1

EN BANC
GR No. L-47362

December 19, 1940

JOHN F. VILLARROEL, appellant-appellant,

vs.
BERNARDINO ESTRADA, turned-appellee.
D. Felipe Agoncillo in representation of the appellantappelante.
D. Crispin Oben in representation of the defendant-appellee.
DECISION
Avancea,J.:
On May 9, 1912, Alejandra F. Callao, mother of defendant
John F. Villarroel, obtained from the spouses Mariano Estrada
and Severina a loan of P1, 000 payable after seven years
(Exhibito A). Alejandra died, leaving as sole heir to the
defendant. Spouses Mariano Estrada and Severina also died,
leaving as sole heir to the plaintiff Bernardino Estrada. On
August 9, 1930, the defendant signed a document (Exhibito B)
by which the applicant must declare in the amount of P1, 000,
with an interest of 12 percent per year. This action relates to
the recovery of this amount.
The Court of First Instance of Laguna, which was filed in this
action, condemn the defendant to pay the claimed amount
of P1, 000 with legal interest of 12 percent per year since the
August 9, 1930until full pay. He appealed the sentence.

It will be noted that the parties in the present case are,

respectively, the only heirs and creditors of the original debtor.
This action is brought under the defendant's liability as the only
son of the original debtor in favor of the plaintiff contracted,
sole heir of primitive loan creditors. It is recognized that the
amount of P1, 000 to which contracts this obligation is the
same debt of the mother's parents sued the plaintiff.
Although the action to recover the original debt has prescribed
and when the lawsuit was filed in this case, the question raised
in this appeal is primarily whether, notwithstanding such
requirement, the action taken is appropriate. However, this
action is based on the original obligation contracted by the
mother of the defendant, who has already prescribed, but
in which the defendant contracted the August 9, 1930 (Exhibito
B) by assuming the fulfillment of that obligation, as prescribed.
Being the only defendant in the original herdero debtor eligible
successor into his inheritance, that debt brought by his mother
in law, although it lost its effectiveness by prescription, is now,
however, for a moral obligation, that is consideration enough to
create and make effective and enforceable obligation
voluntarily contracted its August 9, 1930 in Exhibito B.
The rule that a new promise to pay a debt prescrita must be
made by the same person obligated or otherwise legally
authorized by it, is not applicable to the present case is
not required in compliance with the mandatory obligation
orignalmente but which would give it voluntarily assumed this
obligation. It confirms the judgment appealed from, with
costs against the appellant. IT IS SO ORDERED.
Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, and Horrilleno, MM., Concur.

2
FACTS:
On May 9, 1912, Alejandro Callao, mother of Juan
Villaroel, obtained a loan of P1,000 from spouses
Mariano Estrada and Severina payable after seven
years.
Alejandra died, leaving Juan Villaroel as sole heir,
Spouses Mariano Estrada and Severina also died,
leaving Bernardino Estrada as sole heir.
On August 9, 1930, Juan Villaroel signed a document in
which he declared to pay the debt of his deceased
mother in the amount of P1,000 with legal interest of
12% per annum.
The Court of First Instance of Laguna ordered Juan
Villaroel to pay the amount of P1,000 with an interest
of 12% per annum since August 9, 1930 until full
payment
Villaroel appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to prescription may be
waived or renounced.
HELD: Yes, right to prescription may be waived or
renounced. As a general rule, when a debt has already
prescribed, it cannot be imposed by the creditor.
However, a new contract which recognizes and
assumes the prescribed debt is an exception, for it
would be valid and enforceable. Hence, a person who
acknowledges the correctness of the debt and
promises to pay it despite knowing that the debt has

already prescribed, such as the case at bar, waived the

benefit of the prescription.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 46274

November 2, 1939

A.O. FISHER, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOHN C. ROBB, defendant-appellant.
Marcial P. Lichauco and Manuel M. Mejia for appellant.
Wolfson, Barrion and Baradi and Ignacio Ycaza for appellee.

VILLA-REAL, J.:
The defendant John C. Robb appeals to this Court from the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the
dispositive part of which reads:
Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant, who is ordered to pay to the
former the sum of P2,000, with interest at the legal rate
from March 11, 1938, until paid, plus costs.
The facts established at the trial without discussion are the
following:
In September, 1935, the board of directors of the Philippine
Greyhound Club, Inc., told the herein defendant-appellant

