Servando vs Secretary of Labor

Facts:

Respondents invoke the visitorial and enforcement power of the Secretary of Labor under Art. 128(b) of the
Labor Code which, according to them, is entirely separate and distinct from the Regional Director's power
to adjudicate simple money claims under Art. 129 of the same Code;
o

and that Art. 217 (a) (6) of the Labor Code granting original and exclusive jurisdiction to Labor
Arbiters over all money claims arising from employer-employee relations involving an amount
exceeding P5,000.00, whether or not accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, should not be
interpreted as an amendment to Art. 128(b), i.e. as providing an additional exception to the
visitorial and enforcement power of the Secretary of Labor.

Issue: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over money claims arising from employer-employee
relations
Held: YES

A careful consideration of the above-quoted three (3) provisions of the Labor Code leads the Court to
reiterate its ruling that the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide employees' claims arising from
employer-employee relations, exceeding the aggregate amount of P5,000.00 for each employee, is vested in
the Labor Arbiter (Article 217 (a) (6)).

This exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter is confirmed by the provisions of Article 129
which excludes from the jurisdiction of the Regional Director or any hearing officer of the Department of
Labor the power to hear and decide claims of employees arising from employer-employee relations
exceeding the amount of P5,000.00 for each employee.

To construe the visitorial power of the Secretary of Labor to order and enforce compliance with labor laws
as including the power to hear and decide cases involving employees' claims for wages, arising from
employer-employee relations, even if the amount of said claims exceed P5,000.00 for each employee,
would, in our considered opinion, emasculate and render meaningless, if not useless, the provisions of
Article 217(a) (6) and Article 129 of the Labor Code which as above-pointed out,
confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Labor Arbiter to hear and decide such employees' claims (exceeding
P5,000.00 for each employee). To sustain the respondents' position would, in effect, sanction a situation
where all employees' claims, regardless of amount, can be heard and determined by the Secretary of Labor
under his visitorial power. This does not, however, appear to be the legislative intent.

In other words, the inspection conducted by the Secretary of Labor, through labor regulation officers or
industrial safety engineers, may yield findings of violations through labor standards under labor laws; the
Secretary of Labor may order compliance with said labor standards, if necessary, through appropriate writs
of execution but when the findings disclose an employee claim of over P5,000.00, the matter should be
referred to the Labor Arbiter in recognition of his exclusive jurisdiction over such claims.

In addition to all the foregoing, the Court cannot overlook the fact that petitioner contests the findings of
the labor regulation officer, upon which, the respondents based their questioned orders.

Nor can it be argued with persuasion that the issues raised by petitioner are not evidentiary in nature and
unverifiable in the course of inspection.

Moreover, the total amount of the respondents' award against petitioner, is P964,952.50

The total award of P964,952.50 is a tidy sum sufficient to knock-off any viable enterprise. What is worse is
that all this is done through summary proceedings.

The elementary demands of due process upon which the express exception to the visitorial powers of the
Secretary of Labor1 is obviously anchored, would require something more than a summary disposition

Guico Jr vs Quisumbing
Facts:

The case started when the Office of the Regional Director, Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE),
Region I, San Fernando, La Union, received a letter-complaint dated April 25, 1995, requesting for an
investigation of petitioner's establishment, Copylandia Services & Trading, for violation of labor standards
laws.

Pursuant to the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly
authorized representative under Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended, inspections were conducted at
Copylandia's outlets on April 27 and May 2, 1995.

The inspections yielded the following violations involving twenty-one (21) employees who are copier
operators:
o

(1) underpayment of wages;

(2) underpayment of 13th month pay; and

(3) no service incentive leave with pay

On October 30, 1995, Regional Director Guerrero N. Cirilo issued an Order [6] favorable to the 21
employees.

First, he ruled that the purported Receipt, Waiver and Quitclaim dated December 21 and 22, 1994, could
not cause the dismissal of the labor standards case against the petitioner since the same were executed
before the filing of the said case.

Moreover, the employees repudiated said waiver and quitclaim.

Second, he held that despite the salary increase granted by the petitioner, the daily salary of the employees
was still below the minimum daily wage rate of P119.00 under Wage Order No. RB-I-03.

Thirdly, he held that the removal of the commission and incentive schemes during the pendency of the case
violated the prohibition against elimination or diminution of benefits under Article 100 of the Labor Code,
as amended.

On January 10, 1996, District Labor Officer Adonis Peralta forwarded a Report showing that the petitioner
and most of the 21 employees had reached a compromise agreement

Four (4) employees did not sign in the compromise agreement. They insisted that they be paid what is due
to them according to the Order of the Regional Director in the total amount of P231,841.06.

Issue: whether or not the Regional Director has jurisdiction over the instant labor standards case,
Held: YES

We sustain the jurisdiction of the respondent Secretary.

As the respondent correctly pointed out, this Court's ruling in Servando --- that the visitorial power of the
Secretary of Labor to order and enforce compliance with labor standard laws cannot be exercised where the
individual claim exceeds P5,000.00, can no longer be applied in view of the enactment of R.A. No. 7730
amending Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code,

An order issued by the duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor and Employment under this
article may be appealed to the latter.

In case said order involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the
posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Secretary of
Labor and Employment in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in order appealed from

In his sponsorship speech, Congressman Veloso categorically declared that "this bill seeks to do away with
the jurisdictional limitations imposed through said ruling (referring to Servando) and to finally settle any
lingering doubts on the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment." Petitioner's reliance on Servando is thus untenable.

The next issue is whether petitioner was able to perfect his appeal to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment. Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code clearly provides that the appeal bond must be "in the
amount equivalent to the monetary award in the order appealed from." The records show that petitioner
failed to post the required amount of the appeal bond. His appeal was therefore not perfected.

Batong Buhay vs Dela Serna

Facts:

On 5 February 1987, Elsie Rosalinda B. Ty, Antonia L. Mendelebar, Ma. Concepcion O. Reyes and 1,247
others filed a complaint against Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. for:
o

(1) Non-payment of their basic pay and allowances for the period of 6 July 1983 to 5 July 1984,
inclusive, under Wage Order No. 2;

(2) Non-payment of their basic pay and allowances for the period 16 June 1984 to 5 October 1986,
inclusive under Wage Order No. 5;

(3) Non-payment of their salaries for the period 16 March 1986 to the present;

(4) Non-payment of their 13th month pay for 1985, 1986 and 1987;

(5) Non-payment of their vacation and sick leave, and the compensatory leaves of mine site
employees; and

(6) Non-payment of the salaries of employees who were placed on forced leaves since November,
1985 to the present, if this is not feasible, the affected employees be awarded corresponding
separation pay.

the Labor Standards and Welfare Officers submitted their report stating Order of Compliance be issued
directing respondent Batong Buhay Gold Mines Inc. to pay complainants Elsie Rosalina Ty, et al.
(P4,818,746.40.

When the respondent failed to post a cash/surety bond, and upon motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution by the complainants, the Regional Director, on 14 September 1987 issued a writ of execution
appointing Mr. John Espiridion C. Ramos as Special Sheriff

The Special Sheriff proceeded to execute the appealed Order on 17 September 1987 and seized three (3)
units of Peterbuilt trucks and then sold the same by public auction. Various materials and motor vehicles
were also seized on different dates and sold at public auction by said sheriff.

On 11 December 1987, the respondent finally posted a supersedeas bond which prompted this Office to
issue an Order dated 26 January 1988, restraining the complainants and sheriff Ramos from enforcing the
writ of execution.

Issue: whether the Regional Director has jurisdiction over subject labor standards case.
Held: YES

We agree with the complainants that the regional office a quo has jurisdiction to hear and decide the instant
labor standard case.

E.O. No. 111 was issued on December 24, 1986 or three(3) months after the promulgation of the Secretary
of Labors decision upholding private respondents salary differentials and ECOLAs on September 24,
1986.The amendment of the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Regional Director (Article 128(b)) by
said E.O. 111 reflects the intention enunciated in Policy Instructions Nos. 6 and 37 to empower the

Regional Directors to resolve uncontested money claims in cases where an employer-employee relationship
still exists

The proceedings before the Regional Director must, perforce be upheld on the basis of Article 128(b) as
amended by E.O. No. 111, dated December 24, 1986, this executive order to be considered in the nature of
a curative statute with retrospective application.

Petitioners refusal to allow the Labor Standards and Welfare Officers to conduct inspection in the premises
of their head office in Makati and the failure to file their position paper is equivalent to a waiver of its right
to contest the claims of the employees.

