109 Ong vs.

Metropolitan Water District | Bautista Angelo

L-7644 August 29, 1958 |
FACTS
Metropolitan owns 3 swimming pools at its filters in Balara, Quezon City
It charges the public a certain fee if such wanted to use its pools
Dominador Ong, 14 years of age, son of petitioners, went to the pools along with his 2 brothers
He stayed in the shallow pool, but then he told his brothers that he would get something to drink. His brothers left
him and went to the Deep pool
Around 4pm that day, a bather reported that one person was swimming to long under water
Upon hearing this, the lifeguard on duty dove into the pool to retrieve Ongs lifeless body. Applying first aid, the
lifeguard tried to revive the boy.
Soon after, male nurse Armando Rule came to render assistance, followed by sanitary inspector Iluminado Vicente
who, after being called by phone from the clinic by one of the security guards, boarded a jeep carrying with him the
resuscitator and a medicine kit, and upon arriving he injected the boy with camphorated oil. After the injection,
Vicente left on a jeep in order to fetch Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the Philippines. Meanwhile, Abao continued
the artificial manual respiration, and when this failed to revive him, they applied the resuscitator until the two oxygen
tanks were exhausted
Investigation was concluded and the cause of death is asphyxia by submersion in water (pagkalunod)
The parents of Ong bring this action for damages against Metropolitan, alleging negligence on the selection and
supervision of its employees and if not negligent, they had the last clear chance to revive Ong.
It is to be noted that Metropolitan had complete safety measures in place: they had a male nurse, six lifeguards, ring
buoys, toy roof, towing line, saving kit and a resuscitator. There is also a sanitary inspector who is in charge of a clinic
established for the benefit of the patrons. Defendant has also on display in a conspicuous place certain rules and
regulations governing the use of the pools, one of which prohibits the swimming in the pool alone or without any
attendant. Although defendant does not maintain a full- time physician in the swimming pool compound, it has
however a nurse and a sanitary inspector ready to administer injections or operate the oxygen resuscitator if the need
should arise
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N Metropolitan is liable to the Ongs for its negligence
W/N the last clear chance doctrine may be invoked in this case
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
No. Metropolitan is not negligent
Metropolitan has taken all necessary precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its patrons. It has been shown that
the swimming pools of appellee are provided with a ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid
medicine kit. The bottom of the pools is painted with black colors so as to insure clear visibility. There is on display in
a conspicuous place within the area certain rules and regulations governing the use of the pools. Appellee employs
six lifeguards who are all trained as they had taken a course for that purpose and were issued certificates of
proficiency. These lifeguards work on schedule prepared by their chief and arranged in such a way as to have two
guards at a time on duty to look after the safety of the bathers. There is a male nurse and a sanitary inspector with a
clinic provided with oxygen resuscitator. And there are security guards who are available always in case of
emergency.
The record also shows that when the body of minor Ong was retrieved from the bottom of the pool, the employees
of appellee did everything possible to bring him back to life. When they found that the pulse of the boy was abnormal,
the inspector immediately injected him with camphorated oil. When the manual artificial respiration proved ineffective
they applied the oxygen resuscitator until its contents were exhausted. And while all these efforts were being made,
they sent for Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the Philippines who however came late because upon examining the
body found him to be already dead. All of the foregoing shows that appellee has done what is humanly possible under
the circumstances to restore life to minor Ong and for that reason it is unfair to hold it liable for his death
The Last Clear Chance Doctrine is inapplicable in this case
The record does not show how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool. The only thing the record discloses is
that minor Ong informed his elder brothers that he was going to the locker room to drink a bottle of coke but that from
that time on nobody knew what happened to him until his lifeless body was retrieved. The doctrine of last clear
chance simply means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant
where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious
consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence
Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool and it being apparent that he went there
without any companion in violation of one of the regulations of appellee as regards the use of the pools, and it
appearing that lifeguard Abao responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it and immediately
after retrieving the body all efforts at the disposal of appellee had been put into play in order to bring him back to life,
it is clear that there is no room for the application of the doctrine now invoked by appellants to impute liability to
appellee.

057 MARIKINA AUTO LINE TRANSPORT CORPORATION vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 152040 March 31, 2006
TOPIC:
PONENTE:CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS:
1. Erlinda V. Valdellon is the owner of a two-door commercial apartment located at No. 31 Kamias Road,
Quezon City. The Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation (MALTC) is the owner-operator of a
passenger bus, its employee, was assigned as the regular driver of the bus.
2. At around 2:00 p.m. on October 3, 1992, Suelto was driving the passenger bus along Kamias Road,
Kamuning, Quezon City, going towards EDSA. The bus suddenly swerved to the right and struck the
terrace of the commercial apartment owned by Valdellon. Upon Valdellons request, the court ordered
Sergio Pontiveros, the Senior Building Inspection Officer of the City Engineers Office, to inspect the
damaged terrace.
3. He recommended that since the structural members made of concrete had been displaced, the terrace
would have to be demolished "to keep its monolithicness, and to insure the safety and stability of the
building."
4. In a letter addressed to the bus company and Suelto, Valdellon demanded payment of P148,440.00,
within 10 days from receipt thereof, to cover the cost of the damage to the terrace. he bus company
and Suelto offered a P30,000.00 settlement which Valdellon refused.
5. Valdellon filed a criminal complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property against
Suelto. After the requisite preliminary investigation, an Information was filed with the RTC of Quezon
City.
6. Valdellon also filed a separate civil complaint against Suelto and the bus company for damages. She
prayed that after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in her favor.
7.
ISSUE(S):
1. W/N Suelto is guilty of reckless imprudence which resulted in the damage of Valdellons property
HELD:
1. Yes. Respondent People of the Philippines was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner
Suelto swerved the bus to the right with recklessness, thereby causing damage to the terrace of private
respondents apartment.
RATIO:
Although she did not testify to seeing the incident as it happened, petitioner Suelto himself admitted this in his
answer to the complaint and when he testified in the trial court.
Suelto narrated that he suddenly swerved the bus to the right of the road causing it to hit the column of the
terrace of private respondent. Petitioners were burdened to prove that the damage to the terrace of private
respondent was not the fault of petitioner Suelto. We have reviewed the evidence on record and find that
petitioners failed to prove that petitioner acted on an emergency caused by the sudden intrusion of a passenger
jeepney into the lane of the bus he was driving.
It was the burden of petitioners herein to prove petitioner Sueltos defense that he acted on an emergency, that
is, he had to swerve the bus to the right to avoid colliding with a passenger jeep coming from EDSA that had
overtaken another vehicle and intruded into the lane of the bus.
It is clear from the photographs submitted by the prosecution that the commercial apartment of Dr. Valdellon
sustained heavy damage caused by the bus being driven by Suelto. "It seems highly improbable that the said
damages were not caused by a strong impact. And, it is quite reasonable to conclude that, at the time of the
impact, the bus was traveling at a high speed when Suelto tried to avoid the passenger jeepney."
The damages could not have been caused except by a speeding bus. Had the accused not been speeding, he
could have easily reduced his speed and come to a full stop when he noticed the jeep. Were he more prudent in
driving, he could have avoided the incident or even if he could not avoid the incident, the damages would have
been less severe.
The severe damages sustained could not have resulted had the accused acted as a reasonable and prudent

