EVIDENCE DIGESTS

Justice Bernabe
RULE 130 RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY (C. Testimonial Evidence)
1. People v. Gabawa
Joel Gabawa was accused of raping 35-year-old Eusebia Paloa. During trial, among the
witnesses presented were Dr. Sharon Pagunsan, the Rural Health Physician of San Enrique,
Iloilo and Dr. Mariano Hembra, a psychiatrist of the West Visayas Medical Center. Dr. Pagunsan
conducted the medico-legal examination and the findings in her medical report was that Eusebia
was suffering delusions and flight of ideas while Dr. Hembras psychiatry examination revealed
that Eusebia was suffering from chronic schizophrenia. It should be noted that the medico-legal
report of Dr. Pagunsan also found signs of injuries in Eusebias genitalia that was possibly
caused by sexual intercourse with a man. Another witness, SPO2 Ma. Mae Palabrica was able to
interview Eusebia and found her incoherent and illogical. The defense didnt present any
evidence despite being given sufficient time to prepare and only offered Dr. Pagunsans medical
report. The trial court found Gabawa guilty. One of the arguments presented by Gabawa was that
Eusebia was suffering from chronic schizophrenia and the she would have no capacity to
remember later on what happened several months back if she was then afflicted with the said
sickness. He further alleges that not only could the victim not state in detail how she was raped
but, worse, she failed to demonstrate that she put up any resistance to the alleged sexual assault
committed against her. In affirming the conviction, the Supreme Court stated that while Eusebias
suffering from schizophrenia at the time of the rape was established by the unrebutted testimony
of Dr. Hembra, the fact alone that Eusebia suffered from schizophrenia did not render her
incompetent to testify on the rape incident. Mental deficiency affects the weight accorded
to the testimony, not its admissibility. Accordingly, an adjudication of feeblemindedness
or unsoundness of mind does not render a witness incompetent, as long as her mental
condition or mental maturity is not impaired at the time of her production for the
examination. The insanity or intellectual weakness of a witness, no matter what form it
assumes, is not a valid objection to her competency if, at the time she is testifying, she
has mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong, so far as the facts in issue
and her testimony thereon are involved, understands the nature and obligation of an oath,
and can give a fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matters about which she
testifies. On a factual note, the Court considered transcripts of Eusebias testimony and was
convinced Eusebias testimony is plain, straightforward, to the point and unflawed by any material
or significant inconsistency, thus deserving of full faith and credit. Her testimony indicates that
she could understand questions particularly relating to the incident and could give responsive
answers to them. Eusebia even pointed to the assailant in open court, even bolstering the case. It
is established that schizophrenic persons do not suffer from a clouding of consciousness and
gross deficits of memory. Though she may not have totally lost her memory, it was shown that
Eusebia was suffering from an impairment of judgment, which made her incapable of giving an
intelligent consent to the sexual act. It has been held that where the rape victim is feeble-minded,
even if there may have been no physical force employed on the victim, the force required by the
statute is the sexual act itself. Karl Vincent B. Raso
2. People v. Golimlim
Evelyn Canchela, a mental retardate, was raped by Salvador Golimlim. Golimlim is the husband
of the sister of Evelyns mother. Evelyn told Jovita about what happened but she didnt believe
her. When Evelyn was fetched by Lorna, her half-sister, it was discovered that she was pregnant,
only then did the crime committed to victim actually surfaced. The Medico-Legal findings
confirmed the pregnancy as well as the hymen lacerations of Evelyn. A criminal complaint was
filed by Evelyn, assisted by Lorna, against Golimlim. While the case was pending, Evelyn gave
birth to a girl named Joana. The trial court convicted Golimlim. In his defense, Golimlim argues
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that Evelyns testimony is not categorical and is replete with contradictions, thus engendering
grave doubts as to his criminal culpability. In upholding the trial courts ruling, the Supreme Court
said that the fact that Evelyn is a mental retardate does not disqualify her as a witness nor
render her testimony bereft of truth.