This Court had occasion to hold there is no violation of due process where the Regional Director merely
required the submission of position papers and resolved the case summarily thereafter.

Furthermore, the issuance of the compliance order was well within the jurisdiction of the Regional
Director, as Section 14 of the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases

It bears stressing that this petition involves a labor standards case and it is in keeping with the law that the
worker need not litigate to get what legally belongs to him, for the whole enforcement machinery of the
Department of Labor exists to insure its expeditious delivery to him free of charge.

The Servando ruling, in effect, expanded the jurisdictional limitation provided for by RA 6715 as to include
labor standards cases under Article 128 (b) and no longer limited to ordinary monetary claims under Article
129.

The present law, RA 7730, can be considered a curative statute to reinforce the conclusion that the Regional
Director has jurisdiction over the present labor standards case.

Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force when the
action was commenced, unless a subsequent statute provides for its retroactive application, as when it is a
curative legislation.[

Parenthetically, the same rationale applies in treating RA 7730 as a curative statute. Explicit in its title[22] is
the legislative intent to rectify the error brought about by this Courts ruling that RA 6715 covers even labor
standards cases where the amounts to be awarded by the Regional Director exceed P5,000 as provided for
under RA 6715.

Congressional records relative to Republic Act 7730 reveal that, this bill seeks to do away with the
jurisdictional limitations imposed thru said ruling (referring to Servando) and to finally settle any lingering
doubts on the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Secretary of Labor and Employment.

All the foregoing studiedly considered, the ineluctable conclusion is that the application of RA 7730 to the
case under consideration is proper.

Thus, it is decisively clear that the public respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the Order dated September 16, 1988.

VL Enterprises vs CA
Facts:
On 10 March 1998, the DOLE conducted an inspection of the establishment of petitioner company V.L.
Enterprises. On 5 May 1999, then Regional Director Maximo Lim issued an Order
Petitioners appealed the aforequoted Order of the Regional Director.
On 23 June 1999, DOLE Undersecretary Jose M. Espaol, Jr. rendered an Order directing petitioners V.L. Enterprises
and/or Faustino J. Visitacion, to post cash or surety bond in the amount equivalent to the monetary award; otherwise,
the appeal will be dismissed for not having been perfected.
On 29 July 1999, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, invoking therein that in a similar case
pending with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC NCR Case No. 00-10-0762-27) involving the same
parties and issues, petitioners had already posted a supersedeas bond.

Issue: Whether or not the the regional director of DOLE has jurisdiction
Held: YES

Petitioners must have been unmindful of the fact that one year from the issuance of the Halili Decision, or
on 2 June 1994, Republic Act No. 7730 amended Article 128(b) to its present wording so as to free it from
the jurisdictional limitations found in Articles 129[13] and 217.[14] Thus, as it is now worded, the authority
under Article 128[15] may be exercised by DOLE regardless of the monetary value involved, unlike in
Article 129 where the authority is only for claims not exceeding P5,000.00 per claimant.

This was further affirmed by our ruling in Guico v. Quisumbing,[17] which stated categorically the
abandonment of the Servando ruling:
o

We sustain the jurisdiction of the respondent Secretary. As the respondent correctly pointed out,
this Court's ruling in Servando that the visitorial power of the Secretary of Labor to order and
enforce compliance with labor standard laws cannot be exercised where the individual claim
exceeds P5,000.00, can no longer be applied in view of the enactment of R.A. No. 7730 amending
Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code

An order issued by the duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor and Employment
under this article may be appealed to the latter. In case said order involves a monetary award, an
appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by
a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in the
amount equivalent to the monetary award in the order appealed from

Ex-Bataan Veterans vs Secretary of Labor

Facts:

Ex-Bataan Veterans Security Agency, Inc. (EBVSAI) is in the business of providing security services while
private respondents are EBVSAIs employees assigned to the National Power Corporation
at Ambuklao Hydro Electric Plant, Bokod, Benguet (Ambuklao Plant).

On 20 February 1996, private respondents led by Alexander Pocding (Pocding) instituted a complaint[4] for
underpayment of wages against EBVSAI before the Regional Office of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE).

On 7 March 1996, the Regional Office conducted a complaint inspection at the Ambuklao Plant where the
following violations were noted:
o

(1) non-presentation of records;

(2) non-payment of holiday pay;

(3) non-payment of rest day premium;

(4) underpayment of night shift differential pay;

(5) non-payment of service incentive leave;

(6) underpayment of 13thmonth pay;

(7) no registration;

(8) no annual medical report;

(9) no annual work accidental report;

(10) no safety committee; and

(11) no trained first aider.

On the same date, the Regional Office issued a notice of hearing [6] requiring EBVSAI and private
respondents to attend the hearing on 22 March 1996. Other hearings were set for 8 May 1996, 27 May 1996
and 10 June 1996.

On 19 August 1996, the Director of the Regional Office (Regional Director) issued an Order,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
o

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent EX-BATAAN VETERANS SECURITY

AGENCY is hereby ORDERED to pay the computed deficiencies owing to the affected
employees in the total amount of SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY THREE THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN PESOS and 85/PESOS

Secretary of Labor affirmed Regional Director and CA affirmed as well

Issues: Whether the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives acquired jurisdiction over EBVSAI

Whether the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives have jurisdiction over the money claims of
private respondents which exceed P5,000
Held: YES. YES

In this case, EBVSAI does not deny having received the notices of hearing. In fact, on 29 March and 13
June 1996, Danilo Burgos and Edwina Manao, detachment commander and bookkeeper of EBVSAI,
respectively, appeared before the Regional Director.

They claimed that the 22 March 1996 notice of hearing was received late and manifested that the notices
should be sent to the Manila office.

Thereafter, the notices of hearing were sent to the Manila office. They were also informed
of EBVSAIs violations and were asked to present the employment records of the private respondents for
verification.

They were, moreover, asked to submit, within 10 days, proof of compliance or their position paper. The
Regional Director validly acquired jurisdiction over EBVSAI. EBVSAI can no longer question the
jurisdiction of the Regional Director after receiving the notices of hearing and after appearing before the
Regional Director

we sustained the jurisdiction of the DOLE Regional Director and held that the visitorial and enforcement
powers of the DOLE Regional Director to order and enforce compliance with labor standard laws
can be exercised even where the individual claim exceeds P5,000.

In this case, the Regional Director validly assumed jurisdiction over the money claims of private
respondents even if the claims exceeded P5,000 because such jurisdiction was exercised in accordance with
Article 128(b) of the Labor Code and the case does not fall under the exception clause.

The Court notes that EBVSAI did not contest the findings of the labor regulations officer during the
hearing or after receipt of the notice of inspection results.

It was only in its supplemental motion for reconsideration before the Regional Director that EBVSAI
questioned the findings of the labor regulations officer and presented documentary evidence to controvert
the claims of private respondents.

But even if this was the case, the Regional Director and the Secretary of Labor still looked into and
considered EBVSAIs documentary evidence and found that such did not warrant the reversal of the
Regional Directors order.

The Secretary of Labor also doubted the veracity and authenticity of EBVSAIs documentary evidence.

Moreover, the pieces of evidence presented by EBVSAI were verifiable in the normal course of inspection
because all employment records of the employees should be kept and maintained in or about the premises
of the workplace, which in this case is in Ambuklao Plant, the establishment where private respondents
were regularly assigned

Rizal Security vs Maraan

Facts;

Petitioner Rizal Security and Protective Service, Inc. (Rizal Security) is a corporation organized under
Philippine laws and is doing business as a security agency. Petitioner Rufino S. Antonio, Jr. (Antonio) is the
president of the aforesaid corporation.

On the other hand, private respondents were formerly employed by petitioner Rizal Security as security
guards detailed at Rainbow End Village in Baguio City.

The instant case arose on 19 May 1995, when private respondents Rico Gomez (Gomez) and Edwin O.
Tupas (Tupas), who were then still employed as security guards of petitioner Rizal Security, filed a
Complaint with the DOLE-CAR Regional Office, docketed as CAR00-9507-CI-25, to seek assistance

regarding petitioners alleged violation of laws on labor standards, such as illegal deduction of wages,
underpayment and nonpayment

Pursuant to the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly
authorized representative under Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended, an inspection was conducted
on petitioner Rizal Securitys establishment by the Labor Inspector on 1 June 1995.

