Tio v Videogram Regulatory Board (1987)

Tio v Videogram Regulatory Board GR No L-75697, June 18, 1987

FACTS:
The petition assails the constitutionality of PD No 1987 entitled An act creating the Videogram Regulatory Board
based on several grounds, including the following: (1) Section 10 of PD No 1987 which imposes a tax of 30% on the
gross receipts payable to the local government is a rider and the same is not germane to the subject thereof; (2) the
tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful restraint of trade in violation of the due process of
the Constitution; and (3) undue delegation of power and authority.
ISSUE:
Is PD 1987 constitutional?
RULING: Yes.
(1) The contention that the tax provision of the Decree is a rider is bereft and devoid of merit because the title of the
Decree, which is the creation of the Videogram Regulatory Board (VRB) aimed at regulating and controlling the video
industry, is comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in its preamble and reasonably covers all its
provisions. Moreover, it is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the
body of the decree.
(2) It is axiomatic that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely
deters the activities taxed. The legislature acts upon its constituents in imposing a tax; thus, in general, a sufficient
security against erroneous and oppressive taxation is afforded the taxpayer. Also, the tax imposed by the Decree is a
revenue measure. The tax of 30% is exacted for a public purpose i.e. to answer the need for regulating the video
industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights and the
proliferation of pornographic video tapes.
(3) The grant in Section 11 of the Decree of authority to the VRB to solicit the direct assistance of other agencies &
units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and
units to perform enforcement functions for the Board is NOT a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a
conferment of authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement and implementation.

Case Digest: Lung Center of the Philippines vs. Quezon City and Constantino Rosas
G.R. No. 144104

June 29, 2004

FACTS:
The Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit entity which owns a parcel of land in Quezon City. Erected in the middle of
the aforesaid lot is a hospital known as the Lung Center of the Philippines. The ground floor is being leased to a
canteen, medical professionals whom use the same as their private clinics, as well as to other private parties. The
right portion of the lot is being leased for commercial purposes to the Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center. The
petitioner accepts paying and non-paying patients. It also renders medical services to out-patients, both paying and
non-paying. Aside from its income from paying patients, the petitioner receives annual subsidies from the government.
Petitioner filed a Claim for Exemption from realty taxes amounting to about Php4.5 million, predicating its claim as a
charitable institution. The city assessor denied the Claim. When appealed to the QC-Local Board of Assessment, the
same was dismissed. The decision of the QC-LBAA was affirmed by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals,
despite the Petitioners claim that 60% of its hospital beds are used exclusively for charity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Petitioner is entitled to exemption from realty taxes notwithstanding the fact that it admits paying
clients and leases out a portion of its property for commercial purposes.
HELD:
The Court held that the petitioner is indeed a charitable institution based on its charter and articles of incorporation. As
a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its character as such and its exemption from taxes simply
because it derives income from paying patients, whether out-patient or confined in the hospital, or receives subsidies
from the government, so long as the money received is devoted or used altogether to the charitable object which it is
intended to achieve; and no money inures to the private benefit of the persons managing or operating the institution.
Despite this, the Court held that the portions of real property that are leased to private entities are not exempt from real
property taxes as these are not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes. (strictissimi juris)
Moreover, P.D. No. 1823 only speaks of tax exemptions as regards to:

income and gift taxes for all donations, contributions, endowments and equipment and supplies to be
imported by authorized entities or persons and by the Board of Trustees of the Lung Center of the
Philippines for the actual use and benefit of the Lung Center; and
taxes, charges and fees imposed by the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof with
respect to equipment purchases (expression unius est exclusion alterius/expressium facit cessare tacitum).

