SSC vs AZOTE

FACTS:
Edna and Edgardo Basbas,a member of SSS, were married in civil rites at the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 9, Legazpi City, Albay (RTC). Their union produced six Children born from 1985 to
1999. On April 27, 1994, Edgardo submitted Form E-4 to the SSS with Edna and their three older
children as designated beneficiaries. Thereafter or on September 7, 2001, Edgardo submitted
another Form E-4 to the SSS designating his three younger children as additional beneficiaries.
When Edgardo passed away, Edna filed her claim for death benefits with the SSS as the
wife of a deceased-member. It appeared, however, from the SSS records that Edgardo had earlier
submitted another Form E-4 on November 5, 1982 with a different set of beneficiaries, namely:
Rosemarie Azote (Rosemarie), as his spouse; and Elmer Azote (Elmer),as dependent, born on
October 9, 1982.
Ednas petition with the SSC to claim the death benefits, lump sum and monthly pension of
Edgardo was denied on the ground that although Edgardo filed the Form E-4 designating Edna and
their six children as beneficiaries, he did not revoke the designation of Rosemarie as his wifebeneficiary, and Rosemarie was still presumed to be his legal wife. Consequently, it opined that
Edgardos marriage to Edna was not valid as there was no showing that his first marriage had been
annulled or dissolved. The SSC stated that there must be a judicial determination of nullity of a
previous marriage before a party could enter into a second marriage.
The CA reversed and set aside the resolution and the order of the SSC. It ruled that
Edgardo made a deliberate change of his wife-beneficiary in his 1994 E-4 form, as such was clearly
his voluntary act manifesting his intention to revoke his former declaration in the 1982 E-4
form.15 The 1994 E-4 form submitted by Edgardo, designating Edna as his wife, superseded his
former declaration in his 1982 E-4 form.
CA denied the SSCs motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Court of Appeals gravely erred in granting the petition of the private
respondent and finding her entitled to the SS benefits
HELD:
YES. As a social security program of the government, Section 8 (e) and (k) of RA 8282
expressly provides who would be entitled to receive benefits from its deceased-member, to wit:
SEC. 8. Terms Defined. - For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall, unless the context
indicates otherwise, have the following meanings:
xxxx
(e) Dependents - The dependents shall be the following:
(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member;
(2) The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is
unmarried, not gainfully employed, and has not reached twenty-one (21) years of
age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor
has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or
mentally; and
(3) The parent who is receiving regular support from the member.
xxxx
(k) Beneficiaries - The dependent spouse until he or she remarries, the dependent
legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children, who shall be the
primary beneficiaries of the member: Provided, That the dependent illegitimate children
shall be entitled to fifty percent (50%) of the share of the legitimate, legitimated or legally

adopted children: Provided, further, That in the absence of the dependent legitimate,
legitimated children of the member, his/her dependent illegitimate children shall be
entitled to one hundred percent (100%) of the benefits. In their absence, the dependent
parents who shall be the secondary beneficiaries of the member. In the absence of all the
foregoing, any other person designated by the member as his/her secondary beneficiary.
(Emphasis supplied)
Applying Section 8(e) and (k) of R.A. No. 8282, it is clear that only the legal spouse of the
deceased-member is qualified to be the beneficiary of the latters SS benefits. In this case, there is
a concrete proof that Edgardo contracted an earlier marriage with another individual as evidenced
by their marriage contract. Edgardo even acknowledged his married status when he filled out the
1982 Form E-4 designating Rosemarie as his spouse. 27
It is undisputed that the second marriage of Edgardo with Edna was celebrated at the time when
the Family Code was already in force.1
Using the parameters outlined in Article 41 of the Family Code, Edna, without doubt, failed
to establish that there was no impediment or that the impediment was already removed at the
time of the celebration of her marriage to Edgardo. Settled is the rule that "whoever claims
entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto by substantial
evidence."28 Edna could not adduce evidence to prove that the earlier marriage of Edgardo was
either annulled or dissolved or whether there was a declaration of Rosemaries presumptive death
before her marriage to Edgardo. What is apparent is that Edna was the second wife of Edgardo.
Considering that Edna was not able to show that she was the legal spouse of a deceased-member,
she would not qualify under the law to be the beneficiary of the death benefits of Edgardo. The
Court does not subscribe to the disquisition of the CA that the updated Form E-4 of Edgardo was
determinative of Ednas status and eligibility to claim the death benefits of deceased-member.
Although an SSS member is free to designate a beneficiary, the designation must always conform
to the statute. To blindly rely on the form submitted by the deceased-member would subject the
entire social security system to the whims and caprices of its members and would render the SS
Law inutile.
The existence of two Form E-4s designating, on two different dates, two different women as
his spouse is already an indication that only one of them can be the legal spouse. As can be
gleaned from the certification issued by the NSO, 31 there is no doubt that Edgardo married
Rosemarie in 1982. Edna cannot be considered as the legal spouse of Edgardo as their marriage
took place during the existence of a previously contracted marriage. For said reason, the denial of
Edna's claim by the SSC was correct. It should be emphasized that the SSC determined Edna's
eligibility on the basis of available statistical data and documents on their database as expressly
permitted by Section 4(b) (7) of R.A. No. 8282.
It is of no moment that the first wife, Rosemarie, did not participate or oppose Edna's
claim. Rosemarie's non-participation or her subsequent death on November 11, 2004 32 did not cure
or legitimize the status of Edna.

