1. Plaintiff-appellee Siari Valley Estates Inc. vs.

defendantappellant Filemon Lucasan

GR No. L-7046, 31 August 1955, 97 Phil 987
Facts: In 1921, plaintiff-appellee and duly-organized agricultural
corporation Siari Valley Estate Inc. started raising livestock on its
950-hectare ranch with 7 native cattle. It acquired in 1923 thirty
(30) native cattle and two Indian bulls. Through a native black bull,
native stock was introduced into its herd and the male offspring of
that bull were castrated. Prior to Japanese occupation, the fence
enclosing Siari Valley's pasture was well kept. But in 1943, a
portion of that fence was destroyed, causing some of the cattle
straying into defendant-appellant Filemon Lucasan's adjoining
unfenced range in Sindangan, Zamboanga. Several men employed
under him took advantage of the situation and willfully,
deliberately rounding up and driving many animals from Siari
pasture towards his grazing land. In December 1948, Siari Valley
Estate Inc. filed an action to recover about 200 head of cattle that
were driven or wandered from its pasture lands into defendant's
adjoining ranch. It asked for return of its animals with their
offspring or for payment of those disposed of by defendant, plus
damages. Lucasan denied in his answer that he appropriated or
retained any cattle belonging to Siari Valley and alleged on the
contrary that the plaintiff took away from his pasture 105 heads of
cattle through force and intimidation. He also demanded suitable
compensation.
Farmer Jesus Pandi testified that during the war he saw Lucasan's
men Angel Galimon, Francisco Ramos and Bilingan Subane driving
30 heads of cattle from Siari Valley Estate to defendant's ranch,
and his testimony remained uncontradicted. Galimon, Ramos and
Bilingan were available during the trial, but Lucasan did not place
them on the witness stand to contradict Pandi's testimony.
After submission of several motion and petitions by both parties, a
trial was held, and the Court of First Instance (CFI) Zamboanga on
30 June 1952 (via Hon. Judge Patricio Ceniza) decided in favor of
Siari Valley Estate, affirming its right to recover the (alleged)
strayed animals and its offspring. The said trial court also ordered
Filemon Lucasan to deliver all the cattle in his ranch, especially the
323 animals and its offspring demanded by Siari Valley. He was also
found guilty of contempt proceedings and he is hereby sentenced
to pay a fine of P500.00 pursuant to Section 6, Rule 64 of the Rules
of Court or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency at
the rate of one day, for every PhP2.50 that he fails to pay.

Issues: Defendant Filemon Lucasan appealed CFI Zamboanga's

decision raising the issue whether Siari Valley Estate's cattle were
commingled with his cattle, and was such mix-up (commixtion) was
made in bad faith?

Legal Provisions: Articles 472-473 of RA 386 (The New Civil Code)

states:
Art. 472 - If by the will of their owners two things of the same or
different kinds are mixed, or if the mixture occurs by chance, and in
the latter case the things are not separable without injury, each
owner shall acquire a right proportional to the part belonging to
him, bearing in mind the value of the things mixed or confused.
(381)
Art. 473 - If by the will of only one owner, but in good faith, two
things of the same or different kinds are mixed or confused, the
rights of the owners shall be determined by the provisions of the
preceding article. If the one who caused the mixture or confusion
acted in bad faith, he shall lose the thing belonging to him thus
mixed or confused, besides being obliged to pay indemnity for the
damages caused to the owner of the other thing with which his own
was mixed. (382)
Held by the Supreme Court: The Supreme Court denied
Lucasan's appeal and affirmed CFI Zamboanga's decision that held
him guilty of appropriating or retaining Siari Valley's Cattle and its
offspring. The Supreme Court also applied Article 473 of the New
Civil Code in the present case and it held that Lucasan acted in bad
faith:
Lucasan's cowboys and even his sons Rafael and Vicente rounded
up and drove Siari Valley's cattle into his pasture. He knew that he
had the plaintiff's cattle, but refused to return them despite
plaintiff's demands. He even threatened Siari Valley's men when it
tried to retrieve the animals. He harassed them with false
prosecutions for their attempts to get the said animals back. He
would not allow plaintiff' s cowboys to get into his pasture to
identify its flock. Lastly, he rebranded several Siari Valley cattle
with his own brand and sold those cattle without registering the
sales. Also, after some cattle impounded were entrusted to his
custody as trustee, he disposed of not less than 5 head of cattle
among those he received as such trustee. He disposed of much
more cattle than he had a right to.

2. Manacop vs. CA
GR No. 104875, November 13, 1992
FACTS:
Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on March 1972, a
residential lot with a bungalow located in Quezon City. The
petitioner failed to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to a deed of
assignment signed between petitioners corporation and private
respondent herein (FF Cruz & Co). The latter filed a complaint for
the recovery for the sum of money with a prayer for preliminary
attachment against the former. Consequently, the corresponding
writ for the provisional remedy was issued which triggered the
attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City owned by the
Manacop Construction President, the petitioner. The latter insists
that the attached property is a family home having been occupied
by him and his family since 1972 and is therefore exempt from
attachment.
ISSUE: WON the subject property is indeed exempted from
attachment.
HELD:
The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home
by operation of law under Article 153 of the Family Code. Such
provision does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect
such that all existing family residences, petitioners included, are
deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of
their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and
henceforth, are exempt from execution for the payment of
obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988. Since petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it preceded
the effectivity of the Code and his property is therefore not exempt
form attachment.
The petition was dismissed by SC.

