1.

PICOP vs Base metals dec 6, 2006

DOCTRINE
The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as a contractual undertaking assuring PICOP of exclusive
possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. Such an interpretation would result in the complete abdication by the State in
favor of PICOP of the sovereign power to control and supervise the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources
in the area.
FACTS
Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation entered into a Mines Operating Agreement with Banahaw
Mining and Development Corporation. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Banahaw Mining filed applications for Mining Lease
Contracts over the mining claims with the Bureau of Mines. On April 29, 1988, Banahaw Mining was issued a Mines Temporary
Permit authorizing it to extract and dispose of precious minerals found within its mining claims. Since a portion of Banahaw Mining's
mining claims was located in petitioner PICOP's logging concession in Agusan del Sur, Banahaw Mining and petitioner PICOP
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement, whereby, in mutual recognition of each other's right to the area concerned, petitioner
PICOP allowed Banahaw Mining an access/right of way to its mining claims Banahaw Mining thereafter converted its mining claims
to applications for Mineral Production Sharing Agreements.
While the MPSA were pending, Banahaw Mining, on December 18, 1996, decided to sell/assign its rights and interests
over thirty-seven mining claims in favor of private respondent Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation (Base Metals for brevity).
The transfer included mining claims held by Banahaw Mining in its own right as claim owner, as well as those covered by its mining
operating agreement with CMMCI.
Upon being informed of the development, CMMCI, as claim owner, immediately approved the assignment made by
Banahaw Mining in favor of private respondent Base Metals, thereby recognizing private respondent Base Metals as the new
operator of its claims
On November 18, 1997, petitioner PICOP filed with the Mines Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB), Caraga Regional Office No.
XIII an Adverse Claim and/or Opposition to private respondent Base Metals' application on the following grounds:
I. THE APPROVAL OF THE APPLICATION AND ISSUANCE OF THE MPSA OF BASE METALS WILL VIOLATE THE
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE AGAINST IMPAIRMENT OF OBLIGATION IN A CONTRACT
The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the MAB, ruling that the Presidential Warranty of September 25, 1968 issued by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos merely confirmed the timber license granted to PICOP and warranted the latter's peaceful and
adequate possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. It was only given upon the request of the Board of Investments to
establish the boundaries of PICOP's timber license agreement. The Presidential Warranty did not convert PICOP's timber license
into a contract because it did not create any obligation on the part of the government in favor of PICOP. Thus, the non-impairment
clause finds no application.
Neither did the Presidential Warranty grant PICOP the exclusive possession, occupation and exploration of the concession areas
covered. If that were so, the government would have effectively surrendered its police power to control and supervise the
exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural resources.
ISSUE: w/n the impairment of contracts apply?
HELD

No. The guaranty is merely a collateral inducement

An examination of the Presidential Warranty at once reveals that it simply reassures PICOP of the government's
commitment to uphold the terms and conditions of its timber license and guarantees PICOP's peaceful and adequate possession
and enjoyment of the areas which are the basic sources of raw materials for its wood processing complex. The warranty covers only
the right to cut, collect, and remove timber in its concession area, and does not extend to the utilization of other resources, such as
mineral resources, occurring within the concession.
The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as a contractual undertaking assuring PICOP of exclusive
possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. Such an interpretation would result in the complete abdication by the State in
favor of PICOP of the sovereign power to control and supervise the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources
in the area.
2. didapho earth savers vs gozun mar 30, 2006
DOCTRINE: In the case at bar, Didipio failed to show that the law is invalid. There is taking involved and just compensation is
provided for.
FACTS
After the EDSA Revolution, Cory swiftly rolled out EO 279 w/c empowered DENR to stipulate with foreign
companies when it comes to either technical or financial large scale exploration or mining.
Nine years later, Ramos signed into law RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act. In 1994, Ramos already signed an FTAA
with Arimco Mining Co, an Australian company. The FTAA authorized AMC (later CAMC) to explore 37,000 ha of land in Quirino and
N. Vizcaya including Brgy Didipio. After the passage of the law, DENR rolled out its implementing RRs. Didipio petitioned to have the
law and the RR to be annulled as it is unconstitutional and it constitutes unlawful taking of property.
In seeking to nullify Rep. Act No. 7942 and its implementing rules DAO 96-40 as unconstitutional, petitioners set their
sight on Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 which they claim allow the unlawful and unjust taking of
private property for private purpose in contradiction with Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandating that private property
shall not be taken except for public use and the corresponding payment of just compensation. They assert that public respondent
DENR, through the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, cannot, on its own, permit entry into a private property
and allow taking of land without payment of just compensation.
Despite petitioners assertion, public respondents argue that Section 76 is not a taking provision but a valid exercise of the
police power and by virtue of which, the state may prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good