BARTOLOME VS SSS
FACTS:
John Colcol (John) was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on
board the vessel Maersk Danville, since February 2008. As such, he was enrolled under the
government's Employees' Compensation Program (ECP).3 Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008, an
accident occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John, which led to his untimely
death the following day.
John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P.
Bartolome, Johns biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for
death benefits under PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union.
However, the SSS La Union office denied the claim on the ground that she is no longer considered
as the legal parent of John as he was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol, Johns great grandfather.
Both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC ruled against petitioners entitlement to the death
benefits sought after under PD 626 on the ground she can no longer be considered Johns primary
beneficiary. In effect, the rights which previously belong [sic] to the biological parent of the
adopted child shall now be upon the adopting parent. Hence, in this case, the legal parent referred
to by P.D. 626, as amended, as the beneficiary, who has the right to file the claim, is the adoptive
father of the deceased and not herein appellant.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was likewise denied by the ECC.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the biological parents of the covered, but legally adopted, employee
considered secondary beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in appropriate cases, to receive the benefits
under the ECP
HELD:
YES. Based on Cornelios death certificate, it appears that Johns adoptive father died on
October 26, 1987, or only less than three (3) years since the decree of adoption on February 4,
1985, which attained finality. As such, it was error for the ECC to have ruled that it was not duly
proven that the adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already passed away.
The ECC Rule limiting death benefit claims to the legitimate parents is contrary to law. Rule XV,
Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation deviates from the clear language
of Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code. Hence,Rule XV of the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a substantial deviation from Article 167 (j)
of the Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase dependent parents to refer to legitimate
parents.
As the law does not define dependent parents, it should be understood to have a general and
inclusive scope. Thus, the term parents in the phrase dependent parents in the afore-quoted
Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is used and ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be
unduly limited to legitimate parents as what the ECC did. The phrase dependent parents should,
therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether by nature or by
adoption. When the law does not distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, dependent
parents are parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption, who are in need
of support or assistance.

Moreover, the same Article 167 (j), as couched, clearly shows that Congress did not intend to limit
the phrase dependent parents to solely legitimate parents. At the risk of being repetitive, Article
167 provides that in their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed
on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are secondary
beneficiaries. Had the lawmakers contemplated dependent parents to mean legitimate parents,
then it would have simply said descendants and not legitimate descendants. The manner by
which the provision in question was crafted undeniably show that the phrase dependent parents
was intended to cover all parents legitimate, illegitimate or parents by nature or adoption.
The law is clear that the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their
child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered
employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or
intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by
adoption vis--vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted.
As a result, Cornelios death at the time of Johns minority resulted in the restoration of petitioners
parental authority over the adopted child.
Moreover, John, in his SSS application, named petitioner as one of his beneficiaries for his benefits
under RA 8282, otherwise known as the Social Security Law. While RA 8282 does not cover
compensation for work-related deaths or injury and expressly allows the designation of
beneficiaries who are not related by blood to the member unlike in PD 626, Johns deliberate act of
indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at least evinces that he, in a way, considered petitioner as
his dependent. Consequently, the confluence of circumstances from Cornelios death during
Johns minority, the restoration of petitioners parental authority, the documents showing
singularity of address, and Johns clear intention to designate petitioner as a beneficiary
effectively made petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to death benefit claims as a secondary
beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent parent.
In sum, the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is bereft of legal basis. Cornelios adoption of
John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from
Johns death as a dependent parent given Cornelios untimely demise during Johns minority. Since
the parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under the Employees Compensation
Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, Johns sole remaining beneficiary.

