1) Ty v. CA, G.R. No.127406, Nov.

27, 2000
FACTS:
Private respondent, Edgardo Reyes, was married
with Anna Villanueva in a civil ceremony in March
1977 in Manila and subsequently had a church
wedding in August 1977. Both weddings were
declared null and void ab initio for lack of marriage
license and consent of the parties. Even before the
decree nullifying the marriage was issued, Reyes
wed Ofelia Ty herein petitioner on April 1979 and
had their church wedding in Makati on April 1982.
The decree was only issued in August 1980. In
January 1991, Reyes filed with RTC a complaint to
have his marriage with petitioner be declared null
and void. AC ruled that a judicial declaration of
nullity of the prior marriage with Anna must first be
secured before a subsequent marriage could be
validly contracted. However, SC found that the
provisions of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied to the present case for doing so
would prejudice the vested rights of the petitioner
and of her children.
ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded
to Ofelia Ty.
HELD:
SC is in the opinion of the lower courts that no
damages should be awarded to the wife who sought
damages against the husband for filing a baseless
complaint causing her mental anguish, anxiety,
besmirched reputation, social humiliation and
alienation from her parents. Aside from the fact,
that petitioner wants her marriage to private
respondent held valid and subsisting. She is
likewise suing to maintain her status as legitimate
wife. To grant her petition for damages would

result to a situation where the husband pays the wife

damages from conjugal or common funds. To do
so, would make the application of the law absurd.
Moreover, Philippine laws do not comprehend an
action for damages between husband and wife
merely because of breach of a marital obligation.
Hence, the petition was granted. Marriage between
Ty and Reyes is declared valid and subsisting and
the award of the amount of P15,000 is ratified and
maintained as monthly support to their 2 children
for as long as they are of minor age or otherwise
legally entitled thereto.
2) Arcaba vs. Tabancura Vda. De Batocael G.R. No.
146683 November 22, 2001
FACTS:
Francisco
Comille
and
his
wife
ZosimaMontallana became the registered owners of Lot
No. 437-A located at Balintawak St. and Rizal Avenue in
Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in January 1956.
Zosima died in 1980 hence Francisco and his mother in
law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with
waiver of rights, where the latter waived her share
consisting of of the property in favor of Francisco.
Since Francisco do not have any children to take care of
him after his retirement, he asked Leticia, his niece,
Leticias cousin, Luzviminda and CirilaArcaba, the
petitioner, who was then a widow and took care of
Franciscos house as well as the store inside.
According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers
since they slept in the same room. On the other hand,
ErlindaTabancura, another niece of Francisco claimed
that the latter told her that Cirila was his mistress.
However, Cirila defensed herself that she was a mere
helper who could enter the masters bedroom when
Francisco asked her to and that Francisco was too old
for her. She denied having sexual intercourse with
Francisco. When the nieces got married, Cirila who was
then 34 year-old widow started working for Francisco
who was 75 year old widower. The latter did not pay
him any wages as househelper though her family was

provided with food and lodging. Franciscos health

deteriorated and became bedridden. Tabancura testified
that Franciscos only source of income was the rentals
from his lot near the public streets.
In January 1991, few months before Francisco died, he
executed a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos where he
ceded a portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq m.,
together with his house to Cirila who accepted the same.
The larger portion of 268 sq m. was left under his name.
This was made in consideration of the 10 year of faithful
services of the petitioner. AttyLacaya notarized the deed
and was later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.
In Octoer 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot
received by Cirila had a market value of P57,105 and
assessed value of P28,550. The decedents nephews and
nieces and his heirs by intestate succession alleged that
Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos
executed by Francisco in Arcabas favor was valid.
HELD:
The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of
common law relationship wherein donation is not valid.
The conclusion was based on the testimony of
Tabancura and certain documents bearing the signature
of CirilaComille such as application for business
permit, sanitary permit and the death certificate of
Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand her
wages is an indication that she was not simply a
caregiver employee.
Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse,
especially when one of the parties is already old and
may no longer be interested in sex at the very least,
cohabitation is a public assumption of men and women
holding themselves out to the public as such.
Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of
Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
3) Ayala Investment vs Court of Appeals, GR
No. 1183305, 12 February 1998

Where the husband who is a VP of acertain company

executed or acted as a guarantor to guarantee the
obligation obtained by his corporation. Where the
corporation failed to pay the loan, the creditor filed a
case against the company and the VP who acted as a
guarantor. The judgment was rendered in favor of the
creditor. The judgment became final and during the
execution, the common property was levied in execution
by the sheriff at the instance of the creditor. The wife of
the VP complained to the levy of execution, imposed on
the common property arguing that the obligation
incurred by the husband did not redound to the benefit
of the family. The creditor argued that the obligation
incurred by the husband arising from having acted as a
guarantor has redounded to the benefit of the family in
the sense that through the obligation guaranteed by the
husband, the financial position of the company was
improved such that when the company has eventually
rehabilitated and the company survives, the husband
being the officer of the corporation is guaranteed that his
employment would also continue. He is also guaranteed
to be continued to be given the supreme court holding
that the benefit contemplated under Article 94 (3) is a
benefit which is direct benefit and not an indirect or
speculative benefit.
Philippine
Blooming
Mills
(PBM)
obtained
P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment
and Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent
Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM, executed security
agreements on December 1980 and March 1981 making
him jointly and severally answerable with PBMs
indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan
hence filing of complaint against PBM and Ching. The
RTC rendered judgment ordering PBM and Ching to
jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount
with interests. Pending the appeal of the judgment, RTC
issued writ of execution.
Thereafter, Magsajo,
appointed deputy sheriff, caused the issuance and
service upon respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff
sale on 3 of their conjugal properties on May 1982.
Respondent spouses filed injunction against petitioners

on the ground that subject loan did not redound to the

benefit of the said conjugal partnership. CA issued a
TRP enjoining lower court from enforcing its order
paving way for the scheduled auction sale of respondent
spouses conjugal properties. A certificate of sale was
issued to AIDC, being the only bidder and was
registered on July 1982.
ISSUE: Whether or not the debts and obligations
contracted by the husband alone is considered for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership and is it chargeable.

HELD:
The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement
and benefit of PBM and not for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership of Ching. Furthermore, AIDC
failed to prove that Ching contracted the debt for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. PBM has a
personality distinct and separate from the family of
Ching despite the fact that they happened to be
stockholders of said corporate entity. Clearly, the debt
was a corporate debt and right of recourse to Ching as
surety is only to the extent of his corporate
stockholdings.
Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the
court, if the money or services are given to another
person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety
or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be
categorized as falling within the context of obligations
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The
contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of
the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family.
Ching only signed as a surety for the loan contracted
with AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as a surety is
certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession, it
is not embarking in a business. Hence, the conjugal

partnership should not be made liable for the surety

agreement which was clearly for the benefit of PBM.

The court did not support the contention of the petitioner

that a benefit for the family may have resulted when the
guarantee was in favor of Chings employment
(prolonged tenure, appreciation of shares of stocks,
prestige enhanced) since the benefits contemplated in
Art. 161 of the Civil Code must be one directly resulting
from the loan. It must not be a mere by product or a
spin off of the loan itself.
4) Go vs Court of Appeals, GR No. 114791, 29
May 1997
Family Code Article 73 Exercise of Profession of
Either Spouse
In 1981, Hermogenes Ong and Jane Ong contracted with
Nancy Go for the latter to film their wedding. After the
wedding, the newlywed inquired about their wedding
video but Nancy Go said its not yet ready. She advised
them to return for the wedding video after their
honeymoon. The newlywed did so but only to find out
that Nancy Go can no longer produce the said wedding
video because the copy has been erased.
The Ongs then sued Nancy Go for damages. Nancys
husband, Alex Go, was impleaded. The trial court ruled
in favor of the spouses Ong and awarded in their favor,
among others, P75k in moral damages. In her defense on
appeal, Nancy Go said: that they erased the video tape
because as per the terms of their agreement, the spouses
are supposed to claim their wedding tape within 30 days
after the wedding, however, the spouses neglected to get
said wedding tape because they only made their claim
after two months; that her husband should not be
impleaded in this suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not Nancy Go is liable for moral
damages.

HELD: Yes. Her contention is bereft of merit. It is

shown that the spouses Ong made their claim after the
wedding but were advised to return after their
honeymoon. The spouses advised Go that their
honeymoon is to be done abroad and wont be able to
return for two months.
Anent the issue that Nancy Gos husband should not be
included in the suit, this argument is valid. Under Article
73 of the Family Code, the wife may exercise any
profession, occupation or engage in business without the
consent of the husband. In this case, it was shown that it
was only Nancy Go who entered into a contract with the
spouses Ong hence only she (Nancy) is liable to pay the
damages awarded in favor of the Ongs.
5) ZULUETA VS PAN AMERICAN WORLD
AIRWAYS, INC., GR NO. 28589, 08
JANUARY 1973
This was the ruling of the case of Zulueta vs. PAN
American airways, the husband bought an airline ticket,
but the airline committed a breach of the contract, the
airline failed to bring Mr. Zulueta to the stipulated
destination, so he sued for damages, and he won,
damages were awarded by the court arising from the
breach of contract of carriage. the SC said there is no
evidence that the money used in the purchase of ticket
which served as the contract within the party was the
exclusive money of mr.zulueta, so the presumption is it
was bought using conjugal funds, and therefore the
damages awarded by the court arising from the breach
of contract, financed by the partnership should be
conjugal. So, again you determine the source of the
funding.
Facts: Private respondent Romarico Henson married
Katrina Pineda. They had been most of the time living
separately. The former stayed in Angeles City while the
latter lived in Manila. During the marriage, Romarico
bought parcel of land in Angeles City from his father,
with money borrowed from an officemate.
Meanwhile in Hongkong, Katrina entered into an
agreement with Anita Chan whereby the latter consigned
to Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale. When Katrina
failed to return the pieces of jewelry within the 20-day

period agreed upon, Anita Chan demanded payment of

their value. Katrina issued in favor of Anita Chan a
check, however, was dishonored for lack of funds.
Hence, Katrina was charged with estafa. Trial court
dismissed the case on the ground that Katrina's liability
was not criminal but civil in nature.
Spouses Rafael Zulueta and Telly Albert Zulueta, with
their daughter boarded a PANAM plane from Honolulu
to Manila, the first leg of which was Wake Island. While
on stopover, Mr. Zulueta found the need to relieve
himself and after finding the terminals comfort rooms
full, he walked down the beach to do his business.
Meanwhile, the flight was called and Mr. Zuluetas
absence was noticed. Heading towards the ram, plaintiff
remarked, You people almost made me miss your
flight. You have a defective announcing system and I
was not paged.
Instead of allowing plaintiff to board the plane, however,
the airport manager stopped plaintiff and asked him to
surrender his baggages for inspection. Refusing to
comply with the order, plaintiff was not allowed to
board the plane. His wife and daughter were able to
proceed but were instructed to leave their baggages
behind.
Plaintiff instituted present petition for recovery of
damages against respondents for breach of contract. The
defendants, however, maintain that plaintiffs reason for
going to the beach was not to relieve himself but
because he had a quarrel with his wife.
ISSUE:
Whether or not plaintiff is entitled to damages for breach
of contract.
HELD:
YES, plaintiff is entitled to damages. Firstly, plaintiffs
testimony about what he did upon reaching the beach is
uncontradicted. Furthermore, there is absolutely no
direct evidence about said alleged quarrel. If such was
true, surely, plaintiff would not have walked back from
the beach to the terminal before the plane had resumed

its flight to Manila, thereby exposing his presence to the

full view of those who were looking for him.
Anent the request of the common carrier to inspect the
bags of plaintiff, it appears that Captain Zentner
received information that one of the passengers
expressed a fear of a bomb on board the plane. As a
result, he asked for the plaintiffs bags to verify the
bomb. Nevertheless, this claim is unfounded. The
Captain failed to explain why he seemingly assumed
that the alleged apprehension of his information was
justified. Plaintiff himself intimated to them that he was
well known to the US State Department and that the
Captain was not even aware of the informants name or
any circumstances which may substantiate the latters
fear of a certain bomb.
Defendants further argue that plaintiff was also guilty of
contributory negligence for failure to reboard the plane
within the 30 minutes announced before the passengers
debarked therefrom. This may have justified a reduction
of the damages had plaintiff been unwittingly left by the
plane, owing to the negligence of PANAM personnel, or
even, wittingly, if he could not be found before the
planes departure. It does not, and cannot have such
justification in the case at bar, plaintiff having shown up
before the plane had taken off and he having been offloaded intentionally and with malice.
With all the foregoing, it is clear that plaintiff is entitled
to damages from respondent company.