order, safety and general welfare of the people. This government regulation involves the adjustment of rights for the public good
and that this adjustment curtails some potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property. Public respondents
concluded that to require compensation in all such circumstances would compel the government to regulate by purchase.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7942 and the DENR RRs are valid.
HELD: The SC that the RRs are indeed valid. The SC noted the requisites of eminent domain. They are;
(1)
the expropriator must enter a private property;
(2)
the entry must be for more than a momentary period.
(3)
the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;
(4)
the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected;
(5)
the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial
enjoyment of the property.
In the case at bar, Didipio failed to show that the law is invalid. There is taking involved but it is not w/o just compensation. Sec 76 of
RA 7942 provides for just compensation as well as section 107 of the DENR RR. To wit,
Section 76. xxx Provided, that any damage to the property of the surface owner, occupant, or concessionaire as a
consequence of such operations shall be properly compensated as may be provided for in the implementing rules and
regulations.
Section 107. Compensation of the Surface Owner and Occupant- Any damage done to the property of the surface
owners, occupant, or concessionaire thereof as a consequence of the mining operations or as a result of the construction
or installation of the infrastructure mentioned in 104 above shall be properly and justly compensated.
Further, mining is a public policy and the government can invoke eminent domain to exercise entry, acquisition and use of
private lands.
3. republic vs rosemoor mar 30, 2004
DOCTRINE
Proclamation 84, which merely restored the area excluded from the Biak-na-Bato national park by canceling respondents license, is
clearly not penal in character and neither is it ex post facto.
FACTS
Petitioner Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation (spearheaded by four individuals) after having been
granted permission to prospect for marble deposits in the mountains of Biak-na-Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan, succeeded in
discovering marble deposits of high quality and in commercial quantities in Mount Mabio which forms part of the Biak-na-Bato
mountain range.
Rosemor thereafter applied with the Bureau of Mines, now Mines and Geosciences Bureau, for the issuance of the
corresponding license to exploit said marble deposits.
Within that same year, License No. 33 was issued by the Bureau of Mines in favor of the herein petitioners. It is largely
unfortunate that thereafter, Respondent Ernesto Maceda cancelled the petitioners license stating that their license had illegally
been issued, because it violated Section 69 of PD 463; and that there was no more public interest served by the continued
existence or renewal of the license. The latter reason was confirmed by the language of Proclamation No. 84. According to this law,
public interest would be served by reverting the parcel of land that was excluded by Proclamation No. 2204 to the former status of
that land as part of the Biak-na-Bato national park.
Issue: Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 84 is valid.
Held:
Yes. Proclamation No. 84 is not a bill of attainder; that is, a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial."
Its declaration that QLP No. 33 is a patent nullity is certainly not a declaration of guilt. Neither is the cancellation of the license a
punishment within the purview of the constitutional proscription against bills of attainder.
There is no merit in the argument that the proclamation is an ex post facto law. It is settled that an ex post facto law is
limited in its scope only to matters criminal in nature. Proclamation 84, which merely restored the area excluded from the Biak-naBato national park by canceling respondents license, is clearly not penal in character.
Also at the time President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 84 on March 9, 1987, she was still validly exercising legislative
powers under the Provisional Constitution of 1986. Section 1 of Article II of Proclamation No. 3, which promulgated the Provisional
Constitution, granted her legislative power until a legislature is elected and convened under a new Constitution. The grant of such
power is also explicitly recognized and provided for in Section 6 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
4.
labugal vs ramos jan 27, 2004
DOCTRINE
Although counsel for respondents claim that technical is a very broad term that may cover the management and operation of
such activities, it is still clear from the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission that they intended to limit the utilization of the
natural resources for the sole enjoyment of the Filipinos.
FACTS
1987: Pres. Aquino issued EO 279 whereby she authorized DENR to accept, consider and evaluate proposals
from foreign-ownedcorporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial assistancefor
large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendationof the Secretary,
the President may execute with the foreign proponent.
In entering into such proposals, the President shall consider the real contributions to the economic growth and general
welfare of the country that will be realized, as well as the development and use of local scientific and technical resources that will be
promoted by the proposed contract or agreement. Until Congress shall determine otherwise, large-scalemining, for purpose of this
Section, shall mean those proposals for contracts or agreements for mineralr esources exploration, development, and utilization