3. VILMA G. ARRIOLA and ANTHONY RONALD G. ARRIOLA,

Petitioners, vs. JOHN NABOR C. ARRIOLA, Respondent.
[G.R. No. 177703, January 28, 2008]
Facts:

Fidel Arriola died and is survived by his legal heirs: John Nabor
Arriola (respondent) ,his son with his first wife , and Vilma G.
Arriola, his second wife and his other son, Anthony Ronald Arriola
(petitioners).
On Feb. 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision ordering the
partition of the parcel of land covered by TCT No 383714 (84191)
left by the decedent Fidel S. Arriola by and among his heirs John
Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola in
equal shares of one-third (1/3) each without prejudice to the rights
of creditors or mortgagees thereon, if any.
However, the parties failed to agree on how to divide the above
mentioned property and so the respondent proposed to sell it
though public auction. The petitioners initially agreed but refused
to include in the auction the house standing on the subject land.
The respondent then filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion for
Contempt of Court but was denied by the RTC for lack of merit.
When a motion of reconsideration was still denied by the RTC, the
respondent elevated the case to the CA with a petition for certiorari
and prayed that he be allowed to push through with the auction of
the subject land including the house built on it. The CA granted the
petition and ordered the public auction sale of the subject lot
including the house built on it. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but the CA denied the said motion. Hence this
petition for review on Certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the subject house is covered by the
judgement of partition
Ruling:
The Supreme Court agree that the subject house is covered by the
judgment of partition but in view of the suspended proscription
imposed under Article 159 of the family code, the subject house
immediately partitioned to the heirs.
Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband
and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling
house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it
is situated.
Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and
lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time
of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually
resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is

exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as

hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, applying these concepts, the subject house as well as the
specific portion of the subject land on which it stands are deemed
constituted as a family home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma
from the moment they began occupying the same as a family
residence 20 years back.
Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of
one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a
period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary,
and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds
compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of
whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Appeal to the Court of Appeals denied:

O Upon motion for reconsideration, CA dismissed the petitioners
motion for partition.
It held that family home should continue despite the death of one
or both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The
heirs could not partition the property unless the court found
compelling reasons to rule otherwise. [Son of the private
respondent was a minor beneficiary of the family home]
Issue: Whether partition of the family home is proper where one of
the co-owners refuse to accede to such partition on the ground that
a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home.
Held: Petition granted as the minor son does not satisfy all the
requisites to be considered as a beneficiary of the family home.
Ratio:

4. Patricio vs Dario
Topic: Family Home
Facts:
Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife,
petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario
and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III.
He left a residential house and a pre-school building situated at
Cubao, Quezon City.
Petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent, extra judicially
settled the estate of Marcelino V. Dario.

Three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled

to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the relationship enumerated in Art.
154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home, and (3)
they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
On the first requisite:
o

The beneficiaries of the family home are:

(1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head
of a family
(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters,
whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate.

Petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private

respondent of their intention to partition the subject property and
terminate the co-ownership.

o
Descendants- contemplate all descendants of the person or
persons who constituted the family home without distinction. It
includes the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the spouses
who constitute a family home

O Private responded refused to partition the property.

On the second requisite:

O Petitioner and Marcelino Marc filed an action for partition before

RTC Quezon City

o
The grand son has been living in the family home since
1994, or within 10 years from the death of the decedent

Trial court ordered the partition of the property.

On the third requisite [fail! Did not satisfy!]:

O Private respondents motion for reconsideration denied.

o
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support from
his paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable of
supporting him.
o
Marcelino IV is dependent on the legal support of his father
and not his grandmother.
o

Hence, no legal impediment in partitioning the property.

*No co-owner ought to be compelled to stay in a co-ownership

indefinitely, and may insist on partition on the common property at
any time. An action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot
be barred by laches. Each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the common property.

5. JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS vs. DANILO PANGILINAN

Facts:
Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a company owned by Ernesto M. Ramos,
the patriarch of herein petitioners. The labor arbiter ordered Ramos
and the company to pay the respondents back-wages, separation
pay, 13th month pay & service incentive leave pay. The decision
became final and executory so a writ of execution was issued which
the Deputy Sheriff of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) implemented by levying a property in Ramos name
situated in Pandacan.
Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family home,
hence, exempt from execution to satisfy the judgment award,
Ramos and the company moved to quash the writ of execution.
Respondents argued that it is not the family home there being
another one in Antipolo and that the Pandacan address is actually
the business address. The motion was denied and the appeal was
likewise denied by the NLRC.

Yes. For the family home to be exempt from execution,

distinction must be made as to what law applies based on when it
was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by
the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege.
Hence, two sets of rules are applicable. If the family home was
constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before
August 3, 1988, then it must have been constituted either judicially
or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233
of the Civil Code. Meanwhile, Articles 240 to 242 governs
extrajudicial constitution.
On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is no need
to constitute extra judicially or judicially, and the exemption is
effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any
of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually reside therein. Moreover,
the family home should belong to the absolute community or
conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its
constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its
value must not exceed certain amounts depending upon the area
where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for which the
exemption does not apply as provided under Art. 155 for which the
family home is made answerable must have been incurred after
August 3, 1988. In both instances, the claim for exemption must be
proved.
In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family
home was constituted prior to August 3, 1988, or as early as 1944,
they must comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code.
There being absolutely no proof that the Pandacan property was
judicially or extra judicially constituted as the Ramos family home,
the law protecting the family home cannot apply thereby making
the levy upon the Pandacan property valid.

