Vilbar, Jemina C.

Khan vs. Simbillo

AC No. 5299
August 19, 2003
Facts: Respondent Atty. Rizalino Simbillo advertised himself as Annulment of
Marriage Specialist in 3 major newspapers, the Philippine Daily Inquirer, Manila
Bulletin, and The Philippine Star. He claimed to be an expert in handling annulment
cases and guaranteed a court decree within 4 to 6 months, provided the case will
not involve separation of property or custody of children, for a fee of P48,000.
Petitioner Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr. filed administrative charges against the
respondent for improper advertising and soliciting legal business. Respondent
admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per
se are not prohibited acts.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline found the
respondent guilty.
Issue: Whether or not advertising as a specialist in Annulment of Marriage is in
violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule
138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.
Held: Yes. Atty. Simbillo violated Rule 2.03, concerning any act designed primarily
to solicit legal business, and Rule 3.01, pertaining to a statement or claim regarding
the qualifications or legal services, of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court on the grounds for disbarment and
suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court.
The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public
service, not money, is the primary consideration. Moreover, in advertising himself
as a self-styled Annulment of Marriage Specialist, Atty. Simbillo eroded and
undermined not only the stability but also the sanctity of marriage.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However,
for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal
profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury
to the lawyer and to the bar. Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or
names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as
well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are
permissible. The use of calling cards and publication in reputable law lists, in a
manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief
biographical and informative data is allowable.

Occea vs. Marquez

60 SCRA 38
September 30, 1974
Facts: Petitioners, Atty. Jesus V. Occea and Atty. Samuel C. Occea, are the
lawyers for the estate executrix, Mrs. Necitas Ogan Occea since 1963. Petitioners
filed two motions for Payment of Partial Attorneys Fees for P30,000 dated
November 18, 1965 and July 5, 1966, respectively. The second motion was filed
while the first was still unresolved and the action for the second was deferred.
On November 2, 1966, respondent Judge, Hon. Paulino S. Marquez, issued an order
fixing the total fees of petitioners for the period March, 1963 to December, 1965 at
P20,000. On January 12, 1967, respondent issued an order not only denying
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration but also modifying the original order by
fixing petitioners' fees for the entire testate proceedings at P20,000.
Since petitioners are the husband and the father-in-law of the executrix, the latter
cannot be expected to oppose petitioners' claims for attorney's fees, thus leaving
the co-executor as the lone party to represent and defend the interests of the
estate. Atty. I. V. Binamira, who claims to be co-executor of the Ogan estate, filed
with this Court on July, 1967, a Motion for Leave to Intervene, which was granted in
a resolution of August 9, 1967.
Issues:
1. Whether or not respondent Judge Marquez acted with a grave abuse of
discretion or in excess of jurisdiction in modifying the attorneys fees.
2. Whether or not Intervenor, Atty. Binamira, made false averments before the
court.
Held:
1.

Yes. Respondent Judge Marquez committed a grave abuse of discretion in

prescribing or modifying the attorneys face. This error is correctable by
certiorari. In addition, such fees could not be adequately fixed on the basis of
the record alone, considering that there are other factors necessary in
assessing the fee of a lawyer, such as: (1) the amount and character of the
services rendered; (2) the labor, time and trouble involved; (3) the nature and
importance of the litigation in business in which the services were rendered;
(4) the responsibility imposed; (5) the amount of money or the value of the
property affected by the controversy or involved in the employment; (6) the
skill and experience called for in the performance of the services; (7) the
professional character and social standing of the attorney; and (8) the results
secured. It is also a recognized rule that an attorney may properly charge a
much larger fee when it is contingent than when it is not.
2. Yes. Atty. Binamira, in having deliberately made these false allegations in his
pleadings, has been recreant to his oath. The conduct of the lawyer before
the court and with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and
fairness. It is neither candid nor fair for a lawyer to knowingly make false
allegations in a judicial pleading or to misquote the contents of a document,
the testimony of a witness, the argument of opposing counsel or the contents
of a decision. Before his admission to the practice of law, he took the solemn

oath that he will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court, nor
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any false, groundless or unlawful suit,
and conduct himself as a lawyer with all good fidelity to courts as well as to
his clients.

FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5299. August 19, 2003.]
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public
Information Office, complainant, vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T.SIMBILLO, respondent.
[G.R. No. 157053. August 19, 2003.]
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, petitioner, vs. IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE
and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator
and Chief, Public Information Office, respondents.

