e.

Journal and Record

1. The Enrolled Bill Theory

CASCO CHEMICAL CO. VS. GIMENEZ, 7 SCRA 347 (1963)
FACTS:
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. (Casco) was engaged in the production of synthetic resin
glues used primarily in the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are urea
and formaldehyde which are both being imported abroad. Pursuant to a Central Bank circular,
Casco paid the required margin fee for its imported urea and formaldehyde. Casco however paid in
protest as it maintained that urea and formaldehyde are tax exempt transactions. The Central Bank
agreed and it issued vouchers for refund. The said vouchers were submitted to Pedro Gimenez,
the then Auditor General, who denied the tax refund. Gimenez maintained that urea and
formaldehyde, as two separate and distinct components are not tax exempt; that what is tax
exempt is urea formaldehyde (the synthetic resin formed by combining urea and formaldehyde).
Gimenez cited the provision of Sec. 2, par 18 of Republic Act No. 2609 which provides:
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof
shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:
xxx

xxx

xxx

XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for
the exclusive use of end-users.
Casco however averred that the term urea formaldehyde appearing in this provision should be
construed as urea and formaldehyde. It further contends that the bill approved in Congress
contained the copulative conjunction and between the terms urea and, formaldehyde, and that
the members of Congress intended to exempt urea and formaldehyde separately as essential
elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called urea formaldehyde, not the latter a
finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate,
during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof.
The enrolled bill however used the term urea formaldehyde
ISSUE:
Whether or not the term urea formaldehyde should be construed as urea and formaldehyde.
HELD:
No. Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a
condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions

relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished
product, which is patently distinct and different from urea and formaldehyde, as separate articles
used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as urea formaldehyde.
The opinions or statements of any member of Congress during the deliberation of the said law/bill
do not represent the entirety of the Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill would be
conclusive upon the courts. The enrolled bill which uses the term urea formaldehyde instead of
urea and formaldehyde is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure
passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing
of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive on
which the SC cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and
undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by amendment or
curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

2. Probative Value of the Journal

UNITED STATES VS. PONS, 34 PHIL. 729 (1916)
FACTS:
Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On April 5, 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopez
arrived in Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine were
delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons house. On the other hand, the
customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were not delivered to
any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs officers conducted an investigation
thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium. Since the act of
trading and dealing opium is against Act No. 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and
fraudulently importing and introducing such contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed
the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was approved while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was
not in session. He said that his witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01
March 1914 while the special session of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on February 28,
1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act 2381 was
indeed made a law on February 28, 1914.
HELD:
The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused to go
beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the Court and
to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC
have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by

which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and
functions of the Legislature. Pons witnesses cannot be given due weight against the
conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the legislature. The journals say that the
Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court
did not err in declining to go beyond these journals. The SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the
enrolled bill in this particular case.

3. Matters to be entered in the Journal

4. Journal Entry Rule vs. Enrolled Bill Theory
5. Congressional Record

f. Session
1. Regular Sessions
2. Special Sessions
3. Joint Sessions

4. Salaries, Privileges and Disqualifications

a. Salaries
PHILCONSA VS. MATHAY, 18 SCRA 300 (1966)
FACTS:
Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the Philippines and the
Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to permanently enjoin them from authorizing or
passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and
members of the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969.
The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of the
House of Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964. Petitioner
contends that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the
Constitution. The reason given being that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who took
part in the approval of RA 4134, would have expired only on December 30, 1969; while the term of
the members of the House who participated in the approval of said Act expired on December 30,
1965.

ISSUE:
Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the members of
the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must have fully expired
before the increase becomes effective?

HELD:
In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation for
legislators becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers to all members of the Senate
and the House of Representatives in the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or
separation between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision
speaks of the expiration of the full term of the Senators and Representatives that approved the
measure, using the singular form and not the plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent to
consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use
of the word term in the singular, when combined with the following phrase all the members of the
Senate and the House, underscores that in the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the
fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted
the measure must have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative.
The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is not
operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that
approved it will have expired.

