An Insight into Warehouse Fires

Technical Report

Contents
Introduction

The Extent of the Problem

Observations on Fire Prevention

Observations on Fire Control

Conclusion

13

References

14

Are you

Global Property & Casualty

storing up problems?

Cover Photo of Enchede fireworks factory explosion, 13 May 2000, courtesy of The German Press Agency.
Willis Warehouse Fires 2

Introduction
The first version of this technical report was published in1998 to highlight to our clients the disturbing trend
of large warehouse losses. This third version of the report follows the recent fire in the Dutch border town of
Enschede that graphically demonstrated the possible catastrophic and tragic results of warehouse losses.
This high profile loss adds another statistc to the warehousing sectors loss record that as an illustration
continues to represent 25 per cent of the total claims value handled by Global Property and Casualty (GPC).
This problem is not restricted to our client base and a wider review of the warehouse sectors loss record
shows large fire incidents to be a widespread problem. Certainly our experience shows that this trend appears
to continue unabated which is why we again wish to stress the many lessons apparently going unheeded
from previous incidents.
This review is intended to assist those responsible for the
protection of warehouses to identify the variety of problems that
can arise and learn from the many incidents that have occurred.
The review is also intended to raise the awareness of
organisations to the potential damage that can result from major
warehouse incidents. Property damage is an obvious result of
large fire losses but the associated disruption to operations and
business interruption potential may not be fully appreciated.
Furthermore, there is likely to be no hiding place from adverse
press comment following a warehouse fire which by their nature
are spectacular, and hence newsworthy events. Such press
coverage often leads to damaged corporate reputation and
a negative effect on client confidence which add to the
unaccounted losses an organisation may suffer following
a storage fire.
Our review of past incidents has shown that major fire
losses are not typically caused by a single incident. More
often major fires are a result of a string of unforeseen events
and circumstances leading up to ignition and during
subsequent attempts to control the fire. To aid in understanding these events we have reviewed the leading
causation factors which typify large fire losses and identified
common characteristics which contribute to their scale.
These lessons have been presented from a fire prevention
(prior to ignition) and fire control (post-ignition) strategy
viewpoint. Our advice is that both aspects need to be
considered in any all-encompassing warehouse
protection strategy.
The risk of large warehouse fires always exists in any storage
facility and we aim to raise awareness to this risk. We have
therefore presented a Serious Storage Fire risk-ranking tool which
can be used to aid in qualifying the degree of risk at your
particular storage operations. This questionnaire-based tool
combines the likelihood and possible consequence factors of a
large fire into an overall risk ranking. When plotted on a risk map,
the relative risk of a major fire incident can be readily identified
to enable resources to be directed to priority areas.
Willis Warehouse Fires 3

The Extent of the Problem

An indication of the widespread nature of the warehouse fire
problem can be seen from a review of the loss statistics of
various national fire prevention organisations, insurance
companies and our own database. The number of fires
originating in storage facilities, which includes both
warehouses and storage areas associated with
manufacturing plants, averages around 15 per cent of
the total number of industrial fire incidents reported.
However, these incidents on average represent a
disproportionate 23 per cent of the total property damage
reported. These ratios are common across many statistical
studies and have remained relatively constant over the past
15 years. These findings raise concerns over the size and
continuing frequency of fires in storage facilities
and the failure of the industry to improve this record.
A common misconception is that a warehouse full of
non-combustible products does not pose a fire hazard.
However, packaging materials commonly found in use today
plastic wrapping, cardboard boxes, wooden crates, plastic
or wooden pallets all contribute to the spread of fire.
Indeed, fires involving low risk materials such as metal parts
packed in cardboard will generate ceiling air temperatures
in excess of 650C. Steel structures begin to lose strength at
approximately 600C leading to the possible collapse of
warehouse buildings within ten minutes of a fire taking hold. The
threat of fire should therefore never be underestimated for any
storage facility.
A review of the causes of storage area fires reveals that arson
incidents are the primary cause with significant contributions
also made by open flame, electrical equipment and external/
natural exposures.

