SEC 15

AYTONA V. CASTILLO
On December 29, 1961, Outgoing President Carlos
Garcia appointed petitioner Dominador Aytona as ad
interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona took the
corresponding oath. On the same day, at noon,
President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office;
and on the next day, he issued administrative order
no. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad
interim appointments made by former President
Garcia. There were all-in all, 350 midnight or last
minute appointments made by the former President
Garcia. On January 1, President Macapagal appointed
Andres Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central
Bank. Aytona instituted a case (quo warranto) against
Castillo, contending that he was validly appointed,
thus the subsequent appointment to Castillo by the
new President, should be considered void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 350 midnight appointments
of former President Garcia were valid.
RULING: No. After the proclamation of the election of
President Macapagal, previous President Garcia
administration was no more than a care-taker
administration. He was duty bound to prepare for the
orderly transfer of authority the incoming President,
and he should not do acts which he ought to know,
would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his
successor.
It was not for him to use powers as
incumbent President to continue the political warfare

that had ended or to avail himself of presidential

prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The filling up
vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced
to afford some assurance of deliberate action and
careful consideration of the need for the appointment
and the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be
permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments in
one night and planned induction of almost all of them
a few hours before the inauguration of the new
President may, with some reason, be regarded by the
latter as an abuse Presidential prerogatives, the steps
taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all
vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other
conditions,
and
thereby
deprive
the
new
administration of an opportunity to make the
corresponding appointments.
DE CASTRO V. JUDICIAL BAR COUNCIL (MAR 17,
2010)
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days
after the coming presidential elections on May 10,
2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that
has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory
retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or
seven days after the presidential election. Under
Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof from a list of at least three

nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for

every vacancy. Also considering that Section 15,
Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution
prohibits the President or Acting President from making
appointments within two months immediately before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010,
unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up
the position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC
automatically considered for the position of Chief
Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of
the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio;
Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice
Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B.
Nachura. However, the last two declined their
nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and
January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may
appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition
under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does
not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It
argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must
be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant
to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had

the framers intended the prohibition to apply to

Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily
expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains
why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive
Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial
Department); and that the framers also incorporated in
Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the
Presidents power to appoint members of the Supreme
Court to ensure its independence from political
vicissitudes and its insulation from political
pressures, such as stringent qualifications for the
positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified
period within which the President shall appoint a
Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is
whether the JBC properly initiated the process, there
being an insistence from some of the oppositorsintervenors that the JBC could only do so once the
vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010).
Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may
resume its process until the short list is prepared, in
view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which
unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one
from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme
Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice)
within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint
the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his
retirement.

HELD: Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not

apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme
Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive
Department), provides: Section 15. Two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and
up to the end of his term, a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety.

that the prohibition against the President or Acting

President making appointments within two months
before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does
not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial

Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme
Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and
fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its
discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members.
Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition

contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment
of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have
easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit
in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to
the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in
Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article
VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals
that the prohibition against the President or Acting
President making appointments within two months
before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does
not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition

contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment
of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have
easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit
in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to
the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in
Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article
VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of

the same character, in that they affect the power of
the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and
Section 16 refer only to appointments within the
Executive Department renders conclusive that Section
15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This
conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of
the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context, i.e. that every part must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to

the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd

to assume that the framers deliberately situated
Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they
intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
appointments. If that was their intention in respect of
appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to
be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a
similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within
Section 4 (1) thereof.

vacancies therein will prejudice public service or

endanger public safety.

DE CASTRO V. JUDICIAL BAR COUNCIL (APR 20,

2010)

Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the

incumbent President may appoint the next Chief
Justice since the Constitution do not apply to the
Supreme Court. If the framers of the Constitution
intended the prohibition to apply in the Supreme Court
then it should have expressly stated it in the
Constitution.