6. CAMELO CABATANIA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS

AND CAMELO REGODOS, RESPONDENTS.
Mere Physical Resemblance Between Child And Alleged Father Not
Enough To Establish Paternity And Filiation

Issue:
Whether or not the levy upon the Pandacan property was
valid.
Ruling:

Facts: Florencia filed a petition for recognition in behalf of her child

Camelo, against Camelo. According to her, when her husband left
her, she sought employment as a household helper and it was
there that she met Camelo who hired her as house helper. While
working as a maid, Camelo brought her to Bacolod City where they

had sexual intercourse. Twenty seven days after their sexual

intercourse, she discovered that she was pregnant. Their tryst was
repeated in March, 1982. Camelos housewife, suspecting her to be
pregnant, sent her home. Instead of bringing her home, Camelo
brought her to Bacolod City where he rented a house for her. On
September 9, 1982, she gave birth to Camelo. On the other hand,
Camelo, the alleged father, denied fathering Camelo the son. He
averred that in the course of her employment, Florencia would
often go home to her husband and return to work the next morning,
which displeased his wife and sent home Florencia. On the way to
Cadiz City, they were onboard a Ceres bus so he invited her to
dinner, where she confided that she was financially hard-up. They
had sexual intercourse, but felt something jerking. It was then that
she admitted being pregnant.
Held: The RTC, after trial, believed the testimony of Florencia, and
declared that owing to the physical resemblance between Camelo
the father and Camelo the son who was presented in open court,
there can be no doubt that Camelo is the father of Camelo. Thus it
ruled that Camelo is entitled to support from Camelo the father. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Camelo
thus elevated his case to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court:
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof
is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order for
recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or
may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it
must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear
and convincing evidence.
The applicable provisions of the law are Articles 172 and 175 of the
Civil Code:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of
the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation

shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Private respondent presented a copy of his birth and baptismal

certificates, the preparation of which was without the knowledge or
consent of petitioner. A certificate of live birth purportedly
identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of
paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a
hand in the preparation of said certificate. The local civil registrar
has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on
the information of a third person.
In the same vein, we have ruled that, while a baptismal certificate
may be considered a public document, it can only serve as
evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date
specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the
childs paternity.[9] Thus, certificates issued by the local civil
registrar and baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in
evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly
as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.
Aside from Florencias self-serving testimony that petitioner rented
a house for her in Singcang, Bacolod City, private respondent failed
to present sufficient proof of voluntary recognition.
We now proceed to the credibility of Florencias testimony. Both the
trial court and the appellate court brushed aside the
misrepresentation of Florencia in the petition for recognition that
she was a widow. Both courts dismissed the lie as minor which did
not affect the rest of her testimony. We disagree. The fact that
Florencias husband is living and there is a valid subsisting
marriage between them gives rise to the presumption that a child
born within that marriage is legitimate even though the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress. The presumption of legitimacy does

not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the
broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the
mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect
innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
analysis, the extremely subjective test of physical resemblance or
similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity
and filiation before the courts of law.
7. Concepcion vs. CA
Facts: The spouses Nestor and Allem Nicolas were the lessees of
Florence Concepcion. The spouses were engaged in an office
supply business where they cater to various government agencies.
In 1985, the spouses agreed to let Florence in on the business.
Hence, Florence contributed capital.
But sometime in July 1985, Rodrigo Concepcion, the brother of the
dead husband of Florence, called Florence interrogating her about
the rumored affair that she was having with Nestor. Florence denied
the said rumor. Unsatisfied, Rodrigo met with Nestor face-to-face.
Nestor denied the allegations of Rodrigo. Rodrigo then dared Nestor
to meet the neighbors, friends, and relatives, who allegedly know
of the relationship. Nestor agreed. And so in front of these
neighbors, friends, and relatives, Rodrigo reiterated his allegations
but then these neighbors, friends, and relatives denied having ever
known any illicit affair between Nestor and Florence.

Because of the incident, Nestor felt debased so much so that he

was ashamed of going out in public. As a result, his business
started to decline. Florence also stopped contributing capital. Even
his wife started doubting his fidelity. Nestor then wrote a letter to
Rodrigo asking him to publicly apologize for the incident as well as
to pay the spouses damages. Rodrigo refused hence he was sued
by the spouses. The trial court as well as the Court of Appeals ruled
in favor of the spouses and awarded in their favor a total of P85k in
moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees.
On appeal, Rodrigo insisted that there was no legal basis for the
award of damages against him because the acts complained of are
not those found in Article 26 and Article 2219 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages is proper.

HELD: Yes. The provisions of Articles 26 and 2219 are as follows:

Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The
following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages,
prevention and other relief: (1) Prying into the privacy of anothers
residence; (2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family
relations of another; (3) Intriguing or humiliating another on
account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth,
physical defect, or other personal condition.
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical
injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; (3) Seduction,
abduction, rape or other lascivious acts; (4) Adultery or
concubinage; (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; (6) Illegal
search; (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation; (8)
Malicious prosecution; (9) Acts mentioned in Art. 309 (referring to
disrespect for the dead or wrongfully interfering in a funeral); (10)
Acts or actions referred to in Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34,
and 35 x x x x
Certainly, what Rodrigo did is a violation of Nestors person. The
Supreme Court went on to explain the rationale behind Article 26
and why the enumerations therein are not exclusive: The Code
Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that the human
personality must be exalted. The sacredness of human personality
is a concomitant consideration of every plan for human
amelioration. The touchstone of every system of law, of the culture
and civilization of every country, is how far it dignifies man. If the
statutes insufficiently protect a person from being unjustly
humiliated, in short, if human personality is not exalted then the
laws are indeed defective. Thus, under this article, the rights of
persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for
violations of a persons dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind.

8. Liyao vs Liyao GR No 138961 Mar 7 2002

FACTS: Petitioner, represented by his mother Corazon, filed an

action for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate (spurious) son
of the late William Liyao against herein respondents, the legitimate
wife and children of the deceased.
Corazon is legally married but living separately from her
husband allegedly for more than ten years at the time of the
institution of this civil case. She cohabited with the late William
until his death. Petitioner alleged that he was in continuous
possession and enjoyment of the status of the child of said William
Liyao, having been recognized and acknowledged as such child
by the decedent during his lifetime and presented witnesses and
evidence to prove his allegations. On the other hand, respondents
painted a different picture of the story.
RTC rendered judgment in favour of petitioner.
CA reversed the ruling of RTC, favoured the presumption of
legitimacy of the child and gave weight to the testimonies of the
witnesses of the respondents that Corazon and her husband were
seen together during the period she cohabited with the deceased.
ISSUE:

WON the petition initiated by Corazon to compel

recognition by respondents can prosper.
WON petitioners action to impugn his legitimacy is proper.

