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ART 195.

Who are obliged to give support


DADIVAS DE VILLANUEVA VS VILLANUEVA
54 Phil 93
Facts:
Aurelia Dadivas de Villanueva, plaintiff-appellant, instituted an
action against her husband Rafael to obtain separate maintenance
(monthly allowance), custody of her two younger minor children
Guillermo and Sergio and attorneys fees and other costs.
The lower court ruled in favor of the defendant, upon hearing the
cause of the trial (in light of a doctrine laid down in a former case)a
decision that the plaintiff now appeals.
Aurelia sought separate maintenance on the ground of cruelty
and infidelity. Proof showed that the defendant is guilty of repeated
acts of infidelity (illicit affairs with 4 different women and another one
before the action was begun) and exhibited brutality against the
plaintiff, pushing the latter to finally leave their home and establish a
separate abode with the children.
Issue:
W/N the plaintiff-appellant can ask separate maintenance from
respondent-appellee after she left their domicile
Ruling:
Yes. While the Court ruled in Arroyo vs Vasquez de Arroyo that
unproved or insufficient charges of cruelty are not enough to establish
a case for separate maintenance, it maintained that in cases where
spouses are found guilty of conjugal infidelity, innocent parties are
entitled to right to relief.
In the case at bar, the Court holds that the law is not so
unreasonable as to require a wife to live in marital relations with a
husband whose incurable propensity towards other women makes
common habitation with him unbearable. The respondent, being a
recurrent, gravely offends the sanctity of the marriage tie and should
thus, not be relieved from his duty to support his wife as provided by
law.
The Court ruled that the plaintiffs right to custody of her children
will no longer be disturbed and that she is entitled to P500 monthly
allowance, attorneys fees and other expenses.
Judgment reversed, with cost against appellee.

QUINTANA VS LERMA
24 Phil 285
Facts:
In the case at bar, defendant-appellant Gelasio Lerma appeals
from the judgment of the lower court granting his wife, the plaintiffappellee Maria Quintana, a sum of money allegedly due her based on a
contract they made for support.
As shown in the evidence, the two were married in 1901 and
entered, in February 1905, into a written agreement of separation,
renouncing certain rights as against each other, dividing the conjugal
property between them and the defendant undertaking the duty to
provide plaintiff P20-worth of monthly support and maintenance to be
given within the first three days of each month.
In his original answer to the action, Lerma claimed that Quintana
forfeited her right to support by committing adultery. However, this
special defense was stricken out by the court on the ground that under
Art. 152 of the Civil Code, adultery is not a recognized ground upon
which obligation to support ceases.
The lower court refused to recognize the same defense when
defendant reentered it in his amended complaint.
Issue:
W/N the written agreement made by parties is void
W/N adultery may be permitted as a special defense against
action for support
Ruling:
Yes. The agreement is void because Art. 1432 of the Civil Code
provides that in default of express declarations in the marriage
contract, the separation of the property of the consorts, during
marriage, shall only take place by virtue of a judicial decree, except in
the case provided by article 50. However, the wife has a right of
action against defendant under the Code.
Yes. While the plaintiff wife has the right of action, the Court
ruled that the defendant may also set up adultery as a special defense,
which if properly proved and sustain will defeat the wifes action.
Judgment reversed; cause remanded for new trial with
instructions to permit the interposition of the special defense
of adultery and such amendments of the complaint and answer
as may be necessary to carry the judgment into effect.
MENDOZA VS PARUGAO
41 Phil 271
Facts:

In the case at bar, petitioner Lorenzo Mendoza filed a writ of


certiorari against Gorgonia Parugao, Nueva Ecija ex-officio sheriff
Gabriel Belmonte and Judges Eduardo David (Nueva Ecija CFI) and
Manuel Moran (Vacation Judge of Nueva Ecija) to prohibit the carrying
out of sale of property of petitioner and forward the case to the
Supreme Court for revision.
On August 1925, the CFI declared Mendoza and Parugaos
marriage null and void upon the reappearance of the Parugaos first
husband Antonio Buenaventura, who was considered dead after an
absence of more than 7 years. (Buenaventura died later on.)
While the first judgment was on appeal, Parugao filed for
alimony and settlement of her conjugal property with Mendoza on
September 1925.
Subsequently, the court directed Mendoza to give Parugao
monthly support. However, the writs of execution were not complied
with.
On July 10, 1926, the CFI denied Mendozas motion for
reconsideration regarding support. On July 23, the Supreme Court
affirmed the nullity of Mendoza and Parugaos marriage.
Issue:
W/N Parugao, when she filed for liquidation of conjugal property
and alimony, is entitled to support during pendency of the action
Ruling:
No. While a wife is entitled to support during the pendency of an
annulment suit, this right ceases along with other mutual obligations of
marriage after the decree of nullity is issued.
The marriage between Mendoza and Parugao was annulled on
August 1925. She was, therefore, no longer entitled to support on
September 1925 when she filed the complaint. However, Parugao is
entitled to payment in advance of her share to the conjugal property, if
such exists. CFIs order of monthly payment is to be considered an
advance of conjugal property share but no writ of execution can be
issued thereon because of excess of jurisdiction and its interlocutory
character.
Remedy applied granted, writs of execution void; with
costs against the respondents.
FRANCISCO VS ZANDUETA
61 Phil 752
Facts:
Eugenio Francisco, represented by his natural mother and
curator ad litem, Rosario Gomez, instituted an action for support

