QUASI-DELICTS

1 CONCEPT NCC 1173

PICART vs SMITH
FACTS:

On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his

pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way
across, Smith approached from the opposite direction in an
automobile. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a
horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his
approach.

He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge

he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him
that the man on horseback before him was not observing
the rule of the road. Picart saw the automobile coming and
heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed by
the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the
approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing
on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left.

He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he

did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side.
As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his
left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine.

In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman

would move to the other side. Seeing that the pony was
apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the
right while yet some distance away or slowing down,
continued to approach directly toward the horse without
diminution of speed.

When he had gotten quite near, there being then no

possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the
defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to
escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the automobile
passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became
frightened and turned its body across the bridge, got hit by
the car and the limb was broken.

The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some
violence. As a result of its injuries the horse died. The
plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary

unconsciousness and required medical attention for several

days.
From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from
liability Picart has appealed.
ISSUE:
Is Smith liable for negligence.
HELD:
YES.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent
man in a given situation must of course be always determined in
the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in
the particular case. Abstract speculations cannot here be of much
value but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern
their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or
known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be,
omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to take care
only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of
danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under
consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course
actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take
precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of
harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision,
is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated
in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the
existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is
said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of
the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful
to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his
foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present
case we think that negligence is clearly established. A prudent
man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion,
have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was
fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the
horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course.
Under these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the
duty to guard against the threatened harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from
fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself
on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated,
the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the

problem always is to discover which agent is immediately

and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent
acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since
the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence
of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these
circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair
chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is
chargeable with the consequences, without reference to
the prior negligence of the other party.

SMITH BELL DODWELL SHIPPING vs BORJA

FACTS:
Petitioners vessel was carrying a chemical cargo alkyl benzene
and methyl methacrylate monomer. While knowing that their
vessel was carrying dangerous inflammable chemicals, its officers
and crew failed to take all the necessary precautions to prevent an
accident. Petitioner was therefore negligent.
Smith Bell (petitioner) filed a written request with the Bureau of
Customs for the attendance of the Latters inspection team on
vessel M/T king family which was due to arrive at the port of
manila. Said vessel contained 750 metric tons of alkyl benzene and
methyl methacrylate monomer. On the same day, supervising
customs Inspector Manuel Nalgan instructed respondent Catalino
Borja to board said vessel and perform his duties as inspector upon
the vessels arrival until its departure. While M/T king family was
unloading chemical unto 2 barges, a sudden explosion occurred
setting the vessels afire. Upon hearing this, Borja who was inside
the cabin preparing reports, ran outside to check. Another
explosion was again heard. Fearing for his life, Borja jumped
overboard to save himself. The water howver was likewise on fire
because of the chemicals. Despite this he mange to swam his wasy
for an hour until he was rescued and sent to the hospital. He was
diagnosed to be permanently disabled due to the incident.
ISSUE:
WON Smith bell is not liable as it claims that the explosion
occurred outside of its vessel
HELD:

No. Smith Bell is liable. The lower court and CA ruled that the fire
and explosion had originated from the petitioners vessel. Knowing
fully well that it was carrying dangerous chemicals, petitioner was
negligent in not taking all the necessary precautions in
transporting the cargo. Respondent Borja suffered the following
damage and injuries: (1) chemical burns of the face and arm; (2)
inhalation of fumes from burning chemicals; (3) exposure to the
elements while floating in sea water for about three hours; (4)
homonymous hemianopsia or blurring of the right eye; and (5)
cerebral infract with neo-vascularization, left occipital region with
right sided headache and the blurring of the vision of right eye.
The owner or the person in possession and control of a vessel and
the vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damage caused
to persons and property by reason of negligent navigation or
management.