Sections 20 and 21 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:
SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as provided in the next succeeding
section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to
others, may be witnesses.
xxx
SEC. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. The following
persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such
that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the
facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.
In People v. Trelles, the Court stated that a mental retardate or a feebleminded person is
not, per se, disqualified from being a witness, her mental condition not being a vitiation of
her credibility. It is now universally accepted that intellectual weakness, no matter what
form it assumes, is not a valid objection to the competency of a witness so long as the
latter can still give a fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matter testified to.
It can not then be gainsaid that a mental retardate can be a witness, depending on his or
her ability to relate what he or she knows. If his or her testimony is coherent, the same is
admissible in court To be sure, modern rules on evidence have downgraded mental
incapacity as a ground to disqualify a witness and has become a modern trend of
evidence. Thus, in a long line of cases, the Court has upheld the conviction of the accused
based mainly on statements given in court by the victim who was a mental retardate. Karl
Vincent B. Raso

3. People v. Rama
Roger Rama was accused of kidnapping Joyce Ann Cabiguin, who was 1 year and 6 months old
at the time of the crime. The prosecutions story was gathered mainly from the story of five-year
old Roxanne Cabiguin, Joyce Anns cousin. Roxanne, her sister Rose Ann, Mama Weng, Uncle
Dony, grandmother Diana, Joyce Ann and the latter's younger brother Pogi were at the Dagupan
public plaza. Roxanne played with her Uncle Dony, Rose Ann, and Joyce Ann at the plaza's
stage while her Mama Weng sat at the side of the stage, feeding Pogi. Mama Diana went to a
store to buy some food. At that time, Rama and another man were also at the plaza. Rama called
Roxanne and told her that if she would bring the beautiful girl (referring to Joyce Ann) to him, he
would give Roxanne a biscuit. Rama gave her one biscuit. She ate it. She then carried Joyce Ann
to the accused Rama who ran away with little Joyce Ann. Roxanne told her Mama Weng and
Mama Diana that Joyce Ann was taken by a man. They looked for Joyce Ann and the man but
they were nowhere to be found. During her testimony, Roxanne pointed to the accused Rama as
the man who took away Joyce Ann. The trial court convicted Rama. One of Ramas arguments
was that Roxanne's testimony, coming from the mouth of a five-year old, does not deserve credit
because she could not answer many questions and appeared to have been coached by her
grandmother, Diana. The Supreme Court didnt agree with Ramas contention stating that the
Rules of Evidence provide in Rule 130, Secs. 20 and 21:

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"Sec. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. - Except as provided in the next succeeding
section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perceptions
to others, may be witnesses.
Sec. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. - The following
persons cannot be witnesses:
xxx
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the
facts respecting which they are examined and relating them truthfully."
In Dulla v. Court of Appeals and Andrea Ortega, the Court, citing the above provisions,
gave credence to the testimony of a three-year old witness. It held:
"It is thus clear that any child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can
perceive, and perceiving, can make known his perception to others and of relating
truthfully facts respecting which he is examined. In the 1913 decision in United States v.
Buncad, this Court stated:
Professor Wigmore, after referring to the common-law precedents upon this point says:
'But this much may be taken as settled, that no rule defines any particular age as
conclusive of incapacity; in each instance the capacity of the particular child is to be
investigated.' (Wigmore on Evidence, vol. I, p. 638)
The requirements then of a child's competency as a witness are the: (a) capacity of
observation, (b) capacity of recollection, and (c) capacity of communication. And in
ascertaining whether a child is of sufficient intelligence according to the foregoing, it is
setted that the trial court is called upon to make such determination." In People v.
Mendiola, the Court gave credence to the testimony of the six-year old witness even if she
failed to answer some questions because of her tender age.
