SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 118866-68. September 17, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODOLFO DE LA

CRUZ, alias RODOLFO DOMINGO or OMPONG, accusedappellant.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:

In this appeal from three sentences of reclusion perpetua, accused-appellant Rodolfo

de la Cruz, alias Rodolfo Domingo or Ompong, consistent with his negative pleas when
arraigned on November 5, 1992 and January 11, 1993,[1] impugns his conviction for
multiple murder in Criminal Cases Nos. 92-8029, 92-8030 and 92-8031 by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 74,[2]of Antipolo, Rizal. He anchors his entreaty for the reversal thereof
mainly on the ground that he was not fully and appropriately apprised of or allowed to
exercise his constitutional rights prior to and while undergoing custodial investigation.
In the early evening of June 23, 1992, the lifeless bodies of Teodorico M. Laroya, Jr.
and his children, 12-year old Karen Verona D. Laroya and 10-year old John Lester D.
Laroya, were discovered in their residence at 13 Emerald Street, Greenpark Village,
Cainta, Rizal by their horrified neighbors. The star-crossed trio were all bloodied
consequent to numerous stab wounds, and each of them had a knife still embedded in
and protruding from their bodies when found. Karen Verona also bore external signs of
sexual assault.[3]
None of their neighbors, however, witnessed the gruesome murders. Two of them
later testified in court, namely, Harold Jim F. Balocating and Anita F. Pangan. The former
merely recounted how, while playing table tennis in front of the Laroya residence, he and
his friends stumbled upon the dead bodies of the victims. Anita Pangan, on the other
hand, recalled that at around 9:00 P.M. of June 23, 1992, appellant, who was a brotherin-law of Teodorico Laroya, Jr., purchased some candies at her store which is located
inside the village.[4]
Both Balocating and Pangan had previously executed sworn statements just three
days after the incident, the assertions in which were of the same import as their respective
testimonies in court.[5] On June 27, 1992, the police authorities apprehended appellant at
the house of his brother in Fort Bonifacio. SPO1 Carlos R. Atanacio, Jr., a member of the
Cainta Police Station in Cainta, Rizal interrogated appellant regarding the crimes on the
same day that he was arrested.

This police officer declared in the trial court that before he questioned appellant as to
his participation in said crimes, all steps were undertaken to completely inform the latter
of his rights and this he did in the presence of appellants supposed counsel, one Atty.
Lorenza Bernardino-Villanueva. Appellant then signed, likewise in the presence of said
counsel, an extrajudicial confession wherein he narrated in detail how he allegedly
snuffed out the lives of the victims.[6]
When presented as the lone witness for himself, appellant was observed by the trial
court to be afflicted with a problem in expressing himself and an impediment in his speech
(ngo-ngo). By appellants own account, he only reached the fourth grade of elementary
schooling and, although conversant with Tagalog, he is unable to read and write, although
he can sign his name. He bluntly repudiated the version of SPO1 Atanacio, Jr. and
insisted that he was never assisted by any counsel of his choice, much less met said Atty.
Lorenza Bernardino-Villanueva, when he was interrogated at the police headquarters in
Cainta, Rizal and signed his supposed extrajudicial confession. Parenthetically, his
answers to the questions appearing therein are in surprisingly fluent, flawless and
expressive Tagalog,[7] which could not have been done by him because of his defect in
speech and articulation.
He further claims that he was instead tortured by the police authorities into signing
the same, and not that he did so voluntarily. While he admits having been at the residence
of the victims on the night that they were murdered, he flatly denied having killed them as
he left the trio well and alive that same night when he proceeded to his brothers place in
Fort Bonifacio.[8]
1. In unambiguous and explicit terms, Section 12, paragraph 1, of Article III of the
Constitution requires that [a]ny person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel. Corollary thereto, paragraph 3 thereof declares that any
confession or admission obtained in violation of the same shall be inadmissible in
evidence against the confessant.
An accused person must be informed of the rights set out in said paragraph of Section
12 upon being held as a suspect and made to undergo custodial investigation by the
police authorities.[9] As explained by this Court in People vs. Marra,[10] custodial
investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a
person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant manner. And, the rule begins to operate at once as soon as the investigation
ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and direction is then aimed upon a
particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would then
direct interrogatory question which tend to elicit incriminating statements.
Furthermore, not only does the fundamental law impose, as a requisite function of
the investigating officer, the duty to explain those rights to the accused but also that there
must correspondingly be a meaningful communication to and understanding thereof by
the accused. A mere perfunctory reading by the constable of such rights to the accused
would thus not suffice.

The defendant in the dock must be made to understand comprehensively, in the

language or dialect that he knows, the full extent of the same. A confession made in an
atmosphere characterized by deficiencies in informing the accused of all the rights to
which he is entitled would be rendered valueless and inadmissible, perforated, as it is by
non-compliance with the procedural and substantive safeguards to which an accused is
entitled under the Bill of Rights and as now further implemented and ramified by statutory
law.[11]
2. In the present case, SPO1 Atanacio, Jr., admitted in his testimony before the lower
court that the investigation of appellant in connection with the murders actually
commenced at around 9:00 A.M. on June 27, 1992 at the police headquarters in Cainta,
Rizal, at the time when appellant was still without counsel. [12] The sworn statement
containing appellants extrajudicial confession itself shows that it was taken at around
11:00 A.M.[13] Further, while SPO1 Atanacio, Jr. informed appellant in Tagalog of his right
to remain silent, that any statement he made could be used for or against him in any
court, and that he could have counsel preferably of his own choice, he nonetheless failed
to tell appellant that if the latter could not afford the services of counsel, he could be
provided with one.[14]
The foregoing lapses on the part of the police authorities are all fatal to the
admissibility of the extrajudicial confession supposedly executed by appellant before
SPO1 Atanacio, Jr. Jurisprudence along these lines have all been too consistent - an
accused under custodial interrogation must continuously have a counsel assisting him
from the very start thereof. Indeed, Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, could not be
any clearer.
To reiterate, prior to the commencement of the investigation, the accused must
perforce be informed, on top of all his other rights enumerated therein, that where he
lacks a counsel of his choice because of indigence or other incapacitating cause, he shall
be provided with one. Without this further safeguard, the cautionary right to counsel would
merely impress upon the accused, more so upon an impecunious person like appellant
who is hardly educated, that his right thereto would mean simply that he can consult a
lawyer if he has one or has the financial capacity to obtain legal services, and nothing
more.
Curiously, the record is completely bereft of any indication as to how appellant was
able to engage the services of Atty. Lorenza Bernardino-Villanueva, the counsel who was
allegedly present when appellant executed his confession and who was not even
subpoenaed to testify thereon. This significant circumstance lends credence to the latters
denial that he ever met in person, much less executed the confession in the presence of,
said counsel. What emerges from a perusal of the record is that this counsel was merely
picked out and provided by the law enforcers themselves, thus putting into serious doubt
her independence and competence in assisting appellant during the investigation [15] as to
affect its admissibility.
Moreover, had she been equal to her responsibility in the face of such serious charge
involved in the cases, the failure of SPO1 Atanacio, Jr. to fully apprise appellant of all his
rights, particularly the requirement that if he could not afford the services of a lawyer he
shall be provided with one would have been rectified by said counsel at that very stage

of the investigation.Indeed, from our earliest jurisprudence, the law vouchsafes to the
accused the right to an effective counsel, one who can be made to act in protection of his
rights,[16] and not by merely going through the motions of providing him with anyone who
possesses a law degree.
Again, about the only matter that bears out the presence of such counsel at that stage
of custodial interrogation are the signatures which she affixed on the affidavit. Withal, a
cursory reading of the confession itself and SPO1 Atanacios version of the manner in
which he conducted the interrogation, yields no evidence or indication pointing to her
having explained to the appellant his rights under the Constitution.
In People vs. Ayson, etc., et al.,[17] this Court aptly emphasized these constitutional
safeguards in this wise:

In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards laid down
for a person in police custody, in-custody interrogation being regarded as the
commencement of an adversary proceeding against the suspect.
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that
anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed
for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights
must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been
given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently
waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such
warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence
obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
The objective is to prohibit incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a policedominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without full
warnings of constitutional rights.
The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in custodial interrogations, or incustody interrogation of accused persons. And, as this Court has already stated, by
custodial interrogation is meant questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after
a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way. The situation contemplated has also been more precisely
described by this Court.
x x x After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins, a confrontation
arises which at best may be termed unequal. The detainee is brought to an army camp
or police headquarters and there questioned and cross-examined not only by one but
as many investigators as may be necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself
in strange and unfamiliar surroundings, and every person he meets, he considers

hostile to him. The investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work. They
employ all the methods and means that experience and study have taught them to
extract the truth, or what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are
unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional rights. And even if they were, the
intimidating and coercive presence of the officers of the law in such an atmosphere
overwhelms them into silence. Section 20 of the Bill of Rights seeks to remedy this
imbalance.
3. Necessarily, even while there is evidence of the corpus delicti in this case,
appellants conviction must be set aside for his extrajudicial confession is obviously
inadmissible in evidence against him. The rule is that an extrajudicial confession, where
admissible, must be corroborated by evidence of the corpus delicti in order to sustain a
finding of guilt.[18] Both must co-exist. The insistence of the Office of the Solicitor General
that appellants confession could nonetheless be treated as an admission which could
therefore be admitted in evidence is misplaced, for the Bill of Rights treats of both
confessions and admissions in the same light.[19] In addition, it should be stressed that in
appellants case, no eyewitnesses to the actual killings were ever presented to testify in
court, and the prosecution relied primarily on circumstantial evidence to inculpate
appellant in crimes wherein he was meted three penalties of reclusion perpetua.
It is significant that, with the exception of appellants putative extrajudicial confession,
no other evidence of his alleged guilt has been presented by the People. The proposition
that the medical findings jibe with the narration of appellant as to how he allegedly
committed the crimes falls into the fatal error of figuratively putting the horse before the
cart. Precisely, the validity and admissibility of the supposed extrajudicial confession are
in question and the contents thereof are denied and of serious dubiety, hence the same
cannot be used as the basis for such a finding. Otherwise, it would assume that which
has still to be proved, a situation of petitio principii or circulo en probando.
Evidently, herein appellant cannot be made to suffer the extreme penal
consequences of the crimes on account of the shaky and decrepit circumstantial evidence
proffered by the prosecution. While the defense of alibi advanced by appellant is by nature
a weak one by itself, it assumes commensurate significance and strength where the
evidence for the prosecution itself is frail and effete. For, needless to state, the
prosecution must not rely on the weakness of the evidence of the defense but upon the
vigor of its own.[20] In sum, the presumption of innocence enjoyed by appellant has
remained intact and impervious to the prosecutions assault thereon.
ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises, the judgments of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 74, of Antipolo, Rizal in Criminal Cases Nos. 92-8029, 92-8030 and 928031 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant Rodolfo de la Cruz, alias
Rodolfo Domingo or Ompong, is hereby ACQUITTED. His immediate release is
accordingly ordered unless there be any other lawful cause for his continued
incarceration.
SO

ORDERED.

SYLLABI/SYNOPSIS

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 122485. February 1, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LARRY MAHINAY

Y AMPARADO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:

A violation of the dignity, purity and privacy of a child who is still innocent and unexposed
to the ways of worldly pleasures is a harrowing experience that destroys not only her future but of
the youth population as well, who in the teachings of our national hero, are considered the hope of
the fatherland. Once again, the Court is confronted by another tragic desecration of human dignity,
committed no less upon a child, who at the salad age of a few days past 12 years, has yet to knock
on the portals of womanhood, and met her untimely death as a result of the "intrinsically evil act"
of non-consensual sex called rape. Burdened with the supreme penalty of death, rape is an
ignominious crime for which necessity is neither an excuse nor does there exist any other rational
justification other than lust. But those who lust ought not to lust.
The Court quotes with approval from the People's Brief, the facts narrating the horrible
experience and the tragic demise of a young and innocent child in the bloody hands of appellant,
as such facts are ably supported by evidence on record:[1] *

"Appellant Larry Mahinay started working as houseboy with Maria Isip on November
20, 1993. His task was to take care of Isip's house which was under construction
adjacent to her old residence situated inside a compound at No. 4165 Dian Street,
Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela , Metro Manila. But he stayed and slept in an apartment
also owned by Isip, located 10 meters away from the unfinished house (TSN,
September 6, 1995, pp. 5-10).
"The victim, Ma. Victoria Chan, 12 years old, was Isip's neighbor in Dian Street. She
used to pass by Isip's house on her way to school and play inside the compound yard,
catching maya birds together with other children. While they were playing, appellant
was always around washing his clothes. Inside the compound yard was a septic tank
(TSN, August 22, 1995, pp. 29-31; September 6, 1995, pp. 17; 20-22).

"On June 25, 1995, at 8 o'clock a.m., appellant joined Gregorio Rivera in a drinking
spree. Around 10 o'clock in the morning, appellant, who was already drunk, left
Gregorio Rivera and asked permission from Isip to go out with his friends (TSN,
September 6, 1995, pp. 9-11).
"Meantime, Isip's sister-in-law, Norgina Rivera, who also owned a store fronting the
compound, saw Ma. Victoria on that same day three to four times catching birds
inside Isip's unfinished house around 4 o'clock in the afternoon. The unfinished house
was about 8 meters away from Rivera's store (TSN, September 18, 1995, pp.9-11).
"On the other hand, Sgt. Roberto Suni, also a resident of Dian Street, went to his inlaw's house between 6 to 7 o'clock p.m. to call his office regarding changes on the trip
of President Fidel V. Ramos. The house of his in-laws was near the house of Isip. On
his way to his in-law's house, Sgt. Suni met appellant along Dian Street. That same
evening, between 8 to 9 o'clock p.m., he saw Ma. Victoria standing in front of the gate
of the unfinished house (TSN, September 27, 1995, pp. 3-7; 14-17).
"Later, at 9 o'clock in the evening, appellant showed up at Norgina Rivera's store to
buy lugaw. Norgina Rivera informed appellant that there was none left of it. She
notice that appellant appeared to be uneasy and in deep thought. His hair was
disarrayed; he was drunk and was walking in a dazed manner. She asked why he
looked so worried but he did not answer. Then he left and walked back to the
compound (TSN, September 18, 1995, pp. 4-8; 12-14).
"Meanwhile, Elvira Chan noticed that her daughter, Ma. Victoria, was missing. She
last saw her daughter wearing a pair of white shorts, brown belt, a yellow hair ribbon,
printed blue blouse, dirty white panty, white lady sando and blue rubber slippers
(TSN, August 23, 1995, pp. 22, 33).
"Isip testified that appellant failed to show up for supper that night. On the following
day, June 26, 1995, at 2 o'clock in the morning, appellant boarded a passenger jeepney
driven by Fernando Trinidad at the talipapa. Appellant alighted at the top of the
bridge of the North Expressway and had thereafter disappeared (TSN, September 20,
1995, pp. 4-9; September 27, 1995; pp. 14-17).
"That same morning, around 7:30, a certain Boy found the dead body of Ma. Victoria
inside the septic tank. Boy immediately reported what he saw to the victim's parents,
Eduardo and Elvira Chan (TSN, September 6, 1995, p. 13).
"With the help of the Valenzuela Police, the lifeless body of Ma. Victoria was
retrieved from the septic tank. She was wearing a printed blouse without underwear.
Her face bore bruises. Results of the autopsy revealed the following findings:

Cyanosis, lips and nailbeds,

Contusions, supra pubic area, 6.0 x 3.0 cm., thigh right,
Anterior aspect, middle third, 4.5 x 3.0 cm.
Contused-abrasions on the forehead, 5.0 x 5.0 cm, angle of the left eye, lateral aspect,
2.5 x 1.5 cm. left jaw, 13.5 x 7.0 cm. neck, antero-lateral aspect, right, 2.0 x 1.0 cm.
and left, 7.0 x 6.0 cm., left iliac area, 9.0 x 5.5 cm. intraclavicular area, left, posterior
aspect, 4.0 x 2.0 cm. scapular area, right 4.0 x 4.0 cm. subscapular area, left, 1.5 x 1.5
cm. lumbar area, left 7.0 x 8.0 cm. arm, left, posterior aspect, middle third, 11.00 x 4.0
cm. elbows, right, 4.0 x 3.0 cm. and left 6.0 x 5.0 cm. forearms, left, posterior aspect,
lower rd, 5.2 x 4.0 cm. hand, left, dorsal aspect, 0.8 x 0.9 cm. thighs; right anterolateral aspect, upper 33rd, 12.0 x 10.0 cm. right anterior aspect, lower 3rd 5.0 x 2.0 cm.
and left antero-lower 3rd , 5.5 x 2.5 cm. knee, right, lateral aspect, 1.5 x 1.0 cm. lateral
mallcolum, left, 3.0 x 3.5 cm. foot, left, dorsal aspect 2.2 x 1.0 cm.
Hematoma, forehead, and scalp, left, 3.5 x 3.0 cm.
Hemorrhage, interstitial, underneath nailmarks, neck, subepicardial, subpleural
petechial hemorrhages.
Hemorrhage, subdural, left fronto-parietal area.
Tracheo-bronchial tree, congested.
Other visceral organs, congested.
Stomach, contain 1/4 rice and other food particles.
CAUSE OF DEATH - Asphyxia by Manual Strangulation; Traumatic Head Injury,
Contributory.
REMARKS: Hymen: tall, thick with complete lacerations at 4:00 and 8:00 o'clock
position corresponding to the face of a watch edges congested with blood clots. (TSN,
August 18, 1995; p. 4; Record, p. 126)
"Back in the compound, SPO1 Arsenio Nacis and SPO1 Arnold Alabastro were
informed by Isip that her houseboy, appellant Larry Mahinay, was missing. According
to her, it was unlikely for appellant to just disappear from the apartment since
whenever he would go out, he would normally return on the same day or early
morning of the following day (TSN, September 6, 1995, pp. 6-11-27).

