G.R. No.

88211 September 15, 1989

FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE MANOTOC,
TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO,
FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary
of Justice, Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively,
respondents.
CORTES,
J.:
Before the Court is a controversy of grave national importance. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved,
the Court's
decision in this case would undeniably have a profound effect on the political, economic and other aspects of
national life.
We recall that in February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent
"people power" revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of the
Republic under a revolutionary government. Her ascension to and consolidation of power have not been
unchallenged. The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by political leaders of Mr. Marcos, the takeover of
television station Channel 7 by rebel troops led by Col. Canlas with the support of "Marcos loyalists" and the
unsuccessful plot of the Marcos spouses to surreptitiously return from Hawii with mercenaries aboard an aircraft
chartered by a Lebanese arms dealer [Manila Bulletin, January 30, 1987] awakened the nation to the capacity of
the Marcoses to stir trouble even from afar and to the fanaticism and blind loyalty of their followers in the
country. The ratification of the 1987 Constitution enshrined the victory of "people power" and also clearly
reinforced the constitutional moorings of Mrs. Aquino's presidency. This did not, however, stop bloody challenges
to the government. On August 28, 1987, Col. Gregorio Honasan, one of the major players in the February
Revolution, led a failed coup that left scores of people, both combatants and civilians, dead. There were several
other armed sorties of lesser significance, but the message they conveyed was the same a split in the ranks
of the military establishment that threatened civilian supremacy over military and brought to the fore the
realization that civilian government could be at the mercy of a fractious military.
But the armed threats to the Government were not only found in misguided elements and among rabid followers
of Mr. Marcos. There are also the communist insurgency and the secessionist movement in Mindanao which
gained ground during the rule of Mr. Marcos, to the extent that the communists have set up a parallel
government of their own on the areas they effectively control while the separatist are virtually free to move
about in armed bands. There has been no let up on this groups' determination to wrest power from the
government. Not only through resort to arms but also to through the use of propaganda have they been
successful in treating chaos and destabilizing the country.
Nor are the woes of the Republic purely political. The accumulated foreign debt and the plunder of the nation
attributed to Mr. Marcos and his cronies left the economy devastated. The efforts at economic recovery, three
years after Mrs. Aquino assumed office, have yet to show concrete results in alleviating the poverty of the
masses, while the recovery of the ill- gotten wealth of the Marcoses has remained elusive.
Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But Mrs. Aquino,
considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is
threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly
on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.
The Petition
This case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a dictator forced out of office and into exile
after causing twenty years of political, economic and social havoc in the country and who within the short space
of three years seeks to return, is in a class by itself.
This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to issue travel documents to
Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's
decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
The Issue

Th issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
According to the petitioners, the resolution of the case would depend on the resolution of the following issues:
1. Does the President have the power to bar the return of former President Marcos and family to the Philippines?
a. Is this a political question?
2. Assuming that the President has the power to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to
the Philippines, in the interest of "national security, public safety or public health
a. Has the President made a finding that the return of former President Marcos and his family to the Philippines is
a clear and present danger to national security, public safety or public health?
b.
Assuming
that
she
has
made
(1) Have the requirements of due process been complied with in making such finding?

that

finding

(2) Has there been prior notice to petitioners? (3) Has there been a hearing?
(4) Assuming that notice and hearing may be dispensed with, has the President's decision, including the grounds
upon which it was based, been made known to petitioners so that they may controvert the same?
c. Is the President's determination that the return of former President Marcos and his family to the Philippines is
a clear and present danger to national security, public safety, or public health a political question?
d. Assuming that the Court may inquire as to whether the return of former President Marcos and his family is a
clear and present danger to national security, public safety, or public health, have respondents established such
fact?
3. Have the respondents, therefore, in implementing the President's decision to bar the return of former
President Marcos and his family, acted and would be acting without jurisdiction, or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion, in performing any act which would effectively bar the return of former President
Marcos and his family to the Philippines? [Memorandum for Petitioners, pp. 5-7; Rollo, pp. 234-236.1
The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is
guaranteed under the following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest
of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses
because only a court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their right to
travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance the view that before the right to travel may be
impaired by any authority or agency of the government, there must be legislation to that effect.
The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his family to return to the
Philippines is guaranteed.
The
Universal
Declaration
of
Human
Rights
provides:
Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.
Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which had been ratified by the Philippines,
provides:
Article 12
1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of
movement and freedom to choose his residence.
2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.

3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law,
are necessary to protect national security, public order (order public), public health or morals or the rights and
freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.
4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.
On the other hand, the respondents' principal argument is that the issue in this case involves a political question
which is non-justiciable. According to the Solicitor General:
As petitioners couch it, the question involved is simply whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and his
family have the right to travel and liberty of abode. Petitioners invoke these constitutional rights in vacuo without
reference to attendant circumstances.
Respondents submit that in its proper formulation, the issue is whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos
and family have the right to return to the Philippines and reside here at this time in the face of the determination
by the President that such return and residence will endanger national security and public safety.
It may be conceded that as formulated by petitioners, the question is not a political question as it involves
merely a determination of what the law provides on the matter and application thereof to petitioners Ferdinand
E. Marcos and family. But when the question is whether the two rights claimed by petitioners Ferdinand E.
Marcos and family impinge on or collide with the more primordial and transcendental right of the State to
security and safety of its nationals, the question becomes political and this Honorable Court cannot consider it.
There are thus gradations to the question, to wit:
Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to return to the Philippines and reestablish their
residence here? This is clearly a justiciable question which this Honorable Court can decide.
Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have their right to return to the Philippines and reestablish their
residence here even if their return and residence here will endanger national security and public safety? this is
still a justiciable question which this Honorable Court can decide.
Is there danger to national security and public safety if petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family shall return to
the Philippines and establish their residence here? This is now a political question which this Honorable Court
cannot decide for it falls within the exclusive authority and competence of the President of the Philippines.
[Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 9-11; Rollo, pp. 297-299.]
Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual rights. In support
thereof, they cite Article II of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon
the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions
provided by law, to render personal, military, or civil service.
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of
the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
Respondents also point out that the decision to ban Mr. Marcos and family from returning to the Philippines for
reasons of national security and public safety has international precedents. Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican
Republic, Anastacio Somoza Jr. of Nicaragua, Jorge Ubico of Guatemala, Fulgencio Batista of Cuba, King Farouk of
Egypt, Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez of El Salvador, and Marcos Perez Jimenez of Venezuela were among the
deposed dictators whose return to their homelands was prevented by their governments. [See Statement of
Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul S. Manglapus, quoted in Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 26-32; Rollo, pp. 314319.]
The parties are in agreement that the underlying issue is one of the scope of presidential power and its limits.
We, however, view this issue in a different light. Although we give due weight to the parties' formulation of the
issues, we are not bound by its narrow confines in arriving at a solution to the controversy.
At the outset, we must state that it would not do to view the case within the confines of the right to travel and
the import of the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in the leading cases of Kent v. Dulles [357 U.S. 116, 78 SCt
1113, 2 L Ed. 2d 1204] and Haig v. Agee [453 U.S. 280, 101 SCt 2766, 69 L Ed. 2d 640) which affirmed the right to
travel and recognized exceptions to the exercise thereof, respectively.

It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other
countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the
right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent
from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the
territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct
rights. The Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each
state" [Art. 13(l)] separately from the "right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his
country." [Art. 13(2).] On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and
freedom to choose his residence" [Art. 12(l)] and the right to "be free to leave any country, including his own."
[Art. 12(2)] which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect national security, public
order, public health or morals or enter qqqs own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art.
12(4).] It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to one's country in
the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which
treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to
return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is
part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right
to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e.,
against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
Thus, the rulings in the cases Kent and Haig which refer to the issuance of passports for the purpose of effectively
exercising the right to travel are not determinative of this case and are only tangentially material insofar as they
relate to a conflict between executive action and the exercise of a protected right. The issue before the Court is
novel and without precedent in Philippine, and even in American jurisprudence.
Consequently, resolution by the Court of the well-debated issue of whether or not there can be limitations on the
right to travel in the absence of legislation to that effect is rendered unnecessary. An appropriate case for its
resolution will have to be awaited.
Having clarified the substance of the legal issue, we find now a need to explain the methodology for its
resolution. Our resolution of the issue will involve a two-tiered approach. We shall first resolve whether or not the
President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Then, we
shall determine, pursuant to the express power of the Court under the Constitution in Article VIII, Section 1,
whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcose's to the Philippines poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.
Executive Power
The 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of the three great branches of government. To
recall the words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission [63 Phil. 139 (1936)], "the Constitution has
blocked but with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the
judicial departments of the government." [At 157.1 Thus, the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[the
legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines" Art VI, Sec. 11, "[t]he executive power shall
be vested in the President of the Philippines" [Art. VII, Sec. 11, and "[te judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law" [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.] These provisions not
only establish a separation of powers by actual division [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra] but also confer
plenary legislative, executive and judicial powers subject only to limitations provided in the Constitution. For as
the Supreme Court in Ocampo v. Cabangis [15 Phil. 626 (1910)] pointed out "a grant of the legislative power
means a grant of all legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power means a grant of all the judicial power
which may be exercised under the government." [At 631-632.1 If this can be said of the legislative power which
is exercised by two chambers with a combined membership of more than two hundred members and of the
judicial power which is vested in a hierarchy of courts, it can equally be said of the executive power which is
vested in one official the President.
As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what is meant by executive power" although in the
same article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all
executive departments, bureaus and

offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the commander-in-chief clause,
the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of
Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or international
agreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress, and the power to address Congress [Art. VII, Sec. 1423].
The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of the President did the framers of the
Constitution intend that the President shall exercise those specific powers and no other? Are these se
enumerated powers the breadth and scope of "executive power"? Petitioners advance the view that the
President's powers are limited to those specifically enumerated in the 1987 Constitution. Thus, they assert: "The
President has enumerated powers, and what is not enumerated is impliedly denied to her. Inclusion unius est
exclusio alterius[Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 4- Rollo p. 233.1 This argument brings to mind the institution of
the U.S. Presidency after which ours is legally patterned.**
Corwin, in his monumental volume on the President of the United States grappled with the same problem. He
said:
Article II is the most loosely drawn chapter of the Constitution. To those who think that a constitution ought to
settle everything beforehand it should be a nightmare; by the same token, to those who think that constitution
makers ought to leave considerable leeway for the future play of political forces, it should be a vision realized.
We encounter this characteristic of Article 11 in its opening words: "The executive power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America." . . .. [The President: Office and Powers, 17871957, pp. 3-4.]
Reviewing how the powers of the U.S. President were exercised by the different persons who held the office from
Washington to the early 1900's, and the swing from the presidency by commission to Lincoln's dictatorship, he
concluded that "what the presidency is at any particular moment depends in important measure on who is
President." [At 30.]
This view is shared by Schlesinger who wrote in The Imperial Presidency:
For the American Presidency was a peculiarly personal institution. it remained of course, an agency of
government subject to unvarying demands and duties no remained, of cas President. But, more than most
agencies of government, it changed shape, intensity and ethos according to the man in charge. Each President's
distinctive temperament and character, his values, standards, style, his habits, expectations, Idiosyncrasies,
compulsions, phobias recast the WhiteHouse and pervaded the entire government. The executive branch, said
Clark Clifford, was a chameleon, taking its color from the character and personality of the President. The thrust
of the office, its impact on the constitutional order, therefore altered from President to President. Above all, the
way each President understood it as his personal obligation to inform and involve the Congress, to earn and hold
the confidence of the electorate and to render an accounting to the nation and posterity determined whether he
strengthened or weakened the constitutional order. [At 212- 213.]
We do not say that the presidency is what Mrs. Aquino says it is or what she does but, rather, that the
consideration of tradition and the development of presidential power under the different constitutions are
essential for a complete understanding of the extent of and limitations to the President's powers under the 1987
Constitution. The 1935 Constitution created a strong President with explicitly broader powers than the U.S.
President. The 1973 Constitution attempted to modify the system of government into the parliamentary type,
with the President as a mere figurehead, but through numerous amendments, the President became even more
powerful, to the point that he was also the de facto Legislature. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back
the presidential system of government and restored the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers
by their actual distribution among three distinct branches of government with provision for checks and balances.
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the
President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain
to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the
execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do
not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of
specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of
"executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific
powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers
so enumerated,

It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has
to be executive. Thus, in the landmark decision of Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189
(1928), on the issue of who between the Governor-General of the Philippines and the Legislature may vote the
shares of stock held by the
Government to elect directors in the National Coal Company and the Philippine National Bank, the U.S. Supreme
Court, in upholding the power of the Governor-General to do so, said:
...Here the members of the legislature who constitute a majority of the "board" and "committee" respectively,
are not charged with the performance of any legislative functions or with the doing of anything which is in aid of
performance of any such functions by the legislature. Putting aside for the moment the question whether the
duties devolved upon these members are vested by the Organic Act in the Governor-General, it is clear that they
are not legislative in character, and still more clear that they are not judicial. The fact that they do not fall within the
authority of either of these two constitutes logical ground for concluding that they do fall within that of the remaining one among
which the powers of government are divided ....[At 202-203; Emphasis supplied.]
We are not unmindful of Justice Holmes' strong dissent. But in his enduring words of dissent we find
reinforcement for the view that it would indeed be a folly to construe the powers of a branch of government to
embrace only what are specifically mentioned in the Constitution:
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the more
specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other. ....
xxx xxx xxx
It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not and
cannot carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and divide
the branches into watertight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from believing that
it is, or that the Constitution requires. [At 210- 211.]
The Power Involved
The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of theGovernment is to serve and
protect the people" and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order,the protection of life, liberty, and property,
and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]
Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life,
liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide governmental
action. But such does not mean that they are empty words. Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions, in
drawing a plan of government, and in directing implementing action for these plans, or from another point of
view, in making any decision as President of the Republic, the President has to consider these principles, among
other things, and adhere to them.
Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the
President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More
than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the
Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. It must be borne in
mind that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people
have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good. Hence, lest the officers of the
Government exercising the powers delegated by the people forget and the servants of the people become
rulers, the Constitution reminds everyone that "[s]overeignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them." [Art. II, Sec. 1.]
The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons who seek to return to the country are the
deposed dictator and his family at whose door the travails of the country are laid and from whom billions of
dollars believed to be ill- gotten wealth are sought to be recovered. The constitutional guarantees they invoke
are neither absolute nor inflexible. For the exercise of even the preferred freedoms of speech and of expression,
although couched in absolute terms, admits of limits and must be adjusted to the requirements of equally
important public interests [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, October 7, 1981.]
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise
of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general
welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase

Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by
the Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand [See Corwin, supra, at 153]. It is a power borne
by the President's duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit in the
President's duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed [see Hyman, The American President, where the
author advances the view that an allowance of discretionary power is unavoidable in any government and is
best lodged in the President].
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as protector of the peace. Rossiter The
American Presidency].The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the
commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats
to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also
tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic
tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in
fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency
specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President commander-in- chief the enumeration
of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the President's exercising as Commander-in- Chief powers short
of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial
law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.
That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcose's from returning has been
recognized by members of the Legislature, and is manifested by the Resolution proposed in the House of
Representatives and signed by 103 of its members urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to the
Philippines "as a genuine unselfish gesture for true national reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of our
collective adherence to uncompromising respect for human rights under the Constitution and our laws." [House
Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p. 321.1 The Resolution does not question the President's power to bar the Marcoses
from returning to the Philippines, rather, it appeals to the President's sense of compassion to allow a man to
come home to die in his country.
What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the
Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode
and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations
even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those
residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in
that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to
the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or
denied.
The Extent of Review
Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." [Art. VIII, Sec. 1] Given this wording, we cannot agree with the Solicitor General that the issue
constitutes a political question which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to decide.
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry
into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to
decide. But nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Court's jurisdiction the determination of which is
exclusively for the President, for Congress or for the people themselves through a plebiscite or referendum. We
cannot, for example, question the President's recognition of a foreign government, no matter how premature or
improvident such action may appear. We cannot set aside a presidential pardon though it may appear to us that
the beneficiary is totally undeserving of the grant. Nor can we amend the Constitution under the guise of
resolving a dispute brought before us because the power is reserved to the people.
There is nothing in the case before us that precludes our determination thereof on the political question
doctrine. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners show that the framers intended
to widen the scope of judicial review but they did not intend courts of justice to settle all actual controversies
before them. When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official
whose action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute its judgment for
that of the official concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide.
In this light, it would appear clear that the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, defining
"judicial power," which specifically empowers the courts to determine whether or not there has been a grave

abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government, incorporates in the
fundamental law the ruling in Lansang v. Garcia [G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971, 42 SCRA 4481 that:]
Article VII of the [1935] Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying our
system of government, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere. However, the separation of powers,
under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with the system of checks and
balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when
he acts within the sphere alloted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has
so acted is vested in
the Judicial Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme. In the exercise of such
authority, the function of the Court is merely to check not to supplant the Executive, or to ascertain merely
whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him
or to determine the wisdom of his act [At 479-480.]
Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or not there exist factual basis for the President
to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines. If such
postulates do exist, it cannot be said that she has acted, or acts, arbitrarily or that she has gravely abused her
discretion in deciding to bar their return.
We find that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed during the
briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Security
Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were represented, there exist factual basis for the President's
decision..
The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from within by a
well- organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power,
urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men, police officers and civilian officials, to mention only a
few. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcose's and their followers to destabilize the country, as
earlier narrated in this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this time would only
exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos.
As divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of the State may be contained. The military establishment has
given assurances that it could handle the threats posed by particular groups. But it is the catalytic effect of the
return of the Marcoses that may prove to be the proverbial final straw that would break the camel's back. With
these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in
determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and in
prohibiting their return.
It will not do to argue that if the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines will cause the escalation of violence
against the State, that would be the time for the President to step in and exercise the commander-in-chief
powers granted her by the Constitution to suppress or stamp out such violence. The State, acting through the
Government, is not precluded from taking pre- emptive action against threats to its existence if, though still
nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct. Protection of the people is the essence of the
duty of government. The preservation of the State the fruition of the people's sovereignty is an obligation in the
highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend the Constitution and to see the faithful execution the
laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility.
We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning to recover from the hardships
brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and
relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the
Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed
away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. Then, We cannot ignore the continually increasing burden imposed
on the economy by the excessive foreign borrowing during the Marcos regime, which stifles and stagnates
development and is one of the root causes of widespread poverty and all its attendant ills. The resulting
precarious state of our economy is of common knowledge and is easily within the ambit of judicial notice.
The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the
gains achieved during the past few years and lead to total economic collapse. Given what is within our individual
and common knowledge of the state of the economy, we cannot argue with that determination.

WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave
abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time
and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their
return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.