Canuel vs. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation

G.R. No. 190161.October 13, 2014.
ANITA N. CANUEL, for herself and on behalf of her minor

children, namely: CHARMAINE, CHARLENE, and
CHARL SMITH, all surnamed CANUEL, petitioners, vs.
MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION, EDUARDO U.
MANESE, and KOTANI SHIPMANAGEMENT LIMITED,
respondents.
Labor Law; Seafarers; Death Benefits; The seafarers

beneficiaries may successfully claim death benefits if they are able to
establish that the seafarers death is (a) work-related, and (b) had
occurred during the term of his employment contract.The
provisions currently governing the entitlement of the seafarers
beneficiaries to
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* FIRST DIVISION.
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Canuel vs. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation

death benefits are found in Section 20 of the 2000 POEA-SEC.
Part A(1) thereof states that the seafarers beneficiaries may
successfully claim death benefits if they are able to establish that
the seafarers death is (a) work-related, and (b) had occurred during
the term of his employment contract.
Same; Same; Same; If the injury is the proximate cause of his
death or disability for which compensation is sought, the previous
physical condition of the employee is unimportant and recovery may
be had for injury independent of any preexisting weakness or
disease.That Nancing was suffering from lung cancer, which was
found to have been preexisting, hardly impels a contrary conclusion
since as the LA herein earlier noted the February 20, 2007

injury actually led to the deterioration of his condition. As held in
More Maritime Agencies, Inc. v. NLRC, 307 SCRA 189 (1999), [i]f
the injury is the proximate cause of [the seafarers] death or
disability for which compensation is sought, [his] previous physical
condition x x x is unimportant and recovery may be had for injury
independent of any preexisting weakness or disease, viz.:
Compensability x x x does not depend on whether the injury
or disease was preexisting at the time of the employment
but rather if the disease or injury is work-related or
aggravated his condition. It is indeed safe to presume that, at
the very least, the arduous nature of [the seafarers] employment
had contributed to the aggravation of his injury, if indeed it was
preexisting at the time of his employment. Therefore, it is but just
that he be duly compensated for it. It is not necessary, in order for
an employee to recover compensation, that he must have been in
perfect condition or health at the time he received the injury, or that
he be free from disease. Every workman brings with him to his
employment certain infirmities, and while the employer is not the
insurer of the health of his employees, he takes them as he finds
them, and assumes the risk of having a weakened condition
aggravated by some injury which might not hurt or bother a
perfectly normal, healthy person. If the injury is the proximate
cause of his death or disability for which compensation is
sought, the previous physical condition of the employee is
unimportant and recovery may be had for injury
independent of any preexisting weakness or disease.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Same; Same; Same; While the general rule is that the seafarers
death should occur during the term of his employment, the seafarers
death occurring after the termination of his employment due to his
medical repatriation on account of a work-related injury or illness
constitutes an exception thereto.With respect to the second
requirement for death compensability, the Court takes this
opportunity to clarify that while the general rule is that the
seafarers death should occur during the term of his employment,
the seafarers death occurring after the termination of his
employment due to his medical repatriation on account of a workrelated injury or illness constitutes an exception thereto. This is
based on a liberal construction of the 2000 POEA-SEC as impelled

by the plight of the bereaved heirs who stand to be deprived of a
just and reasonable compensation for the seafarers death,
notwithstanding its evident work-connection. The present petition
is a case in point. Here, Nancings repatriation occurred during the
eighth (8th) month of his one (1) year employment contract. Were it
not for his injury, which had been earlier established as workrelated, he would not have been repatriated for medical reasons and
his contract consequently terminated pursuant to Part 1 of Section
18(B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC.
Same; Same; Liberal Construction; A strict and literal
construction of the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC),
especially when the same would result into inequitable consequences
against labor, is not subscribed to in this jurisdiction.A strict and
literal construction of the 2000 POEA-SEC, especially when the
same would result into inequitable consequences against labor, is
not subscribed to in this jurisdiction. Concordant with the States
avowed policy to give maximum aid and full protection to labor
as enshrined in Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution,
contracts of labor, such as the 2000 POEA-SEC, are deemed to be so
impressed with public interest that the more beneficial conditions
must be endeavoured in favor of the laborer. The rule therefore is
one of liberal construction. As enunciated in the case of Philippine
Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. NLRC, 353 SCRA 47 (2001): The
POEA-Standard Employment Contract for Seamen is designed
primarily for the protection and benefit of Filipino seamen in the
pursuit of their employment onboard ocean-going vessels. Its
provisions must [therefore] be construed and applied fairly,
reasonably and liberally in
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their favor [as it is only] then can its beneficent
provisions be fully carried into effect.
Same; Same; Work-Related Illness; It is enough that the
seafarers work-related injury or illness which eventually causes his
death should have occurred during the term of his employment.
Applying the rule on liberal construction, the Court is thus brought
to the recognition that medical repatriation cases should be
considered as an exception to Section 20 of the 2000 POEA-SEC.