"SPO1 Nacis and SPO1 Alabastro were also informed that a townmate of appellant
was working in a pancit factory at Barangay Reparo, Caloocan City. They proceeded
to said place. The owner of the factory confirmed to them that appellant used to work
at the factory but she did not know his present whereabouts. Appellant's townmate, on
the other hand, informed them that appellant could possibly be found on 8 Street,
Grace Park, Caloocan City (TSN, August 14, 1995, pp. 8-9).
th

"The policemen returned to the scene of the crime. At the second floor of the house
under construction, they retrieved from one of the rooms a pair of dirty white short
pants, a brown belt and a yellow hair ribbon which was identified by Elvira Chan to
belong to her daughter, Ma. Victoria. They also found inside another room a pair of
blue slippers which Isip identified as that of Appellant. Also found in the yard, three
armslength away from the septic tank were an underwear, a leather wallet, a pair of
dirty long pants and a pliers positively identified by Isip as appellant's
belongings. These items were brought to the police station (TSN, August 14, 1995,
pp. 10-13; August 18, 1995, pp. 3-8; August 23, 1995, pp. 21-25).
"A police report was subsequently prepared including a referral slip addressed to the
office of the Valenzuela Prosecutor. The next day, SPO1 Virgilio Villano retrieved the
victim's underwear from the septic tank (TSN, August 23, 1995, pp. 3-8; 14-17).
"After a series of follow-up operations, appellant was finally arrested in Barangay
Obario Matala, Ibaan, Batangas. He was brought to Valenzuela Police Station. On
July 7, 1995, with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes, appellant executed an
extra-judicial confession wherein he narrated in detail how he raped and killed the
victim. Also, when appellant came face to face with the victim's mother and aunt, he
confided to them that he was not alone in raping and killing the victim. He pointed to
Zaldy and Boyet as his co-conspirators (TSN, August 14, 1995, pp. 13-21)."
Thus, on July 10, 1995, appellant was charged with rape with homicide in an Information
which reads:[2]

"That on or about the 26 day of June 1995 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, by means of force
and intimidation employed upon the person of MARIA VICTORIA CHAN y
CABALLERO, age 12 years old, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously lie with and have sexual intercourse with said MARIA VICTORIA
CHAN y CABALLERO against her will and without her consent; that on the occasion
of said sexual assault, the above-named accused, choke and strangle said MARIA
VICTORIA CHAN y CABALLERO as a result of which, said victim died.
th

"Contrary to law."[3]

to which he pleaded not guilty. After trial, the lower court rendered a decision convicting appellant
of the crime charged, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay a total of P73,000.00
to the victim's heirs. The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision states:

"WHEREFORE, finding accused Larry Mahinay y Amparado guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime charged, he is hereby sentenced to death by
electricution (sic). He is likewise condemned to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Ma.
Victoria Chan the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the further sum of P23,000.00 for
the funeral, burial and wake of the victim.
"Let the complete records of the case be immediately forwarded to the Honorable
Supreme Court for the automatic review in accordance to Article 47 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659.
"SO ORDERED."[4]
Upon automatic review by the court en banc pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), as amended,[5] appellant insists that the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution against him is insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In his testimony
summarized by the trial court, appellant offered his version of what transpired as follows:

(T)hat on June 25, 1995, around 9:30 a.m. on Dian Street, Gen. T. de Leon,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, he joined Gregorio Rivera and a certain Totoy in a
drinking spree. Gregorio Rivera is the brother of Maria Isip, appellants employer.
After consuming three cases of red horse beer, he was summoned by Isip to clean the
jeepney. He finished cleaning the jeepney at 12 oclock noon. Then he had lunch and
took a bath. Later, he asked permission from Isip to go out with his friends to see a
movie. He also asked for a cash advance of P300.00 (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 45).
At 2 oclock in the afternoon, appellant, instead of going out with his friend, opted to
rejoin Gregorio Rivera and Totoy for another drinking session. They consumed one
case of red horse beer. Around 6 oclock p.m., Zaldy, a co-worker, fetched him at
Gregorio Riveras house. They went to Zaldys house and bought a bottle of gin. They
finished drinking gin around 8 oclock p.m. After consuming the bottle of gin, they
went out and bought another bottle of gin from a nearby store. It was already 9 oclock
in the evening. While they were at the store, appellant and Zaldy met Boyet. After
giving the bottle of gin to Zaldy and Boyet, appellant left (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp.
6-7).
On his way home, appellant passed by Norgina Riveras store to buy lugaw. Norgina
Rivera informed him that there was none left of it. He left the store and proceeded to
Isips apartment. But because it was already closed, he decided to sleep at the second

floor of Isips unfinished house. Around 10 oclock p.m., Zaldy and Boyet arrived
carrying a cadaver. The two placed the body inside the room where appellant was
sleeping. As appellant stood up, Zaldy pointed to him a knife. Zaldy and Boyet
directed him to rape the dead body of the child or they would kill him. He, However,
refused to follow. Then, he was asked by Zaldy and Boyet to assist them in bringing
the dead body downstairs. He obliged and helped dump the body into the septic tank.
Thereupon, Zaldy and Boyet warned him that should they ever see him again, they
would kill him. At 4 oclock the following morning, he left the compound and
proceeded first to Navotas and later to Batangas (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 4-13).
Subsequently, appellant was apprehended by the police officers in Ibaan, Batangas.
The police officers allegedly brought him to a big house somewhere in Manila. There,
appellant heard the police officers plan to salvage him if he would not admit that he
was the one who raped and killed the victim. Scared, he executed an extra-judicial
confession. He claimed that he was assisted by Atty. Restituto Viernes only when he
was forced to sign the extra-judicial confession (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 9-11).[6]
This being a death penalty case, the Court exercises the greatest circumspection in the review
thereof since there can be no stake higher and no penalty more severe x x x than the termination
of a human life.[7] For life, once taken is like virginity, which once defiled can never be restored.
In order therefore, that appellants guilty mind be satisfied, the Court states the reasons why, as the
records are not shy, for him to verify.
The proven circumstances of this case when juxtaposed with appellants proffered excuse are
sufficient to sustain his conviction beyond reasonable doubt, notwithstanding the absence of any
direct evidence relative to the commission of the crime for which he was prosecuted. Absence of
direct proof does not necessarily absolve him from any liability because under the Rules on
evidence[8] and pursuant to settled jurisprudence,[9] conviction may be had on circumstantial
evidence provided that the following requisites concur:
1. there is more than one circumstance;
2. the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3. the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.

Simply put, for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all circumstances
must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and
at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt.[10] Facts and circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent
with innocence, constitute evidence which, in weight and probative force, may surpass even direct
evidence in its effect upon the court.[11]
In the case at bench, the trial court gave credence to several circumstantial evidence, which
upon thorough review of the Court is more than enough to prove appellants guilt beyond the
shadow of reasonable doubt. These circumstantial evidence are as follows:

FIRST Prosecution witness Norgina Rivera, sister-in-law of Maria Isip, owner of the
unfinished big house where the crime happened and the septic tank where the body of
Maria Victoria Chan was found in the morning of June 26, 1995 is located,
categorically testified that at about 9:00 in the evening on June 25, 1995, accused
Larry Mahinay was in her store located in front portion of the compound of her sisterin-law Maria Isip where the unfinished big house is situated buying rice noodle
(lugaw). That she noticed the accuseds hair was disarranged, drunk and walking in
sigsaging manner. That the accused appeared uneasy and seems to be thinking deeply.
That the accused did not reply to her queries why he looked worried but went inside
the compound.
SECOND Prosecution witness Sgt. Roberto G. Suni, categorically, testified that on
June 25, 1995 between 6:00 and 7:00 in the evening, on his way to his in-laws house,
he met accused Larry Mahinay walking on the road leading to his in-laws residence
which is about 50 to 75 meters away to the unfinished big house of Maria Isip. That
he also saw victim Maria Victoria Chan standing at the gate of the unfinished big
house of Maria Isip between 8:00 and 9:00 in the same evening.
THIRD Prosecution witness Maria Isip, owner of the unfinished big house where
victims body was found inside the septic tank, testified that accused Larry Mahinay is
her houseboy since November 20, 1993. That in the morning of June 25, 1995, a
Sunday, Larry Mahinay asked permission from her to leave. That after finishing some
work she asked him to do accused Larry Mahinay left. That it is customary on the part
of Larry Mahinay to return in the afternoon of the same day or sometimes in the next
morning. That accused Larry Mahinay did not return until he was arrested in Batangas
on July 7, 1995.
FOURTH Prosecution witness Fernando Trinidad, a passenger jeepney driver plying
the route Karuhatan-Ugong and vice versa which include Diam St., Gen. T. de Leon,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, pinpointed the accused Larry Mahinay as one of the
passengers who boarded his passenger jeepney on June 26, 1995 at 2:00 early
morning and alighted on top of the overpass of the North Expressway.
FIFTH Personal belongings of the victim was found in the unfinished big house of
Maria Isip where accused Larry Mahinay slept on the night of the incident. This is a
clear indication that the victim was raped and killed in the said premises.
There is no showing that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses (sic) fabricated
or there was any reason for them to testify falsely against the accused. The absence of
any evidence as to the existence of improper motive sustain the conclusion that no
such improper motive exists and that the testimonies of the witnesses, therefore,