In the case at bar, while the five-year old witness, Roxanne, was not able to answer some
questions such as which was her left and her right, she was straightforward in identifying
the accused Rama as the culprit. The determination of the competence and credibility of a
child as a witness rests primarily with the trial judge as he had the opportunity to see the
demeanor of the witness, his apparent intelligence or lack of it, and his understanding of
the nature of the oath. As many of these qualities cannot be conveyed by the record of the
case, the trial judge's evaluation will not be disturbed on review, unless it is clear from the
record that his judgment is erroneous. Karl Vincent B. Raso
4. Alvarez v. Ramirez
Susan Ramirez filed a complaint for arson against Maximo Alvarez, the husband of Esperanza
Alvarez who is Susans sister. During trial Esperanza Alvarez was presented as a witness by the
prosecution and was described as the estranged wife of the accused. Maximo filed a motion to
disqualify Esperanza from testifying against him while Susan opposed the motion. The trial court
granted Maximos motion of disqualifying Esperanza while the CA nullified the trial courts order.
The question to be resolved is whether Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband in the
Criminal Case. In answering in the affirmative, the Supreme Court held that under Section 22,
Rule 130:
Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. ' During their marriage, neither the
husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a
crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants.

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The reasons given for the rule are 1) There is identity of interests between husband and
wife; 2) one were to testify for or against the other, there is' consequent danger of perjury;
3) The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the
risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and
unhappiness; and 4) Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of
punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other. However, like all other
general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions. Like the rule itself,
the exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh
those in support of the general rule. For instance, where the marital and domestic
relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and
tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility
fails. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury
based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and
confidences of private life, which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals,
which through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:
The act of private respondent in setting fire to the house of his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez,
knowing fully well that his wife was there, and in fact with the alleged intent of injuring the latter, is
an act totally alien to the harmony and confidences of marital relation which the disqualification
primarily seeks to protect. The criminal act complained of had the effect of directly and vitally
impairing the conjugal relation. It underscored the fact that the marital and domestic relations
between her and the accused-husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony,
peace or tranquility to be preserved. The Supreme Court has held that in such a case, identity is
non-existent. In such a situation, the security and confidences of private life which the law aims to
protect are nothing but ideals which through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy
home.
The Supreme Court also took note of the fact that Maximo and Esperanza were defacto
separated for six months before the incident. Karl Vincent B. Raso
5. Sanson, et. al. v. CA
Felicito Sanson, in his capacity as creditor, filed a petition for the settlement of the estate of Juan
Bon Fing Sy with the RTC of Iloilo City. Sanson claimed that Sy was indebted to him in the
amount of P603,000 and to his sister Celedonia, P360,000. Eduardo Montinola and his mother
Angeles also had separate claims, alleging that Sy owed them to P50,000 and P150,000
respectively. Melencia Sy, the spouse of Sy was appointed by the court as administratrix of the
estate. During the hearing of the claims, Sanson, Celedonia and Jade Montinola, wife of Eduardo,
all testified on the transactions that gave rise to the claims despite the objections of Melencia who
invoked Section 23, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court (refer to codal) otherwise known as
the Dead Mans Statute, specifically, on Jade testifying that on separate occasions, Sy borrowed
the P50,000 and P150,000 from her husband and mother-in-law respectively as evidenced by
three checks issued by the deceased. Melencia argues that the checks-exhibits identified by Jade
are inadmissible because she is the daughter-in-law of Angeles and wife of Eduardo making her
covered by the rule on disqualification. The trial court ruled that the Dead Mans Statute does not
apply to the witnesses who testified in support of the claims against the estate. The CA set aside
the trial courts ruling thereby dismissing the respective claims. In reversing the CA decision, the
Supreme Court said thusly:

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The rule renders incompetent: 1) parties to a case; 2) their assignors; or 3) persons in
whose behalf a case is prosecuted.
xxx
The rule is exclusive and cannot be construed to extend its scope by implication so as to
disqualify persons not mentioned therein. Mere witnesses who are not included in the
above enumeration are not prohibited from testifying as to a conversation or transaction
between the deceased and a third person, if he took no active part therein.
xxx
Jade is not a party to the case. Neither is she an assignor nor a person in whose behalf the case
is being prosecuted. She testified as a witness to the transaction. In transactions similar to those
involved in the case at bar, the witnesses are commonly family members or relatives of the
parties. Should their testimonies be excluded due to their apparent interest as a result of their
relationship to the parties, there would be a dearth of evidence to prove the transactions. In any
event, as will be discussed later, independently of the testimony of Jade, the claims of the
Montinolas would still prosper on the basis of their documentary evidencethe checks.
