1. People of the Philippines vs.

Jesus Retubado
Facts:
Someone played a joke on Edwin Retubado, the appellants younger brother who was mentally ill.
Someone inserted a lighted firecracker in a cigarette pack and gave it to Edwin. While Edwin and his
father were having dinner, it exploded. The suspect was their neighbor Emmanuel Caon, Jr. The matter
was brought to the attention of the barangay captain who conducted an investigation. It turned out that
Emmanuel Caon, Jr. was NOT the culprit. The appellant, however, was bent on confronting Emmanuel
Caon, Jr. Thereafter, the father of Emmanuel Jr., 50 y.o. Emmanuel Caon, Sr., (pedicab driver) was
confronted by Jesus when the former was on his way home. Emmanuel Sr. ignored Jesus so the latter
pushed the pedicab which nearly fell into a canal. Jesus followed Emmanuel Sr. to his house. His wife,
Norberta Caon was in the balcony of their house, above the porch waiting for him to arrive. Emmanuel,
Jr., meanwhile, was already asleep. Emmanuel Sr. demanded to know why he was being followed. Jesus
told Emmanuel that he just wanted to talk to Emmanuel Jr., but Emmanuel Sr. told the appellant that his
son was already asleep. Norberta went down from the balcony and placed her hand on her husbands
shoulder to pacify him. Jesus forthwith pulled out a handgun from under his T-shirt and shot Emmanuel
on the forehead. The latter fell to the floor as the appellant walked away from the scene. Emmanuel was
brought to the Tuburan District Hospital, but he died shortly thereafter. Jesus surrendered to the police but
failed to surrender the firearm he used to kill the victim.
Jesus admitted shooting the victim but claimed that he was merely performing a lawful act with
due care hence, cannot be held criminally liable for the victims death. He testified that when he insisted
that Emmanuel wake up his son, Emmanuel went to his room and emerged therefrom holding a handgun.
Jesus grabbed Emmanuels hand, they struggled for the gun but eventually, Emmanuel fell on his knees.
Jesus pulled the gun to the level of Emmanuels forehead, and the gun suddenly went off. Jesus then
rushed to his house to change clothes. He placed the gun on the dining table. When he went back to the
dining room his sister told him that their brother Edwin had taken the gun and thrown it into the sea.
Trial court convicted Jesus of murder, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
Issue:
1. WON Jesus was merely performing a lawful act with due care hence, cannot be held criminally
liable for the victims death - No!
2. WON Jesus is liable for murder - No! Homicide only
Ruling:
The phrase state of necessity is of German origin. Countries which have embraced the classical
theory of criminal law, like Italy, do not use the phrase. The justification refers to a situation of grave peril
(un mal), actual or imminent (actual o imminente). The word propiedad covers diverse juridical rights
(bienes juridicos) such as right to life, honor, the integrity of ones body, and property (la vida, la integridad
corporal, el pudor, el honor, bienes patrimoniales) belonging to another. It is indispensable that the state
of necessity must not be brought about by the intentional provocation of the party invoking the same.
The defense of a state of necessity is a justifying circumstance under Article 11, paragraph 4 of
the RPC. It is an affirmative defense that must be proved by the accused with clear and convincing
evidence. By admitting causing the injuries and killing the victim, the accused must rely on the strength of
his own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the prosecution. Whether the accused
acted under a state of necessity is a question
of fact, which is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
There is no basis to deviate from the findings of the trial court that the appellant was the
provocateur, the unlawful aggressor and the author of a deliberate and malicious act of shooting the
victim at close range on the forehead. The court came to this conclusion based on:
1. Norberta Caons testimony.
2. There is no evidence that the appellant informed the police authorities that he killed the victim in a
state of necessity and that his brother, Edwin, threw the gun into the sea.