HACBANG VS ALO
FACTS:
On 3 April 1937, Bishop Sofronio Hacbang (Bishop Sofronio) died leaving several properties
behind. Among these was Lot No. 8-A of subdivision Plan Psd-6227 located at Espaa Street, San
Juan, Rizal,3 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (19896) 227644 (the subject
lot).
Bishop Sofronio was survived by his parents, Basilio and Maria Hacbang, and his siblings:
Perfecto Hacbang, Joaquin Hacbang, Lucia Teresita Hacbang, and Dolores Hacbang Alo. Petitioner
Dolores L. Hacbang is the grandchild of Perfecto while petitioner Bernardo Hacbang (Bernardo) is a
son of Joaquin. The respondent Basilio Alo is the son of Dolores. He left a will denominated
as Ultima Voluntad y Testamento. He left one-half of his properties to his parents and devised the
other half - including the subject lot - to his sister Dolores. The probate of Bishop Sofronio's will
and the settlement of his estate was archived. Dolores Hacbang Alo later on moved to revive the
settlement proceedings because the CFI had not yet completed adjudicating the properties. CFI
denied such motion.
Petitioners Dolores L. Hacbang and Bernardo filed a petition to cancel TCT No. 169342 on
the ground that it was fraudulently secured. On 7 January 2003, the RTC dismissed the petition
because the petitioners had no right to prosecute the case on the subject lot. The RTC noted that
Bishop Sofronio's will had already been admitted into probate in 1937; thus, the intrinsic validity of
the will is no longer in question. Though the settlement proceedings were archived, Bishop Sofronio
already designated his heirs: Bishop Sofronio's parents were compulsory heirs entitled to half of his
estate while the respondent's mother, Dolores Hacbang Alo, was devised the remaining half (the
free portion). Thus, the petitioners, who are neither compulsory nor testamentary heirs, are not
real parties in interest.
The CA affirmed the RTC's order of dismissal. The CA held that the admission of Bishop
Sofronio's will to probate precluded intestate succession unless the will was intrinsically invalid or
failed to completely dispose of his estate. Contrary to the petitioners' contention, the settlement
proceedings were not dismissed but archived; the will did not lose its validity merely because the
proceedings were archived. Undoubtedly, Bishop Sofronio did not die intestate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not that the probate proceedings of the estate was dismissed, not archived
HELD:
NO. The law in force at the time of the decedent's death determines the applicable law
over the settlement of his estate. Bishop Sofronio died in 1937 before the enactment of the Civil
Code in 1949. Therefore, the correct applicable laws to the settlement of his estate are the 1889
Spanish
Civil
Code
and
the
1901
Code
of
Civil
Procedure.
In any case, under both the Spanish Code and our Civil Code, successional rights are vested at the
precise moment of the death of the decedent.
The inheritance vests immediately upon the decedent's death without a moment's interruption.
This provision was later on translated and adopted as Article 777 of our Civil Code. 10
As a consequence of this principle, ownership over the inheritance passes to the heirs at