man would. The accused was not diligent as he claims to be. What is more probable is that the accused had to
swerve to the right and hit the commercial apartment of the plaintiff because he could not make a full stop as he
was driving too fast in a usually crowded street.
Asian terminals v. Simon enterpresises inc.

GR. No. 177116

FEB 27, 2013
Facts
Simon Enterprise Inc. (Simon) has entered into contract with Contiquincybunge Export Company (Contiquincybunge)
as its consignee of the shipped Soybean Meal. On October 25, 1995 and on November 25, 1995 Contiquincybunge
has made a shipment through M/V Sea Dream and M/V Tern respectively at the Port of Darrow, Louisiana, U.S.A. For
the first shipment, Contiquincybunge made a shipment of 6,825.144 metric tons of U.S. Soybean Meal which when
the M/V Sea Dream arrived at the Port of Manila the bulk of soybean meal was received by the Asian Terminals, Inc.
(ATI), for shipment to Simon. However, when it reached its receiver Simon, it was already short by 18.556 metric
tons. For the second shipment, Contiquincybunge made shipment, through M/V Tern, of 3,300.000 metric tons of U.S.
Soybean Meal in Bulk for delivery to Simon at the Port of Manila. The shipment was received by ATI again for delivery
to Simon. However, the shipped cargos were found lacking 199.863 metric tons.
Simon has filed an action for damages against the unknown owner of the vessels M/V Sea Dream and M/V Tern, its
local agent Inter-Asia Marine Transport, Inc., and petitioner ATI alleging that it suffered the losses through the fault or
negligence of the said defendants. The case of the unknown owner of the vessel M/V Sea Dream has been settled in
release and quitclaim and therefore has been stricken out of the case, leaving M/V Tern, its local agent Inter-Asia
Marine Transport, Inc., and petitioner ATIs case remaining. The RTC has ruled that the defendants be solidarily liable
for the damages incurred by Simon.
Unsatisfied with the RTC ruling, the owner of the M/V Tern, and Inter-Asia Marine Transport, Inc. appealed to CA on
the issue whether RTC has erred in finding that they did not exercise extraordinary diligence in the handling of the
goods. On the other hand, the petitioner ATI has also appealed to CA on the issue that the RTC, the court-a-quo,
committed serious and reversible error in holding ATI solidarily liable with co-defendant appellant Inter-Asia Marine
Transport, Inc. contrary to the evidence presented. The CA ruled that the RTC ruling be assailed with some
modifications on the basis that M/V Tern and Inter-Asia Marine Transport, Inc. have failed to establish that they
exercised extraordinary diligence in transporting the goods or exercised due diligence to forestall or lessen the loss
as provided in Article 1742 of the Civil Code. And on ATIs RTC ruling, it was assailed as well on the basis that the
stevedore of the M/V Tern has witnessed that during the dischargement of the cargo, there has been spillage done by
the stevedores of ATI which is an evidence that ATI has been negligible in handling the goods.
ATI filed a motion for reconsideration at CA but was denied. It then filed a petition for certiorari with the sole issue of
whether the appellate court erred in affirming the decision of the trial court holding petitioner ATI solidarily liable with
its co-defendants for the shortage incurred in the shipment of the goods to respondent.
The issue involves questions of facts which cannot be entertained by SC for it is not a trier of facts under rule 45 of
the 1997 rules of civil procedure. However, the said rule 45 is not ironclad and has certain exceptions. The issue
raised by ATI was merited to be entertained by SC under the rule 4, when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts.
Issue

Whether the appellate court erred in affirming the decision of the trial court holding petitioner ATI solidarily liable with
its co-defendants for the shortage incurred in the shipment of the goods to respondent.
Ruling
The petition for review on certiorari was granted to ATI. The SC agreed to ATIs claim that the CA erred in affirming
the decision of the trial court holding petitioner ATI solidarily liable with its co-defendants for the shortage incurred in
the shipment of the goods to respondent. The CA misapprehended the following facts:
First, petitioner ATI is correct in arguing that the respondent failed to prove that the subject shipment suffered actual
shortage, as there was no competent evidence to prove that it actually weighed 3,300 metric tons at the port of origin.
Second, as correctly asserted by petitioner ATI, the shortage, if any, may have been due to the inherent nature of the
subject shipment or its packaging since the subject cargo was shipped in bulk and had a moisture content of 12.5%.
Third, SC agreed with the petitioner ATI that respondent has not proven any negligence on the part of the former
Spouses Teodoro and Nanette Perena, vs. Spouses Nicolas and Teresita Zarate
GR no. 157917
August 29, 2012
The facts of the case are as follows:
Spouses Perena were engaged in school bus service, transporting students from Paranaque to Don Bosco
Technical Institute in Makati. In June 1996, spouses Zarate contracted spouses Perena to transport their son, Aaron
Zarate, from their residence in Paranaque to Don Bosco. As on the usual days of school in August 22, 1996, the van
picked-up Aaron in their house, he then took the left side seat near the rear door of the said vehicle. Considering that
the students were due by 7:15am at Don Bosco, and because of heavy traffic at the South Superhighway, the driver,
Clemente Alfaro, decided to take the narrow path underneath the Magallanes interchange which then is being used
by Makati bound vehicles as short cut. The said narrow path has a railroad crossing, and while traversing the said
narrow path, closely tailing a huge passenger bus, the driver of the school service decided to overtake the said bus at
about 50 meters away from the railroad crossing. Considering that the stereo is playing loudly and blinded by the bus,
he did not hear the blowing of horn of the oncoming train as a warning to the vehicles. The bus successfully crossed
the railroad crossing but the van did not. The train hit the rear side of the van and the impact threw 9 of the 12
students including Aaron. His body landed in the path of the train, which dragged him, severed his head,
instantaneously killing him. Devastated by the sudden death of their son, spouses Zarate commenced this action for
damages. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the spouses Zarate. On appeal, The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the lower court but lowered the moral damages to php 2,500,000.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a breach of contract of a common carrier and whether there is negligence.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor spouses Zarate, affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals.
In this case, the Supreme Court, once and for all lay the matter to rest that the school service is a common
carrier and not a private carrier, and as such, they are required to observe the extraordinary diligence as provided
under Article 1733 of the Civil Code.
According to the Supreme Court, the true test for a common carrier is not the quantity or extent of the
business actually transacted, or the number and character of the conveyances used in the activity, but whether the
undertaking is a part of the activity engaged in by the carrier that he has held out to the general public as his business
or occupation. Otherwise stated, making the activity or holding himself or itself out to the public as a ready to act for
all who may desire his or its services to transport goods or persons for a fee.

