UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs.

REYES
219 SCRA 192 (1993)
FACTS:
Respondent Nelia Montoya, an American Citizen, worked as an ID checker at the US
Navy Exchange (NEX) at the US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters
in Quezon City. Shes married to Edgardo Montoya, a Filipino-American serviceman
employed by the US Navy & stationed in San Francisco. Petitioner Maxine is an
American Citizen employed at the JUSMAG headquarters as the activity exchange
manager. Jan. 22, 1987 Montoya bought some items from the retail store Bradford
managed, where she had purchasing privileges. After shopping & while she was
already at the parking lot, Mrs. Yong Kennedy, a fellow ID checker approached her &
told her that she needed to search her bags upon Bradfords instruction. Montoya
approached Bradford to protest the search but she was told that it was to be made on all
JUSMAG employees on that day. Mrs. Kennedy then performed the search on her
person, bags & car in front of Bradford & other curious onlookers. Nothing irregular
was found thus she was allowed to leave afterwards. Montoya learned that she was the
only person subjected to such search that day & she was informed by NEX Security
Manager Roynon that NEX JUSMAG employees are not searched outside the store
unless there is a strong evidence of a wrong-doing. Montoya cant recall any
circumstance that would trigger suspicion of a wrong-doing on her part. She is aware
of Bradfords propensity to suspect Filipinos for theft and/or shoplifting. Montoya filed
a formal protest w/Mr. Roynon but no action was taken. Montoya filed a suit against
Bradford for damages due to the oppressive & discriminatory acts committed by
petitioner in excess of her authority as store manager. She claims that she has been
exposed to contempt & ridicule causing her undue embarrassment & indignity. She
further claims that the act was not motivated by any other reason aside from racial
discrimination in our own land w/c is a blow to our national pride & dignity. She seeks
for moral damages of P500k and exemplary damages of P100k. May 13, 1987
Summons & complaint were served on Bradford but instead of filing an answer, she
along with USA government filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that: (1) this is a suit
against US w/c is a foreign sovereign immune from suit w/o its consent and (2)
Bradford is immune from suit for acts done in the performance of her official functions
under Phil-US Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 & Military Bases Agreement of
1947. They claim that US has rights, power & authority w/in the bases, necessary for
the establishment, use & operation & defense thereof. It will also use facilities & areas
w/in bases & will have effective command over the facilities, US personnel,
employees, equipment & material. They further claim that checking of purchases at
NEX is a routine procedure observed at base retail outlets to protect & safeguard
merchandise, cash & equipment pursuant to par. 2 & 4(b) of NAVRESALEACT
SUBIC INST. 5500.1. July 6, 1987 Montoya filed a motion for preliminary
attachment claiming that Bradford was about to leave the country & was removing &
disposing her properties w/intent to defraud her creditors. Motion granted by RTC. July
14, 1987 Montoya opposed Bradfords motion to dismiss. She claims that: (1) search
was outside NEX JUSMAG store thus its improper, unlawful & highly-discriminatory
and beyond Bradfords authority; (2) due to excess in authority and since her liability is
personal, Bradford cant rely on sovereign immunity; (3) Bradfords act was committed
outside the military base thus under the jurisdiction of Philippine courts; (4) the Court
can inquire into the factual circumstances of case to determine WON Bradford acted
w/in or outside her authority. RTC granted Montoyas motion for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary attachment and later on issued writ of attachment opposed by Bradford.
Montoya allowed to present evidence & Bradford declared in default for failure to file
an answer. RTC ruled in favor of Montoya claiming that search was unreasonable,
reckless, oppressive & against Montoyas liberty guaranteed by Consti. She was
awarded P300k for moral damages, P100k for exemplary damages & P50k for actual

expenses. Bradford filed a Petition for Restraining Order. SC granted TRO enjoining
RTC from enforcing decision. Montoya claims that Bradford was acting as a civilian
employee thus not performing governmental functions. Even if she were performing
governmental acts, she would still not be covered by the immunity since she was acting
outside the scope of her authority. She claims that criminal acts of a public
officer/employee are his private acts & he alone is liable for such acts. She believes
that this case is under RP courts jurisdiction because act was done outside the
territorial control of the US Military Bases, it does not fall under offenses where US
has been given right to exercise its jurisdiction and Bradford does not possess
diplomatic immunity. She further claims that RP courts can inquire into the factual
circumstances & determine WON Bradford is immune.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the case is under the RTCs jurisdiction 2. WON case at bar is a suit against the State.
3. WON Bradford enjoys diplomatic immunity.
RULING:
1. YES.Intervention of a third party is discretionary upon the Court. US did not obtain
leave of court (something like asking for Courts permission) to intervene in the present
case. Technically, it should not be allowed to intervene but since RTC entertained its
motion to dismiss, it is deemed to have allowed US to intervene. By voluntarily
appearing, US must be deemed to have subjected itself to RTCs jurisdiction.
2. NO. Doctrine of state immunity is expressed in Art. XVI, Sec. 3 of the 1987
Constitution. This immunity also applies to complaints filed against officials of the
state for acts allegedly performed by them in discharge of their duties since it will
require the state to perform an affirmative act such as appropriation of amount to pay
damages. This will be regarded as a case against the state even if it has not be formally
impleaded. But this is not all encompassing. Its a different matter where the public
official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law & injurious
to rights of plaintiff. State authorizes only legal acts by its officers. Action against
officials by one whose rights have been violated by such acts is not a suit against the
State w/in the rule of immunity of the State from suit. The doctrine of state immunity
cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. It will not apply & may
not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private & personal
capacity as an ordinary citizen. This usually arises where the public official acts w/o
authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. A public official is liable if he acted
w/malice & in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. (Shauf vs.
CA) Also, USA vs. Guinto declared that USA is not conferred with blanket immunity
for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines merely because they have acted as
agents of the US in the discharge of their official functions. In this case, Bradford was
sued in her private/personal capacity for acts done beyond the scope & place of her
official function, thus, it falls w/in the exception to the doctrine of state immunity.
3. NO. First of all, she is not among those granted diplomatic immunity under Art.
16(b) of the 1953 Military Assistance Agreement creating the JUSMAG. Second, even
diplomatic agents who enjoy immunity are liable if they perform acts outside their
official functions (Art. 31, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations).