John C. Robb, to make a business trip to Shanghai to study

the operation of a dog racing course. In Shanghai, the
defendant-appellant stayed at the American Club where be
became acquainted with the plaintiff-appellee, A. O. Fisher,
through their mutual friends. In the course of a conversation,
the defendant-appellant came to know that the plaintiffappellee was the manager of a dog racing course. Upon
knowing the purpose of the defendant-appellant's trip, the
plaintiff-appellee showed great interest and invited him to his
establishment and for several days gave him information about
the business. It seems that the plaintiff became interested in
the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., and asked the defendant
if he could have a part therein as a stockholder. As the
defendant-appellant answered in the affirmative, the plaintiffappellee thereupon filled a subscription blank and, through his
bank in Shanghai, sent to the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc.,
in Manila telegraphic transfer for P3,000 in payment of the first
installment of his subscription. Later on the defendantappellant returned to Manila from Shanghai.
Some months thereafter, when the board of directors of the
Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., issued a call for the payment
of the second installment of the subscriptions, the defendantappellant sent a radiogram to the plaintiff-appellee did so and
sent P2,000 directly to the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., in
payment of the said installment. Due to the manipulations of
those who controlled the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc.,
during the absence of the defendant-appellant undertook the
organization of a company called The Philippine Racing Club,
which now manages the race track of the Santa Ana park. The
defendant immediately endeavored to save the investment of
those who had subscribed to the Philippine Greyhound Club,
Inc., by having the Philippine Racing Club acquire the
remaining assets of the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc. The
defendant-appellant wrote a letter to the plaintiff-appellee in
Shanghai explaining in detail the critical condition of the

4
Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., and outlining his plans to
save the properties and assets of the plaintiff-appellee that he
felt morally responsible to the stockholders who had paid their
second installment (Exh. C). In answer to said letter, the
plaintiff-appellee wrote the defendant-appellant requiring him
to return the entire amount paid by him to the Philippine
Greyhound Club, Inc., (exhibit E). Upon receiving this letter,
the defendant-appellant answered the plaintiff-appellee for any
loss which he might have suffered in connection with the
Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., in the same way that he
could not expect anyone to reimburse him for his own losses
which were much more than those of the plaintiff-appellee
(Exh. B).
The principal question to be decided in this appeal is whether
or not the trial court erred in holding that there was sufficient
consideration to justify the promise made by the defendantappellant in his letters Exhibits B and C.
In the fifth paragraph of the letter Exhibit B, dated March 16,
1936, addressed by the defendant-appellant to the plaintiffappellee, the former said: "I feel a moral responsibility for
these second payments, which were made in order to carry
out my plan (not the first payments, as you have it in your
letter), and Mr. Hilscher and I will see to it that stockholders
who made second payments receive these amounts back as
soon as possible, out of our own personal funds. "As it is, I
have had to take my loss along with everyone else here, and
so far as I can see that is what all of us must do. The
corporation is finally flat, so it is out of the question to receive
back any of your investment from that source; the only salvage
will be the second payment that you made, and that will come
from Hilscher and me personally, as I say, not because of any
obligation, but simply because we have taken it on ourselves
to do that. (And I wish I could find someone who would
undertake to repay a part of my own losses in the enterprise!)"

And in the seventh paragraph of the letter Exhibit C, dated

February 21, 1936, addressed by the same defendantappellant to the same plaintiff-appellee the former said the
following:
However, Mr. Fischer and I feel a personal responsibility to
those few stockholders who made their second payments,
including yourself, and it is our intention to personally repay
the amounts of the second payments made by those few.
. . . And, finally, paragraph 8 of the same letter Exhibit
C states: "We are to receive a certain share of the new
Philippine Racing Club for our services as promoters of
that organization, and as soon as this is received by us,
we will be in a position to compensate you and the few
others who made the second payments. That, as T
have said, will come from us personally, in an effort to
make things easier for those who were sportsmen
enough to try to save the Greyhound organization by
making second payments.
Article 1254 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
A contract exists from the moment one or more
persons consent to be bound with respect to another or
others to deliver something or to render some services.
And article 1261 of the same Civil Code provides the following:
ART. 1261. There is no contract unless the following requisites
exists:
1. The consent of the contracting parties;
2. A definite object which is the subject-matter of the
contract;

5
3. A consideration for the obligation established.
In the present case, while the defendant-appellant told the
plaintiff-appellee that he felt morally responsible for the second
payments which had been made to carry out his plan, and that
Mr. Hilscher and he would do everything possible so that the
stockholders who had made second payments may receive
the amount paid by them from their personal funds because
they voluntarily assumed the responsibility to make such
payment as soon as they receive from the Philippine racing
Club certain shares for their services as promoters of said
organization, it does not appear that the plaintiff-appellee had
consented to said form of reimbursement of the P2,000 which
he had directly paid to the Philippine Greyhound Club, Inc., in
satisfaction of the second installment.
The first essential requisite, therefore, required by the cited
article 1261 of the Civil Code for the existence of a contract,
does not exists.
As to the third essential requisite, namely, "A consideration for
the obligation established," article 1274 of the same Code
provides:lawphi1.net
In onerous contracts the consideration as to each of
the parties is the delivery or performance or the
promise of delivery or performance of a thing or service
by the other party; in remuneratory contracts the
consideration is the service or benefit for which the
remuneration is given, and in contracts of pure
beneficence the consideration is the liberality of the
benefactors.
And article 1275 of the same Code provides:

ART. 1275. Contracts without consideration or with an

illicit consideration produce no effect whatsoever. A
consideration is illicit when it is contrary to law or
morality.
Manresa, in volume 8, 4rth edition, pages 618-619 of his
Commentaries on the Civil Code, has this to say:
Considering the concept of the consideration as the
explanation and motive of the contract, it is related to
the latter's object and even more to its motives with
which it is often confused. It is differentiated from them,
however, in that the former is the essential reason for
the contract, while the latter are the particular reasons
of a contracting party which do not affect the other
party and which do not preclude the existence of a
different consideration. To clarify by an example: A
thing purchased constitutes the consideration for the
purchaser and not the motives which have influenced
his mind, like its usefulness, its perfection, its relation to
another, the use thereof which he may have in mind,
etc., a very important distinction, which precludes the
annulment of the contract by the sole influence of the
motives, unless the efficacy of the former had been
subordinated to compliance with the latter
as conditions.
The jurisprudence shows some cases wherein this
important distinction is established. The consideration
of contracts, states the decision of February 24, 1904,
is distinct from the motive which may prompt the
parties in executing them. The inaccuracies committed
in expressing its accidental or secondary details do not
imply lack of consideration or false consideration,
wherefore, they do not affect the essence and validity
of the contract. In a loan the consideration in its

6
essence is, for the borrower the acquisition of the
amount, and for the lender the power to demand its
return, whether the money be for the former or for
another person and whether it be invested as stated or
otherwise.
The same distinction between the consideration and
the motive is found in the decisions of November 23,
1920 and March 5, 1924.
The contract sought to be judicially enforced by the plaintiffappellee against the defendant-appellant is onerous in
character, because it supposes the deprivation of the latter of
an amount of money which impairs his property, which is a
burden, and for it to be legally valid it is necessary that it
should have a consideration consisting in the lending or or
promise of a thing or service by such party. The defendantappellant is required to give a thing, namely, the payment of
the sum of P2,000, but the plaintiff-appellee has not given or
promised anything or service to the former which may compel
him to make such payment. The promise which said
defendant-appellant has made to the plaintiff-appellee to return
to him P2,000 which he had paid to the Philippine Greyhound
Club, Inc., as second installment of the payment of the amount
of the shares for which he has subscribed, was prompted by a
feeling of pity which said defendant-appellant had for the
plaintiff-appellee as a result of the loss which the latter had
suffered because of the failure of the enterprise. The obligation
which the said defendant-appellant had contracted with the
plaintiff-appellee is, therefore, purely moral and, as such, is not
demandable in law but only in conscience, over which human
judges have no jurisdiction.1awphi1.net
As to whether a moral obligation is a sufficient consideration,
read in volume 12 of the American Jurisprudence, pages 589590, paragraphs 96, 67, the following:

SEC. 96. Moral obligation. Although there is

authority in support of the board proposition that a
moral obligation is sufficient consideration, such
proposition is usually denied. . . . .
The case presenting the question whether a moral
obligation will sustain an express executory promise
may be divided into five classes: (1) Cases in which the
moral obligation arose wholly from ethical
considerations, unconnected with any legal obligations,
perfect or imperfect, and without the receipt of actual
pecuniary or material benefit by the promisor prior to
the subsequent promise; (2) cases in which the moral
obligation arose from a legal liability already performed
or still enforceable; (3) cases in which the moral
obligation arose out of, or was connected with, a
previous request or promise creating originally an
enforceable legal liability, which, however, at the time of
the subsequent express promise had become
discharged or barred by operation of a positive rule of
law, so that at that time there was no enforceable legal
liability; (4) cases in which the moral obligation arose
from, or was connected with, a previous request or
promise which, however, never created any
enforceable legal liability, because of a rule of law
which rendered the original agreement void, or at least
unenforceable; and (5) cases in which the moral
obligation arose out of, or was connected with, the
receipt of actual material or pecuniary benefit by the
promisor, without, however, any previous request or
promise on his part, express or implied, and therefore,
of course, without any original legal liability, perfect or
imperfect.
SEC. 97. Moral obligation unconnected with legal
liability or legal benefit. Although, as subsequently

7
shown was formerly some doubt as to the point, it is
now well established that a mere moral obligation or
conscience duty arising wholly from ethical motives or
a mere conscientious duty unconnected with any legal
obligation, perfect or imperfect, or with the receipt of
benefit by the promisor of a material or pecuniary
nature will not furnish a consideration for an executory
promise. . . . .
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion
and so hold, that the promise made by an organizer of a dog
racing course to a stockholder to return to him certain amounts
paid by the latter in satisfaction of his subscription upon the
belief of said organizer that he was morally responsible
because of the failure of the enterprise, is not the
consideration rquired by article 1261 of the Civil Code as an
essential element for the legal existence of an onerous
contract which would bind the promisor to comply with his
promise.
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the costs
to the plaintiff.
Avancea, C.J., Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, Concepcion, and
Moran, JJ., concur.

