Professional Documents
Culture Documents
As for the new matter raised for the first time on appeal, the court ruled that neither
the rules of procedure nor jurisprudence would sanction the admission of evidence
that has not been formally offered during the trial. But this evidentiary rule is
applicable only to ordinary trials, not to cases covered by the rule on summary
procedure -- cases in which no full-blown trial is held.
The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value.
Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be
considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the
admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be
admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the
guidelines provided by the rules of evidence
UNDER C:
Rule 130, Documentary Evidence, Electronic Evidence,
Case No. 2
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sending of his letter of reconsideration by means of a fax machine is a valid mode of filing a letter of
reconsideration?
HELD:
A motion for reconsideration may either be filed by mail or personal delivery. When a motion for reconsideration was sent by mail,
the same shall be deemed filed on the date shown by the postmark on the envelope which shall be attached to the records of the
case. On the other hand, in case of personal delivery, the motion is deemed filed on the date stamped thereon by the proper office.
And the movant has 15 days from receipt of the decision within which to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal therefrom.
The mode used by petitioner in filing his reconsideration which was sent through a facsimile transmission is not sanctioned by the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
In Garvida v. Sales, Jr., we found inadmissible in evidence the filing of pleadings through fax machines and ruled that:
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning
an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric
current. The current is transmitted as a signal over regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is used by the receiver to
reproduce an image of the elemental area in the proper position and the correct shade. The receiver is equipped with a stylus or
other device that produces a printed record on paper referred to as a facsimile.
xxx A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without
the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally
signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading.xxx
Moreover, a facsimile transmission is not considered as an electronic evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act. In MCC
Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, We determined the question of whether the original facsimile transmissions
are "electronic data messages" or "electronic documents" within the context of the Electronic Commerce Act.
We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document," as defined under the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as
electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic
evidence.
UNDER C:
Rule 130, Documentary Evidence, Electronic Evidence, Case No. 3
ANG V. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 182835 | April 20, 2010 618 SCRA
FACTS:
This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of violence against women when a former boyfriend sent to the girl
the picture of a naked woman, not her, but with her face on it. The herein petitioner, Rustan Ang and the private
respondent, Irish Sagud were lovers during their college days in Wesleyan University in Maria Aurora Province of
Aurora. Eventually, Irish heard that Rustan has a live-in-partner whom Rustan got pregnant. Because of this, Irish
decided to broke up with Rustan. The latter asked Irish to elope with him, since he does not love the other girl, to
which Irish refused. To pressure Irish to get back with him he send multimedia messages to Irish, bearing a picture of
Because of this scenario, Irish, asked help from the Vic-Mayor of the municipality, to which coordination with the local
police was made. Under
UNDER C:
Rule 130, Documentary Evidence, Electronic Evidence, Case No. 4
RAMON A. SYHUNLIONG V. TERESITA D. RIVERA
G.R. No. 200148 | June 4, 2014
FACTS:
UNDER C:
Rule 130, Testimonial Evidence, Disqualifications
FACTS:
Spouses Navarro died in 1958 and 1993, respectively. They left behind
several parcels of land including a 108.3997-hectare lot located in
Cayabon, Milagros, Masbate. The spouses were survived by their
daughters Luisa Navarro Marcos, herein petitioner, and Lydia Navarro
Grageda, and the heirs of their only son Andres Navarro, Jr. The heirs
of Andres, Jr. are the respondents herein.
Petitioner and her sister Lydia discovered that respondents are
claiming exclusive ownership of the subject lot. Respondents based
their claim on the Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property where Andres,
Sr. donated the subject lot to Andres, Jr. Believing that the affidavit is a
UNDER C:
Rule 130, Testimonial Evidence, Disqualifications, Mental Incapacity or Immaturity
PEOPLE V. GOLIMLIM
G.R. No. 145225
|
April 2, 2004
FACTS:
Private complainant Evelyn G. Canchela (Evelyn), is a mental retardate.
When her mother, Amparo Hachero, left for Singapore on May 2, 1996
to work as a domestic helper, she entrusted Evelyn to the care and
custody of her (Amparos) sister Jovita Guban and her husband
Salvador Golimlim, herein appellant, at Barangay Bical, Bulan,
Sorsogon.
Sometime in August 1996, Jovita left the conjugal residence to meet a
certain Rosing,leaving Evelyn with appellant. Taking advantage of the
situation, appellant instructed private complainant to sleep, and soon
after she had laid down, he kissed her and took off her clothes.7 As he
poked at her an object which to Evelyn felt like a knife, he proceeded
to insert his penis into her vagina. His lust satisfied, appellant fell
asleep.
When Jovita arrived, Evelyn told her about what appellant did to her.
Jovita, however, did not believe her and in fact she scolded her.
Sometime in December of the same year, Lorna Hachero, Evelyns halfsister, received a letter from their mother Amparo instructing her to
fetch Evelyn from Sorsogon and allow her to stay in Novaliches,
Quezon City where she (Lorna) resided. Dutifully, Lorna immediately
repaired to appellants home in Bical, and brought Evelyn with her to
Manila.
A week after she brought Evelyn to stay with her, Lorna suspected that
her sister was pregnant as she noticed her growing belly. She
thereupon brought her to a doctor at the Pascual General Hospital at
Baeza, Novaliches, Quezon City for check-up and ultrasound
examination.
Lornas suspicions were confirmed as the examinations revealed that
Evelyn was indeed pregnant. She thus asked her sister how she
became pregnant, to which Evelyn replied that appellant had sexual
intercourse with her while holding a knife.