involving a committed capital investment in a single miningunit project of at least Fifty Million Dollars in United States Currency
(US $50,000,000. 00)
The timeline illustrates:
March 1995 RA 7942 signed into law
March 1995 Government entered FTAA with WMCP 99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, SultanKudarat, Davao
del Sur and North Cotabato .
April 1995 30 days after publication on 10 March 1995, RA 7942 took effect
December 1996 DENR Secretary Victor Ramos issued DAO 96-40
January 1997 counsels for petitioner sent letter to Ramos demanding DENR to stop implementing RA7942 and DAO
96-40. No response, thus this petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with prayer of TRO and preliminary injunction(denied) claiming
that petitioner Ramos acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the assailed Constitutionality of RA 7942 of DENR
Administrative Order 96-40 and of the Financial and TechnicalAssistance Agreement entered into on 30 March 1995 between the
Republic of the Philippines and WMC(Philippines) , Inc..
January 2001 Manifestation of respondents that WMCP is no longer foreign-owned as WMC has sold100% of its equity
to Filipino company Sagittarius Mines, Inc. which is 60% owned by Filipinos or Filipino-owned corporations. WMCP is renamed
as Tampakan Mineral Resources Corporation. 18 December 2001 DENR approved the transfer and registration of FTAA to
Sagittarius from WMCP. Supreme Court said that this manifestation and transfer does not render the issue moot since the question
of validity of the FTAA will affect even that held by Sagittarius.
Issue/s

Whether or not Petitioners have standing.

Whether or Not EO 279 is an invalid law having been issued two days before President Aquinos legislative powers
expired with the convening of Regular Congress and having thus took effect after which.
Whether or Not RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 are unconstitutional and consequently the FTAA entered pursuant to aboves
tated laws is invalid
HELD

Preliminary Issue:
Petitioners have standing since they are residents of the land covered by the FTAA. Sincethe petition if for mandamus and
prohibition and the issue is of constitutionality of a statute, the Supreme is no longer concerned whether or not petitioners are real
parties of interest to the contract/agreement.
EO 279 is valid and whether or not the laws effectivity date lies beyond the expiration of the Presidents legislative power
is irrelevant since it was still enacted when the president held such power. It does not runcounter to EO 200 requiring laws to have
15 days after publication requirement before its effectivity since EO200 also provides unless it is otherwise provided, EO
279 having stated its own effectivity as shall take effectimmediately. In addition, the 15-day post-publication requirement was for
the information of the public anddoes not in any way affect the date of enactment and is not a ground for invalidation. EO 279
nonetheless waspublished on the Official Gazette on 3 August 1987.
The 1987 Constitution provides The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, or utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions providedby law, based on real contributions to the
economic growth and general welfare of the country. In suchagreements, the State shall promote the development and use of
local scientific and technical resources
Some interesting notes:
1) State may directly undertake such activities
(2) State may enter into co-production, joint-venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or qualified corporations
(60% Filipino owned
(3) Congress may allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens
(4) For the large-scale exploration, development, or utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils,the President may enter
into agreements with foreign-owned corporation for technical or financial assistance. The framers of this Constitution expressly
omitted the phrase service contracts that was provided for in the1973 Constitution which allowed foreign companies to manage
and operate mining activities and replaced itwith technical or financial assistance only. RA 7942, DAO 96-40, and the FTAA
between the government and WMCP allows for the management andoperation of the foreign-owned corporation for the large-scale
exploration, development, or utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils.
Although counsel for respondents claim that technical is a very broad term that may cover the management and
operation of such activities, it is still clear from the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission that they intended to limit the
utilization of the natural resources for the sole enjoyment of the Filipinos.
Ultimate decision.
Petition Granted. Certain provisions of RA 7942 are declared null and void. So are all provisions of Departmentof
Environment and Natural Resources Administrative Order 96-40, s. 1996 which are not in conformity withthis Decision, and the
Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement between the Government of the Republicof the Philippines and WMC Philippines, Inc
5. labugal vs ramos dec 1, 2004
DOCTRINE
Under the doctrine of separation of powers and due respect for co-equal and coordinate branches of government, the Court must
restrain itself from intruding into policy matters and must allow the President and Congress maximum discretion in using the
resources of our country and in securing the assistance of foreign groups to eradicate the grinding poverty of our people and answer
their cry for viable employment opportunities in the country.
FACTS

