NOVAYA GAZETA

Le premier des cinq grands gouffres de Berezniki

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0RQH\0DGHRQWKH)DOOV7KURXJK

How Dmitry Rybolovlevs fortune expanded while the largest industrial

disaster of the post-USSR Russia was unfolding

Yulia POLUKHINA,

SOCIETY
20:05 16 October 2016

special correspondent

Novaya Gazetas issue 111 once again featured the Anatomy of

Fortune section with Dmitry Rybolovlev. That covered how
the todays tax resident of Monaco and an avid masterpieces
collector (find more about this in an article by Andrey
Sukhotin in issue 107, of September 26), began his career in
the city of Perm, his business partners were sentenced to serve
substantial terms for arranging a murder, and Rybolovlev
himself spent several months in a detention center on similar
charges, but was acquitted. We promised
to cover the second criminal case, which was never initiated.
This seems to be the crux of the anatomy of Dmitry
Rybolovlevs fortune, which is how to capitalize and profitably
sell a company whose product is pulling a whole city down,
and actually to below the ground this time, literally. While
this article was about to be published, Russian president,
Vladimir Putin, instructed to "verify Uralkali's compliance to
the legislation on regulation of planning work and realization
of mines filling, as well as the work achieved by
Rostekhnadzor [Russian supervisory organ for ecologic,
technologic and atomic surveillance] for the implementation
of the control of above-mentioned works".

Dmitry Rybolovlev in Roman Emperor on his Skorpios island

I came to Berezniki expecting to see a city with a crater in its heart, and to listen
to its inhabitants. Apparently, it looks like a county-size city typical for the Urals,
with straight streets and buildings dating back to Stalins and late Soviets times.
What the city lacks at all is new buildings, despite that its citizens enjoy their
quite comfortable lives at least by the standards of a provincial region.
There is, of course, a TsUM [Central Department Store] in the center, and a
square behind it, opening onto the City Administration, with the ubiquitous
flowerbeds and an ostentatious Board of Honor. I met Alexey, who had lived in
Berezniki for all his life.
Aside from Uralkali, there are five major enterprises in Berezniki. This is not a
single-industry city, as it may seem. Today, it has 150 000 residents, while in
2006, there used to be 180 000. Many have left in the last 10 years. You see, no
one had known what would come next. Some time ago, I had an amazing
conversation with a potential employer. There was a major project going to be
launched. I put together a cost estimation and calculated the expenses. That
happened right after the fall-through. So, Im calling my soon-to-be employer a
week later, and he says he is no longer interested in Berezniki.
This is all about the accident at the Uralkalis first mine (BKRU-1), and the fallsthrough that kept springing up in the city of Berezniki from 2007 and on, which
mostly rests on mines. The locals know it for sure that they are sitting on
cavities, but it seems like they are used to it. It is true, there was an accident at
the third mine in 1986. It is true, the mine was flooded. It happens. They began
grouting the worked-out cavities, but then the USSR collapsed, and the
Soyuzkali enterprise hardly survived at all. Born in the times of the first Soviet
five-year plans, Soyuzkali was reorganized over and over again, from 1993 and
on. Then Uralkalis stocks got grabbed by some people who had no idea about
Bereznikis way of life, but viewed the city as a mere business platform.

The technology requires that once a space is worked-out, it has to be grouted.

Now, as to the volumes of grouting, and whether it was grouted at all in the 90s
and 2000s, there are different accounts on that, Alexey knows Berezniki very
well, and not only above the ground at that. About 80 % of the city is sitting on a
mine take, which is triangular in shape. Its salt composition is not homogenous.
There are carnalite salts and sylvinite salts. The difference is carnalite gets
dissolved quickly, almost instantly, which actually caused the 2007 falls-through,
while sylvinite takes years to dissolve. Most of Berezniki sits on sylvinite salts,
which is why the city is still on the ground.