RULING: No. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is

presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress.(Art 167,FC)
No. We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present
petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the
husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn
the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage.
The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband,
presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the
child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot
choose to be the child of his mothers alleged paramour. On the
other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the
child cannot elect the paternity of the husband who successfully
defeated the presumption. (Art 170-171, FC)

9. TEOFISTA BABIERA VS PRESENTACION CATOTAL

FACTS:
Presentacion questioned the authenticity of the entry of birth of
Teofista. She asserted that the birth certificate is void ab initio, as it
was totally a simulated birth, the signature of informant forged, and
contained false entries, to wit:
That Teofista is the legitimate child of the late spouses Eugenio
Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa;
Signature of the mother, Hermogena, is falsified;
Teofista's correct family name is GUINTO, not Babiera;
Her real mother was Flora Guinto, and her status is an illegitimate
child;
It was clinically and medically impossible for Hermogena to bore a
child at 54 years of age; her last child birth was when Presentacion
was born.
Presentacion ask the court to declare Teofista's certificate of birth
void and ineffective, and to order the City Civil Registrar to cancel
the same as it affect the hereditary rights of Presentacion who
inherited the estate.
Teofista countered that she and Presentacion are full-blooded
sisters, as showed therein her certificate of birth, Certificate of
Baptism, and her School Report Card. She also filed a motion on the
grounds that:
the petition states no cause of action, being an attack on her
legitimacy as the child of Hermogena and Eugenio; that
Presentacion has no legal capacity to file the petition pursuant to
Art. 171 of the Family Code;
and that the petition was barred from prescription in accordance
with Art. 170 of the Family Code.
The trial court ruled in favor of Presentacion. CA affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Presentacion has legal capacity to file the special
proceedings pursuant to Art. 171;

2. Whether or not the special proceedings is improper and barred

by the statute of limitation;
3. Whether or not the public record of Teofista's birth is superior to
the oral testimony of Presentacion.
RULING:
Petition is not meritorious.
1. Article 171 is not applicable in this case. Article 171 of the Family
Code shows that it applies to instances which the father impugns
the legitimacy of his wife's child. The provision, however,
presupposes that the child was the undisputed child of the mother.
Present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth
to Teofista. The present action does not impugn Teofista's filiation
to Eugenio and Hermogeno, be there is no blood relation to impugn
in the first place. The reason why Presentacion took interest on
Teofista's status is to protect the former's successional rights.
2. Article 170 of the FC does not apply. The provision provides a
prescriptive period for action to impugn the legitimacy of the child.
The present action involves the cancellation of Teofista's Birth
Certificate, it does not impugn her legitimacy. The action to nullify
the birth certificate does not prescribe because it was allegedly
declared void ab initio.
3. The specific attendant in the case at bar and the totality of the
evidence presented during trial, sufficiently negates the
presumption of regularity in the issuance of birth certificate.
First, the birth certificate was not signed by the local civil registrar,
and the mother's signature was different from other signatures.
Second, no medical records or doctor's prescription that provide as
evidence of Hermogena's pregnancy. It was impossible for her to
have given birth at 54 years of age. Third, the disposition of
Hermogena which states that she did not give brith to Teofista and
that the latter was not hers of Eugenio.
10. MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA VS CA
FACTS:
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian had various
properties. They both died intestate. The special proceedings for
administration of the properties were filed with the trial court.
Vicente's sister Victoria B. Lirio filed for issuance of letters of
administration in favor of the nephew. Marissa opposed the

petition, saying that she is the sole heir of deceased Vicente and
that she is capable of administering his estate. She submitted the
pieces of documentary evidence and testified that the spouses
treated her as their own daughter. The relatives of Vicente tried to
prove through testimonial evidence, that the spouses failed to
beget a child during their marriage. Victoria categorically declared
that Marissa was not the biological child of the spouses who were
unable to physically procreate.
Trial court relied on Arts. 166 and 170 of the Family Code and ruled
in favor of Marissa. On appeal, the CA reversed the lower court
decision and declared Marissa Benitez-Badua is not the biological
child of the late spouses.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Marissa Benitez-Badua is the legitimate child and
the sole heir of the late spouses.

RULING:
No. The SC find no merit to the petition
Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code cannot be
applied in the case at bar. The above provisions do not contemplate
a situation where a child is alleged not to be the biological child of
a certain couple.
In Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of
the child by:
(1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse,
with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child;
(2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not
have been his child;
(3) that in case of children conceived through artificial
insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either
parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation
or undue influence.
Articles 170 and 171 speak of the prescription period within which
the husband or any of his heirs should file an action impugning the

legitimacy of the child. In this case, it is not where the heirs of the
late Vicente are contending that Marissa is not his child or a child
by Isabel, but they are contending that Marissa was not born to
Vicente and Isabel.

Her birth record filed 6/15/48 showing her birth of 5/26/48 and
that shes an LC of Esperanza and Prospero

Marissa was not the biological child of the dead spouses. Marissa's
Certificate of Live Birth was repudiated by the Deed of ExtraJudicial Settlement of the Estate of the late Isabel by Vicente,
saying that he and his brother-in-law are the sole heirs of the
estate.

