Professional Documents
Culture Documents
G1bbon, P and Neocosmos, M , 1985, 'Some Problems m the Pohtlcal Economy of "Afncan
Socialism'" m Contradzctwns of Accumulation m Afnca, (eds. H. Bemstem and B. Camp
bell), Beverley Hills Sage
Gutelman, M., 1974, Structure et Reformes Agrazres, Pans: Maspero.
Hall, S., 1977 'The "Political" and the "Economic" m Marx's Theory of Classes' in Class and
Class Structure (ed A. Hunt), London: Lawrence & Wishart
Kay, C, 1980, 'The Landlord Road and the Subordmate Peasant Road to Capitalism m Latm
America', Etudes Rurales, No.77, Jan.-March
Kay, C., 1981. 'Political Economy, Class Alliances and Agrarian Change m Chile', The Journal
of Peasant Stud1es, Vol.8, No.4.
Lad au, E , 1977, Capuailsm and Ideology m Marxzst Theory, London: New Left Books
Lemn, V.I., 1899, The Development of Capaalzsm m Russw, Collected Works, Vol.3, LondonLawrence & Wishart, 1972.
Lenm, VI , 1905 Two Tactics of Socwl Democracy m the DemocratiC Revolution, Collected
Works, Vol 9, London. Lawrence & Wishart, 1972
Lemn, V .I , 1907a, The Agranan Programme of Socwl Democracy in the Fzrst Russ zan Revolullon, 1905-1907, Collected Works, Vol 13, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1972
Lenin, VI, 1907b, 'Preface to the Second Edition of his 1899', Collected Works, Vo1.3,
London Lawrence & Wishart, 1972
Love man. B., 1976, Struggle in the Countryszde Po/Illes and Rural Labour in Chile 1919-1973,
Bloommgton: Indiana Umversity Press
Marx, K , 1847, The Poverty of Philosophy, Collected Works, Vol 6, London: Lawrent'e &
Wishart, 1976
Marx. K .. 1848a, 'Speech on the QuestiOn of Free Trade', Collected Wmks, Vo1.6, London.
Lawrence & Wishart, 1976
Marx, K [and F Engels]1848b, The Manifesto of the Communist Party, Collected Works,
Vo1.6, London. Lawrence & Wishart, 1976.
Marx, K., 1857, 'General IntroductiOn to the Grundnsse' m Marx [1858]
Marx, K , 1858, Grundrisse, Harmondsworth: Pengum, 1973.
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Lawrence & Wishart, 1969 and 1972.
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Marx, K . 1866, 'Results of the Immediate Process of ProductiOn' m K Marx Capual Volume
One, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976.
Marx, K, 1867, Caplla/ Volume One, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1974
Marx, K., 1874, Capital Volume Two, London Lawrence & Wishart, 1974
Marx, K., 1881, 'Letter to Sorge, June 20' m K Marx and F Engels, Selected Correspondence,
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London Edward Arnold
Neocosmos, M , 1982, 'Agram:n Reform and the Development of Cap1tahsm m Agriculture', 2
vols , Ph D thesis, University of Bradford.
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Rey, P P, 1973, Les Alliances de Classes, Paris Maspero.
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Soczety, Vo1.6, No I
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S. Amm and K Vergopoulos La Questwn Paysanne et le Capitalisme, Pans: Anthropos
Wnght, T C , 1973, 'Ongms of the Politics of Inflation m Ch1le, 1888-1918', HlSpamc Amer
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Amencan Studies, Vol 7, No I
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= ;. ,
In Latin America the fiesta system takes the form of individual or group
sponsorship of Catholic religious festivals or saints' days. Recruitment to
fiesta office (cargo) is either by election or co-option, and an incumbent
generally holds this position for a year. Sponsorship in this manner necessitates not only extensive ntual participation and allied religious and secular
duties on the part of the officeholder, but also the finance, provision and
organisation of all the festive activities connected with the fiesta.