against petitioner Luis Francisco in a separate case, alleging that he is


the latters acknowledged son and as such is entitled to support.
Luis denied the allegation, claimed that he never acknowledged
Eugenio as his son and was not present at his baptism and that he was
married at time of Eugenios birth.
Despite the denial of paternity however, respondent judge
Francisco Zandueta issued an order granting Eugenio monthly pension,
pendente lite. Luis moved for reconsideration but was denied, hence
the writ for certiorari.
Praying to have the trial transferred, counsel of herein
petitioner, in compromise, agreed that his client would pay the
monthly pension during the pendency of the case.
Issue:
W/N Eugenio Francisco is entitled to support without first
establishing his status as petitioners son
Ruling:
No. The answer as to whether or not petitioners counsel really
agreed to have him pay the pension during the cases pendency is not
necessary to the solution of the case.
As in the case of Yangco vs Rohde, the fact of the civil status
must be proven first before a right of support can be derived. The
Court ruled that it is necessary for Eugenio to prove, through his
guardian ad litem, his civil status as the petitioners son. As such, no
right of support can be given because the very civil status of sonship,
from which the right is derived, is in question.
It held that (t)here is no law or reason which authorizes the
granting of support to a person who claims to be a son in the same
manner as to a person who establishes by legal proof that he is such
son. In the latter case the legal evidence raises a presumption of law,
while in the former there is no presumption, there is nothing but a
mere allegation, a fact in issue, and a simple fact in issue must not be
confounded with an established right recognized by a final judgment.
Additionally, the respondent judge was without jurisdiction to
order for the monthly support in light of herein private respondents
absence of aforementioned status.
Writ granted; order for support, pendente lite, declared
null and void. No costs.
Note:
J. Vickers expresses in his separate concurring opinion his
non-concurrence with the Yangco doctrine, which holds the court in
excess of jurisdiction in granting alimony pendente lite and grants
power to defendant to prevent plaintiff from presenting evidence of

existence of marriage. Guardian ad litem did not present evidence, in


the case at bar. Justices Malcolm and Butte dissent.
QUIMIGUING VS ICAO
34 SCRA 132
Facts:
Carmen Quimiguing, suing through her parents, Antonio and
Jacoba Cabilin, sought an appeal from the orders of Zamboanga CFI,
which dismissed her complaint for support and damages and request
for amendment of complaint.
Quimiguing averred that the then already married Felix Icao
succeeded in having sexual relations with her through force and
intimidation. As a result, she became pregnant despite efforts and
drugs supplied by Icao and had to stop studying. She then claimed for
monthly support, damages and attorneys fees.
The defendant-appellee, however, moved to dismiss in light of
Quimiguings failure to allege the fact that a child had been born in her
complaint. The lower court dismissed the case and subsequently
denied further amendment to the complaint, ruling that no amendment
was allowed for failure of the original complaint to state a cause of
action.
Issue:
W/N the plaintiff-appellants can ask for support and damages
from defendant despite failure to allege fact of birth in complaint
Ruling:
Yes. The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant had right to support
of the child she was carrying and an independent cause of action for
damages.
This is because the Civil Code (Art. 40) recognizes the provisional
personality of the unborn child, which includes its right to support from
its progenitors, even it is only en ventre de sa mere. Article 742 of
the same Code holds that, just as a conceived child, it may receive
donations through persons that legally represent it. Readings of
Articles 40, 854 of the Civil Code and Article 29 of the Spanish Code
also further strengthen the case for reversal of order.
Additionally, for a married man to force a woman not his wife to
yield to his lust xxx constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his
victim that entitles her to claim compensation for damage caused per
Article 21 of the Civil Code, a provision supported by Article 2219,
which provides moral damages for victims of seduction, abduction,
rape or other lascivious acts.
Judgment reversed, set aside and remanded for
proceedings conformable to the decision; with costs against
Icao.