Benita Lastimosas denial that she delivered at Provincial Hospital

11. Cobatbat-Lim vs IAC 166 SCRA 451

Facts: Case at hand is a squabble over the estate of late Dra.
Esperanza Cabatbat. Petitioner is Violeta Cabatbat-Lim who claims
to be the only child of Esperanza while the resps are the sisters and
children of a deceased brother.
Priv resps (sisters of Esperanza) filed @ CFI Pangasinan for
partitioning of Esperanzas estate (died intestate on 4/23/77). Part
of her estate is the Calasiao Bijon Factory which is in possession of
Violeta (alleged child of Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat). They
were saying that Violeta is only a ward (ampon) through the ff
evidences:
Absence of any records that Esperanza was admitted to hospital
where Esperanza was supposedly born
Absence of birth certificate in the live birth section of the
Provincial Hospital (1947-1948)
Civil registry certification of 3/9/77 that there is no birth record of
Violeta Cabatbat from 5/26/48 or 49
Certification that Esperanza and Proceso were only guardians
(from Principal II of the Pilot School)
Amparo Resides testimony on 5/21/48 that she was in the
Provincial Hospital to watch a cousin give birth and there she met
Benita Lastimosa who gave birth to an IC Baby Girl Lastimosa on
5/26/48 (now known as Violeta Cabatbat)
Violeta on the other hand tried to adduce evidence that will support
her claim. Among which he showed are the following:

Procesos testimony that shes his child w/ Esperanza

MC of Violeta and Lim Biak Chiao showed that Esperanza is the

mother of the bride
Deed of Sale 5/14/60 where minor Violeta is assisted by mother
Esperanza
Deed pf Absolute Sale 4/21/61 assisted by father Proceso
TC held that Violeta is NOT natural child of E and P therefore NOT a
legal heir.
Issue: WON Violeta is a natural child of Esperanza and Proceso
Held: NO. TC and CA findings on filiation is given great accord,
conclusive upon the SC. TC then said that the Registry Book of
hospital admission doesnt even Esperanza was a patient on
5/26/48 and it doesnt even show that Esperanza was ever
admitted from 12/1/47 6/15/48. On 5/26/48, Records only show
that there was one birth at that day and that was Benita Lastimosa
who gave birth to an IC baby girl Lastimosa.
Absence of birth record in the Civil Regitry makes her exhibit
doubtable. Moreover, her reliance on NCC 263 is misplaced as such
action is not to impugn legitimacy but to claim inheritance as legal
heirs from a childless aunt. They do not claim that shes an IC

12. CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER,

petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORA
DOMINGO, respondents.
Facts:
The petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are niece and
nephew of the deceased Tedora Dezoller Guerrero, who appears to
be the sister of their father Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 without any ascendant or
descendant, and was survived only by her husband, Martin
Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes,
died on October 3, 1973, hence they seek to inherit from Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation.

The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller

Guerrero, her surviving spouse executed an Affidavit of
Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole
heir, the land in dispute. Martin sold the lot to herein private
respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter, a TCT was issued in
the latters name.
Martin Guerrero died. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an
action for reconveyance claiming that they are entitled to inherit
one-half of the property in question by right of representation.
Tedoro Domingo however, attacks the legitimacy of Hermogenes.
During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was
presented as the lone witness, with documentary evidences offered
to prove petitioners filiation to their father and their aunt.
Petitioners thereafter rested their case and submitted a written
offer of the exhibits.
Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiffs
Evidence on the ground that petitioners failed to prove their
legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for reconveyance.
Respondent Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal, declaring that
the documentary evidence presented by herein petitioners, such as
the baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are all
inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish filiation. Hence,
this appeal.
Issues:
1.
Whether or not a third person (private respondent), not the
father nor an heir, may attack the legitimacy of the petitioners.
2.
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to inherit onehalf of the property in question by right of representation.
Ruling:
1.
The private respondent is not the proper party to impugn
the legitimacy of herein petitioners.
There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and
founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. And well
settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked
collaterally.

Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his
wife. He is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule
which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide
whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral
and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that
his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these
cases, none even his heirs can impugn legitimacy; that would
amount to an insult to his memory.
The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the
legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican Code (Article
335) which provides: The contest of the legitimacy of a child by
the husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before
the competent court; any contest made in any other way is void.
This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171
of the code confirm this view, because they refer to the action to
impugn the legitimacy. This action can be brought only by the
husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed by law.
Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the
action to impugn the legitimacy of a child can no longer be
brought. The status conferred by the presumption, therefore,
becomes fixed, and can no longer be questioned. The obvious
intention of the law is to prevent the status of a child born in
wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty for a long time. It also
aims to force early action to settle any doubt as to the paternity of
such child, so that the evidence material to the matter, which must
necessarily be facts occurring during the period of the conception
of the child, may still be easily available.

2.
The following provisions of the Civil Code provide for the
manner by which the estate of the decedent shall be divided in this
case, to wit:
Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the
deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by
representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if
they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions.
Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and
ascendants, and illegitimate children and their descendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit
the entire estate, without prejudice to the rights of brothers and
sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under Article
1001.

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Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive

with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of
the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the
other half.
Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, one-half of the
subject property was automatically reserved to the surviving
spouse, Martin Guerrero, as his share in the conjugal partnership.
Applying the aforequoted statutory provisions, the remaining half
shall be equally divided between the widower and herein
petitioners who are entitled to jointly inherit in their own right.
Hence, Martin Guerrero could only validly alienate his total
undivided three-fourths (3/4) share in the entire property to herein
private respondent. Resultantly, petitioners and private respondent
are deemed co-owners of the property covered by the Transfer
Certificate of Title in the proportion of an undivided one-fourth (1/4)
and three-fourths (3/4) share thereof, respectively.