Most analyses of the fiesta system relate to the 'autonomous' peasant
communites of Central America (see the bibliographic references cited by
Cancian [1967: 297-8] ). These studies tend to focus on the ritual associated
with religious officeholding, and theorise sponsorship in terms of reciprocal
exchange: that is, a levelling mechanism whereby the community as a whole
prevents individual peasants from accumulating wealth of any kind [Adams,
1957; Cancian, 1965; Foster, 1967; Nash, 1958, 1966; Tax, 1953; Vogt, 1969;
Wolf, 1966]. In the course of sponsoring fiestas, therefore, better-off
peasants redistribute surpluses among the poorer members of the community, and acquire 'prestige' in return. The fiesta is accordingly depicted as a
central and positive institution, supported voluntarily by all the inhabitants
*Centre of Latm Amencan Studzes, Umversuy of Cambndge, West Road, Cambndge CB3 9EF,
England Thzs artzcle is based on fieldwork funded by the SSRC and carried out m Peru dunng
1974-75. It was presented m semmars at the Department of Anthropology, Umversuy of
Durham, m 1981, and at the Centre of Latm Amencan Studzes, Umversuy of Cambridge, m
1982. The author rs grateful to the partlczpants m both these contexts for raismg useful pomts.
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precisely this struggle over meaning that is absent from Gramsci's concept of
hegemony.' According to Faye, in every social arena the subject encounters
(and actively contributes to or struggles against the reproduction of) a
politico-ideological matrix of linguistic forms which constitute discourse. In
this sense, therefore, language operates as the property of a social group
[Volosinov, 1973], and as such is itself the object of expropriation in the
course of politico-ideological struggle when a particular class-specific meaning is either installed in or expelled from discourse relating to - and thus
simultaneously defining/redefining - a given social activity or institution.
Furthermore, since this process of conflict over meaning will in some contexts by its very nature involve (and thus bring into question) other institutional forms and social activity which it encompasses, subjects will be offered
the possibility of accepting or rejecting other components constitutive of a
whole politico-ideological matrix. Given the institutional interrelatedness of
the different components of politico-ideological power exercised by a landlord in the estate system of La Convenci6n, this 'domino' effect possesses
implications for the reproduction of an individual component, such as the
fiesta, during a period of acute class struggle.~
THE FIESTA CONTEXT
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TABLE 1
RELIGIOUS OFFICEHOLDING AND FIESTA EXPENDITURE,
PINTOBAMBA GRANDE 1940-75
Soc1al Composition of
Religious Officeholder
Year
Peasant
Stratum
Non-demesne
Landholding
Hectares
Period of
Fiesta
Tenant Statusb Expenditure'
Years
Sf.
1940
1941
1950
1955
1956
1959
Middle
R1ch
Rich
n.a.
R1ch
Rich
8.00
29.54
10.95
n.a.
12 76
32.69
14
33
n.a.
20
n a.
2
1962 ~
to S
1973
D1scontmued
1974
Merchantd
rNRA
Coordinatord
Riche
Rich
MiddJe'
1975
Notes:
Source
n.a
n.a.
100,000
107,000
133,000
143,000190,000
24,000
n.a
1,000
n.a.
n a.
36 65
12.87
7.93
11
n.a.
23
a. refers to area rented in Pintobamba Grande durmg year of office; b: refers to penod
between onginal settlement as tenant and year of holding office, c: in 1975 Peruvian
Soles; d: held position of principal officeholder; e: held position of secondary
officeholder.
Information provided by ex-tenants m Pintobamba Grande
the exploitative nature of the relationship correspondingly mystified. Furthermore, both Spanish and Quechua project reciprocity as the content of the
landlord/tenant relation ('help', 'payment-in-kind for those helping with
work'), and as a result labour-service is depicted ideologically in terms of
equal exchange. This conceptualisation of the landlord/tenant relation as
'help' ( = reciprocity) also extends to the labour-service variant maquipura.
In Pintobamba Grande the landlord is reported to have addressed his
tenants thus: 'You have to help me (ayudarme) since you cultivate land
which belongs to me, you have to work (maquipurar) for me.' The use of the
term 'help' as a synonym both for 'work' and for the labour-service variant
maquipura is particularly significant. Although the vernacular clearly indicates the presence of an economic wage-relation, this identification of
unequal exchange is nevertheless juxtaposed with a term denoting its opposite, that is, the existence of reciprocal exchange.
