1
2.9
4.5
3.0
2.0
5.1
2.0
0.2
2.8
0.7
2.6
0.6
22.5
24.3
1.8
1.3
1.7
2.5
23.6
25.4
1.8
1.5
2.0
1.3
25.7
28.9
3.1
1.7
1.8
3.0
27.2
28.5
1.3
1.5
1.3
1.5
27.6
29.1
1.5
1.5
1.7
1.3
27.0
28.3
1.3
1.5
1.6
1.2
27.4
28.0
0.6
1.6
1.7
0.5
26.7
26.8
0.1
1.5
1.7
0.1
26.6
27.3
0.7
1.6
1.9
0.4
26.2
27.1
0.9
1.5
1.9
0.5
26.3
27.6
1.3
1.4
1.9
0.8
0.3
1.1
0.6
1.9
1.3
2.9
2.1
3.1
1.8
3.3
2.1
4.7
1.7
3.2
0.5
2.3
0.3
2.4
0.8
2.0
0.9
Memorandum
Acquisition of foreign assets
Change in reserves
Analytical groups
By source of export earnings
Fuel
Saving
Investment
Net lending
Current transfers
Factor income
Resource balance
Memorandum
Acquisition of foreign assets
Change in reserves
Nonfuel
Saving
Investment
Net lending
Current transfers
Factor income
Resource balance
Memorandum
Acquisition of foreign assets
Change in reserves
By external financing source
Net creditor countries
Saving
Investment
Net lending
Current transfers
Factor income
Resource balance
Memorandum
Memorandum
Acquisition of foreign assets
Change in reserves
240
Table 44 (continued)
Averages
__________________
197784 198592
Official financing
Saving
Investment
Net lending
Current transfers
Factor income
Resource balance
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Average
20012004
17.0
19.2
2.2
3.7
0.7
8.4
14.0
18.5
4.5
4.5
2.5
6.5
13.5
20.2
6.6
6.0
4.4
8.2
14.5
19.9
5.4
5.7
4.4
6.7
13.8
19.4
5.7
5.4
4.2
6.9
14.9
19.3
4.4
5.4
3.8
5.9
14.9
19.2
4.3
5.9
4.1
6.1
14.1
19.7
5.6
5.9
4.3
7.2
13.6
19.9
6.3
5.5
3.7
8.0
15.3
19.9
4.6
5.3
3.7
6.3
17.4
21.1
3.7
4.9
3.2
5.5
0.5
0.3
0.6
0.1
1.0
0.1
1.0
1.9
0.5
0.6
1.4
1.3
0.8
1.1
0.2
0.1
0.9
1.3
0.6
0.7
Private financing
Saving
Investment
Net lending
Current transfers
Factor income
Resource balance
24.7
25.8
1.1
0.4
0.9
0.5
26.5
27.3
0.8
0.6
1.7
0.3
28.8
31.9
3.2
0.6
1.6
2.2
30.6
31.3
0.7
0.5
1.2
31.1
31.8
0.8
0.6
1.8
0.5
30.0
30.8
0.7
0.6
2.1
0.7
30.7
30.3
0.4
0.7
1.9
1.6
30.2
29.4
0.8
0.6
1.9
2.0
30.4
30.4
0.8
2.3
1.6
29.6
29.9
0.3
0.8
2.2
1.2
29.1
30.0
1.0
0.7
2.2
0.6
0.9
0.5
1.4
0.7
2.5
1.2
3.6
2.4
4.2
2.4
4.4
2.7
6.3
1.8
4.3
0.2
3.3
0.3
3.4
1.0
2.7
1.1
19.9
23.1
3.2
2.3
2.2
3.3
20.7
23.6
2.9
2.4
2.3
3.0
22.9
24.3
1.4
2.9
1.3
3.0
23.5
24.5
0.9
2.5
0.2
3.2
23.9
25.7
1.8
2.4
0.4
3.8
23.9
25.2
1.3
2.4
0.6
4.3
23.2
25.1
1.9
2.3
0.1
4.1
21.9
22.0
0.1
2.3
0.1
2.4
21.0
21.5
0.5
2.2
2.7
20.8
21.7
0.9
2.1
3.0
21.9
23.1
1.2
1.8
0.1
3.0
1.6
1.6
0.4
0.6
1.7
2.4
1.8
1.5
1.4
0.9
1.1
0.8
1.8
1.6
1.4
1.6
0.5
0.4
0.1
0.3
0.3
20.2
23.2
3.0
1.4
3.5
3.3
18.9
21.4
2.5
2.3
3.1
1.7
17.6
21.5
3.9
3.0
3.3
3.7
19.9
21.3
1.4
2.6
2.5
1.4
19.5
21.5
2.0
2.3
1.6
2.7
18.6
19.4
0.9
2.2
2.1
1.1
17.8
19.8
2.0
2.2
1.9
2.3
16.0
20.2
4.3
2.3
2.2
4.4
16.3
20.4
4.1
2.3
3.0
3.4
17.7
20.9
3.2
2.2
3.0
2.5
19.5
22.5
2.9
2.1
2.7
2.3
0.1
0.7
0.7
0.2
1.0
0.8
2.1
1.4
1.1
1.2
2.9
2.7
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.9
0.3