The extant case involves a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court which challenges the constitutionality
of (1) Republic Act 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995); (2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations (DENR Administrative
Order [DAO] 96-40); and (3) the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated 30 March 1995, executed by the
government with Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP).
Before February, the Court released its Decision, granting the Petition and declaring the unconstitutionality of certain
provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, as well as of the entire FTAA executed between the government and WMCP, mainly on the
finding that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the 1987 Constitution.
The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being similar to service contracts,which, though permitted under the 1973
Constitution, were subsequently denounced for being antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because
they allowed foreign control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation.
The landmark decision drew strength from several legal scholars and authors who had criticized service contracts for,
inter alia, vesting in the foreign contractor exclusive management and control of the enterprise, including operation of the field in the
event petroleum was discovered; control of production, expansion and development; nearly unfettered control over the disposition
and sale of the products discovered/extracted; effective ownership of the natural resource at the point of extraction; and beneficial
ownership of our economic resources.
According to the Decision, the 1987 Constitution (Section 2 of Article XII) effectively banned such service contracts.
Subsequently, Ramos several government officials filed a motion for reconsideration.
Issue:

Whether or not the Court has a role in the exercise of the power of control over the EDU of our natural resources?

Held:

Most certainly not.

The Chief Executive is the official constitutionally mandated to enter into agreements with foreign owned corporations.
On the other hand, Congress may review the action of the President once it is notified of every contract entered into in accordance
with this [constitutional] provision within thirty days from its execution. In contrast to this express mandate of the President and
Congress in the exploration, development and utilization (EDU) of natural resources, Article XII of the Constitution is silent on the
role of the judiciary. However, should the President and/or Congress gravely abuse their discretion in this regard, the courts may -in a proper case -- exercise their residual duty under Article VIII. Clearly then, the judiciary should not inordinately interfere in the
exercise of this presidential power of control over the EDU of our natural resources.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers and due respect for co-equal and coordinate branches of government, the
Court must restrain itself from intruding into policy matters and must allow the President and Congress maximum discretion in using
the resources of our country and in securing the assistance of foreign groups to eradicate the grinding poverty of our people and
answer their cry for viable employment opportunities in the country. The judiciary is loath to interfere with the due exercise by
coequal branches of government of their official functions. As aptly spelled out seven decades ago by Justice George Malcolm,
Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of
government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by
the Organic Act. Let the development of the mining industry be the responsibility of the political branches of government. And let not
the Court interfere inordinately and unnecessarily. The Constitution of the Philippines is the supreme law of the land. It is the
repository of all the aspirations and hopes of all the people.
LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CO.,vs.
WMC RESOURCES INTL. PTY. LTD., WMC PHILIPPINES, INC. and SAGITTARIUS MINES, INC.,
FACTS:
Philippine Government and WMC Philippines, the local wholly-owned subsidiary of WMC Resources International Pty. Ltd.
(WMC Resources) executed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement, denominated as the Columbio FTAA No. 02-95-XI
(Columbio FTAA) for the purpose of large scale exploration, development, and commercial exploration of possible mineral resources
in an initial contract area of 99,387 hectares located in the provinces of South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur, and North
Cotabato in accordance with Executive Order No. 279 and Department Administrative Order No. 63, Series of 1991.
The Columbio FTAA is covered in part by 156 mining claims held under various Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA) by
Southcot Mining Corporation, Tampakan Mining Corporation, and Sagittarius Mines, Inc. (collectively called the Tampakan
Companies), in accordance with the Tampakan Option Agreement entered into by WMC Philippines and the Tampakan Companies
on 25 April 1991, as amended by Amendatory Agreement dated 15 July 1994, for purposes of exploration of the mining claims in
Tampakan, South Cotabato. The Option Agreement, among other things, provides for the grant of the right of first refusal to the
Tampakan Companies in case WMC Philippines desires to dispose of its rights and interests in the mining claims covering the area
subject of the agreement.
WMC Resources subsequently divested itself of its rights and interests in the ColumbioFTAA, and on 12 July 2000
executed a Sale and Purchase Agreement with petitioner Lepanto over its entire shareholdings in WMC Philippines, subject to the
exercise of the Tampakan Companies exercise of their right of first refusal to purchase the subject shares. On 28 August 2000,
petitioner sought the approval of the 12 July 2000 Agreement from the DENR Secretary.
In the interim, on 10 January 2001, contending that the 12 July Agreement between petitioner and WMC Philippines had expired
due to failure to meet the necessary preconditions for its validity, WMC Resources and the Tampakan Companies executed another
Sale and Purchase Agreement, where Sagittarius Mines, Inc. was designated assignee and corporate vehicle which would acquire
the shareholdings and undertake the Columbio FTAA activities. On 15 January 2001, Sagittarius Mines, Inc. increased its
authorized capitalization to P250 million. Subsequently, WMC Resources and Sagittarius Mines, Inc. executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale of Shares of Stocks on 23 January 2001.