The said inspection yielded the following violations as indicated in the Notice of Inspection Results

In the meantime, two significant events apparently took place.

o

First, private respondents signed and submitted a resignation letter addressed to the personnel
manager of petitioner Rizal Security on 10 July 1995, to be effective 1 September 1995.

And second, a notice of Termination of Services dated 25 July 1995 was sent by Dominador N.
Valmonte, Jr., Resident Manager of Rainbow End Village to petitioner Antonio, President of copetitioner Rizal Security.[4] Through the said Notice, Rainbow End Village informed petitioner
Rizal Security of the termination of their Security Services also effective 1 September 1995.

petitioner Rizal Security submitted a Manifestation and Motion assailing the jurisdiction of the DOLECAR Regional Office over the case. Petitioner Rizal Security alleged that the DOLE-CAR Regional Office
had lost its jurisdiction to try the case considering there was no longer any employer-employee relationship
between petitioner Rizal Security and private respondents when the latter ceased to be employees of
petitioner Rizal Security due to their resignation effective 1 September 1995.

Thereafter, on 24 January 1996, the DOLE-CAR Regional Office, through public respondent Director
Maraan, issued the assailed Order denying petitioner Rizal Securitys Manifestation and Motion.

It further ordered the payment of the deficiencies owing the private respondents amounting to P560,989.70

Petitioners are now asking for the issuance of a writ of certiorari and a Temporary Restraining Order to
enjoin public respondents from executing the Order of 24 January 1996 and from enforcing the Writ of
Execution

Issue: Whether or not s whether public respondent DOLE-CAR Regional Director Maraan acted without jurisdiction
in issuing the Order dated 24 January 1996.
Held: YES

While it is true that the quoted provision states that where employee-employer relations have been severed,
complaints or claims for payment of monetary benefits fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of
Labor Arbiters; however, such is not the case in the present Petition.

To emphasize, at the time private respondents instituted CAR00-9507-CI-25 by filing a complaint with the
DOLE-CAR Regional Office, they were still employees of petitioners.

As alleged by petitioner Rizal Security itself, deemed as an admission on its part, the employer-employee
relations between petitioner Rizal Security and private respondents were terminated on 1 September 1995,
or more than three months after the institution of CAR00-9507-CI-25 before the DOLE Regional Office.

Well-settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of an action is determined by
the allegations of the complaint at the time of its filing, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein

It is but axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government
agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determinedby the material
allegations therein, the character of the relief prayed for, and the law existing at the time of the filing of the
complaint or petition

Regarding the validity of the order, it is invalid

Without receipt by the petitioners of the notice and copy of the Order dated 24 January 1996, the same has
not yet become final and executory and the Writ of Execution issued pursuant thereto on 12 March 1996
was premature and without legal basis. This renders the Writ of Execution fatally defective and, thus, null.

Catholic Vicariate vs Sto Thomas

Facts:

Petitioner contracted Kunwha Luzon Construction (KUNWHA) to construct the retaining wall of the
Baguio Cathedral. KUNWHA, in turn, subcontracted CEREBA Builders (CEREBA) to do the formworks
of the church. The contract between KUNWHA and CEREBA lasted up to the completion of the project or
on 8 September 2000.

KUNWHA failed to pay CEREBA. Consequently, the latter failed to pay its employees.

On 29 August 2000, respondent George Agbucay, along with 81 other employees, lodged a complaint
against CEREBA, KUNWHA and petitioner before the DOLE-CAR Regional Office for nonpayment of
wages, special and legal holiday premium pay.

An inspection of the premises resulted in the discovery of violations of labor standards law, such as
nonpayment of wages and holiday pay from 28 June 2000 to 5 September 2000, non-presentation of
employment records, and others.

Petitioner, KUNWHA and CEREBA were given five (5) days from receipt of the notice of inspection
results to rectify its violations. Despite the notice, the parties failed to comply.

A hearing was set wherein CEREBA manifested its willingness to pay the affected employees on the
condition that KUNWHA would pay its obligation to CEREBA.

Petitioner meanwhile manifested that the retention fee due to KUNWHA was sufficient to pay the
deficiencies due the affected employees.

On 12 March 2001, the DOLE-CAR Regional Director issued an Order holding CEREBA, KUNWHA and
petitioner jointly and severally liable to the 82 affected workers in the amount of P1,029,952.80
or P12,560.40 for each employee.

On appeal, the Secretary of Labor reversed the ruling of the Regional Director and held that pursuant to
Articles 106 and 107 of the Labor Code, the liability of KUNWHA, CEREBA and the Catholic Vicariate is
solidary notwithstanding the absence of an employer-employee relationship.
o

The Secretary of Labor ruled, however, that there existed an employer-employee relationship
between the parties since the records show that the subcontracting agreement was terminated only
on 28 September 2000, almost a month after the complaint was filed on 29 August 2000

Issue: whether the Secretary of Labor acquired jurisdiction over the appeal considering that this case falls within the
exception stated in Article 128(b) of the Labor Code
Held: YES. He has jurisdiction as ruled by the Appellate court

The appellate court held that petitioner was estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the Secretary of
Labor, it having attended the initial hearing and therein manifested that it had in its possession the retention
fee of KUNWHA sufficient to answer for the deficiencies due the affected workers.

The appellate court noted that it was only when the judgment imposed joint and several liability that
petitioner began to question the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor.

The appellate court further sustained the finding of the Secretary of Labor that the settlement is not legally
acceptable as it defied public policy for being unconscionable.

Moreover, the appellate court succinctly stated that parties who did not appeal may be benefited by the
judgment of said court insofar as it is favorable and applicable to them

Assuming arguendo the absence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties, the Secretary
of Labor, invoking Odin Security Agency v. De la Serna,[21] correctly declared that petitioner is now
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the Regional Director when it actively participated in the
proceedings held therein.

In said case, petitioner also submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regional Director by taking part in the
hearings before him and by submitting a position paper.

Similarly, it was only when the order of the Regional Director was modified did petitioner question the
formers jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.

This Court declares that petitioner is barred by estoppel from raising the issue of jurisdiction.

Meteoro vs Creative Creatures

Facts:

Respondent is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of producing, providing, or procuring the
production of set designs and set construction services for television exhibitions, concerts, theatrical
performances, motion pictures and the like.

It primarily caters to the production design requirements of ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation in Metro
Manila and nationwide.

On the other hand, petitioners were hired by respondent on various dates as artists, carpenters and
welders. They were tasked to design, create, assemble, set-up and dismantle props, and provide sound
effects to respondents various TV programs and movies.

Sometime in February and March 1999, petitioners filed their respective complaints for non-payment of
night shift differential pay, overtime pay, holiday pay, 13 th month pay, premium pay for Sundays and/or rest
days, service incentive leave pay, paternity leave pay, educational assistance, rice benefits, and illegal
and/or unauthorized deductions from salaries against respondent, before the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region (NCR). Their complaints were consolidated and docketed
as NCR00-9902-IS-011.

After the inspection conducted at respondents premises, the labor inspector noted that the records were not
made available at the time of the inspection; that respondent claimed that petitioners were contractual
employees and/or independent talent workers; and that petitioners were required to punch their cards.

respondent argued that the DOLE-NCR had no jurisdiction over the complaint of the petitioners because of
the absence of an employer-employee relationship.
o

It added that petitioners were free-lance individuals, performing special services with skills and
expertise inherently exclusive to them like actors, actresses, directors, producers, and script
writers, such that they were treated as special types of workers.

Petitioners, on the other hand, averred that they were employees of respondent, as the elements of an
employer-employee relationship existed.

Meanwhile, on April 12, 1999, petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner, with
prayer for payment of overtime pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, holiday pay, service incentive
leave pay, 13th month pay and attorneys fees before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC). The case was docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-04-04459-9.

On October 11, 1999, DOLE Regional Director Maximo Baguyot Lim issued an Order [9] directing
respondent to pay petitioners the total amount of P2,694,709.00.

While recognizing the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Regional Director and his jurisdiction to
entertain money claims, the appellate court noted that Article 128 of the Labor Code provides an instance
when he (Regional Director) may be divested of jurisdiction.

The CA pointed out that respondent had consistently disputed the existence of employer-employee
relationship, thereby placing the case beyond the jurisdiction of the Regional Director.

Issue: Whether or not the case is an exception clause to Article 128(b) of the Labor Code
Held: YES. The jurisdiction lies with the NLRC

As it is now worded, and as consistently held in a number of cases, [17] the visitorial and enforcement powers
of the Secretary, exercised through his representatives, encompass compliance with all labor standards laws
and other labor legislation, regardless of the amount of the claims filed by workers.

In order to do away with the jurisdictional limitations imposed by the Servando ruling and to finally settle
any lingering doubts on the extent of the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, R.A. 7730 was enacted, amending Article 128 (b) to its present formulation, so as to free it
from the jurisdictional restrictions found in Articles 129 and 217.

This notwithstanding, the power of the Regional Director to hear and decide the monetary claims of
employees is not absolute.

The last sentence of Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code, otherwise known as the exception clause, provides
an instance when the Regional Director or his representatives may be divested of jurisdiction over a labor
standards case.

In the present case, the CA aptly applied the exception clause. At the earliest opportunity, respondent
registered its objection to the findings of the labor inspector.

The labor inspector, in fact, noted in its report that respondent alleged that petitioners were contractual
workers and/or independent and talent workers without control or supervision and also supplied with tools
and apparatus pertaining to their job.

In its position paper, respondent again insisted that petitioners were not its employees. It then questioned
the Regional Directors jurisdiction to entertain the matter before it, primarily because of the absence of an
employer-employee relationship.

Finally, it raised the same arguments before the Secretary of Labor and the appellate court.

It is, therefore, clear that respondent contested and continues to contest the findings and conclusions of the
labor inspector.

In sum, respondent contested the findings of the labor inspector during and after the inspection and raised
issues the resolution of which necessitated the examination of evidentiary matters not verifiable in the
normal course of inspection.

Hence, the Regional Director was divested of jurisdiction and should have endorsed the case to the
appropriate Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.

Considering, however, that an illegal dismissal case had been filed by petitioners wherein the existence or
absence of an employer-employee relationship was also raised, the CA correctly ruled that such
endorsement was no longer necessary.

Urbanes vs Secretary of Labor

Facts:

Petitioner Placido O. Urbanes, Jr., doing business under the name and style of Catalina Security Agency,
entered into an agreement[1] to provide security services to respondent Social Security System (SSS).

During the effectivity of the agreement, petitioner, by letter of May 16, 1994, [2] requested the SSS for the
upward adjustment of their contract rate in view of Wage Order No. NCR-03 which was issued by the
Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board-NCR pursuant to Republic Act 6727 otherwise known as
the Wage Rationalization Act,

As his May 16, 1994 letter to the SSS remained unheeded, petitioner sent another letter, dated June 7, 1994,
reiterating the request, which was followed by still another letter, dated June 8, 1994.

On June 24, 1994, petitioner pulled out his agencys services from the premises of the SSS and another
security agency, Jaguar, took over.

On June 29, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint with the DOLE-NCR against the SSS seeking the
implementation of Wage Order No. NCR-03.

In its position paper,[7] the SSS prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that petitioner is not
the real party in interest and has no legal capacity to file the same. In any event, it argued that if it had any
obligation, it was to the security guards.

On the other hand, petitioner in his position paper, citing Eagle Security Agency, Inc. v. NLRC, contended
that the security guards assigned to the SSS do not have any legal basis to file a complaint against it for
lack of contractual privity.

Finding for petitioner, the Regional Director of the DOLE-NCR issued an Order
o

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent Social Security System (SSS) is hereby
Ordered to pay Complainant the total sum of ONE MILLION SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND
EIGHT HUNDRED FIFTY EIGHT AND 46/100 (P 1,600,858.46) representing the wage
differentials under Wage Order No. NCR-03 of the ONE HUNDRED SIXTY EIGHT (168)
Security Guards of Catalina Security Agency covering the period from December 16, 1993 to June
24, 1994

Petitioner asserts that the Secretary of Labor does not have jurisdiction to review appeals from decisions of
the Regional Directors in complaints filed under Article 129 of the Labor Code

Any decision or resolution of the regional director or officer pursuant to this provision may be
appealed on the same grounds provided in Article 223 of this Code, within five (5) calendar days from
receipt of a copy of said decision or resolution, to the National Labor Relations Commission which shall
resolve the appeal within ten (10) calendar days from submission of the last pleading required or allowed
under its rules.

Issue: Whether or not Secretary of Labor has jurisdiction

Held: NO it is the RTC. Same with Lapanday case.
Article 128 states

Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 129 and 217 of this Code to the contrary, and in cases where the
relationship of employer-employee still exists, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly
authorized representatives shall have the power to issue compliance orders to give effect to labor legislation
based on the findings of labor employment and enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers made in
the course of inspection.

An order issued by the duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor and Employment under this
article may be appealed to the latter.

In the case at bar, even if petitioner filed the complaint on his and also on behalf of the security guards,
[22]
the relief sought has to do with the enforcement of the contract between him and the SSS which was
deemed amended by virtue of Wage Order No. NCR-03. The controversy subject of the case at bar is thus a
civil dispute, the proper forum for the resolution of which is the civil courts.

Phil Telegraph and Telephone Co vs NLRC

Facts:

Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever, specifically as a Supernumerary Project
Worker, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 vice one C.F. Tenorio who went
on maternity leave.

Under the Reliever Agreement which she signed with petitioner company, her employment was to be
immediately terminated upon expiration of the agreed period.

Thereafter, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991, and from July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991, private
respondents services as reliever were again engaged by petitioner, this time in replacement of one Erlinda
F. Dizon who went on leave during both periods.

After August 8, 1991, and pursuant to their Reliever Agreement, her services were terminated.

On September 2, 1991, private respondent was once more asked to join petitioner company as a
probationary employee, the probationary period to cover 150 days.

In the job application form that was furnished her to be filled up for the purpose, she indicated in the
portion for civil status therein that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months
earlier, that is, on May 26, 1991.

It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in the two successive reliever
agreements which she signed on June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991.

When petitioner supposedly learned about the same later, its branch supervisor in Baguio City, Delia M.
Oficial, sent to private respondent a memorandum dated January 15, 1992 requiring her to explain the
discrepancy.

In that memorandum, she was reminded about the companys policy of not accepting married women for
employment.

On November 23, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando handed down a decision declaring that private
respondent, who had already gained the status of a regular employee, was illegally dismissed by petitioner.

NLRC affirmed LA

Issue: Whether or not the employee is illegally dismissed

Held: YES

The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in almost all phases of
social and political life, provides a gamut of protective provisions.

To cite a few of the primordial ones, Section 14, Article II on the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies, expressly recognizes the role of women in nation-building and commands the State to ensure, at

all times, the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. Corollary thereto, Section 3 of
Article XIII (the progenitor whereof dates back to both the 1935 and 1973 Constitution) pointedly requires
the State to afford full protection to labor and to promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all, including an assurance of entitlement to tenurial security of all workers.

Principal among these laws are

o

Republic Act No. 6727

Republic Act No. 6955

Republic Act No. 7192,

Republic Act No. 7322

Republic Act No. 7877

Republic Act No. 8042

In the Labor Code, provisions governing the rights of women workers are found in Articles 130 to 138
thereof. Article 130 involves the right against particular kinds of night work while Article 132 ensures the
right of women to be provided with facilities and standards which the Secretary of Labor may establish to
ensure their health and safety.

For purposes of labor and social legislation, a woman working in a nightclub, cocktail lounge, massage
clinic, bar or other similar establishments shall be considered as an employee under Article 138. Article
135, on the other hand, recognizes a womans right against discrimination with respect to terms and
conditions of employment on account simply of sex.

Finally, and this brings us to the issue at hand, Article 136 explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by
reason of the marriage of a female employee.

On the other hand, it is recognized that regulation of manpower by the company falls within the so-called
management prerogatives, which prescriptions encompass the matter of hiring, supervision of workers,
work assignments, working methods and assignments, as well as regulations on the transfer of employees,
lay-off of workers, and the discipline, dismissal, and recall of employees.

As put in a case, an employer is free to regulate, according to his discretion and best business judgment, all
aspects of employment, from hiring to firing, except in cases of unlawful discrimination or those which
may be provided by law

In the case at bar, petitioners policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman
worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all
women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution.

Contrary to petitioners assertion that it dismissed private respondent from employment on account of her
dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved principally because

of the companys policy that married women are not qualified for employment in PT&T, and not merely
because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.

Verily, private respondents act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could not be properly
characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because she wanted
to retain a permanent job in a stable company.

In other words, she was practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting
her civil status for fear of being disqualified from work.

While loss of confidence is a just cause for termination of employment, it should not be simulated.