13. Tayag vs. Court of Appeals and Leyva

Facts:
Siblings Juan Galicia Sr. and Celerina Labuguin entered into a
contract to sell a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija to a certain Albrigido
Leyva:
o 3K upon agreement
o 10K ten days after the agreement
o 10K representing vendors indebtedness to Phil Veterans Bank
o 27K payable within one year from execution of contract.
Leyva only paid parts of the obligation.
But even after the grace period for payment made in the contract
and while litigation of such case, the petitioners still allowed Leyva
to make payments.
With regards to the obligation payable to the Phil Veterans bank by
the vendee, as they deemed that it was not paid in full, such
obligation they completed by adding extra amount to fulfill such
obligation. This was fatal in their case as this is Leyvas argument
that they constructively fulfilled the obligation which is rightfully

due to him. (Trivia: It was Celerina, Juans sister, that paid the bank
to complete such obligation).
Petitioners claim that they are only OBLIGEES with regards to the
contract, so the principle of constructive fulfillment cannot be
invoked against them.
Petitioners, being both creditor and debtor to private respondent, in
accepting piecemeal payment even after the grace period, are
barred to take action through estoppel.
Issue:
1. WON there was constructive fulfillment in the part of the
petitioners that shall make rise the obligation to deliver to Leyva
the deed of sale? YES
2. WON they are still entitled to rescind the contract? NO, barred by
estoppel.
Held:
1.
In a contract of purchase, both parties are mutually obligors and
also obligees, and any of the contracting parties may, upon nonfulfillment by the other privy of his part of the prestation, rescind
the contract or seek fulfillment (Article 1191, Civil Code).
In short, it is puerile for petitioners to say that they are the only
obligees under the contract since they are also bound as obligors to
respect the stipulation in permitting private respondent to assume
the loan with the Philippine Veterans Bank which petitioners
impeded when they paid the balance of said loan. As vendors, they
are supposed to execute the final deed of sale upon full payment of
the balance as determined hereafter.
2.
Petitioners accepted Leyvas delayed payments not only beyond
the grace periods but also during the pendency of the case for
specific performance. Indeed, the right to rescind is not absolute
and will not be granted where there has been substantial
compliance by partial payments. By and large, petitioners
actuation is susceptible of but one construction that they are
now estopped from reneging from their commitment on account of
acceptance of benefits arising from overdue accounts of private
respondent.

11

14. Jison vs. CA

FACTS:
Private respondent, Monina Jison, instituted a complaint against
petitioner, Francisco Jison, for recognition as illegitimate child of the
latter. The case was filed 20 years after her mothers death and
when she was already 39 years of age.

Petitioner was married to Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940 and sometime
in 1945, he impregnated Esperanza Amolar, Moninas mother.
Monina alleged that since childhood, she had enjoyed the
continuous, implied recognition as the illegitimate child of
petitioner by his acts and that of his family. It was likewise alleged
that petitioner supported her and spent for her education such that
she became a CPA and eventually a Central Bank Examiner.
Monina was able to present total of 11 witnesses.
ISSUE: WON Monina should be declared as illegitimate child of
Francisco Jison.

2.
That Francisco recognized Monina as his child through his
overt acts and conduct.
SC ruled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the
putative father is not competence evidence as to the issue of
paternity. Franciscos lack of participation in the preparation of
baptismal certificates and school records render the documents
showed as incompetent to prove paternity. With regard to the
affidavit signed by Monina when she was 25 years of age attesting
that Francisco was not her father, SC was in the position that if
Monina were truly not Franciscos illegitimate child, it would be
unnecessary for him to have gone to such great lengths in order
that Monina denounce her filiation. Moninas evidence hurdles the
high standard of proof required for the success of an action to
establish ones illegitimate filiation in relying upon the provision on
open and continuous possession. Hence, Monina proved her
filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence.
Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if
illegitimate, Monina filed her action well within the period granted
her by a positive provision of law. A denial then of her action on
ground of laches would clearly be inequitable and unjust. Petition
was denied.

HELD:
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be
established in the same way and on the same evidence as that of
legitimate children. Article 172 thereof provides the various forms
of evidence by which legitimate filiation is established.
To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of
the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the
child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental
affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such
acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the
conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and
treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not
accidentally, but continuously.
The following facts was established based on the testimonial
evidences offered by Monina:

15. DINAH B. TONOG v. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
- Dinah gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate
child with Edgar V. Daguimol. The two cohabited for a time and
lived with Edgar's parents and sister.
- A year after Dinah left for US where she found work as a
registered nurse. Gardin was left in the care of her father and
grandparents.
- Edgar later filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin and the
trial court granted the petition and appointed Edgar as the legal
guardian.

1.
That Francisco was her father and she was conceived at the
time when her mother was employed by the former;

12

- Dinah filed a petition for relief from judgement and the court set
aside the original judgement and allowed Dinah to file her
opposition to Edgar's petition. Edgar filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied and the court issued a resolution
granting Dinah's motion for custody over Gardin.

Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a

question of fact to be properly entertained in the special
proceedings before the trial court.

- Edgar filed a petition for certiorari before the CA who modified

their previous decision and granted Edgar custody over Gardin.

16. EUGENIO R. REYES, joined by TIMOTHY JOSEPH M.

REYES, MA. GRACIA S. REYES, ROMAN GABRIEL M. REYES,
and MA. ANGELA S. REYES, petitioners,

- Dinah contends that she is entitled to the custody of the minor,

Gardin Faith, as a matter of law. As the mother of Gardin Faith, the
law confers parental authority upon her as the mother of the
illegitimate minor.

vs. LIBRADA F. MAURICIO (deceased) and LEONIDA F. MAURICIO,

respondents.

Issue:

1.
Eugenio owns a parcel of land in Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan
(4,527 square meters, more or less, and covered by a TCT --property was adjudicated to Eugenio by virtue of an extrajudicial
settlement among the heirs following the death of his parents).