After due consideration and evaluation of the financial and technical qualifications of Sagittarius Mines, Inc., the DENR
Secretary approved the transfer of the Columbio FTAA from WMC Philippines to Sagittarius Mines, Inc. in the assailed Order.
According to said Order, pursuant to Section 66 of Department Administrative Order No. 96-40, as amended, Sagittarius Mines, Inc.
meets the qualification requirements as Contractor-Transferee of FTAA No. 02-95-XI, and that the application for transfer of said
FTAA went thru the procedure and other requirements set forth under the law.
Aggrieved by the transfer of the Columbio FTAA in favor of Sagittarius Mines, Inc., petitioner filed a Petition for Review of
the Order of the DENR Secretary with the Office of the President. Petitioner assails the validity of the 18 December 2001 Order of
the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) approving the application for and the consequent
registration of FTAA No. 02-95-XI from WMC Philippines to Sagittarius Mines, Inc.on the ground that: 1) it violates the constitutional
right of Lepanto to due process; 2) it preempts the resolution of very crucial legal issues pending with the regular courts; and 3) it
blatantly violates Section 40 of the Mining Act.
In a Decision dated 23 July 2002, the Office of the President dismissed the petition
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, particularly Section 40 thereof requiring the approval of the
President of the assignment or transfer of financial or technical assistance agreements should have a retroactive application to the
Columbio FTAA.
HELD:
NO. Applying the above-cited law retroactively would contradict the established legal doctrine that statutes are to be
construed as having only a prospective operation unless the contrary is expressly stated or necessarily implied from the language
used in the law.
In the case at bar, there is an absence of either an express declaration or an implication in the Philippine Mining Act of
1995 that the provisions of said law shall be made to apply retroactively, therefore, any section of said law must be made to apply
only prospectively, in view of the rule that a statute ought not to receive a construction making it act retroactively, unless the words
used are so clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature
cannot be otherwise satisfied.
G.R. No. 163101
BENGUET CORPORATION vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES-MINES ADJUDICATION
BOARD and J.G. REALTY AND MINING CORPORATION
FACTS:
Benguet and J.G. Realty entered into a Royalty Agreement with Option to Purchase (RAWOP) , wherein J.G. Realty was
acknowledged as the owner of four mining claims with a total area of 288.8656 hectares. The parties also executed a Supplemental
Agreement.The mining claims were covered by Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) Application No. APSA-V-0009 jointly
filed by J.G. Realty as claim-owner and Benguet as operator.
After some time, the Executive Vice-President of Benguet, Antonio N. Tachuling, issued a letter informing J.G. Realty of its intention
to develop the mining claims. However, J.G. Realty, through its President, Johnny L. Tan, then sent a letter to the President of
Benguet informing the latter that it was terminating the RAWOP. The latter alleged that petitioner violated some of the provisions of
the RAWOP, specifically on non-payment of royalties and non-fulfillment of obligations stipulated therein.
J.G. Realty filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity/Cancellation of the RAWOP. POA issued a Decision, cancelling the RAWOP and
its Supplemental Agreement. BENGUET was subsequently excluded from the joint MPSA Application over the mineral claims.
Subsequent MR was denied. Said decision was upheld by DENR-MAB.
Hence this instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or no the filing of the petition with the Supreme Court is proper.
HELD:
NO. the instant petition can be denied outright as Benguet resorted to an improper Remedy.
The last paragraph of Section 79 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 states, A petition
for review by certiorari and question of law may be filed by the aggrieved party with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from
receipt of the order or decision of the [MAB].