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.7
0.7
23.9
25.0
1.1
1.3
0.3
2.1
25.8
27.2
1.4
1.1
1.4
1.1
28.7
31.5
2.8
1.2
1.3
2.8
29.8
31.0
1.2
1.2
0.9
1.5
30.4
31.7
1.4
1.2
1.7
0.8
29.8
31.2
1.4
1.3
1.4
1.2
30.5
30.6
0.1
1.4
1.6
0.1
30.1
28.8
1.3
1.3
1.5
1.5
29.8
29.5
0.3
1.3
1.6
0.6
28.8
29.0
0.1
1.3
1.5
0.1
28.4
29.2
0.8
1.2
1.6
0.4
0.6
0.6
1.2
0.9
2.3
1.5
3.2
2.3
3.8
2.1
3.4
1.9
6.0
2.0
4.4
1.0
3.1
0.6
3.0
0.9
2.3
0.9
Memorandum
Memorandum
Acquisition of foreign assets
Change in reserves
Diversified financing
Saving
Investment
Net lending
Current transfers
Factor income
Resource balance
Memorandum
Acquisition of foreign assets
Change in reserves
Net debtor countries by debtservicing experience
Countries with arrears
and/or rescheduling
during 199397
Saving
Investment
Net lending
Current transfers
Factor income
Resource balance
Memorandum
Memorandum
Acquisition of foreign assets
Change in reserves
241
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
Table 44 (concluded)
Averages
__________________
197784 198592
Countries in transition
Saving
Investment
Net lending
Current transfers
Factor income
Resource balance
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Average
20012004
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
23.2
25.9
2.7
1.5
1.1
3.1
24.1
24.7
0.6
0.9
1.0
0.5
23.4
24.3
0.9
0.7
0.6
1.0
21.6
24.1
2.5
0.8
0.4
2.9
20.5
24.1
3.5
0.9
0.9
3.5
18.3
21.7
3.4
0.9
1.6
2.8
20.0
21.4
1.3
1.2
3.3
0.7
20.3
22.0
1.6
1.0
2.1
0.5
22.0
24.1
2.0
1.0
1.7
1.3
...
...
...
...
3.1
2.1
2.2
1.2
2.5
4.3
0.5
0.2
2.8
1.4
1.9
0.1
3.5
1.0
3.4
1.5
2.8
1.5
Memorandum
Acquisition of foreign assets
Change in reserves
Note: The estimates in this table are based on individual countries national accounts and balance of payments statistics. For many countries, the estimates
of national saving are built up from national accounts data on gross domestic investment and from balance-of-payments-based data on net foreign investment.
The latter, which is equivalent to the current account balance, comprises three components: current transfers, net factor income, and the resource balance. The
mixing of data sources, which is dictated by availability, implies that the estimates for national saving that are derived incorporate the statistical discrepancies. Furthermore, errors, omissions, and asymmetries in balance of payments statistics affect the estimates for net lending; at the global level, net lending,
which in theory would be zero, equals the world current account discrepancy. Notwithstanding these statistical shortcomings, flow of funds estimates, such
as those presented in this table, provide a useful framework for analyzing development in saving and investment, both over time and across regions and countries. Country group composites are weighted by GDP valued at purchasing power parities (PPPs) as a share of total world GDP.