The Cursed Matter

A graduate of the Perm Medical University, Dmitry Rybolovlev, and miners from
Berezniki had their ways in life crossed at some point. In 2000, Rybolovlev got
ahold of the controlling interest in Uralkali. Did he know that an accident would
take place at one of his mines - soon called a "second Tchernobyl" in western
Medias - which will lead to resettlement of residents of houses in the emergency
condition within the endangered area, all six years down the road? There are
many reasons to believe he should have known.
Since the early 90s, there have been over a hundred technogenic earthquakes of
a magnitude from 2.0 to 5.0. For instance, October 25, 1993 saw a technogenic
earthquake that registered 4.0 on the Richter scale in the vicinity of BKRU-3
(the old fall-through). On January 5, 1995, there was a major technogenic
earthquake in Solikamsk, a nearby town where Silvinit, a sister enterprise, is
located. There were five shocks of a magnitude from 3.5 to 5.0. On October 9,
1997, Berezniki was shaken by a 4.0 technogenic earthquake, whose epicenter
was nearby BKRUs Nos. 2 and 3. On January 5, 1995, Solikamsk witnessed a
fall-through of over 4 m in depth and 950 by 750 m in size, which appeared in
several seconds. The lake and springs that fed it, collapsed and ended up
underground.
The Novaya Zyryanka village is located close to the first mine, BKRU-1, and is
above its mine take. In spring 1999, there was some rumble in the village,
followed by another earthquake. The soil around the river port gave sag, and
cracks appeared in the walls of several residential houses and of Bereznikis
boarding school. The people thought that the mining works were at fault, and
filed complaints with various authorities.
Then Uralkalis executives decided to grasp the initiative. The enterprise ordered
and paid for a substantial study, which cost 1 million rubles. Over the course of
1999, the Mining Institute was doing geophysical research, the Geokarta (GeoMap) company was mapping the locality to establish the true scale of what was
going on, while the Researcher, a Berezniki company, was measuring the depth
of the falls-through. Then the results of the study were summarized by Galurgia,
an open joint-stock company, as ordered by Uralkali. Few of Bereznikis
residents would believe in the objectivity of OAO Galourguia specialists, this
suspicion is only strengthened by the fact that the lists of affiliated persons of
both companies partly match each other. In 1999, Uralkali owned 23 % of
Galurgias stocks, while Mr. Polikhsha, Director General of the potassium
enterprise, also was on Galurgias board of directors.

Cracked walls of a falling house in Berezniki Photo: Yulia Polukhina / "Novaya"

In 2000, when Dmitry Rybolovlev already owned most of Uralkalis shares, the
research resumed. The research defined six potentially dangerous zones in the
city. Aside from Novaya Zyryanka, they also included a residential district
encompassed by Sverdlova, Yubileynaya, Mira, and Pyatiletki streets, as well as
the dam on the Seminsky pond and the citys waste treatment facilities. Most
importantly, the Perm Mining Institute predicted most underground shifts to
come in 2006. Uralkali, having ordered the study, couldn't ignore its results.
From time to time, the press sees stories springing up saying that the mine should
have been grouted as far back as the Soviet times, after the 1986 fall-through, to
avoid further accidents. As of 2001, the total volume of mines required to be
grouted was 27.4 million cubic meters.
Anatoliy Tyomkin, First Deputy Governor of the Permsky Region, told
Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Independent Newspaper) at the time: The situation we
see in Berezniki today is unique. There is no other city on the planet sitting on
gaping cavities, which threaten to fully devour it. As predicted by the Perm
Mining Institute, the earthquakes like those described above occur once in ten
years. However, the seismic studies say that there will be more underground
shifts from 2003 onwards, with most of them to come in 2006. So, we have five
years left at most to prevent a possible tragedy.
More from the same article (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2001): The first mine
administration has its checkpoint located on Lenina street, in Bereznikis very
center. In some spots, potassium ore is being mined only 250 to 300 meters
below the ground, right under the densely populated districts. Uralkalis first
mine administration does not only do most of the ore mining underneath the city,
but also does most of the grouting. Every year, they run 4 million tons of
industrial waste into the worked-out underground cavities. To compare, about 4.5
million ton of potassium ore is extracted here every year.
Did Uralkali undertake all the necessary work to fill the holes in the
mines? According to the investigation report on the causes of the
accident, it has been the exact opposite. The report states ""OAO
Uralkali" did not respect its obligations in terms of security and
protection of life and health of workers and people living in the area
of influence of the works linked to underground's exploitation." The
report also states that "the accident that happened in mine BKPRU-1
is the result of the underground activities of the operator (conditions
of exploitation) as well as his inaction (notably the lack of sufficient
studies, and insufficient filling of the chambers."