As to claim that the testimonies of Sanson and Celedonia as witnesses to each others claim
against the deceased are not covered by the Dead Mans Statute; besides, the administratrix
waived the application of the law when she cross-examined them.
Melencia, on the other hand, cites the ruling of the Court of Appeals in its decision on review, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
The more logical interpretation is to prohibit parties to a case, with like interest, from testifying in
each others favor as to acts occurring prior to the death of the deceased.
Since the law disqualifies parties to a case or assignors to a case without distinguishing between
testimony in his own behalf and that in behalf of others, he should be disqualified from testifying
for his co-parties. The law speaks of "parties or assignors of parties to a case." Apparently, the
testimonies of Sanson and Saquin on each others behalf, as co-parties to the same case, falls
under the prohibition. (Citation omitted; underscoring in the original and emphasis supplied)
But Sansons and Celedonias claims against the same estate arose from separate transactions.
Sanson is a third party with respect to Celedonias claim. And Celedonia is a third party with
respect to Sansons claim. One is not thus disqualified to testify on the others transaction.
In any event, what the Dead Mans Statute proscribes is the admission of testimonial
evidence upon a claim which arose before the death of the deceased. The incompetency is
confined to the giving of testimony. Since the separate claims of Sanson and Celedonia
are supported by checks-documentary evidence, their claims can be prosecuted on the
bases of said checks. Karl Vincent B. Raso
6. Sunga-Chan v. Chua
Lamberto Chua filed a complaint against Lilibeth Sunga Chan and Cecilia Sunga, daughter and
wife, respectively of the deceased Jacinto Sunga, for Winding Up of Partnership Affairs,
Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and Damages with Writ of Preliminary
Attachment. Chua alleged that he verbally entered into a partnership with Jacinto and allegedly
agreed to register the business name of their partnership Shellite Gas Appliance Center.
Business went but while Jacinto furnished Chua with the merchandise inventories, balance
sheets and net worth, he suspected that the amount indicated in the documents were understated
and undervalued by Jacinto and Josephine Sy, sister of Chuas wife. Jacinto died and Cecilia and
Lilibeth took over the operations, control, custody, disposition and management of Shellite without

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Chuas consent. Chua repeatedly demanded from Lillibeth and Cecilia accounting, inventory,
appraisal, winding up and restitution of his net shares in the partnership but the demand fell on
deaf ears and Lillibeth allegedly continued operations of Shellite and converted it to her own use.
At some point, Lillibeth finally paid P200,000 as partial payment for Chuas share but it wasnt
followed through and there was failure to comply with the duty to account. After many futile
attempts for a motion to dismiss by the Sungas, the trial court eventually ruled in favor of Chua
and the CA affirmed its decision. Among the Sungas contentions was that in the absence of any
written document to show that a partnership between Jacinto and Chua existed, the courts were
proscribed from hearing the testimonies of Chua and Josephine to prove the partnership, invoking
the Dead Man Statute under Sec. 23 of Rule 130, which states that:
"SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party. Parties or
assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an
executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a
person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased
person, or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact
occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of
unsound mind."
However, the Supreme Court was not impressed. In stating that the Dead Mans Statute is not
applicable in this case, the Court gave to reasons to wit:
First, Sungas filed a compulsory counterclaim against Chua in their answer before the trial
court, and with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed
this case from the ambit of the "Dead Man's Statute". Well entrenched is the rule that when
it is the executor or administrator or representatives of the estates that sets up the
counterclaim, the Chua, may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to
defeat the counterclaim. Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim, Chua is not
disqualified from testifying as to matters of facts occurring before the death of the
deceased, said action not having been brought against but by the estate or
representatives of the deceased.
Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the "Dead Man's Statute" for the
simple reason that she is not "a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose
behalf a case is prosecuted." Records show that respondent offered the testimony of
Josephine to establish the existence of the partnership between Chua and Jacinto. The
Sungas insistence that Josephine is the alter ego of Chua does not make her an assignor
because the term "assignor" of a party means "assignor of a cause of action which has
arisen, and not the assignor of a right assigned before any cause of action has arisen."
Plainly then, Josephine is merely a witness of respondent, the latter being the party
plaintiff. Karl Vincent B. Raso
7. Tan v. CA
Fernando Tan Kiat claims to have purchased the subject properties situated in Malate, Manila
from Alejandro Tan Keh. Tan Kiat built a house on the property but the land was not immediately
transferred on account of his foreign nationality. Tan Keh subsequently turned-over the owners
duplicate copy of the land as well as executed a 40-year lease to pass the time while the
nationality issue is being resolved. However, Tan Keh sold the property to his brother Remigio
and also executed a lease contract in favor of Tan Kiat. When it was time for Tan Kiat to demand
the properties back, the TCT of the subject property was transferred to the name of Tan Keh and
Remigio. A complaint for recovery of the property was filed by Tan Kiat, but on motion of Tan
Keh, the complaint was dismissed by the trial court. On appeal to the CA, the dismissal was
reversed and the case was remanded to the trial court. It must be noted that Tan Keh already
died. As part of their argument, the Tans point out that allowing Tan Kiat to rely on parol evidence
would violate the Dead Mans Statute. The Supreme Court reversed the CA decision stating that
he object and purpose of the rule is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in
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regard of the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party, and further to put
the two parties to a suit upon terms of equality in regard to the opportunity to giving
testimony. If one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death,
insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the undue advantage
of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction. From a
reading of the complaint itself, the annexes attached thereto and relevant laws and
jurisprudence, the complaint indeed does not spell out any cause of action. On a factual
note, the ruling of SC was grounded on the fact that he tarried in exercising his right over the
property, only acting after a period of 30 years and became estopped by laches. Karl Vincent B. Raso
8. Zulueta v. CA
Cecilia Zulueta, wife of Dr. Alfredo Martin, entered into the latters clinic, forcibly opened the
drawers and cabinets and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between
Alfredo and his alleged paramour which included greeting cards, cancelled checks, diaries,
passport and photographs. The documents seized were used in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which Cecilia filed against
Alfredo. Alfredo filed a complaint for recovery of the said items. The trial court and the CA ruled in
favor of Alfredo. One of Cecilias arguments was that in another related case, which is the
disbarment case filed by Alfredo against Atty. Alfonso Felix, the Court declared that the
documents were admissible in evidence and its use cant be considered as grounds for
malpractice and gross misconduct by the lawyer. In affirming the RTC and the CAs ruling, the
Supreme Court held that the two cases were entirely different cases and by no means did the
decision in the disbarment case establish the admissibility of the documents and papers in
question. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to
be] inviolable"is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if
there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding. Karl Vincnt B. Raso
9. People v. Carlos
Dr. Pablo Sityar performed a surgical operation upon Fausto Carlos wife for appendicitis and
certain other ailments. After the wife was discharged from the hospital, she was required to return
to Dr. Sityar for dressing of the wounds. On these occasions, Fausto was accompanying her.
However, during one of the visits, when Fausto was sent away on an errand to buy medicine, Dr.
Sityar allegedly outraged the wife. Yet, despite being told of the episode thereafter, Fausto still
returned to consult certain ailments without any outward expressions of resentment against Dr.
Sityar. One day, while he was confined at the Philippine General Hospital, Fausto received a
letter from Dr. Sityar asking for the immediate settlement of the account for the professional
servces rendered his wife. This seemed to be the last straw as the visit of Fausto to Dr. Sityar
would result to the former stabbing and killing the latter. The trial court convicted Fausto of
murder, stating that the act was committed with premeditation based on Exhibit L which was a
letter of Faustos wife to Dr. Sityar two days before the commission of the crime which states that
she feared Fausto contemplated resorting to physical violence in dealing with the deceased.