3. The appellant had the motive to shoot and kill the victim.
There is no treachery in the present case to qualify the crime to murder. To appreciate treachery,
two (2) conditions must be present, namely, (a) the employment of the means of execution that give the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (b) the means of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted. The prosecution failed to adduce an iota of evidence to support the
confluence of the abovementioned conditions.
The appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

2. CABANLIG VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
Prosections version:
A robbery occurred in Nueva Ecija but 4 days later, 3 suspects were caught. All items were recovered
except for a vase and a small radio. Valino, one of those apprehended, knew where the location of the
stolen items were so 5 policemen decided to escort Valino to the place where the stolen items were
hidden. They rode a jeep. While on their way, Valiano was able to grab one of the polices M16 armalite.
Cabanlig, who was behind Valino inside the jeep, saw what happened and decided to fire one shot at
Valino, and after 3 seconds, fired another 4 consecutive shots. Valino did not fire a shot. The next day,
somebody heard the police talking to a fellow policeman, saying that they salvaged Valino.
Defenses version:
It was not a salvage. It was an act of self-defense and performance of duty Sandiganbayan: Cabanlig
liable for homicide since he failed to show that the shooting was the necessary consequence of the due
performance of duty (but the 4 others were acquitted since there was no evidence of conspiracy)
Issue: W/N Cabanlig is liable for Valinos death.
Held: NO. Acquitted.
- Self-defense and fulfillment of duty operate on different principles. Self-defense is based on the principle
of self-preservation from mortal harm, while fulfillment of duty is premised on the due performance of duty.
The difference between the two justifying circumstances is clear, as the requisites of selfdefense and
fulfillment of duty are different.
- While self-defense and performance of duty are two distinct justifying circumstances, self-defense or
defense of a stranger may still be relevant even if the proper justifying circumstance in a given case is
fulfillment of duty. For example, a policeman's use of what appears to be excessive force could be
justified if there was imminent danger to the policeman's life or to that of a stranger. If the policeman used
force to protect his life or that of a stranger, then the defense of fulfillment of duty would be complete, the
second requisite being present.
- Undoubtedly, the policemen were in the legitimate performance of their duty when Cabanlig shot Valino.
Thus, fulfillment of duty is the justifying circumstance that is applicable to this case. To determine if this
defense is complete, we have to examine if Cabanlig used necessary force to prevent Valino from
escaping and in protecting himself and his co-accused policemen from imminent danger.
- In this case, Valino was committing an offense in the presence of the policemen when Valino grabbed
the M16 Armalite from Mercado and jumped from the jeep to escape. The policemen would have been
justified in shooting Valino if the use of force was absolutely necessary to prevent his escape. But Valino
was not only an escaping detainee. Valino had also stolen the M16 Armalite of a policeman. The
policemen had the duty not only to recapture Valino but also to recover the loose firearm. By grabbing
Mercado's M16 Armalite, which is a formidable firearm, Valino had placed the lives of the policemen in
grave danger.

- Had Cabanlig failed to shoot Valino immediately, the policemen would have been sitting ducks. All of the
policemen were still inside the jeep when Valino suddenly grabbed the M16 Armalite.
- By suddenly grabbing the M16 Armalite from his unsuspecting police guard, Valino certainly did not
intend merely to escape and run away as far and fast as possible from the policemen. Valino did not have
to grab the M16 Armalite if his sole intention was only to flee from the policemen. If he had no intention to
engage the policemen in a firefight, Valino could simply have jumped from the jeep without grabbing the
M16 Armalite.
- The Sandiganbayan had very good reasons in steadfastly adhering to the policy that a law enforcer
must first issue a warning before he could use force against an offender. However, the duty to issue a
warning is not absolutely mandated at all times and at all cost, to the detriment of the life of law enforcers.
The directive to issue a warning contemplates a situation where several options are still available to the
law enforcers. In exceptional circumstances such as this case, where the threat to the life of a law
enforcer is already imminent, and there is no other option but to use force to subdue the offender, the law
enforcer's failure to issue a warning is excusable.