6) WONG VS. IAC, GR NO. 70082, 19

AUGUST 1991
Romario Henson married Katrina on January 1964.
They had 3 children however, even during the early
years of their marriage, the spouses had been most of the
time living separately. During the marriage or on about
January 1971, the husband bought a parcel of land in
Angeles from his father using the money borrowed from
an officemate. Sometime in June 1972, Katrina entered
an agreement with Anita Chan where the latter
consigned the former pieces of jewelry valued at
P321,830.95. Katrina failed to return the same within
the 20 day period thus Anita demanded payment of their
value. Katrina issued in September 1972, check of
P55,000 which was dishonored due to lack of funds.
The spouses Anita Chan and Ricky Wong filed action
for collection of the sum of money against Katrina and
her husband Romarico. The reply with counterclaim
filed was only in behalf of Katrina. Trial court ruled in
favor of the Wongs then a writ of execution was
thereafter issued upon the 4 lots in Angeles City all in
the name of Romarico Henson married to Katrina
Henson. 2 of the lots were sold at public auction to
Juanito Santos and the other two with Leonardo Joson.
A month before such redemption, Romarico filed an
action for annulment of the decision including the writ
and levy of execution.

ISSUE: WON debt of the wife without the knowledge of

the husband can be satisfied through the conjugal
property.

HELD:
The spouses had in fact been separated when the wife
entered into the business deal with Anita. The husband
had nothing to do with the business transactions of

Katrina nor authorized her to enter into such. The

properties in Angeles were acquired during the marriage
with unclear proof where the husband obtained the
money to repay the loan. Hence, it is presumed to
belong in the conjugal partnership in the absence of
proof that they are exclusive property of the husband
and even though they had been living separately. A wife
may bind the conjugal partnership only when she
purchases things necessary for support of the family.
The writ of execution cannot be issued against Romarico
and the execution of judgments extends only over
properties belonging to the judgment debtor. The
conjugal properties cannot answer for Katrinas
obligations as she exclusively incurred the latter without
the consent of her husband nor they did redound to the
benefit of the family. There was also no evidence
submitted that the administration of the partnership had
been transferred to Katrina by Romarico before said
obligations were incurred. In as much as the decision
was void only in so far as Romarico and the conjugal
properties concerned, Spouses Wong may still execute
the debt against Katrina, personally and exclusively
The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties
subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to
prove that the properties are exclusively owned by
Romarico. While there is proof that Romarico acquired
the properties with money he had borrowed from an
officemate, it is unclear where he obtained the money to
repay the loan. If he paid it out of his salaries, then the
money is part of the conjugal assets and not exclusively
his. Proof on this matter is of paramount importance
considering that in the determination of the nature of a
property acquired by a person during coverture, the
controlling factor is the source of the money utilized in
the purchase.

7) Go vs Servacio, GR No. 157537, 07

September 2011
FACTS:
Gaviola and Protacio, Jr. entered into a contract of sale
of a parcel of land. 23 years later, Protacio, Jr executed
an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver affirming under
oath that it was his father Protacio Go, Sr.(Married to
Marta Go) who purchased the said property.
Subsequently, Protacio Go together with his son Rito Go
sold a portion of the property to herein respondent Ester
Servacio. On March 2, 2001, the petitioners demanded
the return of the property, but Servacio refused to heed
their demand; hence this case for the annulment of sale
of the property. The contention of the petitioner was that
following Protacio, Jr.s renunciation, the property
became conjugal property; and that the sale of the
property to Servacio without the prior liquidation of the
community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta
was null and void pursuant to Article 130 of the Family
Code. Servacio and Rito countered that Article 130 of
the Family Code was inapplicable; that the want of the
liquidation prior to the sale did not render the sale
invalid, because the sale was valid to the extent of the
portion that was finally allotted to the vendors as his
share; and that the sale did not also prejudice any rights
of the petitioners as heirs, considering that what the sale
disposed of was within the aliquot portion of the
property that the vendors were entitled to as heirs.
The RTC declared that the property was the conjugal
property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the exclusive
property of Protacio, Sr. Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed
the validity of the sale of the property. Aggrieved, the
petitioners went all the way up to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether Article 130 of the Family Code was applicable.
HELD:
The appeal lacks merit.
Under Article 130 in relation to Article 105 of the
Family Code,any disposition of the conjugal property
after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be
made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the
disposition is void. Upon Martas death in 1987, the

conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article

175 (1) of the Civil Code, and an implied ordinary coownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other
heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of
the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following
its liquidation.
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his
children in respect of Martas share in the conjugal
partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any
specific portion of Martas share without an actual
partition of the property being first done either by
agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he
had was an ideal or abstract quota in Martas share.
Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share;
hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and
dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of
his co-owners. Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr.
and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other
co-owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the
selling co-owners were thereby effectively transferred,
making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Martas
share. Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly
provides that the applicability of the rules on dissolution
of the conjugal partnership is without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the
nullification of the sale or for the recovery of possession
of the thing owned in common from the third person
who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who
alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common
property as if it continued to remain in the possession of
the co-owners who possessed and administered it
[Mainit v. Bandoy, supra] In the meanwhile, Servacio
would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of her
vendors in respect of any portion that might not be
validly sold to her.
In the case of Protacio Go vs Ester Cervacio, this is a
case that happened in Maasin City. This is a property
that belongs to the conjugal partnership of gains of the
spouses Protacio and his wife. When the wife died the
father and one of the children Rito Go sold a portion of
the estate to Ester Cervacio. The other children who did

not sell their shares filed a case to declare the transaction

between Protacio and Rito on one hand and Ester
Cervasio on the other void under Article 130 which is
similar to 103. They are contending that since there was
no liquidation, any disposition of the estate of the
deceased wife is void. But the SC ruled that its not
necessarily void, the disposition of the estate without the
required liquidation being made before the disposition is
not necessarily void. It is only void if the property sold
will impair the right of the others who did not agree to
the disposition because what will happen there is when
the wife died the property now being inherited by the
surviving husband the rest of the children under coownership. Upon the termination of the co-ownership
each heir shall be entitled to their respective shares. If
one or some but not all of them dispose their respective
share before the liquidation, the disposition shall be
valid in so far as it pertains to the share of those who
consented to the disposition. What will become void is
only the portion which will correspond to the shares to
those who did not consent to the disposition. The rule
that provided in Article 493 of the Civil Code which
says that every co-owner has the right to dispose of
his/her share in the property in common. Now in this
case of heirs of Protacio Go vs Ester Cervacio and Rito
Go it turned out that the portion which Protacio go (the
father) and the Rito sold to Cervacio did not even
involved the respected shares of both, meaning the
portion sold was even less than what the two of them
were entitled to after liquidation. Supreme Court said
that in so far as the sale that corresponds to the shares of
Protacio and Rito Go is perfectly all right even in the
absence of liquidation. For any way upon liquidation the
shares of the other heirs who did not consent to the sale
will not be affected, meaning have the transaction
involved the portion of the estate more than what the
two of them were entitled to inherit upon dissolution the
excess would have been void but in this case it is less
than what the two are entitled to inherit.
103 and 130 which says that any disposition of the
property without liquidation conducted or made in a
period of 1 year from the death has to be qualified. It is
void only in so far as it pertains to the shares of those
who did not consented of the sale. TAKE NOTE OF

THE CASE! VERY IMPORTANT CASE! This is one of

the instances where the SC did not actually completely
agree to the express provision of the law. Without this
case one would easily say that it is void but SC has its
own way in making things complicated. Dont be
mislead by 103 and 130, understand it in the context of
this recent decision.
8) Carino vs Carino, GR No. 132529, 02
February 2001, 351 SCRA 127
In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Cario married Susan Nicdao
Cario. He had 2 children with her. In 1992, SPO4
contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee
Cario. In 1988, prior to his second marriage, SPO4 is
already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In
1992, he died 13 days after his marriage with Yee.
Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits of
SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00
while Yee was able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In
1993, Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money
against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the P140k.
Yee admitted that her marriage with SPO4 was
solemnized during the subsistence of the marriage b/n
SPO4 and Nicdao but the said marriage between Nicdao
and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid
marriage license as certified by the local civil registrar.
Yee also claimed that she only found out about the
previous marriage on SPO4s funeral.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage
may be invoked to claim presumptive legitimes.
HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null
and void due the absence of a valid marriage license.
The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null
and void for the same has been solemnized without the
judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage
between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC,
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of

contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable

in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. However, for purposes other than
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as
but not limited to the determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case
for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. In such instances, evidence
must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove
the existence of grounds rendering such a previous
marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited
solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring
such previous marriage void.
The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned
by SPO4 as a policeman for their marriage is void due to
bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc
owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by
each party shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art.
148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned
by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is likewise void.
This is because the two were capacitated to marry each
other for there were no impediments but their marriage
was void due to the lack of a marriage license; in their
situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147
of the FC which provides that everything they earned
during their cohabitation is presumed to have been
equally contributed by each party this includes salaries
and wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact
that the other may not have contributed at all.