Fausto argues that the letter was privileged information and is not admissible in evidence. The
Supreme Court, in downgrading the crime from murder to simple homicide, stated that the
numerical weight of authority is, however, to the effect that where a privileged
communication from one spouse to another comes into the hands of a third party, whether
legally or not, without collusion and voluntary disclosure on the part of either of the
spouses, the privilege is thereby extinguished and the communication, if otherwise
competent, becomes admissible. The letter Exhibit L must, however, be excluded for other
reasons. The letter was written by the wife of the defendant and if she had testified at the
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trial the letter might have been admissible to impeach her testimony, but she was not put
on the witness-stand and the letter was therefore not offered for that purpose. If the
defendant either by answer or otherwise had indicated his assent to the statements
contained in the letter it might also have been admissible, but such is not the case here;
the fact that he had the letter in his possession is no indication of acquiescence or assent
on his part. The letter is therefore nothing but pure hearsay and its admission in evidence
violates the constitutional right of the defendant in a criminal case to be confronted with
the witnesses for the prosecution and have the opportunity to cross-examine them. In this
respect there can be no difference between an ordinary communication and one originally
privileged. The question is radically different from that of the admissibility of testimony of
a third party as to a conversation between a husband and wife overheard by the witness.
Testimony of that character is admissible on the ground that it relates to a conversation in
which both spouses took part and on the further ground that where the defendant has the
opportunity to answer a statement made to him by his spouse and fails to do so, his
silence implies assent. That cannot apply where the statement is contained in an
unanswered letter. Karl Vincent B, Raso
10. People v. Sandiganbayan
Ceferino Paredes applied for a free patent over a parcel of land and was approved. However, the
Director of Lands filed an action to cancel the free patent alleging that the land had been
designated reserved as a school site. The trial court ruled to nullify the patent stating that
Paredes it through fraudulent misrepresentations. Generoso Sansaet served as Paredes
counsel. After the trial courts decision, the Sangguniang Bayan filed a complaint for perjury
against Paredes but the Deputy Minister of Justice moved for dismissal of the case on the
grounds of prescription, however, despite this, Paredes was still held before the Tanodbayan. It
was alleged in the proceedings that by using his former position as Provincial Attorney to
influence and induce the Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act on his petition, he had violated
R.A. No. 3019. However, the case was also dismissed due to prescription. In both instances,
Sansaet still served as counsel. Again, a new case was filed against Paredes, Mansueto Honrado
who was a clerk of court and Sansaet for falsification of public documents. Ultimately, Sansaet, in
order to be discharged from the complaint and become a government witness, said that Paredes
contrived to have the graft case under preliminary investigation dismissed on the ground of
double jeopardy by making it appear that the perjury case had been dismissed by the trial court
after he had been arraigned, that the document were prepared and falsified by Honrado and
Paredes in the house of the latter and to evade responsibility, that he did the act upon the
instigation and inducement of Paredes. The Sandiganbayan denied Sansaets discharge stating
that the testimony was privileged information. The crux of the issue is if the test testimony of
Sansaet would be barred by attorney-client privilege. The Supreme Court answered in the
negative holding that statement and communications regarding the commission of a crime
already committed, made by a party who committed it, to an attorney, consulted as such,
are privileged communications. Contrarily, the unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the
effect that communications between attorney and client having to do with clients
contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak
of privileges ordinarily existing in reference to communications between attorney and
client. It is also well settled that in order that a communication between a lawyer and his
client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end.
