Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Calimoso vs Roullo
1.
The dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway;
2.
There is payment of proper indemnity;
Facts:
In his Complaint4 for Easement of Right of Way, the respondent mainly
alleged: that he is the owner of Lot 1462-C-15 situated in Brgy. Sambag,
Jaro, Iloilo City; that his lot is isolated by several surrounding estates owned
by petitioners that he needs a right-of-way in order to have access to a
public road; and that the shortest and most convenient access to the nearest
public road, passes through the petioners lot. The petitioners objected to
the establishment of the easement because it would cause substantial
damage to the two (2) houses already standing on their property. Due to the
respondent's allegedly malicious and groundless suit, the petitioners claimed
entitlement to damages. RTC granted the respondent's complaint and
ordered the petitioners to provide the respondent an easement of right-ofway (42sqm) and ordered the respondent to pay the petitioners proper
indemnity in the amount of Php1,500.00 per square meter of the portion of
the lot subject of the easement. CA affirmed in toto the RTC's decision and
held that all the requisites for the establishment of a legal or compulsory
easement of right-of-way were present in the respondent's case. The
petitioners moved to reconsider the CA's decision arguing that, while the
establishment of the easement through their lot provided for the shortest
route, the adjudged right-of-way would cause severe damage on their
property (damage to the nipa hut and bedroom of the concrete house) but
was denied.
Issues:
1. W/N the respondent has met all the requisites for the establishment
of a legal easement of right-of-way
Held:
No. To be entitled to an easement of right-of-way, the following requisites
should be met:
3.
The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant
estate; and
4.
The right-of-way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from
the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
In this case, the establishment of a right-of-way through the petitioners' lot
would cause the destruction of the wire fence and a house on the petitioners'
property.10 Although this right-of-way has the shortest distance to a public
road, it is not the least prejudicial considering the destruction pointed out,
and that an option to traverse two vacant lots without causing any damage,
albeit longer, is available. Article 650 of the Civil Code provides that the
easement of right-of-way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to
the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
Under this guideline, whenever there are several tenements surrounding the
dominant estate, the right-of-way must be established on the tenement
where the distance to the public road or highway is shortest and where the
least damage would be caused. If these two criteria (shortest distance and
least damage) do not concur in a single tenement, we have held in the past
that the least prejudice criterion must prevail over the shortest distance
criterion.
Additional Information:
The immovable in whose favor the easement is established is called the
dominant estate, and the property subject to the easement is called the
servient estate.8 Here, the respondent's lot is the dominant estate and the
petitioners' lot is the servient estate
Three options were then available to the respondent for the demanded rightof-way: the first option is to traverse directly through the petitioners'
property, which route has an approximate distance of fourteen (14) meters
from the respondent's lot to the Fajardo Subdivision Road; the second
option is to pass through two vacant lots (Lots 1461-B-l and 1461-B-2)
located on the southwest of the respondent's lot, which route has an
approximate distance of forty-three (43) meters to another public highway,
the Diversion Road; and the third option is to construct a concrete bridge
over Sipac Creek and ask for a right-of-way on the property of a certain Mr.
Basa in order to reach the Fajardo Subdivision Road
denied access from subject property to the nearest public road and vice
versa. They thus prayed for a right-of-way within Binangonan Metropolis
East in order for them to have access to Col. Guido Street, a public road.
Respondent denied knowledge of any property adjoining its subdivision
owned by petitioners and Liza. At any rate, it pointed out that petitioners
and Liza failed to sufficiently allege in their complaint the existence of the
requisites for the grant of an easement of right-of-way.
According to Pablo, he and his co-plaintiffs are still in possession of the
subject property. He clarified that the easement of right-of-way that they are
asking from respondent would traverse the latter's subdivision for about 50
meters from the subject property all the way to another subdivision that he
co-owns, Victoria Village, which in turn, leads to Col. Guido Street.