It must rest on an actual breach of duty committed by the employee and not on the employers caprices.

Furthermore, it should never be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified.

Finally, petitioners collateral insistence on the admission of private respondent that she supposedly
misappropriated company funds, as an additional ground to dismiss her from employment, is somewhat
insincere and self-serving.

Concededly, private respondent admitted in the course of the proceedings that she failed to remit some of
her collections, but that is an altogether different story.

The fact is that she was dismissed solely because of her concealment of her marital status, and not on the
basis of that supposed defalcation of company funds

Parenthetically, the Civil Code provisions on the contract of labor state that the relations between the
parties, that is, of capital and labor, are not merely contractual, impressed as they are with so much public
interest that the same should yield to the common good.

It goes on to intone that neither capital nor labor should visit acts of oppression against the other, nor
impair the interest or convenience of the public.

In the final reckoning, the danger of just such a policy against marriage followed by petitioner PT&T is
that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and,
ultimately, of the family as the foundation of the nation.

That it must be effectively interdicted here in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as
discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land is not only in order but imperatively required.

Star Paper Corporation vs. Simbol

GR No. 164774,12 April 2006
Facts:
Petitioner was the employer of the respondents.
Under the policy of Star Paper, the employees are:
o 1. New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has a relative, up to the
3rd degree of relationship, already employed by the company.
o 2. In case of two of our employees (singles, one male and another female) developed a
friendly relationship during the course of their employment and then decided to get
married, one of them should resign to preserve the policy stated above.
Respondents Comia and Simbol both got married to their fellow employees.
Estrella on the other hand had a relationship with a co-employee resulting to her pregnancy on the
belief that such was separated.
The respondents allege that they were forced to resign as a result of the implementation of the said
assailed company policy.
The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC ruled in favor of petitioner. The decision was appealed to the
Court of Appeals which reversed the decision.
Issue: Whether the prohibition to marry in the contract of employment is valid?
Held:

It is significant to note that in the case at bar, respondents were hired after they were found fit for
the job, but were asked to resign when they married a co-employee.
Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of Simbol, then a Sheeting Machine Operator, to
Alma Dayrit, then an employee of the Repacking Section, could be detrimental to its business
operations.
Neither did petitioners explain how this detriment will happen in the case of WilfredaComia, then
a Production Helper in the Selecting Department, who married Howard Comia, then a helper in
the cutter-machine.
The policy is premised on the mere fear that employees married to each other will be less
efficient.
If we uphold the questioned rule without valid justification, the employer can create policies
based on an unproven presumption of a perceived danger at the expense of an employees right to
security of tenure.
Petitioners contend that their policy will apply only when one employee marries a co-employee,
but they are free to marry persons other than co-employees.
The questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it creates a
disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory, the only way it could pass judicial
scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the discriminatory, albeit disproportionate,
effect.
The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in imposing the questioned
policy cannot prejudice the employees right to be free from arbitrary discrimination based upon
stereotypes of married persons working together in one company.
Lastly, the absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in our jurisdiction
cannot benefit the petitioners.
The protection given to labor in our jurisdiction is vast and extensive that we cannot prudently
draw inferences from the legislatures silence that married persons are not protected under our
Constitution and declare valid a policy based on a prejudice or stereotype.

Thus, for failure of petitioners to present undisputed proof of a reasonable business necessity, we
rule that the questioned policy is an invalid exercise of management prerogative.
Corollary, the issue as to whether respondents Simbol and Comia resigned voluntarily has become
moot and academic.
In the case of Estrella, the petitioner failed to adduce proof to justify her dismissal. Hence, the
Court ruled that it was illegal.

Duncan vs Glaxo
Facts:

Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a medical representative on Oct. 24, 1995.

Contract of employment signed by Tecson stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by the
existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing future relationship by consanguinity or
affinity with co-employees or employees with competing drug companies and should management find that
such relationship poses a prossible conflict of interest, to resign from the company. Company's Code of
Employee Conduct provides the same with stipulation that management may transfer the employee to
another department in a non-counterchecking position or preparation for employment outside of the
company
after
6
months.

Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo's products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte area and
entered into a romantic relationship with Betsy, an employee of Astra, Glaxo's competition.
Before getting married, Tecson's District Manager reminded him several times of the conflict of interest but
marriage took place in Sept. 1998.
In Jan. 1999, Tecson's superiors informed him of conflict of intrest.
Tecson asked for time to comply with the condition (that either he or Betsy resign from their respective
positions).
In August 1999, Tecson again requested for more time resolve the problem. In September 1999, Tecson
applied for a transfer in Glaxos milk division, thinking that since Astra did not have a milk division, the
potential conflict of interest would be eliminated.
His application was denied in view of Glaxos "leastmovementpossible" policy. Unable to comply with
condition, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area.
After his request against transfer was denied, Tecson brought the matter to Glaxo's Grievance Committee
and while pending, he continued to act as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte
sales area and was paid his salary, but was not issued samples of products which were competing with
similar products manufactured by Astra.
He was also not included in product conferences regarding such products.
Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at the grievance machinery level, they submitted the matter
for voluntary arbitration. Glaxo offered Tecson a separation pay of onehalf (12) month pay for every year
of service, or a total of P50,000.00 but he declined the offer.
On November 15, 2000, the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered its Decision
declaring as valid Glaxos policy on relationships between its employees and persons employed with
competitor companies, and affirming Glaxos right to transfer Tecson to another sales territory.
the Court of Appeals denied TecsonsPetition for Review on the ground that the NCMB did not err in
rendering its Decision. The appellate court held that Glaxos policy prohibiting its employees from having
personal relationships with employees of competitor companies is a valid exercise of its
managementprerogatives

ISSUES:
1.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Glaxos policy against its employees marrying
employees from competitor companies is valid, and in not holding that said policy violates the equal

protection clause of the Constitution.

2.

Whether or not Tecson was constructively dismissed.

Held:

1.

On Equal Protection

NO. Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies, and other
confidential programs and information from competitors.
The prohibition against pesonal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon
Glaxo's employees is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might
compromise the interests of the company.
That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interest cannot be denied.
It is the settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the state or
those acting under color of its authority. Corollarily, it has been held in a long array of US Supreme Court
decisions that the equal protection clause erects to shield against merely privately conduct, however,
discriminatory or wrongful.
In any event, from the wordings of the contractual provision and the policy in its employee handbook, it is
clear that Glaxo does not impose an absolute prohibition against relationships between its employees and
those of competitor companies.
Its employees are free to cultivate relationships with and marry persons of their own choosing.
What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and the company
that may arise out of such relationships
Moreover, He is estopped from questioning said policy since the assailed company policy which forms part
of respondents Employee Code of Conduct and of its contracts with its employees, such as that signed by
Tescon, was made known to him prior to his employment.
Thus, he was aware of that restriction when he signed his employment contract and when he entered into a
relationship with Bettsy.
The company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to the employee to comply with the
policy. Indeed the application of the policy was made in an impartial and even-handed manner, with due
regard
for
the
lot
of
the
employee.

2.

On Constructive Dismissal

NO.
Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued
employment becomes impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is demotion in rank, or diminution
in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the
employee.
o None of these conditions are present in the instant case.
The challenged policy has been implemented by Glaxo impartially and disinterestedly for a long period of
time. In the case at bar, the record shows that Glaxo gave Tecson several chances to eliminate the conflict
of interest brought about by his relationship with Betsy, but he never availed of any of them.

Del Monte vs Velasco

Facts:

Lolita M. Velasco (respondent) started working with Del Monte Philippines (petitioner) on October 21,
1976 as a seasonal employee and was regularized on May 1, 1977. Her latest assignment was as Field
Laborer.

On June 16, 1987, respondent was warned in writing due to her absences. On May 4, 1991, respondent,
thru a letter, was again warned in writing by petitioner about her absences without permission and a
forfeiture of her vacation leave entitlement for the year 1990-1991 was imposed against her.

On September 14, 1992, another warning letter was sent to respondent regarding her absences without
permission during the year 1991-1992. Her vacation entitlement for the said employment year affected was
consequently forfeited.

In view of the said alleged absences without permission, on September 17, 1994, a notice of hearing was
sent to respondent notifying her of the charges filed against her for violating the Absence Without Official
Leave rule: that is for excessive absence without permission on August 15-18, 29-31 and September 1-10,
1994.The hearing was set on September 23, 1994.

Respondent having failed to appear on September 23, 1994 hearing, another notice of hearing was sent to
her resetting the investigation on September 30, 1994.It was again reset to October 5, 1994.