This is a consolidated case which assails the

constitutionality of the action of former President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo by appointing a Chief Justice
7 days after the Presidential election in 2010.
After the compulsory retirement of former Chief Justice
Reynato Puno, the position of Chief Justice was left
vacant. Section 4 (1), in relation to Section 9, Article
VIII of the Constitution states that, "vacancy shall be
filled within ninety days from occurrence thereof," from
a, "List of nominees prepared by the Judicial Bar
Council for every vacancy" furthermore, Section 15,
Article VII was also taken into consideration which
prohibits the President or the Acting President from
making appointments within two (2) months
immediately before the next Presidential elections and
up to the end of his term, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued

The JBC agreed that the vacant position must be filled

and there were five (5) candidates for the position
from the most senior of the Associates of the court and
one of them is Associate Justice Reynato C. Corona
who was chosen by the President and was appointed
for the position of Chief Justice.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the President can appoint

the successor of the Chief Justice..
RULING: Yes, the President can appoint the successor
of Chief Justice as the prohibitions in the Constitution.
If the framers of the Constitution intend that the
prohibition shall apply to the appointment of Chief
Justice, then they should have expressly stated it in
the Constitution under Section 15 (THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT), Article VII and Section 4 (1), Article VIII
(JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT).
Section 14, Section 15 and Section 16 refers only to
the appointments made in the Executive Department.

JARDELEZA V. SERENO
Following Justice Abads compulsory retirement, the
JBC announced the application or recommendations for
the position left by the Associate Justice. Jardeleza,
the incumbent Sol-Gen at the time, was included in the
list of candidates. However, he was informed through
telephone call from some Justices that the Chief Justice
herself CJ Sereno, will be invoking Sec 2, Rule 10 of
JBC-009 or the so-called unanimity rule against him.
Generally, the rule is that an applicant is included in
the shortlist when s/he obtains affirmative vote of at
least a majority of all the members of the JBC. When
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, however, is invoked
because an applicants integrity is challenged, a
unanimous vote is required.
Jardeleza was then
directed to make himself available on June 30, 2014
before the JBC during which he would be informed of
the objections to his integrity.
Jardeleza wrote a letter-petition asking the SC to
exercise its supervisory power and direct the JBC to,
among others, give Jardeleza a written notice and
sworn written statements of his oppositors or any
documents in the JBC hearings, and to disallow CJ
Sereno from participating in the voting process for
nominees on June 30, 2014.
During the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC, Justice
Carpio appeared and disclosed a confidential
information which, to CJ Sereno, characterized
Jardelezas integrity as dubious. Jardeleza demanded

that CJ Sereno execute a sworn statement specifying

her objections and that he be afforded the right to
cross-examine her in a public hearing. He also
requested deferment of the JBC proceedings, as the SC
en banc has yet to decide in his letter-petition.
However, the JBC continued its deliberations and
proceeded to vote for the nominees to be included in
the shortlist. Thereafter, the JBC released the shortlist
of 4 nominees. It was revealed later that there were
actually 5 nominees who made it to the JBC shortlist,
but 1 nominee could not be included because of the
invocation of the unanimity rule..
Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus via Rule 65
with prayer for TRO to compel the JBC to include him in
the list of nominees on the grounds that the JBC and CJ
Sereno acted with grave abuse of discretion in
excluding him, despite having garnered a sufficient
number of votes to qualify for the position.
Issue: W/N the right to due process is demandable as
a matter of right in JBC proceedings
Yes. While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui
generis, it does not mean that an applicants access to
the rights afforded under the due process clause is
discretionary on the part of JBC.
The Court does not brush aside the unique and special
nature of JBC proceedings. Notwithstanding being a
class of its own, the right to be heard and to explain
ones self is availing. In cases where an objection to