SYNOPSIS
For advertising himself in several leading newspapers as an "Annulment of Marriage
Specialist," Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo was charged for improper advertising and solicitation of
his legal services. Respondent admitted the act imputed to him, but argued that advertising
and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts.
The practice of law is not a business but a profession in which duty to public service, not
money, is the primary consideration. Although solicitation of legal business is not altogether
proscribed, to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession, made
in a modest and decorous manner that wood bring no injury to the lawyer and the bar. Here,
for advertising himself as an annulment of marriage specialist, Atty. Simbillo undermined not
only the stability but also the sanctity of marriage. Thus, for violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court,
Atty. Simbillowas suspended from the practice of law for one year, with stern warning
against repetition of the same or similar offense.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; PROHIBITION AGAINST
SOLICITATION OF LEGAL BUSINESS. Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility read: Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business. Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the
use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
2. ID.; DISBARMENT AND SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS BY THE SUPREME COURT, GROUNDS
THEREFOR. Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states: SEC. 27. Disbarment and
suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
3. ID.; PRACTICE OF LAW AS A PROFESSION, NOT A BUSINESS; ELUCIDATED. It has been
repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty
to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant
to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields
profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public
service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers,
who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. The
following elements distinguish the legal profession from a business: 1. A duty of public
service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the highest
eminence without making much money; 2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the
administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability; 3. A relation to
clients in the highest degree of fiduciary; 4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized
by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising
and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.
4. ID.; LAWYER ADVERTISING HIMSELF AS MARRIAGE ANNULMENT SPECIALIST UNDERMINES
THE STABILITY AND SANCTITY OF MARRIAGE. What adds to the gravity of respondent's

acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled "Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he

wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of
an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of
permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may
be obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of the case, he in fact
encourages people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained
from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.
5. ID.; SOLICITATION OF LEGAL BUSINESS; PROPER MANNER THEREOF. The solicitation of
legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be
compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous
manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar. Thus, the use of simple signs
stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of
practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are
permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable. Publication in reputable law
lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief
biographical and informative data is likewise allowable.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5,
2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: "ANNULMENT' OF
MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667."
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme
Court, called up the published telephone number and pretended to be an interested party.
She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an
expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six
months, provided the case will not involve separation of property or custody of children. Mrs.
Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at
the time of filing of the case and the other half after a decision thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office
revealed that similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of
the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint
against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services,
in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule
138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and
solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views about
the prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by
the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer
advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should be abandoned.
Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court
promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary
to law, public policy and public order as long as it is dignified.
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation. 5 On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed
Resolution No. XV-2002-306, 6 finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and
suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning that a repetition of
similar acts would be dealt with more severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court
on November 11, 2002.
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied
by the IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled,
"Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G.

Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents." This
petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Court's Resolution dated March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or not
they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings. 10
Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not submitting any
additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its early resolution on the
basis of pleadings and records thereof. 11 Respondent, on the other hand, filed a
Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBP's Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03.A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to
solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01.A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27.Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a
party without authority to do so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in
which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not
primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration.
The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary
consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to
themselves. The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a business:
1.A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one
may attain the highest eminence without making much money;
2.A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of justice involving
thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;
3.A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4.A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and
unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment
on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.
There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits
that he caused the publication of the advertisements. While he professes repentance and
begs for the Court's indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he
advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming that
he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing his answer, he again
advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads
Newspaper. Ten months later, he caused the same advertisement to be published in the
October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell. Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and
contemptuous affront on the Court's authority.
What adds to the gravity of respondent's acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled
"Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not
only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the
contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective
clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing

of the case, he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and
would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for
solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is
made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the
bar. Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and
residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals
bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now
acceptable. Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of
conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is likewise
allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:
Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's
name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers,
cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to
the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal
teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees
thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in
other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their
written consent, the names of clients regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it
cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or
periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a
lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data
in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a
lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management, or
contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or
to lower dignity or standing of the profession.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may
contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is
connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The
publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in
the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of
the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a
telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis
and italics supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of
violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138,
Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR
effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., abroad, on official business.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-27396. September 30, 1974.]
JESUS V. OCCE;A and SAMUEL C. OCCE;A, petitioners, vs. HON. PAULINO S.
MARQUEZ, District Judge, Court of First Instance of Bohol, Branch I, respondent. I.V.
BINAMIRA, Co-Executor, Estate of W.C. Ogan, Sp. Proc. No. 423, CFI of Bohol,
intervenor.
Jesus V . Occe;a & Samuel C . Occe;a in their own behalves.
Hon. Paulino S. Marquez for and in his own behalf.
I .V . Binamira for and in his own behalf as intervenor.
DECISION
ANTONIO, J p:
In this petition for certiorari with mandamus, petitioners seek (1) to nullify the order of
respondent Judge Paulino S. Marquez of the Court of First Instance of Bohol, Branch I, in Sp.
Proc. No. 423 entitled "In the Matter of the Testate Estate of William C. Ogan," in relation to
petitioners' claim for partial payment of attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00, dated
November 2, 1966, fixing at P20,000.00 petitioners' attorney's fees, "which would cover the
period March 1963 to December 1965," and directing its immediate payment minus the
amount of P4,000.00 previously received by petitioners, and his second order, dated January
12, 1967, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration and modifying the November 2,
1966 order by deleting therefrom the above-quoted phrase; (2) to direct the said court to
approve the release to them as attorney's fees the amount of P30,000.00 minus the amount
of P4,000.00 already advanced to them by the executrix; and (3) to allow petitioners to
submit evidence to establish the total attorney's fees to which they are entitled, in case no
agreement thereon is reached between them and the instituted heirs.
The gross value of the estate of the late William C. Ogan subject matter of the probate
proceeding in Sp. Proc. No. 423 is more than P2 million. Petitioners, Atty. Jesus V. Occe;a
and Atty. Samuel C. Occe;a, are the lawyers for the estate executrix, Mrs. Necitas Ogan
Occe;a, and they had been representing the said executrix since 1963, defending the

estate against claims and protecting the interests of the estate. In order to expedite the
settlement of their deceased father's estate, the seven instituted heirs decided to enter into
compromise with the claimants, as a result of which the total amount of P220,000.00 in cash
was awarded to the claimants, including co-executor Atty. Isabelo V. Binamira, his lawyers
and his wife. A partial distribution of the corpus and income of the estate was made to the
heirs in the total amount of P450,000.00. On November 18, 1966, the estate and inheritance
taxes were completely settled by the executrix and the requisite tax clearance and
discharge from liability was issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Payment of Attorneys' Fees, dated November 18, 1965,
asking the court to approve payment to them of P30,000.00, as part payment of their fees
for their services as counsel for the executrix since 1963, and to authorize the executrix to
withdraw the amount from the deposits of the estate and pay petitioners. Three of the heirs,
Lily Ogan Peralta, William Ogan, Jr. and Ruth Ogan, moved to defer consideration of the
motion until after the total amounts for the executrix's fees and the attorney's fees of her
counsel shall have been agreed upon by all the heirs. In July, 1966, five of the seven
instituted heirs, namely, Lily Ogan Peralta, Necitas Ogan Occe;a, Federico M. Ogan, Liboria
Ogan Garcia and Nancy Ogan Gibson, filed with the court a Manifestation stating that they
had no objection to the release of P30,000.00 to petitioners as partial payment of attorney's
fees and recommending approval of petitioners' motion.
Their first motion dated November 18, 1965 being still unresolved, petitioners filed a second
Motion for Payment of Partial Attorneys' Fees, dated July 5, 1966, praying for the release to
them of the amount of P30,000.00 previously prayed for by them. Action on the matter was,
however, deferred in an order dated August 6, 1966, upon the request of the Quijano and
Arroyo Law Offices in behalf of heirs William Ogan, Jr. and Ruth Ogan for deferment until
after all the instituted heirs shall have agreed in writing on the total attorney's fees.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration under date of September 12, 1966, asking the
court to reconsider its deferment order and praying that payment to them of P30,000.00 be
approved on the understanding that whatever amounts were paid to them would be
chargeable against the fees which they and the instituted heirs might agree to be
petitioners' total fees.
On November 2, 1966, respondent Judge issued an order fixing the total fees of petitioners
for the period March, 1963 to December, 1965 at P20,000.00. Petitioners moved to
reconsider that order. On January 12, 1967, respondent issued an order not only denying
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration but also modifying the original order by fixing
petitioners' fees for the entire testate proceedings at P20,000.00.
Petitioners contend that respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess
of jurisdiction in fixing the entire attorney's fees to which they are entitled as counsel for the
executrix, and in fixing the said fees in the amount of P20,000.00. The reasons given by
petitioners in support of their contention are: (1) the motion submitted by petitioners for the
court's resolution was only for partial payment of their attorney's fees, without prejudice to
any agreement that might later be reached between them and the instituted heirs on the
question of total attorney's fees, yet respondent Judge resolved the question of total
attorney's fees; (2) considering that the only question raised by petitioners for the court's
determination was that of partial attorney's fees, they never expected the court to make a
ruling on the question of total attorney's fees; consequently, petitioners did not have the
opportunity to prove the total fees to which they were entitled, and, hence, they were
denied due process of law; (3) of the seven heirs to the estate, five had agreed to
petitioners' motion for partial payment to them of attorney's fees in the amount of
P30,000.00, while the remaining two did not oppose the motion; (4) in his order, respondent
Judge stated that he based the amount of P20,000.00 on the records of the case, but the
amount of attorney's fees to which a lawyer is entitled cannot be determined on the sole
basis of the records for there are other circumstances that should be taken into
consideration; and (5) contrary to respondent Judge's opinion, the mere fact that one of the
attorneys for the executrix is the husband of said executrix, is not a ground for denying the
said attorneys the right to the fees to which they are otherwise entitled.
Only Judge Paulino S. Marquez is named respondent in the present petition, for, according to
petitioners, "no proper party is interested in sustaining the questioned proceedings in the
Lower Court."
In his Answer to the petition, respondent Judge alleged that (a) petitioners' proper remedy is
appeal and not a special civil action, considering that there is already a final order on the
motion for payment of fees; (b) petitioner Atty. Samuel Occe;a is the husband of executrix