The Revised Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule 43 to provide a uniform rule on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies.
Under the rule, appeals from their judgments and final orders are now required to be brought to the CA on a verified petition for
review. A quasi-judicial agency or body has been defined as an organ of government, other than a court or legislature, which affects
the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. MAB falls under this definition; hence, it is no different from
the other quasi-judicial bodies enumerated under Rule 43. Besides, the introductory words in Section 1 of Circular No. 191among these agencies areindicate that the enumeration is not exclusive or conclusive and acknowledge the existence of
other quasi-judicial agencies which, though not expressly listed, should be deemed included therein.
The judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of courts dictates that direct resort from administrative agencies to this Court will not be
entertained, unless the redress desired cannot be obtained from the appropriate lower tribunals, or unless exceptional and
compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy falling within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
Thus Benguet should have filed the appeal with the CA.
Petitioner having failed to properly appeal to the CA under Rule 43, the decision of the MAB has become final and executory. On
this ground alone, the instant petition must be denied.

APEX MINING CO., INC.,

Petitioner,
- versus SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORP. ET AL,
FACTS:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration dated 12 July 2006, filed by Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SEM), of
this Courts Decision dated 23 June 2006 (Assailed Decision). The Assailed Decision held that the assignment of Exploration Permit
(EP) 133 in favor of SEM violated one of the conditions stipulated in the permit, i.e., that the same shall be for the exclusive use and
benefit of Marcopper Mining Corporation (MMC) or its duly authorized agents. Since SEM did not claim or submit evidence that it
was a designated agent of MMC, the latter cannot be considered as an agent of the former that can use EP 133 and benefit from it.
It also ruled that the transfer of EP 133 violated Presidential Decree No. 463, which requires that the assignment of a mining right be
made with the prior approval of the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Moreover, the
Assailed Decision pointed out that EP 133 expired by non-renewal since it was not renewed before or after its expiration.
The Assailed Decision likewise upheld the validity of Proclamation No. 297 absent any question against its validity. In
view of this, and considering that under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7942, otherwise known as the Mining Act of 1995, mining
operations in mineral reservations may be undertaken directly by the State or through a contractor, the Court deemed the issue of
ownership of priority right over the contested Diwalwal Gold Rush Area as having been overtaken by the said proclamation. Thus, it
was held in the Assailed Decision that it is now within the prerogative of the Executive Department to undertake directly the mining
operations of the disputed area or to award the operations to private entities including petitioners Apex and Balite, subject to
applicable laws, rules and regulations, and provided that these private entities are qualified.
SEM also filed a Motion for Referral of Case to the Court En Banc and for Oral Arguments dated 22 August 2006.
Apex, for its part, filed a Motion for Clarification of the Assailed Decision, praying that the Court elucidate on the Decisions
pronouncement that mining operations, are now, therefore within the full control of the State through the executive branch.
Moreover, Apex asks this Court to order the Mines and Geosciences Board (MGB) to accept its application for an exploration permit.
In its Manifestation and Motion dated 28 July 2006, Balite echoes the same concern as that of Apex on the actual
takeover by the State of the mining industry in the disputed area to the exclusion of the private sector. In addition, Balite prays for
this Court to direct MGB to accept its application for an exploration permit.
Camilo Banad, et al., likewise filed a motion for reconsideration and prayed that the disputed area be awarded to them.
ISSUE/S:
Whether Southeast Mindanao Mining Corp. (SEM) acquired a vested right over the disputed area, which constitutes a
property right protected by the Constitution.
HELD:
NO. SEM does not aver or prove that its mining rights had been perfected and completed when the Philippine Bill of 1902
was still the operative law. Surely, it is impossible for SEM to successfully assert that it acquired mining rights over the disputed
area in accordance with the same bill, since it was only in 1984 that MMC, SEMs predecessor-in-interest, filed its declaration of
locations and its prospecting permit application in compliance with Presidential Decree No. 463. It was on 1 July 1985 and 10
March 1986 that a Prospecting Permit and EP 133, respectively, were issued to MMC. Considering these facts, there is no
possibility that MMC or SEM could have acquired a perfected mining claim under the auspices of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
Whatever mining rights MMC had that it invalidly transferred to SEM cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be considered mining
rights as contemplated under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and immortalized in McDaniel and Gold Creek Mining.
SEM likens EP 133 with a building permit. SEM likewise equates its supposed rights attached to the exploration permit
with the rights that a private property land owner has to said landholding. This analogy has no basis in law. As earlier discussed,
under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, national wealth, such as mineral resources, are owned by the State and not by their