Accordingly, the phrase work-related death of the seafarer,
during the term of his employment contract under Part A(1)
of the said provision should not be strictly and literally construed to
mean that the seafarers work-related death should have precisely
occurred during the term of his employment. Rather, it is enough
that the seafarers work-related injury or illness which
eventually causes his death should have occurred during
the term of his employment. Taking all things into account, the
Court reckons that it is by this method of construction that undue
prejudice to the laborer and his heirs may be obviated and the State
policy on labor protection be championed. For if the laborers death
was brought about (whether fully or partially) by the work he had
harbored for his masters profit, then it is but proper that his
demise be compensated. Here, since it has been established that (a)
the seafarer had been suffering from a work-related injury or illness
during the term of his employment, (b) his injury or illness was the
cause for his medical repatriation, and (c) it was later determined
that the injury or illness for which he was medically repatriated
was the proximate cause of his actual death although the same
occurred after the term of his employment, the above mentioned
rule should squarely apply. Perforce, the present claim for death
benefits should be granted.
Same; Same; Same; If the seafarers work-related injury or
illness (that eventually causes his medical repatriation and,
thereafter, his death) occurs during the term of his employment, then
the employer becomes liable for death compensation benefits under
Section 20(A) of the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC).
Considering the constitutional mandate on labor as well as relative
jurisprudential context, the rule, restated for a final time, should be
as follows: if the seafarers work-related injury or illness (that
eventually causes his medical repatriation and, thereafter,
his death, as
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in this case) occurs during the term of his employment,

then the employer becomes liable for death compensation
benefits under Section 20(A) of the 2000 POEA-SEC. The
provision cannot be construed otherwise for to do so would not only
transgress prevailing constitutional policy and deride the bearings

of relevant case law but also result in a travesty of fairness and an
indifference to social justice.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Romulo P. Valmores for petitioners.
Del Rosario & Del Rosario Law Office for respondents.
PERLAS-BERNABE,J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the
Decision2 dated May 19, 2009 and the Resolution3 dated
October 30, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R.
S.P. No. 104479 which dismissed petitioners complaint for
death benefits.
The Facts
On July 14, 2006, Nancing R. Canuel (Nancing) was
hired by respondent Magsaysay Maritime Corporation
(Magsaysay) as Third Assistant Engineer for its foreign
principal, respondent Kotani Shipmanagement Limited
(Kotani), to be deployed onboard the vessel M/V North Sea
(vessel) for a period of twelve (12) months, with a basic
salary of US$640.00 a
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1 Rollo, pp. 8-33.
2 Id., at pp. 254-267. Penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario,
with Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Vicente S.E. Veloso,
concurring.
3 Id., at pp. 275-276.
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month.4 He underwent the required preemployment
medical examination, and was declared fit to work by the
company-designated physician.5 Thereafter, he joined the
vessel and commenced his work on July 19, 2006.6

On February 20, 2007, Nancing figured in an accident
while in the performance of his duties onboard the vessel,
and, as a result, injured the right side of his body.7 On
March 5, 2007, he was brought to Shanghai Seamens
Hospital in Shanghai, China where he was diagnosed to
have suffered bilateral closed traumatic hemothorax.8 On
March 12, 2007, Nancing informed his wife, herein
petitioner Anita N. Canuel (Anita), about the accident and
his confinement.9 On March 24, 2007, he was medically
repatriated and immediately admitted to the Manila
Doctors Hospital under the care of a team of medical
doctors led by Dr. Benigno A. Agbayani, Jr., Magsaysays
Medical Coordinator.10 Due to his worsening condition,
Nancing was placed at the hospitals intensive care unit on
April 8, 2007.11 He eventually died on April 25, 2007.12
Nancings death certificate13 indicated the immediate cause
of his death as acute respiratory failure, with lung
metastasis and r/o bone cancer as antecedent cause and
underlying cause, respectively.
On May 23, 2007, Nancings widow, Anita, for herself
and on behalf of their children, Charmaine, Charlene, and
Charl
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4 See Contract of Employment; id., at p. 40.
5 Id., at pp. 12 and 113.
6 Id.
7 Id., at pp. 115-116.
8
Spelled as haemothorax in some parts of the records. See
Shanghai Seamens Hospital Discharge Certificate; id., at pp. 41, 46 and