Necitas Ogan Occe;a, hence, Samuel Occe;a's pecuniary interest now goes against the
pecuniary interest of the four heirs he is representing in the special proceeding; (c) one
reason why respondent Judge ordered the deletion of the phrase containing the period
March, 1963 to December, 1965 from his November 2, 1966 order is that there are
miscellaneous payments appearing in the compromise agreement and in the executrix's
accounting which cover expenses incurred by petitioners for the estate; (d) co-executor I. V.
Binamira should be included as party respondent to comply with Section 5, Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court; and (e) it is the duty of respondent Judge not to be very liberal to the
attorney representing the executrix, who is at the same time the wife of said counsel and is
herself an heir to a sizable portion of the estate, for respondent Judge's duty is to see to it
that the estate is administered "frugally," "as economically as possible," and to avoid "that a
considerable portion of the estate is absorbed in the process of such division," in order that
there may be a worthy residue for the heirs. As special defenses, respondent Judge alleged
that the seven instituted heirs are indispensable parties in this case; that mandamus cannot
control the actuations of the trial court because they involved matters of discretion; and that
no abuse of discretion can be imputed to respondent Judge for trying his best to administer
the estate frugally.
On the arguments that he had opposed in the lower court petitioners' motion for payment of
partial attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00, and that since petitioners Samuel C.
Occe;a and Jesus V. Occe;a are the husband and father-in-law, respectively, of executrix
Necitas Ogan Occe;a, the latter cannot be expected to oppose petitioners' claims for
attorney's fees, thus leaving the co-executor as the lone party to represent and defend the
interests of the estate, Atty. I. V. Binamira, who claims to be co-executor of the Ogan estate,
filed with this Court on July, 1967, a Motion for Leave to Intervene, which was granted in a
resolution of August 9, 1967. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution of
August 9, 1967 and an Opposition to "Motion for Leave to Intervene," contending that Atty.
Binamira ceased to be a co-executor upon his resignation effective October 29, 1965. On
August 15, 1967, Atty. Binamira filed Intervenor's Opposition to Petition (answer in
intervention) traversing the material averments of the petition.
On August 25, 1967, intervenor filed a Reply to Executrix's Opposition and Opposition to
Executrix's Motion for Reconsideration. On September 18, 1967, intervenor filed Intervenor's
Comments on Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated August 9,
1967. On September 21, 1967, petitioners filed against intervenor a Petition for Contempt
asking this Court to hold intervenor in contempt of court. We required intervenor to
comment thereon. On October 9, 1967, petitioners filed a Supplemental Petition for
Contempt. Intervenor filed on October 20, 1967, Intervenor's Comments and Counter
Petition, asking this Court to dismiss petitioners' motion for indirect contempt and instead to
hold petitioners guilty of indirect contempt for gross breach of legal ethics. We deferred
action on the contempt motion until the case is considered on the merits. On January 15,
1968, intervenor I. V. Binamira filed an Answer to Supplemental Petition. This was followed
on February 12, 1968, by another Petition for Contempt, this time against one Generoso L.
Pacquiao for allegedly executing a perjured affidavit dated December 20, 1967, to aid
intervenor I. V. Binamira to escape liability for his deliberate falsehoods, which affidavit
intervenor attached to his Answer to Supplemental Petition. On the same date, February 12,
1968, petitioners filed against intervenor a Second Supplemental Petition for Contempt. On
February 19, 1968, petitioners filed Petitioners' Manifestation Re Documentary Evidence
Supporting Charges.
We shall now consider the merits of the basic petition and the petitions for contempt.
I
The rule is that when a lawyer has rendered legal services to the executor or administrator
to assist him in the execution of his trust, his attorney's fees may be allowed as expenses of
administration. The estate is, however, not directly liable for his fees, the liability for
payment resting primarily on the executor or administrator. If the administrator had paid the
fees, he would be entitled to reimbursement from the estate. The procedure to be followed
by counsel in order to collect his fees is to request the administrator to make payment, and
should the latter fail to pay, either to (a) file an action against him in his personal capacity,
and not as administrator, or (b) file a petition in the testate or intestate proceedings asking
the court, after notice to all the heirs and interested parties, to direct the payment of his
fees as expenses of administration. Whichever course is adopted, the heirs and other
persons interested in the estate will have the right to inquire into the value of the services of
the lawyer and on the necessity of his employment. In the case at bar, petitioner filed his
petition directly with the probate court.