In common with these labour-service variants, the fiesta system was similarly
embedded in a language of oppositions which permitted the dominance/
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labour-rent and the cost of fiesta sponsorship during this period constituted a
deduction by the landlord from the mass of surplus-value accruing to these
capitalist tenants, and was instrumental in the mobilisation of the latter in
the peasant movement which expropriated the landlord. In the course of this
conflict with rich peasant tenants, therefore, it became increasingly difficult
for the landlord to sustain his meanings not only of labour-service but also of
fiesta officeholding (in terms of reciprocity, 'help', etc.), meanings which
were displaced in discourse relating to these institutions by the opposing
concept of acceptability that stressed the exploitative nature of labour-rent
and fiesta sponsorship.
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tasks and duties (the selection and purchase of fiesta items, the supervision
and payment of hired labour, etc.). The religious officeholder himself was
present in Pintobamba Grande only for the fiesta activity on the 16 July. In
1975 the principal religious officeholder was the ONRA Coordinator for the
local district, a middle-ranking functionary of the state agrarian reform
agency. In this case the service functions were similarly delegated to hired
casual labourers, but the officeholder carried out the organisational and
supervisory duties in person (tasks facilitated by the frequent presence on
the peasant Cooperative of the officeholder in his capacity as the ONRA
Coordinator). In the same year the secondary religious officeholders
included two rich peasants and a middle peasant, all members of the Production Committee. One rich peasant sponsored the repair and maintenance of
the chapel on the demesne settlement, a commitment which required the
financing of raw materials (two bags of cement) together with his own
labour-power and that of subaltern 'assistant'. The purchase and transportation of the raw materials (by mule back) was undertaken by the spouse of this
secondary officeholder, while the repair work itself was carried out by his
bonded labourer. The fiesta dancers and puppete.ers were sponsored by
another rich peasant and a middle peasant; the manual labouring tasks
required of these secondary religious officeholders (the transportation of
the performers' equipment from Quillabamba to Pintobamba Grande) were
similarly undertaken by their respective bonded labourers, supervised in
both instances by the officeholder.
A second major difference between the pre- and post-reform structure of
the fiesta concerns the scale of financial sponsorship. Thus the cost to the
principal religious officeholder of sponsoring the main aspects of the fiesta in
1974 requires expenditure of only S/.24,000 compared with the equivalent
outlay of S/.190,000 in 1959, the post-reform cost of fiesta sponsorship to its
principal officeholder having declined to 13 per cent of the pre-reform level.
Similarly, the financial commitment on the part of a secondary officeholder
sponsoring a specific fiesta activity is negligible when compared with prereform levels of expenditure. The total cost of post-reform fiesta sponsorship for all its religious officeholders amounts to some S/.39,000, only 21
per cent of the total cost of pre-reform sponsorship. 17 In those cases where it
applies, the period of residence in Pintobamba Grande by the officeholder
has once again increased, thereby permitting an extended process of accumulation to precede fiesta sponsorship.
In the absence of a landlord, the post-reform fiesta is the politicoideological domain of the bourgeoisie and elements of the petty-bourgeoisie
(large merchants, administrators, rich and middle peasants). Although its
pre-reform economic function as a direct form of rental appropriation by the
landlord from his tenants is correspondingly absent, the post-reform fiesta
nevertheless licenses both the extraction of surplus-value and the reproduction of the peasant Cooperative production relation, and is therefore an
important arena of class struggle. Accordingly, the contradictory aspects of
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56
peasant membership. From this point on poor peasants were able to resist
expulsion for non-completion of the statutory labour requirement, and
non-completion by the whole membership became common.
A corollary of the extensive non-completion of the statutory labour
requirement by the Production Committee membership is its displacement
from a central position in the politico-ideological struggle between different
peasant strata, and its corresponding replacement as the focus of conflict by
the issue of political officeholding. Accordingly, concepts of 'duty' and
'obligation' socially embedded in discourse relating to the statutory labour
requirement (which identify its completion as the condition of continued
membership and thus confer acceptability on sanctions imposed for nonfulfillment) become associated instead with the willingness or unwillingness
of members to hold political office on the executive councils of the Production Committee, Idioms of 'sacrifice' and 'service' hitherto attached to
personal labour in the Cooperative labour process, which licensed reciprocity in the form of co-ownership and other rights to means of production on
this sector, are henceforth invoked in connection with the personal work
element intrinsic to political officeholding (the latter necessitating a heavy
labour contribution from the incumbent). 20 Hence politico-ideological struggle tends to focus increasingly on political officeholding, and takes the
immediate form of hostile/punitive nominations to political office (a refusal
on the part of an unwillingly elected member inviting censure and the threat
of expulsion). Unlike the issue of the statutory labour requirement,
however, the contradictions inherent in political officeholding are more
problematic and not transcended, since by its very nature the latter activity
cannot be delegated to hired labour (as is possible with the statutory labour
requirement).