Karl Vincent B. Raso

11. Sanvicente v. People

Joel Sanvicente was accused of shooting and killing Dennis Wong outside the Far East Bank
Katipunan branch. Atty. Leonardo Valmonte, counsel for Sanvicente, surrendered the .45 caliber
pistol which was used to the Police Station 9 as well as a letter addressed to its Station
Commander explaining that it was his client how was attacked by Wong to grab the money he
just withdrew and after a warning shot, that he was forced to shoot Wong as an act of selfdefense. The letter included a request for an escort and was stated to serve as a voluntary
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surrender without admission of guilt. During trial, the letter was used as one of the exhibits
(Exhibit LL) of the prosecution, to which it relied primarily. However, upon demurrer to evidence
by Sanvicente, the trial court dismissed the case for lack of evidence. The CA reversed the trial
courts order for preventing the prosecution from establishing the due execution of Exhibit LL
which, it claimed, positively identified Sanvicente as the perpetrator of the crime charged. In
reversing the CA, the Supreme Court stated that the trial court correctly rejected the
prosecutions motion to have Exhibit LL further identified "in the manner that it wanted,"
i.e., through the proposed testimony of petitioners counsel, Atty. Valmonte, who
incidentally refused to testify. Aside from covering a subject which squarely falls within
the scope of "privileged communication", it would, more importantly, be tantamount to
converting the admission into a confession. It can not be denied that the contents of
Exhibit LL, particularly with regard to the details of the shooting communicated by
petitioner to Atty. Valmonte, is privileged because it is connected with the business for
which petitioner retained the services of the latter. More specifically, said communication
was relayed by petitioner to Atty. Valmonte in order to seek his professional advice or
assistance in relation to the subject matter of the employment, or to explain something in
connection with it, so as to enable him to better advice his client or manage the litigation.
Pertinent to this is Section 24 (b) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons
cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxxxxxxxx
(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or
with a view to, professional employment nor can an attorneys secretary, stenographer, or
clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact
the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity; x x x. Karl Vincent B. Raso
12. Krohn v. CA
Edgar Krohn, Jr. and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married and had 3 children. However, the
relationship soured, and in order to ease the marital strain, Ma. Paz underwent psychological
testing. However, the effort proved futile as they still separated. Edgar was able to secure a copy
of the confidential psychiatric report on Ma. Paz prepared and signed by Drs. Cornelio Banaag,
Jr., and Baltazar Reyes and used it to nullify his church marriage. Edgar also filed a petition for
annulment of his marriage before the trial court and again cited the Confidential Psychiatric
Evaluation Report. During trial, Ma. Paz objected to the testimony regarding the contents of the
report and expressed her continuing objection to any evidence, oral or documentary, that would
thwart the physican-patient privileged communication rule. The trial court issued an Order
admitting the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation report in evidence while the CA affirmed. The
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court and the CAs decision stating that the treatise presented
by Ma. Paz on the privileged nature of the communication between physician and patient,
as well as the reasons therefor, is not doubted. Indeed, statutes making communications
between physician and patient privileged are intended to inspire confidence in the patient
and encourage him to make a full disclosure to his physician of his symptoms and
condition. Consequently, this prevents the physician from making public information that
will result in humiliation, embarrassment, or disgrace to the patient. For, the patient
should rest assured with the knowledge that the law recognizes the communication as
confidential, and guards against the possibility of his feelings being shocked or his
reputation tarnished by their subsequent disclosure. The physician-patient privilege
creates a zone of privacy, intended to preclude the humiliation of the patient that may
follow the disclosure of his ailments. Indeed, certain types of information communicated
in the context of the physician-patient relationship fall within the constitutionally protected
zone of privacy, including a patient's interest in keeping his mental health records
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confidential. Thus, it has been observed that the psychotherapist-patient privilege is
founded upon the notion that certain forms of antisocial behavior may be prevented by
encouraging those in need of treatment for emotional problems to secure the services of a
psychotherapist. However, Ma. Pazs interpretation is misplaced.