8
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
1. The present action is not only against but a
violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is now
Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court;
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity
as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased,plaintiffsappellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and
Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees.
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.

BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro
Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to
dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery
of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at
the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant
Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence,
for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named
Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said
accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not
criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with
mistake."

2. The action is barred by a prior judgment

which is now final and or in res-adjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action against
defendant Marvin Hill, because he was relieved
as guardian of the other defendant through
emancipation by marriage.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for
reconsideration of the defendants of such denial, reiterating
the above grounds that the following order was issued:
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed
by the defendants on January 14, 1965 and
after thoroughly examining the arguments
therein contained, the Court finds the same to
be meritorious and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on
December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered by
ordering the dismissal of the above entitled
case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p.
40, Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)

9
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses
Elcano, are presenting for Our resolution the following
assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY
UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT I
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO
A VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111,
OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION
3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH
IS NOW FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;
III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO
2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE
INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS
RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT
THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4,
Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffsappellants, defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted

criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First

Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on
the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of
intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the
parties has favored Us with a copy of the decision of acquittal,
presumably because appellants do not dispute that such
indeed was the basis stated in the court's decision. And so,
when appellants filed their complaint against appellees
Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the
death of their son, the appellees filed the motion to dismiss
above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two
decisive issues presented for Our resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the
acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for
civil liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil
Code he applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the
undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained
of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting
subsistenee from his father, was already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a
reiteration and further clarification of the dual character,
criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of
obligation which was firmly established in this jurisdiction
in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court
postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice
Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa
criminal or delito and mere culpaor fault, with pertinent citation
of decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the works of
recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that
the same given act can result in civil liability not only under the

10
Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion
holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the
same act machinist. come under both the Penal Code and
the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent killeth
unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been
the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be
also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of
the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the
employer and not the employee who was being sued. (pp.
615-616, 73 Phil.). 1
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case
could have been prosecuted in a criminal case because his
negligence causing the death of the child was punishable
by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of
the same act of negligence being a proper subject matter
either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability
arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and
independent civil action for fault or negligence under article
1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the
separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana,
under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized,
even with regard to a negligent act for which the
wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a
criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he
could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his
crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court
specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus
that although J. V. House could have been criminally
prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only
punished but also made civilly liable because of his
criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded

damages in an independent civil action for fault or

negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. (p. 618, 73
Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked
should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But
inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been
little understood, in the past, it might not he inappropriate
to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes
not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to
hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only
to fault or negligence not punished by law, accordingly to
the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal
institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope
and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons
and damage to property- through any degree of negligence
- even the slightest - would have to be Idemnified only
through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In
such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasidelito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the
lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd
and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the
laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than
the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning
of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle
of such ancient origin and such full-grown development
as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and
made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil
Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case,
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in
a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to
make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous

11
cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown
beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a
preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant
can and should be made responsible in a civil action under
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise. there
would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi
jus Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of
both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject,
which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of
spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding
of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa
aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek
damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising
from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which
is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it
has nevertheless rendered practically useless and
nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based
on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the
present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual
course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the
harms done by such practice and to restore the principle of
responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et
seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we
caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow
on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no
longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal
Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better
safeguarding or private rights because it realtor, an ancient
and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an
independent civil action, not depending on the issues,
limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and
entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is

more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p.

621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a
reading of the foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia
that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code
therein referred to contemplate only acts of negligence and not
intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal that
the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but
that in fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be
seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of the
Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which
involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed,
Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the
time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations "which are
derived from acts or omissions in which fault or
negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the
subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to
quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline qualification,
"not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized
could lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation of the
letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth
lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning
of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of
such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa
aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made
enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code."
And so, because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code
Commission that drafted the original text of the new Civil
Code, it is to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted
after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not
punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the concept
of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character
or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter.
Thus, the corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the
new code, which is Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations

12
derived from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions
of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by
special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of
the new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision
(Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel or
extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal
and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal
law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of
ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and
individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such
distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa
extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by
decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as
clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding
Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177,
acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether
on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent
civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence,
but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But
said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of the Code)
Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to
only acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo
about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather
than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker
should be observed in applying the same. And considering that
the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil

Code definitely establishes the separability and independence

of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under
Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime
fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a
sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule
111, contemplate also the same separability, it is "more
congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in
harmony with modern progress"- to borrow the felicitous
relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7
Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it
refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he
is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both
scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability
referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively
to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as
a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even
by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia,
that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts
which may be punishable by law.4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the
criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict,
hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against
him.