Major causes of storage property fires (1993 - 1997)

Arson/Suspicious

23%
11%

Exposures (to hostile fire)

Natural Causes

Open Flame

8%

17%

7%
3%
Electrical

10%

12%
9%

Source: (2) National Fire Prevention Association (USA)

Willis Warehouse Fires 4

Heating Equipment
Smoking
Other Equipment
Other

Comparison of serious storage fires with all serious fires (1993-1997)

40

Loss value of storage fires as a

percentage of all serious losses

Number of storage area fires as

a percentage of all serious fires

35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

Source: (1) Fire Prevention Association (UK)

The threat of fire

never be

underes

for any storage facility

Observations on Fire Prevention

The leading causes of warehouse fires indicate the areas where
the greatest benefit can be gained from fire prevention efforts. In
this section, we review each of these likelihood factors that
influence the possibility of a fire.
Arson
The deliberate starting of fires continues to be one of the
leading causes of fires in storage areas with insurers paying
over 1 million per day in arson claims in the United Kingdom
alone. Employees or outsiders can initiate such acts with
motives ranging from revenge or excitement to covering
criminal activities. With such a widespread risk it has proven
difficult to protect storage facilities against a determined
arsonist but with careful consideration and understanding
of the problem the risk can be minimised.

should

timated
The prevention of arson must be multi-faceted and always
designed to stay one step ahead of the arsonist. Basic security
measures will help to protect a facility and should encompass
secure perimeter fencing, external lighting and regular, but
variable patrols of the facility by reputable security personnel.
Additional precautions to provide an extra level of protection
include intruder detection, CCTV monitoring, access control,
identification badges, and random inventory and security
checks.

Open Flames and Hot Surfaces

These common ignition sources are not normally
associated with storage areas until further thought is
given to their possible existence gas fired shrink- wrap
equipment, permanent and temporary heaters, steam
pipes, cutting and welding operations, smoking, etc.
All open flames and hot surfaces must be considered
as possible ignition sources and controlled accordingly.
n

Shrink-wrap

This common packaging method is performed by four

main types of equipment including batch ovens; tunnel
ovens, in which the product is moved on conveyors;
pillar units in which heat guns are either lowered onto
or rotated around the pallet; and portable equipment.
Shrink-wrap equipment can be either electrically
heated or gas fired and is generally designed to operate
in the region of 250C. However, the temperature at the
outlet nozzle of some hot-air guns may reach 900C.
Shrink-wrap equipment has caused many incidents
due to the inappropriate positioning of the equipment,
its use on unsuitable goods e.g. flammable materials,
the malfunction or maloperation of the equipment and
the improper use of portable equipment.
Shrink-wrap equipment should preferably be
located in segregated and dedicated areas with superior
housekeeping standards. Fixed equipment should
be equipped with appropriate safety trips e.g. thermal
cut-out and loss of movement devices, to prevent the
overheating of product upon a malfunction. Furthermore, strict guidance and training in the use of portable
shrink-wrap equipment should be provided.
Extreme care should always be taken with shrinkwrap operations and consideration given to introducing
safer alternatives, such as stretch-wrapping.

UK, 1999

Belgium, 1996

A suspected arson fire originated at a publicly accessible

wall of this 19,000m2 domestic appliance warehouse which
led to the complete destruction of the building and contents.
The loss of the companys main UK distribution facility led to
several large clients threatening to de-list the company
resulting in possible long-term loss of market. Extreme efforts
were required to successfully mitigate the loss of custom.

A 10,000m2 third-party warehouse storing plastic pellets

was completely destroyed following a fire believed to have
originated from a pallet of product that had been
recently manually shrink-wrapped. Although the cause
could not be categorically determined, all open flame
shrink-wrap equipment has now been banned
throughout the company.

Willis Warehouse Fires 5

Observations on Fire Prevention - continued

Cutting and welding

This type of operation is usually only performed

occasionally or by contractors who may not be fully
aware of existing fire hazards. An open flame permit
system and procedure will help to ensure the worker
must first formally seek approval before any work is
conducted. In this way a trained employee will have
the opportunity to highlight any safety precautions
required and supervise the work. Such controls are
essential for facility management to remain in
control of these transient ignition hazards.
n

Smoking

Unauthorised smoking must be controlled through a

well defined and strictly enforced policy. To be effective
the policy should be formalised to define the exact
extent of safe smoking areas and outline the disciplinary
procedures if personnel or contractors are found
disobeying the policy.
n

Heaters and hot surfaces

Storage should be maintained at a safe distance from

these common ignition sources preferably by careful
positioning or by providing heat barriers and shields.
Special attention should be given to portable heaters to
control their positioning and ensure they are maintained
in a safe working condition.