255-256.
9 Id., at pp. 14 and 156.
10 Id., at p. 156.
11 Id., at p. 115.
12 Id., at p. 156.
13 Id., at p. 49.
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Smith, all surnamed Canuel (petitioners) filed a

complaint14 against Magsaysay and Kotani, as well as
Magsaysays Manager/President, Eduardo U. Manese
(respondents), before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), docketed as NLRC-OFW Case No.
(M)-07-05-01423-00, seeking to recover death benefits,
death compensation of minor children, burial allowance,
damages, and attorneys fees.
In their defense, respondents denied any liability and
contended that while Nancing died of acute respiratory
failure, the real cause of his death, as shown in the autopsy
conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation, was
moderately differentiated andenocarcinoma, pneumonia
and pulmonary edema, lung tissue or lung cancer.15 The
said illness is not work-related per advise of their company
doctor, Dr. Marie Cherry Lyn Samson-Fernando, hence, not
compensable.16
The LAs Ruling
In a Decision17 dated December 27, 2007, the Labor
Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of petitioners and thereby
ordered respondents to pay them: (a) the aggregate sum of
US$72,000.00 consisting of US$50,000.00 as death
benefits, US$21,000.00 as death compensation for the three
minor children (US$7,000.00 each), and US$1,000.00 for
burial expenses; (b) illness allowance from March 5, 2007 to
April 25, 2007; (c) P100,000.00 as moral damages; (d)
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (e) 10% of the
total award as attorneys fees.18
The LA found that Nancings death on April 25, 2007
occurred during the term of his twelve-month employment
con_______________
14 Id., at p. 50-51.
15 Id., at pp. 64 and 116.
16 Id., at pp. 69-76.
17 Id., at pp. 111-125. Penned by Executive Labor Arbiter Herminio V.
Suelo.
18 Id., at p. 124.
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tract.19 Moreover, the evidence on record supports the
conclusion that his demise was caused by the injury he
sustained in an accident while performing his job onboard
the vessel. Hence, his death was the result of a workrelated injury that occurred during the term of his
employment.20 Corollary thereto, the LA disregarded
respondents contention that lung cancer, a nonwork
related illness, caused Nancings death as it was apparent
that it was the injury he sustained while working onboard
the vessel that triggered the deterioration of his resistance
against the said illness or any other affliction that he may
have had.21
At odds with the LA Ruling, respondents appealed to the
NLRC.
The NLRCs Ruling
Respondents appeal22 was denied by the NLRC in a
Decision23 dated April 30, 2008.
The NLRC ruled that while respondents correctly
argued that Nancings death did not occur during the term
of his employment pursuant to Section 18 of the Philippine
Overseas
Employment
Administration-Standard
Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) as his employment was
deemed terminated after his medical repatriation, still, it
cannot be doubted that his death was brought about by the
same or similar cause or illness which caused him to be
repatriated.24 Thus, it sustained the findings of the LA that
petitioners are
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19 Id., at p. 119.
20 Id., at pp. 119-120.
21 Id., at pp. 120-121.
22 Id., at pp. 126-149. Dated January 16, 2008, docketed as NLRC
LAC OFW (M) No. 02-000149-08 (8).
23 Id., at pp. 154-162. Penned by Commissioner Gregorio O. Bilog III,
with Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier, concurring.
24 Id., at pp. 158-159.
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entitled to receive compensation for Nancings death.25 It

further affirmed the award of damages and attorneys fees
in petitioners favor but found respondents not liable for
sickness allowance and burial benefits since the same were
already paid by respondents.26
Dissatisfied, respondents sought reconsideration27 but
were denied by the NLRC in a Resolution28 dated June 18,
2008, prompting them to elevate the case to the CA on
certiorari.29
The CAs Ruling
In a Decision30 dated May 19, 2009, the CA found that
the NLRC Ruling was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion and, thus, rendered a new judgment dismissing
petitioners complaint for death benefits.31 Citing the case
of Klaveness Maritime Agency, Inc. v. Beneficiaries of the
Late Second Officer Anthony S. Allas (Klaveness),32 it held
that the death of the seafarer after the termination of his
contract is not compensable, even if the death is caused by
the same illness which prompted the repatriation of the
seafarer and the termination of his contract.33
Petitioners motion for reconsideration34 therefrom was
denied by the CA in a Resolution35 dated October 30, 2009,
hence, the instant petition.
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25 Id.
26 Id., at p. 161.
27 Through a Motion for Reconsideration dated May 28, 2008. Id., at
pp. 163-179.
28 Id., at pp. 183-184. Penned by Commissioner Gregorio O. Bilog III,
with Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier, concurring and
Commissioner Tito F. Genilo, took no part.
29 Dated July 9, 2008. Id., at pp. 185-217.
30 Id., at pp. 254-267.
31 Id., at p. 266.
32 566 Phil. 579; 542 SCRA 593 (2008).
33 Rollo, pp. 264-266.
34 Dated June 9, 2009. Id., at pp. 268-273.
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The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Courts resolution is whether or
not the CA committed reversible error in holding that the
NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting
petitioners complaint for death benefits.
Petitioners claim that the death of Nancing after his
repatriation is compensable because it was the accident he
suffered onboard the vessel that triggered his traumatic
hemothorax,36 eventually leading to his acute respiratory
failure, the immediate cause of his death.37
Echoing the CA, respondents aver that since the
Nancings employment contract was deemed terminated
when he was medically repatriated on March 24, 2007,
petitioners are not entitled to death and other benefits.38
They also maintain that Nancing died of lung cancer which
is not a work-related illness.39
The Courts Ruling
The terms and conditions of a seafarers employment are
governed by the provisions of the contract he signs with the
employer at the time of his hiring. Deemed integrated in
his employment contract is a set of standard provisions
determined and implemented by the POEA, called the
Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the
Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going
Vessels, which provisions are considered to be the
minimum requirements acceptable to
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35 Id., at pp. 275-276.
36 Also spelled as Haemothorax.
37 Rollo, p. 25.
38 See Respondents Comment/Opposition; id., at pp. 298-302.
39 Id., at pp. 302-314.
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the government for the employment of Filipino seafarers