Covered by dark PR
In 2004, when there were elections to the State Duma, Berezniki also held its
local elections. Having bought Uralkali, Dmitry Rybolovlev also had plans for the
city itself.
Undoubtedly, Uralkali is the leader in PR among all of the citys enterprises,
explains Artyom Faizullin, a local lawyer. During the 2004 aggressive election
campaign, there was a whole team of PR men and political engineers brought in
to Berezniki. It seemed that Rybolovlev intended to secure the most favorable
conditions for his enterprise. As a result, the city was completely immersed in
political engineering and covered by a dense shadow of ideology and media
work. It was said that there was this great team of experts, opposed by some
gray, evil guys. A perfect enemy image was created, embodied by a rather welldoing local resident, Sergey Makarov. The public began associating him with
criminals. And this is when Makarov, formally, had never had a single conviction
before, while Rybolovlev was being kept in custody on charges of assassination
(for ordering the assassination of Evgueny Panteleymonov, former director of
company "Neftehimik", for further details, read "Novaya Gazeta" N. 111 of
September, the 25th 2016 Editor). However, all of that was smoothed over,
Uralkalis image was being pushed as being nice and clean, the city drowned in
dark PR, and the meanest methods were used most outrageous approaches,
including physical violence. Rybolovlevs craftsmen won him the elections,
though they overdid it on the dark PR a little bit, so that the election results were
cancelled in some of the districts as people voted against all candidates. Anyway,
Rybolovlev achieved what he wanted, and so we have a potassium mayor
(Serguey Dyakov Editor), a potassium city Duma, and potassium media.
According to Artyom Faizullin, the city is still mostly under control of Uralkali.
But the 2004 capture of the top management positions definitely turned out to
be of most importance in 2006, just before and after the fall-through.

Efficient Management and Its Side Effects

2004 was a year of dramatic changes for the enterprise itself. Maxim
Bakshinsky, a manager who had nothing to do with mining, was appointed to be
Director General of Uralkali. He had graduated from the Moscow Technological
Institute of the Food Industry. Since 1995, he had been working as an executive
for PepsiCo and Coca-Cola in Moscow, St. Petersburg and Samara.
In late 2004, this former Coca-Cola man gave an interview to Permsky
Columnist, speaking of new priorities for Uralkali: Our high-flying plans are
based on a development program for the enterprise, thought out in minute
details. Accurately pursuing these intentions will let us strive to occupy
positions on the worlds potassium fertilizer market that rightfully belongs to us.
<...> The mine administrations will have to set performance targets for
themselves, which will serve as guidelines for planning export sales. The targets
achieved by the team will directly determine the size of the annual bonuses...
Those were the golden years for the Uralkali miners. The performance quotes
kept going up, and the employees received high earnings and bonuses. At the
time, we didnt really think that something could happen, says Alexander, an
ex-miner at BKRU-1. Without the first mine, the operations of the whole
Uralkali would be challenged. BKRU-1 was extracting carnalite salts that were
needed across the whole production cycle. There is another mine like this at
Silvinit, but it was our competitor at the time.
As a result, the first mine was operating at full capacity. Uralkali kept breaking
records from across the whole Soviet period.

The IPO Failure

Uralkali marched into 2006 being a super-profitable enterprise and having a
new Director General, Vladislav Baumgertner. The August 2006 special
stockholders meeting delivered a resolution to approve initial public offering of
its stocks for a value of over 29 % of its equity capital. On September 21, the
Russian Federal Service for Financial Markets issued an authorization for up to
29 % companys stocks to circulate abroad. On September 25, the parameters of
the IPO were announced.
However, on October 11 Uralkali decided not to carry out the initial public
offering of its shares at the London stock exchange. Commenting on the
decision, Dmitry Rybolovlev, Chairman of the Board, mentioned that although
the investors were very interested in the company during preparation for IPO,
the market failed to fully appreciate its full potential. could still manage it.