Applying the considerations mentioned above, there is no question that Perenas as the operators of a
school service were: a) engaged in transporting passengers generally as a business not just as a casual occupation;
b) undertaking to carry passengers over established roads; c) transporting students for a fee. Despite catering limited
clientele, the Perenas operated as a common carrier because they hold themselves out as a ready transportation
indiscriminately to the students of a particular school living within or near where they operated the service and for a
fee.
On the second issue, Article 1756 of the Civil code provides that, In case of death of or injuries to
passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that
they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755. In this case, Aaron Zarate died, and
thus as provided under the above-mentioned law, they are negligent.
397 Cathay Pacific Airways v. Spouses Vasquez| Davide
G.R. No. 150843 March 14, 2003
FACTS
The Spouses Vasquez went to HongKong via Cathay Pacific Airlines. Included in the trip was their maid who rode in
the tourist class, and 2 friends who rode with them in the business class cabin.
On the way back to Manila, the spouses presented their boarding passes to the attendant. The attendant informed
them that their seats have been upgraded to first class because they were Marco Polo Club Members (frequent flyer
club) and they had such the privilege of a free upgrade in seating accommodations when such is available.
The spouses did not want to change their seats because they felt that they should be seated with their friends with
whom they had traveled and Dr. Vasquez had business matters he wanted to discuss with them.
The attendant, however, insisted that they take the seats because the flight has been overbooked and the only way
for them to get in this flight was to take the first class upgrade. They took in reluctantly for want to be with their
friends.
When they returned back to Manila, they demanded from Cathay Pacific damages of up to P1M, including Moral
Damages.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N Spouses Vasquez are entitled to MORAL DAMAGES, if not should they be indemnified in another
manner.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
NO. SPOUSES ARE NOT ENTITLED TO MORAL DAMAGES AS THERE WAS NO BAD FAITH ON THE PART OF
CATHAY PACIFIC OR ITS ATTENDANTS.
The spouses knew that they were members of the Marco Polo Club and that they had such privileged. But
privileges, as known to us, can be waived. The flight attendant whould have consulted the spouses if they wanted to
avail of that privilege before their business class seats were given to someone else and not surprise them, as like
what happened in this case.
The spouses clearly waived such privilege, therefore Cathay Pacific breached the contract of carriage.
It is essential, however, that there exists bad faith or malice when in breach of the contract of carriage. The
attendants changed the seat accommodations without such malice. Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity which was not present in this case.
SPOUSES MAY ENTITLED ONLY TO NOMINAL DAMAGES
The court did not award them even nominal damages, they just made mention that Nominal Damages is the most
the spouses may claim: According to article 2221:
o Article 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for
any loss suffered by him.
66 Africa vs. Caltex, Boquiren and the CA| Makalintal
G.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966 | 16 SCRA 448
FACTS
A fire broke out at the Caltex service station in Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck
into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving truck where the nozzle of the hose was inserted
The fire then spread to and burned several neighboring houses, including the personal properties and effects inside
them.
The owners of the houses, among them petitioners here, sued Caltex (owner of the station) and Boquiren (agent in
charge of operation).
Trial court and CA found that petitioners failed to prove negligence and that respondents had exercised due care in
the premises and with respect to the supervision of their employees. Both courts refused to apply the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur on the grounds that as to its applicability xxx in the Philippines, there seems to be nothing definite, and
that while the rules do not prohibit its adoption in appropriate cases, in the case at bar, however, we find no practical
use for such docrtrine.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply as to
presume negligence on the part of the appellees.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR APPLIES. CALTEX LIABLE.
Res ipsa Loquitur is a rule to the effect that where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be
under the management of defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does
not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in absence
of explanation of defendant, that the incident happened because of want of care.
The aforesaid principle enunciated in Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and Development Co. is applicable in this case.
The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of appellees. A fire
occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The person who knew or could have known how
the fire started were the appellees and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is fair
and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of care.
The report by the police officer regarding the fire, as well as the statement of the driver of the gasoline tank wagon
who was transferring the contents thereof into the underground storage when the fire broke out, strengthen the
presumption of negligence. Verily, (1) the station is in a very busy district and pedestrians often pass through or mill
around the premises; (2) the area is used as a car barn for around 10 taxicabs owned by Boquiren; (3) a store where
people hang out and possibly smoke cigarettes is located one meter from the hole of the underground tank; and (4)
the concrete walls adjoining the neighborhood are only 2 . meters high at most and cannot prevent the flames from
leaping over it in case of fire.
Decision REVERSED. Caltex liable
G.R. No. 121964 June 17, 1997
DRA. ABDULIA RODRIGUEZ, LEONOR PRIETOS, LEONORA RODRIGUEZ NOLASCO, LUZVIMINDA ANTIG
and JUANITA RODRIGUEZ, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HARRY VILORIA, MARGARITA MILAGROS VILORIA and JOHN P. YOUNG,respondents.
Facts:
A fire broke out which razed two apartment buildings, owned by Peititoners Abdulia Rodriguez, Leonora
Rodriguez Nolasco and Juanita Rodriguez, and partially destroying a commercial building.
Leonora Prietos and Luzviminda Antig who were lessees of the apartment units, filed a case for damages
against Harry John Viloria, Margarita Milagros Viloria, and John P. Young (building contractor).
The complaint alleged that by reason of the gross negligence and want of care of the construction workers
and employees of the respondents, the bunkhouse or workers' quarters in the construction site caught fire spreading
rapidly, burning the adjacent buildings owned by petitioners. Due to the negligence of respondents which resulted in
the fire, respondents suffered actual damages representing the value of the buildings and other personal properties.
John Young, contended that he cannot be held responsible even if there was negligence on the part of the
employees for he had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
workers. Petitioners had no cause of action against him.
Harry and Margarita Viloria also alleged that petitioners had no cause of action against them. The fire court
not have been caused by gross negligence of their workers for they did not have any worker in the construction of
their building. The said construction was being undertaken by the independent contractor, John Young, who hired and
supervised his own workers. T
After trial and reception of evidence, the trial court resolved that the fire was not caused by an
instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendants-appellants. The decision stated that plaintiffs-appellants
failed to establish that the fire was the result of respondents' or their workers' negligence.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. The award of damages in favor of respondents including the
award of attorney's fees are hereby DELETED and SET ASIDE.
Issue: WON CA erred in misapplying facts of weight and substance affecting the case. - NO
Held:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of respondent
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R CV No. 36247 is AFFIRMED in toto.
The trial court discussed the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor and its requisites as follows:
It is a rule of evidence whereby negligence of the alleged wrongdoing may be inferred from the mere fact that
the accident happened, provided that: (1) the occurrence is the kind of thing that does not ordinarily happen
without negligence; (2) the occurrence must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the
exclusive control of the defendant; (3) the occurrence was not due to contribution or voluntary action by the

