PERSONS 4TH EXAM CASES

CASE
O Laco v Co
Cho Chit

FACTS AND RULING OF THE COURT

ART. 151 (RE: SUITS AMONG FAMILY MEMBERS)
-petitioner Emilia O'Laco asserts that she merely left the certificate of title covering the property with private respondent O Lay Kia for safekeeping,
the latter who is the former's older sister insists that the title was in her possession because she and her husband bought the property from their
conjugal funds. To be resolved therefore is the issue of whether a resulting trust was intended by them in the acquisition of the property.
-RTC declared that no such trust relation existed
-CA ruled otherwise
-valentin and o lay kia found out that emilia sold parcel of land to roman catholic archbishop of manila
-they then sued emilia and her husband for recovery of said property; asserted that o lay and valentin are the real vendees of the properties;
contended that emilia breached the trust when she sold the land to the roman catholic archbishop of manila
-however emilia and her husband argued that emilia used her own money to buy the said property and that she left the deed of absolute sale to o
lay merely for safekeeping
-emilia then raise petition; contending that the present action should have been dismissed since the complaint fails to allege that earnest efforts
toward a compromise were exerted considering that the suit is between members of the same family and that no trust relation exists between
them
-SC: finds not merit in petition of emilia and her husband.
-SC said that plaintiff herein (o lay and her husband) is allowed to amed their complaint to correct the defect (if the action is within the courts
jurisdiction). In this case, the amendment is only to cure the perceived defect in the complaint which is thus allowed
-even if o lay and her husband id not amend their complaint, they were still allowed to supply new evidence to show that such earnest efforts were
made at a compromise such as when o lay said that she already pressed emilia to transfer title of property to o lay and her husband.
-such aforementioned testimony was not objected by emilia and her husband
-if such new evidence presented is permited to be introduced without objection
-as for issue of WON there was trust in the case herein, court finds that there is trust. (trust relations between parties may either be express or
implied: express are those created with direct acts like writing deeds or by wills or by words of intention to create trust. Implied= is when they are
deducible from the nature of the transaction of intent)
-implied: resulting or constructive (resulting are based on the doctrine that VALUABLE CONSIDERATION determines the equitable title and there is
always presumption that it is contemplated by the parties; arise from nature of the transaction)
-immovables: oral evidence to establish trust. Movables- must be in an authentic document
-O Lay also asserted that documents for property of land was in her possession (court finds that this continuing possession is strong evidence in
favor of o lay and her husband)
-O lays reason for not putting said properties under their name: they were Chinese nationals when they purchased said property
-in the past, o lay even filed act of reonveyance against older brother of emilia who claimed one of the properties as his own (said property was
already named under emilia since as mentioned o lay and her husband are Chinese nationals)
-SC: the circumstances by which emilia obtained new title by reason of the alleged loss of the ole one casts serious doubts on the veracity of her
ownership of the land
-also, before selling property to roman cath., emilia acknowledged said trust
-conspiracy between emilia and her brother when they respectively filed for the properties at the same time
-a resulting trust is repudiated if: 1. Trustee performed unequivocal acts 2. Such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to one who
entrusted property
-once the resulting trust is repudiated it becomes a constructive trust and is SUBJECT TO PRESCRIPTION
-although property was bought by o lay, the legal title was placed in the name of emilia (transfer was just in consonance with the deed of sale in

emilias favor)
-as late as 1959, emilia continued to recognize or just before she got married that ownership is that of o lay thus until that point, o lay was not
aware of any act of emilia which would convey to them the idea that she was repudiating the trust
-after all, as long as the trustee recognizes the trust, the beneficiary may rely upon the recognition and should therefore be not in fault for omitting
to bring an action to enforce his rights
-there is no running of the prescriptive period if the trustee expressly recognizes the resulting trust
-since complaint of breach of trust was filed two months after acquiring knowledge of the sale, the action has not yet prescribed
-PETITION OF EMILIA IS DENIED
GUERRERO V
HERNANDO

-ART 151
-Filed by petitioner as an accion publicana 1 against private respondent, this case assumed another dimension when it was dismissed by
respondent Judge on the ground that the parties being brother-in-law the complaint should have alleged that earnest efforts were first exerted
towards a compromise.
Admittedly, the complaint does not allege that the parties exerted earnest towards a compromise and that the same failed. However, private
respondent Pedro G. Hernando apparently overlooked this alleged defect since he did not file any motion to dismiss nor attack the complaint on
this ground in his answer. It was only on 7 December 1992, at the pre-trial conference, that the relationship of petitioner Gaudencio Guerrero and
respondent Hernando was noted by respondent Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr., they being married to half-sisters hence are brothers-in-law, and on the
basis thereof respondent Judge gave petitioner five (5) days "to file his motion and amended complaint" to allege that the parties were very close
relatives, their respective wives being sisters, and that the complaint to be maintained should allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise
were exerted but failed. Apparently, respondent Judge considered this deficiency a jurisdictional defect.
On 11 December 1992, Guerrero moved to reconsider the 7 December 1992 Order claiming that since brothers by affinity are not members of the
same family, he was not required to exert efforts towards a compromise. Guerrero likewise argued that Hernando was precluded from raising this
issue since he did not file a motion to dismiss nor assert the same as an affirmative defense in his answer.
-But the instant case presents no occasion for the application of the
above-quoted provisions. As early as two decades ago, we already ruled in Gayon v. Gayon 6 that the enumeration of "brothers and sisters" as
members of the same family does not comprehend "sisters-in-law". In that case, then Chief Justice Concepcion emphasized that "sisters-in-law"
(hence, also "brothers-in-law") are not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as members of the same family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code
repeats essentially the same enumeration of "members of the family", we find no reason to alter existing jurisprudence on the matter.
Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling that petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of private respondent Hernando, was required to exert
earnest efforts towards a compromise before filing the present suit.
In his Comment, Hernando argues that ". . . although both wives of the parties were not impleaded, it remains a truism that being spouses of the
contending parties, and the litigation involves ownership of real property, the spouses' interest and participation in the land in question cannot be
denied, making the suit still a suit between half-sisters . . ." 7
Finding this argument preposterous, Guerrero counters in his Reply that his "wife has no actual interest and participation in the land subject of the .
. . suit, which the petitioner bought, according to his complaint, before he married his wife." 8 This factual controversy however may be best left to

the court a quo to resolve when it resumes hearing the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED
Hiyas Savings
and Loan Bank
v Acuna

Romero v
Singson

-ARTICLE 151
-Private respondent alberto filed against bank and his wife remedios and spouses felipe and maria and against register of deeds (to cancel the
mortgage, said that his wife acted in conspiracy with the bank and with the spouses felipe and maria who benefited from the loan). He said it was
impossible that he executed the contract of loan since he was abroad
-now bank is here to question such action of alberto by invoking art 151 and said that there was failure on albertos part to allege in the complaint
that the earnest efforts at a compromise had been made by alberto before filing the complaint
-meanwhile, alberto said that no such act is neede when three of the party-defendants are not members of the family
-alberto prayed for defendant to be declared in default for failure to file answer on time
-RTC: in favor of alberto
-SC: questioned why it was not directed at CA (hierarchy of courts)
-SC: also petition lacks merit
-in case of magbaleta: two brothers and a stranger: ruling was that once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same
family, the law no longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts at a compromise were to be made between members of the family
-PETITION IS DISMISSED
-ART 151
-petitioner is consolacion and Rosario
-respondent is engracia
-they are siblings
-their parents left them with a piece of property in san juan
-it appears that consolacion and their other siblings rafale and ramon are the actual occupants of the said property
-they stayed there with their parents
-meanwhile engracia was living in mandaluyong
-apparently, an absolute deed of sale of said property was executed between parents and engracia despite the fact that parents were dead
-engracia then sent letters telling her siblings to vacate the property
-consolacion and other siblings then filed their complaint against engracia for annulment and cancellation of such absolute deed of sale claiming
that it was forged and that as heirs of their parents, they are the true owners of the property and that they were entitled to a reconveyance of the
same
-METC ruled in favor of engracia
-RTC: had to reaffirm ruling of METC based on the principle of indefeasibility of torrens title meaning to say validity of the TCT cannot be attacked
-CA: petitioner consolacion appealed and it was ruled in favor of engracia since between the two parties, she holds a more recently issues
certificate of title
-hence consolacion raises the case to the SC
-SC: grants petition of consolacion
-the procedural issue of lack of attempts at comprose should be resolved in engracias favors, however the failure of one instituting the suit is not a
jurisdictional defect.
-if opposing party fails to raise such defect in a motion to dismiss, such defect is deemed waived
-sigs were indeed forged since parents were long deceased when absolute deed of sale was executed (hence null and void and hence priniciple of
indefeasibility no longer applies)
-engracia has in her favor a cert. of a title OF NO MOMENT; her title cannot be used to validate the forgery or cure the void sale (the indefeasibility

of a torrens title should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real property)
-since engracia acquired no right over property, the same still belonged to their parents and that since parties in case herein are heirs of their
parents, they are to be co-owners of the said property
- petitioners in case herein is not even seeking for exclusivity in the ownership of the property
-also no merit in argument of engracia that because only two filed the petition, then it should be dismissed since there is no rule which requires
that all the parties in proceedings must jointly take recourse
-PETITION OF CONSOLACION IS GRANTED

Modequillo v
Breva

-issue here is WON a final judgment of the CA in an action for damages may be satisfied by way of execution of a family home constituted under
the family code
-there was a case between jose modequillo and one francisco salinas
-said judgment became final and executory; rendered a levy of execution upon a parcel of residential land registered under the name of petitioner
jose modequillo
-motion to quash levy of execution was filed by jose
-he invoked articles 152 and 153 of the family code
-RTC denied
-hence this case at bar which a motion for review
-assertions of jose: residential house and lot was first occupied as fam residence in 1969 and was duly constituted as a family home under the FC
He then argues that the residential house and lot should therefore be exempt frim payment of the obligations save for exemptions under art 155
-he also alleged that the trial erred when it stated that the FH only became as such upon enactment of the FC since the contention of jose is that al
family residences are eemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupancy prior to FC
-in the present case, the residential house and lot was not constituted as FHG under art 153 of FC
-it is only deeened constituted upon effecvity of FC
-his contention that it should be considered an FH from the time it was occupied by petitioner is not well-taken
-152 and 153 not exactly applied retroactively
-PETITION OF JOSE IS DISMISSED

Taneo v CA

-issue: WON the conveyance made by way of the sherrifs sale pursuant to the writ of execution by the RTC is prohibited under sec 118 of CA 590
and whether or not the family home is exempt from execution
-previous civil case in which it was resolved in favor of private respondent abdon
-in order to satisy said judgement, two of petitioner taneos properties were levied upon one of which is a family home
-after levy, there was public bidding. Property was then conveyed to private respondent as highest bidder
-petitioner then filed an action to declare the deed null and void
-in their complaing, it was alleged that a petition are the children and heirs of Pablo and narcisa who left said property, said such property is
therefore inalienable and not subject to encumbrance having been acquired through free patent
-taneo also they were in possession of such land since 1968
-also alleged illegal deed of conveyance
-meanwhile, abdon said he lawfully acquired said property; it was valid by virtue of the final sale+no redemption was made within one year from
the registration of the property
-abdon also said that the property was owned by someone else namely lazaro who sold land to paclo and narcisa (Pablo then filed free patent)
-but due to the fact that petitioner are in open possession of property, he the respondent has been deprived of its ownership
-RTC dismissed taneos complaint
-SC: taneos petition is devoid of merit: land is really that of lazaro who soldit to Pablo the father of taneo petitioner, that said property was
executed upon to satisfy judgment re: civil case with abdon, petitioner failed to redeem during the reglementary period
-taneos argument: cannot be executed upon since those acquired by free patent under sec 118 of CA 141 said that they cannot be alienated or
encumbered and that the house which their father constituted as a family home should be exempt from execution
-under civil cpde arts 224 to 251, a family home may be consttiued judicially and extrajudicially, but undr FC it is constituted from the time it is
occupied as a family home
-1964: Pablo taneo constituted it however the retroactive effect of the FC particularly on the provisions on the FH has been clearly stated as: (in
SCRA)(basically means that all existing residences at time of enactment of FC are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the
benefits accorded it)
-applicable law: CC
-court found that debt was incurred before constituted as FH
-also house was not erected on the land of taneo but on vacalares family
-SC: sec 118 does not apply
-PETITION OF TANEO IS DENIED

Cabang v basay

-petitioners contention: house cannot be executed upon because it was subsisting as a family home
-appellate courts decision on the ownership of the land was already final and executory (declaring the respondents of this case as the ones
entitled to the possession of the property)
-petition hence lacks merit
-such properties are residential houses, not family homes
-improvements introduced by the petitioners on the subject land as family homes will not extricate them from their predicament
-cite art 153
-fam home cannot be executed if the value of it upon constitution was that of the value prescribed by law under art 153. Likewise, a family home
becomes one if it is constituted on property OWNED ACTUALLY BY THE PERSONS CONSTITUTING IT. In this case, the home stands on property
owned by the respondents thus petitioners continued stay on the subject land is only by mere tolerance of respondents
-PETITION IS DENIED

EULOGIO V

-respondents Bell siblings initially filed complaint against Eulogio spouses, sought for annulment of the contract of sale executed by their parents

BELL SR.

over their residential house and lot

-RTC ruled in favor of respondents but declared the Bell spouses liable to Eulogio spouses in the amount of 1Million php with 12% interest per
annum
-Both pairs of spouses questioned RTC decision in the CA, but CA affirmed RTC decision
-ISSUES: 1.) whether a hearing to determine the value of respondents family home for purposes of execution under art 160 of the FC is barred 2.)
whether respondents fam home may be sold on execution under art 160 of the FC
-PETITION IS DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT
-although the trial court had nullified the deed of sale over respondents family home for lack of a writtem consent from its beneficiaries as
required under art 158 of the family code, the court still recognized the validity of the transaction as an UNSECURED LOAN
-contetntion of the Bells is that the family home cannot be subject to execution because the value of the FH does not exceed 300K as prescribed
under art 153
-respondents family home cannot be sold on execution under art 160. It is exempt.
-the nature and character of the property that debtors may claim to be exempt however are determined by the exemption stature. The exemption
is limited to the particular kind of property or the specific articles prescribed by the statute. Articles 155 and 160 (in relation to art 157) of FC
specify the exemptions mentioned in art 153
-to summarize the exemption of the family home from execution, forced sale, or attachment is limited to 300k in urban areas and 200k in urural
areas unless those maximum values are adjusted by law. If it is shows though that those amounts do not match the present value of the peso
because of currency fluctuations, the amount of exemption shall be based on the value that is most favorable to the constitution of the family
home. Any amount in excessof those limits can be applied to the payment of any of the obligations specified in articles 155 and
160.
-any subsequent improvement or enlargement if the fam home by the persons constitutin it, its owner,s or any of its beneficiares will still be
exempt from execution, forced sale, or attachment PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS ARE OBTAINED: 1.) the actual value of the property at
the time of its constitution has been determined to fall below the statutory limit; 2.) the improvement or enlargement DOES NOT RESULT in an
increase in its value excieeding the statutory limit. Otherwise the fam home can be the subject of a foced sale and any amount above the statutory
limit is applicable to the obligations under articles 155 and 160.
-in this case, already determined fact that the property in dispute is a family home and that is value at the time of constitution was within the
statutory limit
-during execution, none of the two conditions were present. The deed of sale was null and that the actual transaction was an equitable mortgage.
When Eulogio spouses and Bell spouses contracted the sale, the priced stated therein was not the actual value of the property in dispute
-hence, RTC should not have ordered execution of the property it being a family home
-IN FAVOR OF BELL

Patricio v Dario

Badua v CA

-case is a petition seeking to annul and set aside the resolution of the CA which dismissed their complaint re: partition of the property in dispute
-marcelino Dario (father of respondent) died intestate and was survived by his wife petitioner Perla Patricio and their sons Marc and respondent
Marcelino
-after death of Marcelino, perla, marc, and respondent Marcelino extrajudicially settled the estte
-marc and petitioner intended to partition the property
-RTC granted such partition, but respondent appealed saying that his minor son living in the home was a minor beneficiary hence the property
continues to be a family home and cannot be subject to execution
-ISSUE: WHETHER PARTITION OF THE FAM HOME IS PROPER WHERE ONE OF THE CO-OWNERS (being the respondent who also inherited the said
property) REFUSE TO ACCEDED TO SUCH PARTITION ON THE GROUND THAT A MINOR BENEFICIARY STILL RESIDES IN THE SAID HOME
-to be a beneficiary of the family home, 3 reqs must concur: 1) they must be among the relationships enumerated in art 154 of the family code
2)they live in the fam home 3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family
-also refer to art 159
-THIRD REQUISITE IS LACKING. The minor son of respondent cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother since he still has parents who
are capable of supporting him. The liability for support upon the minor child shall devolve upon his parents esp. his father
-CHARACTERISTICS OF LEGLA SUPPORT: 1) it is personal based on family ties 2)it is intransmissible 3) it cannot be renounced 4) cannot be
compromised 5)free from attachment or execution 6)it is reciprocal 7)it is variable in amount
-PETITION IS GRANTED, property is no longer fam home
-paternity and filiation
-spouses benitez died intestate
-petitioner herein claims to be the legitimate child of said spouses. Meanwhile Private respondents filed for administration of their benitez estates
-this filing was opposed by petitioner since as mentioned she claims to be the sole heir of benitez spouses. She showed the cert. of live birth,
baptismal cert., ITR and GSIS which showed that she is the late vicente benitezs supposed legitimate daughter
-however, respondents showed compelling evidence that Isabel benitez was never pregnant
-COURT FINDS NO MERIT IN THE PETITION
-petitioner asserts articles 164, 166, 170, and 171 which are all inapplicable when the respondents were assailing the fact that the petitioner was
not at all the natural child of the benitez spouse (they were not impugning the legitimacy, but rather the fact of her being the biological daughter
of the spouses
-hence, said articles raised by petitioner do not contemplate a situation where a child is alleged NOT TO BE THE CHILD OF NATURE OR BIOLOGICAL
CHILD OF A CERTAIN COUPLE
-it is clear from evidence and facts presented by the private respondents that petitioner is not at all the biological child of the spouses
-the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the
child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child and even amounts to simulation of the childs birth or falsification of his or her
birth certificate
-PETITION IS DISMISSE FOR LACK OF MERIT

BABIERA V
CATOTAL

De Jesus v heirs
of dizon

Liyao v tanhotiliyao

-a birth certificate may be ordered cancelled upon adequate proof that it is fictitious
-presentaction catotal asserted that she is the only suriving spouses of eugenio and hermogena babiera
-respondent Teofista Babiera said that she is the child of babiera spouses, but petitioner said the birth cert. presented by teofista were fake/forged
and she is actually the child of one Flora and that her surname is actually Guinto
-lower courts ruled that from the convincing evidence, petitioner is not the biological child of babiera spouses
-courts also said that articles 170 and 171 do not apply because the instant case deals with the action of cancellatio of the chlds birth certificate
ofr it being void on the ground that the child did not belong to either the father or mother
-also, respondent has legal standing for being the legitimate heir
-why the inapplicability of articles 170-171? REITERATED THE RULING OF BADUA V CA: The case at bench is not where the heirs of the late vicente
are contending that petitioner is not his child with Isabel BUT RATHER THAT THE PETITIONER WAS NOT CHILD OF ISABENL AND VICENTE
-indeed, petitioners argument is bereft of merit. Since present action is with re: cancellation of birth cert. there is no such prescription as
contemplated in art 170. Also, respondents are not impugning the legitimacy to begin with
-also, while it is true that the birth certificate enjoys the presumption of regularity, it is a rebuttable presumption. In herein case, enough evidence
was able to negate such presumption: it was not signed by LCR, no sign. Of mother,
-also, no proof to corroborate that hermogena was really the mother of petitioner
-PETITION IS DENIED
-petition involves the case of two illegitimate children who having been born in lawful wedlock claim to be the illegitimate children of the decedent
in order to enforce their respective shares in the latters estate under the rules of succession
-danilo and Carolina got married, had two children Jacqueline and jinky
-jacqueline and jinky alleged that on juan dizon in a notarized document acknowledged them both as their illeg. Children
-the respondents herein are the surviving spouse and heirs of juan dizon
-ISSUE: WON Jinky and Jacqueline are the illeg. Children of Juan Dizon
-filiation of illeg is proved the same way of leg children (art. 172 of FC)
-the due recognition of an illeg child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or inany authentic writing is in itself a
consummated act of acknowledgement of the child and no further court action is required
-records in herein case show that the petitioners were indeed born during the marriage of their parents danilo and carolina,hence they are their
leg. Children
-PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY (ART. 164) WHICH MAY BE IMPUGNED UNDER ART. 166
-law already establishes that children born during a subsisting marriage is deemed legitimate. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for
the child born in wedlock and ONLY THE FATHER OR IN EXCEPTIONAL INSTANCES THE LATTERS HEIRS CAN IMPUGN SUCH LEGITIMACY THUS WHEN
LEGITIMACY IS SUCCESSFULLY IMPUGNED WHEN THE PATERNITY OF THE HUSBAND CAN BE REJECTED
-PETITION IS DENIED
-William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G. Garcia, filed Civil Case No. 24943 before the RTC of Pasig, Branch 167 which is an
action for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William Liyao against herein respondents, Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao,
Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao
-Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for more than ten (10) years at the time of the institution of
the said civil case. Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of Williams untimely demise
-They lived together in the company of Corazons two (2) children from her subsisting marriage, namely:
Enrique and Bernadette, both surnamed Yulo
-Sometime in 1974, Corazon bought a lot from Ortigas and Co. which required the signature of her husband, Ramon Yulo, to show his