Guingona v. Carague
G.R. No. 94571 April 22, 1991
Gancayco, J.
Facts:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3
Billion appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act, or a total of
P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports amount to
P27,017,813,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled Amending Certain Provisions
of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), by P.D.
No. 1177, entitled Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New
Society, and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic
of the Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For
The Purpose.
The petitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of P.D. 1177, and P.D. No.
1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said
decrees.
Issue:
Is the appropriation of P86 billion in the P233 billion 1990 budget violative of Section 29(1), Article VI of the
Constitution?
Held:
No. There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of words or
religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be made by
law, such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees. In other words,
in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) as well as
expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said appropriation
may be made in general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual
laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or special application which
appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is
sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the language employed (In re Continuing
Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or in the present.

Tan v. Del Rosario Digest

Tan v Del Rosario
Facts:
[if !supportLists]1. Two consolidated cases assail the validity of RA 7496 or the Simplified Net Income Taxation
Scheme ("SNIT"), which amended certain provisions of the NIRC, as well as the Rules and Regulations promulgated
by public respondents pursuant to said law.
[if !supportLists]2. Petitioners posit that RA 7496 is unconstitutional as it allegedly violates the following provisions of
the Constitution:
-Article VI, Section 26(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed
in the title thereof.
- Article VI, Section 28(1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation.
- Article III, Section 1 No person shall be deprived of . . . property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws.
[if !supportLists]3. Petitioners contended that public respondents exceeded their rule-making authority in applying
SNIT to general professional partnerships. Petitioner contends that the title of HB 34314, progenitor of RA 7496, is
deficient for being merely entitled, "Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed and Professionals
Engaged in the Practice of their Profession" (Petition in G.R. No. 109289) when the full text of the title actually reads,
'An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme For The Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged In
The Practice of Their Profession, Amending Sections 21 and 29 of the National Internal Revenue Code,' as
amended. Petitioners also contend it violated due process.
[if !supportLists]5. The Solicitor General espouses the position taken by public respondents.
[if !supportLists]6. The Court has given due course to both petitions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the tax law is unconstitutional for violating due process
NO. The due process clause may correctly be invoked only when there is a clear contravention of inherent or
constitutional limitations in the exercise of the tax power. No such transgression is so evident in herein case.
[if !supportLists]1. Uniformity of taxation, like the concept of equal protection, merely requires that all subjects or
objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities. Uniformity does not
violate classification as long as: (1) the standards that are used therefor are substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the
categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all things being equal, to both
present and future conditions, and (4) the classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the same class.
[if !supportLists]2. What is apparent from the amendatory law is the legislative intent to increasingly shift the income
tax system towards the schedular approach in the income taxation of individual taxpayers and to maintain, by and
large, the present global treatment on taxable corporations. The Court does not view this classification to be arbitrary
and inappropriate.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not public respondents exceeded their authority in promulgating the RR
No. There is no evident intention of the law, either before or after the amendatory legislation, to place in an unequal
footing or in significant variance the income tax treatment of professionals who practice their respective professions
individually and of those who do it through a general professional partnership.

PHILCONSA vs. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994
Facts:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by
both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of
appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the President. It also authorized members of
Congress to propose and identify projects in the pork barrels allotted to them and to realign their respective
operating budgets.
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution, Congress
presented the said bill to the President for consideration and approval.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have become Republic Act
NO. 7663, entitled AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto
Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions, as follows:
1.
Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that this debt reduction scheme cannot be validly done through the
1994 GAA. And that appropriations for payment of public debt, whether foreign or domestic, are automatically
appropriated pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26,
Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative Code of 1987.
2.
Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving
funds in the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs),
3.
Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.
4.
Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the Generics Drugs Law (R.A.
No. 6675).
5.
The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the modernization of the AFP of the
Special Provision No. 2 on the Use of Fund, which requires the prior approval of the Congress for the release of the
corresponding modernization funds, as well as the entire Special Provision No. 3 on the Specific Prohibition which
states that the said Modernization Fund shall not be used for payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18
SF-260 Trainer planes and 150 armored personnel carriers
6.

New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds.

7.

Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Congress.