plaintiff (Gifis Law Dictionary); it is used to state the fact that the situation itself implies negligence or a duty
to compensate whether negligence is in fact proved or not (Radins Law Dictionary); it is [a] rebuttable
presumption that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that [the] instrumentality causinginjury
was in defendants exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in
absence of negligence (Blacks Law Dictionary). ... (OR, 150-151).found on FOOTNOTE
Under the first assigned error petitioners want us to give full credit to the testimony of Noel Villarin, their
principal witness, who, they claimed, "maintained his straight-forward and undisguised manner of answering the
questions" despite the "intense cross-examination." The trial court, however, refused to believe Villarin.
The trial court explained why it had to accept the version of defendants' witnesses in this wise:
The Court needs [sic] not suffer a paralysis of analysis as it compares the two conflicting claims.
Plaintiffs have relied so much on their own assessment of the integrity and weight of Villarin's
testimony. But the court has found the same to be, under close scrutiny, not only less weighty but
also a piece of evidence that taxes belief. Villarin said he saw Paner pour the gasoline, this while
he and three other fellow-workers were sitting on the second floor of the bunkhouse and eating
their supper, and Villarin elaborated by adding that he saw Paner doing this through a hole on the
wall. What wall? Paner said the hole on the wall was at least four (4) meters from the floor of the
bunkhouse on which they were eating, and he could "peep" through that hole which was higher
than by more than double his height! And he did not reveal all this to the firemen who investigated
him. The credibility of the witness may be affected where he tends to exaggerate, or displays
propensity for needlessly detailed observation (People v. Wong, 23 SCRA 146). 18
One of the highly revered dicta in our jurisprudence is that this Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial
court in passing on the credibility of opposing witnesses unless there appears in the record some facts or
circumstances of weight and influence which have been overlooked, which, if considered, could affect the result of
the case. The reason therefor is founded on practical and empirical considerations. The trial judge is in a better
position to decide the question of credibility since he personally heard the witnesses and observed their deportment
and manner of testifying. 19Petitioners have offered no convincing arguments to accommodate their case within the
exception; they did not even dare to refute the above observations and findings of the trial court.
When Major Enriquez took the witness stand, testified for petitioners on his Report and made himself
available for cross-examination by the adverse party, the Report, insofar as it proved that certain utterances were
made (but not their truth), was effectively removed from the ambit of the aforementioned Section 44 of Rule 130.
Properly understood, this section does away with the testimony in open court of the officer who made the official
record, considers the matter as an exception to the hearsay rule and makes the entries in said official record
admissible in evidence asprima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The underlying reasons for this
exceptionary rule are necessity and trustworthiness.
It would have been an entirely different matter if Major Enriquez was not presented to testify on his report. In that
case the applicability of Section 44 of Rule 130 would have been ripe for determination, and this Court would have
agreed with the Court of Appeals that said report was inadmissible since the aforementioned third requisite was not
satisfied. The statements given by the sources of information of Major Enriquez failed to qualify as "official
information," there being no showing that, at the very least, they were under a duty to give the statements for record.
What appears to us to be the underlying purpose of petitioners in soliciting affirmance of their thesis that the Report of
Major Enriquez should be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule, is to shift the burden of evidence to private
respondents under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in negligence cases. They claim, as stated in their offer of
Exhibits, that "the fire started at the generator. . . within the construction site." This quotation is based on the
penultimate paragraph of page 4 of the Report of Major Enriquez and is obviously misleading as there is nothing in
said paragraph that unequivocally asserts that the generator was located within the construction site. The paragraph
reads:
After analyzing the evidences [sic] and the circumstances underlying the situation, one can easily
came [sic] to the conclusion that the fire started at the generator and extended to the bunkhouse
and spread among the combustible stored materials within the construction site. Among the
combustible materials were the plastic (PVC) pipes and plywoods [sic].
Clearly, the phrase within the construction site could only refer to the immediately preceding term
"combustible stored materials."
The trial court itself concluded that the fire could not have started at the generator and that the bunkhouse was not
burned, thus:

All the defendants's witness testified that the generator never caught fire, and no one at all had
heard any explosion anywhere before the fire was discerned. Exhibit 1 (a photograph of the fire
while it was raging reveals that the bunkhouse was intact. 30 (emphasis supplied)
It then declared that "the fire was not caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of
defendants," 31 which is one of the requisites for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in
the law of negligence. 32 It may further be emphasized that this doctrine is not intended to and does not
dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the party charged. It merely determines
and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a
breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances
involved, direct evidence is absent or not readily available. 33
More damaging to petitioners, which could have been enough reason for them to desist from insisting that the Report
of Major Enriquez be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule, are the officer's conclusion and recommendation
in his report, viz.:
V. CONCLUSION:
From the foregoing facts and all other evidences [sic] on hand, the investigator discerned that the
cause of the fire was ACCIDENTAL in nature.
VI. RECOMMENDATION:
It is hereby recommended that the investigation of the case shall be closed.
Obviously then, the second and third assigned errors are likewise without merit
FGU Insurance Corporation vs. G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation and Lambert Eroles
Posted on November 24, 2012
G.R. No. 141910
August 6, 2002
FACTS:
G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver on June 18, 1994, 30 units of Condura S.D. white
refrigerators aboard its Isuzu truck driven by Lambert Eroles, to the Central Luzon Appliances in Dagupan City. While
traversing the North Diversion Road along McArthur highway in Barangay Anupol, Bamban, Tarlac, it collided with an
unidentified truck, causing it to fall into a deep canal, resulting in damage to the cargoes.
FGU, an insurer of the shipment, paid the value of the covered cargoes (P204,450.00) to Concepcion Industries,
Inc.,. Being subrogee of CIIs rights & interests, FGU, in turn, sought reimbursement from GPS. Since GPS failed to
heed the claim, FGU filed a complaint for damages & breach of contract of carriage against GPS and Eroles with the
RTC. In its answer, respondents asserted that GPS was only the exclusive hauler of CII since 1988, and it was not so
engaged in business as a common carrier. Respondents further claimed that the cause of damage was purely
accidental.
GPS filed a motion to dismiss the complaint by way of demurrer to evidence on the ground that petitioner had failed
to prove that it was a common carrier.
The RTC granted the motion to dismiss on April 30, 1996. It subsequently dismissed the complaint holding that GPS
was not a common carrier defined under the law & existing jurisprudence. The subsequent motion for reconsideration
having been denied, FGU interposed an appeal to the CA. The CA rejected the FGUs appeal & ruled in favor of
GPS. It also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES:
1. WON GPS may be considered a common carrier as defined under the law & existing jurisprudence.
2. WON GPS, either as a common carrier or a private carrier, may be presumed to have been negligent when the
goods it undertook to transport safely were subsequently damaged while in its protective custody & possession.
3. Whether the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur is applicable in the instant case.
HELD:
1. The SC finds the conclusion of the RTC and the CA to be amply justified. GPS, being an exclusive contractor &
hauler of Concepcion Industries, Inc., rendering/offering its services to no other individual or entity, cannot be
considered a common carrier. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for hire or compensation,
offering their services to the public, whether to the public in general or to a limited clientele in particular, but never on
an exclusive basis. The true test of a common carrier is the carriage of passengers/goods, providing space for those
who opt to avail themselves of its transportation service for a fee. Given accepted standards, GPS scarcely falls
within the term common carrier.
2. GPS cannot escape from liability. In culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the contract & the failure
of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. The law will not permit a party to be set free from
liability for any kind of misperformance of the contractual undertaking or a contravention of the tenor thereof. A breach
upon the contract confers upon the injured party a valid cause for recovering that which may have been lost/suffered.
The remedy serves to preserve the interests of the promisee that may include his:
1. Expectation interest interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would
have been in had the contract been performed;

2. Reliance interest interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good
a position as he would have been in had the contract not been made;
3. Restitution interest interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has conferred on the other party.
Agreements can accomplish little unless they are made the basis for action. The effect of every infraction is to create
a new duty, or to make recompense to the one who has been injured by the failure of another to observe his
contractual obligation unless he can show extenuating circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due diligence
(normally that of the diligence of a good father of a family or, exceptionally by stipulation or by law such as in the case
of common carriers, that of extraordinary diligence) or of the attendance of fortuitous event, to excuse him from his
ensuing liability.
A default on, or failure of compliance with, the obligation gives rise to a presumption of lack of care & corresponding
liability on the part of the contractual obligor the burden being on him to establish otherwise. GPS has failed to do so.
Eroles, on the other hand, may not be ordered to pay petitioner without concrete proof of his negligence/fault. The
driver, not being a party to the contract of carriage between petitioners principal and defendant, may not be held
liable under the agreement. A contract can only bind the parties who have entered into it or their successors who
have assumed their personality/juridical position. Consonantly with the axiom res inter alios acta aliis neque nocet
prodest, such contract can neither favor nor prejudice a third person. Petitioners civil action against the driver can
only be based on culpa aquiliana, which would require the claimant for damages to prove the defendants
negligence/fault.
3. Res ipsa loquitur holds a defendant liable where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be
under the latters management and the accident is such that, in the ordinary course of things, cannot be expected to
happen if those who have its management/control use proper care. In the absence of the defendants explanation, it
affords reasonable evidence that the accident arose from want of care. It is not a rule of substantive law and does not
create an independent ground of liability. Instead, it is regarded as a mode of proof, or a mere procedural
convenience since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves the plaintiff of, the burden of producing specific proof of
negligence. The maxim simply places the burden of going forward with the proof on the defendant.
However, resort to the doctrine may only be allowed when:
(a) the event is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence;
(b) other responsible causes are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence (includes the conduct of the plaintiff and third
persons); and
(c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendants duty to the plaintiff.
Thus, it is not applicable when an unexplained accident may be attributable to one of several causes, for some of
which the defendant could not be responsible.
Res ipsa loquitur generally finds relevance whether or not a contractual relationship exists between the plaintiff and
the defendant, for the inference of negligence arises from the circumstances and nature of the occurrence and not
from the nature of the relation of the parties. Nevertheless,for the doctrine to apply, the requirement that responsible
causes (other than those due to defendants conduct) must first be eliminated should be understood as being
confined only to cases of pure (non-contractual) tort since obviously the presumption of negligence in culpa
contractual immediately attaches by a failure of the covenant or its tenor.
On the other hand, while the truck driver, whose civil liability is predicated on culpa acquiliana, can be said to have
been in control & management of the vehicle, it is not equally shown that the accident has been exclusively due to his
negligence. If it were so, the negligence could allow res ipsa loquitur to properly work against him. However, clearly
this is not the case.
74 Perla Compania Inc v. Sps. Sarangaya | Corona, J.
G.R. No. 147746 October 25, 2005|
FACTS
In 1986, spouses Sarangaya erected a building known as Super A Building and was subdivided into three doors,
each of which was leased out. The two-storey residence of the Sarangayas was behind the second and third doors of
the building.
In 1988, petitioner Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc., through its branch manager and co-petitioner Bienvenido
Pascual, entered into a contract of lease of the first door of the Super A Building, abutting the office of Matsushita.
Perla Compania renovated its rented space and divided it into two. The left side was converted into an office while
the right was used by Pascual as a garage for a 1981 model 4-door Ford Cortina, a company-provided vehicle he
used in covering the different towns within his area of supervision.
On July 7, 1988, Pascual left for San Fernando, Pampanga but did not bring the car with him. Three days later, he
returned, and decided to warm up the car. When he pulled up the handbrake and switched on the ignition key, the
engine made an odd sound and did not start. Thinking it was just the gasoline percolating into the engine, he again
stepped on the accelerator and started the car. This revved the engine but petitioner again heard an unusual sound.
He then saw a small flame coming out of the engine. Startled, he turned it off, alighted from the vehicle and started to
push it out of the garage when suddenly, fire spewed out of its rear compartment and engulfed the whole garage.
Pascual was trapped inside and suffered burns on his face, legs and arms.