consent to the aforesaid sale. She failed to secure his signature and, had never been in touch with him despite the necessity to meet him. Upon
the advice of William Liyao, the sale of the parcel of land located at the Valle Verde Subdivision was registered under the name of Far East
Realty Investment, Inc.
On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital. During her three (3) day stay at the
hospital, William Liyao visited and stayed with her and the new born baby, William, Jr. (Billy). All the medical and hospital expenses, food and
clothing were paid under the account of William Liyao. William Liyao even asked his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez, to secure a
copy of Billys birth certificate. He likewise instructed Corazon to open a bank account for Billy with the Consolidated Bank and Trust
Company[4] and gave weekly amounts to be deposited therein. [5] William Liyao would bring Billy to the office, introduce him as his good looking
son and had their pictures taken together.[6]
-During the lifetime of William Liyao, several pictures were taken showing, among others, William Liyao and Corazon together with Billys
godfather, Fr. Julian Ruiz, William Liyaos legal staff and their wives while on vacation in Baguio. [7]Corazon also presented pictures in court to
prove that that she usually accompanied William Liyao while attending various social gatherings and other important meetings. [8] During the
occasion of William Liyaos last birthday on November 22, 1975 held at the Republic Supermarket, William Liyao expressly acknowledged Billy as
his son in the presence of Fr. Ruiz, Maurita Pasion and other friends and said, Hey, look I am still young, I can still make a good looking
son."[9] Since birth, Billy had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a recognized and/or acknowledged child of William
Liyao by the latters direct and overt acts.
-Testifying for the petitioner, Maurita Pasion declared that the two children of Corazon from her marriage to Ramon Yulo, namely,
Bernadette and Enrique (Ike), together with some housemaids lived with Corazon and William Liyao as one family. On some occasions like
birthdays or some other celebrations, Maurita would sleep in the couples residence and cook for the family. During these occasions, she would
usually see William Liyao in sleeping clothes. When Corazon, during the latter part of 1974, was pregnant with her child Billy, Maurita often
visited her three (3) to four (4) times a week in Greenhills and later on in White Plains where she would often see William Liyao
-Maurita attended Mr. Liyaos funeral and helped Corazon pack his clothes. She even recognized a short sleeved shirt of blue and
gray[12] which Mr. Liyao wore in a photograph [13] as well as another shirt of lime green [14] as belonging to the deceased. A note was also
presented with the following inscriptions: To Cora, Love From William. [15] Maurita remembered having invited the couple during her mothers
birthday where the couple had their pictures taken while exhibiting affectionate poses with one another. Maurita knew that Corazon is still
married to Ramon Yulo since her marriage has not been annulled nor is Corazon legally separated from her said husband. However, during the
entire cohabitation of William Liyao with Corazon Garcia, Maurita had not seen Ramon Yulo or any other man in the house when she usually
visited Corazon.
-second witness for the petitioner: Gloria knew that Mr. Liyao provided Corazon with a rented house, paid the salary of the maids and food for
Billy. He also gave Corazon financial support. Gloria knew that Corazon is married but is separated from Ramon Yulo although Gloria never had
any occasion to see Mr. Yulo with Corazon in the house where Mr. Liyao and Corazon lived.
-Respondents, on the other hand, painted a different picture of the story: Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga stated that her parents, William Liyao and
Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally married.[16]Linda grew up and lived with her parents at San Lorenzo Village, Makati, Metro Manila until she got
married; that her parents were not separated legally or in fact and that there was no reason why any of her parents would institute legal
separation proceedings in court.
-RTC: ruled in favor of Corazon (In ruling for herein petitioner, the trial court said it was convinced by preponderance of evidence that the
deceased William Liyao sired William Liyao, Jr. since the latter was conceived at the time when Corazon Garcia cohabited with the deceased. The
trial court observed that herein petitioner had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a child of the deceased by direct
and overt acts of the latter such as securing the birth certificate of petitioner through his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez; openly

and publicly acknowledging petitioner as his son; providing sustenance and even introducing herein petitioner to his legitimate children.)
-CA: reversed RTC ruling; favored law of legitimacy hence declared william as legit child of cora with ramon yulo with whom she had a subsisting
marriage with when billy was born
-The appellate court gave weight to the testimonies of some witnesses for the respondents that Corazon Garcia and Ramon Yulo who were still
legally married and have not secured legal separation, were seen in each others company during the supposed time that Corazon cohabited
with the deceased William Liyao. The appellate court further noted that the birth certificate and the baptismal certificate of William Liyao, Jr.
which were presented by petitioner are not sufficient to establish proof of paternity in the absence of any evidence that the deceased, William
Liyao, had a hand in the preparation of said certificates and considering that his signature does not appear thereon. The Court of Appeals stated
that neither do family pictures constitute competent proof of filiation. With regard to the passbook which was presented as evidence for
petitioner, the appellate court observed that there was nothing in it to prove that the same was opened by William Liyao for either petitioner or
Corazon Garcia since William Liyaos signature and name do not appear thereon.
-Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children of Corazon Garcia with Ramon Yulo, in testifying for herein petitioner
amount to impugnation of the legitimacy of the latter?
We think not. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the husband are allowed to contest the legitimacy of the
child. There is nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has already passed away at the time of the birth of the petitioner nor at the
time of the initiation of this proceedings. Notably, the case at bar was initiated by petitioner himself through his mother, Corazon Garcia, and
not through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that
purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law.
-It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy
or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. [30] We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of
the law that only the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting
marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation.
-the instant petition of corazon is DENIED
Concepcion v court
of appeals

-Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married

-Gerardo and Ma. Theresas relationship turned out to be short-lived, however. On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his
marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy. [5] He alleged that nine years before he married Ma. Theresa on December 10, 1980,
she had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled. [6]Gerardo also found out that Mario was still alive and was residing in
Loyola Heights, Quezon City
-Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty years old. She, however, averred that the marriage was a sham and that
she never lived with Mario at all.[8]
The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresas marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to
the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma.
Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. [9]
Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their marriage annulled. She held him responsible for the bastardization of
Gerardo
-It is, therefore, undeniable established by the evidence in this case that the appellant [Ma. Theresa] was married to Mario Gopiao, and that she
had never entered into a lawful marriage with the appellee [Gerardo] since the so-called marriage with the latter was void abinitio. It was

[Gerardo] himself who had established these facts. In other words, [Ma. Theresa] was legitimately married to Mario Gopiao when the child Jose
Gerardo was born on December 8, 1990. Therefore, the child Jose Gerardo under the law is the legitimate child of the legal and subsisting
marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao
-Thus, implicit from the above provision is the fact that a minor cannot be deprived of his/her legitimate status on the bare declaration of the
mother and/or even much less, the supposed father. In fine, the law and only the law determines who are the legitimate or illegitimate
children for ones legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. Not even the birth certificate of the minor can change his
status for the information contained therein are merely supplied by the mother and/or the supposed father. It should be what the law says
and not what a parent says it is
-The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. [19] Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during
the marriage of his parents is legitimate.[20]
As a guaranty in favor of the child[21] and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:
Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced
as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy
-Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b)[24] of the Family Code. He cannot. He has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma.
Theresas husband Mario or, in a proper case, [25] his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife. [26] Impugning
the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. [27] Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma.
Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her
child.
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period of conception. [28] To overthrow this
presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that
could have enabled the husband to father the child. [29] Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved, unless such
presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary.
-To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must be such as to make marital intimacy impossible. [32]This may take
place, for instance, when they reside in different countries or provinces and they were never together during the period of conception. [33] Or, the
husband was in prison during the period of conception, unless it appears that sexual union took place through the violation of prison
regulations.[34]
Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together in Fairview, Quezon City, Mario was living in Loyola Heights
which is also in Quezon City. Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a scant four kilometers apart.
Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also that no evidence at all was presented to disprove personal access
between them. Considering these circumstances, the separation between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not such as
to make it physically impossible for them to engage in the marital act.
-First, the import of Ma. Theresas statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her legitimate son with Mario but her illegitimate son with Gerardo.
This declaration an avowal by the mother that her child is illegitimate is the very declaration that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family
Code.
The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a
child born or conceived within a valid marriage.
Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not mean that there was never an instance where Ma. Theresa could have been

together with Mario or that there occurred absolutely no intercourse between them. All she said was that she never lived with Mario. She never
claimed that nothing ever happened between them.
Telling is the fact that both of them were living in Quezon City during the time material to Jose Gerardos conception and birth. Far from
foreclosing the possibility of marital intimacy, their proximity to each other only serves to reinforce such possibility. Thus, the impossibility of
physical access was never established beyond reasonable doubt.
Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresas statement is to allow her to arrogate unto herself a right exclusively lodged in the husband, or in a
proper case, his heirs. [37] A mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain. [38] Hence, Ma. Theresa is not permitted
by law to question Jose Gerardos legitimacy.
Finally, for reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say that she had no intercourse with her husband and that her
offspring is illegitimate.
-In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein.[46] As prima facie evidence, the statements in the
record of birth may be rebutted by more preponderant evidence. It is not conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the statements
made therein by the interested parties.[47] Between the certificate of birth which is prima facie evidence of Jose Gerardos illegitimacy and the
quasi-conclusive presumption of law (rebuttable only by proof beyond reasonable doubt) of his legitimacy, the latter shall prevail. Not only does
it bear more weight, it is also more conducive to the best interests of the child and in consonance with the purpose of the law.
-petition of Gerardo (not the son, but the dad) is hereby DENIED
Ong v diaz

-A Complaint3 for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending litigation was filed by minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz (Joanne), represented
by her mother and guardian, Jinky C. Diaz (Jinky), against Rogelio G. Ong
-As alleged by Jinky in her Complaint in November 1993 in Tarlac City, she and Rogelio got acquainted. This developed into friendship and later
blossomed into love. At this time, Jinky was already married to a Japanese national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil wedding
-Jinky and Rogelio cohabited and lived together
-Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor Joanne and Jinky home after delivery. Rogelio paid all the hospital bills and the baptismal
expenses and provided for all of minor Joannes needs recognizing the child as his.
In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and stopped supporting minor Joanne, falsely alleging that he is not the father
of the child.
-The RTC finally held:
The only issue to be resolved is whether or not the defendant is the father of the plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz.
-Since it was duly established that plaintiffs mother Jinky Diaz was married at the time of the birth of Joanne Rodjin Diaz, the law presumes that
Joanne is a legitimate child of the spouses Hasegawa Katsuo and Jinky Diaz (Article 164, Family Code). The child is still presumed legitimate
even if the mother may have declared against her legitimacy (Article 167, Ibid).
The legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds provided for in Article 166 of the same Code. Paragraph 1 of the said
Article provides that there must be physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with the wife within the first 120 days of
the 300 days following the birth of the child because of
a) physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
b) husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible;
c) serious illness of the husband which prevented sexual intercourse.
It was established by evidence that the husband is a Japanese national and that he was living outside of the country (TSN, Aug. 27, 1999, page
5) and he comes home only once a year. Both evidence of the parties proved that the husband was outside the country and no evidence was

shown that he ever arrived in the country in the year 1997 preceding the birth of plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz.
While it may also be argued that plaintiff Jinky had a relationship with another man before she met the defendant, there is no evidence that she
also had sexual relations with other men on or about the conception of Joanne Rodjin
-A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. 21 As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status
of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:
Article 167. The children shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. We explained the rationale of this rule in the recent case
of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals22:
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural
justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the
odium of illegitimacy.
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary.
Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code23 provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days
following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husbands having access to
his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.24
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
There had been divergent and incongruent statements and assertions bandied about by the parties to the present petition. But with the
advancement in the field of genetics, and the availability of new technology, it can now be determined with reasonable certainty whether
Rogelio is the biological father of the minor, through DNA testing.
-Coming now to the issue of remand of the case to the trial court, petitioner questions the appropriateness of the order by the Court of Appeals
directing the remand of the case to the RTC for DNA testing given that petitioner has already died. Petitioner argues that a remand of the case
to the RTC for DNA analysis is no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio. To our mind, the alleged impossibility of complying with the order
of remand for purposes of DNA testing is more ostensible than real. Petitioners argument is without basis especially as the New Rules on DNA
Evidence28 allows the conduct of DNA testing
-From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as there
exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA.
As defined above, the term "biological sample" means any organic material originating from a persons body, even if found in inanimate objects,
that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones. 29
Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as enumerated above as may be available, may be used for DNA testing. In this

case, petitioner has not shown the impossibility of obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA
testing.
-any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to
-WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit

FERNANDEZ V CA

FERNANDEZ V
FERNANDEZ

LABAGALA V
SANTIAGO

-violeta Esguerra who is the single mother and guardian ad litem of petitioners claro and john paul prayed for support from private respondent
carlito Fernandez
-petitioners herein seek to compel carlito to acknowledge them as his illegitimate children
-evidence presented were the following: certificates of live birth identifying carlito as the father, photographs of carlito taken during the
baptismal and pictures of calrito and claro taken at the home of violeta
-COURT: PETITION HAS NO MERIT
-court held that the petitioners cannot simply rely on the photos. As eexplained by the respondent, he was only there as a sponsor which was
corroborated
-the baptismal cert. did not show any participation of the father in its preparation (also bapt. Cert.s are only evidence of the administration of
the sacraments, they are not competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the childs paternity
-birth certs also lacked proof that the father had a hand at its preparation (a birth cert. not signed by the alleged father therein indicated is not
competent evidence of paternity
-APPEAL IS DISMISSED
-case is a petition for review nullifying the partition of a parcel of land in favor of herein respondents
-parcel of land is in dispute
-principal issue for resolution in this case concerns the rights of the parties to the conjugal property
-the respondent court ruled on rodolfoss right to the deed of extra-judicial partition as the alleged heir of the spouses Fernandez
-however, case herein somehow deals with the allegation that Rodolfo is not actually born to the deceased spouses
-SC: agree with respondent court when it found that petitioner Rodolfo failed to prove his filiation
-it was gound that birth was not at all recorded in the LCR. The application for recognition of back pay rights is only proof that jose Fernandez
filed said application but has no veracity of the declaration and statement contained concerning the relationship with appellant
-additionally, the status of the continuous and open possession of legit alone does not proof filiation . it is only a ground for a child to COMPEL
RECOGNITION BY HIS ASSUMED PARENT
-also, birth certificates are only proof of administration of sacraments
-pictures do not constitute proof of filiation
-a partition which includes a person belived to be an heir BUT WHO IS NOT shall be void only with respect to such person. Hence in this case,
petitioner Rodolfo is efinitely not the child by nature of the spouses Fernandez and not a legal heir thus the subject deed of extra-judicial
settlement of the state is null and void insofar as Rodolfo is concerned
-Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of land. Jose died intestate
- respondents filed a complaint for recovery of title, ownership, and possession against herein petitioner, Ida C. Labagala
-Respondents alleged that Joses share in the property belongs to them by operation of law, because they are the only legal heirs of their
brother, who died intestate and without issue.
-On the other hand, petitioner claimed that her true name is not Ida C. Labagala as claimed by respondent but Ida C. Santiago. She claimed
not to know any person by the name of Ida C. Labagala. She claimed to be the daughter of Jose and thus entitled to his share in the subject
property. She maintained that she had always stayed on the property, ever since she was a child.She argued that the purported sale of the
property was in fact a donation to her, and that nothing could have precluded Jose from putting his thumbmark on the deed of sale instead of

his signature. She pointed out that during his lifetime, Jose never acknowledged respondents claim over the property such that respondents had
to sue to claim portions thereof. She lamented that respondents had to disclaim her in their desire to obtain ownership of the whole property.
Petitioner revealed that respondents had in 1985 filed two ejectment cases against her and other occupants of the property. The first was
decided in her and the other defendants favor, while the second was dismissed. Yet respondents persisted and resorted to the present action.
-Petitioner asserts further that respondents cannot impugn her filiation collaterally, citing the case of Sayson v. Court of Appeals[12] in which
we held that (t)he legitimacy of (a) child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the
period limited by law.[13] Petitioner also cites Article 263 of the Civil Code in support of this contention. [14]
For their part, respondents contend that petitioner is not the daughter of Jose, per her birth certificate that indicate her parents as Leo
Labagala and Cornelia Cabrigas, instead of Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. [15] They argue that the provisions of Article 263 of the Civil
Code do not apply to the present case since this is not an action impugning a childs legitimacy but one for recovery of title, ownership, and
possession of property.
The issues for resolution in this case, to our mind, are (1) whether or not respondents may impugn petitioners filiation in this action for
recovery of title and possession; and (2) whether or not petitioner is entitled to Joses 1/3 portion of the property he co-owned with respondents,
through succession, sale, or donation.
On the first issue, we find petitioners reliance on Article 263 of the Civil Code to be misplaced. Said article provides:
Art. 263. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the recording of the birth in the Civil Register, if
the husband should be in the same place, or in a proper case, any of his heirs.
If he or his heirs are absent, the period shall be eighteen months if they should reside in the Philippines; and two years if abroad. If the birth of
the child has been concealed, the term shall be counted from the discovery of the fraud.
This article should be read in conjunction with the other articles in the same chapter on paternity and filiation in the Civil Code. A careful
reading of said chapter would reveal that it contemplates situations where a doubt exists that a child is indeed a mans child by his wife, and the
husband (or, in proper cases, his heirs) denies the childs filiation. It does not refer to situations where a child is alleged not to be the child at all
of a particular couple.[16]
Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a person is not a mans child by his
wife. However, the present case is not one impugning petitioners legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is not a
legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all. [17] Moreover, the present action is one for recovery of title and possession, and
thus outside the scope of Article 263 on prescriptive periods.
Petitioners reliance on Sayson is likewise improper. The factual milieu present in Sayson does not obtain in the instant case. What was
being challenged by petitioners in Sayson was (1) the validity of the adoption of Delia and Edmundo by the deceased Teodoro and Isabel
Sayson, and (2) the legitimate status of Doribel Sayson. While asserting that Delia and Edmundo could not have been validly adopted since
Doribel had already been born to the Sayson couple at the time, petitioners at the same time made the conflicting claim that Doribel was not
the child of the couple. The Court ruled in that case that it was too late to question the decree of adoption that became final years
before. Besides, such a challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally but in a direct proceeding. [18]
In this case, respondents are not assailing petitioners legitimate status but are, instead, asserting that she is not at all their brothers
child. The birth certificate presented by respondents support this allegation.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that::
The Certificate of Record of Birth (Exhibit H)[19] plainly states that Ida was the child of the spouses Leon Labagala and [Cornelia] Cabrigas. This

document states that it was Leon Labagala who made the report to the Local Civil Registrar and therefore the supplier of the entries in said
Certificate. Therefore, this certificate is proof of the filiation of Ida. Appellee however denies that Exhibit H is her Birth Certificate. She insists
that she is not Ida Labagala but Ida Santiago. If Exhibit H is not her birth certificate, then where is hers? She did not present any though it would
have been the easiest thing to do considering that according to her baptismal certificate she was born in Manila in 1969. This court rejects such
denials and holds that Exhibit H is the certificate of the record of birth of appellee Ida
baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive proof of filiation. [24] More so are the entries made in an income tax return,
which only shows that income tax has been paid and the amount thereof. [25]
We note that the trial court had asked petitioner to secure a copy of her birth certificate but petitioner, without advancing any reason
therefor, failed to do so. Neither did petitioner obtain a certification that no record of her birth could be found in the civil registry, if such were
the case. We find petitioners silence concerning the absence of her birth certificate telling. It raises doubt as to the existence of a birth
certificate that would show petitioner to be the daughter of Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. Her failure to show her birth certificate would
raise the presumption that if such evidence were presented, it would be adverse to her claim. Petitioners counsel argued that petitioner had
been using Santiago all her life. However, use of a family name certainly does not establish pedigree.
Further, we note that petitioner, who claims to be Ida Santiago, has the same birthdate as Ida Labagala. [26] The similarity is too uncanny to
be a mere coincidence.
During her testimony before the trial court, petitioner denied knowing Cornelia Cabrigas, who was listed as the mother in the birth
certificate of Ida Labagala. In her petition before this Court, however, she stated that Cornelia is the sister of her mother, Esperanza. It appears
that petitioner made conflicting statements that affect her credibility and could cast a long shadow of doubt on her claims of filiation.
Thus, we are constrained to agree with the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is in reality the child of Leon Labagala and
Cornelia Cabrigas, and contrary to her averment, not of Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. Not being a child of Jose, it follows that
petitioner can not inherit from him through intestate succession. It now remains to be seen whether the property in dispute was validly
transferred to petitioner through sale or donation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED

LOCSIN V LOCSIN

-a cert of live birth duly recorded in the LCR and a copy of which is transmitted to the civil registry general pursuant to the civil registry law os
prima facie evidence of the facts therein states
-however of there are material discrepancies between them, the one entered in the civil registry general prevails
-case is a petition for review seeking to reverse CA decision which granted administration of the intestate estate of Juan Locsin (he died
intestate) to Juan E. Locsin Jr.
-antecedent: Juan E. Locsin Jr. alleged that he is an acknowledged natural child of Juan Locsin and that during his lifetime, the deceased owned
personal properties and THAT HE IS THE ONLY SURVIVING LEGAL HEIR OF THE DECEDENT
-however heirs of Juan namely Maria, Manuel and Ester opposed Juan Jr.s allegations. They averred that respondent is not a child or an
acknowledged natural child of the late Juan Locsin who never even affixed Sr. in his name
-respondent Juan Jr. used the following as proof of his filiation: cert. of live birth and a photograph taken during the burial of the deceased
-COURT CANNOT SUBSCRIBE TO THE ABOVE FINDINGS
-record of live birth: oct. 22, 1956.
-it was then recorded in revised form on dec. 1 1958. Issue was how a 1958 form could be used in 1957 when respondents birth was recorded
-the LCRs response (Maybe the forms in 1956 were already exhausted so the former CR had requested for new form) does not exactly
explain how a revised form dated dec. 1, 1958 could have been used on jan. 30, 1957 or almost two years earlier
-A BIRTH CERT. NOT SIGNED BY THE ALLEGED FATHER IS NOT COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF PATERNITY. A birth cert. is a formidable piece of
evidence prescribed under art. 172 of the FC for purposes of recognition