should be given full faith and credit. (People vs. Retubado, 58585 January 20, 1988
162 SCRA 276, 284; People vs. Ali L-18512 October 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 756).
SIXTH Accused Larry Mahinay during the custodial investigation and after having
been informed of his constitutional rights with the assistance of Atty. Restituto
Viernes of the Public Attorneys Office voluntarily gave his statement admitting the
commission of the crime. Said confession of accused Larry Mahinay given with the
assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes is believed to have been freely and voluntarily
given. That accused did not complain to the proper authorities of any maltreatment on
his person (People vs. delos Santos L-3398 May 29, 1984; 150 SCRA 311). He did
not even informed the Inquest Prosecutor when he sworn to the truth of his statement
on July 8, 1995 that he was forced, coersed or was promised of reward or leniency.
That his confession abound with details know only to him. The Court noted that a
lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office Atty. Restituto Viernes and as testified by
said Atty. Viernes he informed and explained to the accused his constitutional rights
and was present all throughout the giving of the testimony. That he signed the
statement given by the accused. Lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office is expected
to be watchful and vigilant to notice any irregularity in the manner of the investigation
and the physical conditions of the accused. The post mortem findings shows that the
cause of death Asphyxia by manual strangulation; Traumatic Head injury
Contributory substantiate. Consistent with the testimony of the accused that he pushed
the victim and the latters head hit the table and the victim lost consciousness.
Pagpasok niya sa kuwarto, hinawakan ko siya sa kamay tapos tinulak ko siya, tapos
tumama iyong ulo niya sa mesa. Ayon na, nakatulog na siya tapos ni-rape ko na siya.
There is no clear proof of maltreatment and/or tortured in giving the statement. There
were no medical certificate submitted by the accused to sustain his claim that he was
mauled by the police officers.
There being no evidence presented to show that said confession were obtained as a
result of violence, torture, maltreatment, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or
leniency nor that the investigating officer could have been motivated to concoct the
facts narrated in said affidavit; the confession of the accused is held to be true, correct
and freely or voluntarily given. (People v. Tuazon 6 SCRA 249; People v. Tiongson 6
SCRA 431, People v. Baluran 52 SCRA 71, People v. Pingol 35 SCRA 73.)
SEVENTH Accused Larry Mahinay testified in open Court that he was not able to
enter the apartment where he is sleeping because it was already closed and he
proceeded to the second floor of the unfinished house and slept. He said while
sleeping Zaldy and Boyet arrived carrying the cadaver of the victim and dumped it
inside his room. That at the point of a knife, the two ordered him to have sex with the

dead body but he refused. That the two asked him to assist them in dumping the dead
body of the victim in the septic tank downstairs. (Tsn pp8-9 October 16, 1995). This is
unbelievable and unnatural. Accused Larry Mahinay is staying in the apartment and
not in the unfinished house. That he slept in the said unfinished house only that night
of June 25, 1995 because the apartment where he was staying was already closed. The
Court is at a loss how would Zaldy and Boyet knew he (Larry Mahinay) was in the
second floor of the unfinished house.
Furthermore, if the child is already dead when brought by Zaldy and Boyet in the
room at the second floor of the unfinished house where accused Larry Mahinay was
sleeping, why will Boyet and Zaldy still brought the cadaver upstairs only to be
disposed/dumped later in the septic tank located in the ground floor. Boyet and Zaldy
can easily disposed and dumped the body in the septic tank by themselves.
It is likewise strange that the dead body of the child was taken to the room where
accused Larry Mahinay was sleeping only to force the latter to have sex with the dead
body of the child.
We have no test to the truth of human testimony except its conformity to aver
knowledge observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the
miraculous. (People vs. Santos L-385 Nov. 16, 1979)
EIGHT If the accused did not commit the crime and was only forced to
disposed/dumpted the body of the victim in the septic tank, he could have apprise Col.
Maganto, a high ranking police officer or the lady reporter who interviewed him. His
failure and omission to reveal the same is unnatural. An innocent person will at once
naturally and emphatically repel an accusation of crime as a matter of preservation
and self-defense and as a precaution against prejudicing himself. A persons silence
therefore, particularly when it is persistent will justify an inference that he is not
innocent. (People vs. Pilones, L-32754-5 July 21, 1978).
NINTH The circumstance of flight of the accused strongly indicate his consciousness
of guilt. He left the crime scene on the early morning after the incident and did not
return until he was arrested in Batangas on July 7, 1995.[12]
Guided by the three principles in the review of rape cases, to wit:[13]
1). An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for
the person accused, though innocent, to disprove;
2). In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape, where only two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution; and
3). The evidence of the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the defense.

the foregoing circumstantial evidence clearly establishes the felony of rape with homicide defined
and penalized under Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11, R.A. 7659,
which provides:

When and how rape is committed Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances.
1.) By using force or intimidation;
2.) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3.) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two
or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the
penalty shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on
the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty
shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
the following attendant circumstances:
1.) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
2.) When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
3.) When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other
relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.
4.) When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
5.) When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) disease.
6.) When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or Philippine
National Police or any law enforcement agency.
7.) When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical
mutilation.[14]

At the time of the commission of this heinous act, rape was still considered a crime against
chastity,[15] although under the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 (R.A. No. 8353), rape has since been reclassified as a crime against persons under Articles 266-A and 266-B, and thus, may be prosecuted
even without a complaint filed by the offended party.
The gravamen of the offense of rape, prior to R.A. 8353, is sexual congress with a woman by
force and without consent.[16] (Under the new law, rape may be committed even by a woman and
the victim may even be a man.)[17] If the woman is under 12 years of age, proof of force and consent
becomes immaterial[18] not only because force is not an element of statutory rape,[19] but the absence
of a free consent is presumed when the woman is below such age. Conviction will therefore lie,
provided sexual intercourse is be proven. But if the woman is 12 years of age or over at the time
she was violated, as in this case, not only the first element of sexual intercourse must be proven
but also the other element that the perpetrators evil acts with the offended party was done through
force, violence, intimidation or threat needs to be established. Both elements are present in this
case.
Based on the evidence on record, sexual intercourse with the victim was adequately
proven. This is shown from the testimony of the medical doctor who conducted post mortem
examination on the childs body:
Q: And after that what other parts of the victim did you examine?
A: Then I examined the genitalia of the victim.
Q: And what did you find out after you examined the genitalia of the victim?
A: The hymen was tall-thick with complete laceration at 4:00 oclock and 8:00 oclock position and that
the edges were congested.
Q: Now, what might have caused the laceration?
A: Under normal circumstances this might have (sic) caused by a penetration of an organ.
Q: So, the laceration was caused by the penetration of a male organ?
A: Adult male organ, sir.
Q: You are very sure of that, Mr. Witness?
A: I am very sure of that.[20]

Besides, as may be gleaned from his extrajudicial confession, appellant himself admitted that
he had sexual congress with the unconscious child.
15. T: Ano ang nangyari ng mga sandali o oras na iyon?
S: Natutulog po ako sa itaas ng bahay ni ATE MARIA, yung malaking bahay na ginagawa, tapos
dumating yung batang babae. Pag-pasok niya sa kuwarto hinawakan ko siya sa kamay tapos tinulak
ko siya. Tapos tumama yung ulo niya sa mesa. Ayon na, nakakatulog na siya tapos ni rape ko na
siya.
16. T: Ano ang suot nung batang babae na sinasabi mo?
S: Itong short na ito, (pointing to a dirty white short placed atop this investigators table. Subject evidence
were part of evidences recovered at the crime scene).
17. T: Bakit mo naman ni rape yung batang babae?

S: Eh nasobrahan ako ng lasing. Hindi ko na alam ang ginagawa ko.

18. T: Ano ba ang inyong ininom bakit ka nasobrahan ng lasing?
S: Red Horse po at saka GIN.
19. T: Saan lugar ng malaking bahay ni ATE MARIA mo ni rape yung batang babae?
S: Sa kuwarto ko po sa itaas.
20. T: Kailan ito at anong oras nangyari?
S: Mga bandang alas 8:00 ng gabi, araw ng Linggo, hindi ko na matandaan kung anong petsa, basta
araw ng Linggo.
21. T: Saan lugar ito nangyari?
S: Sa Diam, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, M.M.
22. T: Alam mo na ba ang pangalan ng batang babae na ni rape mo?
S: Hindi ko po alam.
23. T: Ngayon, nais kong ipaalam sa iyo na ang pangalan ng batang babae na iyong ni rape at pinatay
ay si MA. VICTORIA CHAN? Matatandaan mo ba ito?
S: Oho.
24. T: Nung ma-rape mo, nakaraos ka ba?
S: Naka-isa po.
25. T: Nais kong liwanagin sa iyo kung ano ang ibig sabihin ng NAKARAOS, maaari bang ipaliwanag
mo ito?
S: Nilabasan po ako ng tamod.
26. T: Nung nakaraos ka, nasaan parte ng katawan ng batang babae yung iyong ari?
S: Nakapasok po doon sa ari nung babae.
27. T: Natapos mong ma-rape si MA. VICTORIA CHAN, ano pa ang sumunod mong ginawa?
S: Natulak ko siya sa terrace.
28. T: Ano ang nangyari kay MA. VICTORIA matapos mong itulak sa terrace?
S: Inilagay ko po sa poso-negra.
29. T: Saan makikita yung poso-negra na sinasabi mo?
S: Doon din sa malaking bahay ni ATE MARIA.
30. T: Bakit mo namang naisipang ilagay si MA. VICTORIA sa poso-negra?
S: Doon ko lang po inilagay.
31. T: Bakit nga doon mo inilagay siya?
S: Natatakot po ako.
32. T: Kanino ka natatakot?
S: Natatakot po ako sa ginawa kong masama, natatakot ako sa mga pulis.