Is Dinah entitled to the custody of Gardin?

Ruling:
No. The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a
tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her. The
exception allowed by the rule has to be for compelling reasons
for the good of the child.
A mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is below
seven years of age for compelling reasons. Instances of
unsuitability are neglect, abandonment, unemployment and
immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of
the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness. If
older than seven years of age, a child is allowed to state his
preference, but the court is not bound by that choice. The court
may exercise its discretion by disregarding the childs preference
should the parent chosen be found to be unfit, in which instance,
custody may be given to the other parent, or even to a third
person.
Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling
factor, SC find that the appellate court did not err in allowing her
father to retain in the meantime parental custody over her.
Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar
surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the
people and places to which she had apparently formed an
attachment.

FACTS:

2.
Librada F. Mauricio (Librada, DECEASED) and her daughter
Leonida F. Mauricio (Leonida) filed a complaint before the DARAB of
Malolos, Bulacan alleging that theyre the legal heirs of Godofredo
Mauricio who was the lawful and registered tenant of Eugenio
through his predecessors-in-interest to the subject land( that from
1936 until his death in May 1994, Godofredo had been working on
the subject land and introduced improvements consisting of fruitbearing trees, seasonal crops, a residential house and other
permanent improvements; that through fraud, deceit, strategy and
other unlawful means, Eugenio caused the preparation of a
document denominated as Kasunduan dated 28 September 1994 to
eject respondents from the subject property, and had the same
notarized by Notary Public Ma. Sarah G. Nicolas in Pasig, Metro
Manila; that Librada never appeared before the Notary Public; that
Librada was illiterate and the contents of the Kasunduan were not
read nor explained to her; that Eugenio took undue advantage of
the weakness, age, illiteracy, ignorance, indigence and other
handicaps of Librada in the execution of the Kasunduan rendering it
void for lack of consent; and that Eugenio had been employing all
illegal means to eject respondents from the subject property).
3.
Leonida and Librada prayed for the declaration of nullity of
the Kasunduan and for an order for Eugenio to maintain and place
them in peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject property.
4.
According to Eugenio: Godofredos occupation of the
subject premises was based on the formers mere tolerance and

13

accommodation. Eugenio denied signing a tenancy agreement, nor

authorizing any person to sign such an agreement. He maintained
that Librada, accompanied by a relative, voluntarily affixed her
signature to the Kasunduan and that she was fully aware of the
contents of the document. Moreover, Librada receivedP50,000.00
from Eugenio on the same day of the execution of the Kasunduan.
Eugenio also questioned the jurisdiction of the DARAB since the
principal relief sought by respondents is the annulment of the
contract, over which jurisdiction is vested on the regular courts.
Provincial Adjudicator Godofredo was the tenant of Eugenio, and
Librada, being the surviving spouse, should have peaceful
possession of the land.
DARAB - Mauricios are former tenants of Spouses Reyes.
CA - affirmed the decision and resolution of the DARAB.
ON APPEAL, Leonidas legal standing as a party was also assailed
by Eugenio. Eugenio submitted that the complaint was rendered
moot with the death of Librada, Godofredos sole compulsory heir.
Eugenio contended that Leonida is a mere ward of Godofredo and
Librada, thus, not a legal heir.

ISSUE: WON Eugenio can question the filiation of Leonida in a case

regarding land dispute.

HELD: NO.
RATIO: We are in full accord with the Court of Appeals when it ruled
that Eugenio cannot collaterally attack the status of Leonida in the
instant petition.
It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked.
Well-known civilista Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino, in his book Civil Code
of the Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence, noted that
the aforecited doctrine is rooted from the provisions of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. He explained thus:
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of
defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different
purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly
impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican
code (article 335) which provides: The contest of the legitimacy of

a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper

complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any
other way is void. This principle applies under our Family Code.
Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they
refer to the action to impugn the legitimacy. This action can be
brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods
fixed in the present articles.
In Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental, the Court stated that legitimacy and filiation can be
questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper
party, and not through collateral attack.
The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also
be made subject to a collateral attack. In Reyes v. Sotero, this
Court reiterated that adoption cannot be assailed collaterally in a
proceeding for the settlement of a decedents estate. Furthermore,
in Austria v. Reyes, the Court declared that the legality of the
adoption by the testatrix can be assailed only in a separate action
brought for that purpose and cannot be subject to collateral attack.
17. LUCAS versus-LUCAS
FACTS: Petitioner, filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation
(with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing)2 before
RTC of Valenzuela City. Respondent was not served with a copy of
the petition. Nonetheless, respondent learned of the petition to
establish filiation. His counsel therefore went to the trial court and
obtained a copy of the petition. Petitioner filed with the RTC a Very
Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Hence, on September 3,
2007, the RTC, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and
substance, issued the Order3 setting the case for hearing and
urging anyone who has any objection to the petition to file his
opposition.
After learning of the September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration.5 Respondent averred that the petition
was not in due form and substance because petitioner could not
have personally known the matters that were alleged therein. He
argued that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere
allegation pointing to respondent as petitioners father. Moreover,
jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA
evidence.
ISSUE: Should a court order for DNA testing be considered a
search which must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in
order to be valid?