Bradford, UK 1992(3)
A fire started in a raw material warehouse when
drums of azodiisobutyronitrile (AZDN) ruptured
due to their proximity to a hot steam condensate
pipe. The material reacted with adjacent incompatible
materials leading to a complete loss of the
warehouse and extensive contamination of local
rivers. As a result of the lessons learnt the rebuilt
facility was protected by sprinkler systems with fire
wall segregation and a firewater catchment system.

Willis Warehouse Fires 6

Electrical Equipment
The ignition risk from electrical equipment can be
minimised by ensuring it is maintained through a
formalised maintenance programme performed by
qualified staff. Maintenance should be supplemented
by regular inspections (a combination of visual and
thermographic inspections is essential) and an
effective work order system to ensure problems are
rectified promptly.
Of particular note is the number of large warehouse
fires that have been reportedly caused by lighting
equipment failures. Light fixtures will invariably
be positioned directly above storage, presenting an everpresent ignition source if the fixtures mode of failure can
release hot material. This risk is common to every storage
area and a review of light fittings and maintenance should
be seen as an important aspect of fire prevention.
Key exposure areas to be aware of include:
n

High intensity discharge (HID) lamps

As lamp technology has improved, pressures inside HID

lamps have reached 4.8 bar with temperatures in excess of
1000C. Violent failures of HID lamps can discharge large
and hot fragments onto vulnerable storage and such lamps
have been identified as the likely cause of ignition in several
recent fires.
Such fixtures should be reviewed to ensure integral
barriers are provided to prevent the discharge of hot
fragments. Otherwise, HID bulbs should be specifically
designed for use without barriers.

Observations on Fire Prevention - continued

Fluorescent lamps

The maximum surface temperature of typical

fluorescent lamp components is 90C. If positioned close
to storage, or if dust is allowed to collect on the
components, a fire can result. Furthermore, if the units
are used beyond their expected service life, electrical
failures can cause arcing and overheating.

Storage can be exposed to many ignition sources either

from internal or external sources:
n

It is preferrable to provide dedicated storage

areas, however this may not always be possible.
Therefore, non-segregated manufacturing or other
activities located alongside storage areas may present
sources of ignition. A common approach to prevent
cross exposure is to install fire barriers or walls to
achieve adequate segregation.

Wilton, UK 1995(3)
A plastics warehouse was completely lost to fire
resulting in a US$14 million stock loss. The probable
cause was concluded to be the failure of a fluorescent light
fitting which resulted in molten acrylic from the light
cover dripping onto storage. Both the design and
maintenance of the lighting systems were considered to
be at fault. Subsequently the light design was reviewed
and the previous breakdown approach to light fitting
maintenance was replaced by a formal inspection and
maintenance programme.

Accepted good practice for the maintenance

of continuously operating electric discharge lighting systems
is to switch the lamps off for 15 minutes each week. Lamps
approaching the end of their useful life will then fail to restart
and can be replaced before they have the opportunity to
fail in service.

Internal exposures

Natural exposures

Lightning is the most common natural ignition source.

Protection is achieved via lightning conductors and
grounding systems installed in accordance with
national codes and standards.
n

External exposures

Neighbouring activities, buildings and vegetation are

generally beyond the control of facility management
but may present a higher risk of ignition than well
controlled on-site hazards. Protection strategies and
emergency plans need to consider these off-site issues.
India, 1994(4)
Sparks from a fireworks display during a festival
triggered an explosion and fire in a nearby fireworks
warehouse. 22 people died in the incident.