ART 201. Amount of Support


ADVINCULA VS ADVINCULA
10 SCRA 109
Facts:
Manuela Advincula, represented by her guardian-ad-litem Pura
Borbon filed a civil case against Manuel Advincula for acknowledged
merit and supporta case that was dismissed upon motion of both
parties. Thereafter, Manuela instituted a similar case against the same
defendant in the same court, which the defendant moved to dismiss in
light of the previously dismissed case.
The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the previous
case was dismissed without reservation and with prejudice.
Issue:
W/N a withdrawn complaint of similar facts bars a new complaint
Ruling:
No. The Court ruled that, in accordance with the provisions of
Rules of Court, the first case was dismissed without prejudice
because the lower court made no statement that it was made with
prejudice.
Also, since the plaintiffs action is for acknowledgement and
support, the judgment does not become final. The right to support is
of such nature that its allowance is essentially provisional xxx It cannot
be regarded as subject to final determination.
Additionally, the dismissal of the former case appeared to be a
result of a compromise. It has no force and cannot bar filing of another
action because acknowledgment cannot be subject of such.
Order set aside, case remanded; with costs against
defendant-appellee.
JOCSON VS EMPIRE INSURANCE CO.
103 Phil 580
Facts:
Agustin Jocson, who was appointed guardian of the persons and
properties of his minor children Carlos, Rodolfo, Perla, Enrique and
Jesus, had a bond filed with Empire Insurance Co. for surety and
managed his childrens properties that included war damage
payments, which formed part of their inheritance from their mother.
In the course of the guardianship, Agustin submitted periodic
accounts to the court for expenses for education and clothing of the
children.
After his death, Perla, who had already reached age of majority
and thereafter appointed guardian of her still minor brothers Enrique

and Jesus, filed a petition for the reopening of Agustins accounts,


claiming that illegal disbursements were made from the guardianship
funds for education and clothing. Upon reaching age of majority,
Enrique and Jesus adopted the petition and moved for declaration of
illegality of disbursementswhich Empire Insurance Co. and Agustins
administratrix appealed fromon the ground that these should have
come instead from the support, which they were entitled to receive
from their father.
Issue:
W/N the petitioners-appellants contention their fathers
disbursements from their guardianship funds are illegal are valid
Ruling:
No. The Court ruled that right to support (which includes
education and clothing) must be demanded and established before it
becomes payable. It does not arise from the petitioners mere
relationship with their father. The need for support, as already stated,
cannot be presumed and especially must this be true in the present
case where it appears that the minors had means of their own.
Therefore, the disbursements made by Agustin, which were even
sanctioned by the lower court, are not illegal. Claim for support should
also be done in a separate action, not in guardianship proceedings.
Judgment affirmed; without costs since (case) is a
paupers appeal.
BALTAZAR VS SERFINO
14 SCRA 820
Facts:
Plaintiff-appellant Olympia Baltazar, in behalf of her minor son,
Armenio Serfino appeals from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, ordering defendant-appellee Sergio
Serfino to pay P15-worth of monthly support from the rendering of
judgment on July 1960.
Olympia, a widow, bore the son of Sergio, a married man, on
December 19, 1943. She contends that the amount granted by the
court should have been P50, payable from the time of Armenios birth
except for the period of May 1957 to April 1959 when the child was
living with his father and that the defendant-appellee should pay
P1000 on account of attorneys fees.
Issue:
W/N the amount of support should be increased
W/N the defendant should pay a monthly support dating from his
sons birth

Ruling:
Yes. According to Art. 196 of the Civil Code, the amount of
support should be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver
and the needs of the recipient. The lower court found that defendantappellee, who was supporting his wife and legitimate children, was
earning amply from his rice mill, ten-hectare land and palay produce,
which places his average annual income at P1,085. Additionally, the
court took notice of the facts that he does not need to pay rent for his
familys residence and his tailoring shop was profiting well.
No. The Supreme Court ruled that obligation to give support
shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to
receive it needs it for maintenance. However, it shall not be paid from
the date it is extrajudicially demanded.
Additionally, the Court held that attorneys fees are recoverable
from the person obliged to give support when the other party entitled
to such support had to resort to the court for the enforcement of his
right.
Judgment modified. Defendant-appellee is sentenced to pay
Armenio Serfino the sum of P25.00 monthly from June 1959 (when the
extrajudicial demand was made) and the sum of P300.00 as attorney's
fees, with costs.