onboard foreign ocean-going vessels.40
The provisions currently governing the entitlement of
the seafarers beneficiaries to death benefits are found in
Section 20 of the 2000 POEA-SEC.
Part A(1) thereof states that the seafarers beneficiaries
may successfully claim death benefits if they are able to
establish that the seafarers death is (a) work-related, and
(b) had occurred during the term of his employment
contract, viz.:
SECTION20.COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS.
A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR DEATH.
1. In case of work-related death of the seafarer, during the
term of his contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the
Philippine Currency equivalent to the amount of Fifty Thousand US
dollars (US$50,000) and an additional amount of Seven Thousand
US dollars (US$7,000) to each child under the age of twenty-one
(21) but not exceeding four (4) children, at the exchange rate
prevailing during the time of payment. (Emphases supplied)
Part A(4) of the same provision further complements

Part A(1) by stating the other liabilities of the employer
to the seafarers beneficiaries if the seafarer dies (a) as a
result of work-related injury or illness, and (b) during the
term of his employment, viz.:
_______________
40 Nisda v. Sea Serve Maritime Agency, 611 Phil. 291, 315; 593 SCRA
668, 693 (2009).
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SECTION20.COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS.
131
A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR DEATH.

xxxx
4. The other liabilities of the employer when the seafarer
dies as a result of work-related injury or illness during the
term of employment are as follows:
a. The employer shall pay the deceaseds beneficiary all
outstanding obligations due the seafarer under this Contract.
b. The employer shall transport the remains and personal effects
of the seafarer to the Philippines at employers expense except if the
death occurred in a port where local government laws or regulations
do not permit the transport of such remains. In case death occurs at
sea, the disposition of the remains shall be handled or dealt with in
accordance with the masters best judgment. In all cases, the
employer/master shall communicate with the manning agency to
advise for disposition of seafarers remains.
c. The employer shall pay the beneficiaries of the seafarer the
Philippines currency equivalent to the amount of One Thousand US
dollars (US$1,000) for burial expenses at the exchange rate
prevailing during the time of payment. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Integral as they are for a valid claim for death

compensation, the Court examines this case according to
the above stated dual requirements.
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First Requirement:
The Seafarers Death Should be Work-Related.
While the 2000 POEA-SEC does not expressly define

what a work-related death means, it is palpable from
Part A(4) as above cited that the said term refers to the
seafarers death resulting from a work-related injury
or illness. This denotation complements the definitions
accorded to the terms work-related injury and workrelated illness under the 2000 POEA-SEC as follows:
Definition of Terms:
For purposes of this contract, the following terms are defined as
follows:
xxxx
11. Work-Related Injury injury(ies) resulting in disability
or death arising out of and in the course of employment.
12. Work-Related Illness any sickness resulting to
disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed
under Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions set therein
satisfied. (Emphases supplied)
Given that the seafarers death in this case resulted

from a work-related injury as defined in the 2000 POEASEC above, it is clear that the first requirement for death
compensability is present.
As the records show, Nancing suffered a work-related
injury within the term of his employment contract when he
figured in an accident while performing his duties as Third
Assistant Engineer at cylinder number 7 of the vessel on
February 20, 2007.41 The foregoing circumstances aptly fit
the legal attribution of the phrase arising out of and in the
_______________
41 Rollo, p. 13.
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course of employment which the Court, in the early
case of Iloilo Dock & Engineering Co. v. Workmens
Compensation Commission,42 pronounced as follows:
The two components of the coverage formula arising out of and
in the course of employment are said to be separate tests which
must be independently satisfied; however, it should not be forgotten
that the basic concept of compensation coverage is unitary, not dual,
and is best expressed in the word, work-connection, because an
uncompromising insistence on an independent application of each of
the two portions of the test can, in certain cases, exclude clearly
work-connected injuries. The words arising out of refer to the
origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its
character, while the words in the course of refer to the time,
place, and circumstances under which the accident takes
place.
As a matter of general proposition, an injury or accident is said
to arise in the course of employment when it takes place
within the period of the employment, at a place where the
employee reasonably may be, and while he is fulfilling his
duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto.43
(Emphases supplied; citations omitted)
That Nancing was suffering from lung cancer, which was