In those days, the brine was already coming into the first mine, but the pumps
The October 27, 2006 report by the geology and hydrogeology group says: Up
to October 17, 2006, the brines were coming into the brine collector at about
2050 m3 per hour, which was managed by the two pumping stations that
pumped the brines into the central brine collector. These would be put into
operation once a week. On October 17, 2006, the brines suddenly rushed into
the brine collector <...> over 300400 m3 per hour, which led to the flooding
of the two pumping stations. To counteract the inrush, two K-100 pumps were
assembled and put into operation on October 18, 2006, which could not handle
the inflow. On October 19, 2006, two more pumps were assembled and put into
operation by the end of the day <...>. On October 19, 2006, the high
concentration of hydrogen sulphide in the atmosphere of the mine triggered
the emergency response plan, which included getting people out of the mine.
On October 20, 2006, after measures to improve the ventilation were taken,
the works in the mine were resumed. On October 20, 2006, two more pumps
were assembled. <...> The measures taken allowed to manage and control the
inflow.
On October 24, 2016, the railroad bed near BKRU-1 gave a sag. The staff of the
railroad station announced that it would not work from the following day
onward.
On October 25, the mine was abandoned, and it was decided to flood it. Fresh
water, not brines, were let into the mine. On the same day, the soil sagged in the
territory of the railroad station.
On October 30, 2006, the media officially announced for the first time that
the mine in the emergency condition in Berezniki would be flooded.
Soon after that, Dmitry Rybolovlev left for Europe, and has hardly lived in
Russia since then. The rumor had it that he was afraid to get deprived of his
freedom and his business.

More scared than hurt

The causes of the accident were investigated by the Russian Federal Service for
Ecological, Technological and Nuclear Supervision (Rostekhnadzor) and a
dedicated government committee. On July 27, 2007, the Russian Government
Order No. 814-R was issued, signed by Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov, which
distinctly states the technogenic nature of the accident and clearly reveals its true
scale.

GOVERNMENTAL ORDER FROM JULY THE 27th

2007
In order to take immediate measures to prevent negative consequences of the
technogenic accident caused by flooding the mine in the Verkhnekamskoye
(Upper Kama) deposit of potassium-magnesium salts in the city of Berezniki,
Permsky region, within the zone of possible destruction as indicated by
Rostekhnadzor, and taking into account the national-wide character of the above
emergency,
1. By July 1, 2007, the Russian Ministry of Regional Development together with
the government of the Permsky region is to approve a list of citizens to be
resettled from the zone of possible destruction, the total area of housing located
within the zone of possible destruction, and a list of objects to be constructed,
indicating the funding for each object.
2. The government of the Permsky region is:
according to the list of citizens and the list of objects indicated in clause 1 of this
Order, to arrange for resettlement of citizens from the residential premises
located within the zone of possible destruction, by December 1, 2007, and to
ensure, in cooperation with the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the
Russian Ministry of Emergencies, that the people are evacuated from the zone of
possible destruction, by December 1, 2007; <...>
. The Russian Ministry of Finance is to provide the budget of the Permsky
region with a loan of up to 700 million rubles, at the expense of the federal
budget, to cover the expenses on resettlement of the citizens from the zone of
possible destruction.
<>

6. The Russian Ministry of Transportation is to ensure uninterrupted railroad

communication between the cities of Solikamsk and Perm.
7. The Russian Federal Agency of Water Resources is to take measures to
maintain a safe level of water in the Nizhne-Zyryanskoye (Seminskoye)
reservoir.
<>
The Russian Ministry of Regional Development together with the Russian
Ministry of Finance, the Russian Ministry of Economic Development, the
Russian Ministry of Emergencies and the government of the Permsky region is
to prepare suggestions on funding the measures to prevent negative
consequences of the emergency, and to submit them to the Russian
Government by August 1, 2007."
Looks great, but where is Uralkali on this list?
Yuri Trutnev, in 2006, was already the Minister of Natural Resources and the
Head of the Government Commission for prevention of the negative
consequences of the technogenic accident caused by the flooding of Uralkalis
mine was simply speaking of the "ethical responsibility" of the company.
According to the conclusions of the Government Commission, the disaster has
been triggered by a group of technical and geological factors, which massively
spared OAO Uralkali. According to many sources, the fact OAO Galuriga,
an OAO Uralkali's affiliated structure, has written a part of the
Commission's report, has played a major role in the conclusions
favorable to OAO Uralkali.
All the Federal Ministers have not been as generous as Yuri Trutnev in their
appreciation. For example, Sergei Shoigu, the Russian Minister of Emergencies,
stated that Uralkali simply got rid of the resolution of problems caused by its
activity: I would advise that the journalists take a look at the financial
results of this enterprise of the recent years. You might also want to
find out which company is the number one taxpayer in Switzerland,
and everything will fall into place. The government is doing its best to
resolve the situation that has arisen, but we had better hold the owner
of the enterprise liable as well. He must also take part in the process.
By that time, Uralkalis net profit went up by 1.8 % to reach 3.8 billion rubles.

Setchin's Phantom
In June 2007, it was clear that the consequences of the accident at BKPRU-1
would mostly be handled at the expense of the federal budget. The zone of soil
sagging in Berezniki included part of the federal railroad and the gas pipeline of
the heat station No. 10. The scientists also determined sectors and objects that
could end up within the sagging zone, including 31 residential houses, 2 schools
and 3 kindergartens. The regional budget allocated 100 million rubles to
construct residential housing, while another 150 million rubles would be spent to
construct a 6-kilometer road to bypass the zone of possible soil sagging.
Could Uralkali have gotten into a different kind of hole, a financial one, because
of the BKRU-1 accident? Quite the contrary. The disaster only favored the
company, which then was owned by Rybolovlev. There was a shortage of
potassium salts in the world market at the time, and so the prices soared.
Uralkalis net profit for 2006 was 3.8 billion rubles, but boosted to 8 billion in
2007 and to 29.4 billion in 2008.
Could Uralkali have gotten into a different kind of hole, a financial one, because
of the BKRU-1 accident? Quite the contrary. The disaster only favored the
company, which then was owned by Rybolovlev. There was a shortage of
potassium salts in the world market at the time, and so the prices soared.
Uralkalis net profit for 2006 was 3.8 billion rubles, but boosted to 8 billion in
2007 and to 29.4 billion in 2008.
In October 2007, Rybolovlev had a good start with the IPO and made almost 1
billion dollars in London. However, there finally appeared a man in the autumn
of 2008 who could, better than anyone else, remind the lucky billionaire the
consequences of the ecological disaster. That was Igor Ivanovich Setchin, Vice
PM at the time. He initiated the establishment of a new government commission.
The findings it arrived at are not known with certainty. Rostekhnadzor and the
Prosecutor Generals Office failed to respond to an official request submitted by
Novaya Gazeta. flooding of his own company's mine.

However, we know Setchin strongly disapproved the fact Rybolovlev had then
bought a house to Donald Trump in Palm Beach, in the State of Florida, for 100
million US Dollars (that he is demolishing at the moment), whilst not wanting to
participate in the liquidation of the consequences of the biggest ecological
disaster in Russia after Tchernobyl caused by the
Anyway, Uralkali and the Russian government executed an agreement in March
2009 after long negotiations, wherein the company would pay a compensation
of 7.5 billion rubles (the initial amount claimed by authorities after second
Commission's work ordered by Setchin was 2.6 billion dollars, which today
equals 158 billion rubles. Two-thirds of that were spent on the construction of a
bypass branch line, and the rest, on the issues having to do with resettlement of
citizens. The 2013 agreement indicates that the governments of Russia and the
Permsky region also paid comparable amounts, 2.5 billion rubles each. However,
Uralkali could have settled the issue with residential houses on its own, by
spending less than a third of its profit for 2008.
In summer 2010, Dmitry Rybolovlev rushed to sell the controlling interest in
Uralkali and to leave Russia and made himself about 5.3 billion dollars, which
already left in masterpieces acquisition for about 2 billion dollars, luxury real
estate properties in Europe, Dubai and In the US (1 billion dollars), AS Monaco
football club (200 million dollars only for acquiring the club), a Falcon plane, an
Airbus, a yacht, etc. It is interesting to note that, however, Dmitry Rybolovlev
hasn't reckoned it was necessary to spend one single kopek in the reconstruction
process of the stricken region.

The House with Cracks

Uralkali's spending for environment protection, 2001-2013:
Year

Spending for environment

protection in US Dollas

2001

730'000

2002

no data

2003

no data

2004

10,7 million

2005

9,5 million

2006

8,5 million (initially budgeted

6,5 million)