242
198996
Four-Year
Average
19972000
1997
1998
1999
2000
Four-Year
Average
20012004
3.4
3.0
4.2
2.9
3.2
2.5
5.7
4.7
3.3
2.7
4.3
1.4
4.2
3.2
5.8
2.2
2.5
2.2
3.2
0.2
3.0
2.8
3.5
0.8
3.5
2.7
4.8
2.8
4.0
2.8
5.4
4.6
Memorandum
Potential output
Major industrial countries
2.8
2.6
2.3
2.4
2.3
2.3
2.2
2.3
4.3
6.4
5.8
9.9
3.6
3.7
6.2
6.3
5.3
1.8
2.3
6.1
8.8
0.9
6.4
4.5
3.7
9.2
11.4
7.0
4.8
1.3
2.9
5.9
1.1
2.7
5.9
7.2
8.2
6.0
7.3
8.0
4.8
2.4
3.4
6.6
9.2
1.2
5.6
6.0
5.2
10.3
11.4
5.0
3.2
4.9
5.9
3.0
2.4
2.7
6.2
5.6
7.2
6.1
6.7
7.8
1.2
3.8
0.9
0.1
0.1
1.9
0.3
0.8
0.6
0.5
0.9
1.2
6.6
1.2
0.8
1.5
1.7
0.3
1.2
0.6
0.1
0.1
0.2
2.8
10.7
0.2
2.0
4.1
0.9
2.5
3.1
5.7
7.8
5.4
3.3
1.5
32.1
14.8
1.4
27.7
7.2
0.9
7.8
3.4
1.0
1.6
3.7
5.8
32.9
6.6
3.7
41.9
160.6
1.7
8.0
26.4
2.1
9.2
28.2
1.5
10.3
20.9
1.4
6.7
39.3
1.8
5.8
18.1
2.0
4.3
10.1
5.7
5.5
2.9
3.9
4.1
3.2
4.0
3.2
4.5
3.0
4.0
3.3
3.9
3.5
3.8
3.5
Percent of GDP
Balances on current account
Advanced economies
Developing countries
Countries in transition
0.4
2.2
0.4
1.9
0.5
1.2
2.8
0.4
1.1
2.8
0.2
1.5
3.1
0.3
1.0
2.4
0.3
1.2
2.8
0.2
1.5
2.5
35.1
8.4
35.9
30.2
36.1
41.6
34.6
30.8
37.1
39.2
37.1
49.3
35.8
47.0
33.2
41.0
Debt service
Developing countries
Countries in transition
4.6
2.0
4.7
3.6
5.9
7.0
5.6
3.8
6.0
6.6
6.3
8.9
5.7
8.7
5.1
7.0
1Data
243
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
198996
Four-Year
Average
19972000
1997
1998
1999
2000
Four-Year
Average
20012004
4.2
2.4
3.8
1.8
5.7
9.2
0.1
8.8
4.3
6.0
0.8
4.5
5.8
11.4
0.9
11.4
3.2
4.9
6.6
1.3
3.5
2.4
1.5
1.1
4.8
5.6
1.2
7.2
5.4
6.7
0.1
7.3
Africa
Real GDP
Export volume1
Terms of trade1
Import volume1
2.4
4.3
3.6
5.2
2.5
5.2
0.2
4.2
3.6
3.4
0.1
5.1
3.1
6.3
0.3
7.9
3.4
1.8
5.6
2.9
3.1
3.3
2.2
5.2
5.0
6.1
2.8
4.6
5.2
5.1
0.3
4.8
Asia
Real GDP
Export volume1
Terms of trade1
Import volume1
7.2
5.8
0.2
5.3
8.0
12.7
0.6
12.1
5.2
6.9
1.0
3.1
6.6
14.3
0.5
7.0
3.7
6.0
3.8
9.2
5.3
1.2
1.2
5.5
5.4
6.3
0.7
10.1
5.9
7.9
0.4
9.5
2.5
1.1
6.9
1.0
3.9
7.7
3.8
3.1
4.8
2.3
4.6
4.5
9.8
0.2
13.2
3.2
5.3
13.6
2.6
1.8
0.6
3.7
2.0
3.1
3.6
1.4
5.3
4.5
3.8
0.1
4.0
Western Hemisphere
Real GDP
Export volume1
Terms of trade1
Import volume1
1.7
4.2
4.4
2.4
3.0
7.9
0.2
10.7
2.9
6.7
0.4
6.7
5.3
10.0
2.8
19.9
2.2
5.5
6.1
7.3
0.1
5.6
3.5
4.7
3.9
5.6
1.8
5.5
4.9
7.6
0.2
6.9
2.2
3.9
5.3
1.3
2.7
5.1
0.9
4.4
2.9
5.9
0.1
5.5
4.2
9.9
0.2
14.3
2.0
0.4
4.7
2.0
1.3
6.1
2.0
4.1
7.5
2.7
6.1
4.9
7.9
0.5
6.7
5.6
5.5
1.4
3.2
6.9
10.5
11.1
4.9
6.6
0.8
4.4
6.4
12.9
1.1
10.4
3.7
7.0
5.1
2.6
4.4
1.2
0.4
2.0
5.1
5.4
0.7
8.4
5.7
7.0
0.4
8.1
Regional groups
Analytical groups
Net debtor countries by debtservicing experience
244
Table 46 (concluded)
1988
1992
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2004
11.8
221.7
27.1
14.4
12.8
11.7
185.9