Bernabe v Alejo

De la Rosa v Vda.
De Damian

-however, it only offers prima facie evidence AND MAY BE REFUTED BY CONTRARY EVIDENCE
-in this case, the glaring discrepancies between the two certificates of live birth have overturned the genuineness of the cert.
-photography cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation
-JUAN LOCSIN JR IS NOT AN HEIR. HE CANNOT CLAIM ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE
-the right to seek recognition granted by the civil code to illeg. Children who were still minors at the time the FC took effect CANNOT BE
IMPAIRED OR TAKEN AWAY. The minors hence have up to four years from attaining the age of majority within which to file an action for
recognition
-ernesto bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary Carolina.
-ernesto and his wife died intestate living Ernestina the sole surviving heir
-carolina herein alleged that their child (with Ernesto) Adrian is an acknowledged illeg. Child and as such is given a share in his estate
-RTC ruling was that action had prescribed since such recognition should have been done during the lifetime of the putative father
-ISSUE: WON Civil Code rule on proving filiation of illeg. Child should apply considering that Adrian was born during the effectivity of the civil
code
-Ernestina Bernabes petition is without merit
-under FC, an action for the recognition of an illeg. Child must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent.
-FC makes no distinction on whether the child was still a minor when the parent died. However, under CC a different rule applies when a minor
illeg. child files an action for recognition
-court holds that article 285 of the civil code is a substantive law as it gives adiran the right to file his petition for recognition within four years
from attaining majority age. Therefore the family code cannot impair or take adrians right to file an action for recognition because that right
had already been vested prior to FC enactment
-case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of gullermo and Josefa
-the main issue in this case is who between the petitiojners and respondents are the lawful heirs of the decedengts.
-claimants are divided into two: 1) alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado consisting of her half and full-blood siblings, nephews, and nieces; and 2) the
alleged heirs of Guillermo particularly his sisters, nephews, and nieces, his illeg. Child and the de facto adopted child
-josefa is the daughter of felisa by lucio. She has other siblings, but because felisa never married lucio, they were all the illeg. Children of felisa
-but before lucio, felisa had an affair with one ramon with whom she had a son named Luis. The issue here now is the legal status of ramon and
Felisas union which is yet to be decided
-in deciding w/n felisa and ramon ever got married will answer whether the successional rights fall between leg. And illeg. Relatives. If ramon
and felisa got married, their only child luis will be a LEG. HALF-BLOOD BROTHER OF JOSEFA and therefore NOT INCLUDED IN HER INTESTATE
SUCCESSION. But if felisa and ramon never got married, luis and his heirs would be entitled to inherit from Josefa as they would fall within the
illeg. Line (rule is illeg children cannot inherit from the leg. Children)
-petitioners (heirs of luis) allege that ramon and felisa never got married. They said no evidence was shown to prove such a marriage.
-luis was also openly recognized as the natural child of felisa, thereby not at all acknowledging ramon as the father
-meanwhile, the oppositors (respondents) said that the absence of the record of marriage did not necessarily mean that no marriage took place
-meanwhile, Josefa and guillermos marriage is also in dispute. Petitioners said that Josefa and Guillermo simply cohabited and never got
married (said that no marriage existed in the LCR, and that Josefa was referred to as seniorita or an unmarried woman in one baptismal cert.)
-oppositors however insist that the absence of marriage cert. did not mean that no marriage took place. They said that Josefa and Guillermo got
married (showed as proof cert. of identity, josefas passport, application for pension) and that they took into their home Guillermina and Nanie.
They were never legally adopted, but were simply de factor adopted children. The two of them are hence the alleged heirs of Guillermo along
with an illeg. Child who is respondent Guillerma who says that she enjoyed open and continuous possession of illeg. Status from brirth and that
in josefas obituary which was prepared by Guillermo named her as one of the children and that her report card from UST showed that Guillermo
was identified as the father
-meanwhile, oppositors claim that Guillermo has no interest in the estate as she WAS NEVER DULY ACKNOWLEDGED AS AN ILLEG. CHILD. They

VERCELES V
POSADAS

DELA CRUZ V
GARCIA

said her right to acknowledgement had prescribed bc Guillermo is already dead and that she cannot claim voluntary acknowledgment bc the
docs she presented were NOT AUTHENTIC WRITING PRESCRIBED IN THE NCC
-in addition, it was revealed that after the death of Josefa, Guillermo filed a petition to adopt guillermina and nannie and stating under oath that
he actually had no illeg or leg. Children at the time when he adopted guillermina and nannie
-when Guillermo died, during the proceedings in the partition of the estate, guillerma filed a motion to intervene saying that she was the only
surviving descendant of Guillermo
-issue herein now is to decide whether or not there was indeed a valid marriage between Guillermo and Josefa AND who are the legal heirs of
the spouses
-first issue: court sustains presumption of marriage. Evidence was sufficient and that witness testimonies backed up the presumption.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage
-FOR THE SECOND ISSUE: to determine the lawful heirs of Josefa, it is important to know w/n felisa and ramons union was a valid marriage to
decide to luis and his heirs can have the right to inherit from josefas inestate estate as illeg. Children
-court decided that felisa and ramon never got married due to lack of convincing evidence hence luis is the illeg child of felisa and is therefore
entitled to inherit from Josefa as a half-blood illeg. Sibling
-WHO ARE THE LAWFUL HEIRS OF GUILLERMO? Guillerma herein asserts that she is the illeg child of Guillermo which is true however her
recognition is in dispute. Hence, guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: compulsory recognition through the open and continuous
possession of the status of an illeg. Child AND voluntary recognition through authentic writing
-while she is the illeg child and that she was in continuous and open possession of the status of an illeg child this did not constitute
acknowledgment BUT A MERE GROUND BY WHICH SHE COULD HAVE COMPELLED ACKNOWLEDGMENT THROUGH THE COURTS
-as for the voluntary recognition, the UST report card was not signed and that the obituary presented was not the original manuscript
-same misfortune befalls gullermina WHO WAS NEVER ADOPTED IN ACCORDANCE TO LAW. Petition was filed, but never came into fruitation.
-GUILLERMINA AND GUILLERMA HENCE CANNOT INHERIT/HAVE NO LEGAL RIGHT OVER THE ESTATES
-this is a case praying for monthly support from teofisto
-maria (respondent), a young barrio lass, was alleged to have been impregnated by the petitioner
-maria said that proof of his knowleged of her pregnancy was his letter to her as well as other letters in which he used the alias ninoy
-issue: WON paternity and filiation can be resolved in action for damages with support? WON the filiation of the child verna as the illeg child of
petitioner teofisto was prove?
-court finds that the letters are declarations that petitioner did sire Verna, that even if he used an alias, the similar penhamnship plus annotation
at the back of petitioners photograph as a youth in unmistakable. Such admissions which are handwritten private instruments fall under art
172(2) of the FC
-RULED IN FAVOR OF MARIA. VERNA IS INDEED ILLEG CHILD OF TEOFISTO
-jenie and Christian lived together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage. Christian died. Afterwards, Jenie who continued to live with
Christians parents gave birth to her son chris. When she applied for registration for her son, she used christians last name in support of which
she submitted the childs cert. of live birth, affidavit to use surname, and affidavit of acknowledgement executed by christians father.
-both affidavits proved to attest that Christian had acknowledged the unborn child during his lifetime. Jenie also attached affidavit to use
surname in a document entitled autobiography which Christian during his lifetime wrote in his own handwriting in which he acknowledged the
pregnancy of jenie.
-however, LCR denied application of jenie stating that an illeg child not duly recognized by the father cannot use the surname of the father (art.
176 of FC as amended by RA 9255)
-ISSUE: WON the unsigned handwritten docu can be considered as express recognition on the part of Christian
-COURT HELD THAT YES, christians handwritten autobio though insigned substantially satisfies requirements of art 172 of family code and
therefore art 176 as amended.

NEPMOUCENO V
LOPEZ

GOTARDO v
BULING

SALAS V
MATUSALEM

-christian died two months prior to birth, the relevant matters in autobio were written by Christian, jenis affidavit was corroborated by the
father of Christian
-any authentic writing: to be effective the claim of filiation must BE MADE BY THE PUTATIVE FATHER HIMSELF AND THE WRITING MUST BE THE
WRITING OF THE FATHER
-in view of the pronouncements herein made, the court sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting the reqs of affixing the sigs of the
acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a leg or illef. Child is made: 1) private
handwritten instrument is the LONE EVIDENCE there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same MUST BE SIGNED BY THE
ACKNOWLEDGING PARENT 2)if said private handwritten instrument is accompanied by OTHER RELEBANT AND COMPETENT EVIDENCES it
suffices that the claim is sufficiently made as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence
-JENIES PETITION IS GRANTED
-respondent herein filed action for support from petitioner ben-hur nepmuceno
-respondent arhbencel said that she had gave birth to Araceli due to her extramarital affair with benhur
-she said benhur refused to affix his sig on the cert. of live birth of Araceli, but that in a handwritten note stated that he will support Araceli by
giving her an amount of 1500 each month
-ISSUE: WON Araceli is the acknowledged illeg. Child of benhur who is then entitled to support
-responent argued that the filitation was established by the handwritten note
-court finds merit in benhurs petition
-who may give support? (art 194 to art 195 of FC)., however does the said handwritten note alleged by arahbencel fall under art 172(2)?
-court specifies what incriminating acts can be considered as acceptable evidence to establish filiation: a notarial agreement to support a child
whose filiation is admitted by the putative father was considered acceptable evidence.
-however in herein case, the handwritten note does not contain any statement whatsoever about the filiation of benhur with aracel. It is
therefore not within the ambit of art 172(2) vis--vis art 17 of FC which asmits as competent evidence of illeg. Filiation an admission of filiation
in a private handwritten instrument
-the only other evidence submitted in herein case was a copy of cert. of live birth which has no sign. Of benhur
-IN FAVOR OF BENHUR
-divina (respondent herein) filed for legal support from charles (petitioner) for support of their child gliffze
-divina said that she had sexual relations with Charles. Divina eventually got pregnant. They were supposed to get married, but Charles backed
out
-when gliffze was born, divina filed for suppot for their child. RTC ruled in favor of Charles, but CA reversed it.
-charles raises the case to the SC re: filiation with with gliffze
-charles argued that the respondents mere testimony should not be enough and that the evidence on record is insufficient to prove paternity
-ISSUE: whether or not Charles should recognize gliffze as his illeg child and therefore provide legal support to him
-SC: AFFIRM CA RULING
-in this case, divina established the prima facie case that the petitioner Charles is the putative father of gliffze through testimony of sexual
relations. There was corroborated testimony of this from another witness
-charles was not able to rebut such testimonies, failed to substantiate his allegations
-evidently, the totality of divinas positively and convincingly shows that no real inconsistencies in her testimonies existed
-DENIED PETITION OF CHARLES
-annabelle (respondent) filed for support against petitioner narciso for their child Christian. Annabelle said that narciso had even rented an
apartment where she had stayed and that narciso shouldered all expenses for the birth of Christian
-however, Annabelle refused offer of narcisos family to take the child from her and afterwards, she was abandoned by narciso
-annabelles testimonies were corroborated re: rental of apartment and the weekly visit of narciso

-RTC and CA ruled in favor of Annabelle, hence this instant petition by narciso
-SC: grants the petition of narciso
-under art 175 of FC, illeg filiation may be established the same way as leg filiation but must be during lifetime of putative father
-in herein case, the cert of live birth presented by Annabelle WAS NOT SIGNED AT ALL BY NARCISO. It was also only Annabelle who prepared the
said cert of live birth, not narciso
-as to the baptismal cert. court has ruled time and time again that it is only an evidence of the administration of the sacraments. They are not
necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the childs paternity
-also, pictures talen of the other an her child with the alleged father are inconclusive evidence
-as to the handwritten notes, they too are not sufficient as they were NOT SIGNED BY NARCISO AND CONTAINED NO STATEMENT OF ADMISSION
BY NARCISO that he is the father of Christian
-RULED IN FAVOR OF NARCISO