DELSAN TRANSPORT vs C&A CONSTRUCTION

FACTS:
C & A construction, construct a deflector wall at the Vitas
reclamation Area in Tondo,
Manila it was not formally turnover to National Housing Authority
though it was completed in 1994. On 12:00 midnight of October
20, 1994 Captain Demetrio T. Jusep of M/V Delsan Express receive
a report that that a typhoon was going to hit Manila after eight (8)
hours. At 8:35AM he tried to seek shelter but it was already
congested. At 10:00 a.m. Capt. Jusep drop the anchor at the
vicinity of Vitas mouth, the waves were already reaching 8 to 10
feet. The ship was dragged by the wind toward the Napocor power
barge Capt. Jusep ordered a full stop of the vessel to avoid the
collision but when the engine was re-started, it hit the deflector
wall constructed by the respondent. P456,198.24 was the damaged
cause by the incident. C & A Construction demanded payment of
the damages from Capt. Jusep but the latter refused to pay due to
the cause of the incident was by a fortuitous event. The trial court
ruled that Jusep was not guilty of negligence in applying the
emergency rule: because it had taken necessary precautions to
avoid accident. CA reversed & set aside the decision. Captain Jusep
was found guilty of negligence in transferring the vessel only at
8:35 a.m. of October 21,1994 and held liable for damages in
waiting until 8:35 a.m. before transfering the vessel to sought
shelter.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Capt. Jusep was negligent.
(2) Whether or not the petitioner is solidarily liable under Art. 2180
of the Civil Code for Quasi-Delict.
HELD:
(1) The court finds Captain Jusep is guilty of negligence, the failure
to take immediate and appropriate action under the circumstances,
despite the knowledge that there is typhoon but he waited for the
lapse of eight (8) hours instead. Captain Jusep showed an
inexcusable lack of care and caution which an ordinary prudent
person would have observed in the same situation.
The trial court erred in applying the emergency rule because the
danger where Capt. Jusep found himself was caused by his own
negligence.
(2) The court finds the petitioner liable for the negligent act of
Capt. Jusep. Whenever an employees negligence causes damage
to another, it instantly arise a presumption that the employer failed
to exercise the care and diligence of supervision of his employee.
In Fabre, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals held that due diligence requires
consistent compliance of rules & regulation for the guidance and
actual implementation of rules. But the petitioner fails to give any
evidence that its rule are strictly implemented and monitored in
compliance therewith petitioner is therefore liable for the negligent
act of Capt. Jusep. The amount of P 456, 198.27 due earn 6%
interest per annum from October 3, 1995 until the finality of the
decision.
PHIL. NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION vs CA
FACTS:

PASUDECO and TRB entered into a MOA, where the former was
allowed to enter and pass through NLEX under some specified
terms and conditions. PNCC, NLEX operator was furnished a
copy of the MOA and interposed no objection.

On January 23, 1993 (2:30 a.m.), NLEX Security staffs saw a

pile of sugarcane in the middle portion of the north and
southbound lanes of the road. They placed lit cans with diesel
oil in the north and southbound lanes, including lane dividers
with reflectorized markings, to warn motorists of the
obstruction.

The security staffs requested PASUDECO to clear the area.

At around 4:00 a.m., five (5) PASUDECO men arrived, and
started clearing the highway of the sugarcane. The men left
the area at around 5:40 a.m., leaving a few flattened
sugarcanes scattered on the road.
As the bulk of the sugarcanes had been piled and transferred
along the roadside, Sendin thought there was no longer a need
to man the traffic. As dawn was already approaching, Sendin
and company removed the lighted cans and lane dividers.
At about 6:30 a.m., Rodrigo S. Arnaiz, together with his sister
and friend, was driving his two-door Toyota Corolla along the
NLEX at about 65 kilometers per hour. As the vehicle ran over
the scattered sugarcane, it flew out of control and turned turtle
several times. The accident threw the car about fifteen paces
away from the scattered sugarcane.
On March 4, 1993, Arnaiz and company filed a complaint for
damages against PASUDECO and PNCC. They alleged that the
combined gross negligence of PASUDECO and PNCC was the
direct and proximate cause of the injuries sustained by them.
RTC Only PASUDECO is liable
CA PASUDECO and PNCC are jointly and solidarily liable liable