9) Lilius vs Manila Railroad, GR No. L-39587,

24 March 1934

In the case of Lilius vs. Manila Railroad, this involves a

family, husband and wife and their child who figured in
a VA, they were hit by an on rushing train owned by the
manila railroad, the wife suffered serious physical
injuries, after trial the court awarded certain sum of
money by way of damages, moral damages for the
sufferings, the pain that the wife endured. The SC ruled
that since the award of damages is intended to
compensate the injured party for the injury she or he
suffered, that should be his or her exclusive property.
because the pain and suffering are personal to the party
concern.
What about damages arising from breach of contract?
The rule is it depends if the contract is finance by the
partnership, any damages that the court may award
arising from that breach of contract or transaction, it
should form part of the conjugal partnership, but if its
personal it should form part of the exclusive.
FACTS: Lilius was driving with his wife and daughter
for sightseeing in Pagsanjan Laguna. It was his first time
in the area and he was entirely unacquainted with the
conditions of the road and had no knowledge of the
existence of a railroad crossing. Before reaching the
crossing in question, there was nothing to indicate its
existence and, it was impossible to see an approaching
train. At about seven or eight meters from the crossing
the plaintiff saw an autotruck parked on the left side of
the road. Several people, who seemed to have alighted
from the said truck, were walking on the opposite side.
He slowed down and sounded his horn for the people to
get out of the way. With his attention thus occupied, he
did not see the crossing but he heard two short whistles.
Immediately afterwards, he saw a huge black mass fling
itself upon him, which turned out to be locomotive No.
713 of the MRCs train. The locomotive struck the
plaintiffs car right in the center. The 3 victims were
injured and were hospitalized.
Lilus filed a case against MRC in the CFI. Answering
the complaint, it denies each and every allegation

thereof and, by way of special defense, alleges that the

Lilius, with the cooperation of his wife and coplaintiff,
negligently and recklessly drove his car, and prays that it
be absolved from the complaint.
The CFI decided in favor of Lilius. The 2 parties
appealed said decision, each assigning errors on said
judgement.
ISSUE:
WON Manila Railroad Company is liable for damages
WON the sums of money fixed by the court a quo as
indemnities for damages proper
Injuries sutained by Lilius
for injuries sustained by wife and child
for loss of domestic service of wife to husband
HELD: The judgment appealed from is affirmed in toto,
with the sole modification on interest to be added on the
indemnity in favor of Lilius.
1. YES
Upon examination of the oral as well as of the
documentary evidence, this court is of the opinion that
the accident was due to negligence on the part of the
defendant-appellant company alone, for not having had
on that occasion any semaphore at the crossing to serve
as a warning to passers-by of its existence in order that
they might take the necessary precautions before
crossing the railroad; and, on the part of its employees
the flagman and switchman, for not having remained
at his post at the crossing in question to warn passers-by
of the approaching train
Although it is probable that the defendant-appellant
entity employed the diligence of a good father of a
family in selecting its aforesaid employees, however, it
did not employ such diligence in supervising their work

and the discharge of their duties. The diligence of a good

father of a family, which the law requires in order to
avoid damage, is not confined to the careful and prudent
selection of subordinates or employees but includes
inspection of their work and supervision of the discharge
of their duties.
2.a. With respect to the plaintiffs appeal, the first
question to be decided is that raised by Lilius relative to
the insufficiency of the sum of P5,000 which the trial
court adjudicated to him by way of indemnity for
damages consisting in the loss of his income as
journalist and author as a result of his illness. As to the
amount of P10,000 claimed by Lilius as damages for the
loss of his wifes services in his business, which services
consisted in going over his writings, translating them
into foreign languages and acting as his secretary, in
addition to the fact that such services formed part of the
work whereby he realized a net monthly income of
P1,500, there is no sufficient evidence of the true value
of said services nor to the effect that he needed them
during her illness and had to employ a translator to act
in her stead.
b. Taking into consideration the fact that the wife in
the language of the court, which saw her at the trial
young and beautiful and the big scar, which she has on
her forehead caused by the lacerated wound received by
her from the accident, disfigures her face and that the
fracture of her left leg has caused a permanent deformity
which renders it very difficult for her to walk, and
taking into further consideration her social standing,
neither is the sum adjudicated to her for patrimonial and
moral damages, excessive.
As to the indemnity in favor of the child neither is the
same excessive, taking into consideration the fact that
the lacerations received by her have left deep scars that
permanently disfigure her face and that the fractures of

both her legs permanently render it difficult for her to

walk freely, continuous extreme care being necessary in
order to keep her balance in addition to the fact that all
of this unfavorably and to a great extent affect her
matrimonial future.

before he was injured and that he would be willing to

continue rendering them had he not been prevented from
so doing

c. Lilius also seeks to recover the sum of P2,500 for the

loss of what is called Anglo-Saxon common law
consortium of his wife, that is, her services, society
and conjugal companionship, as a result of personal
injuries which she had received from the accident now
under consideration.

However, in order that a victim of an accident may

recover indemnity for damages from the person liable
therefor, it is not enough that the latter has been guilty of
negligence, but it is also necessary that the said victim
has not, through his own negligence, , contributed to the
accident.
It appears that Lilius took all precautions which his skill
and the presence of his wife and child, driving his car at
a speed which prudence demanded according to the
circumstances and conditions of the road, slackening his
speed in the face of an obstacle and blowing his horn
upon seeing persons on the road. If he failed to stop,
look and listen before going over the crossing, in spite
of the fact that he was driving at 12 miles per hour after
having been free from obstacles, it was because, his
attention having been occupied in attempting to go
ahead, he did not see the crossing in question, nor
anything, nor anybody indicating its existence, as he
knew nothing about it beforehand. The first and only
warning, which he received of the impending danger,
was two short blows from the whistle of the locomotive
immediately preceding the collision and when the
accident had already become inevitable.

Under the law and the doctrine of this court, one of the
husbands rights is to count on his wifes assistance.
This assistance comprises the management of the home
and the performance of household duties. However,
nowadays when women, in their desire to be more
useful to society and to the nation, are demanding
greater civil rights and are aspiring to become mans
equal in all the activities of life, marriage has ceased to
create the presumption that a woman complies with the
duties to her husband and children, which the law
imposes upon her, and he who seeks to collect indemnity
for damages resulting from deprivation of her domestic
services must prove such services. In the case under
consideration, apart from the services of his wife as
translator and secretary, the value of which has not been
proven, Lilius has not presented any evidence showing
the existence of domestic services and their nature,
rendered by her prior to the accident, in order that it may
serve as a basis in estimating their value.
Furthermore, inasmuch as a wifes domestic assistance
and conjugal companionship are purely personal and
voluntary acts which neither of the spouses may be
compelled to render, it is necessary for the party
claiming indemnity for the loss of such services to prove
that the person obliged to render them had done so

NOTES:

10) Go vs. Yamane, GR No. 160762, 3 May 2006

Petitioners: Spouses JOSEPHINE MENDOZA GO &
HENRY GO
Respondent: LEONARDO YAMANE
FACTS:
Lot in Baguio City is registered in the name of Muriel
Yamane, wife of Leonardo Yamane. Atty. De Guzman

whohandled a case for wife and her sisters levied the

said property to satisfy the lien for attorneys fees.
The RTC of Baguio City held that the subject parcel of
land was the paraphernal property of Muriel Yamane
and not theconjugal property of the spouses. Leonardo
Yamane, husband filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was denied. Thecase was brought to the Court of
Appeals.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
RTC. The appellate court contends that, property
acquired during marriage is presumed to be conjugal,
unless the exclusive funds of one spouse are shown to
have been used for thepurpose.
Husbands name appeared on the Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) and the Deed of Absolute Sale. Both
documentsindicate that Muriel was married to Leonardo
Yamane.
ISSUE:
Whether the nature of the property is conjugal or
paraphernal
HELD:
Property purchased by spouses during the existence of
their marriage is presumed to be conjugal in nature,
unless it beproved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. (Article 160)The nature of a
property, whether conjugal or paraphernal, is determined
by law and not by the will of one of the spouses.
The mere registration of a property in the name of one
spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature. Conjugal
propertycannot be held liable for the personal obligation
contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage of
benefit is shown tohave accrued to the conjugal
partnership.

The CA committed no error in declaring that the parcel

of land belonged to the conjugal partnership of Spouses
Murieland Leonardo Yamane. They acquired it from
Eugene Pucay on February 27, 1967, or specifically
during the marriage. Wethen follow the rule that proof of
the acquisition of the subject property during a marriage
suffices to render the statutorypresumption operative. It
is clear enough that the presently disputed piece of land
pertains to the conjugal partnership.
The contract or transaction between Atty. De Guzman
and the Pucay sisters appears to have been incurred for
theexclusive interest of the latter. Muriel was acting
privately for her exclusive interest when she joined her
two sistersinhiring the services of Atty. De Guzman to
handle a case for them. Accordingly, whatever expenses
were incurred by Murielin the litigation for her and her
sisters' private and exclusive interests, are her exclusive
responsibility and certainly cannotbecharged against the
contested conjugal property. This piece of land may not
be used to pay for her indebtedness,becauseher
obligation has not been shown to be one of the charges
against the conjugal partnership.
The power of the court in executing judgments extends
only to properties unquestionably belonging to the
judgmentdebtor alone. In this case, therefore, the
property -- being conjugal in nature -- cannot be levied
upon. Petition is DENIED
11) Pana vs Heirs of Juanete, GR NO. 164201,
10 December 2012
The rule of exhaustion was apply to the case of Efren
Pana Vs. The Heirs of Juanite, this involves the husband
and wife who were charged of murder along with other
accused, after trial the husband was acquitted but the
wife was convicted and adjudged civilly liable to pay
the victims, when the judgement becomes final, the
sheriff enforced, executed the money judgement the
civil aspect of the case, and the sheriff tried to enforce it
against the conjugal partnership. In this case the court

applied the rule on charging the conjugal partnership for

the personal liabilities of either spouse. The liabilities
are personal the wife because if arose from the crime,
under 122 personal, under 94 personal, but it was
allowed to be enforce against the conjugal partnership,
because the court said that it appears that there are
sufficient and there is no need to wait for liquidation. So
in this case the SC made a categorical ruling that for
purposes of satisfying obligations by way of advance
reimbursement mechanism it is not necessary to wait
until liquidation.
Although for purposes of reimbursement which will be
deducted from the share of the spouse who incurred the
personal obligations, thats how the reimbursement is
done, just deduct it from the share, is always subject to
the conditions that at the end of the day during
liquidation there is still assets to share or to divide.
FACTS: Petitioner EfrenPana (Efren), his wife Melecia,
and others were accused of murder. Efren was acquitted
but Melecia and another person was found guilty and
was sentenced to the penalty of death and to pay each of
the heirs of the victims, jointly and severally for civil
indemnity and damages.
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased,
the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ, resulting in the
levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren
and Melecia. Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice
of sale on execution were issued.
Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the
writ of execution, claiming that the levied properties
were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia.
ISSUE: WON the conjugal properties of spouses Efren
and Melecia can be levied and executed upon for the
satisfaction of Melecias civil liability in the murder
case.
HELD: Art. 122. The payment of personal debts
contracted by the husband or the wife before or during
the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal

properties partnership except insofar as they redounded

to the benefit of the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities
imposed upon them be charged to the partnership.

for insufficiency of evidence. Evidently, there was a

check issued worth $25,000 paid to the owner of the
Paranaque property which became the conjugal dwelling
of the spouses. The wife executed an instrument
acknowledging the loan but Abelardo did not sign.

The payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon the

spouses may be enforced against the partnership assets if
the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive
property or if it should be insufficient.

ISSUE: WON a loan obtained to purchase the conjugal

dwelling can be charged against the conjugal
partnership.

Since Efren does not dispute the RTCs finding that

Melecia has no exclusive property of her own, the above
applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in the
murder case imposed on her may be enforced against
their conjugal assets after the responsibilities
enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been
covered.
12) Carlos vs. Abelardo, GR No. 146504, 9 April
2002
Honorio Carlos filed a petition against Manuel
Abelardo, his son-in-law for recovery of the $25,000
loan used to purchase a house and lot located at
Paranaque. It was in October 1989 when the petitioner
issued a check worth as such to assist the spouses in
conducting their married life independently. The seller
of the property acknowledged receipt of the full
payment. In July 1991, the petitioner inquired from
spouses status of the amount loaned from him, the
spouses pleaded that they were not yet in position to
make a definite settlement. Thereafter, respondent
expressed violent resistance to the extent of making
various death threats against petitioner. In 1994,
petitioner made a formal demand but the spouses failed
to comply with the obligation. The spouses were
separated in fact for more than a year prior the filing of
the complaint hence spouses filed separate answers.
Abelardo contended that the amount was never intended
as a loan but his share of income on contracts obtained
by him in the construction firm and that the petitoner
could have easily deducted the debt from his share in the
profits. RTC decision was in favor of the petitioner,
however CA reversed and set aside trial courts decision

HELD:
Yes, as it has redounded to the benefit of the family.
They did not deny that the same served as their conjugal
home thus benefiting the family. Hence, the spouses are
jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan.
Abelardos contention that it is not a loan rather a profit
share in the construction firm is untenable since there
was no proof that he was part of the stockholders that
will entitle him to the profits and income of the
company.
Hence, the petition was granted and Abelardo is ordered
to pay the petitioner in the amount of $25,000 plus legal
interest including moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees.