found to have been preexisting, hardly impels a contrary
conclusion since as the LA herein earlier noted the
February 20, 2007 injury actually led to the deterioration of
his condition.44 As held in More Maritime Agencies, Inc. v.
NLRC,45 [i]f the injury is the proximate cause of [the
seafarers] death or disability for which compensation is
sought, [his] previous physical condition x x x is
unimportant and
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42 135 Phil. 95; 26 SCRA 102 (1968).
43 Id., at pp. 97-98; p. 106.
44 Rollo, pp. 120-121.
45 366 Phil. 646; 307 SCRA 189 (1999).
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recovery may be had for injury independent of any

preexisting weakness or disease, viz.:
Compensability x x x does not depend on whether the injury
or disease was preexisting at the time of the employment
but rather if the disease or injury is work-related or
aggravated his condition. It is indeed safe to presume that, at
the very least, the arduous nature of [the seafarers] employment
had contributed to the aggravation of his injury, if indeed it was
preexisting at the time of his employment. Therefore, it is but just
that he be duly compensated for it. It is not necessary, in order for
an employee to recover compensation, that he must have been in
perfect condition or health at the time he received the injury, or that
he be free from disease. Every workman brings with him to his
employment certain infirmities, and while the employer is not the

insurer of the health of his employees, he takes them as he finds
them, and assumes the risk of having a weakened condition
aggravated by some injury which might not hurt or bother a
perfectly normal, healthy person. If the injury is the proximate
cause of his death or disability for which compensation is
unimportant and recovery may be had for injury
independent of any preexisting weakness or disease.46
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Clearly, Nancings injury was the proximate cause of

his death considering that the same, unbroken by any
efficient, intervening cause, triggered the following
sequence of events: (a) Nancings hospitalization at the
Shanghai Seamens Hospital47 where he was diagnosed
with bilateral closed traumatic haemothorax;48 (b) his
repatriation and eventual admission to the Manila Doctors
Hospital;49 and (c) his acute
_______________
46 Id., at pp. 654-655; p. 196.
47 Rollo, pp. 156-157.
48 Id., at pp. 41, 46 and 255-256.
49 Id., at p. 156.
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135

respiratory failure, which was declared to be the
immediate cause of his death.50
Thus, for the foregoing reasons, it cannot be seriously
disputed that the first requirement for death
compensability concurs in this case.
Second Requirement:
The Seafarers Death Should Occur During the
Term of Employment.
With respect to the second requirement for death
compensability, the Court takes this opportunity to clarify
that while the general rule is that the seafarers death
should occur during the term of his employment, the

seafarers death occurring after the termination of his
employment due to his medical repatriation on account of a
work-related injury or illness constitutes an exception
thereto. This is based on a liberal construction of the 2000
POEA-SEC as impelled by the plight of the bereaved heirs
who stand to be deprived of a just and reasonable
compensation for the seafarers death, notwithstanding its
evident work-connection. The present petition is a case in
point.
Here, Nancings repatriation occurred during the eighth
(8th) month of his one (1) year employment contract. Were it
not for his injury, which had been earlier established as
work-related, he would not have been repatriated for
medical reasons and his contract consequently terminated
pursuant to Part 1 of Section 18(B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC
as hereunder quoted:
SECTION18.TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT.
xxxx
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50 Id., at pp. 49 and 156.
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B. The employment of the seafarer is also terminated when the

seafarer arrives at the point of hire for any of the following reasons:
1. when the seafarer signs-off and is disembarked for medical
reasons pursuant to Section 20(B)[5] of this Contract.
The terminative consequence of a medical repatriation

case then appears to present a rather prejudicial quandary
to the seafarer and his heirs. Particularly, if the Court were
to apply the provisions of Section 20 of the 2000 POEASEC as above cited based on a strict and literal
construction thereof, then the heirs of Nancing would stand
to be barred from receiving any compensation for the
latters death despite its obvious work-relatedness. Again,
this is for the reason that the work-related death would, by

