GRU reform points to streamlined Russian

intelligence - October 10 2011

The head of the Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), GeneralLieutenant Aleksandr Shlyakhturov, is now on extended medical leave -- a typical precursor to
dismissal. His work appears to be complete: his main role was to force reforms on the agency
against considerable internal resistance. Under Shlyakhturov, the shape and mission of the GRU
have been altered to reflect the new priorities of the military and political elite, as well as a more
aggressive, focused role for the intelligence community ahead of Vladimir Putin's return to the
presidency.
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Impact

The GRU is in relative disarray, and faces further erosion of its authority and autonomy.

Reforms are not limited to military intelligence, but are part of a process of
rationalisation across the intelligence community.

The agencies will be given a sharper focus, with resources devoted to Africa and Latin
America likely to be drawn down.

What next
Having previously opted to play agencies against each other and encourage competition and
overlap, Putin now seems to be changing policy in the interests of developing a more responsive,
capable and outward-looking security sector. The result will be sharper and more responsive
espionage in key areas of interest -- primarily Central Asia, China, South Asia, Eastern Europe
and the United States. The other outcome is a likely reduction in long-running and generally
counterproductive inter-agency rivalries.

Analysis
All general officers over the retirement age (60) must obtain presidential approval to continue
their tenure, and the 63-year-old Shlyakhturov's continued service looks increasingly in doubt.
Yet even amid numerous reports of his looming departure, as well as his absence from the GRU's
headquarters on medical grounds since late August, Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov
has asserted that no decision had been made about the intelligence chief's future, and that it was

up to the president to decide. Regardless of Shlyakhturov's fate, open speculation about him
underlines the GRU's decline.
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Open speculation about the GRU chief's future underlines the once-invincible agency's decline

Downsizing the GRU

The GRU has historically been among Russia's most powerful and aggressive security agencies.
However, Shlyakhturov has imposed substantial cuts since his appointment in 2009, including:

shedding some 1,000 staff by rotating personnel to regular military territorial commands,
and enforcing retirement ages;

in the process, reducing the number of GRU generals from 100 to 20;

cutting three of eight special forces brigades and permitting their transfer to territorial
military commands; and

scaling down foreign intelligence operations outside neighbouring post-Soviet states.

Rationalising Russian spycraft

Streamlining the GRU reflects a rationalisation of intelligence activities that is likely to become
even more significant once Putin is back in the Kremlin next year. Three processes are
underway:

FSB-SVR feud. The Federal Security Service (FSB), largely responsible for domestic
security, and the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) have a long-running feud revolving
around the efforts of the former to dominate the latter (see RUSSIA: Foreign Intelligence
foibles boost FSB clout - December 3, 2010). Putin has signalled that the SVR will
remain independent, but that it needs to accommodate the FSB's missions to track
domestic adversaries abroad.

Improving coordination and responsiveness. One complaint of veteran GRU staff is that
the assignment of intelligence collection responsibilities -- especially from satellites and
electronic intercepts -- is now coming directly from territorial military commands and
service headquarters rather than the agency itself. However, this reflects a wider effort to
make intelligence more timely and more responsive to the needs of its 'consumers'.
Likewise, the resolution of the SVR-FSB feud is meant to improve intelligence-sharing.

Generational change. In part, this reflects the rise of a new generation of leaders not
shaped by the turf wars resulting from the partition of the Soviet KGB. Even the heads of
the intelligence community are approaching the retirement age or are well past it,

including the FSB's Aleksandr Bortnikov (60 this November), the SVR's Mikhail
Fradkov (61) and the Federal Protection Service's Yevgeny Murov (66).
Another part of the rationalisation is the concentration of Russian intelligence efforts on a few
key missions:
Targeting Russians abroad
The assassination of three Chechen rebels in Istanbul on September 16 by a presumed Russian
intelligence officer has highlighted the security agencies' role in dealing with perceived enemies
abroad. 'Wet work' only represents a small fraction of such activity, but Western intelligence
agencies believe that the FSB and SVR now cooperate in not only monitoring numerous Russian
emigres (from Chechen sympathisers to businesspeople), but also occasionally putting pressure
on them or disrupting their activities if these are seen as inimical to national interests.
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Regular military and GRU assets are being refocused on Central Asia
Central Asian emphasis
Russia has for some years been concerned about US and (to a greater extent) Chinese economic,
political and military activity in Central Asia (see CENTRAL ASIA: Former partners reject
Russian dominance - August 1, 2011). However, the 'Arab awakenings' have raised new worries
about the stability of the region's authoritarian regimes. Just as the recent Centre-2011 military
exercises saw Russian and allied forces war-gaming intervention to put down an attempt at
regime change in Central Asia, so too have the intelligence agencies been charged with increased
monitoring of opposition groups, potential alternate leaders and 'public morale'.
Economic intelligence
This remains a strategic priority, including supporting 'national champions' such as Gazprom and
defence manufacturers.
Strengthening counter-intelligence
Despite its alarmist rhetoric, the Russian security community had complacently enjoyed the
reduction of Western intelligence activity in Russia. However, the recent revelation that an
alleged Chinese intelligence agent had been arrested last year -- and that two scientists from St
Petersburg Baltic State Technical University had been accused of passing classified materials to
Beijing -- reflect growing concerns about espionage from rising powers (see RUSSIA/CHINA:
Arms sales pose dilemma for Moscow - December 20, 2010). As a result, the SVR and GRU are
being assigned to assist the FSB's counter-intelligence missions.

Outlook

Shlyakhturov has no obvious successor, and would leave the GRU in disarray. It may be
downgraded next year from a main military directorate to an ordinary one, and moved out of its
purpose-built headquarters in Moscow's Khodinka suburb and into the General Staff building. It
will certainly lose its privileged position as both a federal body and a subdivision of the General
Staff. Under Shlyakhturov, the GRU has already in practice become much more subordinate to
Makarov, the chief of the general staff. The potential profits from selling the Khodinka site may
be part of the rationale for moving the GRU, but physically locating it within the rest of the
General Staff apparatus would further emphasise the directorate's direct responsibility to the
military leadership.
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