There is no question that the probate court acts as a trustee of the estate, and as such
trustee it should jealously guard the estate under administration and see to it that it is
wisely and economically administered and not dissipated. 3 This rule, however, does not
authorize the court, in the discharge of its function as trustee of the estate, to act in a
whimsical and capricious manner or to fix the amount of fees which a lawyer is entitled to
without according to the latter opportunity to prove the legitimate value of his services.
Opportunity of a party to be heard is admittedly the essence of procedural due process.
What petitioners filed with the lower court was a motion for partial payment of attorney's
fees in the amount of P30,000.00 as lawyers for the executrix for the period February, 1963,
up to the date of filing of the motion on or about November 18, 1965. Five of the seven heirs
had manifested conformity to petitioners' motion, while the remaining two merely requested
deferment of the resolution of the motion "until the total amount for Executrix's fees and
attorney's fees of her counsel is agreed upon by all the heirs." The court, however, in spite of
such conformity, and without affording petitioners the opportunity to establish how much
attorney's fees they are entitled to for their entire legal services to the executrix, issued an
order fixing at P20,000.00 the entire attorney's fees of petitioners.
In his Order of January 12, 1967, respondent Judge explained:
"The records of this case are before the Court and the work rendered by Atty. Samuel
Occe;a, within each given period, is easily visible from them; his work as revealed
by those records is the factual basis for this Court's orders as to attorney's fees.
"Whatever attorney's fees may have been approved by the Court on October 28,
1965 were as a result of compromise and were with the written consent of all the
heirs and of all the signatories of the compromise agreement of October 27, 1965.
That is not so with respect to Atty. Occe;a's thirty-thousand peso claim for fees; and
so, this Court, after a view of the record, had to fix it at P20,000.00. The record can
reflect what an attorney of record has done."
In fixing petitioners' attorney's fees solely on the basis of the records of the case, without
allowing petitioners to adduce evidence to prove what is the proper amount of attorney's
fees to which they are entitled for their entire legal services to the estate, respondent Judge
committed a grave abuse of discretion correctable by certiorari. Evidently, such fees could
not be adequately fixed on the basis of the record alone, considering that there are other
factors necessary in assessing the fee of a lawyer, such as: (1) the amount and character of
the services rendered; (2) the labor, time and trouble involved; (3) the nature and
importance of the litigation or business in which the services were rendered; (4) the
responsibility imposed; (5) the amount of money or the value of the property affected by the
controversy or involved in the employment; (6) the skill and experience called for in the
performance of the services; (7) the professional character and social standing of the
attorney; and (8) the results secured, it being a recognized rule that an attorney may
properly charge a much larger fee when it is contingent than when it is not.
It should be noted that some of the reasons submitted by petitioners in support of their fees
do not appear in the records of the case. For instance, they claim that in connection with
their legal services to the executrix and to the estate, petitioner Samuel C. Occe;a had
been travelling from Davao to Tagbilaran from 1965 to March, 1967, and from Davao to Cebu
and Manila from 1963 to March, 1967, and that in fact he and his family had to stay for
almost a year in Dumaguete City. These claims apparently bear strongly on the labor, time
and trouble involved in petitioners' legal undertaking, and, consequently, should have been
subject to a formal judicial inquiry. Considering, furthermore, that two of the heirs have not
given their conformity to petitioners' motion, the need for a hearing becomes doubly
necessary. This is also the reason why at this stage it would be premature to grant
petitioners' prayer for the release to them of the amount of P30,000.00 as partial payment
of their fees.
II
As stated above, petitioners have filed petitions for indirect contempt of court against
intervenor I.V. Binamira charging the latter of having made false averments in this Court.
We have carefully considered these charges and the answers of intervenor, and, on the basis
of the evidence, We conclude that intervenor I.V. Binamira has deliberately made false
allegations before this Court which tend to impede or obstruct the administration of justice,
to wit:

1. To bolster his claim that the executrix, without approval of the court, loaned
P100,000.00 to the Bohol Land Transportation Company, Inc., intervenor submitted
as Annex 5 of his Answer to Supplemental Petition a so-called "Real Estate Mortgage"
which he made to appear was signed by Atty. Vicente de la Serna and the executrix.
The certification of the Deputy Clerk of Court (Annex A-Contempt) shows that what
intervenor claims to be a duly executed mortgage is in reality only a proposed
mortgage not even signed by the parties.
2. Intervenor, in his Intervenor's Opposition to Petition, also stated that in December,
1965, the executrix, without the court's approval or of the co-executor's consent, but
with petitioners' consent, loaned P100,000.00 to the Bohol Land Transportation
Company, Inc. out of the estate's funds. The record shows that only P50,000.00 was
loaned to the company to protect the investment of the estate therein, and that the
same was granted pursuant to a joint motion signed, among others, by intervenor,
and approved by the court.
3. To discredit petitioner Samuel C. Occea and his wife, the executrix, intervenor
stated in his Intervenor's Opposition to Petition that less than a month after the loan
of P100,000.00 had been granted to the transportation company, petitioner Samuel
C. Occe;a was elected president by directors of his own choosing in the Bohol Land
Transportation Company, Inc., insinuating that in effect the executrix loaned to her
husband the said sum of money. The certification of the corporate secretary of the
Bohol Land Transportation Company, Inc. (Annex D-Contempt) states that petitioner
Samuel C. Occe;a was not the president of the company at the time, nor did he act
as president or treasurer thereof, and that the president was Atty. Vicente de la
Serna. This last fact is also shown in intervenor's own Annex 5 of his Answer to
Supplemental Petition.
4.In intervenor's Opposition to this petition for certiorari, he stated that contrary to
the executrix's statement in the 1965 income tax return of the estate that an estate
income of P90,770.05 was distributed among the heirs in 1965, there was in fact no
such distribution of income. The executrix's project of partition (Annex E-Contempt)
shows that there was a distribution of the 1965 income of the estate.
5. To discredit petitioners and the executrix, intervenor alleged in his Intervenor's
Opposition to Petition that petitioners caused to be filed with the court the executrix's
verified inventory which failed to include as assets of the estate certain loans granted
to petitioner Samuel C. Occe;a in the sum of P4,000.00 and to the executrix various
sums totalling P6,000.00. The letters written by the late W. C. Ogan to his daughter,
the executrix (Annexes F, G. and H-Contempt), show that the said sums totalling
P10,000.00 were in reality partly given to her as a gift and partly for the payment of
certain furniture and equipment.
6. Intervenor, in order to further discredit petitioners and the executrix, stated in his
Reply to Executrix's Opposition and Opposition to Executrix's Motion for
Reconsideration that the executrix and petitioners refused to pay and deliver to him
all that he was entitled to under the compromise agreement. The receipt dated
October 29, 1965, signed by intervenor himself (Annex I-Contempt), shows that he
acknowledged receipt from petitioner Samuel C. Occe;a, lawyer for the executrix,
the sum of P141,000.00 "in full payment of all claims and fees against the Estate,
pursuant to the Agreement dated October 27, 1965.
7. In his Reply to Executrix's Opposition and Opposition to Executrix's Motion for
Reconsideration, intervenor alleged that he signed Atty. Occe;a's prepared receipt
without receiving payment, trusting that Atty. Occe;a would pay the amount in full,
but later Atty. Occe;a withheld Chartered Bank Check No. 55384 for P8,000.00
drawn in favor of intervenor and P15,000.00 in cash. A receipt signed by intervenor I.
V. Binamira (Annex K-Contempt) shows that he acknowledged receipt of the check in
question in the amount of P8,000.00 "intended for Mrs. Lila Ogan Castillo . . ." Anent
the sum of P15,000.00 in cash, Annex J-Contempt (Reply to the Opposition for
Authority to Annotate Interest, etc. filed by intervenor with the probate court) shows
that intervenor, as movant, himself had alleged that "no check was issued to movant,
but withdrawn amount of P15,000.00 was included in purchasing Manager's Check
No. 55398 for the Clerk of Court (deposit) for P75,000.00," for the said amount was
voluntarily extended by intervenor as a favor and gesture of goodwill to form part of
the total cash bond of P75,000.00 deposited with the Clerk of Court, as shown by a

receipt signed by Atty. Samuel C. Occe;a (Annex K-11-Contempt) which forms part of
the record in the court below.
8. In his intervenor's Comments and Counter-Petition, intervenor denied the truth of
petitioners' claim that intervenor had voluntarily and willingly extended the sum of
P15,000.00 as a favor and gesture of goodwill to form part of the P75,000.00-deposit.
In the Opposition to Motion of Executrix for Reconsideration of Order of February 19,
1966, dated April 16, 1966 (Annex K-2-Contempt), intervenor had, however, admitted
that "out of the goodness of his heart . . . in the nature of help," he had "willingly
extended as a favor and gesture of goodwill" the said sum of P15,000.00.
9. To impugn the claim of petitioner Samuel C. Occe;a that he stayed in Dumaguete
City for almost one year to attend to the affairs of the estate, intervenor, in his
intervenor's Opposition to Petition, alleged that said petitioner's stay in Dumaguete
City was not to attend to the affairs of the estate, but to enable him to teach in
Silliman University. The certification of the Director of the personnel office of Silliman
University, dated December 4, 1967 (Annex V-Contempt) is, however, to the effect
that their "records do not show that Atty. Samuel C. Occe;a was teaching at Silliman
University or employed in any other capacity in 1963, or at any time before or after
1963."
The foregoing are only some of the twenty-one instances cited by petitioners which clearly
show that intervenor had deliberately made false allegations in his pleadings.
We find no rule of law or of ethics which would justify the conduct of a lawyer in any case,
whether civil or criminal, in endeavoring by dishonest means to mislead the court, even if to
do so might work to the advantage of his client. The conduct of the lawyer before the court
and with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness. It is neither candid
nor fair for a lawyer to knowingly make false allegations in a judicial pleading or to misquote
the contents of a document, the testimony of a witness, the argument of opposing counsel
or the contents of a decision. Before his admission to the practice of law, he took the solemn
oath that he will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court, nor wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any false, groundless or unlawful suit, and conduct himself as a
lawyer with all good fidelity to courts as well as to his clients. We find that Atty. Binamira, in
having deliberately made these false allegations in his pleadings, has been recreant to his
oath.
The charges contained in the counter-petition for indirect contempt of intervenor I. V.
Binamira against petitioners have not been substantiated by evidence, and they must,
therefore, be dismissed.
We note that no further action was taken on the petition for contempt filed by petitioners
against Generoso L. Pacquiao, who executed the affidavit attached to intervenor's Answer to
Supplemental Petition, the contents of which petitioners claim to be deliberate falsehoods.
The said respondent Pacquiao not having been afforded an opportunity to defend himself
against the contempt charge, the charge must be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, (1) the petition for certiorari is granted, and the court a quo is directed to hold
a hearing to determine how much the total attorney's fees petitioners are entitled to, and (2)
Atty. Isabelo V. Binamira, who appeared as intervenor in this case, is hereby declared guilty
of contempt and sentenced to pay to this Court within ten (10) days from notice hereof a
fine in the sum of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00). Costs against intervenor.
Fernando, Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ ., concur.