ISSUE:
Was there gross negligence on the part of PASUDECO and PNCC
HELD:
Yes.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable
man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something
which a prudent and reasonable man would do. It also refers to the
conduct which creates undue risk of harm to another, the failure to
observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the
circumstance justly demand, whereby that other person suffers
injury.
There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered by
the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other
person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant
and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. Article 2176 of the
New Civil Code provides: Whoever by act or omission causes

damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to

pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

visible warning sign at that time was the defective standard

signboard STOP, LOOK and LISTEN wherein the sign Listen was
lacking while that of Look was bent. No whistle blow from the
train was likewise heard before it finally bumped the car of
Amores. Amores died.
The heirs of Amores filed a Complaint for Damages against
petitioners PNR and Virgilio J. Borja (Borja), PNRs locomotive
driver at the time of the incident.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners, rationalizing
that the proximate cause of the collision was Amores fatal
misjudgment and the reckless course of action he took in
crossing the railroad track even after seeing or hearing the
oncoming train.
CA reversed.

Further, where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or

omissions of two or more persons, although acting independently,
are in combination with the direct and proximate cause of a single
injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what
proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is
responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence
resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint
tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under
Article 2194 of the Civil Code.

In the case at bar, PASUDECO's negligence in transporting

sugarcanes without proper harness/straps, and that of PNCC in
removing the emergency warning devices, were two successive
negligent acts which were the direct and proximate cause of
Latagan's injuries.

ISSUE:
WON CA was correct in ascribing negligence on the part of the
petitioners

Thus, with PASUDECO's and the petitioner's successive negligent

acts, they are joint tortfeasors who are solidarily liable for the
resulting damage under Article 2194 of the New Civil Code.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the present petition is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47699, dated April 29, 2003, is
AFFIRMED.

PHIL. NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION vs CA

FACTS:

Amores was traversing the railroad tracks in Manila. Before

crossing the railroad track, he stopped for a while then
proceeded accordingly. Unfortunately, just as Amores was at
the intersection, a Philippine National Railways (PNR) train
turned up and collided with the car.

At the time of the mishap, there was neither a signal nor a

crossing bar at the intersection to warn motorists of an
approaching train. Aside from the railroad track, the only

HELD:
Yes.
As the action is predicated on negligence, the relevant provision is
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, which states that:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there was no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of
this chapter.
Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the
protection of the interests of another person that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury. Using the
aforementioned philosophy, it may be reliably concluded that there
is no hard and fast rule whereby such degree of care and vigilance
is calibrated; it is dependent upon the circumstances in which a
person finds himself. All that the law requires is that it is
perpetually compelling upon a person to use that care and
diligence expected of sensible men under comparable
circumstances.

We hold that the petitioners were negligent when the collision took
place. the train was running at a fast speed because
notwithstanding the application of the ordinary and emergency
brakes, the train still dragged the car some distance away from the
point of impact. Evidence likewise unveils the inadequate
precautions taken by petitioner PNR to forewarn the public of the
impending danger. It is the responsibility of the railroad company
to use reasonable care to keep the signal devices in working order.
Failure to do so would be an indication of negligence.
Railroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a
reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to persons and property
at railroad crossings, which duties pertain both to the operation of
trains and to the maintenance of the crossings. The failure of the
PNR to put a cross bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman, or
semaphore is evidence of negligence and disregard of the safety of
the public, even if there is no law or ordinance requiring it, because
public safety demands that said device or equipment be installed.
The petitioners insist that a train has a right-of-way in a railroad
crossing under the existing laws.
However, the obligation to bring to a full stop vehicles moving in
public highways before traversing any through street only accrues
from the time the said through street or crossing is so designated
and sign-posted. From the records of the case, it can be inferred
that Amores exercised all the necessary precautions required of
him as to avoid injury to himself and to others. The witnesses
testimonies showed that Amores slackened his speed, made a full
stop, and then proceeded to cross the tracks when he saw that
there was no impending danger to his life. Under these
circumstances, we are convinced that Amores did everything, with
absolute care and caution, to avoid the collision.
It is settled that every person or motorist crossing a railroad track
should use ordinary prudence and alertness to determine the
proximity of a train before attempting to cross. We are persuaded
that the circumstances were beyond the control of Amores for no
person would sacrifice his precious life if he had the slightest
opportunity to evade the catastrophe.
In view of the foregoing, We will now discuss the liability of
petitioner PNR. Article 2180 of the New Civil Code discusses the