24.5
9.6
15.0
6.3
154.2
24.1
8.3
15.8
4.9
148.3
24.1
7.7
16.4
6.6
167.6
27.0
9.0
18.0
4.5
160.6
27.0
9.2
17.8
4.9
152.2
24.5
9.0
15.5
6.7
131.3
19.2
7.4
11.9
Africa
Current account balance
Total external debt
Debt-service payments2
Interest payments
Amortization
16.2
257.0
27.8
13.2
14.8
10.0
248.6
26.9
10.3
17.0
4.6
230.2
22.6
9.1
13.6
5.2
220.0
22.6
8.9
13.7
15.6
251.2
24.2
10.2
14.0
14.9
244.4
28.3
12.0
16.3
10.9
224.6
26.8
12.3
14.5
8.2
190.1
20.6
9.2
11.9
Asia
Current account balance
Total external debt
Debt-service payments2
Interest payments
Amortization
12.0
184.8
21.1
10.2
10.9
4.8
155.1
20.4
7.5
12.9
7.6
118.3
16.2
6.1
10.1
0.9
115.0
14.5
5.0
9.5
9.4
118.6
19.5
5.8
13.7
4.6
112.5
15.7
5.4
10.3
2.0
107.9
14.6
5.3
9.5
3.7
90.6
12.7
4.1
8.6
13.5
146.4
16.3
8.2
8.1
15.0
107.3
12.4
5.2
7.2
4.2
93.0
17.8
4.0
13.8
2.6
92.8
15.3
3.6
11.6
9.0
120.9
15.6
5.0
10.6
2.7
119.1
17.4
5.3
12.1
2.5
115.3
15.2
5.0
10.1
3.5
111.4
11.2
5.3
5.9
Western Hemisphere
Current account balance
Total external debt
Debt-service payments2
Interest payments
Amortization
7.4
308.3
43.1
25.4
17.8
19.9
276.5
41.9
16.7
25.1
14.1
238.8
45.1
15.9
29.1
22.2
225.9
50.1
15.6
34.5
30.9
260.9
50.9
17.5
33.4
18.5
246.5
54.9
18.2
36.7
16.7
228.8
47.9
17.3
30.6
13.4
195.1
35.8
13.8
22.0
23.6
343.6
39.1
21.7
17.5
11.0
322.1
35.6
13.9
22.0
9.7
260.8
28.8
11.4
17.4
15.2
244.1
33.2
10.9
22.3
25.8
288.3
36.7
12.9
23.8
18.0
270.4
45.3
14.7
30.6
14.2
238.3
39.3
14.0
25.6
9.8
190.3
26.8
9.5
17.6
11.3
168.7
25.5
9.8
15.7
8.0
141.4
24.5
8.5
16.0
3.8
136.5
23.5
7.6
15.8
0.1
145.8
26.7
8.5
18.1
1.1
141.3
24.2
8.4
15.8
3.2
137.8
22.1
8.2
13.9
6.8
120.3
18.2
7.2
11.0
Regional groups
Analytical groups
Net debtor countries by debtservicing experience
Countries with arrears
and/or rescheduling
during 199397
Current account balance
Total external debt
Debt-service payments2
Interest payments
Amortization
1Data
245
December 1993
December 1993
December 1993
December 1997
December 1997
December 1997
246
Economic Convergence
September 1995
December 1997
Price Stability
Inflation Targets
Global Liquidity
December 1993
December 1997
247
V. Fiscal Policy
Structural Budget Indicators for Major Industrial Countries
May 1996
December 1993
248
December 1997
May 1998, Chapter IV
Leverage
September 1995
September 1995
September 1995
249
December 1993
September 1995
September 1995
December 1997
December 1997
Exchange-Rate-Based Stabilization
Currency Convertibility
Currency Boards
250
December 1997
Currency Convertibility
May 1997
September 1995
X. Regional Issues
World Economic Outlook
The Maastricht Agreement on Economic and Monetary Union
January 1993
December 1997
251
December 1997
252
September 1995
253
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