13
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's
emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty.
Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the
conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from
responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon
emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under
Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the
minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article
399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or
absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary
concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's
person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as
though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or
alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his
father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court
only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article
2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity,
the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company." In the instant case, it
is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living
with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of
the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was
still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation
which is not unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the
reason behind the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with
their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation
of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to

prevent them from causing damage to third persons. 5 On the

other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing
that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless,
sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that
such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into
transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial
litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And
surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise
stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the
parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor,
does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and
alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be
done by their minor married child without their consent. (Art.
399; Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to
Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of
Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is
now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has
become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the
trial court is ordered to proceed in accordance with the
foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.
Martin, J, was designated to sit in the Second Division.

14
Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J, concurring:
Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act,
which is blameworthy, when judged by accepted legal
standards. "The Idea thus expressed is undoubtedly board
enough to include any rational conception of liability for the
tortious acts likely to be developed in any society." (Street, J.
in Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39
Phil. 587, 600). See article 38, Civil Code and the ruling that
"the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil action to the injured
person in the same manner and to the same extent as an
adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812 cited by Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs.
Tiangco, 74 Phil. 576, 579).
Footnotes
1 Referring to Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of
February 14, 1919.
2 Referring to Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil. 821.
3 Referring to Bernal et al, vs. House et al., 54 Phil. 327.
4 Parenthetically, Manresa seemingly holds. the contrary view
thus:
"Sin embargo, para no ineurrir en error hay que tener en
cuenta que los lineage. del precepts contenido en el presente
articulo son bastante mas reducidos, pues no se hallan
comprendidos en el todos los datios que pues tener por causa
la culpa o la negligencia.

"En efecto, examinando detenidamente la terminos general de

la culpa y de la negligencia. se observe que, tanto en una
como en otra de dichas causas, hay tres generoso o tres
especies distintas, a saber:
1. La que represents una accion u omision voluntaria por la
que results incumplida una obligacion anteriormente
constituida.
2. La que sin existencia de una obligacion anterior produce un
dano o perjuicio que, teniendo su origen en un hecho ilicito, no
reviste los caracteres de delito o falta; y
3. La que teniendo por origen un hecho que constituya delito o
falta produce una responsabilidad civil como accesoria de la
responsabilidad criminal.
"La primera de estas tres especies de culpa o negligencia es
siempre accesoria de una obligacion principal, cuyo
incumplimiento da origen a la terminos especial de la culpa en
materia de contratos, y el eatudio de esta debe harms al
examinar cada contrato, en especial, como lo hicimos asi,
analizando entoces los peculiares efectos de dicha culpa en
cada uno de ellos.
"La tercera de las especies citadas es accesoria tambien,
pues no puede concebirse su existencia sin la de un delicto o
falts que la produzca. Es decir, que solo al lado de la
responsabilidad criminal puede supuesto esa responsabilidad
civil y la obligacion proveniente de la culpa, ineurrir como una
consecuencia de la responsabilidad criminal, y, por
consiguente, su examen y regulacion perusal. al Derecho
penal.
"Como consecuencia de ello, results que la unica especie de
culpa y omisiones o negligencia que puede ser y es

15
meanwhile.' del presente capitulo, es la separability, o sea la
que sin la existencia de una obligacion anterior, y sin ningun
antecedents contractual, produce un dano o perjuico que tiene
su origen en una accion u omision culpable solo civilmente; as
decir, que siendo ilicita, no reviste sin embargo, los caracteres
de un delito o falta por no estar penada por la ley. Y aun
dentro de estos lineage hay que restringir aun mas los
terminos o la materia propria de este articulo, el cual se refiere
unicamente a la culpa o negligencia personates del obligado,
pero no a las que prudencia de actos o de omisiones de
persons., distintas de este." (pp. 642-643, Vol. XII, Manresa,
Codigo Civil Espanol.)
5 "Nuestro Codigo no ha seguido la escuela italiana, sino que
mas bien se ha instantaneous, en el criterio de la doctrina fullgrown puesto que impone la obligacion de reparar, el dano
causado en virtud de una presuncion juris tecum de culpa por
parte del que tiene bajo su autoridad o dependecia al
causante del daho, derivada del hicimos de no haber puesto el
cuidado y la vinculos debida en los actos de sus subordinados
para evitar dicho resultado. Asi es que, segun el parrafo ultimo
del art. 1,903, cesa dicha responsabilidad cuando se prueba
que los obligados por los actos ajenos emplearon toda la
diligencia de un buen padre de familia. Luego no es la causa
de la obligacion impuesta la representacion, ni el interes, ni la
necesidad de que haya quienes responda del dano causado
por el que no tiene personalidad in garantias de specialist.
para responsabilidad por siendo sino el incumplimiento
implicito o supuesto de los deberes de precaucion y de
prudencia que impuesta los vinculos civiles que unicamente al
obligado con las persons., por quienes debe representacion,
el mal causado, Por ese motivo coloca dicha obligacion entre
las que prudencia de la culpa of negligentj (pp. 670671,
Manresa, Codigo Civil Espanol, Vol. XII.)