LIGOT VS. MATHAY, 56 SCRA 823 (1974)

FACTS:
Benjamin Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the
Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30,
1957 to December 30, 1969. During his second term in office (1961-1965), Republic Act No. 4134
fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national government
was enacted into law and took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress
(senators and congressmen) were increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per

annum, but the Act expressly provided that said increases shall take effect in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution.
Ligots term expired on December 30, 1969, so he filed a claim for retirement under
Commonwealth Act No. 186, section 12 (c) as amended by Republic Act No. 4968 which provided
for retirement gratuity of any official or employee, appointive or elective, with a total of at least
twenty years of service, the last three years of which are continuous on the basis therein provided
in case of employees based on the highest rate received and in case of elected officials on the
rates of pay as provided by law. The House of Representatives granted his petition however, Jose
Velasco, the then Congress Auditor refused to so issue certification. The Auditor General then,
Ismael Mathay, also disallowed the same.
The thrust of Ligots appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed on the basis of the
increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress (which was not applied to him
during his incumbency which ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs.
Mathay that such increases would become operative only for members of Congress elected to
serve therein commencing December 30, 1969) should not have been disallowed, because at the
time of his retirement, the increased salary for members of Congress as provided by law (under
Republic Act 4134) was already P32,000.00 per annum.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit.
HELD:
No. To allow Ligot a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum would be
a subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of office and of achieving indirectly
what he could not obtain directly. Ligots claim cannot be sustained as far as he and other
members of Congress similarly situated whose term of office ended on December 30, 1969 are
concerned for the simple reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation
within the purview of the Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and other
emoluments to their salary as provided by law. To grant retirement gratuity to members of
Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased
salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving
during their term of office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the
salary beyond that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their
incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor-General in his decision in the similar case of Ligots
colleague, ex-Congressman Melanio Singson, Such a scheme would contravene the Constitution
for it would lead to the same prohibited result by enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly
what cannot be done directly.

b. Freedom from Arrest

PEOPLE VS. JALOSJOS, G.R. 132875, FEBRUARY 3, 2000
FACTS:
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now
confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts
of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking
that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at
legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance
of a non-bailable offense.
ISSUE:
Whether or not being a Congressman is a substantial differentiation which removes the accusedappellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law by reason of
the mandate of the sovereign will.
RULING:
NO. While the Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection
of laws., this simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights
enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The duties imposed by the mandate of the people are
multifarious. The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public
welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may
plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. Here, election to the position of Congressman
is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office
are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes
of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. Hence, the performance of legitimate
and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in
prison.

c. Speech and Debate Clause

JIMENEZ VS. CABANGBANG 17 SCRA 876 (1966)
FACTS:
Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its
Committee on National Defense. In November 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an

open letter addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly three
operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian
political strategists. That such strategists have had collusions with communists and that the
Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup dtat to place him as the president. The
planners allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise and that Jimenez et al
may or may not be aware that they are being used as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was
said to have been published in newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case
against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang alleging that
Cabangbangs statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be dismissed because
he said that as a member of the lower house, he is immune from suit and that he is covered by the
privileged communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to members of
Congress.
HELD:
No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged
from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning
from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other
place.
The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to utterances made
by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered,
statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as
bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official
discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly
authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the performance of the acts in question.
Congress was not in session when the letter was published and at the same time he, himself,
caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be
so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer
of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court the said
communication is not absolutely privileged.

d. Disqualifications
ADAZA VS. PACANA, JR. 135 SCRA 431 (1985)
FACTS:

Homobono Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30,
1980 elections. He took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial governor
on March 3, 1980. Fernando Pacana, Jr. was elected vice-governor for same province in the same
elections. Under the law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986. On March
27, 1984, Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 BP elections; petitioner
Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing first
among the candidates, while Pacana lost. Adaza took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa
on July 19, 1984 and since then he has discharged the functions of said office. On July 23, 1984,
Pacana took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental before President Marcos, and
started to perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984. Claiming to be the lawful occupant of
the governors office, Adaza has brought this petition to exclude Pacana therefrom. He argues that
he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he remains to be the governor of the
province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that within the context of
the parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a local elective official can
hold the position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be an elected member of
Parliament.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a governor of the province
simultaneously. Whether or not a vice governor who ran for Congress and lost can assume his
original position and as such can, by virtue of succession, take the vacated seat of the governor.

HELD:
Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:
Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa] shall not hold any
other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime
minister or member of the cabinet . . .
The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence Adaza cannot invoke common law
practices abroad. He cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his
holding of more than one office. Adaza further contends that when Pacana filed his candidacy for
the Batasan he became a private citizen because he vacated his office. Pacana, as a mere private
citizen, had no right to assume the governorship left vacant by petitioners election to the BP. This
is not tenable and it runs afoul against BP. 697, the law governing the election of members of the
BP on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which specifically provides that governors, mayors,
members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate of
candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office. Indubitably, respondent falls
within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the time he filed his certificate of

candidacy for the 1984 BP election he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as
provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code.