 Meanwhile, respondents were busy watching television when they heard two loud explosions. The smell of gasoline
permeated the air and, in no time, fire spread inside their house, destroying all their belongings, furniture and
appliances.
The city fire marshall conducted an investigation and thereafter submitted a report to the provincial fire marshall. He
concluded that the fire was accidental. The report also disclosed that petitioner-corporation had no fire permit as
required by law.
Based on the same report, a criminal complaint for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to (sic) Damage in (sic)
Property was filed against petitioner Pascual. On the other hand, Perla Compania was asked to pay the amount of
P7,992,350, inclusive of the value of the commercial building. At the prosecutors office, petitioner Pascual moved for
the withdrawal of the complaint, which was granted.
Respondents (spouses Sarangaya) later on filed a civil complaint based on quasidelict against petitioners for a sum
of money and damages, alleging that Pascual acted with gross negligence while petitioner-corporation lacked the
required diligence in the selection and supervision of Pascual as its employee.
During the trial, respondents presented witnesses who testified that a few days before the incident, Pascual was
seen buying gasoline in a container from a nearby gas station. He then placed the container in the rear compartment
of the car.
In his answer, Pascual insisted that the fire was purely an accident, a caso fortuito, hence, he was not liable for
damages. He also denied putting a container of gasoline in the cars rear compartment. For its part, Perla Compania
refused liability for the accident on the ground that it exercised due diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of Pascual as its branch manager.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N Pascual liable under res ipsa loquitur doctrine
o <Pascual> It was a fortuitous event
W/N Perla Compania liable under tort
o <Perla Compania> We exercised due diligence in selecting Pascual
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
YES, Pascual liable under res ipsa loquitur doctrine
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means the thing or the transaction speaks for itself. It relates to
the fact of an injury that sets out an inference to the cause thereof or establishes the plaintiffs prima facie case. The
doctrine rests on inference and not on presumption. The facts of the occurrence warrant the supposition of
negligence and they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct evidence is lacking.
The doctrine is based on the theory that the defendant either knows the cause of the accident or has the best
opportunity of ascertaining it and the plaintiff, having no knowledge thereof, is compelled to allege negligence in
general terms. In such instance, the plaintiff relies on proof of the happening of the accident alone to establish
negligence.
The doctrine provides a means by which a plaintiff can pin liability on a defendant who, if innocent, should be able to
explain the care he exercised to prevent the incident complained of. Thus, it is the defendants responsibility to show
that there was no negligence on his part.
To sustain the allegation of negligence based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the following requisites must
concur:
1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and
3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
Under the first requisite, the occurrence must be one that does not ordinarily occur unless there is negligence.
Ordinary refers to the usual course of events. Flames spewing out of a car engine, when it is switched on, is
obviously not a normal event. Neither does an explosion usually occur when a car engines revved. Hence, in this
case, without any direct evidence as to the cause of the accident, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur comes into play
and, from it, we draw the inference that based on the evidence at hand, someone was in fact negligent and
responsible for the accident.
The test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: did the defendant in
committing the alleged negligent act, use reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person in the
same situation would have employed? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
Here, the fact that Pascual, as the caretaker of the car, failed to submit any proof that he had it periodically checked
(as its year-model and condition required) revealed his negligence. A prudent man should have known that a 14-yearold car, constantly used in provincial trips, was definitely prone to damage and other defects. For failing to prove care
and diligence in the maintenance of the vehicle, the necessary inference was that Pascual had been negligent in the
upkeep of the car.
The exempting circumstance of caso fortuito may be availed only when: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and
unexpected occurrence was independent of the human will; (b) it was impossible to foresee the event which
constituted the caso fortuito or, if it could be foreseen, it was impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as
to render it impossible to perform an obligation in a normal manner and (d) the person tasked to perform the
obligation must not have participated in any course of conduct that aggravated the accident.[20]