Liwayway testified next. According to her, she and her children Ronnie and
Liza are the surviving heirs of the late Carlos who owned the subject
property. Carlos acquired ownership over the same after he had been in
continuous, public and peaceful possession thereof for 50 years, the
circumstances of which he narrated in a Sinumpaang Salaysay that he
executed while he was still alive. Carlos stated therein that even before he
was born in 1939, his father was already in possession and working on the
subject property; that in 1948, he started to help his father in tilling the land;
that when his father became weak and eventually died, he took over the
land; and, that he already sought to register his ownership of the property
with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and to
declare
the
same
for
taxation
purposes.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court - said court concluded that petitioners
and Liza are entitled
to an easement of right-of-way
It observed that petitioners and Liza's allegation in their Complaint that they
were in possession of the subject property for more than 50 years was not
denied by respondent in its Answer. Thus, the same is deemed to have been
impliedly admitted by the latter. It then ratiocinated that based on Article
1137 of the Civil Code, petitioners and Liza are considered owners of the
subject property through extraordinary prescription. Having real right over
the same, therefore, they are entitled to demand an easement of right-of-way
under
Article
649redof
the
Civil
Code.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals - concluded that petitioners and Liza have
no right to demand an easement of right-of-way from respondent.
On appeal, respondent argued mat petitioners and Liza were neither able to
prove that they were owners nor that they have any real right over the
subject property intended to be the dominant estate. Hence, they are not
entitled to demand an easement of right-of-way. At any rate, they likewise
failed to establish that the only route available from their property to Col.
Guido
Street
is
through
respondent's
subdivision.
CA held that the evidence adduced by petitioners and Liza failed to
sufficiently establish their asserted ownership and possession of the subject
property. Moreover, it held that contrary to the RTC's observation,
respondent in fact denied in its Answer the allegation of petitioners and
Liza that they have been in possession of subject property for more than 50
years.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners are entitled to demand an easement of right-ofway from respondent.
RULING:
NO. Petitioners are NOT entitled to demand an easement of right-of-way
from respondent.
Under Article 649 of the Civil Code, an easement of right-of-way may be
and other real rights over immovable property are acquired through
uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years without need of title or of
good faith.43 However, it was clarified in the Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.
Republic of the Philippines,44 that only lands of the public domain
subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or
for the development of national wealth, or removed from the sphere of
public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or
lands of private ownership, may be alienated or disposed through any of the
modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.45 And if the mode of
acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, it must first
be shown that the land has already been converted to private ownership
prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period. Otherwise, Article
1113 of the Civil Code, which provides that property of the State not
patrimonial in character shall not be the subject of prescription,
applies.46cralawrednad
Sifting through petitioners' allegations, it appears that the subject property is
an unregistered public agricultural land. Thus, being a land of the public
domain, petitioners, in order to validly claim acquisition thereof through
prescription, must first be able to show that the State has - expressly
declared through either a law enacted by Congress or a proclamation issued
by the President that the subject [property] is no longer retained for public
service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has
been converted into patrimonial. Consequently, without an express
declaration by the State, the land remains to be a property of public
dominion and hence, not susceptible to acquisition by virtue of
prescription.47
In the absence of such proof of declaration in this case, petitioners' claim of
ownership over the subject property based on prescription necessarily
crumbles. Conversely, they cannot demand an easement of right-of-way
from
respondent
for
lack
of
personality.
subject property.
In its allegations, respondent claims that Caruff constituted a voluntary
easement when it constructed the generating set and sump pumps over the
disputed portion of the subject property for its benefit. However, it should
be noted that when the appurtenances were constructed on the subject
property, the lands where the condominium was being erected and the
subject property where the generating set and sump pumps were constructed
belonged to Caruff. Therefore, Article 613 of the Civil Code does not apply,
since no true easement was constituted or existed, because both
properties were owned by Caruff.
HELD:
YES. Bolton Street, a public highway, was already subsisting when the
OCT over the parcel of land of Velasco was issued. It has been where it is
since time immemorial. Bolton Street constituted an easement of public
highway on subject Lot No. 77, from which petitioners lot was taken, when
such bigger lot was originally registered. It remained as such legal
encumbrance, as effectively as if it had been duly noted, notwithstanding
the lack of annotation, on the certificate of title, by virtue of the clear and
express provision of Section 39 of Act 496, which states:
FACTS:
On June 20, 1960, 'the plaintiff-appellant file against the defendant-appellee
an action for damages.