When compared with political officeholding on the executive councils of
the Production Committee, religious officeholding in the reintroduced fiesta
system possesses a number of economic advantages from the viewpoint of
rich and middle peasant members. First, as regards both the extent and the
intensity of the workload, religious officeholding requires considerably less
commitment than political officeholding. Second, whereas the majority of
tasks required of a religious officeholder may be allocated by the latter to
'assistants' (that is, labourers employed by the officeholder), it is impossible
by the nature ofthe tasks involved to delegate the functions of political office
to subordinates of the officeholder. Third (and a corollary of the previous
two points), in terms of opportunity costs fiesta sponsorship constitutes a
fraction of the fmancial commitment represented by holding political office
on the Production Committee executive.
Religious officeholding also possesses distinct politico-ideological advantages when compared with political officeholding. Unlike political officeholders in the Production Committee, religious officeholders in the fiesta
context are vulnerable neither to accusations of embesslement nor to
accusations of devoting insufficient time to officeholding tasks (because of
the small sums involved on the one hand, and the fact that a division of
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57
religious officeholding labour permits the delegation not only of tasks but
also responsibility). In short, although politico-ideological concepts which
permit the operationalisation of 'reciprocal' exchanges, such as 'service',
'sacrifice', etc., are inscribed in both political and religious officeholding,
the latter is of less economic cost to the incumbent than the former. Hence its
attraction for rich and middle peasant members, unwilling or unable to hold
political office in the Production Committee, who in the course of (secondary) religtous officeholding are nevertheless able to reproduce the politicoideological conditions whtch make possible not only particular forms of
private appropriation from the Production Committee as a whole but also
the reproduction of the Cooperative production relation itself.l' The object
of fiesta sponsorship by rich and middle peasants in Pintobamba Grande
during the post-reform era is that it defuses the issue of political officeholding as a condition of member status for those called upon- but declining- to
'serve' in this manner, and thus avoids the possibility of expulsion from the
Production Committee by an increasingly dominant poor peasant
membership. 21
CONCLUSION
Class struggle on the demesne sector of Pintobamba Grande in the prereform era involves a process m which both the fiesta system and labour-rent
share a common language, mode of recruitment, economic function, and
sanction. Within this matrix, contradictory aspects of one institution are
transposed on to the other, and a breakdown in the politico-ideological
efficacy of one entails a corresponding breakdown for the other. The
development during this period of a stratum of capitalist tenants, coupled
with increased appropriation from the latter by the landlord in the double
form of labour-rent and fiesta sponsorship resulted in the rejection of
landlord-specific meanings attached to these institutions and the acceptance
of tenant-specific meanings. The restructured post-reform fiesta similarly
corresponds to an arena in which attempts are made to deflect politicoideological conflict. Accordingly, contradictions arising from the struggle
for access to and control over new means of productton are marked by the
reaffirmation in this context of idioms stressing the contribution by capitalist
peasants to the Cooperative in the form of sponsorship. Insofar as it constitutes a politically-acceptable substitute for (and hence alternative to) political officeholding, therefore, religious office holding permits these capitalist
peasants to claim that the conditions of member status have been met. In
short, whereas pre-reform fiesta sponsorship corresponds to a deduction
from capitaL post-reform sponsorship by contrast reproduces the capital
relation.
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2.
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6
r II
Texts which project many aspects of th1s theory onto the fiesta system in Peru mclude
Casaverde (1970]. Conhn (1974], FIOravanti (1973], Fonseca (1973, 1974], Gow (1974],
Isbell (1978]. Malengreau [1974], Nunez del Prado and Bonmo (1969]. and Sallnow (1974,
1981]. In a more recent text, Sallnow (1983] exammes the different ritual practices associated with fiestas on the rural estate in southern Peru dunng the Colonial and Repubhcan
penods; although this constitutes a welcome departure from ah1stoncal functionalist
approaches, it nevertheless confmes 1ts analysis to the hegemomc role of rellgwus ideology,
and thus falls to record the extent to wh1ch the fiesta is an arena where politically important
non-liturg1cal id10ms are reproduced and confhct takes place over theu class-spec1flc
meanings. In the case of the fiesta considered below, only non-religious ideology changes
wh1le religwus 1d10ms remam the same.