liability of the employer once negligence or fault on the part of the

employee has been established. The employer is actually liable on
the assumption of juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise
diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its
employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated by
showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the
employee, a factual matter that has not been demonstrated. Even
the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory employees
cannot be incidentally invoked to overturn the presumption of
negligence on the part of the employer.
GUILLANG vs BEDANIA
FACTS:

Genaro Guillang was driving his car along Aguinaldo Highway

in Cavite when it was hit by a turning 10-wheeler truck driven
by Rodolfo Bedania and owned by Rodolfo de Silva. The car
was a total wreck while the truck sustained minor damage.

Antero, one of the car passengers, died due to the injuries he

sustained from the collision.

Petitioners Genaro, Llanillo, Dignadice, and the heirs of Antero

instituted a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict
against respondents Bedania and de Silva.

The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. The

trial court found Bedania grossly negligent for recklessly
maneuvering the truck by making a sudden U-turn in the
highway without duer egard to traffic rules and the safety of
other motorists. The trial court also declared de Silva grossly
negligent in the selection and supervision of his driver,
Bedania.

On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the lower court and

dismissed the civil case for lack of merit. Petitioners then filed
a MR but to no avail.
ISSUE:
Who is liable for the damages suffered by petitioners
HELD:
Bedanias and de Silva are liable.
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of
the interest of another person that degree of care, precaution, and

vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such

other person suffers injury. In Picart v. Smith, we held that the test
of negligence is whether the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act used that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinary person would have used in the same situation.
Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the
contrary, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the
time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
In this case, the report showed that the truck, while making the Uturn, failed to signal, a violation of traffic rules. The police records
also stated that, after the collision, Bedania escaped and
abandoned the petitioners and his truck. This is another violation
of a traffic regulation. Therefore, the presumption arises that
Bedania was negligent at the time of the mishap.
The evidence presented in this case also does not support the
conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the truck had already
executed the U-turn before the impact occurred. If the truck had
fully made the U-turn, it should have been hit on its rear.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals said that the point of impact was
on the lane where the car was cruising. Therefore, the car had
every right to be on that road and the car had the right of way over
the truck that was making a U-turn. Clearly, the truck encroached
upon the cars lane when it suddenly made the U-turn.

precaution, the mishap in all probability would not have happened.

The sudden U-turn of the truck without signal lights posed a
serious risk to oncoming motorists. Bedania failed to prevent or
minimize that risk. The trucks sudden U-turn triggered a series of
events that led to the collision and, ultimately, to the death of
Antero and the injuries of petitioners.
We agree with the trial court that de Silva, as Bedanias employer,
is also liable for the damages suffered by petitioners. De Silva
failed to prove that he exercised all the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of his employees.
BJDC v. Lanuzo
FACTS:
This case involves a claim for damages arising from the
death of a motorcycle rider in a nighttime accident due to the
supposed negligence of a construction company then undertaking
reblocking work on a national highway. The plaintiffs insisted that
the accident happened because the construction company did not
provide adequate lighting on the site, but the latter countered that
the fatal accident was caused by the negligence of the motorcycle

Contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, the sheer size

of the truck does not make it improbable for the truck to execute a
sudden U-turn. The trial courts decision did not state that the truck
was traveling at a fast speed when it made the U-turn. The trial
court said the truck made a sudden U-turn, meaning the U-turn
was made unexpectedly and with no warning, as shown by the fact
that the trucks signal lights were not turned on.

rider himself.