The complaint alleged that the plaintiff is the absolute owner and actual
possessor of a 557,949-square-meter parcel of land in La Fuente, Santa
Rosa, Nueva Ecija
The plaintiff-appellant Valisno bought the land from the defendantappellees sister, Honorata Adriano Francisco, on June 6,1959.
The land which is planted with watermelon, peanuts, corn, tobacco, and
other vegetables adjoins that of the appellee Felipe Adriano on the bank of
the Pampanga River.
At the time of the sale of the land to Valisno, the land was irrigated by
water from the Pampanga River through a canal about seventy (70) meters
long, traversing the appellee's land.
On December 16, 1959, the appellee levelled a portion of the irrigation
canal so that the appellant was deprived of the irrigation water and
prevented from cultivating his 57-hectare land.
The appellant filed in the Bureau of Public Works and Communications a
complaint for deprivation of water rights. A decision was rendered on
are the irrigation law and the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866,
specifically Article 122 thereof.
RULING:
In the meantime, plaintiff Valisno rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own
expense because his need for water to irrigate his watermelon fields was
urgent.
The deed of sale in favor of Valisno included the "conveyance and transfer
of the water rights and improvements" appurtenant to Honorata Adriano's
property.
According to the appellant, the water right was the primary consideration
for his purchase of Honorata's property, for without it the property would be
unproductive.
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation
purposes, which are appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the
conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the
conveyance. The purchaser's easement of necessity in a water ditch running
across the grantor's land cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by
a third person.
As an easement of waters in favor of the appellant has been established, he
is entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction, disturbance or wrongful
interference (19 CJ 984), such as the appellee's act of levelling the irrigation
canal to deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is set aside, and a new one is entered
ordering the appellee to grant the appellant continued and unimpeded use of
the irrigation ditch traversing his land in order to obtain water from the
Pampanga River to irrigate appellant's land. Let the records of this case be
remanded to the court a quo for the reception of evidence on the appellant's
claim for damages.
SO ORDERED.
10
Held:
1. No. In order for petitioner to acquire the disputed road
as an easement of right-of-way, it was incumbent upon
petitioner to show its right by title or by an agreement with
the owners of the lands that said road traversed.
Easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed
upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable
belonging to a different owner. By its creation, easement is
established either by law (in which case it is a legal
easement) or by will of the parties (a voluntary easement).
In terms of use, easement may either be continuous or
discontinuous. The easement of right of way the
privilege of persons or a particular class of persons to
pass over anothers land, usually through one
particular path or linen is characterized as a
discontinuous easement because its use is in intervals
and depends on the act of man. Because of this
character, an easement of a right of way may only be
acquired by virtue of a title.
Article 622 of the New Civil Code is the applicable law in
the case at bar, viz:
Art. 622. Continuous non-apparent easements, and
Property Cases- Easements- Atty Salazar- 2016 1st Sem
The lower court correctly disbelieved the plaintiffsappellants contention that an agreement existed because
there is simply no direct evidence to support this allegation.
BAPCI submitted purely circumstantial evidence that are
not sufficiently adequate as basis for the inference than an
agreement existed. By themselves, the circumstances the
plaintiffs-appellants cited i.e., the employment of sixteen
(16) relatives of the defendants-appellants; the defendantsappellants unjustified silence; the fact that the existence of
the agreement is known to everyone, etc. are events
susceptible of diverse interpretations and do not
necessarily lead to BAPCIs desired conclusion.
2. No. , "It is already well-established that a right of way is
discontinuous and, as such, cannot be acquired by
prescription."
Continuous and apparent easements are acquired
either by virtue of a title or by prescription of ten years.