3. CASE OF CALL OF DUTY

SALVADOR YAPYUCO y G.R. Nos. 120744-46
ENRIQUEZ,
Petitioner,
- versus HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
FACTS:
The cases are predicated on a shooting incident on April 5, 1988 in Barangay Quebiawan, San
Fernando, Pampanga which caused the death of Leodevince Licup (Licup) and injured Noel
Villanueva (Villanueva). Accused were petitioners Salvador Yapyuco, Jr. (Yapyuco) and
Generoso Cunanan, Jr. (Cunanan) and Ernesto Puno (Puno) who were members of the Integrated
National Police (INP) stationed at the Sindalan Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga; Jose
Pamintuan (Pamintuan) and Mario Reyes, who were barangay captains of Quebiawan and Del
Carmen, respectively; Ernesto Puno, Andres Reyes and Virgilio Manguerra (Manguerra), Carlos
David, Ruben Lugtu, Moises Lacson (Lacson), Renato Yu, Jaime Pabalan (Pabalan) and Carlos
David (David), who were either members of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF) or civilian
volunteer officers in Barangays Quebiawan, Del Carmen and Telebastagan. They were all
charged with murder, multiple attempted murder and frustrated murder in three Informations, the
inculpatory portions of which read:
Criminal Case No. 16612:

That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all
public officers, being then policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil
Home Defense Force (CHDF), respectively, confederating and mutually helping one another, and
while responding to information about the presence of armed men in said barangay and
conducting surveillance thereof, thus committing the offense in relation to their office, did then
and there, with treachery and evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and
with deliberate intent to take the life of Leodevince S. Licup, attack the latter with automatic
weapons by firing directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney ridden by Leodevince S. Licup
and inflicting multiple gunshot wounds which are necessarily mortal on the different parts of the
body, thereby causing the direct and immediate death of the latter.
On the same day, and with the same intent to take life and attack Eduardo S. Flores, Alejandro R.
de Vera, Restituto G. Calma and Raul V. Panlican also, Noel C. Villanueva boarded on the same
colored green Toyota Tamaraw by using firing weapons; although three are all same criminal
cases, they were filed directly to the above-named accused. The criminal cases numbers; 16613
and 16614.
Yapyuco who was then allegedly adversed entered individual pleas of not guilty. A month later,
Yapyuco voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, and at his arraignment likewise entered a
negative plea. In the meantime, Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, David, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and
Manguerra jointly filed a Motion for Bail relative to Criminal Case No. 16612. On May 10,
1991, the Sandiganbayan granted bail in Criminal Case No. 16612. Yapyuco likewise applied for
bail on May 15, 1991 and the same was also granted on May 21, 1991. Pamintuan, same as
Pabalan who died earlier; died on November 21, 1992, and accordingly, the charges against him
were dismissed.
The prosecution established that in the evening of April 5, 1988, Villanueva, Flores, Calma, De
Vera, Panlican and Licup (victims) were at the residence of Salangsang as guests at the barrio
fiesta celebrations between 5:00 and 7:30 p.m.. The company decided to leave at around 7:30
p.m., shortly after the religious procession had passed. As they were all intoxicated, Salangsang
reminded Villanueva, who was on the wheel, to drive carefully and watch out for potholes and
open canals on the road. With Licup in the passenger seat and the rest of his companions at the
back of his Tamaraw jeepney, Villanueva allegedly proceeded at 5-10 kph with headlights
dimmed. Suddenly, as they were approaching a curve on the road, they met a burst of gunfire and
instantly, Villanueva and Licup were both wounded and bleeding profusely.
In open court, Flores executed a sketch depicting the relative location of the Tamaraw jeepney on
the road, the residence of Salangsang where they had come from and the house situated on the
right side of the road right after the curve where the jeepney had taken a left turn; he identified
said house to be that of a certain Lenlen Naron where the gunmen allegedly took post and
opened fire at him and his companions. He could not tell how many firearms were used. He