On January 10, 1995, after hearing, the petitioner terminated the services of respondent effective January
16, 1994 due to excessive absences without permission.

Feeling aggrieved, respondent filed a case for illegal dismissal against petitioner asserting that her dismissal
was illegal because she was on the family way suffering from urinary tract infection, a pregnancy-borne, at
the time she committed the alleged absences.

She explained that for her absence from work on August 15, 16, 17 & 18, 1994 she had sent an application
for leave to her supervisor, Prima Ybaez. Thereafter, she went to the company hospital for check-up and
was advised accordingly to rest in quarters for four (4) days or on August 27 to 30, 1994.

Unable to recover, she went to see an outside doctor, Dr. Marilyn Casino, and the latter ordered her to rest
for another five (5) consecutive days, or from September 5 to 9, 1994. She declared she did not file the
adequate leave of absence because a medical certificate was already sufficient per company policy.

On September 10, 1994 she failed to report to work but sent an application for leave of absence to her
supervisor, Prima Ybaez, which was not anymore accepted.

On April 13, 1998, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the Complaint for lack of merit.

NLRC reversed LA

CA affirmed NLRC

Issue: whether the petitioner discharged the respondent on account of pregnancy, a prohibited act.

Held: YES. CA affirmed

First. The Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Co. case is not applicable, principally because the nature
and gravity of the illness involved in that case chronic asthmatic bronchitis are different from the conditions
that are present in the instant case, which is pregnancy and its related illnesses.
o

The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the condition of asthmatic bronchitis may
be intermittent, in contrast to pregnancy which is a continuingcondition accompanied by various
symptoms and related illnesses. Hence, as to the former, if the medical certificate or other proof
proffered by the worker fails to correspond with the dates of absence, then it can be reasonably
concluded that, absent any other proof, such absences are unjustified.

As the CA and the NLRC correctly noted, it is not disputed that respondent was pregnant and that she was
suffering from urinary tract infection, and that her absences were due to such facts.

Petitioners contention that the cause for the dismissal was gross and habitual neglect unrelated to her state
of pregnancy is unpersuasive.

The Court agrees with the CA in concluding that respondents sickness was pregnancy-related and,
therefore, the petitioner cannot terminate respondents services because in doing so, petitioner will, in effect,
be violating the Labor Code which prohibits an employer to discharge an employee on account of the
latters pregnancy
o

Article 137 of the Labor Code provides this prohibition

The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the NLRC and the CA that the respondent was
able to subsequently justify her absences in accordance with company rules and policy; that the respondent
was pregnant at the time she incurred the absences; that this fact of pregnancy and its related illnesses had
been duly proven through substantial evidence; that the respondent attempted to file leaves of absence but
the petitioners supervisor refused to receive them; that she could not have filed prior leaves due to her
continuing condition; and that the petitioner, in the last analysis, dismissed the respondent on account of her
pregnancy, a prohibited act.

Petitioner puts much emphasis on respondents long history of unauthorized absences committed several
years beforehand. However, petitioner cannot use these previous infractions to lay down a pattern of
absenteeism or habitual disregard of company rules to justify the dismissal of respondent.

The undeniable fact is that during her complained absences in 1994, respondent was pregnant and suffered
related illnesses. Again, it must be stressed that respondents discharge by reason of absences caused by her
pregnancy is covered by the prohibition under the Labor Code.

Since her last string of absences is justifiable and had been subsequently explained, the petitioner had no
legal basis in considering these absences together with her prior infractions as gross and habitual neglect.

Phil Com Employees Union vs Philippine Global Communications

Facts:

Upon the expiration of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between petitioner Philcom Employees
Union (PEU or union, for brevity) and private respondent Philippine Global Communications, Inc.
(Philcom, Inc.) on June 30, 1997, the parties started negotiations for the renewal of their CBA in July 1997.
While negotiations were ongoing, PEU filed on October 21, 1997 with the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB) National Capital Region, a Notice of Strike, docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS No.
10-435-97, due to perceived unfair labor practice committed by the company
In view of the filing of the Notice of Strike, the company suspended negotiations on the CBA which moved

the union to file on November 4, 1997 another Notice of Strike, docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS No. 11-46597, on the ground of bargaining deadlock
On November 11, 1997, at a conciliation conference held at the NCMB-NCR office, the parties agreed to
consolidate the two (2) Notices of Strike filed by the union and to maintain the status quo during the
pendency of the proceedings (Annex "3", Comment, p. 567, ibid.).
On November 17, 1997, however, while the union and the company officers and representatives were
meeting, the remaining union officers and members staged a strike at the company premises, barricading
the entrances and egresses thereof and setting up a stationary picket at the main entrance of the building.
The following day, the company immediately filed a petition for the Secretary of Labor and Employment to
assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute in accordance with Article 263(g) of the Labor Code.
On November 19, 1997, then Acting Labor Secretary Cresenciano B. Trajano issued an Order assuming
jurisdiction over the dispute, enjoining any strike or lockout, whether threatened or actual, directing the
parties to cease and desist from committing any act that may exacerbate the situation, directing the striking
workers to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the Secretary's Order and for
management to resume normal operations, as well as accept the workers back under the same terms and
conditions prior to the strike.
The parties were likewise required to submit their respective position papers and evidence within ten (10)
days from receipt of said order
On November 28, 1997, a second order was issued reiterating the previous directive to all striking
employees to return to work immediately.
PEU also claims that Philcom has committed several unfair labor practices. PEU asserts that there are
"factual and evidentiary bases" for the charge of unfair labor practices against Philcom.

Issue: Whether or not there is unfair labor practices

Held:

Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the workers' right to organize.
The prohibited acts are related to the workers' right to self-organization and to the observance of a CBA.
Without that element, the acts, no matter how unfair, are not unfair labor practices.
The only exception is Article 248(f), which in any case is not one of the acts specified in PEU's charge of
unfair labor practice.
A review of the acts complained of as unfair labor practices of Philcom convinces us that they do not fall
under any of the prohibited acts defined and enumerated in Article 248 of the Labor Code.
The issues of misimplementation or non-implementation of employee benefits, non-payment of overtime
and other monetary claims, inadequate transportation allowance, water, and other facilities, are all a matter
of implementation or interpretation of the economic provisions of the CBA between Philcom and PEU
subject to the grievance procedure.
The Court has always respected a company's exercise of its prerogative to devise means to improve its
operations. Thus, we have held that management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion and
judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, supervision and transfer of
employees, working methods, time, place and manner of work
Even assuming arguendo that Philcom had violated some provisions in the CBA, there was no showing that
the same was a flagrant or malicious refusal to comply with its economic provisions. The law mandates that
such violations should not be treated as unfair labor practices.
The bottom line is that PEU should have immediately resorted to the grievance machinery provided for in
the CBA.
In disregarding this procedure, the union leaders who knowingly participated in the strike have acted
unreasonably. The law cannot interpose its hand to protect them from the consequences of their illegal acts

A strike declared on the basis of grievances which have not been submitted to the grievance committee as
stipulated in the CBA of the parties is premature and illegal.
Having held the strike illegal and having found that PEU's officers and members have committed illegal
acts during the strike, we hold that no writ of execution should issue for the return to work of PEU officers
who participated in the illegal strike, and PEU members who committed illegal acts or who defied the
return-to-work orders that the Secretary issued on 19 November 1997 and 28 November 1997.
The issue of who participated in the illegal strike, committed illegal acts, or defied the return-to-work
orders is a question of fact that must be resolved in the appropriate proceedings before the Secretary of
Labor.