an applicants qualifications is raised, the observance

of due process neither contradicts the fulfillment of the
JBCs duty to recommend. This holding is not an
encroachment on its discretion in the nomination
process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due
process supports and enriches the exercise of its
discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently denies
the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to
protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer
understanding of the situation it faces, thereby
guarding the body from making an unsound and
capricious assessment of information brought before it.
The JBC is not expected to strictly apply the rules of
evidence in its assessment of an objection against an
applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the person
challenged complies with the dictates of fairness
because the only test that an exercise of discretion
must surmount is that of soundness.
Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that
Jardeleza should have been included in the shortlist
submitted to the President for the vacated position of
Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose not
from the unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of
JBC-009 per se, but from the violation by the JBC of its
own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due
process. By no means does the Court intend to strike
down the unanimity rule as it reflects the JBCs policy
and, therefore, wisdom in its selection of nominees.
Even so, the Court refuses to turn a blind eye on the
palpable defects in its implementation and the ensuing
treatment that Jardeleza received before the Council.

True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination,

but this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC
failed to observe the minimum requirements of due
process.

SEC 16
ATTY. ELPIDIO SORIANO III VS. REUBEN LISTA, ET
AL.
Eight officers of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) were
promoted by the President to Vice Admiral, Rear
Admiral, Commodore, Naval Captain, and they
assumed
office
without
confirmation
by
the
Commission on Appointments (COA). Petitioner, as a
taxpayer, filed a petition with the Supreme Court
questioning the constitutionality of their assumption of
office, which requires confirmation of the COA.
Held: Petitioner has no locus standi. A party bringing a
suit challenging the constitutionality of an act or

statute must show not only that the law or act is

invalid, but also that he has sustained, or is in
immediate or imminent danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of its enforcement and not
merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.
The instant petition cannot even be classified as a
taxpayers suit because petitioner has no interest as
such and this case does not involve the exercise by
Congress of its taxing power.
Pursuant to Executive Order of President Ramos, the
PCG was transferred from the Department of National
Defense to the Office of the President, and later to the
Department of Transportation and Communication
(DOTC).
It is clear from SECTION 16, ARTICLE VII of the 1987
Constitution that only appointed officers from the rank
of colonel or naval captain in the armed forces require
confirmation by the CA. The rule is that the plain, clear
and unambiguous language of the Constitution should
be construed as such and should not be given a
construction
that
changes
its
meaning.
The
enumeration of appointments subject to confirmation
by the CA under SECTION 16, ARTICLE VII of the 1987
Constitution is exclusive. The clause "officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain"
refers to military officers alone.
PIMENTEL V. ERMITA
This is a petition to declare unconstitutional the
appointments issued by President Gloria Macapagal-

Arroyo
(President
Arroyo)
through
Executive
Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita (Secretary Ermita) to
Florencio B. Abad, Avelino J. Cruz, Jr., Michael T.
Defensor, Joseph H. Durano, Raul M. Gonzalez, Alberto
G. Romulo, Rene C. Villa, and Arthur C. Yap
(respondents) as acting secretaries of their
respective departments.
On August 2004, Arroyo issued appointments to
respondents as acting secretaries of their respective
departments.
Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004. On 23
September 2004, President Arroyo issued ad interim
appointments to respondents as secretaries of the
departments to which they were previously appointed
in an acting capacity.
Issue:
Is
President
Arroyos
appointment
of
respondents as acting secretaries without the consent
of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is
in session, constitutional?
Held: Yes. The power to appoint is essentially
executive in nature, and the legislature may not
interfere with the exercise of this executive power
except in those instances when the Constitution
expressly allows it to interfere. Limitations on the
executive power to appoint are construed strictly
against the legislature. The scope of the legislatures
interference in the executives power to appoint is
limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to
an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a person

to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to

that office. Neither may Congress impose on the
President the duty to appoint any particular person to
an office.
However, even if the Commission on Appointments is
composed of members of Congress, the exercise of its
powers is executive and not legislative. The
Commission on Appointments does not legislate when
it exercises its power to give or withhold consent to
presidential appointments.
Petitioners contend that President Arroyo should not
have appointed respondents as acting secretaries
because in case of a vacancy in the Office of a
Secretary, it is only an Undersecretary who can be
designated as Acting Secretary.
The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is
its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure
intended to fill an office for a limited time until the
appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In
case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego
of the President, such as the office of a department
secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an
alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the
permanent appointee of her choice could assume
office.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the
President the obligation to appoint automatically the
undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter
ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a