13) Guiang vs. CA, GR No. 125172, 26 June

1998
FACTS:
The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of
both the husband and the wife. The absence of the
consent of one renders the sale null and void, while the
vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable. Only in the
latter case can ratification cure the defect.
Over the objection of private respondent Gilda Corpuz
and while she was in Manila seeking employment (with
the consent of her husband), her husband sold to the
petitioners-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang
one half of their conjugal peoperty, consisting of their

residence and the lot on which it stood. Upon her return

to Cotabato, respondent gathered her children and went
back to the subject property. Petitioners filed a
complaint for trespassing. Later, there was an amicable
settlement between the parties. Feeling that she had the
shorter end of the bargain, respondent filed an Amended
Complaint against her husband and petitioners. The said
Complaint sought the declaration of a certain deed of
sale, which involved the conjugal property of private
respondent and her husband, null and void.
Gilda Corpuz and Judie Corpuz are legally married
spouses. The spouses has 3 children.
The Corpuz couple, with plaintiff-wife Gilda Corpuz as
vendee, bought a lot located in South Cotabato, and
particularly from Manuel Callejo who signed as vendor
through a conditional deed of sale.
Later, the Corpuz spouses sold one-half portion of their
Lot spouses Guiang. The latter have since then occupied
the one-half portion [and] built their house thereon
.They are thus adjoining neighbors of the Corpuzes.
Gilda left for Manila trying to look for work abroad and
her departure was with the consent of her husband. She
was not able to go abroad though. She stayed for
sometime in Manila.
After his wifes departure for Manila, defendant Judie
seldom went home to the conjugal dwelling.
Sometime in 1990, Harriet Corpuz learned that her
father intended to sell the remaining one-half portion
including their house, of their homelot to defendants
Guiangs. She wrote a letter to her mother informing her.
She [Gilda Corpuz] replied that she was objecting to the
sale. Harriet, however, did not inform her father about
this; but instead gave the letter to Mrs.
LuzvimindaGuiang so that she [Guiang] would advise
her father
However, in the absence of his wife Gilda defendant
Judie pushed through the sale of the remaining one-half

portion. He sold to defendant LuzvimindaGuiang thru a

document known as Deed of Transfer of Rights the
remaining one-half portion of their lot and the house
standing .Transferor Judie Corpuzs children Junie and
Harriet signed the document as witness.
Four (4) days, obviously to cure whatever defect in
defendant Judie title over the lot transferred, defendant
LuzvimindaGuiang as vendee executed another
agreement over the lot , this time with Manuela Jimenez
Callejo, a widow of the original registered owner from
whom the Corpuz spouses originally bought the lot ,
who signed as vendor . Judie signed as a witness to the
sale. The new sale described the lot differently but it is
obvious from the mass of evidence that the correct lot is
the very lot earlier sold to the corpus spouses.
Plaintiff then returned home. She found her children
staying with other households. Only Junie was staying
in their house. Gilda gathered her children together and
stayed at their house. Her husband was nowhere to be
found. She was informed by her children that their father
had a wife already.
For staying in their house sold by her husband, plaintiff
was
complained
against
by
defendant
LuzvimindaGuiang and her husband before the
Barangay authorities for trespassing. The parties thereat
signed a document known as amicable settlement. In
full, the settlement provides for, to wit:
That respondent, Mrs. Gilda Corpuz and her three
children, namely: Junie, Hariet and Judie to leave
voluntarily the house of Mr. and Mrs. Antonio Guiang,
where they are presently boarding without any charge,
on or before April 7, 1990
Believing that she had received the shorter end of the
bargain, Gilda went to the Barangay Captain to question
her signature on the amicable settlement. She was
referred however to the Office-In-Charge at the time,
and the latter in turn told her that he could not do
anything on the matter.

This particular point not rebutted. The Barangay Captain

who testified did not deny that Mrs. Gilda Corpuz
approached him for the annulment of the settlement. We
thus conclude that Mrs. Corpuz really approached the
Barangay Captain for the annulment of the settlement.
Annulment not having been made, plaintiff stayed put in
her house and lot.
Defendant-spouses Guiang followed thru the amicable
settlement with a motion for the execution of the
amicable settlement, filing the same with the MTC of
Koronadal. The proceedings [are] still pending before
the said court, with the filing of the instant suit.
As a consequence of the sale, the spouses Guiang spent
for the preparation of the Deed of Transfer of Rights, as
the amount they paid to Mrs. Manuela Callejo, having
assumed the remaining obligation of the Corpuzes to
Mrs. Callejo and expenses particularly the taxes and
other expenses towards the transfer of the title to the
spouses Guiangs were incurred for the whole lot.
Private Respondent Gilda Corpuz filed an Amended
Complainant against her husband Judie and PetitionerSpouses Guiang. The said Complaint sought the
declaration of a certain deed of sale, which involved the
conjugal property of private respondent and her
husband, null and void.
The trial court rendered a judgment is rendered for Gilda
and against the defendants therein, declaring both the
Deed of Transfer of Rights amicable settlement as null
void and of no effect; Recognizing as lawful and valid
the ownership and possession of plaintiff Gilda over the
remaining one-half portion of subject lot 9; and ordering
plaintiff
Gilda
to
reimburse
defendants
LuzvimindaGuiangthe amount corresponding to the
payment made by defendants Guiangs to Manuel Callejo
for the unpaid balance of the account of plaintiff in favor
of Manuel Callejo.
Dissatisfied, petitioners-spouses filed an appeal with the
CA. Respondent Court affirmed the decision of the trial
court

Reconsideration was similarly denied by the same court,

hence this petition.
ISSUE: Petition denied; the challenged decision
affirmed
Whether the assailed Deed of Transfer of Rights was a
void or a voidable contract
WON the execution of the amicable settlement can
validly rectify the defect in the assailed Deed of Transfer
of Rights
HELD:
1. VOID CONTRACT.
The Guiang spouses allege that absence of Gildas
consent merely rendered the Deed voidable under
Article 1390 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or
annullable, even though there may have been no damage
to the contracting parties
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake,
violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
These contracts are binding, unless they are annulled by
a proper action in court. They are susceptible of
ratification.(n)
The error in petitioners contention is evident. Article
1390, par. 2, refers to contracts visited by vices of
consent, i.e., contracts which were entered into by a
person whose consent was obtained and vitiated through
mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or
fraud. In this instance, private respondents consent to
the contract of sale of their conjugal property was totally
inexistent or absent.
The said contract properly falls within the ambit of
Article 124 of the Family Code, which was correctly
applied by the the lower court:

Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the

conjugal partnership properly shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands
decision shall prevail, subject recourse to the court by
the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of
within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole
powers of administration. These powers do not include
the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must
have the authority of the court or the written consent of
the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and
the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn
by either or both offerors. (NOTES, #2)
Furthermore, it must be noted that the fraud and the
intimidation referred to by petitioners were perpetrated
in the execution of the document embodying the
amicable settlement. Gilda Corpuz alleged during trial
that barangay authorities made her sign said document
through misrepresentation andcoercion. 13 In any event,
its execution does not alter the void character of the
deed of sale between the husband and the petitionersspouses, as will be discussed later. The fact remains that
such contract was entered into without the wifes
consent.
In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is premised on
the absence of private respondents consent. To
constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires the
concurrence of the following elements: (1) cause, (2)
object, and (3) consent, 14 the last element being
indubitably absent in the case at bar.
2. NO. Insisting that the contract of sale was merely
voidable, petitioners aver that it was duly ratified by the

contending parties through the amicable settlement

they executed.
The position is not well taken. The trial and the appellate
courts have resolved this issue in favor of the private
respondent. The trial court correctly held:
By the specific provision of the law [Art. 1390, Civil
Code] therefore, the Deed to Transfer of Rights cannot
be ratified, even by an amicable settlement. It cannot
be denied that the amicable settlement entered into by
plaintiff Gilda spouses Guiang is a contract. It is a direct
offshoot of the Deed of Transfer of Rights. By express
provision of law, such a contract is also void:
Art. 1422. A contract which is the direct result of a
previous illegal contract, is also void and inexistent.
(Civil Code of the Philippines).
In summation therefore, both the Deed of transfer of
Rights and the amicable settlement are null and void.
Doctrinally and clearly, a void contract cannot be
ratified.
NOTES:
1. Comparing said law with its equivalent provision in
the Civil Code, the trial court adroitly explained the
amendatory effect of the above provision in this wise: 12
The legal provision is clear. The disposition or
encumbrance is void. It becomes still clearer if we
compare the same with the equivalent provision of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 166 of the
Civil Code, the husband cannot generally alienate or
encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership
without the wifes consent. The alienation or
encumbrance if so made however is not null and void. It
is merely voidable. The offended wife may bring an
action to annul the said alienation or encumbrance. Thus
the provision of Article 173 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, to wit:

Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within
ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts
for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered
into without her consent, when such consent is required,
or any act or contract of the husband which tends to
defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal
partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this
right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the
marriage, may demand the value of property
fraudulently alienated by the husband.(n)
This particular provision giving the wife ten (10)
years . . . during [the] marriage to annul the alienation or
encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code. It
is thus clear that any alienation or encumbrance made
after August 3, 1988 when the Family Code took effect
by the husband of the conjugal partnership property
without the consent of the wife is null and void.
2. Neither can the amicable settlement be considered a
continuing offer that was accepted and perfected by the
parties, following the last sentence of Article 124. The
order of the pertinent events is clear: after the sale,
petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing against
private respondent, after which the barangay authorities
secured an amicable settlement and petitioners filed
before the MTC a motion for its execution. The
settlement, however, does not mention a continuing offer
to sell the property or an acceptance of such a
continuing offer. Its tenor was to the effect that private
respondent would vacate the property. By no stretch of
the imagination, can the Court interpret this document as
the acceptance mentioned in Article 124.
Art 124 of the FC rules that In the event that one spouse
is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration.
These powers do not include the powers of disposition
or encumbrance which must have the authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void.
Respondents consent to the contract of sale of their
conjugal property was totally inexistent or absent. The

nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence

of private respondents consent. To constitute a valid
contract, the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the
following elements: (1) cause, (2) object, and (3)
consent, the last element being indubitably absent in the
case at bar.
A void contract cannot be ratified.
Neither can the amicable settlement be considered a
continuing offer that was accepted and perfected by the
parties, following the last sentence of Article 124. The
order of the pertinent events is clear: after the sale,
petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing against
private respondent, after which the barangay authorities
secured an amicable settlement and petitioners filed
before the MTC a motion for its execution. The
settlement, however, does not mention a continuing offer
to sell the property or an acceptance of such a
continuing offer. Its tenor was to the effect that private
respondent would vacate the property. By no stretch of
the imagination, can the Court interpret this document as
the acceptance mentioned in Article 124.

Under Art. 124 of the Family Code: In the event that

one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers
of disposition or encumbrance which must have the
authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
The properties subject to the contract in this
case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be
effective, the consent of both husband and wife must be
obtained. Respondent Norma Camaisa did not give her
written consent to the sale. Even granting that
respondent Norma actively participated in negotiating
for the sale of the subject properties, which she denied,
her written consent to the sale is required by law for its
validity. She may have been aware of the negotiations
for the sale of their conjugal properties, however that is
not sufficient to demonstrate consent.