PUYAT VS. DE GUSMAN, 113 SCRA 31 (1982)

FACTS:
In May 1979, Eugenio Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International Pipe
Industries. The election was subsequently questioned by Eustaquio Acero (Puyats rival) claiming
that the votes were not properly counted hence he filed a quo warranto case before the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on May 25, 1979. Prior to Aceros filing of the case,
Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa purchased ten shares of
stock of IPI from a member of Aceros group. And during a conference held by SEC Commissioner
Sixto de Guzman, Jr. (from May 25-31, 1979) to have the parties confer with each other, Estanislao
Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for Acero. Puyat objected as he argued that it is
unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as counsel (to anyone) before any administrative
body (such as the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited himself from appearing as
counsel for Acero. He instead filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the said SEC case for him
to intervene, not as a counsel, but as a legal owner of IPI shares and as a person who has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC Commissioner granted the motion and in effect granting
Fernandez leave to intervene.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI, can appear and intervene in the SEC
case without violating the constitutional provision that an assemblyman must not appear as
counsel in such courts or bodies?
HELD:
No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is not appearing as a
counsel. Even though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal interest in the matter in litigation
he is still barred from appearing. He bought the stocks before the litigation took place. During the
conference he presented himself as counsel but because it is clearly stated that he cannot do so
under the constitution he instead presented himself as a party of interest which is clearly a
workaround and is clearly an act after the fact. A mere workaround to get himself involved in the
litigation. What could not be done directly could not likewise be done indirectly.

e. Duty to Disclose

5. Electoral Tribunals

ABBAS VS. SET, 166 SCRA 651 (1988)

FACTS:
In October 1987, Firdausi Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest against 22
candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11 (1987)
congressional elections by the COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of three (3)
Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators. Abbas later on filed for the disqualification of
the 6 senator members from partaking in the said election protest on the ground that all of them are
interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of
fair play and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought. To accommodate
the proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested the following amendment: Tribunals Rules
(Section 24) - requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of resolutions of
whatever nature - is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the
remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice,
and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the
situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave
the resolution of the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this
Court, whose disqualification is not sought.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Abbas proposal could be given due weight.
HELD:
The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the
Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains
its composition and defines its jurisdiction and powers.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the
remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may
be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members of
the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those judicial and legislative components
commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of Senators. The legislative component herein cannot be totally excluded from
participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and

intent of the Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in saying that no Senator-Member of the

SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal.
Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the
resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in
the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light of the
Constitution, the SET cannot legally function as such; absent its entire membership of Senators
and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of
valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

BONDOC VS. PINEDA, 201 SCRA 792 (1991)

FACTS:
Pineda, member of Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Bondoc, member of
Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for Representative for 4TH district of Pampanga.
Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest at the House of Rep Electoral Tribunal
(HRET)
After review, HRET decided that Bondoc won by 107 votes.
Cong. Camasura revealed to Cong. Cojuangco (LDP Sec. Gen) that he voted for Bondoc
because he was consistent with truth, justice and self-respect and that they would abide by the
results of the recounted votes where Bondoc was leading.
Cong. Camasura was then expelled from his party (LDP) because it was a complete betrayal
to his party when he decided for Bondoc.
HRET then ordered Camasura to withdraw and rescind his nomination from the tribunal.
Bondoc filed for petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to HRET from its resolution.
ISSUE:
W/N THE HOUSE OF REP. EMPOWERED TO INTERFERE WITH THE DISPOSITION OF AN
ELECTION CONTEST IN THE HRET BY REORGANIZING THE REPRESENTATION IN THE
TRIBUNAL OF THE MAJORITY PARTY?
W/N HRET RESOLUTION TO ORDER CAMASURA TO WITHDRAW AND RESCIND HIS
NOMINATION IS VALID
HELD:
NO! COURT SAID THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANY POLITICAL PARTY TO CONTROL
VOTING IN THE TRIBUNAL . THE TRIBUNAL HAS THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION AS JUDGE
TO CONTESTS RELATING TO ELECTION, RETURNS AND QUALIFICATIONS OF THE MEMS
OF THE HOUSE OF REP.
HRET RESOLUTION IS NULL AND VOID.
ACTION OF HRET IS VIOLATIVE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE BECAUSE:

1.
IT IS A CLEAR IMPAIRMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVE OF THE HRET
TO BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF THE ELECTION CONTEST BET. PINEDA AND BONDOC. TO
SANCTION INTERFERENCE BY THE HOUSE OF REP. WOULD REDUCE TRIBUNAL AS TOOL
FOR THE AGGRANDIZEMENT OF THE PARTY IN POWER (LDP)
2.
MEMBERS OF THE TRIBUNAL MUST BE NON-PARTISAN. CAMASURA WAS
DISCHARGING HIS FUNCTIONS WITH COMPLETE DETACHMENT, IMPARTIALITY AND
INDEPENDENCE. DISLOYALTY TO PARTY AND BREACH OF PARTY DISCIPLINE -> NOT
VALID GROUND FOR EXPULSION OF MEMBER OF THE TRIBUNAL
3.
IT VIOLATES CAMASURAS RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE. MEMBERS OF HRET
ARE ENTITLED TO SECURITY OF TENURE. MEMBERSHIP MAY NOT BE TERMINATED W/O
UNDUE CAUSE SUCH AS: EXPIRATION OF TERM OF OFFICE, DEATH, PERMANENT
DISABILITY, RESIGNATION FROM POLITICAL PARTY, FORMAL AFFILIATION WITH ANOTHER
PARTY. DISLOYALTY IS NOT A VALID CAUSE!

CODILLA VS. DE VINECIA, G.R. 150605, DECEMBER 10, 2002

FACTS:
Petitioner garnered the highest votes in the election for representative in the 4th district of Leyte as
against respondent Locsin. Petitioner won while a disqualification suit was pending. Respondent
moved for the suspension of petitioners proclamation. By virtue of the Comelec ex parte order,
petitioners proclamation was suspended. Comelec later on resolved that petitioner was guilty of
soliciting votes and consequently disqualified him. Respondent Locsin was proclaimed winner.
Upon motion by petitioner, the resolution was however reversed and a new resolution declared
respondents proclamation as null and void. Respondent made his defiance and disobedience to
subsequent resolution publicly known while petitioner asserted his right to the office he won.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
3.

Whether or not respondents proclamation was valid.

Whether or not the Comelec had jurisdiction in the instant case.
Whether or not proclamation of the winner is a ministerial duty.

HELD:
1.
The respondents proclamation was premature given that the case against petitioner had not
yet been disposed of with finality. In fact, it was subsequently found that the disqualification of the
petitioner was null and void for being violative of due process and for want of substantial factual
basis. Furthermore, respondent, as second placer, could not take the seat in office since he did not
represent the electorates choice.

2.
Since the validity of respondents proclamation had been assailed by petitioner before the
Comelec and that the Comelec was yet to resolve it, it cannot be said that the order disqualifying
petitioner had become final. Thus Comelec continued to exercise jurisdiction over the case pending
finality. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review
resolutions or decisions of the Comelec. A petition for quo warranto must also fail since
respondents eligibility was not the issue.
3. The facts had been settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction
on the matter, that petitioner won. The rule of law demands that its (Comelecs) Decision be
obeyed by all officials of the land. Such duty is ministerial. Petitioner had the right to the office
which merits recognition regardless of personal judgment or opinion.
PIMENTEL VS. HRET, G.R. NO. 141489, NOVEMBER 29, 2002
FACTS:
On 03 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect and election on 1998 was held in
accordance to this. Proclaimed winners were fourteen party-list representatives from thirteen
organizations. This was assailed by Senator Pimentel. He contend that party-list representatives
should conform with Article 6 Section 17 18 of the 1987 Constitiution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Party-list System Act should be null and void?
DECISION:
Petition dismissed. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the
prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits to choose from among its members those who
may occupy the seats allotted to the House in Electoral Tribunal.
ADDITIONAL CASES:
morato vs guingona
bayan muna vs neda?
KMU vs. NEDA GR no. 167798 April 19, 2006
FACTS:
In April 13, 2005, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Executive Order 420 requiring all
government agencies and government-owned corporations to streamline and harmonize their
Identification Systems. The purposes of the uniform ID data collection and ID format are to reduce

costs, achieve efficiency and reliability and ensure compatibility and provide convenience to the
people served by government entities.
Petitioners allege that EO420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of legislative
functions by the executive branch of the government. Furthermore, they allege that EO420
infringes on the citizens rights to privacy.
ISSUE:
In issuing EO 420, did the president make, alter or repeal any laws?
RULING:
Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them. In issuing EO 420, the
President did not make, alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and executed existing
laws. EO 420 reduces costs, as well as insures efficiency, reliability, compatibility and userfriendliness in the implementation of current ID systems of government entities under existing laws.
Thus, EO 420 is simply an executive issuance and not an act of legislation.