AGUILAR V SIASAT

ARADO V ALCORAN

-spouses alfredo aguilar and Candelaria siasat-aguilar died intestate

-petitioner Rodolfo filed action against edna siasat saying that he is the only son and sole surviving heir of the spouses and that the subject
titles of properties which were missing were alleged to have been taken by edna
-meanwhile, edna said that Rodolfo is not at all the son and heir of the aguilar spouses and that he was only a mere stranger that was taken into
the household of the spouses out of the geneority and kindness of their heart
-rodolfo however presented the following documents: high school records that stated alfredo aguilar as his parent, his ITR that indicated
candaleria as his mother, SSS that has signature and tumb marks of alfredo, information sheet of employment of alfredo which stated that
Rodolfo is his son, cert. of marriag that indeed aguilar spouses were validly married
-RTC: denied petition of Rodolfo. Said that evidence was not convincing enough to claim status of legal biological son or adopted son. CA only
affirmed RTC ruling
-ISSUE RAISED: are the proofs presented by Rodolfo substantial enough to back up his claim?
-rodolfo also said that edna can no longer impugn his legitimacy since it had already prescribed pursuant to articles 170-171
-SC GRANTS PETITION OF RODOLFO
-the court reiterats ruling from de jesus v dizon citing art 172(2) which says that filiationof an illeg child can be proved the same way as a leg
child when there is an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned
-the due recognition of an illeg. Child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is in itself a
consummated act of acknowedlegedment an requires no further court action
-presumption that a child born during wedlock is legitimate
-this case could have been easy for petitioner had he furnished a copy of his cert. of live birth. The NSO copy wouldhave sufficed.
-IN FAVOR OF RODOLFO
-raymundo alcoran was married to Joaquina arado
-their marriage produced a son named Nicolas who married Florencia but their union had no offspring
-during marriage, Nicolas had extramarital affair with francisca who gave birth to anacleto. Anacleto then grew up and got married to one
elenette sonjaco
-after some time, Raymundo died and Nicolas died. Florencia soon followed after and so did Joaquina
-during partition, arado heirs filed a complaint against anacleto and elenette. Their allegation was that the properties of Raymundo were
inherited by Nicolas alone and that when he died, his properties were inherited by Florencia and his siblings and that his child with his affair with
francisca (wh is anaecleto) was unknown and spurious and hence not entitled to inheritance
-in their answer, anacleto said that he was indeed expressly recognized by niclas as the latters son. Evidence was the cert. of live birth of
anacleto and since he was still too young to administer when Nicolas died, said property was administer by Joaquina his grandmother who left

GERONIMO V
SANTOS

in her will in favor of anacleto the said property

-RTC dimissed complaint since it was proven that anacleto was really the acknwoleged illeg child of Nicolas. CA only affirmed
-ISSUE: WON anacleto is the recognized illeg child of Nicolas and WON he is entitled to such properties
-SC ruling: affirm RTC decision but for different reasons.
-petitioners did not discharged burden of proof. Court cites articles 172, 173, and 175.
-in the cert. of live birth, there was express recog of anacleto by Nicolas (there was participation of Nicolas in the preparation of said cert)
-however, bapt. Cert and photos cannot be appreciated as proof
-however, under CC, illeg. Children have no right to inherit (basis of ruling: CC, hence cannot sustain fact that Joaquina bequeathed property to
anacleto via a will since under CC as an illeg child, he cannot inherit)
-court affirms the holding of the RTC and CA tht the provisions of the FC SHOULD APPLY BECAUSE THE PETITIONERS COMPLAINT WAS FILED
LITIGATED AND DECIDED DURNG FC. UNDER FC: ILLEG CHILD FILIATION IS PROVED UNDER ART 175
-On April 17, 2001, plaintiff Karen Santos, claiming to be the only child of deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo filed a complaint for
annulment of document and recovery of possession against the defendants Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo who are the brothers of her father.
She alleged that with the death of her parents, the property consisting of one-half of the parcel of land located at San Jose, Paombong, Bulacan
with Tax Declaration No. 99-02017-00219 and belonging to her parents was passed on to her by the law on intestacy
-The plaintiff took the stand and testified that her parents were Rufino and Caridad Geronimo. The defendants Eugenio and Emiliano were the
half-brothers of her father Rufino, being the children of Rufino's father Marciano Geronimo with another woman Carmen San Juan. Rufino coowned Lot 1716 with the defendants' mother Carmen, and upon his death in 1980, when the plaintiff was only 8 years old, his share in the
property devolved on his heirs.
-Eugenio Geronimo, the defendant, disputes the allegation that the plaintiff is the only child and legal heir of his brother Rufino. He disclosed
that when Rufino's wife could not bear a child, the couple decided to adopt the plaintiff who was Caridad's niece from Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur.
-BOTH RTC AND CA RULED THAT PLAINTIFF HAS SUFFICIENLTLY PROVEN HER FILIATION
-(1) the plaintiff was allowed by her putative parents to bear their family name Geronimo; (2) they supported her and sent her to school paying
for lier tuition fees and other school expenses; (3) she was the beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad before the GSIS; (4) after the death
of Rufino, Caridad applied for and was appointed legal guardian of the person and property of the plaintiff from the estate left by Rufino; and (5)
both Caridad and the plaintiff executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino on the basis of the fact that they are both the legal
heirs of the deceased.
It is clear that the status enjoyed by the plaintiff as the legitimate child of Rufino and Caridad has been open and continuous, x x x The
conclusion follows that the plaintiff is entitled to the property left by Rufino to the exclusion of his brothers, the defendants, which consists of a
one-half share in Lot 1716.9
-SC
RULING: grants the petition
-Despite its finding that the birth certificate which respondent offered in evidence is questionable, the trial court ruled that respondent is a
legitimate child and the sole heir of deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad. The RTC based this conclusion on secondary evidence that is similar
to proof admissible under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code to prove the filiation of legitimate children, viz.:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the following evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Petitioner argues that such secondary evidence may be admitted only in a direct action under Article 172 because the said provision of law is
meant to be instituted as a separate action, and proof of filiation cannot be raised as a collateral issue as in the instant case which is an action
for annulment of document and recovery of possession.
Petitioner is correct that proof of legitimacy under Article 172, or illegitimacy under Article 175, should only be raised in a direct and separate
action instituted to prove the filiation of a child. The rationale behind this procedural prescription is stated in the case of Tison v. Court of
Appeals,19viz.:
x x x [W]ell settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
The rationale for these rules has been explained in this wise:
"The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code xxx actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be
attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and
within the period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different
purpose.The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican Code (Article 335)
which provides: 'The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the competent
court; any contest made in any other way is void.' This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this
view, because they refer to "the action to impugn the legitimacy."
This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles.
Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child can no longer be brought. The status
conferred by the presumption, therefore, becomes fixed, and can no longer be questioned. The obvious intention of the law is to prevent the
status of a child born in wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty for a long time. It also aims to force early action to settle any doubt as to
the paternity of such child, so that the evidence material to the matter, which must necessarily be facts occurring during the period of the
conception of the child, may still be easily available.
xxxx
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the
infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral and economic interest
involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs - can
impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory." 20
What petitioner failed to recognize, however, is that this procedural rule is applicable only to actions where the legitimacy - or illegitimacy - of a

child is at issue. This situation does not obtain in the case at bar.
In the instant case, the filiation of a child - herein respondent - is not at issue. Petitioner does not claim that respondent is not the legitimate
child of his deceased brother Rufino and his wife Caridad. What petitioner alleges is that respondent is not the child of the deceased spouses
Rufino and Caridad at; all. He proffers this allegation in his Amended Answer before the trial court by way of defense that respondent is not an
heir to his brother Rufino. When petitioner alleged that respondent is not a child of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad in the proceedings
below, jurisprudence shows that the trial court was correct in admitting and ruling on the secondary evidence of respondent - even if such proof
is similar to the evidence admissible under the second paragraph of Article 172 and despite the instant case not being a direct action to prove
one's filiation. In the following cases, the courts a quoand this Court did not bar the introduction of secondary evidence in actions which involve
allegations that the opposing party is not the child of a particular couple even if such evidence is similar to the kind of proof admissible under
the second paragraph of Article 172.
In the 1994 case of Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals,21 therein deceased spouses Vicente Benitez (Vicente) and Isabel Chipongian (Isabel)
owned various properties while they were still living. Isabel departed in 1982, while Vicente died intestate in 1989. In 1990, Vicente's sister
(Victoria Benitez-Lirio) and nephew (Feodor Benitez Aguilar) instituted an action before the trial court for the issuance of letters of
administration of his estate in favor of Feodor. In the said proceedings, they alleged that Vicente was "survived by no other heirs or relatives be
they ascendants or descendants, whether legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted x x x." 22 They further argued that one "Marissa
Benitez[-]Badua who was raised and cared for by them since childhood is, in fact, not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted, and is
therefore not a legal heir [of Vicente]."23 Marissa opposed the petition and proffered evidence to prove that she is an heir of Vicente. Marissa
submitted the following evidence, viz.:
1. her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. 3);ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
2. Baptismal Certificate (Exh. 4);ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
3. Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet for Membership with the GSIS of the late Vicente naming her as his daughter (Exhs. 10 to 21); and
4. School Records (Exhs. 5 & 6).
She also testified that the said spouses reared and continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. 24
Feodor and his mother Victoria offered mostly testimonial evidence to show that the spouses Vicente and Isabel failed to beget a child during
their marriage. They testified that the late Isabel, when she was 36 years old, was even referred to an obstetrician-gynecologist for treatment.
Victoria, who was 77 years old at the time of her testimony, also categorically stated that Marissa was not the biological child of the said
spouses who were unable to physically procreate.25cralawred
The trial court, relying on Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code, declared Marissa as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses
Vicente and Isabel. The appellate court: reversed the RTC's ruling holding that the trial court erred in applying Articles 166 and 170 of the Family
Code. On appeal to this Court, we affirmed the reversal made by the appellate court, viz.:
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is
alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband

(or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by
proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in
case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through
mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period
within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate
court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs
of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not
born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is
apropos, viz:
"Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the Family Code] is not well-taken. This legal provision refers to an
action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the
private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta
Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither legally adopted
child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased." 26
Similarly, the 2001 case of Labagala v. Santiago27 originated from a complaint for recovery of title, ownership and possession before the trial
court. Respondents therein contended that petitioner is not the daughter of the decedent Jose and sought to recover from her the 1/3 portion of
the subject property pertaining to Jose but which came into petitioner's sole possession upon Jose's death. Respondents sought to prove that
petitioner is not the daughter of the decedent as evidenced by her birth certificate which did not itself indicate the name of Jose as her father.
Citing the case of Sayson v. Court of Appeals and Article 263 of the Civil Code (now Article 170 of the Family Code), 28petitioner argued that
respondents cannot impugn her filiation collaterally since the case was not an action impugning a child's legitimacy but one for recovery of title,
ownership and possession of property. We ruled in this case that petitioner's reliance on Article 263 of the Civil Code is misplaced and
respondents may impugn the petitioner's filiation in an action for recovery of title and possession. Thus, we affirmed the ruling of the appellate
court that the birth certificate of petitioner Labagala proved that she "was born of different parents, not Jose and his wife." 29 Citing the
aforecited cases of Benitez-Badua and Lim v. Intermediate Appellate Court,30 we stated, viz.:
This article should be read in conjunction with the other articles in the same chapter on paternity and filiation in the Civil Code. A careful reading
of said chapter would reveal that it contemplates situations where a doubt exists that a child is indeed a man's child by his wife, and the
husband (or, in proper cases, his heirs) denies the child's filiation. It does not refer to situations where a child is alleged not to be the child at all
of a particular couple.31
Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a person is not a man's child by his wife. However,
the present case is not one impugning petitioner's legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is not a
legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all. x x x32
Be that as it may, even if both courts a quo were correct in admitting secondary evidence similar to the proof admissible under Article 172 of
the Family Code in this action for annulment of document and recovery of possession, we are constrained to rule after a meticulous examination
of the evidence on record that all proof points to the conclusion that herein respondent is not a child of the deceased spouses Rufino and
Caridad. While we ascribe to the general principle that this Court is not a trier of facts, 33 this rule admits of the following exceptions where
findings of fact may be passed upon and reviewed by this Court, viz.:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2)