Under civil law and its jurisprudence, easements
are either continuous or discontinuous according to the
manner they are exercised, not according to the
presence of apparent signs or physical indications of
the existence of such easements. Thus, easement is
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15
Javellana vs IAC
FACTS:
Marsal & Co., Inc., and Marcelino Florete, Sr. is the
present owner of the land adjoining the Iloilo River up to the
adjacent lot where the L. Borres Elem. School is located. There
existed a main canal from the Iloilo River which passes through the
Marsal property and thru a canal that traverses the school property
going towards Lot 2344. Marsal & Co. closed the dike entrance and
later on demolished the portions of the main dike connecting the
main canal to the canal running thru the school grounds. This
closure caused flooding in the premises of the school and its vicinity
because the canal serves as outlet of rain or flood water that
empties into the river. This prompted the school and barangay
officials to complain to higher authorities about the closure of the
canal. When Florete was about to bury a pipe in lieu of an open
canal, he was prevented from doing so by the district supervisor,
Javellana, thus he instituted a complaint for recovery of damages
for allegedly denying his access to the use of the canal to his
property. The RTC ruled in favor of Javellana thus Florete appealed
to the IAC which reversed the decision thus the case at bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not an easement was established in favor of the
school property
RULING:
YES. A positive easement of water-right-of-way was
constituted on the property of Florete as the servient estate in favor
of the L. Borres Elementary School and the nearby lands as
dominant estates since it has been in continuous use for no less
than 15 years by the school fishpond as well as by the nearby
adjacent lands.
As a positive easement, Florete had no right to terminate
16
the use of the canal without violating Art. 629 of the CC which
provides that The owner of the servient estate cannot impair, in
any manner whatsoever, the use of the servitude. Nevertheless if by
reason of the place originally assigned or of the manner established
for the use of the easement, the same should become very
inconvenient to the owner of the servient estate, or should prevent
him from making any important works, repairs or improvements
thereon, it may be charged at his expense, provided he offers
another place or manner equally convenient and in such a way that
no injury is caused thereby to the owner of the dominant estate or
to those who may have a right to the use of the easement.
SPS.
FERNANDO
VERGARA
VERGARA, Petitioners, v. ERLINDA
SONKIN, Respondent.
Additional Facts:
> One witness almost drowned
> One witness saved a woman, who while picking shells fell into the
canal
> 2 witnesses took a bath in the canal, 1 when he was still a child,
the other when he was still single
> Canal is used by residents for salt-making using plastic bags, which
is in competition with Marsal & Co. in the production of salt
> the canal is a source of salt water, it is fresh and clean since the
tide changes from the Iloilo River while the fishpond is stagnant and
polluted
> before the closure of the dikes, there were no floods in the vicinity
> tube to be buried: 10-inch rubber tube
> canal:
AND
HERMINIA
TORRECAMPO
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wall.
HELD: YES.
Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides: When the plaintiffs own
negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury
being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
Verily, contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered,
which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform
for his own protection. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the
Sonkin property is lower in elevation than the Vergara property, and
thus, it is legally obliged to receive the waters that flow from the
latter, pursuant to Article 637 of the Civil Code. This provision refers
to the legal easement pertaining to the natural drainage of lands,
which obliges lower estates to receive from the higher estates
water which naturally and without the intervention of man
descends from the latter, i.e., not those collected artificially in
reservoirs, etc., and the stones and earth carried by the waters,
Art. 637. Lower estates are obliged to receive the waters which
naturally and without the intervention of man descend from the
higher estates, as well as the stones or earth which they carry with
them.
The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will
impede this easement; neither can the owner of the higher estate
make works which will increase the burden. In this light, Sps. Sonkin
should have been aware of such circumstance and, accordingly,
made the necessary adjustments to their property so as to minimize
the burden created by such legal easement. Instead of doing so,
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VALDEZ V. TABISULA
FACTS:
Petitioner-spouses Victor and Jocelyn Valdez purchased via a
January 11, 1993 Deed of Absolute
Sale from respondent-spouses Francisco Tabisula and
Caridad Tabisula a 200 square meter (sq.m.)
portion (the subject property) of a 380 sq. m. parcel of land
located in San Fernando, La Union. The deed
stated that the petitioners shall be provided a 2
meters wide road right-of-way on the western
side
1/2
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21
subdivision, ARB constructed the disputed road to link the two phases.