Willis Warehouse Fires 7

Observations on Fire Control

A recent study(5) reported that on average there are between
one and five fire incidents annually per storage premises, the
majority of which are controlled by manual intervention.
However, a proportion of these fires grow beyond this stage
turning into reportable fire incidents (1 in 250 incidents)
requiring fire brigade intervention with a further 1 in 750
incidents developing into serious fires resulting in roof
collapse. A review of these serious incidents shows a number
of common themes which alone, or in combination, result in
the uncontrolled escalation of a fire into a serious incident:
delayed detection or notification of fire
the rapid spread of fire beyond the original source due to
the involvement of aerosols, flammable products,
combustible construction, incompatibility of stored
products or poor housekeeping
large open storage areas without fire walls or breaks
lack or failure of automatic sprinkler systems to effectively
control the fire
the generation of large quantities of smoke
environmental effects
In this section, we review each of these factors to aid our
understanding of how to best limit the size of a fire incident.
Fire Detection
Storage areas are heavily dependent on manual fire-fighting
resources to limit the spread of fire and accomplish final
extinguishment. During the critical early stages of a fire, any
delay in notification of the incident will severely hinder the
effectiveness of the responding fire brigade and result in a
significant increase in the fires impact. It is therefore
important that a fire is detected early and the alarm is swiftly
notified through to fire-fighters.

Source: (6) Allendale

Average Loss Per Serious Incident

(1985 - 1994 gross loss*)
US$ 3,453,000
US$ 5,930,700
*Non-sprinklered warehouses. Values indexed to 2000.

A further adverse aspect of storage area fires is that over

60 per cent of fires occur between the hours of 18.00 and
06.00(1,5). Premises are generally lightly staffed or unoccupied
during these times, leading to the increased probability that
a fire will grow undetected.

Willis Warehouse Fires 8

Fire Spread
Fire spread through storage areas is dependent upon the
fire characteristics of the product involved, storage
arrangements and the materials of construction of the
building itself. If not correctly accounted for, the rapid
spread of fire can lead to a fire growing beyond the
capabilities of both automatic fire protection systems and
the manual fire-fighting response resulting in the
complete loss of large storage buildings. The following
aspects have repeatedly proved to increase the speed
of fire spread:
n

mixed storage in third-party warehousing.

Fire Brigade Response

Effective
Ineffective

These factors combine to highlight the need to provide

some form of continuous fire detection together with
emergency notification procedures for storage areas.
Fires can be detected in their incipient stage by either
automatic fire detection systems, watchman patrols and/
or continuous occupation of the area. A suitable level of
round-the-clock fire surveillance should be considered for all
storage facilities and procedures developed to ensure alarms
are quickly relayed to the relevant fire response centre.

Aerosols and flammable liquids

Special attention must be given to these products

since they can accelerate fire spread due to the
missile effect produced by exploding aerosols and
the flowing properties of flammable liquids.
Specifically designed automatic protection systems
and/or adequate segregation are considered the only
effective means of fire control for such high hazard
storage. Specific fire protection guidance is available
in the National Fire Codes published by the
National Fire Prevention Association (USA) and other
relevant national fire codes.

Ohio, USA 1987(7)

An accidental spill of solvent was ignited by a fork lift
truck in a 17,000 m2 automotive paint distribution
centre. Although the facility was fully sprinklered, the
fire spread so rapidly it overwhelmed both the sprinkler
system and the fire brigade who arrived within six
minutes of the first alarm. The initial 40 litre spill fire
spread through the entire 5,600,000 litre stock of
paints and solvents within 28 minutes!

Observations on Fire Control - continued

Combustible construction

Building materials can contribute to the rapid spread

of fire either alone or in combination with combustible
storage. Construction features to be aware of include:
combustible insulation panels, particularly those
containing foam plastic as commonly found in
cold stores
combustible water-proofing and insulation layers
on steel-deck roofing panels
spray-on internal insulation materials
combustible structural elements
e.g. wood plank roofing or joists.
n

Construction features should also be included in

any fire control strategy review and mitigated by either
specifying low or non-combustible construction
components or installing control features such as
firewalls, fireproofing barriers or automatic fire
protection systems.

Incompatible and hazardous storage

Many chemical products should never be stored together

due to their particular properties e.g. oxidising and
reducing agents, water reactive chemicals in sprinklered
areas, or self-igniting substances alongside general
storage. Trained personnel should review and continually
monitor storage to ensure all hazardous materials and
storage incompatibilities are identified. This awareness of
hazards will aid in the development of a suitable storage
and segregation policy, which if policed properly will
minimise the chance of ignition and reduce the risk of
rapid fire spread.
Guidance on the fire hazards and fire separation
for packaged materials is given in Health and Safety
Executive and Comit Europen des Assurances
guidelines (see Further Reading).