mere legal technicality, be considered to have occurred
after the term of his employment on account of his medical
repatriation. It equally bears stressing that neither would
the heirs be able to receive any disability compensation
since the seafarers death in this case precluded the
determination of a disability grade, which, following
Section 20(B)51 in relation to Section 3252 of the 2000
POEA-SEC, stands as the basis therefor.
_______________
51
B.COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR
ILLNESS.
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related
injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:
1.The employer shall continue to pay the seafarer his wages during the
time he is onboard the vessel;
2.If the injury or illness requires medical and/or dental treatment in a
foreign port, the employer shall be liable for the full cost of such medical,
serious dental, surgical and hospital treatment as well as board and
lodging until the seafarer is declared fit to work or to be repatriated.
However, if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires medical
attention arising from said injury or illness, he shall
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_______________
be so provided at cost to the employer until such time he is declared fit
to work or the degree of his disability has been established by the
company-designated physician.
3.Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is
entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is
declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been
assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this
period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment
medical examination by a company-designated physician within three
working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated
to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same
period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with
the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the
right to claim the above benefits.
If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a
third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the
seafarer. The third doctors decision shall be final and binding on both
parties.
4.Those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably
presumed as work-related.
5.Upon sign-off of the seafarer from the vessel for medical treatment, the
employer shall bear the full cost of repatriation in the event the seafarer
is declared (1) fit for repatriation; or (2) fit to work but the employer is
unable to find employment for the seafarer onboard his former vessel or
another vessel of the employer despite earnest efforts.
6.In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer caused
by either injury or illness the seafarer shall be compensated in
accordance with the schedule of benefits arising from an illness or
disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation
applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted.
52
See
SECTION32.SCHEDULE
OF
DISABILITY
OR
IMPEDIMENT
FOR
INJURIES
SUFFERED
AND
DISEASES
INCLUDING
OCCUPATIONAL
DISEASES
OR
ILLNESS
CONTRACTED, of the 2000 POEA-SEC.

138
138

However, a strict and literal construction of the 2000

POEA-SEC, especially when the same would result into
inequitable consequences against labor, is not subscribed to
in this jurisdiction. Concordant with the States avowed
policy to give maximum aid and full protection to
labor as enshrined in Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution,53 contracts of labor, such as the 2000 POEASEC, are deemed to be so impressed with public interest
that the more beneficial conditions must be endeavoured in
favor of the laborer.54
_______________
53 Section 3, Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution reads as
follows:
LABOR
Sec. 3.The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including
the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to
security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They
shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting
their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between
workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in
settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual
compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers,
recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production
and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to
expansion and growth.
54 Legal Heirs of the Late Edwin B. Deauna v. Fil-Star Maritime
Corporation, G.R. No. 191563, June 20, 2012, 674 SCRA 284, 304.
139
, OCTOBER 13, 2014
139

The rule therefore is one of liberal construction. As
enunciated in the case of Philippine Transmarine Carriers,
Inc. v. NLRC:55
The POEA-Standard Employment Contract for Seamen is designed
primarily for the protection and benefit of Filipino seamen in the
pursuit of their employment onboard ocean-going vessels. Its
provisions must [therefore] be construed and applied fairly,
reasonably and liberally in their favor [as it is only] then
can its beneficent provisions be fully carried into effect.56
(Emphasis supplied)
Applying the rule on liberal construction, the Court is

thus brought to the recognition that medical repatriation
cases should be considered as an exception to Section 20 of
the 2000 POEA-SEC. Accordingly, the phrase workrelated death of the seafarer, during the term of his
employment contract under Part A(1) of the said
provision should not be strictly and literally construed to
mean that the seafarers work-related death should have

precisely occurred during the term of his employment.
Rather, it is enough that the seafarers work-related
injury or illness which eventually causes his death
should have occurred during the term of his
employment. Taking all things into account, the Court
reckons that it is by this method of construction that undue
prejudice to the laborer and his heirs may be obviated and
the State policy on labor protection be championed. For if
the laborers death was brought about (whether fully or
partially) by the work he had harbored for his masters
profit, then it is but proper that his demise be
compensated. Here, since it has been established that (a)
the seafarer had been suffering from a work-related injury
or illness during the term of his employment, (b) his injury
or illness was the cause for his medical repatriation, and
(c) it was later determined
_______________
55 405 Phil. 487; 353 SCRA 47 (2001).
56 Id., at p. 495; p. 54.
140
140

that the injury or illness for which he was medically

repatriated was the proximate cause of his actual death
although the same occurred after the term of his
employment, the above mentioned rule should squarely
apply. Perforce, the present claim for death benefits should
be granted.
To quell any confusion, it is but fitting to make clear
that a liberal construction of Section 20 of the 2000 POEASEC as above discussed would not offend the Courts ruling
in Klaveness,57 which was inaccurately relied upon by the
CA to justify its decision. The inaccuracy so recognized
stems from the glaring factual and legal variance between
Klaveness and the present case. Upon careful scrutiny, the
seafarer in Klaveness was not medically repatriated but
was actually signed off from the vessel after the
completion of his contract. He was subsequently
diagnosed to have urinary bladder cancer, which was not
proven to be work-related, and died almost two (2)

years after the termination of his contract of employment.
Hence, since the employment contract was terminated
without any connection to a work-related cause, but rather
because of its mere lapse, death benefits were denied to the
seafarers heirs. In contrast, the seafarer in this case was
medically repatriated due to a work-related injury
which resulted to his death a month after his
confinement in a local hospital. Again, were it not for said
injury, the seafarer would not have been medically
repatriated and his employment contract, in turn,
terminated. By these circumstances, it is clear that the
termination of the employment contract was forced upon by
a work-related cause. As alluded earlier, it would then be
antithetical to the States policy on labor to deprive the
seafarers heirs of death compensation despite its palpable
work-connection. Based on the foregoing, it is, hence,
apparent that the Courts pronouncement herein would not
conflict that in Klaveness. Truth be told, the defining
parameter in workers compensation cases should
_______________
57 Supra note 32 at pp. 584-590; p. 597.
141
, OCTOBER 13, 2014
141