position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the

guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot
impose on the President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become
vacant while Congress is in session. Since a
department secretary is the alter ego of the President,
the acting appointee to the office must necessarily
have the Presidents confidence. Thus, by the very
nature of the office of a department secretary, the
President must appoint in an acting capacity a person
of her choice even while Congress is in session. That
person may or may not be the permanent appointee,
but practical reasons may make it expedient that the
acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee.
The law expressly allows the President to make such
acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I,
Book III of EO 292 states that [t]he President may
temporarily designate an officer already in the
government service or any other competent person to
perform the functions of an office in the executive
branch. Thus, the President may even appoint in an
acting capacity a person not yet in the government
service, as long as the President deems that person
competent.
Finally, petitioners claim that the issuance of
appointments in an acting capacity is susceptible to
abuse. Petitioners fail to consider that acting
appointments cannot exceed one year as expressly
provided in Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of

EO 292. The law has incorporated this safeguard to

prevent abuses, like the use of acting appointments as
a way to circumvent confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments.
Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from
appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are
effective
upon
acceptance.
But
ad-interim
appointments are extended only during a recess of
Congress, whereas acting appointments may be
extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover adinterim
appointments
are
submitted
to
the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation or
rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to
the
Commission
on
Appointments.
Acting
appointments are a way of temporarily filling
important offices but, if abused, they can also be a
way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
However, we find no abuse in the present case. The
absence of abuse is readily apparent from President
Arroyos issuance of ad interim appointments to
respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress,
way before the lapse of one year.

MATIBAG V. BENIPAYO
On February 1999, petitioner Matibag was appointed
Acting Director IV of the Comelecs EID by then
Comelec Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a
temporary capacity. On March 2001, respondent
Benipayo was appointed Comelec Chairman together
with other commissioners in an ad interim
appointment. While on such ad interim appointment,
respondent Benipayo in his capacity as Chairman
issued a Memorandum address transferring petitioner
to the Law Department. Petitioner requested Benipayo
to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and
her reassignment to the Law Department. She cited
Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7
dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of government
offices that transfer and detail of employees are
prohibited during the election period. Benipayo denied
her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001,
citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated November
6, 2000, exempting Comelec from the coverage of the
said Memo Circular. Petitioner appealed the denial of
her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en
banc. She also filed an administrative and criminal
complaint Department 17 against Benipayo, alleging

that her reassignment violated Section 261 (h) of the

Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No.
3258, Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 07, s.
001, and other pertinent administrative and civil
service laws, rules and regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law
Department, petitioner filed the instant petition
questioning the appointment and the right to remain in
office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and
Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively.
Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional
provisions on the independence of the COMELEC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim
appointments issued by the President amounts to a
temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1 (2),
Article IX-C of the Constitution.
We find petitioners argument without merit. An ad
interim appointment is a permanent appointment
because it takes effect immediately and can no longer
be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
does not alter its permanent character. The
Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment
permanent in character by making it effective until

disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or

until the next adjournment of Congress.
In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint
permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the
COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason were extended permanent appointments
during the recess of Congress. They were not
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity, unlike Commissioner Haydee Yorac in
Brillantes vs. Yorac and Solicitor General Felix Bautista
in Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista.
The ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason are expressly allowed by the Constitution which
authorizes the President, during the recess of
Congress, to make appointments that take effect
immediately. While the Constitution mandates that the
COMELEC shall be independent , this provision
should be harmonized with the Presidents power to
extend ad interim appointments. To hold that the
independence
of
the
COMELEC
requires
the
Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad
interim appointees before the appointees can assume
office will negate the Presidents power to make ad
interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule on
statutory construction to give meaning and effect to
every provision of the law. It will also run counter to
the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution.

Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an

investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as
it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or
render awards in disputes between contending parties.
All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of
graft and corruption and make recommendations. It
may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite
people in contempt, much less order their arrest.
Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine
from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant
the filing of an information in our courts of law.
Petitioners
asked
the
Court
to
declare
it
unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing
its functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it
arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public
office and appropriate funds for its operation.

SEC17

BIRAOGO
V.
COMMISSION

THE

PHILIPPINE

TRUTH

Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine

Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of
the President with the primary task to investigate
reports of graft and corruption committed by thirdlevel public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of

the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O.
No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President
to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to
achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not
include the power to create an entirely new public
office which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth
Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and
statutes when it vested the Truth Commission with

quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding,

those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under
the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the
Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it
selectively targets for investigation and prosecution
officials and personnel of the previous administration
as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it
excludes those of the other administrations, past and
present, who may be indictable.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or

supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the
DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasijudicial body and its functions do not duplicate,
supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal
protection clause because it was validly created for
laudable purposes.
ISSUES:

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal

standing of petitioners and argued that:

1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the

petitions and question E. O. No. 1;

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress

because the Presidents executive power and power of
control necessarily include the inherent power to
conduct investigations to ensure that laws are
faithfully executed and that, in any event, the
Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD
No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled
jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or
form such bodies.

2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation

of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to
create and to appropriate funds for public offices,
agencies and commissions;

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to

appropriate funds because there is no appropriation
but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by
Congress.

RULING:

3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the

Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection
clause.

The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to

wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to question

the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise

stated, he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3)
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest
opportunity;
and
(4)
the
issue
of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the
power of the Congress as a body to which they belong
as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are
impaired, so is the power of each member thereof,
since his office confers a right to participate in the
exercise of the powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the
prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they
are allowed to question the validity of any official
action which, to their mind, infringes on their
prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he
sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal
and direct injury attributable to the implementation of
E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of
justice on a given question. In private suits, standing
is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule. It
provides that every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest.
Real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be

benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the

party entitled to the avails of the suit.

Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public

suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in
assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as
a representative of the general public. He has to show
that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to
make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the
public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or
taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury
as a result. The Court, however, finds reason in
Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of
transcendental importance to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional
issues in the petition which deserve the attention of
this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that
our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the
President are not limited to those specific powers
under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers
of
the
President
granted
pursuant
to
this
constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create
ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need
to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been

faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc

investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into
matters which the President is entitled to know so that
he can be properly advised and guided in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land.

2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment

or allocations of existing funds already appropriated.
There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of
the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is
no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the
operation of the commission because, whatever funds
the Congress has provided for the Office of the
President will be the very source of the funds for the
commission. The amount that would be allocated to
the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and
regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or
erode their respective powers. If at all, the
investigative function of the commission will
complement those of the two offices. The function of
determining probable cause for the filing of the
appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be
with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTCs power to
investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can
advise and guide the President in the performance of
his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of
the laws of the land.

4.
Court
finds
difficulty
in
upholding
the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its
apparent transgression of the equal protection clause
enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It
requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose
of the equal protection clause is to secure every
person within a states jurisdiction against intentional
and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by
the express terms of a statue or by its improper
execution through the states duly constituted
authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. Equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited
to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to
all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the
members of the class are not similarly treated, both as
to rights conferred and obligations imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as

violative of the equal protection clause. The clear
mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find
out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft
and corruption during the previous administration only.
The intent to single out the previous administration is
plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class,
that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class
of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly
situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal
protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the
commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and
selective retribution. Superficial differences do not
make for a valid classification.

The PTC must not exclude the other past

administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the
authority to investigate all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount
law of the nation to which all other laws must conform

and in accordance with which all private rights

determined and all public authority administered. Laws
that do not conform to the Constitution should be
stricken down for being unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive
Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause
of the Constitution.