discoverer. The discoverer or locator can only develop and utilize said minerals for his own benefit if he has complied with all the
requirements set forth by applicable laws and if the State has conferred on him such right through permits, concessions or
agreements. In other words, without the imprimatur of the State, any mining aspirant does not have any definitive right over the
mineral land because, unlike a private landholding, mineral land is owned by the State, and the same cannot be alienated to any
private person as explicitly stated in Section 2, Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution:
All lands of public domain, waters, minerals x x x and all other natural resources are owned by the
State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. (Emphases
supplied.)
Further, a closer scrutiny of the deed of assignment in favor of SEM reveals that MMC assigned to the former the rights
and interests it had in EP 133, thus:
1. That for ONE PESO (P1.00) and other valuable consideration received by the ASSIGNOR from
the ASSIGNEE, the ASSIGNOR hereby ASSIGNS, TRANSFERS and CONVEYS unto the ASSIGNEE whatever
rights or interest the ASSIGNOR may have in the area situated in Monkayo, Davao del Norte and Cateel, Davao
Oriental, identified as Exploration Permit No. 133 and Application for a Permit to Prospect in Bunawan, Agusan
del Sur respectively. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is evident that what MMC had over the disputed area during the assignment was an exploration permit. Clearly, the
right that SEM acquired was limited to exploration, only because MMC was a mere holder of an exploration permit. As
previously explained, SEM did not acquire the rights inherent in the permit, as the assignment by MMC to SEM was done
in violation of the condition stipulated in the permit, and the assignment was effected without the approval of the proper
authority in contravention of the provision of the mining law governing at that time. In addition, the permit expired on 6
July 1994. It is, therefore, quite clear that SEM has no right over the area.
G.R. No. 98332
January 16, 1995
MINERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, and JOEL D. MUYCO, Director of Mines
and Geosciences Bureau, respondents.
FACTS:
Pursuant to Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279, authorizing the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint venture, coproduction, or production-sharing agreements for the exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources, and prescribing
the guidelines for such agreements and those agreements involving technical or financial assistance by foreign-owned corporations
for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, the DENR Secretary issued DENR Administrative Order No. 57,
series of 1989, entitled "Guidelines on Mineral Production Sharing Agreement under Executive Order No. 279." Under the transitory
provision of said DENR Administrative Order No. 57, embodied in its Article 9, all existing mining leases or agreements which were
granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, except small scale mining leases and
those pertaining to sand and gravel and quarry resources covering an area of twenty (20) hectares or less, shall be converted into
production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines.
The Secretary of the DENR then further issued DENR Administrative Order No. 82, series of 1990, laying down the "Procedural
Guidelines on the Award of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) through Negotiation."
The issuance and the impending implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 after their respective
effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc. to file the instant petition assailing their validity and
constitutionality before this Court.
Petitioner Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., mainly contends that the administrative orders do not conform with Executive
Order Nos. 211 and 279, petitioner contends that both orders violate the non-impairment of contract provision under Article III,
Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution on the ground that Administrative Order No. 57 unduly pre-terminates existing mining leases and
other mining agreements and automatically converts them into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from its effectivity
date. On the other hand, Administrative Order No. 82 declares that failure to submit Letters of Intent and Mineral ProductionSharing Agreements within two (2) years from the date of effectivity of said guideline or on July 17, 1991 shall cause the
abandonment of their mining, quarry and sand gravel permits.
Petitioner argued that Executive Order No. 279 does not contemplate automatic conversion of mining lease agreements into mining
production-sharing agreement as provided under Article 9, Administrative Order No. 57 and/or the consequent abandonment of
mining claims for failure to submit LOIs and MPSAs under Section 3, Administrative Order No. 82 because Section 1 of said
Executive Order No. 279 empowers the DENR Secretary to negotiate and enter into voluntary agreements which must set forth the
minimum terms and conditions provided under Section 2 thereof. Moreover, petitioner contends that the power to regulate and
enter into mining agreements does not include the power to preterminate existing mining lease agreements.
ISSUE:
Whether or not DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 issued by the DENR Secretary are unconstitutional.
HELD:
NO. DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 are not unconstitutional.