Clearly, Bedanias negligence was the proximate cause of the

collision which claimed the life of Antero and injured the
petitioners. Proximate cause is that which, in the natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred. The cause of the collision is traceable to the negligent
act of Bedania for if the U-turn was executed with the proper

that Balbinos Honda motorcycle sideswiped the road barricade

Nena alleged that she was the surviving spouse of the

late Balbino who figured in the accident that transpired at the site
of the reblocking work at about 6:30 p.m. on October 30, 1997;

placed by the company in the right lane portion of the road,

causing him to lose control of his motorcycle and to crash on the
newly cemented road, resulting in his instant death; and that the

companys failure to place illuminated warning signs on the site of

burden of proof is on the plaintiff if the defendant denies the

the project, especially during night time, was the proximate cause

factual allegations of the complaint in the manner required by the

of the death of Balbino.

Rules of Court, but it may rest on the defendant if he admits

expressly

In its answer, BJDC denied Nenas allegations of

negligence, insisting that it had installed warning signs and lights

or

impliedly

the

essential

allegations

but

raises

affirmative defense or defenses, which if proved, will exculpate him

from liability.

along the highway and on the barricades of the project; that at the
time of the incident, the lights were working and switched on; that

The Court affirmed the findings of the RTC, and rules that

its project was duly inspected by the Department of Public Works

the Lanuzo heirs, the parties carrying the burden of proof, did not

and Highways (DPWH), the Office of the Mayor of Pili, and the Pili

establish by preponderance of evidence that the negligence on the

Municipal Police Station; and that it was found to have satisfactorily

part of the company was the proximate cause of the fatal accident

taken measures to ensure the safety of motorists.

of Balbino.

ISSUE:

During the trial, the Lanuzo heirs attempted to prove

inadequacy of illumination instead of the total omission of
Whether or not heirs of Balbino were able to establish by

preponderance of evidence the negligence of BJDC.

illumination. In contrast, the company credibly refuted the

allegation of inadequate illumination. The Court observes, too, that
SPO1 Corporal, a veteran police officer detailed for more than 17

HELD:

years at the Pili Police Station, enjoyed the presumption of

NO. The party alleging the negligence of the other as

the cause of injury has the burden to establish the allegation with
competent evidence. If the action based on negligence is civil in
nature, the proof required is preponderance of evidence.
In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who
would be defeated if no evidence is given on either side. The

regularity in the performance of his official duties. In his report, it

was mentioned that upon arrival at the scene of the incident it
was noted that road sign/barricade installed on the road has a
light.

of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of

environmental tragedies.
Plaintiffs

prayed

that

judgement

be

rendered

ordering

the

respondent, his agents, representatives and other persons acting

in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA)
in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the complaint had no cause of action against him and
that it raises a political question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that
granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of
contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for
certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set aside the
dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge
Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)

gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.

FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and
joined by their parents. The first complaint was filed as a
taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the
Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region against
defendant

(respondent)

Secretary

of

the

Department

of

Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that

they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the
natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical
forests.

They

further

asseverate

that

they

represent

their

generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that

continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the
impairment of contracts.
RULING:
First Issue: Cause of Action.

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their

Second Issue: Political Issue.

complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent

Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution

agree with this. The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal

provides for the expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme

right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is

Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the

incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said

decision of the Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts

right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the

as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with

environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious

grave abuse of discretion.

management and conservation of the country's forests. Section 4

of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary
government agency responsible for the governing and supervising

Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

the exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the

country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument

also

the

by which the state regulates the utilization and disposition of forest

Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative

substantially

re-stated

in

Title

XIV

Book

IV

of

resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a

Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases

contract within the purview of the due process clause thus, the

for policy formation, and have defined the powers and functions of

non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly

the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they

withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as

represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as

in this case. The granting of license does not create irrevocable

DENR's duty to protect and advance the said right.

rights, neither is it property or property rights.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the

Moreover,

correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect or respect the

obligations of contract is limit by the exercise by the police power

same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the

of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and

granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse

general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to

of discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology.

the police power of the State.

the

constitutional

guaranty

of

non-impairment

of

Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs

should be renewed or granted.