Housekeeping

Build-up of combustible waste, storage between racks

and uncontrolled storage located adjacent to external
walls can all aid the spread of fire. Particular care should
be taken during transient conditions such as seasonal
over-stocking when accepted standards are allowed
to slip. It should be recognised that the storage area
and hence downstream supply chain is at its most
vulnerable during these times. Good standards
of housekeeping should therefore be maintained
at all times.

Renfrew, UK 1977(8)

Enschede, The Netherlands 2000(10)

A transit warehouse stored sodium chlorate in drums

alongside sacks of milk powder. A fire started in waste
packaging outside the warehouse and spread through
the exterior wall of the building. Sodium chlorate is a
strong oxidising agent and when mixed with the
carbon-based milk powder created a severe fire and
explosion destroying the entire warehouse. Personnel
were unaware of the consequences of mixing these
two seemingly low hazard materials.

A fire in this fireworks warehouse detonated an

estimated 100 tonnes of explosives leading to 18
deaths, 946 injuries and the devastation of the
surrounding residential quarter. The cause of the
initiating fire is still under investigation but arson and/or
improper storage practices are considered the leading
potential causes. However, what can be learnt from this
incident is that the consequences of a fire were not fully
appreciated before the event leading to inappropriate
positioning of the facility (see front cover).

Willis Warehouse Fires 9

Observations on Fire Control continued

Fire Walls
Fire walls are an important passive protection feature
which, if properly designed and used, can limit the spread
of fire through large storage areas. Common examples of
the use of fire walls include:
n

n
n

to segregate storage areas from manufacturing

and ancillary activities
to separate high hazard material from general storage
to restrict the amount of storage in any single
fire area.

Extreme care must be taken in the design and maintenance

of fire walls to ensure they do not become prematurely
breached during a fire. Common failures have included
inadequate design allowing fire to pass around or over the
barrier, failure of fire doors and shutters to operate
automatically and unprotected openings allowing fire and
smoke to pass unhindered. Fire walls should therefore be
carefully reviewed to ensure they continue to provide an
effective fire stop.

Automatic Sprinkler Protection

Sprinkler systems have a proven record in reducing the
financial impact of fire incidents. In addition, the action of
such systems has several spin-off benefits including improved
life-safety survival rates, reducing the scale of a fire and limiting
firewater run-off and environmental effects. Automatic
protection should therefore always be considered as the
preferred fire control strategy.
Warehouse Loss Experience
With sprinklers
Without sprinklers

Average Gross Loss Per Serious Incident

(1985-1994 gross loss*)
US$ 589,900
US$ 4,534,400

Source: (6) Allendale

*Values indexed to 2000

One important lesson to take from previous storage fires

is that a sprinklered warehouse may not necessarily be a
protected warehouse. A sprinkler system is designed to protect
materials with specific fire characteristics in defined storage
arrangements. If the fire characteristics of the storage increases
e.g. by the introduction of flammable liquids, increased plastic
content or increased storage height, the sprinkler system can
become inadequate and may not be capable of controlling a
developing fire. Studies(5) show seven per cent of fires in
protected storage areas are not controlled by sprinkler
systems due to inadequate design.
Any changes to arrangement and/or type of materials
stored may affect protection requirements. It is therefore
critical that storage is regularly monitored and a formal
change procedure considers the implications to protection
systems and strategy prior to any change in storage type or
arrangement. Notification of such changes should always be
given to the responding fire brigades to ensure they are
properly prepared.

Belgium, 1996

Cologne, Germany 1977(7)

This warehouse was divided into three compartments

by concrete fire walls as legally requested. A fire spread
through the fire wall due to intensive heat radiation
leading to a complete loss of the building. Similar storage
buildings separated by 30m of open space went
undamaged due to the actions of the local fire brigade.
This highlights that adequate spacing can provide the
most reliable form of fire segregation.