16
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-32599 June 29, 1979
EDGARDO E. MENDOZA, petitioner
vs.
HON. ABUNDIO Z. ARRIETA, Presiding Judge of Branch
VIII, Court of First Instance of Manila, FELINO TIMBOL,
and RODOLFO SALAZAR, respondents.
David G. Nitafan for petitioner.
Arsenio R. Reyes for respondent Timbol.
Armando M. Pulgado for respondent Salazar.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:
Petitioner, Edgardo Mendoza, seeks a review on certiorari of
the Orders of respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 80803
dismissing his Complaint for Damages based on quasidelict against respondents Felino Timbol and Rodolfo Salazar.
The facts which spawned the present controversy may be
summarized as follows:
On October 22, 1969, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a
three- way vehicular accident occurred along Mac-Arthur
Highway, Marilao, Bulacan, involving a Mercedes Benz owned
and driven by petitioner; a private jeep owned and driven by
respondent Rodolfo Salazar; and a gravel and sand truck
owned by respondent Felipino Timbol and driven by Freddie
Montoya. As a consequence of said mishap, two separate
Informations for Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage to
Property were filed against Rodolfo Salazar and Freddie
Montoya with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. The race

against truck-driver Montoya, docketed as Criminal Case No.

SM-227, was for causing damage to the jeep owned by
Salazar, in the amount of Pl,604.00, by hitting it at the right
rear portion thereby causing said jeep to hit and bump an
oncoming car, which happened to be petitioner's Mercedes
Benz. The case against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, docketed
as Criminal Case No. SM 228, was for causing damage to the
Mercedes Benz of petitioner in the amount of P8,890.00
At the joint trial of the above cases, petitioner testified that
jeep-owner- driver Salazar overtook the truck driven by
Montoya, swerved to the left going towards the poblacion of
Marilao, and hit his car which was bound for Manila. Petitioner
further testified that before the impact, Salazar had jumped
from the jeep and that he was not aware that Salazar's jeep
was bumped from behind by the truck driven by Montoya.
Petitioner's version of the accident was adopted by truck driver
Montoya. Jeep-owner-driver Salazar, on the other hand, tried
to show that, after overtaking the truck driven by Montoya, he
flashed a signal indicating his intention to turn left towards the
poblacion of Marilao but was stopped at the intersection by a
policeman who was directing traffic; that while he was at a stop
position, his jeep was bumped at the rear by the truck driven
by Montova causing him to be thrown out of the jeep, which
then swerved to the left and hit petitioner's car, which was
coming from the opposite direction.
On July 31, 1970, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
Branch V, Sta. Maria, rendered judgment, stating in its decretal
portion:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the
accused Freddie Montoya GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of damage to property thru reckless
imprudence in Crime. Case No. SM-227, and hereby
sentences him to pay a fine of P972.50 and to

17
indemnify Rodolfo Salazar in the same amount of
P972.50 as actual damages, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, both as to fine and
indemnity, with costs.
Accused Rodolfo Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED from
the offense charged in Crime. Case No. SM-228, with
costs de oficio, and his bond is ordered canceled
SO ORDERED. 1
Thus, the trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any
liability, civil and criminal, in view of its findings that the
collision between Salazar's jeep and petitioner's car was the
result of the former having been bumped from behind by the
truck driven by Montoya. Neither was petitioner awarded
damages as he was not a complainant against truck-driver
Montoya but only against jeep-owner-driver Salazar.
On August 22, 1970, or after the termination of the criminal
cases, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 80803 with the Court of
First Instance of Manila against respondents jeep-owner-driver
Salazar and Felino Timbol, the latter being the owner of the
gravel and sand truck driven by Montoya, for indentification for
the damages sustained by his car as a result of the collision
involving their vehicles. Jeep-owner-driver Salazar and truckowner Timbol were joined as defendants, either in the
alternative or in solidum allegedly for the reason that petitioner
was uncertain as to whether he was entitled to relief against
both on only one of them.
On September 9, 1970, truck-owner Timbol filed a Motion to
Dismiss Civil Case No. 80803 on the grounds that the
Complaint is barred by a prior judgment in the criminal cases
and that it fails to state a cause of action. An Opposition
thereto was filed by petitioner.