Lim v. Court of Appeals clearly lays down the requisites in order that the privilege may be
successfully invoked: (a) the privilege is claimed in a civil case; (b) the person against
whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or
obstetrics; (c) such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient
in his professional capacity; (d) the information was necessary to enable him to act in that
capacity; and, (e) the information was confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the
reputation (formerly character) of the patient. In the instant case, the person against whom
the privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He
is simply the patient's husband who wishes to testify on a document executed by medical
practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the claimed prohibition. Neither can his
testimony be considered a circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony cannot have
the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and executed the
report.
13. Abad Gonzales v. CA
Carolina Abad Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco sought the
settlement of the intestate estate of their brother, Ricardo. During the special proceedings, they
claimed that they were the only heirs of Ricardo as he died a bachelor leaving no descendants or
ascendants. Cecilia Empaynado and Marian Empaynado filed a motion to set aside the special
proceedings concerning the estate of Ricardo alleging that Honoria was the common law wife of
Ricardo while Cecilia and Marian were their children and that there is still another child named
Rosemarie of Ricardo by another woman. The trial court ruled in favor of the Empaynados,
declaring Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie as the surviving legal heirs of Ricardo. The CA also
ruled in favor of the Empaynados. One of the Abads arguments is that the Empaynado children
cant be Ricardos since, by means of an affidavit of a physician named Dr. Pedro Arenas, it is
alleged that he was at the time infected with gonorrhea and as consequence, is sterile. The
subject of contention is the admissibility of Dr. Arenas affidavit under Section 24 (c) of Rule 130
of the Rules of Court. In affirming the CA decision, the Supreme Court held that the rule on
confidential communications between physician and patient requires that: a) the action in
which the advice or treatment given or any information is to be used is a civil case; b) the
relation of physician and patient existed between the person claiming the privilege or his
legal representative and the physician; c) the advice or treatment given by him or any
information was acquired by the physician while professionally attending the patient; d)
the information was necessary for the performance of his professional duty; and e) the
disclosure of the information would tend to blacken the reputation of the patient. The
Abads do not dispute that the affidavit meets the first four requisites. They assert,
however, that the finding as to Ricardo Abad's "sterility" does not blacken the character of
the deceased. The Abads conveniently forget that Ricardo Abad's "sterility" arose when
the latter contracted gonorrhea, a fact which most assuredly blackens his reputation. In
fact, given that society holds virility at a premium, sterility alone, without the attendant
embarrassment of contracting a sexually-transmitted disease, would be sufficient to
blacken the reputation of any patient. The Court held that the affidavit inadmissible in
evidence. And the same remains inadmissible in evidence, notwithstanding the death of
Ricardo Abad. Karl Vincent B. Raso
14. People v. Invencion
Artemio Invencion was accused of raping his 16-year-old daughter Cynthia Invencion. Among the
witnesses presented by the prosecution was Elven Invencion, an 8-year-old half-brother of
Cynthia and son of Artemio from his second common-law wife. Elvens testimony stated that
while he was sleeping in one room with his father Artemio, Cynthia and two other younger
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brothers, he was awakened by Cynthias loud cries and saw his father on top of Cynthia, doing a
pumping motion. The trial court convicted Artemio. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Artemio
attacks the competency and credibility of Elven as a witness. He argues that Elven, as his son,
should have been disqualified as a witness against him under Section 20(c), Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. Besides, Elvens testimony appears not to be his but what the prosecution wanted
him to say, as the questions asked were mostly leading questions. Moreover, Elven had ill-motive
in testifying against him, as he (Artemio) was cruel to him. In affirming the conviction, the Court
said that as to the competency of Elven to testify, such is not affected by Section 25, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the rule on "filial privilege." This rule is not
strictly a rule on disqualification because a descendant is not incompetent or disqualified
to testify against an ascendant.The rule refers to a privilege not to testify, which can be
invoked or waived like other privileges. As correctly observed by the lower court, Elven
was not compelled to testify against his father; he chose to waive that filial privilege when
he voluntarily testified against Artemio. Elven declared that he was testifying as a witness
against his father of his own accord and only "to tell the truth." Karl Vincent B. Raso

Karl Vincent B. Raso ALS D-2012

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