Both these analyt1cal approaches to the fiesta system employ the followmg oppositions.
nation
community
capitahst
non-capttahst
non-egahtanan egahtanan
non-md1genous : md1genous
The mfrastructure/superstructural relat1onsh1p 1s for Gramsci lJ971] encapsulated m the
concept 'hegemony', wh1ch refers to the ab1lity of a ruling class to exercise total soc1al
control Without explicit recourse to coercwn The obJect of this opaque power is to obtam
consent for rule by formulatmg alternatives through the definition of what constitutes
'reasonable' resolutions to (and thereby contaimng) conflict However, as has been noted
by Anderson [ 1977] and Negn eta/ [ 1979], the concept 'hegemony' IS madequate m that It
allocates a passtve role to politically subordmate class elements, the latter consequently
appeanng as (uncntJcal) consumers of ex1stmg ( = dommant) poht1co-deological meanmg
rather than as achve formulators of an alternative framework of consciOusness. The result
of th1s theonsation 1s that 'hegemony' negates both the element of politico-Ideological
contradiction and therefore struggle
This mterrelatedness of the different components of landlord power 1s accurately depicted
by one of the protagomsts in the struggle [Blanco 1972: 57]:
The (landlord] Is not only the boss and owner of the means of production; he 1s the
one who almost d1rectly appoints JUdges and local officials, just as he appomts
school-teachers or closes schools. In a large measure, he also supplants the local
authontles in h1s functions: he enforces law and order d1rectly . . . The power IS
clearly concentrated m h1m, unlike the situatiOn m the ctties where . . the system IS
more complex, the transmission belts more hidden and d1sgmsed Under those
Circumstances, when peasants have succeeded in orgamzing themselves to fight for
better workzng condtllons, they have m fact also succeeded in dzsplacmg the rule of the
landowner m other respects (emphasis added)
In Quechua the suff1x -yoc denotes possessiOn Hence the vernacular form carguyoc
md1cates that its subject 1s the 'possessor of a cargo', an officeholder.
The landlord, his km, guests, and the pnest were seated apart from the other f1esta
participants The fust dnnk and plate of food was served to the landlord by the rellg10us
officeholder m person, who then served the kin and guests of the owner. The estate tenants,
sub-tenants and theu kmsfolk were served food and dnnk by the km and/or subalterns of
the officeholder Feastmg and dnnking carried on mto the night, accompamed by contmuous mus1c and mterspersed w1th dancmg, puppet shows and speeches by the rehgwus
officeholder and landlord pledgmg friendshtp and emphas1smg communal spmt. The
firework d1splay m the early hours of the mormng simultaneously marked the chmax and
s1gnalled the end of the fiesta entertainment. After the final mass in the mornmg. the
tenants and sub-tenants returned to the1r non-demesne dwellmgs and the landlord to the
estate house on the demesne.
The mtrae~tate monopoly/monopsony. finally abolished m 1962 along w1th all the other
vanants of noncaptahst rent, consisted of the control exemsed by the landlord over all
market mputs and outlets ava1lable to estate tenants Th1s system reqmred that tenants and
4
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59
sub-tenants resident on the non-demesne both purchase theu commodities from and sell
produce to the landlord, the former rece1vmg as a result between 50 and 60 per cent of the
free market pnce from the latter for crops cultivated by peasant producers (C/DA, 1966.