When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of
discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing, L-4875, Nov.
27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.); (6) When the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee (Evangelista
v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]); (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v.
Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).34
It is clear in the case at bar that the ruling of both courts a quo declaring respondent as a legitimate child and sole heir of the deceased spouses
Rufino and Caridad is one based on a misapprehension of facts.
A mere cursory reading of the birth certificate of respondent would show that it was tampered specifically on the entries pertaining to the date
of birth of respondent and the name of the informant. Using pentel ink, the date of birth of respondent - April 6, 1972 - and the name of the
informant -Emma Dao - were both superimposed on the document. Despite these glaring erasures, the trial court still relied on the prima
facie presumption of the veracity and regularity of the birth certificate for failure of petitioner to explain how the erasures were done and if the
alterations were due to the fault of respondent. It thus ruled that respondent's filiation was duly established by the birth certificate. The
appellate court did not agree with this finding and instead ruled that the birth certificate presented does not qualify as the valid registration of
birth in the civil register as envisioned by the law. We reiterate the relevant pronouncement of the CA, viz.:
x x x The document in question was signed by one Emma Dao who was not identified as either the parent of the plaintiff or the physician or
midwife who attended to her birth. Exhibit 14, legally, cannot be the birth certificate envisioned by the law; otherwise, with an informant as
shadowy as Emma Dao, the floodgates to spurious filiations will be opened. Neither may the order of the court Exhibit E be treated as thefinal
judgment mentioned in Article 172 as another proof of filiation. The final judgment mentioned refers to a decision of a competent court finding
the child legitimate. Exhibit G is merely an order granting letters of guardianship to the parent Caridad based on her representations that she is
the mother of the plaintiff.35
Nonetheless, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that respondent has proven her filiation by showing that she has enjoyed that open
and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad, viz.:
x x x The evidence consists of the following: (1) the plaintiff was allowed by her putative parents to bear their family name Geronimo; (2) they
supported her and sent her to school paying for her tuition fees and other school expenses; (3) she was the beneficiary of the burial benefits of
Caridad before the GS1S; (4) after the death of Rufino, Caridad applied for and. was appointed legal guardian of the person and property of the
plaintiff from the estate left by Rufino; and (5) both Caridad and the plaintiff executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino on the
basis of the fact that they are both the legal heirs of the deceased. 36
We do not agree with the conclusion of both courts a quo. The appellate court itself ruled that the irregularities consisting of the superimposed
entries on the date of birth and the name of the informant made the document questionable. The corroborating testimony of Arturo Reyes, a
representative of the NSO, further confirmed that the entries on the date of birth and the signature of the informant are alterations on the birth
certificate which rendered the document questionable. To be sure, even the respondent herself did not offer any evidence to explain such
irregularities on her own birth certificate. These irregularities and the totality of the following circumstances surrounding the alleged birth of
respondent are sufficient to overthrow the presumption of regularity attached to respondent's birth certificate, viz.:

1. The identity of one Emma Dao, whose name was superimposed as the informant regarding the birth of respondent, remains unknown.
2. The testimony of Atty. Elmer De Dios Lopez, a legal consultant of the Department of Education in Bulacan, proved that the deceased Caridad
did not have any maternity leave during the period of her service from March 11, 1963 to October 24, 1984 as shown by her Service Record as
an elementary school teacher at Paombong, Bulacan. This was corroborated by a certification from Dr. Teofila R. Villanueva, Schools Division
Superintendent, that she did not file any maternity leave during her service. No testimonial or documentary evidence was also offered to prove
that the deceased Caridad ever had a pregnancy.
3. Based on the birth certificate, respondent was born in 1972 or 13 years into the marriage of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad. When
respondent was born, Caridad was already 40 years old. There are no hospital records of Caridad's delivery, and while it may have been possible
for her to have given birth at her own home, this could have been proven by medical or non-medical records or testimony if they do, in fact,
exist.
4. It is worthy to note that respondent was the sole witness for herself in the instant case.
Finally, we also find that the concurrence of the secondary evidence relied upon by both courts a quodoes not sufficiently establish the one
crucial fact in this case: that respondent is indeed a child of the deceased spouses. Both the RTC and the CA ruled that respondent is a
legitimate child of her putative parents because she was allowed to bear their family name "Geronimo", they supported her and her education,
she was the beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad in her GSIS policy, Caridad applied for and was appointed as her legal guardian in
relation to the estate left by Rufino, and she and Caridad executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino as his legal heirs.
In the case of Rivera v. Heirs of Romnaldo Villanueva37 which incisively discussed its parallelisms and contrasts with the case of Benitez-Badua
v. Court of Appeals,38 we ruled that the presence of a similar set of circumstances - which were relied upon as secondary proof by both courts a
quo in the case at bar - does not establish that one is,a child of the putative parents. Our discussion in the Rivera case is instructive, viz.:
In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, Marissa Benitez-Badua, in attempting to prove that she was the sole heir of the late Vicente Benitez,
submitted a certificate of live birth, a baptismal certificate, income tax returns and an information sheet for membership in the Government
Service Insurance System of the decedent naming her as his daughter, and her school records. She also testified that she had been reared and
continuously treated as Vicente's daughter.
By testimonial evidence alone, to the effect that Benitez-Badua's alleged parents had been unable to beget children, the siblings of BenitezBadua's supposed father were able to rebut all of the documentary evidence indicating her filiation. One fact that was counted against BenitezBadua was that her supposed mother Isabel Chipongian, unable to bear any children even after ten years of marriage, all of a sudden conceived
and gave birth to her at the age of 36.
Of great significance to this controversy was the following pronouncement:
But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid
adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts to
simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document, (emphasis ours)
Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence
of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested parties. Following the logic of Benitez, respondent Angelina and her co-

defendants in SD-857 should have adduced evidence of her adoption, in view of the contents of her birth certificate. The records, however, are
bereft of any such evidence.
There are several parallels between this case and Benitez-Badua that are simply too compelling to ignore. First, both Benitez-Badua and
respondent Angelina submitted birth certificates as evidence of filiation. Second, both claimed to be children of parents relatively advanced in
age. Third, both claimed to have been born after their alleged parents had lived together childless for several years.
There are, however, also crucial differences between Benitez-Badua and this case which ineluctably support the conclusion that respondent
Angelina was not Gonzales' daughter, whether illegitimate or adopted. Gonzales, unlike Benitez-Badua's alleged mother Chipongian, was not
only 36 years old but 44 years old, and on the verge of menopause at the time of the alleged birth. Unlike Chipongian who had been married to
Vicente Benitez for only 10 years, Gonzales had been living childless with Villanueva for 20 years. Under the circumstances, we hold that it was
not sufficiently established that respondent Angelina was Gonzales' biological daughter, nor even her adopted daughter. Thus, she cannot
inherit from Gonzales. Since she could not have validly participated in Gonzales' estate, the extrajudicial partition which she executed with
Villanueva on August 8, 1980 was invalid.39

TAMARGO V CA

-n 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in
her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Civil Case
No. 3457-V, by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural
parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic
incident. In addition to this case for damages, a criminal information or Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed [Criminal Case No.
1722-V] against Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto, however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he bad acted
without discernment.
-n their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that
not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since
parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.
-Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines 9 has similarly insisted upon the requisite that the child, doer of the tortious act, shall have
beer in the actual custody of the parents sought to be held liable for the ensuing damage:
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by
the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their companyand under their parental authority subject to the
appropriate defenses provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents,
the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect may be giver to the decree of
adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically custody
over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit
the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been
retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which
they could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be
unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of

vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could
have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.
-PETITION IN FAVOR OF TAMARGO SPOUSES GRANTED. NATURAL PARENTS ARE STILL LIABLE
LAHOM V SIBULO

LANDINGING V
REPUBLIC

-diosdado and isabelita desired to adopt isabelitas nephew jose Melvin

-in keeping with the court order, they even changed his last name from sibulo to lahom
-however, in 1999 isabelita filed a motion to rescind the adoption since jse Melvin refused to accept change in surname
-sec. 19 of RA 8552 states the grounds for rescidngin adoption in which it was explicity stated that adoption, being in the best interest of the
child, shall not be subject to recission by the adopter. However, the adopter may disinherit the adoptee
-contention of isabelita: RA 8552 should not adversely affect her right to annul the adoption decree
-SC: no merit in petition. A person has not vested right in statutory privilege. Adoption is a right created by statute
-hence, matters relating to adoption including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree are subject to regulation of
the state.
-RA 8552 gas withdraw from an adopter the right to rescind the adoption decree, but adopter has the remedy to cause the forfeiture of certain
benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving adopted child. Adopter may deny child his/her legitime by will and testament and may freely
exclude him from having s ahre in the disposable portion of the estate
-IN FAVOR STILL OF JOSE
-diwata landingin, a US citizen, of PH parentage and a resident of guam filed for a petition to adopt elaine dizon and elma dizon. they are the
minor children of manuel (diwatas brother) and amelia.
-she alleged in her petition that when manuel died, their mother left them to go to Italy and marry someone else
-petitioner then desires to adopt the children and that the minors have already given their written consent to the adoption.
-diwata says she is qualified to adopt as she is a 57 year-old widow, gainfully employed, has children of her own, and that she lives alone
-RTC granted such adoption however such decision was assailed by the republic since it was found that there was no consent of the mother in
the adoption
-petitioner failed to present a certain pagbilao as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of mother amelia likewise failing to show
any other evidence that amelia consented to such adoption
-ISSUE: WON diwata is entitled to adopt the minors even without the written consent of their mother, WON affidavit of consent was complied
with by law, WON petitioner is financially capable of adopting the minors
-SC: petition of diwata is denied for lack of merit
-known rule that every reasonable intendment should thus be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the
law (re: adoption statutes and regulations)
-RA 8552 sec 9: the general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship
from unwarranted interference by interlopers and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the chuld in the manner of the
preposes
-clearly the written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption
-petitioners contention must be rejected . when she filed her petition, RA8552 was already in effect hence she must comply with section 9 of
said act
-if mother has abandoned, then should have obtained consent of the legal guardian
-however in this case, no such abandonment was proven. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time in the care of others is not such an
abandonment (mother still sends financial support to the children)
-petitioner failed to offer in evidence pagbilaos report and of the joint affidavit of consent supposedly executed by her children; she likewise
failed to prove authenticity of affidavit