Domingo vs Rayala
Facts:

Sexual harassment is an imposition of misplaced superiority which is enough to dampen an employees

spirit and her capacity for advancement. It affects her sense of judgment; it changes her life.
On November 16, 1998, Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC,
filed a Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala before Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
To support the Complaint, Domingo executed an Affidavit narrating the incidences of sexual harassment
complained of,
After the last incident narrated, Domingo filed for leave of absence and asked to be immediately

transferred. Thereafter, she filed the Complaint for sexual harassment on the basis of Administrative Order
No. 250, the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7877 in the Department of Labor and Employment
Lower courts held Rayala liable for sexual harassment

Issue: Whether or not Rayala is liable for sexual harassment

Held:YES

Indeed, we find no reason to deviate from this rule. There appears no valid ground for this Court to review
the factual findings of the CA, the OP, and the Investigating Committee.
These findings are now conclusive on the Court. And quite significantly, Rayala himself admits to having
committed some of the acts imputed to him.
He insists, however, that these acts do not constitute sexual harassment, because Domingo did not allege in
her complaint that there was a demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor as a condition for her
continued employment or for her promotion to a higher position.
Rayala urges us to apply to his case our ruling in Aquino v. Acosta.
We find respondents insistence unconvincing.
Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which states that the wrongful acts or
omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. An action for each
can proceed independently of the others.
This rule applies with full force to sexual harassment.
Likewise, contrary to Rayalas claim, it is not essential that the demand, request or requirement be made as a
condition for continued employment or for promotion to a higher position.
It is enough that the respondents acts result in creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for
the employee.
That the acts of Rayala generated an intimidating and hostile environment for Domingo is clearly shown
by the common factual finding of the Investigating Committee, the OP and the CA that Domingo reported
the matter to an officemate and, after the last incident, filed for a leave of absence and requested transfer to
another unit.
Rayala holds the exalted position of NLRC Chairman, with the rank equivalent to a CA Justice. Thus, it is
not unavailing that rigid standards of conduct may be demanded of him
Rayala has thrown every argument in the book in a vain effort to effect his exoneration. He even puts
Domingos character in question and casts doubt on the morality of the former President who ordered, albeit
erroneously, his dismissal from the service.
Unfortunately for him, these are not significant factors in the disposition of the case. It is his character that
is in question here and sadly, the inquiry showed that he has been found wanting.

Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corp vs NLRC

Facts:

Petitioner Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation (PAAUC) is a corporation duly organized and
existing under Philippine laws, petitioner Francis Chua is its President while private respondent Rosalinda
C. Cortez was a company nurse of petitioner corporation until her termination on 7 November 1994.
On 5 October 1994 a memorandum was issued by Ms. Myrna Palomares, Personnel Manager of petitioner
corporation, addressed to private respondent Rosalinda C. Cortez requiring her to explain within forty-eight
(48) hours why no disciplinary action should be taken against her
o
(a) for throwing a stapler at Plant Manager William Chua, her superior, and uttering invectives
against him on 2 August 1994;

(b) for losing the amount of P1,488.00 entrusted to her by Plant Manager Chua to be given to Mr.
Fang of the CLMC Department on 23 August 1994; and,
o (c) for asking a co-employee to punch-in her time card thus making it appear that she was in the
office in the morning of 6 September 1994 when in fact she was not.
The memorandum however was refused by private respondent although it was read to her and discussed
with her by a co-employee.
She did not also submit the required explanation, so that while her case was pending investigation the
company placed her under preventive suspension for thirty (30) days effective 9 October 1994 to 7
November 1994
On 3 November 1994 a third memorandum was issued to private respondent, this time informing her of her
termination from the service effective 7 November 1994 on grounds of gross and habitual neglect of duties,
serious misconduct and fraud or willful breach of trust
LA ruled in favor of the petitioner
NLRC reversed LA
o

Issue: Whether or not there is illegal dismissal

Held: YES.

As to the first charge, respondent Cortez claims that as early as her first year of employment her Plant
Manager, William Chua, already manifested a special liking for her, so much so that she was receiving
special treatment from him who would oftentimes invite her "for a date," which she would as often refuse.
On many occasions, he would make sexual advances - touching her hands, putting his arms around her
shoulders, running his fingers on her arms and telling her she looked beautiful.
The special treatment and sexual advances continued during her employment for four (4) years but she
never reciprocated his flirtations, until finally, she noticed that his attitude towards her changed.
He made her understand that if she would not give in to his sexual advances he would cause her termination
from the service; and he made good his threat when he started harassing her.
Private respondent admittedly allowed four (4) years to pass before finally coming out with her employer's
sexual impositions.
Not many women, especially in this country, are made of the stuff that can endure the agony and trauma of
a public, even corporate, scandal. If petitioner corporation had not issued the third memorandum that
terminated the services of private respondent, we could only speculate how much longer she would keep
her silence
This uneasiness in her place of work thrived in an atmosphere of tolerance for four (4) years, and one could
only imagine the prevailing anxiety and resentment, if not bitterness, that beset her all that time. But
William Chua faced reality soon enough.
Since he had no place in private respondent's heart, so must she have no place in his office.
So, he provoked her, harassed her, and finally dislodged her; and for finally venting her pent-up anger for
years, he "found" the perfect reason to terminate her.
If for this alone private respondent should be adequately compensated.
Thus, for the anxiety, the seen and unseen hurt that she suffered, petitioners should also be made to pay her
moral damages, plus exemplary damages, for the oppressive manner with which petitioners effected her
dismissal from the service, and to serve as a forewarning to lecherous officers and employers who take
undue advantage of their ascendancy over their employees.
All told, the penalty of dismissal is too excessive and not proportionate to the alleged infractions committed
considering that it does not appear that private respondent was an incorrigible offender or that she inflicted
serious damage to the company, nor would her continuance in the service be patently inimical to her
employers interest.

Even the suspension imposed upon her while her case was pending investigation appears to be unjustified
and uncalled for.

Libres vs NLRC
Facts:

Petitioner Carlos G. Libres, an electrical engineer, was holding a managerial position with National Steel
Corporation (NSC) as Assistant Manager.
On 3 August 1993 he received a Notice of Investigation from Assistant Vice President Isidro F. Hynson Jr.,
his immediate superior, requesting him to submit a written explanation relative to the charge of sexual
harassment made by Susan D. Capiral, Hynsons secretary, allegedly committed by Libres sometime in May
1992, and subsequently to answer clarificatory questions on the matter.
The notice also warned him that failure to file his written explanation would be construed as a waiver of his
right to be heard.
On 14 August 1993 petitioner submitted his written explanation denying the accusation against him and

offering to submit himself for clarificatory interrogation.

Subsequently, Hynson Jr. conducted an internal investigation to which Libres and Capiral were invited to
ventilate their respective sides of the issue.
They readily responded.
The MEC, after deliberation, concluded that the charges against petitioner constituted a violation of Item 2,
Table V, of the Plants Rules and Regulations.
It opined that touching a female subordinates hand and shoulder, caressing her nape and telling other
people that Capiral was the one who hugged and kissed or that she responded to the sexual advances
are unauthorized acts that damaged her honor.
Referring to the Manual of the Philippine Daily Inquirer in defining sexual harassment, the MEC finally
concluded that petitioners acts clearly constituted sexual harassment as charged and recommended
petitioners suspension for thirty (30) days without pay.
Libres filed for illegal suspension
Petitioner primarily disputes the failure of the NLRC to apply RA No. 7877, An Act Declaring Sexual
Harassment Unlawful in the Employment, Education or Training Environment and for Other Purposes, in
determining whether he actually committed sexual harassment.
He asserts that his acts did not fall within the definition and criteria of sexual harassment as laid down in
Sec. 3 of the law.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is liable for sexual harassment

Held: YES

Republic Act No. 7877 was not yet in effect at the time of the occurrence of the act complained of. It was
still being deliberated upon in Congress when petitioners case was decided by the Labor Arbiter.
As a rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided, or except in a criminal case when
their application will favor the accused.
Hence, the Labor Arbiter have to rely on the MEC report and the common connotation of sexual
harassment as it is generally understood by the public. Faced with the same predicament, the NLRC had to
agree with the Labor Arbiter.
In so doing, the NLRC did not commit any abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the Labor
Arbiter.
As Mr. Justice Puno elucidated, As a managerial employee, petitioner is bound by more exacting work
ethics.
He failed to live up to his higher standard of responsibility when he succumbed to his moral perversity.
And when such moral perversity is perpetrated against his subordinate, he provides a justifiable ground for
his dismissal for lack of trust and confidence.
It is the right, nay, the duty of every employer to protect its employees from oversexed superiors.
Public respondent therefore is correct in its observation that the Labor Arbiter was in fact lenient in his
application of the law and jurisprudence for which petitioner must be grateful and not gripe against.

Barcenas vs NLRC
FACTS:

The Buddhist Temple has hired petitioner who speaks the Chinese language as secretary and interpreter.
The head monk, Chua Se Su, had sexual relations with petitioner, which resulted to the latter giving birth to
a child. In May, 1982, of five months before giving birth to the alleged son of Su on October 12, 1982,
petitioner was sent home to Bicol.
Upon the death of Su in July, 1983, complainant remained and continued in her job.
In 1985, respondent Manuel Chua (Chua, for short) was elected President and Chairman of the Board of
the Poh Toh Buddhist Association of the Philippines, Inc. and Rev. Sim Dee for short) was elected Head
Buddhist Priest.
Thereafter, Chua and Dee discontinued payment of her monthly allowance and the additional P500.00
allowance effective 1983.