2007

18,9 million

2008

No data

2009

10,5 million

2010*

19,5 million

2011

39,3 million

2012

41,5 million

2013

45 million

*Year when Rybolovlev sold his major participation in Uralkali

The resettlement issue was really pressing, as when Rybolovlev was the owner,
it was not being dealt with at all, explains Alexey, the first man I talked to in
Berezniki. Basargin, our new governor, is thought to be incompetent, but I tell
you, he was the one who initiated the resolution, like, guys, lets construct
permanent houses for those being resettled. Then the Permsky region, Uralkali,
and the Russian budget all took part. There are now over 50 houses in the
emergency condition, not only very close to the first mine, but also in other
residential blocks that were built in 70s and 80s. Just the other day, a fruitless
trial ended, when they wanted to put the citys former chief architect in jail for
approving the construction of the quick-assembly residential houses. Half a year
after the mine collapsed in 2007, they began building whole blocks of quickassembly houses on the right bank of Kama River. The houses were sheer plastic.
They resettled some families into them, who lived there for three years, and then
the guys from the consumer rights protection agency came and found
formaldehyde in them. Later, the houses were recognized as unlivable. 1.7 billion
rubles from the federal budget had been spent on them.
Alexey brings me to those houses. There are 89 empty cottages, uninhabited,
unguarded. Some of them are used by the builders to live in. There is another
large-scale construction project going on, building permanent houses this time.
A high-rise building looms from behind the abandoned cottages. Thats where
they resettled some of the people from these framehouses, says Alexey.
Some old ladies are sitting on a bench. We used to live in these, says the 82year-old Lilia Dmitriyevna. She had mostly lived near the first potassium mine.
After the fall-through, her house was recognized to be in the emergency
condition, and her whole family was resettled into a quick-assembly cottage. I
had had a three-bedroom apartment, but got a one-bedroom one here. This one
is not ours. This is temporary shelter. So, it turns out I have no apartment of my
own. Before the accident, I was on the waiting list for housing improvement in
Berezniki. When they moved us here, we were taken off the list. I say to the city
mayor, how long are you going to football us around? What, move again? My
possessions all got broken in all those moves. Really, almost nothing left. If we
were to move once again, you could just move the things to the trash just as
well. Now, what was the move like? The city authorities came to us and said we
were moving out on that day. The next day, everything was just loaded onto the
trucks. Those who got apartments in the new houses, are getting registered there
as residents, and others are registered in these unhealthy houses.

Another lady of an advanced age, Olga, joins in: Once in 2009, we just had a
piece of the ceiling fall down. We were living in Yubileynaya Street. Good thing
that nobody was at home. We invited the municipal commission over there, they
put up blinking lights onto our house, and then told us we were moving out.

Actually, the formaldehyde thing has a long story, says Artyom Faizullin, a
lawyer and attorney for one of the affected families. No one ever assumed
responsibility for what had happened. They convinced the population that the
mines were worked out with a town sitting on them, which was said to have no
equivalent in the world. When the formaldehyde scandal broke out, the town
authorities ought to have referred to reports produced by sanitary supervision
bodies, and to make a judgment that the quick-assembly houses were in the
emergency condition and unlivable, and, under law, to begin resettling the
people into some housing that could be lived in, or to pay them monetary
compensation. The problem that arose was this: The town authorities did their
best to avoid recognizing those houses as being in the emergency condition,
since if they did make such a judgment, this would lead to an investigation of
how that had come about.
And everything would be just great, and the town authorities would have won
the game if it were not for one family, which just bucked it and refused to move
out until their housing was officially recognized as being in the emergency
condition. The Ponomaryovs-Motins family. We studied the documentation and
filed another lawsuit in last February, demanding that inter-agency
organizations recognize their apartment as unlivable, and we won the case. The
town administration was forced to raise the issue again. As a result, they
recognized all the apartments in the formaldehyde houses as unlivable last
summer. Not that we clearly understand what will happen next.

Well, we do clearly understand what will happen to Berezniki. There are five
large falls-through in the town now. They are filling with groundwater and
expanding.
As to Dmitry Rybolovlev, he is, of course, far from dealing with these down-to(below)-earth issues. He is dealing with his own problems, with his own
property, and successfully at that. For instance, the town commission of Palm
Beach, Florida, issued a permit to knock down the mansion Rybolovlev bought
from Donald Trump for 100 million dollars in 2004.
By the way, there are no cracks in the soil under it. Furthermore, he managed
to run off from all his responsibilities for the ecological disaster in Berezniki
partly caused by him and to live a luxury life abroad, whereas the consequences
of this tragic event are still not settled ten years after.
P.S. Novaya Gazeta has sent an official demand to OAO Uralkali but hasn't
received any answer by the time we are publishing this article, despite their
multiple promises. We also tried to ask our questions to Dmitry Rybolovlev's
representative, but they remained unanswered.

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