be the element of work-relatedness which was clearly
absent in the contract-completion situation in
Klaveness.58 To reiterate, if the death is work-related, as
herein ascribed, then the seafarers heirs should not be
denied compensation.
To reinforce the point, a survey of previous Court rulings
wherein death compensability had been denied the heirs
of the seafarer actually demonstrates the significance of
the work-relatedness element in workers compensation
cases. For instance, in Gau Sheng Phils., Inc. v. Joaquin,59
the illness of the seafarer therein, who was terminated
based on mutual consent, was found to be non-compensable
since he died of chronic renal failure which was not listed
as a compensable illness. Likewise, in Aya-ay, Sr. v.
Arpaphil Shipping Corp.,60 the Court denied the claim for
death compensation because the seafarer therein was

repatriated due to an eye injury but subsequently died of a
stroke, which was not listed as a compensable illness under
the POEA-SEC. Death compensation was also denied to the
claimants in Hermogenes v. Osco Shipping Services, Inc.,61
since no evidence was offered to prove the cause of the
termination of the contract of employment, whereas it was
found that the seafarer therein died three (3) years after
his disembarkation of an illness which was not shown to
have been contracted during his employment. An identical
ruling was rendered in Prudential Shipping and
Management Corp. v. Sta. Rita,62 wherein the seafarer in
said case was repatriated due to umbilical hernia but
_______________
58 Klaveness is similar to Medline Management, Inc. v. Roslinda, G.R.
No. 168715, September 15, 2010, 630 SCRA 471, and Sea Power Shipping
Enterprises, Inc. v. Salazar, G.R. No. 188595, August 28, 2013, 704 SCRA
233, where death compensation was denied since the seafarers in those
cases were repatriated not because of any illness but due to the
expiration of their respective contracts of employment.
59 481 Phil. 222; 437 SCRA 608 (2004).
60 516 Phil. 628; 481 SCRA 282 (2006).
61 504 Phil. 564; 467 SCRA 301 (2005).
62 544 Phil. 94; 515 SCRA 157 (2007).
142
142

died one (1) year after of cardiopulmonary arrest, which

was not, however, established as work-related. Similarly,
death compensation was denied the claimants in Ortega v.
CA,63 considering that the seafarer therein died of lung
cancer which was not found to be work-related.
Meanwhile, on the opposite end of the jurisprudential
spectrum, the Court, in a number of cases, granted claims
for death benefits although the seafarers death therein had
occurred after their repatriation primarily because of the
causal connection between their work and the illness which
had eventually resulted in their death.
In the 1999 case of Wallem Maritime Service, Inc. v.
NLRC,64 the death benefit claims of the heirs of the
seafarer who had died after having been repatriated on

account of mutual consent between him and his employer
was allowed by the Court because of the reasonable
connection between his job and his illness. As pertinently
stated in that case:
It is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the
growth, development or acceleration of the illness to entitle the
claimant to the benefits provided therefor. It is enough that the
employment had contributed, even in a small degree, to the
development of the disease and in bringing about his death.
It is indeed safe to presume that, at the very least, the nature of
Faustino Inductivos employment had contributed to the
aggravation of his illness if indeed it was preexisting at the time
of his employment and therefore it is but just that he be duly
compensated for it. It cannot be denied that there was at least
a reasonable connection between his job and his lung
infection, which eventually developed into septicemia and
ultimately caused his death. As a [utility man] onboard the
vessel, he was exposed to harsh
_______________
63 576 Phil. 601; 553 SCRA 649 (2008).
64 376 Phil. 738; 318 SCRA 623 (1999).
143
, OCTOBER 13, 2014
143

sea weather, chemical irritants, dusts, etc., all of which
invariably contributed to his illness.
Neither is it necessary, in order to recover compensation, that
the employee must have been in perfect condition or health at the
time he contracted the disease. Every workingman brings with him
to his employment certain infirmities, and while the employer is not
the insurer of the health of the employees, he takes them as he
finds them and assumes the risk of liability. If the disease is the
proximate cause of the employees death for which compensation is
unimportant and recovery may be had therefor independent of any
preexisting disease.65 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Later, the Court, in Seagull Shipmanagement and
Transport, Inc. v. NLRC66 a sickness and permanent