Petitioner and her son were evicted forcibly from their quarters in the temple by six police officers.
She was brought first to the Police precinct in Tondo and then brought to Aloha Hotel where she was
compelled to sign a written undertaking not to return to the Buddhist temple in consideration of the sum of
P10,000.00. Petitioner refused and Chua shouted threats against her and her son.
Her personal belongings including assorted jewelries were never returned by respondent Chua.
Chua alleges that she was never an employee of the temple, but only attended to the personal needs of the
former head monk, hence was co-terminus with such.
LA ruled in favour of the petitioner. NLRC reversed.

ISSUE: WON petitioner is an employee of the temple

HELD:YES. Petitioner is an employee of the temple as secretary and interpreter.

Moreover, the work that petitioner performed in the temple could not be categorized as mere domestic
work.
We find that petitioner, being proficient in the Chinese language, attended to the visitors, mostly Chinese,
who came to pray or seek advice before Buddha for personal or business problems; arranged meetings
between these visitors and Su and supervised the preparation of the food for the temple visitors; acted as
tourist guide of foreign visitors; acted as liaison with some goverment offices; and made the payment for
the temples Meralco, MWSS and PLDT bills. Indeed, these tasks may not be deemed activities of a
household helper.
They were essential and important to the operation and religious functions of the temple.
In spite of this finding, her status as a regular employee ended upon her return to Bicol in May, 1982 to
await the birth of her love-child allegedly by Su.
The records do not show that petitioner filed any leave from work or that a leave was granted her.
Neither did she return to work after the birth of her child on October 12, 1982, whom she named Robert
Chua alias Chua Sim Tiong.
The NLRC found that it was only in July, 1983 after Su died that she went back to the Manila Buddhist
Temple. Petitioners pleadings failed to rebut this finding.
Clearly, her return could not be deemed as a resumption of her old position which she had already
abandoned.
Thus, her return to the temple was no longer as an employee but rather as Sus mistress who is bent on
protecting the proprietary and hereditary rights of her son and nephew. Finally, while petitioner contends
that she continued to work in the temple after Su died, there is, however, no proof that she was re-hired.

Apex Mining vs NLRC

Facts:

Private respondent Sinclita Candida was employed by petitioner Apex Mining Company, Inc. on May 18,
1973 to perform laundry services at its staff house located at Masara, Maco, Davao del Norte. In the
beginning, she was paid on a piece rate basis. However, on January 17, 1982, she was paid on a monthly
basis at P250.00 a month which was ultimately increased to P575.00 a month.

She had an accident and reported it to her immediate supervisor Mila de la Rosa and to the personnel
officer, Florendo D. Asirit.

Petitioner did not allow her to return to work and dismissed her on February 4, 1988.

LA ruled in favor of the complainants.

NLRC affirmed LA

Issue: Is the househelper in the staff houses of an industrial company a domestic helper or a regular employee of the
said firm?
Held: She is a regular employee

The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such househelper or domestic servant who is employed in the
employer's home to minister exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer's family.
Such definition covers family drivers, domestic servants, laundry women, yayas, gardeners, houseboys and
other similar househelps.

The definition cannot be interpreted to include househelp or laundrywomen working in staffhouses of a

company, like petitioner who attends to the needs of the company's guest and other persons availing of said
facilities.

The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in the home of said
employer.

While it may be true that the nature of the work of a househelper, domestic servant or laundrywoman in a
home or in a company staffhouse may be similar in nature, the difference in their circumstances is that in
the former instance they are actually serving the family while in the latter case, whether it is a corporation
or a single proprietorship engaged in business or industry or any other agricultural or similar pursuit,
service is being rendered in the staffhouses or within the premises of the business of the employer.

In such instance, they are employees of the company or employer in the business concerned entitled to the
privileges of a regular employee.

The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working within the premises of the business of the
employer and in relation to or in connection with its business, as in its staffhouses for its guest or even for its
officers and employees, warrants the conclusion that such househelper or domestic servant is and should be
considered as a regular employee of the employer
Ultra Villa Food Haus vs Geniston
Facts:

During the elections of May 11, 1992, private respondent acted as a Poll Watcher for the National Union of
Christian Democrats. The counting of votes lasted until 3:00 p.m. the next day, May 12. Private respondent
did not report for work on both days on account of his poll-watching.

Upon arriving home on May 12, private respondent discovered that Tio had phoned his mother that
morning. Tio allegedly gave his mother an inscrutable verbal lashing, and informed the latter that private
respondent was dismissed from work. On May 13, 1992, private respondent went to Tios residence to plead
his case only to be subjected to a brow beating by Tio who even attempted to force him to sign a
resignation letter.

Private respondent prayed that the Labor Arbiter order petitioner Tio to pay him overtime pay, premium
pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, salary differential and 13th month pay. He likewise prayed for
reinstatement plus backwages or, in the alternative, separation pay, as well as moral damages, exemplary
damages and attorneys fees.

The Labor Arbiter found that private respondent was indeed petitioners personal driver. Private respondents
claim that he was an employee of the Ultra Villa Food Haus was deemed by the Labor Arbiter to be a mere
afterthought

Issue: Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to 13th month pay
Held: By Law he is not entitled but the Court awarded him the benefit nonetheless due to the practice of the
petitioner of constantly giving him 13th month pay.

Employing the same line of analysis, it would seem that private respondent is not entitled to13 month
pay. The Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13 th Month Pay Law also excludes employers of
household helpers from the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 851

Nevertheless, we deem it just to award private respondent 13th month pay in view of petitioners practice of
according private respondent such benefit. Indeed, petitioner admitted that she gave private respondent 13th
month pay every December.

Remington vs Castaneda
Facts:

Erlinda Castaneda ("Erlinda") instituted on March 2, 1998 a complaint for illegal dismissal,underpayment
of wages, etc.

Erlinda alleged that she started working in August 1983 as company cook with a salary of Php4,000.00 for
Remington, a corporation engaged in the trading business;

Remington denied that it dismissed Erlinda illegally. It posited that Erlinda was a domestic helper,not a
regular employee

LA dismissed the complaint and ruled that the respondent was a domestic helper under the personal service
of Antonio Tan, finding that herwork as a cook was not usually necessary and desirable in the ordinary
course of trade andbusiness of the petitioner corporation,

Upon appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) rendered a Decision, datedNovember 23,
2000, reversing the labor arbiter,

Petitioner moved to reconsider this decision but the NLRC denied the motion. This denial of itsmotion
prompted petitioner to file a Petition for Certiorar i with the Court of Appeals,

While the petition was pending with the Court of Appeals, the NLRC rendered anotherDecision in the
same case on August 9, 2001. Evidence in support of complainants having actually filed a Motion for
Reconsideration within the reglementary period having been sufficiently established, a determination of its
merits is thus, in order.

On the merits, the NLRC found respondent s motion for reconsideration meritorious leading to the
issuance of its second decision with the following dispositive portion: the decision dated November 23,
2000, is MODIFIED byincreasing the award of retirement pay due the complainant.

Issue: Whether or not Erlinda is a domestic servant or a regular employee

Held:

We are not inclined to uphold the declaration below that complainant is a domestic helper of the family of
Antonio Tan. There was no allegation by respondent that complainant had ever worked in the residence of
Mr. Tan.

What is clear from the facts narrated by the parties is that complainant continuously did her job as a cook in
the office of respondent serving the needed food for lunch and merienda of the employees.

Thus, her work as cook inured not for the benefit of the family members of Mr. Tan but solely for the
individual employees of respondent.

Complainant as an employee of respondent company is even bolstered by no less than the certification
dated May 23, 1997 issued by the corporate secretary of the company certifying that complainant is their
bonafide employee.

This is a solid evidence which the Labor Arbiter simply brushed aside. But, such error would not be
committed here as it would be at the height of injustice if we are to declare that complainant is a domestic
helper.

Complainants work schedule and being paid a monthly salary of P4,000.00 are clear indication that she is a
company employee who had been employed to cater to the food needed by the employees which were
being provided by respondent to form part of the benefit granted them.

petitioner enjoys the prerogative to control respondents conduct in undertaking her assigned work,
particularly the nature and situs of her work in relation to the petitioners workforce, thereby establishing
the existence of an employer-employee relationship between them.