IN RE: PETITION
FOR ADOPTION OF
MICHELLE AND
MICHAEL JUDE LIM

-PETITION IS DENIED
-this is a petition re: the adoption of michelle lim and Michael lim
-petitioner is an optometrist who is married to primo lim. They are childless.
-a certain lucia entrusted to them two minor children (michelle and Michael)
-the spouse raised the minors and thereafter soon filed a petition to adopt them under RA 8552 (they tried to avail of the amnesty in said act by
invoking the simulation the birth of a child)
-on april 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of michelle and Michael. At that time,michelle was 25 and Michael was 18
-michelle and her husband gave their consent and michale also gave his consent as shown in their respective affidavits of consent. Petitioners
husband also gave his consent
-RTC denied it since petitioner had remarried, she needed to file the petition jointly with the new husband. CA affirmed RTC ruling
-ISSUE: WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt
-SC: deny petition
-section 7 of article III of RA 8552 expressly provides for the joint adoption of husband and wife except in certain cases
-the petitioner having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed must jointly adopt. The fact that he gave his consent is not
enough. Being an American citizen, olario must also comply with the requirements set forth in sec. 7 of RA 852
-petitioner is also wrong in arguing that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary even after kids have reached age of emancipation
hence even the remarriage of the parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children unless the court appoints another person to be
the guardian of the children (parental authority being one of the legal effects of adoption under article 5 of RA 8552)
-also, no dissolution of marriage was yet delivered. Marriage still subsists hence there must be joint adoption
-DENIED PETITION. ADOPTON MUST BE JOINT

CASTRO V
GREGORIO

-in all instances of adoption where it a spouse attempts to adopt a child outside of wedlock, the other spouse and other legit children must be
notified personally through personal service of summons. It is not enough that they be deemed notified through constructive service
-case originally stemmed from the adoption of jose marie gregorio and ana regina gregorio by jose castro who is the estranged husband of
Rosario castro and the father of joanne castro.
-rosario alleged that she and jose were separated in fact but remained friends
-meanwhile, it was revealed that jose was once married to Rosario, but the marriage did not produce children. He then had a union with one
lilibeth. It was during such union that jose adopted jed and regina (children of lilibeth).
-rosario and joanne then filed for petition to annul such adoption. They allege that their consents were not duly obtained. They allege that fraud
was employed by jose. They argued that there was fabrication of the consent and the false information shown in the birth certs of je and regina
-petitioners also argued that they should have been given notice by the RTC of the adoption as adoption law requires their consent as a requisite
in the proceedings
-PETITIONERS ARE CORRECT (BASIS IS ART. III SEC. 7 OF RA 8552, such provision is mandatory)
-in the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, jose and Rosario remained legally married despite their de facto separation
0for jose to be eligible in adopting jed and regina, both Rosario and joann must show their consent
-also, there was fraud in this case. When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of any other interested party, as in
thi case, then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether the fraud was committed through the use of forged documents or perjured testimony
during trial
-RULED IN FAVOR OF PETITIONERS ROSARIO AND JOANNA

BARTOLOME V SSS

-john was employed in maritime services and as such he received compensation for his work
-an accident occurred onboard while he was working which led to his death. He was childless and unmarried when he died this petitioner
bernardian who is the mother of john said that she is the sole heir of john

DE ASIS V COURT
OF APPEALS

GAN V REYES

-when mother went to claim the benefits, SSS informed her that john was legally adopted by Cornelio colcol
-issue: are the biological parents of the covered, but legall adopted, employee considered secondary beneficiaries and thus entitled in
appropriate cases to receive such benefit? (rather, who can claim first? Adoptive parent or biological parent?)
-SC: PETITION OF MOTHER IS WITH MERIT
-while bernardina is the biological mother of john, it was not proven that adoptive parent Cornelio was no longer alive hence SSS denied claim of
bernardina initially
-ECC, however, overlooked the crucial fact of CORNELIOS DEATH CERT. (evidence offered by bernardina)
-the rule limiting death benefit claims to the legitimate parents is CONTRARY TO LAW
-hence, question is raised of whether or not petitioner is entitled to the death claim benefit in view of johns death
-in labor law: legit.parents are considered beneficiaries
-the term parents is used and ought to be taken in its general sense (biological or adopted)
-bernardina qualifies as johns dependent parent. True when Cornelio adopted john, then about two years old, petitioners parentl authority over
john was severed. However lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed aside from cornelios death was that when the adoptive parent
died less than three years after the adoption decree, john was still a minor at about four years of age
-as a minor, parental authority reverts back in favor of the biological parent (sec. 20 of RA 8552 which is applied by analogy)
-moreover, this ruling finds support in the fact that even though parental authority is severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between the
adoptee and the biological parent are not entirel eliminated. (Art. 190 of FC on siccesson which is the sole provi under FC not repealed by RA
8552 and RA 8043)
-it is apparent tht the biological parent bernardina retian her rights of succession.
-PETITION IS GRANTED IN FAVOR OF BERNARDINA
-vircel andres in her capacity as the legal guardian of the minor glen de asis brought an action for maintenance and support against manuel de
asis (petitioner) alleging that manuel is the father of subjtec minor glen and the former refused to provide for maintenance of the latter
-manuel denied his paternity and thus cannot be required to support glen
-court finds no merit in manuels contention
-the right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person.
-in the case at bar, glens mother manifested that she was withdrawing the case since it seemed futile to seek support from manuel who denied
his paternity over glen
-the manifestation sent in by respondents mother in the first case AMOUNTED TO RENUNCIATION AS IT SEVERED THE VINCULUM THAT GIVES
THE MINOR GLEN THE RIGHT TO CLAIM SUPPORT
-the agreement also entered into by manuel and the mother for the dismissal of the complaint for maintenance and support is in the nature of a
compromise which cannot be countenance.
-although in the case under scrutiny, the admission may be binding BUT SUCH AN ADMISSION IS AT MOST EVIDENTIARY AND DOES NOT
CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISH THE LACK OF FILIATION. Filiation must be judicially declared and established and it is for the court to to declare its
existence and absence. IT CANNOT BE LEFT TO THE WILL OR AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES
-PETTION OF MANUEL IS HEREBY DISMISSED
-bernadette file a petition for support against augustus gan for the support for the schooling of her three-year old daughter francheska who is
the alleged love child between augustus and Bernadette
-petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and that the cert. of live birth of francheska
indicated that the father was UNKNOWN and that there was no legal or factual basis for the claim of support
-RTC however found that francheska is the illeg daughter of augustus and ordered him to support her
-petitioner assailed the decision claiming that the in an action by a child against the putative father, adultery of the childs mother is a valid
defense to show that the child was the fruit of an adulterous relation for in such case it would not be the child of the father and therefore not
entitled to support

MANGONON V CA

LIM V LIM

DOLINA V
VALLECERA

-in all cases involving a child, his interest an welfare are always paramount concerns. Hence, no useful purpose would serve him re: his
insistence to undergo DNA parternity testing. What has been decided by the RTC is already final
-paramount interest of the child: the money an property adjudged for support and education should and must be given presently and without
delay because if it had to wait final judgment, th children may in the meantime have suffered because of lack of funds
-PETITION OF AUGUSTUS DENIED
-petitioner Belen in behalf of her minor child Rica and Rina filed a petition for support against respondent Federico. She and Federioc were
actually married and it was eventually annulled.
-belen then remarried and with his assistance, they raised the twins rica and rina. At the time of institution of the petition, rica and rina were
studying in the US but were financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education.
-petitioner alleged that rica and rina were in fact the leg. Children of Federico saying that they were born seven months from the date of the
annulment of her marriage from Federico hence according to articles 174 and 195(b) in relation to articles 194(1) and (2) and 199(c) of FC, they
are entitled to support
-federicos contention: the birth certs of rica and rina do not bear his sig hence no basis for support. He also said that liability for support shpuld
devolve to petitioner and her second husband, but belen has stated that she cannot support them
-he also said that he was only making 40K a month and hence cannot support them
-at the time of filing of petition, rica had already entered a university in new jersey and that rina was also studying college in a university in long
island
-what has been proven: that twin daughter are filitated to the private respondent Federico and hence are entitled to support pendent lite
-next question is who should be made liable: refer to art 199 of FC
-in this case, both RTC and CA held Federico liable with respect to his income
-meanwhile franciso who is the father of Federico himself stated in the witness stand said that his son did not own anything
-hence, in accordance to art 199, the grandfather Francisco is next liable since Federico cannot support the twins due to lack of property
-option as to how to give support: art. 204
-RULING: AFFIRMED. SUPPORT IS GRANTED VIA THE GRANDFATHER
-respondent Cheryl married Edward Lim
-they were residing in forbes park together with ewards ailing grandmother
-edwards business provided for salary of 6,0000. Cheryl had no job
-cheryl then abandoned the house bringing with her the children after a violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught having an affair
with chua giak
-ISSUE: WON there is basis to hold edwards parents liable for support (refere to art 195 and art 200 par. 3 of FC)
-SC: Yes. pettiioners herein are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to respondents
-petitioners are liable for support but only to their grandchildren
-although the obligation to give support arising from parental authrotiy end upon emancipation, the same obligation arising from spousal and
general familial ties ideally lasts during the obligees lifetime
-in this case, there is definite inability of Cheryl and eward to support their children hence the liability shifts to the ascendants in the nearest
degree, being the grandparents
-PETITION OF GRANDPARENTS DENIED. THEY ARE ORDERED TO SUPPORT THE CHILDREN OF CHERYL AND EDWARD ALL SURNAMED LIM
-peititoner dolina filed a petition against respondent glenn for a TPO invoking RA 9262 due to alleged woman and child abuse
-petitioner also asked for financial support by withholding from glenns pay the amount of support as the RTC may deem appropriate
-ISSUE: issue is WON the RTC correctly dimissed dolinas action for TPO and denied her application for temporary support for the child
-SC: dolina filed the wrong action to obtain support from glenn. The object of RA 9262 is for the protection and safety of women and their
children.
-It turns out dolinas true motive behind filing ra 9262 was to get support from glenn.

LIM-LUA V LUA

-to be entitled to legal support, petitioner must in PROPER ACTION first establish filiation and/or acknowledgement of the person to be
supported
-since the child in herein case is an illeg child, he will NOT BE ENTITLED, if he has NOT BEEN recognized by the father
-if filiation becomes beyond question, support naturally follows
-COURT DENIES DOLINAS PETITION
-she should have filed an action directly for support where the issue of compulsory recognitipn may be integrated and resolved
-susan lim and danilo lua got married but their marriage was soon declared null
-susan now files for action for support against danilo. Danilo said that susan is not entitled to spousal support considering that she does not
maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their children and from him the respondent and that he has continued to support the entire family
-respondent also argued that the court did not take into consideration his income in awarding support to the petitioner
-main issue: WON certain expenses already incurred by the respondent MAY BE DEDUCATED FROM THE TOTAL SUPPORT IN ARREARS OWING TO
THE PETITIONER AND HER CHILDREN
-pertinent provision is art 194
-respondent said that disallowing the subject deductions would result in unjust enrichment thus making him pay twice for the same obligation
since they all reside in one house and have all since depended on him for financial support (i.e. cars he bought for the children, payment of bills
and groceries)
-the grant of support does not need final judgment and hence there could be temporary support pendent lite
-in this case, the amount of monthly support pendent lite was determined after due hearing
-as for financial capacity of danilo, he is definitely capable of supporting them
-controversy in this case only happened when respondent complied with CA decision that there should be deduction from the total amount in
arrear
-SC: TO REVERSE CA RULING
-the CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by the respondent to be credited against the accrued support pendent lite. Hence the
value of the two cars, purhcases through credit card, SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISALLOWED AS THESE BEAR NO RELATION TO THE JUDGMENT
AWARDING SUPPORT PENDETE LITE. The deductions should have been limite to those basic needs and expenses considered by RTC and CA.
-PARTLY GRANTED, modified the deductions from the support pendent lite in arrears of Danilo to his wife and two children