UNDER C:
Rule 130, Testimonial Evidence, Disqualifications, Marital DQ, Case No. 2
PEOPLE V. CASTANEDA
G.R. No. L-46306 | February 27, 1979
FACTS:
Benjamin Manaloto was charged with the crime of Falsification of Public
Document. The complaint was filed by his wife, Victoria Manaloto.
That on or about the 19th day of May, 1975, in the Municipality of San
Fernando, province of Pampanga, Philippines, Benjamin falsified in a
deed of sale the house and lot belonging to the conjugal partnership in
favor of Ponciano Lacsamana, making it appear that his spouse gave
her marital consent to said sale.
At the trial, the prosecution called the wife to the witness stand but the
defense moved to disqualify her as a witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule
130. The prosecution stated that it is a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other. Notwithstanding such opposition,
respondent Judge granted the motion, disqualifying Victoria.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of Public Document
may be considered as a criminal case for a crime committed by a
husband against his wife and, therefore, an exception to the rule on
marital disqualification.
HELD:
No. The case is an exception to the marital disqualification rule. WHEN
AN OFFENSE DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND VITALLY IMPAIRS,
THE CONJUGAL RELATION, IT COMES WITHIN THE EXCEPTION to the
statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a
criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the other.
In the case, it must be noted that had the sale of the said house and
lot, and the signing of the wifes name by her husband in the deed of
sale, been made with the consent of the wife, no crime could have
been charged against said husband. It is the husbands breach of his
wifes confidence which gave rise to the offense charged. And it is this
same breach of trust which prompted the wife to make the necessary
complaint.
With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where
the victim of the crime and the person who stands to be directly
prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person but the wife herself.
And it is undeniable that the act had the effect of directly and vitally
impairing the conjugal relation. This is apparent not only in the act of
the wife in personally lodging her complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal, but also in her insistent efforts in connection with the
instant petition, which seeks to set aside the order disqualifying her
from testifying against her husband.
Taken collectively, the actuations of the witness-wife underscore the
fact that the martial and domestic relations between her and the
accused-husband have become so strained that there is no more
harmony to be preserved said nor peace and tranquility which may be
disturbed. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the
consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is nonexistent.
Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidence of private life
which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which,
through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.
UNDER C:
Rule 130, Testimonial Evidence, Disqualifications, Death or Insanity, Case No. 1
RAZON V. CA
UNDER C:
Rule 130, Testimonial Evidence, Disqualifications, Death or Insanity, Case No. 2
SUNGA-CHAN V. CHUA
G.R. No. 143340 | August 15, 2001
FACTS:
Respondent alleged that, he verbally entered into a business
partnership with Jacinto. Respondent and Jacinto allegedly agreed to
register the business name of their partnership, under the name of
Jacinto as a sole proprietorship. The partnership allegedly had Jacinto
as manager, assisted by Josephine Sy, a sister of the wife respondent,
Erlinda Sy.
Upon Jacinto's death, his surviving wife, petitioner Cecilia and
particularly his daughter, petitioner Lilibeth, took over the operations,
control, custody, disposition and management of Shellite without
respondent's consent. Despite respondent's repeated demands upon
petitioners for accounting, inventory, appraisal, winding up and
restitution of his net shares in the partnership, petitioners failed to
comply.
Petitioners filed their Answer with Compulsory Counter-claims,
contending that they are not liable for partnership shares, unreceived
income/profits, interests, damages and attorney's fees, that
respondent does not have a cause of action against them, and that the
trial court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action, the SEC
being the agency that has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
case. As counterclaim, petitioner sought attorney's fees and expenses
of litigation.
The trial court rendered its Decision ruling for respondent. Petitioners
filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court, the CA dismissed the
appeal. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners question the correctness of the finding of the trial court and
the Court of Appeals that a partnership existed between respondent
and Jacinto from 1977 until Jacinto's death. In the absence of any
written document to show such partnership between respondent and
UNDER C:
Rule 130, Testimonial Evidence, Disqualifications, Death or Insanity, Case No. 3
BORDALBA V. CA
G.R. No. 112443 | January 25, 2002
Facts:
In 1980, herein petitioner was granted a Free Patent and was issued an
Original Certificate of Title over the herein subject lot. Shecaused the
subdivision and titling of the said lot into 6 parcels, as well as the
conveyance of the two parcels thereof. Private respondents,however,
claimed ownership over the same lot by virtue of an extrajudicial
partition made as early as 1947. Hence, they filed a complaint
todeclare void the Free Patent as well as the cancellation of the titles
issued. The trial court, finding that fraud was employed by petitioner
inobtaining the Free Patent, declared said free patent and title void and
ordered its cancellation. However, the purchaser and mortgagee ofthe
two parcels conveyed were declared in good faith, hence, upheld their
rights over the property. Both petitioner and private
respondentsappealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with
Issue:
Whether or not there is a violation of dead mans statute?
Held:
No. The dead man's statute does not operate to close the mouth of a
witness as to any matter of fact coming to his knowledge in anyother
way than through personal dealings with the deceased person, or
communication made by the deceased to the witness.
Since the claim of private respondents and the testimony of their
witnesses in the present case is based, inter alia, on the 1947 Deed of
Extra-judicial Partition and other documents, and not on dealings and
communications with the deceased, the questioned testimonies were
properly admitted by the trial court.
Likewise untenable is the claim of petitioner that private respondents
are not legal heirs of Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay. Other
than their bare allegations to dispute their heirship, no hard evidence
was presented by them to substantiate their allegations. Besides, in
order that an heir may assert his right to the property of a deceased,
no previous judicial declaration of heirship is necessary.
UNDER C:
Rule 130, Testimonial Evidence, Hearsay Evidence Rule, Case No. 1