the precise moment of death - not at the time the heirs are declared, nor at the time of the
partition, nor at the distribution of the properties. There is no interruption between the end of the
decedent's
ownership
and
the
start
of
the
heir/legatee/devisee's
ownership.
For intestate heirs, this means that they are immediately entitled to their hereditary shares in the
estate even though they may not be entitled to any particular properties yet. For legatees and
devisees granted specific properties, this means that they acquire ownership over the legacies and
devises at that immediate moment without prejudice to the legitimes of compulsory heirs.
Undoubtedly, Bishop Sofronio did not die intestate. He left a will that was probated in 1937. He left
half of his properties to his parents and the remaining half to his sister Dolores Hacbang Alo. The
admission of his will to probate is conclusive with respect to its due execution and extrinsic validity.
Our jurisdiction accords great respect to the testator's freedom of disposition. Hence, testate
succession has always been preferred over intestacy. 13 As much as possible, a testator's will is
treated and interpreted in a way that would render all of its provisions operative. 14 Hence, there is
no basis to apply the provisions on intestacy when testate succession evidently applies.
Even though the CFI archived the settlement proceedings, there is no indication that it declared
any of the dispositions in the will invalid. The records are understandably bare considering the
probate proceedings were initiated as early as 1937. Nonetheless, we find no reason to doubt the
intrinsic
validity
of
the
will.
Bishop Sofronio was free to dispose of his estate without prejudice to the legitimes of his
compulsory heirs. Bishop Sofronio's only compulsory heirs were his parents. 15 Their legitime was
one-half of Bishop Sofronio's estate. 16 Considering that Bishop Sofronio gave his parents half of his
estate, then he was free to dispose of the free portion of his estate in favor of his sister, Dolores
Hacbang Alo. Thus, his will was intrinsically valid.
At the precise moment of death, the heirs become owners of the estate pro-indiviso. They become
absolute owners of their undivided aliquot share but with respect to the individual properties of the
estate, they become co-owners. This co-ownership remains until partition and distribution. Until
then, the individual heirs cannot claim any rights over a specific property from the estate. This is
because the heirs do not know which properties will be adjudicated to them yet. Hence, there is a
need for a partition before title over particular properties vest in the distributee-heirs.
However, heirs, legatees, and devisees bequeathed specific properties do not require Court
adjudication to identify which particular properties become theirs; the testator had already
identified these. From the very moment of the testator's death, title over these particular
properties
vests
on
the
heir,
legatee,
or
devisee.
On 3 April 1937, title over the subject lot passed on to the respondent's mother, Dolores Hacbang
Alo, at the exact moment of her brother's death. From that moment on, she was free to dispose of
the subject lot as a consequence of her ownership.