 In fine, human agency must be entirely excluded as the proximate cause or contributory cause of the injury or loss.
In a vehicular accident, for example, a mechanical defect will not release the defendant from liability if it is shown that
the accident could have been prevented had he properly maintained and taken good care of the vehicle.
The circumstances on record do not support the defense of Pascual. Clearly, there was no caso fortuito because of
his want of care and prudence in maintaining the car.
Under the second requisite, the instrumentality or agency that triggered the occurrence must be one that falls under
the exclusive control of the person in charge thereof. In this case, the car where the fire originated was under the
control of Pascual. Being its caretaker, he alone had the responsibility to maintain it and ensure its proper functioning.
No other person, not even the respondents, was charged with that obligation except him.
Where the circumstances which caused the accident are shown to have been under the management or control of a
certain person and, in the normal course of events, the incident would not have happened had that person used
proper care, the inference is that it occurred because of lack of such care. The burden of evidence is thus shifted to
defendant to establish that he observed all that was necessary to prevent the accident from happening. In this aspect,
Pascual utterly failed.
Under the third requisite, there is nothing in the records to show that respondents contributed to the incident. They
had no access to the car and had no responsibility regarding its maintenance even if it was parked in a building they
owned.
YES, COMPANIA LIABLE UNDER TORT
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications,
experience and service records.[25] While the petitioner-corporation does not appear to have erred in considering
Pascual for his position, its lack of supervision over him made it jointly and solidarily liable for the fire.
In the supervision of employees, the employer must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation and impose disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. o fend off vicarious liability, employers must
submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence, that they complied with everything that was incumbent on
them.
Here, petitioner-corporations evidence hardly included any rule or regulation that Pascual should have observed in
performing his functions. It also did not have any guidelines for the maintenance and upkeep of company property
like the vehicle that caught fire. Petitioner-corporation did not require periodic reports on or inventories of its
properties either. Based on these circumstances, petitioner-corporation clearly did not exert effort to be apprised of
the condition of Pascuals car or its serviceability.
MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. RODELIO ALBERTO AND ENRICO ALBERTO REYES,
RESPONDENTS.
VELASCO JR., J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, seeking to reverse and set aside the July 28, 2010
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its October 29, 2010 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. (Malayan Insurance). The July 28, 2010 CA Decision reversed and set
aside the Decision dated February 2, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 51 in Manila.
FACTS
At around 5 oclock in the morning of December 17, 1995, an accident occurred at the corner of EDSA and Ayala
Avenue, Makati City, involving four (4) vehicles, to wit: (1) a Nissan Bus operated by Aladdin Transit with plate
number NYS 381; (2) an Isuzu Tanker with plate number PLR 684; (3) a Fuzo Cargo Truck with plate number PDL
297; and (4) a Mitsubishi Galant with plate number TLM 732.[4]
Based on the Police Report issued by the on-the-spot investigator, Senior Police Officer 1 Alfredo M. Dungga (SPO1
Dungga), the Isuzu Tanker was in front of the Mitsubishi Galant with the Nissan Bus on their right side shortly before
the vehicular incident. All three (3) vehicles were at a halt along EDSA facing the south direction when the Fuzo
Cargo Truck simultaneously bumped the rear portion of the Mitsubishi Galant and the rear left portion of the Nissan
Bus. Due to the strong impact, these two vehicles were shoved forward and the front left portion of the Mitsubishi
Galant rammed into the rear right portion of the Isuzu Tanker.
Previously, particularly on December 15, 1994, Malayan Insurance issued Car Insurance Policy No. PV-025-00220 in
favor of First Malayan Leasing and Finance Corporation (the assured), insuring the aforementioned Mitsubishi Galant
against third party liability, own damage and theft, among others. Having insured the vehicle against such risks,
Malayan Insurance claimed in its Complaint dated October 18, 1999 that it paid the damages sustained by the
assured amounting to PhP 700,000.
Maintaining that it has been subrogated to the rights and interests of the assured by operation of law upon its
payment to the latter, Malayan Insurance sent several demand letters to respondents Rodelio Alberto (Alberto) and
Enrico Alberto Reyes (Reyes), the registered owner and the driver, respectively, of the Fuzo Cargo Truck, requiring
them to pay the amount it had paid to the assured. When respondents refused to settle their liability, Malayan
Insurance was constrained to file a complaint for damages for gross negligence against respondents.
In their Answer, respondents asserted that they cannot be held liable for the vehicular accident, since its proximate
cause was the reckless driving of the Nissan Bus driver. They alleged that the speeding bus, coming from the service
road of EDSA, maneuvered its way towards the middle lane without due regard to Reyes right of way. When the

1.
2.
3.

Nissan Bus abruptly stopped, Reyes stepped hard on the brakes but the braking action could not cope with the inertia
and failed to gain sufficient traction. As a consequence, the Fuzo Cargo Truck hit the rear end of the Mitsubishi
Galant, which, in turn, hit the rear end of the vehicle in front of it. The Nissan Bus, on the other hand, sideswiped the
Fuzo Cargo Truck, causing damage to the latter in the amount of PhP 20,000. Respondents also controverted the
results of the Police Report, asserting that it was based solely on the biased narration of the Nissan Bus driver.
After the termination of the pre-trial proceedings, trial ensued. Malayan Insurance presented the testimony of its lone
witness, a motor car claim adjuster, who attested that he processed the insurance claim of the assured and verified
the documents submitted to him. Respondents, on the other hand, failed to present any evidence.
In its Decision dated February 2, 2009, the trial court, in Civil Case No. 99-95885, ruled in favor of Malayan Insurance
and declared respondents liable for damages. The dispositive portion reads:
Judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff against defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff the following:
The amount of P700,000.00 with legal interest from the time of the filing of the complaint;
Attorneys fees of P10,000.00 and;
Cost of suit.
Dissatisfied, respondents filed an appeal with the CA, In its Decision dated July 28, 2010, the CA reversed and set
aside the Decision of the trial court and ruled in favor of respondents, disposing:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision dated 2
February 2009 REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint dated 18 October 1999 is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED
The CA held that the evidence on record has failed to establish not only negligence on the part of respondents, but
also compliance with the other requisites and the consequent right of Malayan Insurance to subrogation. It noted that
the police report, which has been made part of the records of the trial court, was not properly identified by the police
officer who conducted the on-the-spot investigation of the subject collision. It, thus, held that an appellate court, as a
reviewing body, cannot rightly appreciate firsthand the genuineness of an unverified and unidentified document, much
less accord it evidentiary value.
Subsequently, Malayan Insurance filed its Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that a police report is a prima
facie evidence of the facts stated in it. And inasmuch as they never questioned the presentation of the report in
evidence, respondents are deemed to have waived their right to question its authenticity and due execution.
In its Resolution dated October 29, 2010, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, Malayan Insurance
filed the instant petition.
ISSUES
In its Memorandum dated June 27, 2011 raised by Malayan Insurance were sum up to (1) the admissibility of the
police report; (2) the sufficiency of the evidence to support a claim for gross negligence; and (3) the validity of
subrogation in the instant case.
HELD
Admissibility of the Police Report
Malayan Insurance contends that, even without the presentation of the police investigator who prepared the police
report, said report is still admissible in evidence, especially since respondents failed to make a timely objection to its
presentation in evidence. Respondents counter that since the police report was never confirmed by the investigating
police officer, it cannot be considered as part of the evidence on record.
Indeed, under the rules of evidence, a witness can testify only to those facts which the witness knows of his or her
personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from the witness own perception.Concomitantly, a witness may not
testify on matters which he or she merely learned from others either because said witness was told or read or heard
those matters. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what the
witness has learned. This is known as the hearsay rule.
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
Sufficiency of Evidence
Malayan Insurance contends that since Reyes, the driver of the Fuzo Cargo truck, bumped the rear of the Mitsubishi
Galant, he is presumed to be negligent unless proved otherwise. It further contends that respondents failed to present
any evidence to overturn the presumption of negligence. Contrarily, respondents claim that since Malayan Insurance
did not present any witness who shall affirm any negligent act of Reyes in driving the Fuzo Cargo truck before and
after the incident, there is no evidence which would show negligence on the part of respondents.
One of the theoretical bases for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that necessary evidence is absent or not available.
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality
which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that
the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon
the proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence. The inference which the doctrine permits
is grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically
accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person.