33. T: Buhay pa ba si MA. VICTORIA nung ilagay mo siya sa poso-negra?

S: Hindi ko po alam dahil nung pagbagsak niya inilagay ko na siya sa poso-negra.
34. T: Nung gawin mo ba itong krimen na ito, mayroon ka kasama?
S: Nag-iisa lang po ako.
35. T: Noong mga oras o sandaling gahasain mo si MA. VICTORIA CHAN, buhay pa ba siya o patay
na?
S: Buhay pa po.
36. T: Papaano mo siya pinatay?
S: Tinulak ko nga po siya sa terrace.[21]

In proving sexual intercourse, it is not full or deep penetration of the victims vagina; rather
the slightest penetration of the male organ into the female sex organ is enough to consummate the
sexual intercourse.[22] The mere touching by the males organ or instrument of sex of the labia of
the pudendum of the womans private parts is sufficient to consummate rape.
From the wounds, contusions and abrasions suffered by the victim, force was indeed
employed upon her to satisfy carnal lust. Moreover, from appellants own account, he pushed the
victim causing the latter to hit her head on the table and fell unconscious. It was at that instance
that he ravished her and satisfied his salacious and prurient desires. Considering that the victim, at
the time of her penile invasion, was unconscious, it could safely be concluded that she had not
given free and voluntary consent to her defilement, whether before or during the sexual act.
Another thing that militates against appellant is his extrajudicial confession, which he,
however, claims was executed in violation of his constitutional right to counsel. But his contention
is belied by the records as well as the testimony of the lawyer who assisted, warned and explained
to him his constitutionally guaranteed pre-interrogatory and custodial rights. As testified to by the
assisting lawyer:
Q Will you please inform the Court what was that call about?
A We went to the station, police investigation together with Atty. Froilan Zapanta and we were told by
Police Officer Alabastro that one Larry Mahinay would like to confess of the crime of, I think, rape
with homicide.
Q And upon reaching the investigation room of Valenzuela PNP who were the other person present?
A Police Officer Alabastro, sir, Police Officer Nacis and other investigator inside the investigation room
and the parents of the child who was allegedly raped.
Q- And when you reached the investigation room do you notice whether the accused already there?
A The accused was already there.
Q Was he alone?
A he was alone, sir.
Q So, when you were already infront of SPO1 Arnold Alabastro and the other PNP Officers, what did
they tell you, if any?

A They told us together with Atty. Zapanta that this Larry Mahinay would like to confess of the crime
charged, sir.
Q By the way, who was that Atty. Zapanta?
A Our immediate Superior of the Public Attorneys Office.
Q Was he also present at the start of the question and answer period to the accused?
A No more, sir, he already went to our office. I was left alone.
Q But he saw the accused, Larry Mahinay?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, when Atty. Zapanta left at what time did the question and answer period start?
A If I am not mistaken at around 4:05 of July 7, 1995 in the afternoon, sir.
Q And when this question and answer period started, what was the first thing that you did as assisting
lawyer to the accused?
A First, I tried to explain to him his right, sir, under the constitution.
Q What are those right?
A That he has the right to remain silent. That he has the right of a counsel of his own choice and that if
he has no counsel a lawyer will be appointed to him and that he has the right to refuse to answer
any question that would incriminate him.
Q Now, after enumerating these constitutional rights of accused Larry Mahinay, do you recall whether
this constitutional right enumerated by you were reduced in writing?
A Yes, sir, and it was also explained to him one by one by Police Officer Alabastro.
Q I show to you this constitutional right which you said were reduced into writing, will you be able to
recognize the same?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please go over this and tell the Court whether that is the same document you mentioned?
A Yes, sir, these were the said rights reduced into writing.
ATTY. PRINCIPE:
May we request, Your Honor, that this document be marked as our Exhibit A proper.
Q Do you recall after reducing into writing this constitutional right of the accused whether you asked
him to sign to acknowledge or to conform?
A I was the one who asked him, sir. It was Police Officer Alabastro.
Q But you were present?
A I was then present when he signed.
Q There is a signature in this constitutional right after the enumeration, before and after there are two
(2) signatures, will you please recognize the two (2) signatures?
A These were the same signatures signed in my presence, sir.

Q The signature of whom?

A The signature of Larry Mahinay, sir.
ATTY. PRINCIPE:
May we request, Your Honor, that the two (2) signatures identified by my compaero be encircled and
marked as Exhibit A-1 and A-2.
Q After you said that you apprised the accused of his constitutional right explaining to him in Filipino,
in local dialect, what was the respond of the accused?
A- Larry Mahinay said that we will proceed with his statement.
Q What was the reply?
A He said Opo.
Q Did you ask him of his educational attainment?
A It was the Police Officer who asked him.
Q In your presence?
A In my presence, sir.
Q And when he said or when he replied Opo so the question started?
A Yes, sir.
Q I noticed in this Exhibit A that there is also a waiver of rights, were you present also when he signed
this waiver?
A Yes, sir, I was also present.
Q Did you explain to him the meaning of this waiver?
A I had also explained to him, sir.
Q In Filipino?
A In Tagalog, sir.
Q And there is also a signature after the waiver in Filipino over the typewritten name Larry Mahinay,
Nagsasalaysay, whose signature is that?
A This is also signed in my presence.
Q Why are you sure that this is his signature?
A He signed in my presence, sir.
Q And below immediately are the two (2) signatures. The first one is when Larry Mahinay subscribed
and sworn to, there is a signature here, do you recognize this signature?
A This is my signature, sir.
Q And immediately after your first signature is a Certification that you have personally examined the
accused Larry Mahinay and testified that he voluntary executed the Extra Judicial Confession, do
you recognize the signature?
A This is also my signature, sir.[23] (emphasis supplied).

Appellants defense that two other persons brought to him the dead body of the victim and
forced him to rape the cadaver is too unbelievable. In the words of Vice-Chancellor Van Fleet of
New Jersey,[24]

Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness,
but must be credible in itself- such as the common experience and observation of
mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the
truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and
experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous, and is outside
of judicial cognizance.
Ultimately, all the foregoing boils down to the issue of credibility of witnesses. Settled is the
rule that the findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the
trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable
evidence of the witnesses department on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to
the appellate courts.[25]In this case, the trial courts findings, conclusions and evaluation of the
testimony of witnesses is received on appeal with the highest respect,[26] the same being supported
by substantial evidence on record.There was no showing that the court a quo had overlooked or
disregarded relevant facts and circumstances which when considered would have affected the
outcome of this case[27] or justify a departure from the assessments and findings of the court
below. The absence of any improper or ill-motive on the part of the principal witnesses for the
prosecution all the more strengthens the conclusion that no such motive exists.[28] Neither was any
wrong motive attributed to the police officers who testified against appellant.
Coming now to the penalty, the sentence imposed by the trial court is correct. Under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by R.A. 7659 when by reason or on occasion
of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. This special complex crime is
treated by law in the same degree as qualified rape -- that is, when any of the 7 (now 10) attendant
circumstances enumerated in the law is alleged and proven, in which instances, the penalty is
death. In cases where any of those circumstances is proven though not alleged, the penalty cannot
be death except if the circumstance proven can be properly appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance under Articles 14 and 15 of the RPC which will affect the imposition of the proper
penalty in accordance with Article 63 of the RPC. However, if any of those circumstances proven
but not alleged cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance under Articles 14 and 15, the
same cannot affect the imposition of the penalty because Articles 63 of the RPC in mentioning
aggravating circumstances refers to those defined in Articles 14 and 15. Under R.A. No. 8353, if
any of the 10 circumstances is alleged in the information/complaint, it may be treated as a
qualifying circumstance. But if it is not so alleged, it may be considered as an aggravating
circumstance, in which case the only penalty is death subject to the usual proof of such
circumstance in either case.
Death being a single indivisible penalty and the only penalty prescribed by law for the crime
of rape with homicide, the court has no option but to apply the same regardless of any mitigating
or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the commission of the crime[29] in accordance
with Article 63 of the RPC, as amended.[30] This case of rape with homicide carries with it penalty
of death which is mandatorily imposed by law within the import of Article 47 of the RPC, as
amended, which provides:

The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be imposed under
existing laws, except when the guilty person is below eighteen (18) years of age at the
time of the commission of the crime or is more than seventy years of age or when
upon appeal or automatic review of the case by the Supreme Court, the required
majority vote is not obtained for the imposition of the death penalty, in which cases
the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua. (emphasis supplied).
In an apparent but futile attempt to escape the imposition of the death penalty, appellant tried
to alter his date of birth to show that he was only 17 years and a few months old at the time he
committed the rape and thus, covered by the proscription on the imposition of death if the guilty
person is below eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the crime.[31] Again, the record
rebuffs appellant on this point considering that he was proven to be already more than 20 years of
age when he did the heinous act.
Pursuant to current case law, a victim of simple rape is entitled to a civil indemnity of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) but if the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any
of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by present amended law, the civil
indemnity for the victim shall be not less than seventy-five thousand pesos (P75,000.00).[32] In
addition to such indemnity, she can also recover moral damages pursuant to Article 2219 of the
Civil Code[33] in such amount as the court deems just, without the necessity for pleading or proof
of the basis thereof.[34] Civil Indemnity is different from the award of moral and exemplary
damages.[35] The requirement of proof of mental and physical suffering provided in Article 2217 of
the Civil Code is dispensed with because it is recognized that the victims injury is inherently
concomitant with and necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape to warrant per se the
award of moral damages.[36] Thus, it was held that a conviction for rape carries with it the award of
moral damages to the victim without need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof.[37]
Exemplary damages can also be awarded if the commission of the crime was attended by one
or more aggravating circumstances pursuant to Article 2230 of the Civil Code[38] after proof that
the offended party is entitled to moral, temperate and compensatory damages.[39] Under the
circumstances of this case, appellant is liable to the victims heirs for the amount of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Lastly, considering the heavy penalty of death and in order to ensure that the evidence against
and accused were obtained through lawful means, the Court, as guardian of the rights of the people
lays down the procedure, guidelines and duties which the arresting, detaining, inviting, or
investigating officer or his companions must do and observe at the time of making an arrest and
again at and during the time of the custodial interrogation[40] in accordance with the Constitution,
jurisprudence and Republic Act No. 7438:[41] It is high-time to educate our law-enforcement
agencies who neglect either by ignorance or indifference the so-called Miranda rights which had
become insufficient and which the Court must update in the light of new legal developments:
1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be informed in a
language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown
the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings, information or communication must be in
a language known to and understood by said person;
2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may be
used as evidence against him;

3. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of
an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice;
4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will
be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or
may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one acting in his behalf;
5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that no custodial
investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his counsel or after a
valid waiver has been made;
6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to communicate or
confer by the most expedient means telephone, radio, letter or messenger with his lawyer
(either retained or appointed), any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor,
priest or minister chosen by him or by any one from his immediate family or by his counsel,
or be visited by/confer with duly accredited national or international non-government
organization. It shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished;
7. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the same;
8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that it must
be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the
waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak;
9. That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any time or
stage of the process that he does not wish to be questioned with warning that once he makes
such indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or the
interrogation must ceased if it has already begun;
10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the
right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any time during the
process, regardless of whether he may have answered some questions or volunteered some
statements;
11. He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained in
violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall
be inadmissible in evidence.

Four members of the Court although maintaining their adherence to the separate opinions
expressed in People v. Echegaray[42] that R.A. No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty,
is unconstitutional nevertheless submit to the ruling of the Court, by a majority vote, that the law
is constitutional and that the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of appellant is hereby AFFIRMED except for the award of
civil indemnity for the heinous rape which is INCREASED to P75,000.00, PLUS P50,000.00
moral damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised
Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to
the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
6/21/00 11:16:37 PM

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 122142. May 17, 2000]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JIMMY

OBRERO y CORLA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.: HTML
This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Manila,
finding accused-appellant Jimmy Obrero y Corla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with all the accessory penalties, and to indemnify the heirs of the victims Nena
Berjuega and Remedios Hitta in the amount of P50,000.00 each and to pay the sum of
P4,000.00 representing the amount of money stolen.
The information alleged
That on or about August 11, 1989, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused conspiring and confederating with one, whose true name,
identity and present whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping
one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
intent of gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit: the
said accused take, rob and carry away the amount of P4,000.00 cash
belonging to Antonio Cabrera against his will, to the damage and prejudice
of said owner in the aforesaid amount of P4,000.00 Philippine Currency;
that on the occasion thereof and by reason of the aforesaid robbery, the
said accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill,
attacked, assaulted and used personal violence upon the person of NENA
BERJUEGA and REMEDIOS HITTA, by stabbing them to death, thereby
inflicting upon the said victims mortal stab wounds which were the direct
and immediate cause of their death thereafter.
Contrary to law.
Only accused-appellant had been apprehended. His co-accused Ronnie Liwanag has
been at large. When arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty, whereupon, trial
ensued.
The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely, Pat. Benjamin Ines, Dr. Marcial G.
Cenido, and Atty. Bienvenido De los Reyes. Pat. Ines of the Western Police District
investigated the robbery with homicide. The gist of his testimony is to the following
effect:

Accused-appellant was a delivery boy employed by Angie Cabosas whose business

was selling chickens to customers. Cabosass business was located in Blumentritt
Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. CODES
In the morning of August 11, 1989, accused-appellant was asked to deliver dressed
chickens to Emma Cabrera, a regular customer at Room 4-D Gatlin Building, 1344 C.M.
Recto Avenue in Sta. Cruz, Manila. At about 10:20 a.m., accused-appellant came back
and turned over to his employer the amount of P2,000.00. Pat. Ines testified that after
receiving report of the killing, he and Pfc. Ricardo Sibal went to see Angie Cabosas
from which they learned that the latter has received a call from Emma Cabrera
informing Angie that her house had been robbed and her two maids killed. They were
told that accused-appellant had gone to Pangasinan allegedly to attend the burial of his
grandfather. Pat. Ines said he and P/Lt. Villamor Valdez, Pfc. Sibal, Pfc. Edmundo
Cabal and Pat. Renato Gutierrez went to Rosales, Pangasinan but failed to find
accused-appellant. They were told by the sister of accused-appellant, Merly Asuncion,
that accused-appellant had gone to La Union. According to Pat. Ines, accused-appellant
confided to his sister that he had allegedly done something wrong in Manila.
Pat. Ines identified two sworn statements, both executed on August 11, 1989, one of
which, he said, had been executed by Helen N. Moral, a househelp of Emma Cabrera,
and the other by Angie C. De los Reyes. In her statement marked Exhibit I, Moral said
that upon arriving in the house at about 12:20 p.m. that day, she and her employers
nephew, Carlos Emerson, found the bodies of the victims sprawled on the floor. She
told Pat. Ines that accused-appellant used to deliver pork and dressed chicken to their
place.
On the other hand, in her sworn statement given on August 14, 1989 and marked as
Exhibit L, Anita C. De los Reyes stated that on August 11, 1989, she had seen accusedappellant and Ronnie Liwanag, their hands covered with blood, coming out of the Gatlin
Building on C.M. Recto Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila.[2]
Pat. Ines testified that on March 3, 1990, he and his group received information from
Pat. Alfredo Que of the Urdaneta Police Station that accused-appellant was in Cataban,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan. Accordingly, they went to the place indicated and the next day,
March 4, 1990, they were able to apprehend accused-appellant whom they brought to
Manila. Pat. Ines said accused-appellant was positively identified by Anita De los Reyes
as one of those whom she saw running down the stairs of the Gatlin Building on C.M.
Recto Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila with blood in his hands.[3]
Pat. Ines testified that on that same day, March 4, 1990, accused-appellant gave a
confession (Exh. O) in writing with the assistance of counsel, Atty. Bienvenido De los
Reyes, in which he admitted participation in the killing of Nena Berjuega and Remedios
Hitta. Pat. Ines himself executed an affidavit (Exh. P) stating the circumstances of
accused-appellants arrest. He said accused-appellant refused to sign the booking and
information sheet.[4] yacats