14) Jader-Manalo vs. Camaisa, GR No. 147978,

28 January 2002
FACTS:
Petitioner, Thelma A. Jader-Manalo made an offer to
buy the properties of the respondents from the husband
of Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa, respondent Edilberto
Camaisa. After some bargaining, petitioner and
Edilberto agreed upon the purchase price and terms of
payment. The agreement handwritten by the petitioner
was signed by Edilberto, with assurance from him that
he would secure his wifes consent. Petitioner was later
on surprised when she was informed that respondent
spouses were backing out of the agreement. Hence, she
filed a complaint for specific performance and damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a
conjugal property without the wife's written consent.
HELD:

15) Homeowners Savings vs. Dailo, GR No.

153802, 11 March 2005
FACTS:
FACTS: MiguelaDailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr were
married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage the
spouses purchased a house and lot situated at San Pablo
City from a certain Dalida. The subject property was
declared for tax assessment purposes The Deed of
Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor of
the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to the
exclusion of his wife.
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Gesmundo, authorizing
the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners
Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses
Dailos house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the
SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan from petitioner. As

security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the same day a

Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property
in favor of petitioner. The abovementioned transactions,
including the execution of the SPA in favor of
Gesmundo, took place without the knowledge and
consent of respondent.[
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a
result, petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the
extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was
issued in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder. After
the lapse of one year without the property being
redeemed, petitioner consolidated the ownership thereof
by executing an Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale.
In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died. In one of her
visits to the subject property, Miguela learned that
petitioner had already employed a certain Brion to clean
its premises and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed
because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the
premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage
constituted on the subject property, which was conjugal
in nature, respondent instituted with the RTC San Pablo
City a Civil Case for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage
and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner.
In the latters Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground
that the property in question was the exclusive property
of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a
Decision declaring the said documents null and void and
further ordered the defendant is ordered to reconvey the
property subject of this complaint to the plaintiff, to pay
the plaintiff the sum representing the value of the car
which was burned, the attorneys fees, moral and
exemplary damages.

The appellate court affirmed the trial courts Decision,

but deleted the award for damages and attorneys fees
for lack of basis. Hence, this petition
ISSUE:
1. WON THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE
LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. ON THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY AS CO-OWNER THEREOF IS VALID AS
TO HIS UNDIVIDED SHARE.
2. WON THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE
FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE LOAN OBTAINED BY
THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. THE SAME
HAVING REDOUNDED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE
FAMILY.
HELD: the petition is denied.
1. NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. . . .
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole
powers of administration. These powers do not include
the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must
have the authority of the court or the written consent of
the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. . .
.

the system of relative community or conjugal

partnership of gains governed the property relations
between respondent and her late husband. With the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988,
Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the
Family Code was made applicable to conjugal
partnership of gains already established before its
effectivity unless vested rights have already been
acquired under the Civil Code or other laws.
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the
property relations of respondent and the late Marcelino
even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal
partnership of gains is a special type of partnership,
where the husband and wife place in a common fund the
proceeds, products, fruits and income from their
separate properties and those acquired by either or both
spouses through their efforts or by chance. Unlike the
absolute community of property wherein the rules on coownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal
partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of
partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is
expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal
partnership of gains) or by the spouses in their marriage
settlements. Thus, the property relations of respondent
and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by
Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the
Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on
partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the
former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on
partnership apply only when the Family Code is silent
on the matter.

In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court

declared that the absence of the consent of one renders
the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the
conjugal property pertaining to the husband who
contracted the sale.

The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime,

without the knowledge and consent of his wife,
Marcelino constituted a real estate mortgage on the
subject property, which formed part of their conjugal
partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the
Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or
written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or
encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.

Respondent and the late Marcelino.were married on

August 8, 1967. In the absence of a marriage settlement,

The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect

to the share of the spouse who makes the disposition or

encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on coownership under Article 493 of the Civil Code does.
Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish. Thus, both the trial court and the appellate
court are correct in declaring the nullity of the real estate
mortgage on the subject property for lack of
respondents consent.
2. NO. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, [T]he
conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . .
(1)
Debts and obligations contracted by either
spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that
the family may have been benefited; . . . .
Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a
liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to
defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new
Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity
and well-being of the family as a unit.[
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the
creditor-party
litigant
claiming
as
such.
Eiincumbitprobatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who
asserts, not he who denies, must prove). Petitioners
sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late
Marcelino to finance the construction of housing units
without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family,
without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this
Court. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be
held liable for the payment of the principal obligation.
NOTES:
In addition, a perusal of the records of the case reveals
that during the trial, petitioner vigorously asserted that
the subject property was the exclusive property of the
late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. Nowhere in the answer filed
with the trial court was it alleged that the proceeds of the
loan redounded to the benefit of the family. Even on
appeal, petitioner never claimed that the family
benefited from the proceeds of the loan. When a party
adopts a certain theory in the court below, he will not be

permitted to change his theory on appeal, for to permit

him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party
but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair
play, justice and due process. A party may change his
legal theory on appeal only when the factual bases
thereof would not require presentation of any further
evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to
properly meet the issue raised in the new theory.

16) Sps. Lita De Leon & Felic Rio Tarrosa vs.

Anita de Leon, et al., G.R. No. 185063, 23
July 2009
Sometime in 1965, Bonifacio O. De Leon, then single,
and the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation
(PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for
the purchase on installment of a parcel of land. Three
years later, Bonifacio married Anita.
After full payment of the purchase price for the lot,
PHHC executed, on June 22, 1970, a Final Deed of Sale
in favor of Bonifacio. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 173677 was issued on February 24, 1972 in the
name of Bonifacio, single.
Subsequently, Bonifacio, for PhP 19,000, sold the
subject land to his sister, Lita, and her husband. Felix
Rio Tarrosa (Tarrosas). The Deed of Sale dated January
12, 1974 (Deed of Sale) did not bear the written consent
and signature of Anita. Bonifacio died in 1996. The
Tarrosas registered the Deed of Sale and had TCT No.
173677 canceled. They secured the issuance in their
names of TCT No. N-173911 from the Quezon City
Register of Deeds. Anita and her children then filed an
action for reconveyance against the Tarrosas.
The Regional Trial Court, on the finding that the lot in
question was the conjugal property of Bonifacio and

Anita, rendered judgment in favor of Anita and her

children. The Court of Appeals held that the Tarrosas
failed to overthrow the legal presumption that the parcel
of land in dispute was conjugal.
In their petition before the Supreme Court, the Tarrosas
assert that, since Bonifacio purchased the lot from
PHHC on installment before he married Anita, the land
was Bonifacios exclusive property and not conjugal,
even though some installments were paid and the title
was issued to Bonifacio during the marriage.
The Supreme Court ruled that the property is conjugal:
Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code, the governing
provision in effect at the time Bonifacio and Anita
contracted marriage, provides that all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively
to the husband or the wife. For the presumption to arise,
it is not, as Tan v. Court of Appeals teaches, even
necessary to prove that the property was acquired with
funds of the partnership. Only proof of acquisition
during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption
that the property is conjugal. In fact, even when the
manner in which the properties were acquired does not
appear, the presumption will still apply, and the
properties will still be considered conjugal.
In the case at bar, ownership over what was once a
PHHC lot and covered by the PHHC-Bonifacio
Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred during
the marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. It is well settled
that a conditional sale is akin, if not equivalent, to a
contract to sell. In both types of contract, the efficacy or
obligatory force of the vendors obligation to transfer
title is subordinated to the happening of a future and
uncertain event, usually the full payment of the purchase
price, so that if the suspensive condition does not take
place, the parties would stand as if the conditional
obligation had never existed. In other words, in a
contract to sell ownership is retained by the seller and is
not passed to the buyer until full payment of the price,
unlike in a contract of sale where title passes upon
delivery of the thing sold.
Such is the situation obtaining in the instant case. The
conditional contract to sell executed by and between
Bonifacio and PHHC on July 20, 1965 provided that

ownership over and title to the property will vest on

Bonifacio only upon execution of the final deed of sale
which, in turn, will be effected upon payment of the full
purchase price. . .
Evidently, title to the property in question only passed to
Bonifacio after he had fully paid the purchase price on
June 22, 1970. This full payment, to stress, was made
more than two (2) years after his marriage to Anita on
April 24, 1968. In net effect, the property was acquired
during the existence of the marriage; as such, ownership
to the property is, by law, presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership.
Such presumption is rebuttable only with strong, clear,
categorical, and convincing evidence. There must be
clear evidence of the exclusive ownership of one of the
spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party
asserting it.
The Supreme Court also ruled that the fact that the
transfer certificate of title was in the name of Bonifacio
did not change the conjugal nature of the property:
Petitioners argument that the disputed lot was
Bonifacios exclusive property, since it was registered
solely in his name, is untenable. The mere registration of
a property in the name of one spouse does not destroy its
conjugal nature. What is material is the time when the
property was acquired.
As Anita never gave consent to the sale, the Supreme
Court ruled that the sale was void:
. . . the 1950 Civil Code is very explicit on the
consequence of the husband alienating or encumbering
any real property of the conjugal partnership without the
wifes consent. To a specific point, the sale of a conjugal
piece of land by the husband, as administrator, must, as
a rule, be with the wifes consent. Else, the sale is not
valid. So it is that in several cases we ruled that the sale
by the husband of property belonging to the conjugal
partnership without the consent of the wife is void ab
initio, absent any showing that the latter is incapacitated,
under civil interdiction, or like causes. The nullity, as we
have explained, proceeds from the fact that sale is in
contravention of the mandatory requirements of Art. 166
of the Code. Since Art. 166 of the Code requires the
consent of the wife before the husband may alienate or
encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership,

it follows that the acts or transactions executed against

this mandatory provision are void except when the law
itself authorized their validity.
Accordingly, the Deed of Sale executed on January 12,
1974 between Bonifacio and the Tarrosas covering the
PHHC lot is void.
The Supreme Court held that Bonifacio cannot sell his
portion of the conjugal partnership:
Prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the
interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate,
a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor
an equitable estate, and does not ripen into a title until it
appears that there are assets in the community as a result
of the liquidation and settlement. The interest of each
spouse is limited to the net remainder or remanente
liquido (haber ganancial) resulting from the liquidation
of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution.
Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the
conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and
liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after
dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined
that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are
net assets left which can be divided between the spouses
or their respective heirs.
Therefore, even on the supposition that Bonifacio only
sold his portion of the conjugal partnership, the sale is
still theoretically void, for, as previously stated, the right
of the husband or the wife to one-half of the conjugal
assets does not vest until the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership.
Finally, the Supreme Court ruled that the Tarrosas
should be reimbursed for the amount they paid to
purchase the property.
17) Dino vs Dino, GR No. 178044, 19 January
2011
January 1998 petitioner and respondent got married. On
May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of
Niullity of Marriagw against respondent citing
psychological incapacity under article 36. Petitioner
alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to
give love and support to him, and had abandoned her
responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on
shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that

depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that

respondent was not faithful, and would at times become
violent and hurt him. The trial court declared their
marriage void ab initio.
The court ruled that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon
compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family
Code. It later altered it to A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after
liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code
ISSUE:
(1) Did the trial court err when it ordered that a decree
of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after
liquidation, partition, and distribution of parties
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code?
(2)WON the trial court erred when it ordered that a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be
issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the
parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code
HELD:
(1) Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages does not apply to Article 147 of the Family
Code. It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that
Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages
which are declared void ab initio under Articles 40 and
45 and not under Article 36 which is the ground for the
nullification of the petitioner and respondents marriage.
Thus, the decision of the trial court is affirmed but with
modifications.
(2)The court erred. The Court has ruled in Valdes v.
RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage,
regardless of its cause, the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
either by Article 147 or
Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the
Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless

void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case

before the Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the
following elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry
each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their
marriage is void
All these elements are present in this case and there is no
question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to
the property relations between petitioner and
respondent.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that
Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages
which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final
judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code.
In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to
marriages which are declared void ab initio under
Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared
void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties
of the parties.
Since the property relations of the parties in art 40 and
45 are governed by absolute community of property or
conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to
liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a
decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case
for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code because the marriage is governed by the
ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was
declared void under Article 3615 of the Family Code
and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the
liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner
and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes,
the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a
void marriage during the period of cohabitation is
governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the
Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the
properties of the spouses should be liquidated in
accordance with the Civil Code provisions on coownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code,

[p]artition may be made by agreement between the

parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x. It is not
necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in
the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of
marriage.