disability claims case decided under the auspices of the
1984 version of the POEA-SEC (which, unlike the present
standard contract, only requires that the illness of death
occur during the term of the employment whether workrelated or not) significantly observed that:
Even assuming that the ailment of the worker was contracted
prior to his employment, this still would not deprive him of
compensation benefits. For what matters is that his work had
contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of
the disease and in bringing about his eventual death. Neither
is it necessary, in order to recover compensation, that the employee
must have been in perfect health at the time he contracted the
disease. A worker brings with him possible infirmities in the course
of his employment, and while the employer is not the insurer of the
health of the employees, he takes them as he finds them and
assumes the risk of liability. If the disease is the proximate
cause
_______________
65 Id., at pp. 747-748; p. 632.
66 388 Phil. 906; 333 SCRA 236 (2000).
144
144

of the employees death for which compensation is sought,

the previous physical condition of the employee is
unimportant, and recovery may be had for said death,
independently of any preexisting disease.67 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
The Court similarly took into account the workrelatedness element in granting the death benefits claim in
InterOrient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v. Remo,68 a 2010
case decided under the 1996 POEA-SEC which operated
under parameters identical to the 1984 POEA-SEC. Quoted
hereunder are the pertinent portions of that ruling:
It was established on record that before the late Lutero Remo
signed his last contract with private respondents as Cook-Steward

of the vessel M/T Captain Mitsos L, he was required to undergo a
series of medical examinations. Yet, he was declared fit to work by
private respondents company designated-physician. On April 19,
1999, Remo was discharged from his vessel after he was
hospitalized in Fujairah for atrial fibrillation and congestive heart
failure. His death on August 28, 2000, even if it occurred
months after his repatriation, due to hypertensive cardiovascular disease, could clearly have been work-related.
Declared as fit to work at the time of hiring, and hospitalized
while on service on account of atrial fibrillation and congestive
heart failure, his eventual death due to hypertensive
cardiovascular disease could only be work-related. The death due
to hypertensive cardio-vascular disease could in fact be traced to
Lutero Remos being the Cook-Steward. As Cook-Steward of an
ocean-going vessel, Remo had no choice but to prepare and
eat hypertension-inducing food, a kind of food that
eventually caused his hypertensive cardiovascular
_______________
67 Id., at pp. 914-915; p. 243.
68 G.R. No. 181112, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 237.
145
, OCTOBER 13, 2014
145

disease, a disease which in turn admittedly caused his
death.
Private respondents cannot deny liability for the subject
death by claiming that the seafarers death occurred beyond
the term of his employment and worsely, that there has been
misrepresentation on the part of the seafarer. For, as
employer, the private respondents had all the opportunity to
prequalify, thoroughly screen and choose their applicants to
determine if they are medically, psychologically and mentally fit for
employment. That the seafarer here was subjected to the required
prequalification standards before he was admitted as CookSteward, it thus has to be safely presumed that the late Remo was
in a good state of health when he boarded the vessel.69 (Emphases
and underscoring supplied; citation omitted)
More recently, in the 2013 case of InterOrient Maritime,
Incorporated v. Candava,70 also decided under the

framework of the 1996 POEA-SEC, the Court pronounced
that the seafarers death therein, despite occurring after
his repatriation, remains compensable for having been
caused by an illness duly established to have been
contracted in the course of his employment.71
Thus, considering the constitutional mandate on labor
as well as relative jurisprudential context, the rule,
restated for a final time, should be as follows: if the
seafarers work-related injury or illness (that
eventually causes his medical repatriation and,
thereafter, his death, as in this case) occurs during
the term of his employment, then the employer
becomes liable for death compensation benefits
under Section 20(A) of the 2000 POEA-SEC. The
provision cannot be construed otherwise for to do so would
not only transgress prevailing constitutional policy and
_______________
69 Id., at p. 249.
70 G.R. No. 201251, June 26, 2013, 700 SCRA 174.
71 Id., at p. 187.
146
146

deride the bearings of relevant case law but also result

in a travesty of fairness and an indifference to social
justice.
For all these reasons, the Court hereby grants the
petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated May 19, 2009 and the Resolution dated
October 30, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P.
No. 104479 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
the Decision dated April 30, 2008 of the National Labor
Relations Commission is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ., Chairperson),

Bersamin and Perez, JJ., concur.
Leonardo-De
Castro,
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and

set aside.
Notes.The
Philippine
Overseas
Employment
Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEASEC) clearly provides that when a seafarer sustains a
work-related illness or injury while onboard the vessel, his
fitness or unfitness for work shall be determined by the
company-designated physician. (Santiago vs. Pacbasin
Ship Management, Inc., 670 SCRA 271 [2012])
To be entitled for death compensation benefits from the
employer, the death of the seafarer (1) must be workrelated; and (2) must happen during the term of the
employment contract. (Sy vs. Philippine Transmarine
Carriers, Inc., 690 SCRA 202 [2013])
o0o
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Canuel vs. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation

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Canuel vs. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation

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G.R. No. 190161.October 13, 2014.

ANITA N. CANUEL, for herself and on behalf of her minor

Labor Law; Seafarers; Death Benefits; The seafarers

, OCTOBER 13, 2014