recounted that after the shooting, he, unaware that Licup and Villanueva were wounded, jumped
out of the jeepney when he saw from behind them Pamintuan emerging from the yard of Narons
house. Frantic and shaken, he instantaneously introduced himself and his companions to be
employees of San Miguel Corporation but instead, Pamintuan corrected them for not stopping
when flagged. At this point, he was distracted when Villanueva cried out and told him to
summon Salangsang for help as he (Villanueva) and Licup were wounded. He dashed back to
Salangsangs house as instructed and, returning to the scene, he observed that petitioner Yu was
also there, and Villanueva and Licup were being loaded into a Sarao jeepney to be taken to the
hospital. This was corroborated by Villanueva who stated that as soon as the firing had ceased,
two armed men, together with Pamintuan, approached them and transferred him and Licup to
another jeepney and taken to the nearby St. Francis Hospital.
Flores claimed that all the accused in the case had not been known to him prior to the incident,
except for Pamintuan whom he identified to be his wifes uncle and with whom he denied having
had any rift nor with the other accused for that matter, which would have otherwise inspired ill
motives. He claimed the bullet holes on the Tamaraw jeepney were on the passenger side and
that there were no other bullet holes at the back or in any other portion of the vehicle.
Yapyuco only took stand for defense, narrated that in the afternoon of April 5, 1988, he and his
men were investigating a physical injuries case when Yu suddenly received a summon for police
assistance from David, who supposedly was instructed by Pamintuan, concerning a reported
presence of armed NPA members in Quebiawan. Yapyuco allegedly called on their main station
in San Fernando for reinforcement but at the time no additional men could be dispatched. Hence,
he decided to respond and instructed his men to put on their uniforms and bring their M-16 rifles
with them.
Yapyuco continued that at the place appointed, he and his group met with Pamintuan who told
him that he had earlier spotted four (4) men carrying long firearms. As if sizing up their
collective strength, Pamintuan allegedly intimated that he and barangay captain Mario Reyes of
nearby Del Carmen had also brought in a number of armed men and that there were likewise
Cafgu members convened at the residence of Naron. Moments later, Pamintuan announced the
approach of his suspects, hence Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno took post in the middle of the road
at the curve where the Tamaraw jeepney conveying the victims would make an inevitable turn.
As the jeepney came much closer, Pamintuan announced that it was the target vehicle, so he,
with Cunanan and Puno behind him, allegedly flagged it down and signaled for it to stop. He
claimed that instead of stopping, the jeepney accelerated and swerved to its left. This allegedly
inspired him, and his fellow police officers Cunanan and Puno, to fire warning shots but the
jeepney continued pacing forward, hence they were impelled to fire at the tires thereof and
instantaneously, gunshots allegedly came bursting from the direction of Narons house directly at
the subject jeepney.

Yapyuco recalled that Flores, exclaimed that they were employees of San Miguel Corporation.
Holding their fire, they searched the vehicle and found no firearms but two injured men whom
they loaded them to jeep and brought to hospital. From there he and his men returned to the
scene supposedly to investigate and look for the people who fired directly at the jeepney. They
found no one; the Tamaraw jeepney was likewise gone.
That night, he said, his group which responded to the scene were twelve (12) in all, comprised of
Cunanan and Puno from the Sindalan Police Substation, the team composed of Pamintuan and
his men, as well as the team headed by Captain Mario Reyes. He admitted that all of them,
including himself, were armed. He denied that they had committed an ambuscade because
otherwise, all the occupants of the Tamaraw jeepney would have been killed. He said that the
shots which directly hit the passenger door of the jeepney did not come from him or from his
fellow police officers but rather from Cafgu members assembled in the residence of Naron,
inasmuch as said shots were fired only when the jeepney had gone past the spot on the road
where they were assembled.
Issue: Whether or not Yapyuco and his men and the offense committed is the necessary
consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right.
Whether or not they had deliberately ambushed the victims with the intent of killing them.
Held: The Sandiganbayan reduced the basic issue to whether the accused had acted in the regular
and lawful performance of their duties in the maintenance of peace and order either as barangay
officials and as members of the police and the CHDF, and hence, could take shelter in the
justifying circumstance provided in Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code:
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH EXEMPT FROM
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Article 11. Justifying circumstances. - The following do not incur any criminal liability:
5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office.
With the evidence in hand, it found Yapyuco, Cunanan, Puno, Manguera and Mario and Andres
Reyes guilty as co-principals in the separate offense of homicide for the eventual death of Licup
(instead of murder as charged in Criminal Case No. 16612) and of attempted homicide for the
injury sustained by Villanueva (instead of frustrated murder as charged in Criminal Case No.
16614), and acquitted the rest in those cases. It acquitted all of them of attempted murder
charged in Criminal Case No. 16613 in respect of Flores, Panlican, De Vera and Calma.
The availability of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of a right
or office under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code rests on proof that (a) the accused acted
in the performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of his right or office, and (b) the injury
caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance of such

duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. The justification is based on the complete
absence of intent and negligence on the part of the accused, inasmuch as guilt of a felony
connotes that it was committed with criminal intent or with fault or negligence. Where invoked,
this ground for non-liability amounts to an acknowledgment that the accused has caused the
injury or has committed the offense charged for which, however, he may not be penalized
because the resulting injury or offense is a necessary consequence of the due performance of his
duty or the lawful exercise of his right or office. Thus, it must be shown that the acts of the
accused relative to the crime charged were indeed lawfully or duly performed; the burden
necessarily shifts on him to prove such hypothesis.

We find that the requisites for justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code do not
obtain in this case.
The undisputed presence of all the accused at the situs of the incident is a legitimate law
enforcement operation. No objection is strong enough to defeat the claim that all of them who
were either police and barangay officers or CHDF members tasked with the maintenance of
peace and order were bound to, as they did, respond to information of a suspected rebel
infiltration in the locality. While, it may certainly be argued that rebellion is a continuing offense,
it is interesting that nothing in the evidence suggests that the accused were acting under an
official order to open fire at or kill the suspects under any and all circumstances. Even more
telling is the absence of reference to the victims having launched such aggression as would
threaten the safety of any one of the accused, or having exhibited such defiance of authority that
would have instigated the accused, particularly those armed, to embark on a violent attack with
their firearms in self-defense.
But whether or not the passengers of the subject jeepney were NPA members and whether or not
they were at the time armed, are immaterial in the present inquiry inasmuch as they do not stand
as accused in the prosecution at hand. Besides, even assuming that they were as the accused
believed them to be, the actuations of these responding law enforcers must inevitably be ranged
against reasonable expectations that arise in the legitimate course of performance of policing
duties. The rules of engagement, of which every law enforcer must be thoroughly knowledgeable
and for which he must always exercise the highest caution, do not require that he should
immediately draw or fire his weapon if the person to be accosted does not heed his call. Pursuit
without danger should be his next move, and not vengeance for personal feelings or a damaged
pride. Police work requires nothing more than the lawful apprehension of suspects, since the
completion of the process pertains to other government officers or agencies.
The records disclose no ill motives attributed to petitioners by the prosecution. It is interesting
that, in negating the allegation that they had by their acts intended to kill the occupants of the
jeepney, petitioners turn to their co-accused Pamintuan, whose picture depicted in the defense

evidence is certainly an ugly one: petitioners affidavits as well as Yapyucos testimony are replete
with suggestions that it was Pamintuan alone who harbored the motive to ambush the suspects as
it was he who their (petitioners) minds that which they later on conceded to be a mistaken belief
as to the identity of the suspects. Cinco, for one, stated in court that Pamintuan had once reported
to him that Flores, a relative of his (Pamintuan), was frequently meeting with NPA members and
that the San Miguel Corporation plant where the victims were employed was being penetrated by
NPA members. He also affirmed Yapyucos claim that there had been a number of ambuscades
launched against members of law enforcement in Quebiawan and in the neighboring areas
supposedly by NPA members at around the time of the incident. But as the Sandiganbayan
pointed out, it is unfortunate that Pamintuan had died during the pendency of these cases even
before his opportunity to testify in court emerged.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED. The joint decision of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case Nos. 16612, 16613 and 16614, dated June 27, 1995, are hereby AFFIRMED with
the following MODIFICATIONS:

(a) In Criminal Case No. 16612, petitioners are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum; in Criminal Case No. 16614, the indeterminate
sentence is hereby modified to Two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as the
maximum, and Six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum.
(b) Petitioners are DIRECTED to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Leodevince Licup
in the amount of P77,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 in moral damages, as well as Noel
Villanueva, in the amount of P51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages, and P20,000.00
as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
(Inclusion: Justifying circumstance; lawful exercise of right. The availability of the justifying
circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of a right or office under Article 11 (5) of
the Revised Penal Code rests on proof that (a) the accused acted in the performance of his duty
or in the lawful exercise of his right or office, and (b) the injury caused or the offense committed
is the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such
right or office. The justification is based on the complete absence of intent and negligence on the
part of the accused, inasmuch as guilt of a felony connotes that it was committed with criminal
intent or with fault or negligence.
4. G.R. No. L-67766 August 14, 1985 ISIDRO T. HILDAWA vs. ENRILE
FACTS: Petitioners Isidro T. Hildawa and Ricardo C. Valmonte in these Special Civil Actions pray that a
"preliminary injunction issue directing respondents to recall the crimebusters and restraining them from

fielding police teams or any of this sort with authority/license to kill and after hearing, declaring the order
of respondents fielding crimebusters null and void and making the injunction permanent." They alleged
that the formation and fielding of secret marshals and/or crimebusters with absolute authority to kill
thieves, holduppers, robbers, pickpockets and slashers are violative of the provisions of the New
Constitution under Sections 1, 17,19, 20 and 21 of Article III (Bill of Rights).
ISSUE: Whether or not the creation and deployment of special operations team to counter the resurgence
of criminality is violative of the provisions of the Constitution.
HELD: The Supreme held that there is nothing wrong in the creation and deployment of special operation
teams to counter the resurgence of criminality, as there is nothing wrong in the formation by the police of
special teams/squads to prevent the proliferation of vices, prostitution, drug addiction, pornography and
the like. That is the basic job of the police. It is the alleged use of violence in the implementation of the
objectives of the special squads that the court is concerned about. It is our way of life that a man is
entitled to due process which simply means that before he can be deprived of his life, liberty or property,
he must be given an opportunity to defend himself. Due process of law requires that the accused must be
heard in court of competent jurisdiction, proceeded against under the orderly process of law, and only
punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a
judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law.

5. Luis A. Tabuena, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan

(268 SCRA 332, February 17, 1997)
FACTS:
Then Pres. Ferdinand Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena, General Manager of the Manila International
Airport Authority (MIAA), over the phone to pay directly to the presidents office and in cash what the
MIAA owes the Phil. National Construction Corp. The verbal instruction was reiterated in a Presidential
memorandum. In obedience to Pres. Marcos instruction, Tabuena, with the help of Gerardo Dabao and
Adolfo Peralta, the Asst. Gen. Mgr. and the Acting Finance Services Mgr. of MIAA, respectively, caused
the release of P55M of MIAA funds of three (3) withdrawals and delivered the money to Mrs. Fe RoaGimenez, private secretary of Marcos. Gimenez issued a receipt for all the amounts she received from
Tabuena. Later, it turned out that PNCC never received the money. The case involves two (2) separate
petitions for review by Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta. They appeal the Sandiganbayan decision
convicting them of malversation of MIAA funds in the amount of P55M.Further, petitioners claimed that
they were charged with intentional malversation, as alleged in the amended information, but it would
appear that they were convicted for malversation with negligence. Hence, their conviction of a crime
different from that chargedviolated their constitutional right to be informed of the accusation.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Sandigan bayan convicted them of a crime not charged in the amended information;
and
2. Whether or not Tabuena and Peralta acted in good faith.
HELD:

(1)No. Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa present in
the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs from the
mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved.(2)Yes. Tabuena acted in strict compliance
with the MARCOS Memorandum. The order emanated from the Office of the President and bears the
signature of the President himself, the highest official of the land. It carries with it the presumption that it
was regularly issued. And on its face, the memorandum is patently lawful for no law makes the payment
of an obligation illegal. This fact, coupled with the urgent tenor for its execution constrains one to act
swiftly without question. However, a more compelling reason for the ACQUITTAL is the violation of the
accused's basic constitutional right to due process. Records show that the Sandiganbayan actively took
part in the questioning of a defense witness and of the accused themselves. The questions of the court
were in the nature of cross examinations characteristic of confrontation, probing and insinuation. Tabuena
and Peralta may not have raised the issue as an error, there is nevertheless no impediment for the court
to consider such matter as additional basis for a reversal since the settled doctrine is that an appeal
throws the whole case open to review, and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct such
errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from whether they are made the subject of assignments
of error or not. The " cold neutrality of an impartial judge" requirement of due process was certainly
denied Tabuena and Peralta when the court, with its overzealousness, assumed the dual role of
magistrate and advocate. Time and again the Court has declared that due process requires no less than
the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. That the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to
be impartial, to give added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The parties are entitled
to no less than this, as a minimum guaranty of due process. HENCE, Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta
are acquitted of the crime of malversation.

6. People vs. Madarang

332 SCRA 99, [G.R. No. 132319] (May 12, 2000)
FACTS:
After having a quarrel, accused stabbed his wife causing her death. He was then charged with Parricide.
He claimed that he was in the state of insanity during that incident for he cannot recollect what happened.
He further claimed that according to the doctor in NCMH, wherein he was admitted, there was a high
possibility that he was already suffering from insanity prior to his commission of the crime.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused, invoking insanity, can claim exemption from liability for the crime he
committed.
RULING:
No. He is not exempt. In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent criterion for insanity
to be exempting as it is required that there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing
the act, i.e., the accused is deprived of reason; he acted without the least discernment because there is a
complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality
of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The issue of insanity is a question of fact. The state or
condition of a mans mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing ones insanity
requires testimony of an expert witness, such as a psychiatrist. The proof must relate to the time
preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is charged.

In the case at bar, the appellant was diagnosed to be suffering from schizophrenia when he was
committed to the NCMH months after he killed his wife. Medical books describe schizophrenia as a
chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality and often
accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. The arguments advanced by the appellant to prove his
insanity are speculative and non-sequitur. For one, his claim that he has absolutely no recollection of the
stabbing incident amounts to a mere general denial that can be made with facility. None of the witnesses
declared that he exhibited any of the symptoms associated with schizophrenia immediately before or
simultaneous with the stabbing incident. Also schizophrenics have lucid intervals during which they are
capable of distinguishing right from wrong.

7. People vs Dungo
G.R. No. 89420July 31, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROSALINO DUNGO, accused-appellant.
Facts: On March 16, 1987 between 2:00 and 3:00pm, the accused went to Mrs. Sigua's office at the
Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit, Pampanga. After a brief talk, the accused drew a knife from the
envelope he was carrying and stabbed Mrs. Sigua several times. After which he departed from the office
with blood stained clothes, carrying a bloodied bladed weapon. The autopsy report revealed that the
victim sustained 14 wounds, 5 of which were fatal.Rodolfo Sigua, husband of the deceased, testified that
sometime in February 1987, the accused Rosalino Dungo inquired from him why his wife was requiring
so many documents from him. Rodolfo explained to him the procedure at the DAR.
The accused, in defense of himself, tried to show that he was insane at the time of the commission of the
offense:
Two weeks prior to March 16, 1987, Rosalino's wife noticed that he appears to be in deep thought
always,maltreating their children when he was not used to it before. There were also times that her
husband would inform her that his feet and head were on fire when in truth they were not.
On that fateful day, Rosalino complained of stomachache but they didn't bother to buy medicine as the
pain went away immediately. Thereafter, he went back to the store. But when Andrea followed him to
thestore, he was no longer there. Worried, she looked for him. On her way home, she heard people saying
that a stabbing occurred. She saw her husband in her parents-in-law's house with people milling around.
She asked her husband why he did the act, to which Rosalino answered, "That's the only cure for my
ailment. I have cancer of the heart. If I don't kill the deceased in a number of days, I would die. That
same day, the accused went to Manila.
Dr. Santiago and Dr. Echavez of the National Center for Mental Health testified that the accused was
confined in the mental hospital, as per order of the trial court dated Aug. 17, 1987. Based on the reports of
their staff, they concluded that Rosalino was psychotic or insane long before, during and after the
commission of the alleged crime and classified his insanity as an organic mental disorder secondary to
cerebro-vascular accident or stroke. But Dr. Balatbat who treated the accused for ailments secondary to
stroke, and Dr. Lim who testified that the accused suffered dorm occlusive disease, concluded that
Rosalino was somehow rehabilitated after a series of medical treatment in their clinic.
Issue: Whether or not the accused was insane during the commission of the crime charged.
Held: No. For insanity to relieve the person of criminal liability, it is necessary that there be a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that he acts w/o the least discernment and that there be
complete absence or deprivation of the freedom of the will.