Initially, petitioners offered to pay ARB P50,000 as indemnity for the use of
the road. Adamant, ARB refused the offer and fenced the perimeter of the
road fronting the properties of petitioners. By doing so, ARB effectively cut
off petitioners' access to and from the public highway.
FACTS:
Woodridge is the usufructuary of a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-363902 in the name of spouses Ernesto T.
Matugas and Filomena U. Matugas. Its co-petitioner, Miguela JimenezJavier, is the registered owner of the adjacent lot under TCT No. T-330688.
On the other hand, ARB is the owner and developer of Soldiers Hills
Subdivision in Bacoor, Cavite, which is composed of four phases. Phase I of
the subdivision was already accessible from the Marcos Alvarez Avenue. To
provide the same accessibility to the residents of Phase II of the
CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The appellate court went on to rule
that a compulsory right of way exists in favor of petitioners as "[t]here is
no other existing adequate outlet to and from [petitioners'] properties to
the Marcos Alvarez Avenue other than the subject existing road lot
designated as Lot No. 5827-F-1 belonging to [ARB].In addition, it
awarded P500,000 to ARB as reasonable indemnity for the use of the road
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lot.
Unsatisfied with the ruling of the appellate court, petitioners filed this
petition for review on certiorari insisting that ARB is not entitled to be paid
any indemnity.
dominion over the subdivision roads. Therefore, until and unless the roads
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18
are donated, ownership remains with the owner-developer.
Since no donation has been made in favor of any local government and the
title to the road lot is still registered in the name of ARB, the disputed
property remains private
ISSUE:
2) YES
Whether or not the subject road is public property?
Whether or not there is a need for a payment of indemnity?
RULING:
1)NO
Likewise, we hold the trial court in error when it ruled that the subject
road is public property pursuant to Section 2 of Presidential Decree No.
1216.The pertinent portion of the provision reads:
All told, the only requisite left unsatisfied is the payment of proper
indemnity.
In the case of a legal easement, Article 649 of the Civil Code prescribes the
parameters by which the proper indemnity may be fixed. Since the
intention of petitioners is to establish a permanent passage, the second
paragraph of Article 649 of the Civil Code particularly applies:
Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be
continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a
permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land
occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate.
The law is clear. The transfer of ownership from the subdivision ownerdeveloper to the local government is not automatic but requires a positive
act from the owner-developer before the city or municipality can acquire
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ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is obliged to pay the full value of the property
taken or easement fee only;
RULING:
YES. Petitioner is obliged to pay the full value of the property taken.
Petitioner insists that if any amount should be paid to respondents, it
should only be an easement fee of 10% the value of the property, not
the full value, since it acquired only a simple right-of-way easement
for the passage of its overhead transmission lines. It points out that
its charter authorizes the acquisition only of a right-of-way easement
for its transmission lines and the payment of an easement fee.
The Court do not agree with the contention of the petitioner. The
Court has consistently held that the determination of just
compensation is a judicial function. No statute, decree, or executive
order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the
courts findings.
In National Power Corporation v. Manubay Agro-Industrial
Development Corporation, petitioner (also the NPC) likewise sought
the expropriation of certain properties which would be traversed by
its
transmission lines. In the said case, petitioner similarly argued that
only an easement fee should be paid to respondent since the
construction of the transmission lines would be a mere encumbrance
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end);
(3)
That the isolation was not due to acts of the
proprietor of the dominant estate; and
(4)
That the right of way claimed is at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as consistent
with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate
to a public highway may be the shortest. (Art. 650)
What clearly the appealed Decision overlooked or failed to
accord the significance due it is the fact already adverted to and
which has never been disputed that respondent Ramos, having
already been granted access to the public road (Parada Road)
through the other adjoining Lot 860-B owned by Epifania
inexplicably gave up that right of access by walling off his property
from the passageway thus established.
If at the time he filed suit against the petitioner, such access
could no longer be used, it was because he himself had closed it off
by erecting a stone wall on his lot at the point where the
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