HEIRS OR BASBAS vs BASBAS

FACTS:
Severo Basbas was married to Ana Rivera. Severo died on July 14, 1911. They had a child
named Valentin (Basbas). During Severos lifetime, he acquired a parcel of land in Santa Rosa,
Laguna otherwise known as Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate. Lot No. 39 is adjacent to
Lot No. 40 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate which lot was acquired, by purchase, by Valentin
Basbas. Sometime in 1995, [herein petitioners Heirs of Valentin Basbas] discovered that
[respondents] Crispiniano and Ricardo Basbas were able to secure for themselves Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-294295 over Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate. Sometime in
1987, [respondents], through Crispiniano Basbas, filed a Petition for Reconstitution of Title before
the Regional Trial Court, Bian, Laguna, docketed as LRC Case No. B-758, covering Lot No. 39 of the
Santa Rosa Detached Estate.
Subsequently thereafter, or on June 1, 1989, an Order was issued by the RTC granting the
aforesaid petition. On the basis of said Order, the title covering Lot No. 39 was ordered
reconstituted in the name of the heirs of Severo Basbas and Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-1684
(N.A.) was issued. On November 13, 1993, [therein] defendants Crispiniano Basbas y Talampas and
[respondent] Ricardo Basbas y Talampas executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of
deceased Severo Basbas stating among others that the only heirs of Severo Basbas are Felomino
Basbas and Melencio Casubha.
On the basis of said Extra-Judicial Settlement the Registry of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna
cancelled Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-1684 and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-294295 was issued in the names of [therein] defendants Crispiniano Basbas and [respondent]
Ricardo Basba. Petitioners then brought the matter to the Barangay but no settlement was
reached. Hence, this instant action.
MTC and RTC of Sta. Rosa Laguna annulled TCT No. 294295 issued in the name of
Crispiniano Talampas Basbas (Crispiniano) and herein respondent Ricardo Talampas Basbas
(Ricardo), covering Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate, the subject property, and
originally titled to the decedent, Severo Basbas (Severo) under Certificate of Title No. RT-1684
(N.A.). Crispiniano and Ricardo and all their successors-in-interest were ordered to reconvey the
subject property to petitioners.
Both parties, petitioners, Heirs of Valentin Basbas (Valentin), and respondent Ricardo trace
their claim of ownership over herein subject property to Severo. Countering petitioners allegations,
Crispiniano and Ricardo denied petitioners ownership over Lot No. 39 and contended that upon
Severos death, he was survived by two heirs, Valentin (grandfather of petitioners) and Nicolas
Basbas (Nicolas) (paternal grandfather of Crispiniano and Ricardo) who evenly divided Severos
estate, comprising of two lots, herein subject property, Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached
Estate, and Lot No. 40, adjacent thereto, among them. Lot No. 40 was inherited by Valentin, while
Lot No. 39 went to Nicolas.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA seriously erred in reversing and setting aside the decision of the rtc
branch 24 of binan, laguna affirming that of MTC sta. rosa, lagunas decision finding for the
petitioners
HELD:
Valentins long-possessed status as a legitimate child and thus, heir of Severo, need no
longer be the subject of a special proceeding for declaration of heirship as envisioned by the Court
of Appeals. There is no need to re-declare his status as an heir of Severo. And, contraposed to the
fact that Valentins status as a legitimate child of Severo is already established, Nicolas status as a
purported heir of Severo can no longer be established, Nicolas right thereto expiring upon his
death.
Glaringly, there is no pretension from respondents end that Nicolas was born of a valid marriage,
only that he is Severos son. Nonetheless, even if respondents were minded to establish the status
of Nicolas, whether he is a legitimate or an illegitimate child of Severo, such can no longer be done.
Article 165, in relation to Articles 173 and 175, of the Family Code and Article 285 of the Civil Code
state:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Art. 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise
provided in this Code.
We find no need for a separate proceeding for a declaration of the heirs of Severo in order to
resolve petitioners Action for Annulment of Title and Reconveyance of the subject property.
Prescinding from the foregoing, a closer scrutiny of the documents presented in evidence by
Crispiniano and Ricardo before the trial court, betray the fraudulence of their claim. We add that
Valentins rights to the succession vested from the moment of death of the decedent Severo. 19 In
turn, petitioners, as Heirs of Valentin, who is an uncontested heir of decedent Severo, rights to the
succession vested from the moment of Valentins death. As such, they own Lot No. 39,
undisputedly titled in Severos name and forming part of Severos estate, and are entitled to the
titling thereof in their names. One final note. Severo, as well as Valentin, have been long dead. It is
well-nigh that title to the subject property, Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate, appear in
the names of the petitioners, Heirs of Valentin, herein declared heirs of Severo, or their successorsin-interest, to finally settle title thereto and prevent occurrences of fraudulent titling thereof.
Hence, petitioners, Heirs of Valentin and their successors-in-interest, are directed to take the
appropriate action for titling of the subject property.
The issue as to whether or not the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Severo Basbas
executed by Crispiniano and Ricardo Basbas is valid. The Court believes otherwise. Simply
because the defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo] are not the legal heirs of the late
Severo Basbas. They (defendants) [including herein respondent Ricardo] claimed that they derived
their title and ownership over Lot No. 39 in representation of Felomino Basbas, an alleged
[grand]son of the late Severo Basbas; that Severo Basbas gave Lot No. 39 to Nicolas Basbas; and
that Lot No. 40 was also given by Severo Basbas to Valentin Basbas. Such a claim has no basis at
all. The [petitioners] evidence, specifically the Friar Lands Certificate x x x and the Certification
from the DENR x x x show that Valentin Basbas acquired Lot No. 40 of the Santa Rosa Detached
Estate by purchase from the government way back on April 1, 1913, contrary to the allegations of
the defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo] that the same was given by Severo Basbas to
Valentin Basba as the latters share in the inheritance.
Claiming to be the only heirs of Felomino Basbas (their father), and that Felomino Basbas and
Melencio Casubha are the only heirs of the late Severo Basbas, Crispiniano Basbas and Ricardo
Basbas executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Severo Basbas on November
12, 1993, whereby they adjudicated to themselves Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate x
x x. On the basis of the said Extra-Judicial Settlement, Crispiniano Basbas filed a Petition For The
Reconstitution of Title No. (N.A.) covering Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate x x x
before the Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna, and after hearing, an Order was issued granting
the aforesaid petition. Subsequently thereafter, TCT No. RT-1684 (N.A.) in the names of the Heirs of
Severo Basbas was cancelled and a new title (TCT No. 294295) was issued in the names of
Crispiniano
Basbas
and
Ricardo
Basbas,
defendants
[therein.]
Based on the evidence on hand, defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo] acquired the

property in question through fraud and, therefore, an implied trust was created in favor of
[petitioners] under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code.