Under Philippine jurisdiction, there's no definite test or criterion for insanity. However, the definition of
insanity under Sec 1039* of the Revised Administrative Code can be applied. In essence, it states that
insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties, which is manifested in
language or conduct. An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequence
of his act.
Evidence of insanity must refer to the mental condition at the very time of doing the act. However, it is
also permissible to receive evidence of his mental condition for a reasonable period before and after the
time of the act in question. The vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts.

8. G.R. No. 144266 Nov 27, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WILSON ANTONIO, JR., ALIAS "INTSIK"
FACTS: Wilson Intsik Antonio Jr., as claimed by his mother Fe Antonio and a
psychiatrist, Dr. Rowena G. Cosca., has been diagnosed with schizo-affective disorder
or psychosis which required a long-term treatment. The said mental disorder is
manifested by behavioral problems such as auditory hallucinations and paranoia
delusions or persecutory delusions.
On the 16th of June year 1996 around 7:15 in the morning, Antonio, carrying his
shotgun, walked towards Sergio Bobby Mellas house, shot Mella on the chest,
shoulder, back and was also hit on his left thigh while asleep. Antonio hurriedly left the
room after firing. When the police arrived, Mella was already dead. Antonio was then
nowhere to be found after the incident. Until, on the 23 rd of October 1997, he
surrendered to the police.
WILSON ANTONIO, JR. alias "Intsik" appeals from the Decision of the trial court
convicting him of murder and imposing upon him the penalty of death.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant was insane during the commission of the crime
and was exempt from criminal liability.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the court a quo finding accusedappellant Wilson Antonio, Jr. guilty of murder qualified by treachery for the killing of
Sergio "Bobby" Mella and imposing upon him the death penalty is MODIFIED. Accusedappellant is sentenced instead to reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the heirs of the
deceased P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages,
and P855,000.00 for lost earnings. No costs.
The accused-appellant admitted on cross-examination that he killed the deceased out of
anger and a desire for revenge. Accused-appellant believed that he had been wronged
when Mella boxed him so he retaliated. Although the accused-appellant was suffering
from schizo-affective disorder or psychosis, and was verified that he was sometime sent
to hospital for treatment, his mother testified that he misses taking his medications and
sometimes he even refuse taking his medications. Dr. Cosca concluded that since
accused-appellant was not taking his medicine around the time the offense was
committed, and he had been drinking alcohol which interfered with any medication he

might have taken and triggered the symptoms of psychosis, accused-appellant might
have been in the active phase of psychosis which prompted him to kill Bobby Mella.
However, the testimony of the accused-appellant claiming that he killed the deceased
out of anger and with the desire of revenge and that he knew very well that killing a
person was against the law of God and of man, proved that he is aware of his acts and
the consequences of his acts. Accused-appellants act of hiding from the authorities
because his fear of being punished was a proof of such awareness.