The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby

GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET ASIDE.

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court

finds it to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed
violation of their rights.

Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu,

Arigo v. Swift

and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a

balanced and healthful ecology.

FACTS:
ISSUES:
The USS

Guardian is

an

Avenger-class

mine

countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December 2012, the US

1.

Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

2.

Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for

Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the

said vessel to enter and exit the territorial waters of the

damages caused by USS Guardian.

Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of
routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty. On
January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving
on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.

3.

Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA

applies in this case.

On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic

Bay for its next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17,
2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran
aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha

HELD:
First issue: YES.

Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was

injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking
fuel or oil.
Petitioners have legal standing
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and postsalvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to

Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of

cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the

justice on a given question. Specifically, it is a partys personal

provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros

and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will

sustain direct injury as a result of the act being challenged, and

calls for more than just a generalized grievance. However, the

Second issue: YES.

rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has

relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers
and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when
the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental
importance,

of

overreaching

significance

to

society,

or

of

paramount public interest.

The US respondents were sued in their official capacity

as commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and
supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or
omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS

In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we

Guardian

on

the

TRNP

was committedwhile

they

were

recognized the public right of citizens to a balanced and

performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction

healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional

of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions

history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. We

and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is

declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need

deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State

not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil

immunity

and polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from

this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.

the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental

importance with intergenerational implications. Such right carries
with it the correlative duty to refrain from

impairing the

environment.
On the novel element in the class suit filed by the

therefore

bars

the

exercise

of

jurisdiction

by

During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio

T. Carpio took the position that the conduct of the US in this case,
when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No.
10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the
matter

within

the ambit of
the

Article

Law

of

31
the

of
Sea

the

United

petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do

Nations Convention on

(UNCLOS). He

ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of

explained that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign

environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own

immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31

and future generations.

of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases

where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of

the coastal State regarding passage through the latters

concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the

internal waters and the territorial sea.

provisions of this Convention or other rules of international law.

Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships
operated for non-commercial purposes

In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice

Carpio, they continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject
to the following exceptions:

With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A

and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in this Convention affects the
immunities of warships and other government ships operated for

Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and

non-commercial purposes. A foreign warships unauthorized

regulations of the coastal State

entry into our internal waters with resulting damage to

If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the
coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea and

marine resources is one situation in which the above

provisions may apply.

disregards any request for compliance therewith which is made to

But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as

it, the coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea

in this case, the US?

immediately.
According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified
Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a

the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy the US considers

warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial

itself bound by customary international rules on the traditional

purposes

uses of the oceans as codified in UNCLOS.

The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or

Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that the US refusal to join

damage to the coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by

the UNCLOS was centered on its disagreement with UNCLOS

a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial

regime of deepseabed mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans

purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State

and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind, pointing out that

such has nothing to do with its the US acceptance of customary

marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional

international rules on navigation.

features.

The Court also fully concurred with Justice Carpios view that non-

In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present

membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will

controversy is beyond dispute. Although the said treaty

disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its

upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of

internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear

Coastal States while navigating the latters territorial sea,

international responsibility under Art. 31 in connection with the

the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial sea

USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha

immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the

reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our long-time ally and

Coastal State, and they will be liable for damages caused

trading partner, which has been actively supporting the countrys

by their warships or any other government vessel operated

efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its

for non-commercial purposes under Article 31.

obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship while

transiting our internal waters. Much less can we comprehend a

Third issue: NO.