The questioned administrative orders are reasonably directed to the accomplishment of the purposes of the law under which they
were issued and were intended to secure the paramount interest of the public, their economic growth and welfare. The validity and
constitutionality of Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 must be sustained, and their force and effect upheld.
Administrative Order No. 57 applies only to all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the
1987 Constitution pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. It bears mention that under the text of Executive Order No. 211, there is a
reservation clause which provides that the privileges as well as the terms and conditions of all existing mining leases or agreements
granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, shall be subject to any and all
modifications or alterations which Congress may adopt pursuant to Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Hence, the
strictures of the non-impairment of contract clause under Article III, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution do not apply to the aforesaid
mining leases or agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. They can
be amended, modified or altered by a statute passed by Congress to achieve the purposes of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution.
Moreover, nowhere in Administrative Order No. 57 is there any provision which would lead us to conclude that the questioned order
authorizes the automatic conversion of mining leases and agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, pursuant
to Executive Order No. 211, to production-sharing agreements. The provision in Article 9 of Administrative Order No. 57 that "all
such leases or agreements shall be converted into production sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these
guidelines" could not possibly contemplate a unilateral declaration on the part of the Government that all existing mining leases and
agreements are automatically converted into production-sharing agreements. On the contrary, the use of the term "productionsharing agreement" in the same provision implies negotiation between the Government and the applicants, if they are so minded.
Negotiation negates compulsion or automatic conversion as suggested by petitioner in the instant petition. A mineral productionsharing agreement (MPSA) requires a meeting of the minds of the parties after negotiations arrived at in good faith and in
accordance with the procedure laid down in the subsequent Administrative Order No. 82.

G.R. No. 135190. April 3, 2002

SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. BALITE PORTAL MINING COOPERATIVE and others
similarly situated; and THE HONORABLE ANTONIO CERILLES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), PROVINCIAL MINING REGULATORY BOARD OF DAVAO (PMRB-Davao), respondents.

FACTS:
The instant case involves a rich tract of mineral land situated in the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve known as the Diwalwal
Gold Rush Area. Located at Mt. Diwata in the municipalities of Monkayo and Cateel in Davao Del Norte, the land has been
embroiled in controversy since the mid-80s due to the scramble over gold deposits found within its bowels.
On March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper) was granted Exploration Permit No. 133 (EP No. 133) over 4,491
hectares of land, which included the hotly-contested Diwalwal area.
Not long thereafter, Congress enacted on June 27, 1991 Republic Act No. 7076, or the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act. The law
established a Peoples Small-Scale Mining Program to be implemented by the Secretary of the DENR and created the Provincial
Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) under the DENR Secretarys direct supervision and control. The statute also authorized the PMRB
to declare and set aside small-scale mining areas subject to review by the DENR Secretary and award mining contracts to smallscale miners under certain conditions.
On December 21, 1991, DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran issued Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 66, declaring
729 hectares of the Diwalwal area as non-forest land open to small-scale mining. The issuance was made pursuant to the powers
vested in the DENR Secretary by Proclamation No. 369, which established the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve.
On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum Order No. 97-03 which directs the DENR to study thoroughly and
exhaustively the option of direct state utilization of the mineral resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area. Such study shall include,
but shall not be limited to, studying and weighing the feasibility of entering into management agreements or operating agreements,
or both, with the appropriate government instrumentalities or private entities, or both, in carrying out the declared policy of
rationalizing the mining operations in the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area; such agreements shall include provisions for profit-sharing
between the state and the said parties, including profit-sharing arrangements with small-scale miners, as well as the payment of
royalties to indigenous cultural communities, among others. The Undersecretary for Field Operations, as well as the Undersecretary
for Legal and Legislative Affairs and Attached Agencies, and the Director of the Mines and Geo-sciences Bureau are hereby ordered
to undertake such studies. x x x
Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Court of Appeals against PMRB-Davao, the
DENR Secretary and Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative (BCPMC), which represented all the OTP grantees. It prayed for
the nullification of the above-quoted Memorandum Order No. 97-03 on the ground that the direct state utilization espoused therein
would effectively impair its vested rights under EP No. 133.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. It ruled that the DENR Secretary did not abuse his discretion in issuing Memorandum
Order No. 97-03 since the same was merely a directive to conduct studies on the various options available to the government for
solving the Diwalwal conflict.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that the assailed memorandum order did not adopt the direct state
utilization scheme in resolving the Diwalwal dispute.
Held:
We agree with the Court of Appeals ruling that the challenged MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt direct state utilization as a
policy in resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the memorandum clearly indicate that what was directed thereunder was
merely a study of this option and nothing else. Contrary to petitioners contention, it did not grant any management/operating or
profit-sharing agreement to small-scale miners or to any party, for that matter, but simply instructed the DENR officials concerned to
undertake studies to determine its feasibility.