WYLIEVS. RARANG
G.R. No. 74135 | 28 May 1992
FACTS:
As assistant administrative officer of the US Naval Station, Wylie was tasked, among
other things, to supervise the publication of the Plan of the Day (POD); the POD
feature important news, announcements, warnings, etc., that were of interest to the
military. And one of their regular features was the action line inquiry. On 3 Feb 1978,
the POD published under the said section an inquiry regarding theft wherein Aurora
Rarang was implicated and identified. Four days later, Wylie wrote her an apology.
Rrarang however went to the Court of First Instance and filed a case asking for
indemnity against Wylie, and his superior, Capt. Williams. Wylie and Williams
responded by filing a motion to dismiss. Unfortunately, the trial court denied their
petition and ruled in favor of Rarang.
They appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court (Court of Appeals), but their
petition was again denied. Simultaneous with their appeal, was Rrarangs appeal as she
was not satisfied with the amount of damages given to her. Fortunately for her, the
appellate court granted her appeal, increasing the amount that Wylie and Williams are
obligated to pay.
Discontented with the ruling of the appellate court, the defendant filed a petition o the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the American naval officers who commit a crime or tortious act while
discharging official functions still covered by the principle of state immunity from suit
(pursuing the question further, does the grant of rights, power, and authority to the
United States under the RP-US Bases Treaty cover immunity of its officers from crimes
and torts).
RULING:
No. The court opined that our laws, and presumably, those of the United States, forbid
the performance of offenses under the guise of official duty. The court cites the case of
Chavez vs. Sandiganbayan, which maintained that, public officials can be held
personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with
official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad
faith. In the case at bar, the court ruled that Wylie and Williams committed an act of
defamation against Rarang; further, they also committed negligence as they did not
omit the name Auring in the article in the said publication.
The court denies the petition.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS. RUIZ

136 SCRA 487
FACTS:
The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one
of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the US.
Respondent alleges that it won in the bidding conducted by the US fro the construction
of wharves in said base that was wrongly awarded to another group. For this reason, a
suit for specific performance was filed by him against the US.
ISSUE:
Whether the United States Naval Base in bidding for said contracts exercise
governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity.
RULING:
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of
another state without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the
principles of independence and equality of states. However, the rules of international
law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the
activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them
between sovereign and governmental acts and private, commercial and proprietary acts.
The result is that state immunity now extends only to sovereign and governmental acts.
The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise
out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or
economic affairs. A state may be said to have descended to the level of an individual
and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters
into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates the exercise of its
sovereign function. In this case, the projects are an integral part of the naval base which
is devoted to the defense of both the US and the Philippines, indisputably a function of
the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes.

TEXACO VS. LIBYA

FACTS:
A decree to nationalize all Texacos rights, interest and property in Libya was
promulgated by Libya. This action of the Libyan Government led Texaco to request for
arbitration, but it was refused by Libya. A sole arbitrator was however appointed by the
International Court of Justice on Texacos request, and Libya was found to have
breached its obligations under the Deeds of Concessions and was also legally bound to
perform in accordance with their terms.
ISSUE:
Whenever reference is being made to general principles of law in the International
arbitration context, can this be held to be a sufficient criterion for the
internationalization of a contract?
RULING:
Yes. Whenever reference is been made to general principles of law in the international
arbitration context, it is always held to be a sufficient criterion for the
internationalization of a contract. The lack of adequate law in the state considered and
the need to protect the private contracting party against unilateral and abrupt
modifications of law in the contracting state is a justification to the recourse to general
principles. Though international law involves subjects of a diversified nature, legal
international capacity is not solely attributable to a state. A private contracting party,
unlike a state, has only a limited capacity and is limited to invoke only those rights that
he derives from his contract.