Issue:
whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the
Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e)
Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUS) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUCs) are
constitutional; whether or not the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service and the automatic
appropriation of funds therefore is constitutional
Held:
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process. There is,
therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the
validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution.

The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign
Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the court in Gonzales, the
repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law.
In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination when the President vetoed said
special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other government agencies. If some government agencies were
allowed to use their income and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been
enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as exceptions to the one-fund
policy (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities and Exchange Commission;
E.O. No. 359 for the Department of Budget and Managements Procurement Service).
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is unconstitutional. The
Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the
appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended 70%
by administrative and 30% by contract.
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should strictly comply with the
formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health is an appropriate provision. Being
directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the AFP, the special
provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also vetoing the said item.
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the use of Fund for the AFP modernization program that the
President must submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for its approval, is an exercise of the
congressional or legislative veto. However the case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the
validity of the legislative veto as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be
disposed of on other grounds. Therefore, being inappropriate provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were
properly vetoed.
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization fund for payment of the trainer planes
and armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional
prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts entered
into by the Government itself. The veto of said special provision is therefore valid.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being
managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the
Article VI of the Constitution.
Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the language used in the challenged Special
Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the President the right to defer or reduce the spending,
much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the
appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and manifested in
another law considering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the
creation of the CAFGUs to be amended.
On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to appropriations to the Supreme Court,
constitutional commissions, the NHA and the DPWH, there is less basis to complain when the President said that the
expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined
whether they are proper or inappropriate. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take
necessary and proper steps to carry into execution the law. These steps are the ones to be embodied in the
guidelines.

Civil Liberties Union VS. Executive Secretary

FACTS:
Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83896 and
Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions were consolidated and are being resolved jointly as both seek a
declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25,
1987.
Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries to hold other than government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions. The
pertinent provisions of EO 284 is as follows:
Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive
Department may in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and
government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor.
Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they must relinquish the excess
position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two
positions other than his primary position.
Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or
undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
The petitioners are challenging EO 284s constitutionality because it adds exceptions to Section 13 of Article VII other
than those provided in the constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other
office or employment in government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1. The Vice President may be
appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2 of Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice is an ex-officio
member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII.
Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional.
Decision:
No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted. Executive Order No. 284 was declared null and void.
Ratio:
In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of Article VII, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional. By
restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in
addition their primary position to not more that two positions in the government and government corporations, EO
284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of
Sec. 13 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.
The phrase unless otherwise provided in this constitution must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those
particular instances cited in the constitution itself: Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8 Art. VIII.

[ G. R. NO. 156982, SEPTEMBER 08, 2004 ]

NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, JUANITO G. ESPINO,
DIRECTOR IV, NCR, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, AND ERNESTO C. EULALIA, RESIDENT AUDITOR,
NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION. RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created on March 25, 1994 by then
President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No. 347. The NAC is tasked to receive, process and review amnesty
applications. It is composed of seven members: a Chairperson, three regular members appointed by the President,
and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local Government as ex officio members.
It appears that after personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three ex officio members turned over
said responsibility to their representatives who were paid honoraria beginning December 12, 1994. However, on
October 15, 1997, NAC resident auditor Eulalia disallowed on audit the payment of honoraria to these
representatives amounting to P255,750 for the period December 12, 1994 to June 27, 1997, pursuant to COA
Memorandum No. 97-038.
ISSUE:
Whether representatives can be entitled to payment intended for ex-officio members
RULING:
The representatives in fact assumed their responsibilities not by virtue of a new appointment but by mere
designation from the ex officio members who were themselves also designated as such.
There is a considerable difference between an appointment and designation. An appointment is the selection
by the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the powers and functions of a given office; a designation
merely connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person already in the public service by
virtue of an earlier appointment.
Designation does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon the person so designated the right to
claim the salary attached to the position. Without an appointment, a designation does not entitle the officer to receive
the salary of the position.