14

RULING: Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the

constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient
justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case
must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test.
Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of
procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost
universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before
a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in
paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter,
before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing,
the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility
of paternity.
The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction
to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus,
during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner
must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable
possibility of paternity.
Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a
DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the court. The court
may, for example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for
the DNA testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence to
establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be
corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA
testing.
18. De Jesus vs Dizon G.R. No. 142877
Prayer of the Petitioner: Petitioners maintain that their recognition
as being illegitimate children of the decedent, embodied in an
authentic writing, is in itself sufficient to establish their status as
such and does not require a separate action for judicial approval.
Facts:
The case involves two illegitimate children who having been born in
a lawful wedlock; claim to be the illegitimate children of the
decedent, Juan G. Dizon in order to enforce their respective shares
in the latters estate under the rules on succession. Danilo B. de
Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on August 23, 1964
and during this marriage, herein petitioners, Jacqueline A. de Jesus
and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus were born. However, in a notarized
document dated June 07, 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged
Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children
by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Subsequently, on the following year,

Juan G. Dizon died intestate leaving behind a considerable amount

of assets. Thus, on the strength of his notarized acknowledgment,
herein petitioners filed a complaint for Partition with Inventory and
accounting of the Dizon estate. On the other hand, herein
respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the
decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations of which the
deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case. They
argued that the complaint, even while denominated as being one
for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of
petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo
de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate
children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. But, the trial
court denied their motion to dismiss as well as their motion for
reconsideration, which prompted the respondents to elevate the
issue before the Court of Appeals but still the latter upheld the
decision of the lower court and ordered that case be remanded for
further proceedings. Years later, respondents, notwithstanding with
their submission of their answers and several motions, they filed an
omnibus motion for the dismissal of the complaint. They contend
that the action instituted was, in fact, made to compel the
recognition of petitioners as being the illegitimate children of
decedent Juan G. Dizon and that the partition sought was merely
an ulterior relief once petitioners would have been able to establish
their status as such heirs. They also asserted that an action for
partition was not an appropriate forum to ascertain the question of
paternity and filiation because the same could only be taken up in
an independent suit or proceeding. And at this instance, the trial
court favored with the respondents and therefore dismissed the
complaint of the petitioners for lack of cause of action and being
improper.

Issue:
Whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate off
springs of the decedent.

Ruling:
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is
established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register
or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by
the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be

15

proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of

a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child
in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or
in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is
required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground
for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition
that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where,
instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence
merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth,
a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing,
judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is
essential in order to establish the childs acknowledgment.
However, based on the records presented, they showed that
petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents. The
certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being
their father. There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly
established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing
reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are
legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the
absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access
between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days
which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the
physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with
his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately
in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious
illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual
intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods
set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the
Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to
impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible
and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and
unassailable. In an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to
the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their
legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina
Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the law
itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born
during the marriage of the parents .Jurisprudence is strongly settled
that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be
attacked collaterally, one that can only be repudiated or contested
in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. Indeed, a child
so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been

sentenced as having been an adulteress. WHEREFORE, the

foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant petition is DENIED.
20. David vs CA
21. Fernandez vs. Fernandez
22. In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction of
Entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang G.R.
159966, March 30 2005, 454 SCRA 2155
Case Doctrines:
The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized
illegitimate child contains a given name, a middle name and a
surname.
Before a person can be authorized to change his name given him
either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show
proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may
justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.
That the continued use of a middle name would cause confusion
and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to
drop it from one's registered complete name.
Facts: Julian was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents
Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married
to each other. When his parents subsequently got married on
September 22, 1998, they executed a deed of legitimation of their
son so that the childs name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan
to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
Since the couple planned to live in Singapore where Julian will
study together with a sister who was born in Singapore, Anna Lisa
decided to file a petition in the Regional Trial Court seeking to drop
his middle name and have his registered name in the Civil Registry
changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. The
reason given for the change of name sought in the petition is that
Julian may be discriminated against when he studies in Singapore
because of his middle name since in Singapore middle names or
the maiden surname of the mother is not carried in a person's
name.
After trial, the RTC denied the petition because the reason given did
not fall within the grounds recognized by law. The RTC ruled that
since the State has an interest in the name of a person it cannot
just be changed to suit the convenience of the bearer of the name.

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The RTC said that legitimate children have the right to bear the
surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no reason why
this right should be taken from Julio considering that he was still a
minor. When he reaches majority age he could then decide whether
to change his name by dropping his middle name, added the RTC.

since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien

parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase
signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing
anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and
there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a
fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice
public interest.

Issues:

In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the
dropping his middle name is convenience. However, how such
change of name would make his integration into Singaporean
society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the
continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and
difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it
from his registered complete name.

Was the RTC correct in denying the petition?

Held:
Yes. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation
of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who may
have the same given name and surname as he has. When an
illegitimate child is legitimated by subsequent marriage of his
parents or acknowledged by the father in a public instrument or
private handwritten instrument, he then bears both his mother's
surname as his middle name and his father's surname as his
surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an
acknowledged natural child. The registered name of a legitimate,
legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given
name, a middle name and a surname.

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and

entities for purposes of identification, and that a change of name is
a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be
authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of
birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or
any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise,
the request should be denied.

To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not

only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he
will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among
the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a)
when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to
write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal
consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid
confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known

In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous

foundation on which his petition for change of name is based, it is
best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment
and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of
tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of
the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may
just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.

23. IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY

ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
FACTS:
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate
child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He prayed that the child's
middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother's surname,
and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his
legitimate child and heir, and pursuant to Art. 189 of the Family
Code, she is now known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that
Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname Garcia as her
middle name.
The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her
relationship with her natural mother should be maintained and

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preserved, to prevent any confusion and hardship in the future, and

under Article 189 she remains to be an intestate heir of her mother.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural
father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name.
RULING:
Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her
natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers
surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do
so.

Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No.

9255, (An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of
Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a child may use.
Article 365 of the CC merely provides that an adopted child shall
bear the surname of the adopter. Article 189 of the Family Code,
enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the
matter.
Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an
legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, Stephanie is entitled to
all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname
of her father and her mother.

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