214--15; Hobsbawm, 1969 46-7, Fioravantz, 1974: 78]. An obstacle to the development of
cap1tahst peasant farmmg, th1s restrictiOn on free commerce was Imposed contractually by
the landlord on his tenants (that 1s, It constituted a pre-cond1tion for the assumption of
tenant status), and earned the sanction of exclus1on or ev1ction from non demesne means
of productiOn on the estate
8 In the neighbounng province of Paucartambo, for example, the nght of estate tenants to all
the components and activities assocJated w1th fiesta celebratiOns was enshrined m tenure
contracts between landlord and tenant [Palacio, 1962.79, 86]. Sigmflcantly, the 'economic
assistance' extended by the landlord to the offlceholdmg tenant sponsonng the fiesta 1s
expressed m terms of 'help' (derecha a Ia ayuda econ6mzca del patron cuando e/ colona se
compromete a pasar cargos reltgiosos) Similarly, in La Convenc16n the act of f1esta
sponsorship was projected as a 'gift' made by the officeholder to the landlord [Craig, 1967:
20]
9. For an analogous depictwn of f1esta sponsorship as 'religwus duty' (oblzgaci6n relzgiosa) m
Paucartambo. see PalaciO [1962 86]. The existence of a hybnd form of the labour-rent
vanantfaena constitutes further evidence of the identification by estate tenants of religwus
sponsorship w1th landlord appropriation; thus a memorandum presented to the civ1c
authont1es m La Convenc16n by the Cusco Workers' Federation m 1960 con tams a protest
by estate tenants against the vanant of labour-rent known as glonafaena, wh1ch entailed
labour-serv1ce on the landlord demesne 'in honour of the patron saint of the estate'
[Aranda and Escalante, 1978 70-71]
10. This v1ew of peasant umon oppositiOn to religwus sponsorship m La Convenc16n IS
supported by Crag [1967. 81], who observes that 'most hohdays, pnor to the commumty
breakaway from the hac1endas, were of a religious nature and generally were Imposed by
the [landlord] - often to exact tnbute from the [estate tenants]. The [peasant] umons
generally d1d not support any religiOus functions as an mtegral part of . umon actiVIty'
11. Of additional poht1co-1deological importance was the spatial element, the fact that the
landlord demesne was the s1te of both labour-serv1ce and the fiesta
12. Class struggle med1ated in terms of ayuda, socorro, Jurk'a, oblzgan6n, etc., upholds the
v1ew advanced by Volosinov [1973: 22] that 'm order for any 1tem [of language], from
whatever domam of reahty 1t may come, to enter the social purv1ew of the group and ehc1t
semiOtiC reacuon, 1t must be aswciated with the vital socw-econom1c prereqms1tes of the
particular group's existence, 1t must somehow, even If only obhquely, make contact w1th
the bases of the group's matenal hfe.'
13 Between 1948/50 and 1959/60 there was a threefold increase m landlord revenue from
labour-rent and the fiesta [Brass, 1982: 231, Table 3-10]
14 W1th regard to the social compositiOn of rehgwus officeholders, each peasant propnetor m
Pmtobamba Grande was class1fled as belonging to the rich, m1ddle or poor peasant stratum
on the bas1s of ex-tenant or ex-sub-tenant status together with the quantity, quality and
productivity of h1s holdmg. The amount of non-demesne land owned was a s1gmf1cant
different~atmg element because of 1ts crucial role m the cultivatiOn of coffee, the most
profitable cash-crop grown by peasant producers m La Convenc16n (Brass, 1983: 370-72]
15. Ev1dence from both the Pampa de Anta m highland Cusco, where during the md-1970s '1t
was agreed that the most expens1ve cargos . . would be eliminated because of theu cost'
[Guzllet, 1979: 28], and the agrarian cooperatives on the coastal region, where f1estas which
'had been mfrequent in the coastal haciendas ... were held almost once a month m these
enterprises after 1974' [McC/tntock, 1981: 211], suggests that similartransformatlons m the
fiesta officeholdmg structure and functwn have occurred elsewhere m Peru for the same
economic reasons. A more recent study of the fiesta system m Central Amenca (Smith,
1977] ind1cates that mult1ple officeholdmg in order to reduce sponsorship costs has also
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three of the (known) secondary rehgious officeholders for 1975 were also rich and middle
peasants who had demonstrated publicly their unwillingness to hold pohucal office after
having been nominated dunng the annual election for executive posts in November 1974
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Gow, D. 1974, 'Taytacha Qoyllur Rit'I', Allpanch!S, Vol VII
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South Amenca, New York Doubleday
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Amencan Stud1es, Vol.l, No I
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Long and B Roberts (eds.), Peasant Cooperatwn and Capualtst Expansion in Central Peru,
b&57le!!!ti'azel
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62
INTRODUCTION
Professor, Division of the Social Sciences, Fordham University, College at Lmcoln Center, New
York, NY 10023. The author gratefully acknowledges that the research on wh1ch this article IS
based was supported by grants from the Natwnal Scumce Foundation and Fordham Umverstty
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