Accused-appellants extrajudicial confession was presented in evidence as Exhibit O. [5] In

it, accused-appellant said he started working for Angie Cabosas in the latters business
on Blumentritt Street, Manila three or four months before the incident. Cabosas and
accused-appellants sister Merly Asuncion, had been neighbors in Rosales, Pangasinan.
Accused-appellants work was to deliver dressed chicken. Emma Cabrera was a regular
customer to whom he made deliveries in the morning. On August 10, 1989, his fellow
employee, Ronnie Liwanag, proposed that they rob Emma in order to be able to go to
La Union to visit his family. On August 11, 1989, after learning that only two helpers
were then at the residence of Emma Cabrera, accused-appellant and Ronnie decided to
pull the heist. Ronnie covered the mouth of one Nena Berjuega to prevent her from
shouting but, as she tried to run away, Ronnie stabbed and killed her. Ronnie then gave
the knife to accused-appellant who stabbed the younger maid Remedios Hitta from
which she died. Thereafter, the two proceeded to Blumentritt Street and divided the
money Ronnie had taken from the house of Emma Cabrera. From Blumentritt Street,
Ronnie went to La Union, while accused-appellant proceeded to Pangasinan. The
extrajudicial confession is in Tagalog and signed by accused-appellant in the presence
of Atty. De los Reyes.
The prosecution next presented Atty. Bienvenido De los Reyes, a PC Captain of the
WPD Headquarters, U.N. Avenue, Manila. He said that on March 4, 1990, he happened
to be at Station 7 of the WPD, representing a client accused of illegal recruitment. He
was asked by Lt. Generoso Javier of the WPD Homicide Section to assist accusedexecuting an extrajudicial confession. According to Atty. De los Reyes, he apprised
accused-appellant of his constitutional rights, explaining to him that any statement made
by him could be used against him in court, but accused-appellant said he was willing to
give a statement as in fact he did, confessing to the commission of the crime of robbery
with homicide.[6]
The other prosecution witness was Dr. Marcial G. Cenido, medico-legal officer who
conducted autopsies on August 11, 1989 on the victims, Nena Berjuega and Remedios
Hitta. After proper identification (Exh. D) by the victims employer, Antonio Cabrera, Dr.
Cenido prepared a postmortem report (Exh. A) that Nena Berjuega suffered 16 stab
wounds from which she died. olanski
Dr. Cenido testified that the victim sustained 16 stab wounds which affected her vital
organs, specifically the right and left lungs and the heart, causing her death. Six of
these wounds were fatal so that she could not survive despite immediate medical
attention. He concluded that the assailant and the victim could be facing each other
when wounds nos. 1, 3 and 5 (Exhs. B-1, B-2, and B-4, respectively) were inflicted and
that the assailant may have been on the left lateral side of the victim when he inflicted
wound no. 8 (Exh. B-5) and at the victims back when assailant inflicted wound no. 16
(Exh. B-6). He said that there could be one or more assailant who inflicted these
wounds by using a single bladed weapon.[7]
Dr. Cenido likewise prepared a postmortem report (Exh. F) that Remedios Hitta suffered
12 stab wounds from which she died.

Dr. Cenido testified that the victim sustained 12 stab wounds with seven fatal ones that
caused her death. The fatal wounds damaged her left and right lungs and the heart that
she would not survive despite immediate medical attention. He observed that in wounds
nos. 1, 2 and 3 (Exhs. G-1, G-2, and G-3, respectively), the assailant and the victim
could be facing each other, while in wounds nos. 4, 9 and 11 (Exhs. G-4, G-6, and G-7,
respectively), the assailant could have been at the back of the victim. He said that there
could be one or more assailant who inflicted these wounds using a single bladed
weapon.[8]
Dr. Cenido prepared the certificates of death of the victims, Nena Berjuega and
Remedios Hitta (Exhs. C and H). He stated that the weapon used on both victims could
have been the same and that both victims sustained multiple stab wounds. [9]
With the testimonies of Pat. Ines, Atty. De los Reyes, and Dr. Cenido and the
extrajudicial confession (Exh. O), as well as the sworn statements of Helen Moral (Exh.
I) and Anita De los Reyes (Exh. L), the prosecution rested its case.
The defense presented, as its sole witness, accused-appellant Jimmy Obrero y Corla.
Accused-appellant testified that he had worked for Angie Cabosas in Blumentritt Street
for four (4) months before the incident in this case. Angie was a neighbor of his sister,
Merly Asuncion, in Pangasinan. Angies business was selling dressed chickens.
Accused-appellant said that at about 9:00 a.m. on August 11, 1989, he delivered
dressed chickens to Emma Cabreras residence on C.M. Recto Avenue. He came back
from his errand at around 10:20 a.m. and remitted the amount of P2,000.00 which had
been paid to him. He denied participation in the commission of the crime and claimed
that he was arrested without a warrant in Pangasinan. He claimed that, after being
informed of the charges against him, he was beaten up and detained for a week and
made to execute an extrajudicial confession. He denied having known or seen Atty. De
los Reyes before and stated that he did not understand the contents of the extrajudicial
confession which he signed because he does not know how to read. [10]
On August 31, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused JIMMY OBRERO Y CORLA,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide,
defined and punishable under Article 294(a) of the Revised Penal Code,
and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
with all the accessory penalties provided by law. He is further condemned
to pay the heirs of the victims, Remedios Hitta and Nena Berjuega the
sum of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS each as civil indemnity
for their death and the additional sum of P4,000.00 as the amount of
money taken, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
His immediate transfer to the National Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa is
hereby ordered.

SO ORDERED. haideem
Hence, this instant appeal. Accused-appellant assails the validity of this extrajudicial
confession which forms the basis of his conviction for the crime of robbery with
homicide. He claims that Atty. De los Reyes, who assisted him in executing his
confession, was not the counsel of his own choice. That was the reason, he said, he
refused to sign the booking and information sheet. He said he signed the extrajudicial
confession five times as a sign that it was involuntarily executed by him.
Art. III, 12 of the Constitution provides in pertinent parts:
(1)......Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel.
(2)......No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means
which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention
places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.
(3)......Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section
17 shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this constitutional
provision: (1) those which are the product of third degree methods such as torture,
force, violence, threat, intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of 12, and (2)
those which are given without the benefit of Miranda warnings, which are the subject of
paragraph 1 of the same 12.
Accused-appellant claims that his confession was obtained by force and threat. Aside
from this bare assertion, he has shown no proof of the use of force and violence on him.
He did not seek medical treatment nor even a physical examination. His allegation that
the fact that he was made to sign the confession five times is proof that he refused to
sign it.
To begin with, what accused-appellant claims he was made to sign five times is not the
same confession (Exh. O) but different parts thereof. He signed his name on page 1 to
acknowledge that he had been given the Miranda warnings. (Exh. O-3) Then, he signed
again as proof that after being given the Miranda warnings he agreed to give a
statement. (Exh. O-6) Next, he signed again his name at the end of page 2 to
authenticate that page as part of his confession. (Exh. O-7) Fourth, he signed the third
page at the end of his confession. (Exh. O-10) Fifth, he signed his name again on the
third page in which the jurat appears. (unmarked, [p. 3] of Exh. O)

We discern no sign that the confession was involuntarily executed from the fact that it
was signed by accused-appellant five times. kirsten
Nor can it be inferred that the confession was involuntarily executed from the fact that
accused-appellant refused to sign the booking and information sheet. For if he were
simply forced to execute the extrajudicial confession and sign it for five times, there is
no reason the police was not able to make him sign the said sheet as well. The
inference rather was that no force was used to make accused-appellant execute the
confession, otherwise, he could also have been forced to sign the booking and
information sheet.
Extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary, and, in the absence of conclusive
evidence showing the declarants consent in executing the same has been vitiated, such
confession will be sustained.
Moreover, the confession contains details that only the perpetrator of the crime could
have given. No one except accused-appellant could have stated that it was he who
killed the younger maid of Emma Cabrera (Remedios Hitta), that he committed the
crime together with his townmate, Ronnie Liwanag, and that he used the same weapon
given to him by Ronnie after the latter had stabbed and killed the other helper (Nena
Berjuega), details which are consistent with the medico-legal findings that the wounds
sustained by the two victims were possibly caused by one and the same bladed
weapon. It has been held that voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its
being replete with details which could possibly be supplied only by the accused,
reflecting spontaneity and coherence which cannot be said of a mind on which violence
and torture have been applied.[11] When the details narrated in an extrajudicial
confession are such that they could not have been concocted by one who did not take
part in the acts narrated, where the claim of maltreatment in the extraction of the
confession is unsubstantiated and where abundant evidence exists showing that the
statement was voluntarily executed, the confession is admissible against the declarant.
There is greater reason for finding a confession to be voluntary where it is corroborated
by evidence aliunde which dovetails with the essential facts contained in such
confession.[12] barth
But what renders the confession of accused-appellant inadmissible is the fact that
accused-appellant was not given the Miranda warnings effectively. Under the
Constitution, an uncounseled statement, such as it is called in the United States from
which Art. III, 12(1) was derived, is presumed to be psychologically coerced. Swept into
an unfamiliar environment and surrounded by intimidating figures typical of the
atmosphere of police interrogation, the suspect really needs the guiding hand of
counsel.
Now, under the first paragraph of this provision, it is required that the suspect in
custodial interrogation must be given the following warnings: (1) He must be informed of
his right to remain silent; (2) he must be warned that anything he says can and will be

used against him; and (3) he must be told that he has a right to counsel, and that if he is
indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.[13]
In the case at bar, the prosecution presented Pat. Ines and Atty. De los Reyes to
establish that the above-enumerated requisites were fully satisfied when accusedappellant executed his extrajudicial confession. Pat. Benjamin Ines testified:[14]
Q......What happened during the investigation of the accused?
A......He consented to give a written statement to me, sir.
Q......Now, when accused Jimmy Obrero consented to give statement,
Patrolman, was he assisted by counsel?
A......Yes, sir, we provided him with a lawyer.
Q......And who was that lawyer that was provided by you?
A......Atty. Bienvenido De los Reyes, sir.
Q......And who personally took down the statement of the accused?
A......I was the one who personally took the statement of accused
Obrero. Jksm
Q......Do you know what was the gist of that statement that was given to
you, what was it all about?
A......Its all about the admission of Jimmy Obrero, the gruesome slaying of
two househelps.
....
Q......Before having taken down the admission of Jimmy Obrero, what
investigative steps did you undertake relative to his constitutional right,
patrolman?
A......I informed Jimmy Obrero of his constitutional right to remain silent, to
have an attorney; that everything that he will say will be used for or
against him. He, however, consented to proceed with the written
statement.
Q......Now, Patrolman, did you indicate his constitutional rights that you
stated in this written statement of Jimmy Obrero?
A......Yes, sir, I put it on the statement which he voluntarily gave.