A fire in an automotive spares warehouse was believed to

have been started by careless smoking. Although the
building was sprinkler protected the fire overwhelmed the
system resulting in a complete loss of the facility. The
increasing content of plastics in automobiles was
recognised as the root cause of the incident. The design of
the original 1960s protection system had not increased in
line with the increased fire load of the plastic components
stored, resulting in its failure to control the developing fire.

Willis Warehouse Fires 10

Observations on Fire Control continued

Smoke Generation
Manual fire fighting inside large open warehouses is
extremely difficult and dangerous, and comes with
no guarantee of success. Heat and smoke generation,
which is a consequence of any fire, greatly hinders
fire fighters and can obscure the seat of a fire. In addition,
the smoke can spread far beyond the seat of the fire causing
widespread damage to perishable or sensitive products.
It is therefore critical to consider how smoke generated
by a fire will behave and how its effects can be minimised.
In particular, climate controlled storage areas require
special consideration as the air recirculation systems can
rapidly spread smoke to unaffected areas.
Smoke control strategies can mitigate these problems
using a number of features:
n

ventilation systems arranged to shut down or switch from

circulation to extraction mode upon early
smoke detection
heat and smoke vents installed at roof level to evacuate
products of combustion
smoke detection systems arranged to activate fire doors
during the early stages of a fire, hence reducing the spread
of smoke.

These features have the dual benefit of reducing

smoke damage to stored product and aiding the
responding fire brigade by improving visibility.

Environmental Effects

Smoke is an obvious and highly visible environmental

impact that storage fires create. Along with smoke, the
plume arising from a fire will contain unburned gases and
noxious materials that will eventually be deposited downwind. Fortunately, experience has shown that it is rare for
hazardous concentrations to occur at ground level but
residue drop-out may result in damage to a wide
surrounding area.
Of more concern are several recent cases that have
highlighted the need to consider the environmental effects
of firewater run-off. Environmentally sensitive products can
be washed into local watercourses and aquifers following
the application of large quantities of firewater during fire
fighting operations. The effect can be severe biological
damage over a wide area.

USA, 1997

Basle, Switzerland 1986(9)

A fire in a cold storage warehouse supposedly originated from

the failure of a HID light fitting. All aspects of the control of the
fire worked to plan with the sprinkler system and fire brigade
restricting the fire damage to around six per cent of the total
facility floor area. However, the relatively slow operation of fire
doors, due to fusible link activation, and the continued operation
of the air handlers, which was intended to restrict temperature
rises, resulted in over 90 per cent of stock in the warehouse
becoming smoke damaged and unsalvageable.

Fire in a non-sprinklered mixed chemical warehouse

created around 7,500 m3 of firewater run-off containing
30 tonnes of chemicals, which polluted over 250 km of
the River Rhine. The severe ecological damage created a
huge public relations backlash and caused the company
to discontinue sales of a range of products involved.

Willis Warehouse Fires 11

Observations on Fire Control continued

Contaminated firewater run-off can be minimised by the use of

automatic sprinklers since they only apply water to the fire area
and are more effective at controlling a fire during
its early stages, thereby reducing water usage. However,
in all cases a firewater run-off handling strategy should be
considered especially if environmentally sensitive products
can become involved.
Features of a strategy may typically include:
n

firewater catchment system with sufficient capacity to retain

expected run-off
sealing of building and/or site drains to prevent release of
run-off
close co-operation with local environmental authorities to
pre-plan a damage limitation response.

A further environmental issue arising from major fires can

be the disposal of fire damaged product. Depending on the
product and degree of contamination, local regulators can
classify fire damaged goods as hazardous material requiring
costly disposal. In one recent case the cost of disposal of the
damaged product equalled the cost to rebuild the
completely gutted warehouse.
Third-Party Warehousing
Off-site and third-party warehousing is commonly used to
accommodate spillover storage and for distribution
purposes. Although these facilities offer operational
flexibility, this is often at the cost of accepting lower fire
prevention and control standards. Furthermore, products
may be stored adjacent to other clients higher hazard or
non-compatible products significantly increasing exposure to
a serious fire, which is often not evaluated.
Standards of both fire prevention and control should be
specified in all third-party warehousing contracts. Regular
audits should also be undertaken to ensure standards are
maintained. To gain an insight into whether third-party
warehousing is providing acceptable standards, compare
the results of the enclosed risk-ranking questionnaire from
in-house warehouses with those from contracted facilities.