Government exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling

to comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in
the global task to protect and preserve the marine environment as
provided in Article 197 of UNCLOS

The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains

only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as
the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it

Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis

can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal

States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a

case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental

regional

law is to be filed separately.

basis,

directly

or

through

competent

international

organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules,

standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent
with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the

The Court considered a view that a ruling on the

application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of
the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible for the

grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond

Petitioners claimed that the grounding, salvaging and post-

the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.

salvaging

operations

of

the

USS

Guardian

violated

their

constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology since

unnecessary at this point to

these events caused and continue to cause environmental damage

determine whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed

of such magnitude as to affect other provinces surrounding the

The Court also found

absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have

resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows
the recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative
fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed
instituted with the criminal action charging the same violation of

Tubbataha Reefs. Aside from damages, they sought a directive

from the SC for the institution of civil, administrative and criminal
suits for acts committed in violation of environmental laws and
regulations in connection with the grounding incident. They also
prayed for the annulment of some VFA provisions for being
unconstitutional.

an environmental law.
--Facts:
In 2013, the USS Guardian of the US Navy ran aground on an area
near the Tubbataha Reefs, a marine habitat of which entry and
certain human activities are prevented and afforded protection by
a Philippine law. The grounding incident prompted the petitioners
to seek for issuance of Writ of Kalikasan with TEPO from the SC.
Among those impleaded are US officials in their capacity as
commanding officers of the US Navy. As petitioners argued, they
were impleaded because there was a waiver of immunity from suit
between US and PH pursuant to the VFA terms.

Issue 1: W/N the US Government has given its consent to be sued

through the VFA
No. The general rule on states immunity from suit applies in this
case.
First, any waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only
to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as for
the issuance of the writ of kalikasan. Hence, contrary to
petitioners claim, the US government could not be deemed to
have waived its immunity from suit.
Second, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as
commanding officers of the US Navy who have control and
supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. Since the
satisfaction of any judgment against these officials would require

remedial actions and the appropriation of funds by the US

the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind. Such

government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself.

has nothing to do with the acceptance by the US of customary

Thus, the principle of State Immunity from suit bars the exercise of

international rules on navigation. (Justice Carpio)

jurisdiction by the court over their persons.

Hence, non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US
Issue 2: W/N the US government may still be held liable for

will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over

damages caused to the Tubbataha Reefs

its internal waters and territorial sea. It is thus expected of the US

to bear international responsibility under Art. 31 in connection

Yes. The US government is liable for damages in relation to the

with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the

grounding incident under the customary laws of navigation.

Tubbataha reefs. ##

The conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a

Other Issues

restricted area in violation of RA 10067 and caused damage to the

Claim for Damages Caused by Violation of Environmental

TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31

Laws Must be Filed Separately

of the UNCLOS. While historically, warships enjoy sovereign

immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the

The invocation of US federal tort laws and even common law is

UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail

improper considering that it is the VFA which governs disputes

to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State

involving US military ships and crew navigating Philippine waters in

regarding passage through the latters internal waters and the

pursuance of the objectives of the agreement.

territorial sea.
As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only
Although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter

to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions. Since

of long-standing policy, theUS considers itself bound by customary

jurisdiction cannot be had over the respondents for being immuned

international rules on the traditional uses of the oceans, which is

from suit, there is no way damages which resulted from violation of

codified in UNCLOS.

environmental laws could be awarded to petitioners.

As to the non-ratification by the US, it must be noted that the US

In any case, the Rules on Writ of Kalikasan provides that a criminal

refusal to join the UNCLOS was centered on its disagreement with

case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental

UNCLOS regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers

law is to be filed separately. Hence, a ruling on the application or

non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to a US

the duly authorized representative of the US government. The VFA

personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the

being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a

USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a

matter of international law to abide by its terms and provisions. A

petition for a writ of Kalikasan.

petition under the Rules on Writ of Kalikasan is not the proper

remedy to assail the constitutionality of its provisions.

Challenging the Constitutionality of a Treaty Via a Petition

for the Issuance of Writ of Kalikasan is Not Proper
The VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has
been recognized as a treaty by the US as attested and certified by