Q......And will you please tell us which part of the statement of Jimmy
Obrero is it indicated, the consent which he gave after having pointed out
to him his constitutional right?
A......This portion sir, this "sagot-opo" and then it was further affirmed by
his signature over his typewritten name, sir.
For his part, Atty. De los Reyes testified:[15]
Q:......Were you able to confront the suspect at that time, herein
accused? Chief
A:......Yes, sir, I told him for the purpose of investigation -- custodial
investigation I can render my services to him and afterwards avail the
services of another lawyer and I told him his rights under the law, sir.
Q:......What was the reply of Jimmy Obrero, the accused, in this case at
that time you confronted Jimmy Obrero?
A:......He is willing at that time and [voluntarily] gave his affirmation that he
wanted to secure my services, sir.
....
Q......After having manifested that he will retain your services as counsel
for the investigation, Atty. De los Reyes, what happened next?
A......I told him the rights under the Constitution, the right to remain silent,
the right to secure lawyer, the right not to give statement, the right not to
be placed in any identification procedure in a police line up, and I told him
that all the evidences he might give will be utilized against him in the court
with respect to the case -- and despite of that, he said he wanted to give
his statement to the police in my presence.
Q......Was he able to give statement to the police?
A......Yes, sir. I was there inside the room with the client and observing
fairly [when he] gave statement voluntarily.
Q......Was that statement taken down into writing?
A......In a question and answer form, sir.
Indeed, the waiver signed by accused-appellant reads:
MGA KARAPATAN AYON SA ATING BINAGONG SALIGANG BATAS:

Ikaw, JIMMY OBRERO y CORLA, ay aking isasailalim sa pagsisiyasat sa

salang Pagnanakaw na may kasamang Pagpatay, nais kong ipaalam sa
iyo ang iyong mga karapatan ayon sa ating Binagong Saligang Batas:
1. Karapatan mo ang manahimik at huwag sagutin ang mga itatanong ko
sa iyo;
2. Karapatan mo ang kumuha ng isang abogado na iyong sariling pili na
maaaring makatulong sa iyo sa imbistigasyon na ito at kung hindi ka
makakakuha ng iyong abogado ay bibigyan ka namin ng isa na walang
bayad para makatulong sa iyo; Esm
3. Karapatan mo rin na malaman na ang lahat ng iyong sasabihin dito sa
iyong salaysay ay maaaring gamiting katibayan o ebidensya laban o
pabor sa iyo o sa kanino mang tao sa alinmang hukuman dito sa Pilipinas.
Ngayon na naipaalam ko na sa iyo ang iyong mga karapatan, nais mo pa
bang magbigay ng iyong malaya at kusang loob na salaysay?
SAGOT : (ni Jimmy Obrero y Corla)Opo.
TANONG: Kung ganoon ay sabihin mo ulit ang iyong pangalan at lagdaan
mo ito sa ibabaw ng iyong pangalan na ipipirma o imamakinilya ko?
(Sgd.) JIMMY OBRERO y CORLA
There was thus only a perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights to accused-appellant
without any effort to find out from him whether he wanted to have counsel and, if so,
whether he had his own counsel or he wanted the police to appoint one for him. This
kind of giving of warnings, in several decisions[16] of this Court, has been found to be
merely ceremonial and inadequate to transmit meaningful information to the suspect.
Especially in this case, care should have been scrupulously observed by the police
investigator that accused-appellant was specifically asked these questions considering
that he only finished the fourth grade of the elementary school. Indeed, as stated in
People v. Januario:[17]
Ideally, therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial
investigation (if the latter could not afford one) should be engaged by the
accused (himself), or by the latters relative or person authorized by him to
engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the accused or
person authorized by the accused to file such petition. Lawyers engaged
by the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and
supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas, the
relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be
symbiotic.[18] Esmsc

Moreover, Art. III, 12(1) requires that counsel assisting suspects in custodial
interrogations be competent and independent. Here, accused-appellant was assisted by
Atty. De los Reyes, who, though presumably competent, cannot be considered an
"independent counsel" as contemplated by the law for the reason that he was station
commander of the WPD at the time he assisted accused-appellant. On this point, he
testified as follows:
Q......Now, whenever there is a crime committed wherein the member of
police to which you belong or working but could not solve the crime and
then you were designated as counsel to extend legal assistance to a
suspect who is under a custodial investigation and in that conference with
the suspect you may have inquired confidential information, what would
you do, will you keep it to yourself or you must have to divulge that to your
co-policeman because you know that?
A......If I am the lawyer, then all the testimonies and declaration is my
preferential right, I can divulge it even to my fellow officer.
Q......Now, by the way, do you have authority to practice the law
profession, did you get approval or permit from the civil -A......Previously, when I was at the JAGO, we are authorized verbally [as
long as] it will not hamper our time, we will not work our time during the
police duty, maam.
Q......According to you, you were extending legal assistance to your client
who was charged of illegal recruitment, do you not consider that conflict of
duty because no less than your organization was the one investigating
that? Esmmis
A......I am extending my legal assistance to the client I am handling the
case because if it is true that he committed the crime then I will back out, if
I found suspicion and there is no proof at all, I go to the litigation.
ATTY. ALISUAG:
That is all, Your Honor.[19]
The trial court, agreeing with him, ruled:
As shown in Exhibit "O", accused consented to giving his extrajudicial
confession after he was informed of rights under custodial investigation,
by affixing his signature thereto (Exhibit "O-3"). And absent any showing
that the assisting lawyer, though a station commander but of another
police station, was remiss in his duty as a lawyer, this Court holds that the
proceedings were regularly conducted. In fact, he testified that he first

asked the accused if he is accepting his legal services (TSN, March 5,

1991, p. 4); that he informed the accused of his Miranda rights and despite
the warning, he decided to give his confession just the same; that he was
at all time present when the accused was being interrogated with the
accused giving his answers voluntarily (Ibid, p. 4); that he read to the
accused the questions and answers before he signed his extrajudicial
confession (Ibid, p. 8). Clearly shown was the fact that Atty. De los Reyes
was equal to his duties as a lawyer than a member of the police force,
when he lend his assistance to the accused during his in-custody
interrogation.[20]
This is error. As observed in People v. Bandula,[21] the independent counsel required by
Art. III, 12(1) cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, municipal
attorney, or counsel of the police whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused.
In this case, Atty. De los Reyes, as PC Captain and Station Commander of the WPD,
was part of the police force who could not be expected to have effectively and
scrupulously assisted accused-appellant in the investigation, his claim to the contrary
notwithstanding. To allow such a happenstance would render illusory the protection
given to the suspect during custodial investigation.[22] Esmso
For these reasons, we hold that accused-appellants extrajudicial confession is
inadmissible in evidence.
Without the extrajudicial confession, the conviction of accused-appellant cannot stand.
The prosecution tried to introduce circumstantial evidence of accused-appellants guilt
consisting of the sworn statements (Exhs. I and L) of Helen Moral, the househelp who
said accused-appellant used to deliver dressed chickens to the Cabrera residence, and
Anita de los Reyes who said that on March 11, 1989 she was passing in front of the
Gatlin Building where the killing took place when she saw accused-appellant running
down the stairs with blood in his hands. These statements are likewise inadmissible for
being hearsay. Consequently, there is no identification of accused-appellant.
And while there is evidence of homicide consisting of the corpus delicti, there is no
evidence of the robbery except the confession (Exh. O) of accused-appellant which, as
already stated, is inadmissible. It does not matter that accused-appellant failed to object
to the introduction of these constitutionally proscribed evidence. The lack of objection
did not satisfy the heavy burden of proof which rested on the prosecution. We cannot
thus affirm the conviction of accused-appellant because of the procedural irregularities
committed during custodial investigation and the trial of the case. It may be that by this
decision a guilty person is set free because the prosecution stumbled, but we are
committed to the principle that it is far better to acquit several guilty persons than to
convict one single innocent person.
WHEREFORE, the decision in Criminal Case No. 90-82187 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 12, Manila, convicting accused-appellant Jimmy Obrero y Corla of the crime of

robbery with homicide is REVERSED and accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED on

the ground of reasonable doubt.
The Director of Prisons is hereby directed to forthwith cause the release of accusedappellant unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause and to inform the
Court accordingly within ten (10) days from notice.
SO ORDERED. MENDOZA, J
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.
De Leon, Jr., J., on leave.