Willis Warehouse Fires 12

Conclusion
In todays economy an effective product distribution system
is seen as an essential pre-requisite to being a successful
business partner. Indeed, more and more management
time is focused on improving delivery performance and
shifting storage responsibilities further up the supply chain.
This has resulted in the logistics interface between
companies becoming a high profile issue upon which
continued business relationships depend.
At the heart of any product distribution system is the
warehouse, whose role in business continuity has been
generally under-valued in the past. This has resulted in
risk management efforts and fire protection investment
being diverted to more traditionally recognised business
critical areas such as manufacturing. This lack of attention
is in sharp contrast to the criticality of warehouses and
which we suggest has led to the unabated trend in
warehouse fires.
Our clear message to those responsible for warehouses
is to give careful consideration to the possible
consequences of a major fire. Loss history has shown that
serious fires will occur in dedicated warehouses,
manufacturing storage areas and third-party warehouses
whatever the product stored and therefore they should
never be discounted. There are a number of well known
contributory factors which have directly led to serious fires
in storage areas and continue to repeat themselves.
Lessons in fire prevention and control are therefore here for
all to note and if included within an all-encompassing
protection strategy can significantly reduce the risk and size
of major fire incidents.
The objective of this Technical Report is to assist the risk
management community to further raise awareness of the
wide range of exposures linked to warehousing. In order to
assist in this process, we have designed a Risk-Ranking Tool
for Serious Storage Fires which can be found at the back
of this report.

All our

knowledge

comes through
the correcting
of our mistakes

Karl Popper

Willis Warehouse Fires 13

References
1. Serious Storage Area Fires.
Fire Prevention Association, No. 318, March 1999.
2. The U.S. Fire Problem Overview Report. Leading Causes
And Other Patterns And Trends - Storage Properties
Excluding Dwelling Garages.
Fire Analysis and Research Division, National Fire
Protection Association, April 2000.
3. Loss Prevention Bulletin, Issue 132.
Institution of Chemical Engineers, December 1996.
4. Hazardous Cargo Bulletin Incident Log.
July, 1994.
5. The Probability of Fires in Warehouses
and Storage Premises.
Hymes and Flynn, 1992.

Further Reading

Chemical Warehousing, the Storage

of Packaged Dangerous Substances.
Health and Safety Executive, HMSO, 1998.
Recommendations for the Fire Protection
of Stores Containing Hazardous Substances.
Comit Europen des Assurances.
English version published by
The Loss Prevention Council, 1997.
Loss Prevention Council Recommendations
for Warehouse and Other Storage Places.
The Loss Prevention Council, March 1989.
The Control of Fire-water Run-off from
CIMAH Sites to Prevent Environmental Damage.
Health and Safety Executive, HMSO, 1995.

6. Unprotected Warehouses, Fire and Water.

Allendale, 1997.
7. Before the Fire.
Fire Prevention Strategies for Storage Occupancies.
National Fire Prevention Association, 1988.
8. The Fire and Explosion at Container Depot,
Renfrew 4 January 1977. HSE Report, HMSO, 1979.
9. Loss Prevention Bulletin, Issue 075.
Institution of Chemical Engineers, June 1987.
10. Exposure, Property and Engineering.
GE Frankona Re, September 2000.

For further information, please contact:

Kevin Snowdon
snowdonk@willis.com
Willis
Global Property & Casualty
One Camomile Street
London EC3A 7LA
Telephone +44 (0) 20 7488 8111
Fax +44 (0)20 7975 2402
Website: www.willis.com

Photographs courtesy of West Yorkshire Fire Service,

FirePix International and German Press Agency.

Risk-Ranking Tool
for Serious Storage Fires
The following questionnaire can be used to quickly measure the relative risk of serious
fires in your storage facilities. The first step is to complete the questionnaire and sum the
likelihood and consequence scores. The scores can then be used to position the overall serious
fire risk rating of a particular facility onto the risk map shown at the end. From their positions
on the risk map, different facilities can be compared and areas where improvements are
most needed can be identified.
Likelihood Factors - Fire Prevention Aspects
Arson
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Perimeter fence provided with locked gates during unoccupied times and illuminated?
Intruder alarm system installed and alarms continually monitored?
Continuous security guard presence and patrols?
Access control system installed?
Random inventory and security checks performed?

Open Flame Controls

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Shrink-wrap equipment used in storage area?

Shrink-wrap equipment protected by safety trip devices?
Hot work permit and procedures in place?
Defined smoking policy with clear signage and regularly policed?
Heaters and hot surfaces highlighted and segregated from storage?

Electrical Equipment
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Formalised maintenance programme practised on electrical equipment?

Programme includes thermographic and visual equipment inspections?
Qualified personnel used for maintenance and modifications to electrical system?
Light fittings designed to prevent hot fragments falling onto storage?
Lights maintained and inspected within regular maintenance programme?

Exposures
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Storage areas segregated from manufacturing or other activities by detachment or fire walls?
Severe external exposures e.g. high hazard facilities adjoin storage building with high risk of fire spread? (If YES go to 20)
Moderate external exposure: e.g. moderate-risk facilities nearby with adequate separation to hinder fire spread? (If YES go to 20)
Low external exposure: e.g. well detached facilities, light surrounding vegetation and low build-up of combustible waste?
Product stored in multi-tenant warehouse without product separation?

Total Likelihood Score (20 maximum)

Yes

No

0
0
0
0
0

+1
+1
+1
+1
+1

+1
0
0
0
0

0
+1
+1
+1
+1

0
0
0
0
0

+1
+1
+1
+1
+1

0
+3
+2
+1
+1

+1
0
0
0
0

Consequence Factors - Fire Control Features

Incompatible Materials
21.

Well defined hazardous material identification and segregation policy?

Yes

No

+1

Fire Spread
22. High fire loading e.g. products containing or packaged with an appreciable quantity of plastics, rubber or flammable liquids? (If YES go to 25) +3
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Medium fire load e.g. wood, paper or natural fibre cloth with limited plastic content? (If YES go to 25)
Low fire load e.g. non-combustible materials in paper, cardboard or wood packaging materials?
Aerosols and/or flammable liquids are stored alongside general storage?
The storage building contains extensive use of combustible construction materials, e.g. combustible insulation or roofing?
The storage area is divided into maximum 4,000 m2 areas by effective firewalls or detached by minimum 30m open spaces?

Fire Detection
28.
29.
30.

Storage areas are continuously manned?

Fire watch/security patrols are made through internal areas on a minimum two hourly frequency?
Automatic fire detection systems installed throughout all areas and continuously monitored?

Manual Fire Fighting Response

31.
32.

On-site and/or public fire brigade available within 5 minutes and capable of effective fire control?
Firewater supplies available - hydrants, water reservoirs?

Automatic Fire Fighting Protection

33.

Full coverage automatic sprinkler systems provided?

If YES to question 33 answer following:
33.1 Protection systems inspected monthly and serviced annually?
33.2 Protection system of proper design and adequate for stored products?
33.3 Changes in storage type and arrangement accounted for in design of sprinkler system?

+2
+1
+1
+1
0

0
0
0
0
+1

0
0
0

+1
+1
+2

0
0

+1
+1

+4

0
0
0

+1
+1
+1

+1

+1
0

0
+1

Smoke Control
34.

Smoke control strategy considered and aided by features such as smoke extraction systems,
heat and smoke vents, fire doors activated by smoke detectors?

Environmental Issues
35.
36.

Stored products are known to be environmentally sensitive?

Provisions made for firewater run-off?

Total Consequence Score (20 maximum)

20

Risk Ranking Map

Likelihood

High Risk
Priority for fire prevention improvements

Very High Risk

10
High Risk
Priority for fire control improvements

Medium Risk

Low Risk
0

10
Consequence

20

Willis
Global Property & Casualty
One Camomile Street
London EC3A 7LA
Telephone: +44 (0)20 7488 8111
Fax: +44 (0)20 7975 2402
7 Hanover Square
7th Floor
New York NY10004
Telephone: +1 (212) 344 8888
Fax: +1 (212) 344 8442
Website: www.willis.com