In an Order dated September 12, 1970, respondent Judge

dismissed the Complaint against truck-owner Timbol for
reasons stated in the afore- mentioned Motion to Dismiss On
September 30, 1970, petitioner sought before this Court the
review of that dismissal, to which petition we gave due course.
On January 30, 1971, upon motion of jeep-owner-driver
Salazar, respondent Judge also dismissed the case as against
the former. Respondent Judge reasoned out that "while it is
true that an independent civil action for liability under Article
2177 of the Civil Code could be prosecuted independently of
the criminal action for the offense from which it arose, the New
Rules of Court, which took effect on January 1, 1964, requires
an express reservation of the civil action to be made in the
criminal action; otherwise, the same would be barred pursuant
to Section 2, Rule 111 ... 2 Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration thereof was denied in the order dated
February 23, 1971, with respondent Judge suggesting that the
issue be raised to a higher Court "for a more decisive
interpretation of the rule. 3
On March 25, 1971, petitioner then filed a Supplemental
Petition before us, also to review the last two mentioned
Orders, to which we required jeep-owner-driver Salazar to file
an Answer.
The Complaint against
truck-owner Timbol
We shall first discuss the validity of the Order, dated
September 12, 1970, dismissing petitioner's Complaint against
truck-owner Timbol.
In dismissing the Complaint against the truck-owner,
respondent Judge sustained Timbol's allegations that the civil

18
suit is barred by the prior joint judgment in Criminal Cases
Nos. SM-227 and SM-228, wherein no reservation to file a
separate civil case was made by petitioner and where the
latter actively participated in the trial and tried to prove
damages against jeep-driver-Salazar only; and that the
Complaint does not state a cause of action against truckowner Timbol inasmuch as petitioner prosecuted jeep-ownerdriver Salazar as the one solely responsible for the damage
suffered by his car.
Well-settled is the rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a
bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must
concur: (1) it must be a final judgment; (2) it must have been
rendered by a Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and over the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits;
and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions,
Identity of parties, Identity of subject matter and Identity of
cause of action.
It is conceded that the first three requisites of res judicata are
present. However, we agree with petitioner that there is no
Identity of cause of action between Criminal Case No. SM-227
and Civil Case No. 80803. Obvious is the fact that in said
criminal case truck-driver Montoya was not prosecuted for
damage to petitioner's car but for damage to the jeep. Neither
was truck-owner Timbol a party in said case. In fact as the trial
Court had put it "the owner of the Mercedes Benz cannot
recover any damages from the accused Freddie Montoya, he
(Mendoza) being a complainant only against Rodolfo Salazar
in Criminal Case No. SM-228. 4 And more importantly, in the
criminal cases, the cause of action was the enforcement of the
civil liability arising from criminal negligence under Article l of
the Revised Penal Code, whereas Civil Case No. 80803 is
based on quasi-delict under Article 2180, in relation to Article
2176 of the Civil Code As held in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al. 5

The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the

separate in. individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa
aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show
that there is a distinction between civil liability arising
from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code)
and responsibility for fault or negligence under articles
1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same
negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising
from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate
responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902
to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the
authorities above cited render it inescapable to
conclude that the employer in this case the defendantpetitioner is primarily and directly liable under article
1903 of the Civil Code.
That petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil
case is based on quasi-delict is evident from the recitals in the
complaint to wit: that while petitioner was driving his car along
MacArthur Highway at Marilao, Bulacan, a jeep owned and
driven by Salazar suddenly swerved to his (petitioner's) lane
and collided with his car That the sudden swerving of Salazar's
jeep was caused either by the negligence and lack of skill of
Freddie Montoya, Timbol's employee, who was then driving a
gravel and sand truck iii the same direction as Salazar's jeep;
and that as a consequence of the collision, petitioner's car
suffered extensive damage amounting to P12,248.20 and that
he likewise incurred actual and moral damages, litigation
expenses and attorney's fees. Clearly, therefore, the two
factors that a cause of action must consist of, namely: (1)
plaintiff's primary right, i.e., that he is the owner of a Mercedes
Benz, and (2) defendant's delict or wrongful act or omission
which violated plaintiff's primary right, i.e., the negligence or
lack of skill either of jeep-owner Salazar or of Timbol's
employee, Montoya, in driving the truck, causing Salazar's

19
jeep to swerve and collide with petitioner's car, were alleged in
the Complaint. 6
Consequently, petitioner's cause of action being based
on quasi-delict, respondent Judge committed reversible error
when he dismissed the civil suit against the truck-owner, as
said case may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation
not arising from the act or omission complained of as a
felony, such civil action may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of
the latter.
But it is truck-owner Timbol's submission (as well as that of
jeep-owner-driver Salazar) that petitioner's failure to make a
reservation in the criminal action of his right to file an
independent civil action bars the institution of such separate
civil action, invoking section 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court, which
says:
Section 2. Independent civil action. In the cases
provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil
action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action may be brought by the injured party during the
pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is
reserved as required in the preceding section. Such
civil action shau proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.
Interpreting the above provision, this Court, in Garcia vs.
Florida 7 said:

As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act

causing damages may produce a civil liability arising
from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa
extra-contractual. The former is a violation of the
criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and
independent negligence, having always had its own
foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of
the view that in accordance with Article 31, the civil
action based upon quasi-delict may proceed
independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal
negligence and regardless of the result of the latter.
Hence, 'the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with
reference to ... Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code
is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for
these articles were drafted ... and are intended to
constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in
what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which
is procedural, may also be regarded as an
unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles
32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide
for the reservation required in the proviso ... .
In his concurring opinion in the above case, Mr. Justice
Antonio Barredo further observed that inasmuch as Articles
2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code create a civil liability distinct
and different from the civil action arising from the offense of
negligence under the Revised Penal Code, no reservation,
therefore, need be made in the criminal case; that Section 2 of
Rule 111 is inoperative, "it being substantive in character and
is not within the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate;
and even if it were not substantive but adjective, it cannot
stand because of its inconsistency with Article 2177, an
enactment of the legislature superseding the Rules of 1940."
We declare, therefore, that in so far as truck-owner Timbol is
concerned, Civil Case No. 80803 is not barred by the fact that

20
petitioner failed to reserve, in the criminal action, his right to
file an independent civil action based on quasi-delict.

Neither would an independent civil action he. Noteworthy is

the basis of the acquittal of jeep-owner-driver Salazar in the
criminal case, expounded by the trial Court in this wise:

The suit against

jeep-owner-driver Salazar
The case as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, who was
acquitted in Criminal Case No. SM-228, presents a different
picture altogether.
At the outset it should be clarified that inasmuch as civil liability
co-exists with criminal responsibility in negligence cases, the
offended party has the option between an action for
enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminalunder
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action for
recovery of damages based on culpa aquilianaunder Article
2177 of the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil
liability based on culpa criminal under section 1 of Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court is deemed simultaneously instituted with
the criminal action, unless expressly waived or reserved for
separate application by the offended party. 8
The circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the
conclusion that petitioner had opted to base his cause of
action against jeep-owner-driver Salazar on culpa criminal and
not on culpa aquiliana as evidenced by his active participation
and intervention in the prosecution of the criminal suit against
said Salazar. The latter's civil liability continued to be involved
in the criminal action until its termination. Such being the case,
there was no need for petitioner to have reserved his right to
file a separate civil action as his action for civil liability was
deemed impliedly instituted in Criminal Case No. SM-228.

In view of what has been proven and established

during the trial, accused Freddie Montoya would be
held able for having bumped and hit the rear portion of
the jeep driven by the accused Rodolfo Salazar,
Considering that the collision between the jeep driven
by Rodolfo Salazar and the car owned and driven by
Edgardo Mendoza was the result of the hitting on the
rear of the jeep by the truck driven by Freddie Montoya,
this Court behaves that accused Rodolfo Salazar
cannot be held able for the damages sustained by
Edgardo Mendoza's car. 9
Crystal clear is the trial Court's pronouncement that under the
facts of the case, jeep-owner-driver Salazar cannot be held
liable for the damages sustained by petitioner's car. In other
words, "the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. "
Accordingly, inasmuch as petitioner's cause of action as
against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is ex- delictu, founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, the civil action must be
held to have been extinguished in consonance with Section
3(c), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court 10 which provides:
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In
all cases not included in the preceding section the
following rules shall be observed:
xxx xxx xxx
c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds

21
from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil night arise did not exist. ...

No costs.
SO ORDERED.

And even if petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-ownerdriver Salazar were not ex-delictu, the end result would be the
same, it being clear from the judgment in the criminal case that
Salazar's acquittal was not based upon reasonable doubt,
consequently, a civil action for damages can no longer be
instituted. This is explicitly provided for in Article 29 of the Civil
Code quoted here under:
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is
acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for
damages for the same act or omission may be
instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance
of evidence ...
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based
upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In
the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be
inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the
acquittal is due to that ground.
In so far as the suit against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is
concerned, therefore, we sustain respondent Judge's Order
dated January 30, 1971 dismissing the complaint, albeit on
different grounds.
WHEREFORE, 1) the Order dated September 12, 1970
dismissing Civil Case No. 80803 against private respondent
Felino Timbol is set aside, and respondent Judge, or his
successor, hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing on the
merits; 2) but the Orders dated January 30, 1971 and
February 23, 1971 dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No.
80803 against respondent Rodolfo Salazar are hereby upheld.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero and

De Castro, JJ., concur.
#Footnotes
1 p. 26, Rollo
2 pp. 147-149, Ibid.
3 pp. 138-139, Ibid.
4 Decision P. 26, Ibid
5 73 PhiL 607, 620 (1942)
6 Racoma vs. Fortich, 39S CRA 521(1971)
7 52 SCRA 420 (1973)
8 Padua vs. Robles, 66 SCRA 485 (1975)
9 pp. 25-26, Rollo
10 Eleano Hill, 77 SCRA 98 (1977)