18) Valdez vs. RTC of Quezon City, GR No.

122749, 31 July 1996, 260 SCRA 221
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in
1971 and begot 5 children. Valdez filed a petition in
1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which was
granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground
of their mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and
Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother
while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they
prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the
decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of
common property in unions without marriage. During
the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint
affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be
based on co-ownership.
HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage,

regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of
the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall be considered as having
contributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.
19) Francisco vs. Master Iron Works, GR No.
151967, 16 February 16, 2005
FACTS:
Josefina Castillo was 24 years old when she and
Eduardo Francisco got married on January 1983. The
latter was then employed as Vice President in a Private
Corporation. Josefina acquired two parcels of land
where Imus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale in
favor of Josefina, married to Eduardo. An affidavit of
waiver was executed by Eduardo where he declared that
prior to his marriage with Josefina, the latter purchased
the land with her own savings and that he waived
whatever claims he had over the property. When
Josefina mortgaged the property for a loan, Eduardo
affixed his marital conformity to the deed. In 1990,
Eduardo who was then a General Manager, bought bags
of cement from defendant but failed to pay the same.
The latter filed a complaint for recovery and trial court
rendered judgment against Eduardo. The court then
issued a writ of execution and the sheriif issued a notice
of levy on execution over the alleged property of
Josefina for the recovery of the balance of the amount
due under the decision of the trial court. Petitioner filed
a third party claim over the 2 parcels of land in which
she claimed as her paraphernal property.
ISSUE: WON the subject property is the conjugal
property of Josefina and Eduardo.
HELD:
The Court ruled that petitioner failed to prove that she
acquired the property with her personal funds before her
cohabitation with Eduardo and that she was the sole
owner. The Deed of Absolute Sale on record showed it
was issued after her marriage. Their case fall under

Article 148 and since they got married before the Family
Code, the provision, pursuant to Art 256, can be applied
retroactively if it does not prejudice vested rights.
Petitioner likewise failed that she had any vested right.
Where the parties are in a void marriage due to a legal
impediment that invalidates such marriage, Art 148
should be applied. In the absence of proof that the
wife/husband has actually contributed money, property,
or industry to the properties acquired during such union
the presumption of co-ownership will not arise.
The petition was denied for lack of merit. The decision
of CA that the property was conjugal was affirmed.

20) Abrenica vs Abrenica, GR No. 180572, 18

June 2012
Respondents filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) two cases against petitioner
regarding an alleged refusal of petitioner to return and
transfer partnership funds. The SEC initially heard the
cases but they were later transferred to the RTC of
Quezon City pursuant to Republic Act No. 8799, which
transferred
jurisdiction
over
intra-corporate
controversies from the SEC to the courts. The RTC
rendered a decision in favor of respondents, causing
petitioner to file with the Court of Appeals a Motion for
Leave of Court to Admit Attached Petition for Review
under Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA,
however, denied said motion as well as the subsequent
Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner invokes liberal
construction of the rules in seeking reversal of the above
resolutions. He alleges that his appeal was not filed late
but that he only resorted to the wrong mode of appeal;
that realizing his error, he immediately filed the Motion
For Leave to Admit Petition for Review; that his notice
of appeal had the effect of tolling the period of
perfecting his appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court; that although unaware of A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC,
he appealed four days after receiving the consolidated
decision through a notice of appeal, thus showing his
"sincerity" in appealing the decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in the nonapplication of a liberal construction of the
rules resulting in the refusal to admit petitioners
petition for review
Held:
No. Under Rule 1, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, liberal construction of the rules is the
controlling principle to effect substantial justice. Thus,
litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on
their merits and not on technicalities. This does not
mean, however, that procedural rules are to be ignored
or disdained at will to suit the convenience of a party.
Procedural law has its own rationale in the orderly

administration of justice, namely, to ensure the effective

enforcement of substantive rights by providing for a
system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or
whimsicality in the settlement of disputes. Hence, it is a
mistake to suppose that substantive law and procedural
law are contradictory to each other, or as often
suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should
never be permitted if it would result in prejudice to the
substantive rights of the litigants. Litigation is not a
game of technicalities, but every case must be
prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure
so that issues may be properly presented and justly
resolved. Hence, rules of procedure must be faithfully
followed except only when for persuasive reasons, they
may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal
application of the rules of procedure should be an effort
on the part of the party invoking liberality to explain his
failure to abide by the rules."Oversight" and "excusable
negligence" have become an all too familiar and ready
excuse on the part of lawyers remiss in their bounden
duty to comply with established rules. Rules of
procedure are tools designed to promote efficiency and
orderliness as well as to facilitate attainment of justice,
such that strict adherence thereto is required. The
application of the Rules may be relaxed only when
rigidity would result in a defeat of equity and substantial
justice
21) Quiao vs Quiao, GR No. 176556, 04 July
2012
FACTS: Brigido Quiao (petitioner) and Rita Quiao
(respondent) contracted marriage in 1977. They had no
separate properties prior to their marriage. During the
course of said marriage, they produced four children. In
2000, Rita filed a complaint against Brigido for legal
separation for cohabiting with another woman.
Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision in 2005
declaring the legal separation of the parties pursuant to
Article 55. Save for one child (already of legal age), the
three minor children remains in the custody of Rita, who
is the innocent spouse.

The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided

equally between them subject to the respective legitimes
of their children; however, Brigidos share of the net
profits earned by the conjugal partnership shall be
forfeited in favor of their children in accordance to par. 9
of Article 129 of the FC.
A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for
execution, which was granted by the trial court. By
2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards to the earlier
decision; the writ was partially executed.
After more than 9 months later, Brigido filed a motion
for clarification asking the RTC to define Nets Profits
Earned. In answer, the court held that the phrase
denotes the remainder of the properties of the parties
after deducting the separate properties of each of the
spouses and debts.
Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside
its previous decision stating that NET PROFIT
EARNED shall be computed in accordance with par. 4
of Article 102 of the FC. However, it later reverted to its
original Order, setting aside the last ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains governs the couples property
relations.
HELD: Yes. Brigido and Rita tied the knot on January 6,
1977. Since at the time of exchange of martial vows, the
operative law was the NCC and since they did not agree
on a marriage settlement, the property relations between
them is the system of relative community or the
conjugal partnership of gains. Under this property
relation, the husband and wife place in a common fund
the fruits of their separate property and the income from
their work and industry. The husband and wife also own
in common all the property of the conjugal partnership
of gains.

22) Beumer vs Amores, GR No. 195670, 03

December 2012
Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina,
married in March 29, 1980. After several years, the RTC
of Negros Oriental declared the nullity of their marriage
in the Decision dated November 10, 2000 on the basis of
the formers psychological incapacity as contemplated
in Article 36 of the Family Code. Consequently,
petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal
Partnership dated December 14, 2000 praying for the
distribution of the properties claimed to have been
acquired during the subsistence of their marriage. In
defense, respondent averred that, with the exception of
their two (2) residential houses on Lots 1 and 2142, she
and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal properties
during their marriage.
During trial, petitioner testified that the properties were
registered in the name of respondent, these properties
were acquired with the money he received from the
Dutch government as his disability benefit since
respondent did not have sufficient income to pay for
their acquisition. He also claimed that the joint affidavit
they submitted before the Register of Deeds of
Dumaguete City was contrary to Article 89 of the
Family Code, hence, invalid.
For her part, respondent maintained that the money used
for the purchase of the lots came exclusively from her
personal funds, in particular, her earnings from selling
jewelry as well as products from Avon, Triumph and
Tupperware.
On February 28, 2007, the RTC dissolved the parties
conjugal partnership, awarding all the parcels of land to
respondent as her paraphernal properties; the tools and
equipment in favor of petitioner as his exclusive
properties; the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and
2142 as co-owned by the parties.
The personal properties, i.e., tools and equipment
mentioned in the complaint which were brought out by
Willem from the conjugal dwelling are hereby declared
to be exclusively owned by the petitioner.
The two houses are hereby declared to be co-owned by
the petitioner and the respondent since these were

acquired during their marital union and since there is no

prohibition on foreigners from owning buildings and
residential units. Petitioner and respondent are, thereby,
directed to subject this court for approval their project of
partition on the two houses aforementioned.
On appeal, petitioner insisted that the money used to
purchase the foregoing properties came from his own
capital funds and that they were registered in the name
of his former wife only because of the constitutional
prohibition against foreign ownership. Thus, he prayed
for reimbursement of one-half (1/2) of the value of what
he had paid in the purchase of the said properties,
waiving the other half in favor of his estranged ex-wife.
CA affirmed. The CA stressed the fact that petitioner
was "well-aware of the constitutional prohibition for
aliens to acquire lands in the Philippines." Hence, he
cannot invoke equity to support his claim for
reimbursement.
ISSUE:
W/N the foreigner Beumer can seek reimbursement of
the value of purchased parcels of Philippine land in the
petition for separation of his properties and his wifes on
the ground that he bought the parcels using his own
disability fund
HELD: No.
It held petitioner cannot seek reimbursement on the
ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and
knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition
against foreign ownership of Philippine land24
enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987
Philippine Constitution which reads:
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes
into equity must come with clean hands. Conversely
stated, he who has done inequity shall not be accorded
equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of
equity on the ground that his conduct has been
inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or
deceitful. In this case, petitioners statements regarding
the real source of the funds used to purchase the subject
parcels of land dilute the veracity of his claims: While

admitting to have previously executed a joint affidavit

that respondents personal funds were used to purchase
the properties he likewise claimed that his personal
disability funds were used to acquire the same.
Evidently, these inconsistencies show his untruthfulness.
Thus, as petitioner has come before the Court with
unclean hands, he is now precluded from seeking any
equitable refuge.
In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of
equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given that he
acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties
by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is wellestablished that equity as a rule will follow the law and
will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because
of public policy, cannot be done directly. Surely, a
contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null
and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and
produces no legal effect at all.
Neither can the Court grant petitioners claim for
reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment. As
held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a
foreigner seeking monetary reimbursement for money
spent on purchase of Philippine land, the provision on
unjust enrichment does not apply if the action is
proscribed by the Constitution.
Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the
New Civil Code.
The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM
ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No
person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of
another). An action for recovery of what has been paid
without just cause has been designated as an accion in
rem verso. This provision does not apply if, as in this
case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by
the application of the pari delicto doctrine. It may be
unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an
accion in rem verso over the subject properties, or from
recovering the money he paid for the said properties,
but, as Lord Mansfield stated in the early case of
Holman v. Johnson: "The objection that a contract is
immoral or illegal as between the plaintiff and the
defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of
the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the

objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general

principles of policy, which the defendant has the
advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between
him and the plaintiff."
23) Fuentes vs Roca, GR No. 178902, 21 April
2010
FACTS: On, Oct 11, 1982, Tarciano Roca bought a 358square meter lot in Zambales from his mother. Six years
later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to the
petitioners Fuentes spouses through the help of Atty.
Plagata who would prepare the documents and
requirements to complete the sale. In the agreement
between Tarciano and Fuentes spouses there will be a
Php 60,000 down payment and Php 140,000 will be paid
upon the removal of Tarciano of certain structures on the
land and after the consent of the estranged wife of
Tarciano, Rosario, would be attained. Atty. Plagata thus
went about to complete such tasks and claimed that he
went to Manila to get the signature of Rosario but
notarized the document at Zamboanga . The deed of sale
was executed January 11, 1989. As time passed,
Tarciano and Rosario died while the Fuentes spouses
and possession and control over the lot. Eight years later
in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario filed a
case to annul the sale and reconvey the property on the
ground that the sale was void since the consent of
Rosario was not attained and that Rosarios signature
was a mere forgery. The Fuentes spouses claim that the
action has prescribed since an action to annul a sale on
the ground of fraud is 4 years from discovery.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Fuentes spouses ruling
that there was no forgery, that the testimony of Atty.
Plagata who witnessed the signing of Rosario must be
given weight, and that the action has already prescribed.
On the other hand, the CA reversed the ruling of the CA
stating that the action has not prescribed since the
applicable law is the 1950 Civil Code which provided
that the sale of Conjugal Property without the consent of
the other spouse is voidable and the action must be
brought within 10 years. Given that the transaction was

in 1989 and the action was brought in 1997 hence it was

well within the prescriptive period.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Rosarios signature on the
document of consent to her husband Tarcianos sale of
their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged;
2. Whether or not the Rocas action for the declaration
of nullity of that sale to the spouses already prescribed;
and
3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent
was not had, could bring the action to annul that sale.
RULING: 1. The SC ruled that there was forgery due to
the difference in the signatures of Rosario in the
document giving consent and another document
executed at the same time period. The SC noted that the
CA was correct in ruling that the heavy handwriting in
the document which stated consent was completely
different from the sample signature. There was no
evidence provided to explain why there was such
difference in the handwriting.
2. Although Tarciano and Rosario was married during
the 1950 civil code, the sale was done in 1989, after the
effectivity of the Family Code. The Family Code applies
to Conjugal Partnerships already established at the
enactment of the Family Code. The sale of conjugal
property done by Tarciano without the consent of
Rosario is completely void under Art 124 of the family
code. With that, it is a given fact that assailing a void
contract never prescribes. On the argument that the
action has already prescribed based on the discovery of
the fraud, that prescriptive period applied to the Fuentes
spouses since it was them who should have assailed
such contract due to the fraud but they failed to do so.
On the other hand, the action to assail a sale based on no
consent given by the other spouse does not prescribe
since it is a void contract.
3. It is argued by the Spouses Fuentes that it is only the
spouse, Rosario, who can file such a case to assail the
validity of the sale but given that Rosario was already

dead no one could bring the action anymore. The SC

ruled that such position is wrong since as stated above,
that sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the
land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario
despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the
ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the
Rocas. As lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under
Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude any person
from its enjoyment and disposal.
24) Ravina vs Abrille, GR No. 160708, 16
October 2009
FACTS:
[Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro
Villa Abrille are husband and wife. They have four
children, who are also parties to the instant case and are
represented by their mother, Mary Ann.
In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-square meter parcel
of land denominated as Lot 7, located in Davao City,
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-88674 in their names. Said lot is adjacent to a parcel
of land which Pedro acquired when he was still single
and which is registered solely in his name under TCT
No. T-26471.
Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan
from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP),
the spouses built a house on Lot 7 and Pedros lot. The
house was finished in the early 1980s but the spouses
continuously made improvements, including a poultry
house and an annex.
In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his
family. Mary Ann was forced to sell or mortgage their
movables to support the family and the studies of her
children. By himself, Pedro offered to sell the house and
the two lots to herein petitioners, Patrocinia and
Wilfredo Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified the
petitioners of her objections, but Pedro nonetheless sold
the house and the two lots without Mary Anns consent,
as evidenced by a Deed of Sale[5]. It appears on the said
deed that Mary Ann did not sign on top of her name.
On July 5, 1991 while Mary Ann was outside the house
and the four children were in school, Pedro together
with armed members of the Civilian Armed Forces

Geographical Unit (CAFGU) and acting in connivance

with petitioners[6] began transferring all their
belongings from the house to an apartment.
When Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid Villa Abrille
came home, they were stopped from entering it. They
waited outside the gate until evening under the rain.
They sought help from the Talomo Police Station, but
police authorities refused to intervene, saying that it was
a family matter. Mary Ann alleged that the incident
caused stress, tension and anxiety to her children, so
much so that one flunked at school.]

void, being a conjugal property while the sale

of lot 7 was valid since it was the husbands
exclusive property
CA declared that: sale of lot 7 to petitioners is valid
but the sale of lot 8 is null and void; that the husband
is ordered to return the value of the
consideration
for
lot
8
to petitioners; that
petitioners are ordered to reconvey the house and lot to
the wife
ISSUE: Whether or not the husband can sell a
property which is part exclusive and part conjugal

Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille

are husband and wife. In 1982, the spouses acquired lot
7 in Davao City with TCT T-88674 in their names. Said
lot was adjacent to lot 8 which Pedro acquired when he
was still single and was registered solely under his name
(TCT T-26471)
Spouses used their conjugal funds and loan from DBP
to build a house on 7 and Pedros lot. Consequently,
they made improvements, including a poultry house and
an annex
1991 The husband got a mistress and started to
neglect his family.
The wife wasforced to sell or
mortgage their movables to support the family.
On his own, the husband wanted to dispose of the
house and two lots to the petitioners Patrocinia and
Wilfredo Ravina. The wife opposed but the
husband still sold the property without the wifes
consent and signature
July 5, 1991 While the wife and children were out,
the husband and some CAFGU members transferred all
their belongings from the house to an apartment. When
they got home, the were prevented from entering the
house. Thus, the wife filed a complaint for the
annulment of sale with damages against the husband and
the petitioners.
During the trial, the husband alleged that the house
was built from his exclusive funds
September 26, 1995 RTC ruled in favor of the wife,
declaring that the sale of lot 8 was

HELD: Art. 160 NCC provides that all property of the

marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it is proven that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Lot 7 is an
exclusive property of the husband since it was acquired
prior to his marriage with the respondent. However, lot
8 was acquired in 1983 during the marriage of the
spouses. There is no evidence proving that the
subject property was acquired through exchange or
barter. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the
property subsists in the absence of and convincing
evidence to overcome the presumption.
A sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded
after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988 is governed by Art. 124 FC which states that a
disposition or encumbrance is void if done a. without
the consent of both the husband and wife, or; b. in case
of one spouses inability, the authority of the court.
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong
to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to
the court by the wife for proper remedy which must be
availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole
powers of administration. These powers do not include
the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must
have the authority of the court or the written consent of

the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or

consent, the disposition
or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction
shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by
the other spouse or authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors. (Emphasis supplied.)
Unlike in the NCC which gives the wife 10 years to
annul the alienation or encumbrance, any alienation or
encumbrance under the FC without the consent of both
spouses is NULL AND VOID. Just like in ACP, if the
husband, without the knowledge and consent of the
wife, sells
conjugal property, the sale is void. If the sale was with
knowledge the not consent of the wife, the wife has 5
years from the date of the contract to annul the sale.
In the present case, the wife filed within the prescribed
period. However, her action to annul the sale pertains
only to the conjugal house and lot which does
not include lot 7 which is an
exclusive property of the husband. The petitioners
cannot argue that they were buyers of good faith since
they knew that at the
time of the sale, Pedro was married to Mary Ann and her
signature did not appear in the deed.
Even if they were to argue that the property is an
exclusive property of the husband, that they proceeded
with the sale regardless of the wifes contention and that
the she was in actual and public possession of the
house at the time of the sale, clearly indicates
that they are not purchasers in good faith. CA
DECISION AFFIRMED

25) Borromeo vs Descaller, GR No. 159310, 24

February 2009
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, met respondent
Antonietta Opalla-Descallar. They fell in love and live
together. They bought a house and lot and an Absolute
Deed of Sale was issued in their names. However, when
the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for
registration, it was refused on the ground that Jambrich
was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the
public domain. Consequently, his name was erased but
his signature remained and the property was issued on
the name of the Respondent alone. However their
relationship did not last long and they found new love.
Jambrich met the petitioner who was engaged in
business. Jambrich indebted the petitioner for a sum of
money and to pay his debt, he sold some of his
properties to the petitioner and a Deed of Absolute
Sale/Assignment was issued in his favor. However,
when the Petitioner sought to register the deed of
assignment it found out that said land was registered in
the name of Respondent. Petitioner filed a complaint
against respondent for recovery of real property.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Jambrich has no title to the properties
in question and may not transfer and assign any rights
and interest in favor of the petitioner?
2. Whether or not the registration of the properties in the
name of respondents make him the owner thereof.
RULINGS:
1. The evidence clearly shows that as between
respondent and Jambrich, it was Jambrich who
possesses the financial capacity to acquire the properties
in dispute. At the time of the acquisition of the
properties, Jamrich was the source of funds used to
purchase the three parcels of land, and to construct the
house. Jambrich was the owner of the properties in
question, but his name was deleted in the Deed of
Absolute Sale because of legal constraints. Nevertheless,

his signature remained in the deed of sale where he

signed as a buyer. Thus, Jambrich has all authority to
transfer all his rights, interest and participation over the
subject properties to petitioner by virtue of Deed of
Assignment. Furthermore, the fact that the disputed
properties were acquired during the couples cohabitation
does not help the respondent. The rule of co-ownership
applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage, but otherwise capacitated to marry each other
does not apply. At the case at bar, respondent was still
legally married to another when she and Jambrich lived
together. In such an adulterous relationship and no coownership exists between the parties. It is necessary for
each of the partners to prove his or her actual
contribution to the acquisition of property in order to
able to lay claim to any portion of it.
2. It is settled rule that registration is not a mode of
acquiring ownership. It is only a means of confirming
the existence with notice to the world at large. The mere
possession of a title does not make one the true owner of
the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the
titles of the disputed properties in her name does not
necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the
owner.
26) Villanueva vs Court of Appeals, GR No.
143286, 14 April 2004
In Villanueva, the husband abandoned his legitimate
family to cohabit with his mistress. During his
cohabitation with the mistress, he acquired properties
and he registered the properties in his name. The SC said
these properties even if they were acquired during the
cohabitation with this mistress are presumed to belong
to the ACP or CPG existing in the valid marriage. Same
with Belcodero. He had a mistress and registered the
properties under her name. But the mistress failed to
prove that she actually contributed to the acquisition of
the property so the SC said that property is presumed to
be under the existing valid marriage.
If the party under 148 acted in bad faith, is unmarried.
Take note, if he is married, those properties are

presumed to be under the valid existing marriage BUT if

the one who acted in bad faith is not married, you now
apply the RULE ON FORFEITURE. His share on the
co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of the same
order as provided for in 147.
Take note that when the marriage is declared void under
147 or 148, the procedure on the liquidation of the
properties acquired during the cohabitation shall follow
the procedure provided for under the rules on coownership. It will not follow the rule provided for under
art 102 of ACP or 129 for CPG.
FACTS: On 13 October 1988, Eusebia Retuya filed a
complaint before the trial court against her husband
Nicolas Retuya, Pacita Villanueva and Nicolas son with
Pacita, Procopio Villanueva. Eusebia sought the
reconveyance from Nicolas and Pacita of several
properties (subject properties), claiming that such are
her conjugal properties with Nicolas. Plaintiff Eusebia,
is the legal wife of defendant Nicolas, having been
married on October 7, 1926. Out of the lawful wedlock,
they begot five (5) children. Spouses Retuya resided at
Mandaue City. During their marriage, they acquired real
properties and all improvements situated in Mandaue
City, and Consolacion, Cebu. Nicolas is the co-owner of
a parcel of land situated in Mandaue City which he
inherited from his parents Esteban Retuya and Balbina
Solon as well as the purchasers of hereditary shares of
approximately eight (8) parcels of land in Mandaue City.
Some of the properties earn income from coconuts
leased to corporations
In 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with his legitimate
family and cohabited with defendant, Pacita Villanueva,
wherein Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate son.
Nicolas, then, was the only person who received the
income of the properties. Pacita, from the time she
started living in concubinage with Nicolas, has no
occupation. She had no properties of her own from
which she could derive income. From the time Nicolas
suffered stroke until the present, his illegitimate son is
already the one who has been receiving the income of
his properties

Settlement between parties was asked but not met. Trial

court in favor of Eusebia Natuya. Petitioners appealed.
Eusebia died, and was then substituted by her heirs. CA
upheld trial courts decision
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject properties acquired
during the marriage between Eusebia and Procopio are
conjugal
HELD: YES, they are conjugal. Petition denied;
decision of CA affirmed
RATIO: The Family Code provisions on conjugal
partnerships govern the property relations between
Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were married before
the effectivity of Family Code.
Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that
the Family Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships
established before the Family Code without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code or
other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the
properties are acquired during the marriage, the
presumption is that they are conjugal. The burden of
proof is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal.
This is counter-balanced by the requirement that the
properties must first be proven to have been acquired
during the marriage before they are presumed conjugal.
Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7 October 1926.
Nicolas and Pacita started cohabiting in 1936. Eusebia
died on 23 November 1996. Pacita and Nicolas were
married on 16 December 1996. Petitioners themselves
admit that Lot No. 152 was purchased on 4 October
1957. The date of acquisition of Lot No. 152 is clearly
during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia.
Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152,
were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and
Eusebia, the presumption under Article 116 of the
Family Code is that all these are conjugal properties of
Nicolas and Eusebia.

27) Boado vs Court of Appeals, GR No. 145222,

24 April 2009
On 30 April 1984, Spouses Roberto and Venus Buado
(petitioners) filed a complaint for damages against
Erlinda Nicol (Erlinda) with Branch 19 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Bacoor, Cavite. Said action
originated from Erlinda Nicols civil liability arising
from the criminal offense of slander filed against her by
petitioners.
On 6 April 1987, the trial court rendered a decision
ordering Erlinda to pay damages. Said decision was
affirmed, successively, by the Court of Appeals and this
Court. Finding Erlinda Nicols personal properties
insufficient to satisfy the judgment, the Deputy Sheriff
issued a notice of levy on real property on execution
addressed to the Register of Deeds of Cavite.
Two (2) days before the public auction sale on
28 January 1993, an affidavit of third-party claim from
one Arnulfo F. Fulo was received by the deputy sheriff
prompting petitioners to put up a sheriffs indemnity
bond. The auction sale proceeded with petitioners as the
highest bidder.
On 4 February 1993, a certificate of sale was issued in
favor of petitioners. Almost a year later on 2 February
1994, Romulo Nicol (respondent), the husband of
Erlinda Nicol, filed a complaint for annulment of
certificate of sale and damages with preliminary
injunction against petitioners and the deputy sheriff.
Respondent, as
plaintiff therein,
alleged
that
the defendants, now petitioners, connived and directly
levied upon and execute his real property without
exhausting the personal properties of Erlinda Nicol.
Respondent averred that there was no proper publication
and posting of the notice of sale. Furthermore,
respondent claimed that his property which was valued
at P500,000.00 was only sold at a very low price
of P51,685.00, whereas the judgment obligation of
Erlinda Nicol was only P40,000.00. Petitioners motion
for reconsideration was denied on 23 August
2000. Hence, the instant petition attributing grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:

WON the wife's criminal liability is chargeable to the

conjugal partnership
WON the husband of the judgment debtor may file an
independent action to protect the conjugal property
subject to execution.
HELD:
There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in
nature. Article 122 of the Family Code explicitly
provides that payment of personal debts contracted by
the husband or the wife before or during the marriage
shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except
insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the
family. Unlike in the system of absolute community
where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a
crime
or quasi-delict
is
chargeable
to
the
absolute community of property, in the absence or
insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtorspouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the
system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal
partnership of gains has no duty to make advance
payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse.
Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be
concluded that the civil obligation arising from the
crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. To reiterate, conjugal
property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation
contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or
benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal
partnership. Hence, the filing of a separate action by
respondent is proper and jurisdiction is thus vested on
Branch 21. Petitioners failed to show that the Court of
Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
remanding the case to Branch 21 for further
proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.

28) Veloso vs Martinez, GR No. L-8715, 24

October 1914
ROBERTO and VENUS BUADO vs COURT OF
APPEALS and ROMULO NICOL

Mariano Veloso vs. Lucia Martinez,personally and as

administratrix of theestate of Domingo Franco
On the 1st day of July, 1911, the plaintiff commenced an
action in the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Cebu to recover of the defendant, personally and as
administratrix of the estate of Domingo Franco, deceased,
the possession of a certain parcel of land particularly
described in the second paragraph of the complaint,
together with the sum of P125 per month, from the 1st day
of June, 1911.
The defendant presented a demurrer to said complaint,
which was overruled. No exception was taken to the ruling
of the court upon the demurrer. Later the defendant
answered, setting up a general denial and a special
defense. The special defense consisted

First. Of a counterclaim in the sum of P18,500, as

attorney's fees for services rendered by the deceased,
Domingo Franco, to the plaintiff; and, second, for the
recovery of certain jewelry, of the value of P6,000,
particularly described in the answer of the defendant,
alleged to be in the possession of the plaintiff.
The first special defense, relating to attorney's fees, was
later withdrawn by the defendant. The only questions left
for litigation were: .
First. Whether the plaintiff was entitled to the recovery of
the parcel of land in question; and, second, whether the

defendant was entitled to recover from the plaintiff the

jewelry described in her answer.
After
hearing
the
evidence,
the
Honorable
AdophWislizenus, judge, in a carefully prepared opinion,
found that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the
possession of the land in question, together with the sum
of P100 for each month from the month of June, 1911,
until the possession of the land was returned to him.
The lower court further found that the defendant was
entitled to the possession of said jewelry, and ordered the
plaintiff to return the same to her and in case of the
plaintiff's failure to return said jewelry to the defendant,
then and in that case, he shall pay to the defendant, for
such failure, the sum of P6,000.
From the judgment of the lower court, each of the parties,
plaintiff and defendant, appealed to this court. Later the
defendant withdrew her appeal, thereby allowing that part
of the judgment relating to the plaintiff's right to the
possession of the land in question, together with damages,
to become final. The only question remaining, therefore,
for this court to decide is as to the ownership and right of
possession of said jewels. It is admitted that the jewels in
question, before the possession of the same was given to
the plaintiff, belonged to the defendant personally and that
she had inherited the same from her mother. The
defendant, Lucia Martinez, is the widow of Domingo
Franco, and after the death of her husband she was
appointed administratrix of his estate. The record further
shows (Exhibit C) that a short time before the death of
Domingo Franco he borrowed from the plaintiff the sum
of P4,500 and gave as security for the payment of said
sum the jewelry described in the complaint. The money
was borrowed on the 7th day of April, 1911, under
promise to repay the same, with 12 per cent interest, on the
7th day of May, 1911. It is not clear whether or not the
jewelry, at the time of the execution of said document
(Exhibit C), was in fact delivered to the plaintiff. Said

exhibit states that the jewelry was contained "dentro de

unacaja que quedacerradadespues de demonstradas las
alhajas a D. Mariano Veloso" (in a box which remains
closed after the jewels were shown to Mariano Veloso).
The document further admits the "la llavaquedaraenpoder
de D. Domingo Franco" (the key shall remain in
possession of Domingo Franco). After the death of
Domingo Franco it appears that said jewelry was found in
the same "caja" and that the key was in the possession of
the defendant. It is very doubtful, indeed, under the facts,
whether the plaintiff ever obtained the actual possession of
the jewelry. His possession, however, seems to be admitted
by the defendant in the present action. So far as the record
shows the jewelry was in the same box where it was found
at the time of the execution and delivery of said Exhibit C
and that the defendant still has the key to said box.
During the trial of the cause the plaintiff attempted to show
that the jewels in question were pawned to him by
Domingo Franco, with the full knowledge and consent of
the defendant. And not only that, the plaintiff further
attempts to show that after the death of Domingo Franco,
the defendant promised to pay the amount for which the
said jewels were pawned. The defendant positively denies
that she knew that her husband had pawned her jewels or
that she promised to redeem the same by paying the
amount due. No explanation is contained in the record
why the jewels were placed in said box (presumably a
money safe). In view of the fact, however, that the record
shows that the jewels were the sole and separate property
of the wife, acquired from her mother, and in the absence
of further proof, we must presume that they constituted a
part of her paraphernal property. As such paraphernal
property she exercised dominion over the same. (Article
1382, Civil Code.) She had the exclusive control and
management of the same, until and unless she had
delivered it to her husband, before a notary public, with
the intent that the husband might administer it properly.
(Article 1384, Civil Code.) There is no proof in the record

that she had ever delivered the same to her husband, in any
manner, or for any purpose. That being true, she could not
be deprived of the same by any act of her husband,
without her consent, and without compliance with the
provisions of the Civil Code above cited.1awphil.net
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the defendant is
entitled to the possession of said jewels, or to their value,
amounting to P6,000.
The judgment of the lower court is therefore affirmed,
with costs.
29. G-TRACTORS INC. VS COURT OF APPEALS,
GR NO. L-57402, 28 FEBRUARY 1985
G Tractors Inc. vs CA and spouses Nicasio. The husband
was engaged in the logging business. He obtained a
logging concession from the government. In pursuit of
this business, he alone entered into a contract with G
Tractors for the purpose of the logging business. Due to
the non-payment of the stipulated rentals for the heavy
equipment, the owner of the equipment goes to court for
the collection of the unpaid rentals. G Tractors won and
now seeks to enforce the money judgment, but G
tractors levy on execution a property belonging to the
community property.
WON this obligation enforce against a common
property when Mr. Nicasio was the only one who
incurred this obligation and there was no showing that it
benefit of the family because in fact the business went
down the drain.maybe
The Supreme Court said Mr. Nicasio ventured into this
business which is intended for the family. It is not
required if the nature of the construction itself that it
would normally redound to the benefit of the family, it is
not required that actual benefit is incurred to the family,
it is enough that it is presumed to have been intended for
the benefit of the family. So when the business went
down the drain any liability incurred thereof maybe
enforce against the common/community property. The
incurring spouse should not be left alone.

[ This was the ruling in the case of G Tractors Inc. vs

CA and spouses Nicasio. The husband was engaged in
the logging business. He obtained a logging concession
from the government. In pursuit of this business, he
alone entered into a contract with G Tractors for the
purpose of the logging business. Due to the nonpayment of the stipulated rentals for the heavy
equipment, the owner of the equipment goes to court for
the collection of the unpaid rentals. G Tractors won and
now seeks to enforce the money judgment, but G
tractors levy on execution a property belonging to the
community property. WON this obligation enforce
against a common property when Mr. Nicasio was the
only one who incurred this obligation and there was no
showing that it benefit of the family because in fact the
business went down the drain. maybe
The Supreme Court said Mr. Nicasio ventured
into this business which is intended for the family. It is
not required if the nature of the construction itself that it
would normally redound to the benefit of the family, it is
not required that actual benefit is incurred to the family,
it is enough that it is presumed to have been intended for
the benefit of the family. So when the business went
down the drain any liability incurred thereof maybe
enforce against the common/community property. The
incurring spouse should not be left alone. ]