In the case at bar, aside from the statement in the police report, none of the parties disputes the fact that the Fuzo
Cargo Truck hit the rear end of the Mitsubishi Galant, which, in turn, hit the rear end of the vehicle in front of it.
Respondents, however, point to the reckless driving of the Nissan Bus driver as the proximate cause of the collision,
which allegation is totally unsupported by any evidence on record. And assuming that this allegation is, indeed, true, it
is astonishing that respondents never even bothered to file a cross-claim against the owner or driver of the Nissan
Bus.
As mentioned above, the requisites for the application of the res ipsa loquitur rule are the following: (1) the accident
was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which
caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered
must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
In the instant case, the Fuzo Cargo Truck would not have had hit the rear end of the Mitsubishi Galant unless
someone is negligent. Also, the Fuzo Cargo Truck was under the exclusive control of its driver, Reyes. Even if
respondents avert liability by putting the blame on the Nissan Bus driver, still, this allegation was self-serving and
totally unfounded. Finally, no contributory negligence was attributed to the driver of the Mitsubishi Galant.
Consequently, all the requisites for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are present, thereby creating a
reasonable presumption of negligence on the part of respondents.
Validity of Subrogation
Malayan Insurance contends that there was a valid subrogation in the instant case, as evidenced by the claim check
voucher and the Release of Claim and Subrogation Receipt presented by it before the trial court. Respondents,
however, claim that the documents presented by Malayan Insurance do not indicate certain important details that
would show proper subrogation.
Note also that when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, it must so state in the form of a
timely objection and it cannot raise the objection to the evidence for the first time on appeal. Because of a
partys failure to timely object, the evidence becomes part of the evidence in the case. Thereafter, all the
parties are considered bound by any outcome arising from the offer of evidence properly presented.
Subrogation is the substitution of one person by another with reference to a lawful claim or right, so that he who is
substituted succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to a debt or claim, including its remedies or securities. The
principle covers a situation wherein an insurer has paid a loss under an insurance policy is entitled to all the rights
and remedies belonging to the insured against a third party with respect to any loss covered by the policy. It
contemplates full substitution such that it places the party subrogated in the shoes of the creditor, and he may use all
means that the creditor could employ to enforce payment.
We have held that payment by the insurer to the insured operates as an equitable assignment to the insurer of all the
remedies that the insured may have against the third party whose negligence or wrongful act caused the loss. The
right of subrogation is not dependent upon, nor does it grow out of, any privity of contract. It accrues simply upon
payment by the insurance company of the insurance claim. The doctrine of subrogation has its roots in equity. It is
designed to promote and to accomplish justice; and is the mode that equity adopts to compel the ultimate payment of
a debt by one who, in justice, equity, and good conscience, ought to pay.
The petition was GRANTED. The CAs July 28, 2010 Decision and October 29, 2010 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No.
93112 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated February 2, 2009 issued by the trial court in Civil
Case No. 99-95885 is hereby REINSTATED.
No pronouncement as to cost

G.R. No. L-22533

February 9, 1967

PLACIDO C. RAMOS and AUGUSTO L. RAMOS, petitioners,

vs.
PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING CO. OF THE P.I. and ANDRES BONIFACIO, respondents.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:

FACTS:
The car driven by Augusto Ramos (son of co-plaintiff Placido Ramos) collided with the truck of PEPSI, driven by the
driver and co-defendant Andres Bonifacio. As a result, the Ramoses sued Bonifacio and Pepsi.

The trial court found Bonifacio negligent and declared that PEPSI-COLA had not sufficiently proved that it exercised
the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. PEPSI-COLA and Bonifacio, solidarily, were
ordered to pay the plaintiffs damages.
The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA affirmed the decision of the trial court, but absolved PEPSICOLA from liability, finding that it sufficiently proved due diligence in the selection of its driver Bonifacio. In its
decision, CA stated the basis for its decision:
The uncontradicted testimony of Juan T. Anasco, personnel manager of defendant company, was to the effect that
defendant driver was first hired as a member of the bottle crop in the production department; that when he was hired
as a driver, 'we had size [sic] him by looking into his background, asking him to submit clearances, previous
experience, physical examination and later on, he was sent to the pool house to take the usual driver's examination,
consisting of: first, theoretical examination and second, the practical driving examination, all of which he had
undergone, and that the defendant company was a member of the Safety Council. Our Supreme Court had put it
down as a rule that In order that the defendant may be considered as having exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family, he should not have been satisfied with the mere possession of a professional driver's license; he
should have carefully examined the applicant for employment as to his qualifications, his experiences and record of
service. Defendant Company has taken all these steps.
ISSUE: Whether PEPSI-COLA exercised due diligence in the selection of its employee.
HELD:
The appellants contended that Aasco, being PEPSI-COLA's employee, is a biased and an interested witness. This is
a question of fact, and the SC would not disturb the findings of CA.
It should perhaps be stated that in the instant case no question is raised as to due diligence in the supervision by
PEPSI-COLA of its driver. Article 2180 points out that the owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions. This responsibility shall cease when the employers prove that they
observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage; hence, PEPSI-COLA shall be relieved from
liability (rebuttable presumption of negligence).
The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed.

RESOLUTION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Petitioners impute to PEPSI-COLA the violation of subpars M.V.O. Administrative Order No. 1 in that at the time of the
collision, the trailer-truck, which had a total weight of 30,000 kgms., was (a) being driven at a speed of about 30 k.p.h.
or beyond the 15 k.p.h. limit set and (b) was not equipped with a rear-vision mirror nor provided with a helper for the
driver. There is no finding that the tractor-truck did not have a rear-vision mirror.
Petitioners also charge PEPSI-COLA with having violated par. (b) of Sec. 8-A of the Rev. Motor Vehicle Law, alleging
that the truck exceeded the dimensions allowed. It is not enough that the width of the tractor-truck exceed the limit in
Sec. 8-A; in addition, it must also appear that there was no special permit granted under Sec. 9. Unfortunately for
petitioners, that vital factual link is missing. There was no proof much less any finding to that effect.

We are urged to apply the Anglo-American doctrine of respondent superior. We cannot however, abandon the Bahia
ruling without going against the explicit mandate of the law. A motor vehicle owner is not an absolute insurer against
all damages caused by its driver. Article 2180 of our Civil Code is very explicit that the owner's responsibility shall
cease once it proves that it has observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
The Bahia case merely clarified what that diligence consists of, namely, diligence in the selection and supervision of
the driver-employee.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the basis of an employer's liability is his own negligence, not that of his
employees. The former is made responsible for failing to properly and diligently select and supervise his erring
employees. We do not and have never followed the respondent superior rule.8 So, the American rulings cited by
petitioners, based as they are on said doctrine, are not authoritative here.
In view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied.