CIVREV DIGESTS

When laws become effective

Tanada v. Tuvera
Facts: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of
public concern (Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine
Constitution) as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise
effectively promulgated, Lorenzo M. Tanada, Abraham F. Sarmiento
and Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and
Nationalism, Inc. (Mabini) seek a writ of mandamus to compel Juan
C. Tuvera (in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President),
Joaquin Venus (in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the
President), Melquiades P. de la Cruz (in his capacity as Director,
Malacaang Records Office), and Florendo S. Pablo (in his capacity
as Director, Bureau of Printing), to publish, and or cause the
publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees,
letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive
orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Issue: Whether publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua
non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws
themselves provide for their own effectivity dates
Held: NO. Generally, publication in the Official Gazette is necessary
in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its
effectivity date for then the date of publication is material for
determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day
following its publication but not when the law itself provides for
the date when it goes into effect. This is correct insofar as it
equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Article 2
of the New Civil Code, however, does not preclude the requirement
of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides
for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of the such provision
is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without
such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be
the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for
the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever,
not even a constructive one. Further, publication is necessary to

apprise the public of the contents of regulations and make the said
penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. The publication
of laws has taken so vital significance when the people have
bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by
the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass
media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa
and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records
no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the
President. The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public
nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law.
Presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties
for their violation or otherwise impose a burden on the people, such
as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other
presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or
class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need
not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned. The publication of presidential
issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person
may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents. Presidential issuances of general
application, which have not been published, shall have no force and
effect. However, the implementation/enforcement of presidential
decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is an
operative fact, which may have consequences which cannot be
justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

Garcillano v. House of Representatives

Facts: The Hello Garci tapes came out.They allegedly contained the
Presidents instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio
Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004
presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject
of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees
of both Houses of Congress.
On June 8, 2005, House Minority Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero
delivered a privilege speech, setting in motion a congressional
investigation jointly conducted by respondent House Committees.
NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of

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former NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the House
Committees seven alleged original tape recordings of the supposed
three-hour taped conversation. After prolonged and impassioned
debate by the committee members on the admissibility and
authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played in
the chambers of the House.
On August 3, 2005, the hearings were suspended indefinitely.
Nevertheless, they decided to prepare committee reports based on
the said recordings and the testimonies of the resource persons.
Garcillano then filed a petition for prohibition and injunction, with
prayer for a TRO (the first of the two petitions in this case), asking
that the respondent House Committees be restrained from using
these tape recordings. He also asked that they be stricken off the
record of and that the House desist from further using the
recordings. The House discussion and debates on the Garci case
then stopped.
Two years after, Sen. Lacson delivered a privilege speech reviving
the issue. The speech was referred to the Senate Committee on
National Defense and Security.The following day, in plenary
session, a lengthy debate ensued when Senator Richard Gordon
aired his concern on the possible transgression of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 42001(An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire-Tapping) if the
body were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter. On August
28, 2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered a privilege
speech, articulating her considered view that the Constitution
absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or communication of
the contents of the Hello Garci tapes. However, she recommended
a legislative investigation into the role of the Intelligence Service of
the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or other government
entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials.
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo
Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of Appeals, filed a Petition for
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, docketed as G.R. No.
179275, seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled
legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended
legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of
the Constitution.
The Court didnt issue the injunctive writ and Senate hearings took
place.

[8]

Issues: 1. WON Garcillanos petition for prohibition should be

granted.
2. WON The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct
of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of
procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Held: 1. NO.
2. NO! (Its obvious with the way its phrased)
Ratio: 1. Its already moot and academic. The recordings were
already played in the House and heard by its members. There is
also the widely publicized fact that the committee reports on the
Hello Garci inquiry were completed and submitted to the House in
plenary by the respondent committees.
2. Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides
that the Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The requisite
of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic
requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it
will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes
publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides
that laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of
their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines.
The Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation
only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the
14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members
commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the
publication of these rules when they first opened their session.
The Senate Rules simply state said Rules shall take effect
seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation. They dontexplicitly provide for the
continued effectivity of such rules until they are amended or
repealed. It cannot be presumed that the Rules would
continue into the next Congress. The Senate of the next

An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the
Privacy of Communications and for Other Purposes.

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Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative
inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished business.
It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its
legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the
published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective
in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or
repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
Also, publication of the rules via a booklet form available to anyone
for free, and accessible to the public at the Senates internet web
page is insufficient to comply with the publication requirement. R.A.
8792 (The E-Commerce Act) considers an electronic data message
or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written
document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law
merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the
original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents.
It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules
and regulations.
The Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the
Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry
subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid
of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have
caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the
October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we
take judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication does not cure
the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant
petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the
legislative investigation subject thereof still could not be
undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees, because no
published rules governed it, in clear contravention of the
Constitution.

SECURITIES
AND
NETWORK
G.R. No. 164026

EXCHANGE

COMMISSION

vs.

GMA

FACTS
On August 19, 1995, the petitioner, GMA NETWORK, INC., (GMA), a

domestic corporation, filed an application for collective approval of

various amendments to its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws
with the respondent Securities and Exchange Commission,
(SEC). The amendments applied for include, among others, the
change in the corporate name of petitioner from "Republic
Broadcasting System, Inc." to "GMA Network, Inc." as well as the
extension of the corporate term for another fifty (50) years from
and after June 16, 2000. Upon such filing, the petitioner had been
assessed by the SECs Corporate and Legal Department a separate
filing fee for the application for extension of corporate term
equivalent to 1/10 of 1% of its authorized capital stock plus 20%
thereof or an amount of P1,212,200.00. On September 26, 1995,
the petitioner informed the SEC of its intention to contest the
legality and propriety of the said assessment. However, the
petitioner requested the SEC to approve the other amendments
being requested by the petitioner without being deemed to have
withdrawn its application for extension of corporate term. The
following month, the petitioner formally protested the assessment
amounting to P1,212,200.00 for its application for extension of
corporate term. The following year, the SEC approved the other
amendments to the petitioners Articles of Incorporation,
specifically Article 1 thereof referring to the corporate name of the
petitioner as well as Article 2 thereof referring to the principal
purpose for which the petitioner was formed. But GMA requested
for an official opinion/ruling from the SEC on the validity and
propriety of the assessment for application for extension of its
corporate
term.
Consequently,
the
respondent
SEC,
through
Associate
Commissioner Fe Eloisa C. Gloria, on April 18, 1996, issued its
ruling upholding the validity of the questioned assessment. Thusly,
GMA appealed the ruling of the SEC to the Court of Appeals (CA),
on the ground that ground that the assessment of filing fees for the
petitioners application for extension of corporate term equivalent
to 1/10 of 1% of the authorized capital stock plus 20% thereof is
not in accordance with law.
ISSUE
Whether the SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1986
should be the basis for computing the filing fee relative to GMAs
application for the amendment of its articles of incorporation for
purposes of extending its corporate term?

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RULING
The SEC assailed the Decision dated February 20, 2004 of the Court
of Appeals which directed that SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1,
Series of 1986 should be the basis for computing the filing fee
relative to GMA Network, Inc.s (GMAs) application for the
amendment of its articles of incorporation for purposes of
extending its corporate term. The appellate court agreed with the
SECs submission that an extension of the corporate term is a grant
of a fresh license for a corporation to act as a juridical being
endowed with the powers expressly bestowed by the State. As
such, it is not an ordinary amendment but is analogous to the filing
of new articles of incorporation. However, the Court of Appeals
ruled that Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994 is legally
invalid and ineffective for not having been published in accordance
with law. The challenged memorandum circular, according to the
appellate court, is not merely an internal or interpretative rule, but
affects the public in general. Hence, its publication is required for
its effectivity. Rate-fixing is a legislative function which concededly
has been delegated to the SEC by R.A. No. 3531 and other
pertinent laws. The due process clause, however, permits the
courts to determine whether the regulation issued by the SEC is
reasonable and within the bounds of its rate-fixing authority and to
strike it down when it arbitrarily infringes on a persons right to
property. The instant appeal is dismissed for lack of merit.

Exceptions to irretroactivity of laws

LIAM LAW VS. OLYMPIC SAWMILL
FACTS:
Liam Law loaned 10k to Olympic Sawmill Corporation and Ellino Lee
Chi. The loan became due but the debtors failed to pay and asked
for an extension of 3 months instead. Law agreed but added an
additional obligation of 6k to the principal amount.
The debtors failed to pay again. Because of this, Law instituted a
collection case against the debtors. The trial court ruled in favor of
Law.
ISSUE:
WON the additional obligation of 6k constituted usurious interest???
RULING:
NO.

Usury has been legally non-existent. Interest can now be charged

as lender and borrower may agree upon. The Rules of Court in
regards to allegations of usury, procedural in nature, should be
considered repealed with retroactive effect.
Judicial Decisions
FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS v. CA
Facts: The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners
collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family
of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents
and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents
had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its
proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. On
the basis of the foregoing facts, the RTC rendered judgment finding
petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to
private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was
affirmed in toto by the CA. On the last day of the 15-day period to
file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file
a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the
CA. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration but this was
also denied.
Issue: WON the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioners motion for extention to file a Motion for Reconsideration
NO!
Ratio: The CA correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas
Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, that the fifteen-day period for appealing
or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the
rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time
to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the
Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and
the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only
in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort,
which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the
extension requested.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case
should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the nonpublication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of

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the time the subject decision of the CA was promulgated. Contrary
to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the publication of
Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be
binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the
bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep
abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues
have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the
advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such
publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and
law journals.
Computation of Time
Quiqui vs Boncaros
Facts: (wont name who private respondents and petitioners are coz
there are a lot) Private respondents obtained a free patent over a
parcel of land. Petitioners contest this alleging that the land
belongs to them because their late father purchased the same and
that they continuously and actually possessed it.
Petitioners filed a case for reconveyance against
respondents on the ground that the patent was obtained through
fraud. Answer was filed, pre trial commenced but no amicable
settlement until trial was set. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
On July 16, 1979 the trial court dismissed the complaint.
Counsel for petitioners received copy of the decision on July 17,
1989. A motion for reconsideration was filed on August 17, 1979.
Trial court denied the MR because it was filed beyond the 30-day
reglementary period.
Issue: Whether MR was filed beyond the reglementary period?
Held: YES!
Under the rules enforced at the time of this case, an appeal
may be taken within 30days from notice of the judgment of the trial
court. In relation thereto, the New Civil Code states that in
computing period, the 1st day shall be excluded and the last day
included.
In this case, counting 30days from July 17 (day petitioners
counsel received copy of the judgment) excluding 1 st day the
30th day would be August 16. Petitioners filed their MR one day late

or on August 17. Because of this, the order of the trial court

dismissing the complaint has become final and executor.
Nationality Principle Conflicts Rules
Llorente vs. CA
Nationality Principle: Conflicts Rules
FACTS: Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in
Camarines Sur. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo left
for the US Navy while Paula stayed in their conjugal home in
Camarines Sur. Lorenzo was admitted to US citizenship and
Certificate of Naturalization was issued in his favor. When Lorenzo
was allowed to visit his wife in the Philippines, he discovered his
wife was pregnant and was living in and having an adulterous
relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. Lorenzo refused to
forgive Paula and the two drew a written agreement which
essentially shows that Paula admitted her adulterous acts and that
the couple agreed to separate.
Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce which was granted.
Lorenzo returned to the Philippines and married Alicia Llorente.
Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in
the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or
cohabitation. Lorenzo and Alicia lived together for 25 years and
produced 3 children.
Before Lorenzo died, he executed a will, which was pending before
the probate court, bequeathing all his property to Alicia and their 3
children. After Lorenzo died, Paula filed with the same court a
petition for letters of administration over his estate in his favor.
Alicia filed as well.
RTC found that the divorce decree granted to Lorenzo is void and
inapplicable in the Philippines therefore the marriage he contracted
with Alicia is void. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce is valid.
HELD: YES.

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In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., the court held that owing to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the CC, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces, the same being considered contrary to the concept of
public policy and morality. In the same case, the court ruled that
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid
according to their national law.
Furthermore, in the case of Quita v. CA, that once proven that
respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the
divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become
applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit
from him.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the CA must be
reversed. The divorce obtained by Lorenzo from his first wife Paula
was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
(The SC remand the case to the TC for ruling on the intrinsic validity
of the will is left to the TC.)
Application of Chapter 2: Human Relations
De Tavera vs PTS
Petitioner is a doctor, specializing in treating tuberculosis. She was
appointed as member of the Board Directors of defendant Phil.
Tuberculosis Society. However, she was alleging that she was
removed from her post without informing her of the lawful cause
and thereafter, Romulo was appointed as her replacement. She
was claiming that 4 members of the Board were not members of
the Society and hence, they did not have the power to be
appointed in the Board and to vote. She filed a case against them,
claiming that they violated the Human Rights provisions of the Civil
Code. Defendants were claiming that the position of petitioner is
held at the pleasure of the Board and hence, she may be removed
at anytime.
ISSUE: Can she invoke the human relations provisions of the CC?
SC: NO
Petitioner cannot seek relief from the general provisions of the New
Civil Code on Human Relations nor from the fundamental principles

of the New Constitution on preservation of human dignity. While

these provisions present some basic principles that are to be
observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and
the stability of social order, these are merely guides for human
conduct in the absence of specific legal provisions and definite
contractual stipulations. In the case at bar, the Code of By-Laws of
the Society contains a specific provision governing the term of
office of petitioner. The same necessarily limits her rights under the
New Civil Code and the New Constitution upon acceptance of the
appointment.
Moreover, the act of the Board in declaring her position as vacant is
not only in accordance with the Code of By-Laws of the Society but
also meets the exacting standards of honesty and good faith.

9. Chato v. Fortune Tobacco

RA 7654 was passed in June 10, 1993. Prior to its enactment,
cigarette brands Champion, Hope and More were considered local
brands subjected to a lower ad valorem tax rate. 2 days before RA
7654 took effect, Chato issued RMC 37-93 which reclassified the
same cigarette brands resulting to the imposition of a higher ad
valorem rate. In effect, the RMC subjected the cigarette brands to
the RA even before it took effect. In a separate case (CIR v. CA),
RMC 37-93 was held to be not valid for having fallen short of the
requirements for a valid admin issuance.
Fortune (the cigarette manufacturer) filed a complaint for damages
against Chato in her private capacity. It contended that Chato
violated Art. 32 of the CC by depriving it of its property without due
process of the law and in violation of equal protection. To this,
Chato argued that she issued the RMC in the performance of her
official functions and within the scope of her authority so she cant
be liable. She filed motion to dismiss.
Via petition for certiorari, the denial of the motion to dismiss
reached the SC. In its June 19, 2007 decision it ordered the trial
court to proceed with the case. Chato moved for the
reconsideration of that decision.
Issue: w/n Chato can be held liable in her personal capacity for
having issued the RMC NO

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Ruling: To determine whether a public officer is liable for improper
or non-performance of duty, it must be first determined what kind
of duty is involved. There are 2 kinds of duties exercised by public
officers. One is the duty owing to the public collectively and duty
owing to particular individuals. The former pertains to officers who
act for the public at large and are ordinarily paid out of the
treasury. Ex. Governors duty to the public is to see to it that laws
are properly executed, that competent officials are appointed by
him, etc. Legislators owe a duty to the public to pass wise and
proper laws. For this kind of duty, no one individual could single
himself out and assert that the duties are owed to him alone. The
second kind covers those who perform duties to an individual by
reason of their employment by a particular person to do some act
for him in an official capacity. They usually receive their
compensation from that particular individual. Ex. A sheriff in
serving civil process for a private suitor, a recorder of deeds in
recording a deed or mortgage in favor of a private individual, a
notary public in protesting a negotiable paper, etc.
When what is involved is a duty owing to the public in general, an
individual can have no cause of action for damages against the
public officer. The exception to this is if the individual suffers a
particular or special injury on account of the public officers
improper or non-performance. The principle may now translate into
the rule that an individual can hold a public officer personally liable
for damages on account of an act or omission that violates a
constitutional right only if it results in a particular wrong or injury to
the former.
A public officer like Chato, vested with quasi-legislative or rulemaking power, owes a duty to the public to promulgate rules which
are compliant with the requirements of valid admin regulations. Its
a duty owed not to the respondent alone, but to the entire public
who would be affected by such rule.
Note that in CIR v. CA, the RMC was not declared unconstitutional
for violating the due process requirement or the equal protection
clause. Court only said that the RMC did not meet the requirements
for a valid admin issuance. Fortune relies heavily on that case as its
cause of action. It shows therefore that it really has no cause of
action for failing to show its allegation that Chato violated Art. 32.

Fortune failed to show that it incurred some particular wrong or

injury.
Finally,
Sec.
227
of
the
Tax
Reform
Act
of
1997
provides: Satisfaction of Judgment Recovered Against any Internal
Revenue Officer. When an action is brought against any Internal
Revenue officer to recover damages by reason of any act done in
the performance of official dutyany judgment, damages or costs
recovered in such action shall be satisfied by the Commissioner.
No such judgment, damages or costs shall be paid or reimbursed in
behalf of a person who has acted negligently or in bad faith, or with
willful oppression. Because the respondents complaint does not
impute negligence or bad faith to the petitioner, any money
judgment by the trial court against her will have to be assumed by
the Republic of the Philippines. As such, the complaint is in the
nature of a suit against the State.
Duty to act with Justice, Observe Honesty and Good Faith
Llorente v. Sandiganbayan
Facts: Llorente, then municipal mayor of Zamboanga del Norte was
charged with violation of Sec. 3[e] of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
According to the information: he did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally with evident bad faith refuse to sign and
approve the payrolls and vouchers representing the payments of
the salaries and other emoluments of Leticia G. Fuertes, without
just valid cause and without due process of law, thereby causing
undue injury to the said Leticia G. Fuertes. While admitting some
delays in the payment of the complainants claims, petitioner
sought to prove the defense of good faith -- that the withholding of
payment was due to her failure to submit the required money and
property clearance, and to the Sangguniang Bayans delayed
enactment of a supplemental budget to cover the claims. He adds
that such delays did not result in undue injury to complainant.
Respondent Court held that the delay or withholding of
complainants salaries and emoluments was unreasonable and
caused complainant undue injury. Being then the sole breadwinner
in their family, the withholding of her salaries caused her difficulties
in meeting her familys financial obligations like paying for the
tuition fees of her four children.

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ISSUE Did petitioner not act in good faith in refusing to immediately
sign the vouchers and implement the compromise agreement until
the Sangguniang Bayan had enacted the appropriation ordinance
and until Mrs. Fuertes submitted the clearance from the
Municipality of Pinan, Zamboanga del Norte? NO. PETITION IS
GRANTED.
HELD Respondent Court cannot shift the blame on the petitioner,
when it was the complainant who failed to submit the required
clearance. This requirement, which the complainant disregarded,
was even printed at the back of the very vouchers sought to be
approved. As assistant municipal treasurer, she ought to know that
this is a condition for the payment of her claims. Also, given the
lack of corresponding appropriation ordinance and certification of
availability of funds for such purpose, petitioner had the duty not to
sign the vouchers.
As chief executive of the municipality Llorente could not
have approved the voucher for the payment of complainants
salaries under Sec. 344, Local Government Code of 1991. The
petitioners failure to approve the complainants vouchers was due
to some legal obstacles, and not entirely without reason. Thus,
evident bad faith cannot be completely imputed to him.
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity
and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through
some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.
It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive
design or some motive of self interest or ill will for ulterior
purposes. Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent
on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause damage.
Actions for Breach of promise to marry
Bunag v. CA
Facts: Conrado Bunag, Jr. brought Zenaida Cirilo to a motel where
they had sexual intercourse. Later that evening, said Bunag
brought Cirilo to the house of his grandmother in Las Pias, Metro
Manila, where they lived together as husband and wife for 21 days.
Soon, Bunag and Cirilo filed their respective applications for a
marriage license with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of

Bacoor, Cavite. However, Bunag left Cirilo and soon filed an

affidavit withdrawing his application for a marriage license.
Cirilo claims that she was abducted and raped. One of the
cases she filed was a suit for damages based on a breach of a
promise to marry. The trial court decided in her favor. This was
affirmed by the CA.
Issue: Should damages be awarded based on a breach of a
promise to marry?
Decision: No.
In this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that
an action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil
law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by
the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. Generally, therefore, a
breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable, except where
the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the
necessary incidents thereof.
In this case however, moral damages were awarded based
on art. 21 of the Civil Code which states that any person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for moral damages. As such, the act of Bunag forcibly
abducting Cirilo and having carnal knowledge with her against her
will, and thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape
criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such promise after
cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute acts
contrary to morals and good customs.
Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the
statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless
even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury,
and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
specifically provide for in the statutes. Thus, the damages awarded
to Cirilo were proper.

12. Baksh vs. Court of Appeals (219 SCRA 115)

Facts:
Baksh, an Iranian citizen, courted respondent
Gonzales. She accepted his love on the condition that they will get
married, so he promised her that he will marry her. Gonzales

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parents made preparations by looking for pigs and chickens,
inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors. Without
getting married, Baksh and Gonzales lived together. Gonzales
cherry got popped. Thereafter, Baksh began maltreating Gonzales
and eventually told her that he no longer wanted to marry her and
that he was already married to another woman. Gonzales filed a
complaint for damages.
Issue:
W/N Article 21 of the New Civil Code is applicable
such that damages may be awarded?
Held: Yes! Article 21 applies! SC said that Article 21 is designed to
expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict by granting adequate
legal remedy for the untold moral wrongs which are impossible for
human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute
books.
Where a mans promise to marry is the proximate cause of
the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to
fulfil that promise thereafter become the proximate cause of the
giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had,
in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was
only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her
to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could
justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of
such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind
it and the wilful injury to her honor and reputation which followed
thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have
been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or
public policy.
Unjust Enrichment at the expense of others
13. GARCIA V PHILIPPINE AIRLINES
FACTS: Petitioners Juanito Garcia and Alberto Dumago are
employees of PAL who have been dismissed after being caught in
the act of sniffing shabu in the toolroom. Garcia et al filed an illegal
dismissal case against PAL before the Labor Arbiter (LA). The LA
ruled in favor of Garcia et al and ordered PAL to immediately
reinstate petitioners. On appeal to the NLRC by PAL, the decision of
the LA was reversed. Meanwhile, the LA issued a Notice of
Garnishment the Writ of Execution for the reinstatement aspect of

its decision. When PAL tried to enjoin the reinstatement and

garnishment, NLRC affirmed such Notice and Writ but suspended
and referred the action to the Rehabilitation Receiver of PAL which
at that time was undergoing rehabilitation receivership. However,
when PAL manifested that SEC had approved its exit from the
rehabilitation, SC resolved to entertain the issue of whether PAL
should pay backwages to the Garcia et al from the time the LA
ordered their reinstatement up to the time the NLRC reversed the
findings of the LA
ISSUE: Whether or not compelling PAL to pay backwages despite
the fact that the NLRC ruled in its favor on appeal constitutes
unjust enrichment
HELD: NO. the social justice principles of labor law outweigh or
render inapplicable the civil law doctrine of unjust enrichment.
According to article 223 of the Labor Code, the order of
reinstatement of the labor arbiter is immediately executor even
pending appeal. The reinstatement may be actual or payroll
reinstatement at the option of the employer. HOWEVER, in this
case, PAL is excused from complying with the obligation to reinstate
Garcia et al either actually or otherwise because while the case was
before the LA and the NLRC, it was under rehabilitation. It is basic
in corporate rehabilitation that all actions against a corporation
undergoing rehabilitation is ipso jure suspended. This includes labor
actions. True, the implementation of the reinstatement order is a
ministerial duty of the LA unless it is restrained by a higher court. In
this case, the injunction partook the nature of suspension of action
by legislative fiat i.e. law on corporate rehabilitation. This is equally
effective as when the injunction was issued by a higher court.
Liability of public officers
14. Aberca v Ver (1988)
Ver, et al, are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
They conducted raids against the houses of the petitioners (Aberca,
etc), claiming that they were communists. In doing so, Ver, et al,
used spurious judicial search warrants. Ver, et al, took the personal
belongings of the petitioners and even arrested some of them
without warrants.

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Aberca, et al, sued for damages. Ver, et al, claim that they are
immune from suit.
Issue: Can Aberca recover damages?
Held: Yes, under Art 32 of the Civil Code, public officials and private
citizens can be held liable for damages for infringing upon the
rights of others.
Art 32 provides a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and
freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. No man may seek to
violate those sacred rights with impunity. In times of great upheaval
or of social and political stress, when the temptation is strongest to
yield to the law of force rather than the force of law, it is necessary
to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are
immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or
imperious demands of the ruling power. The rule of law must
prevail, or else liberty will perish.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or
employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating
the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated
therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only
judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided
their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal
Code or other penal statute.

15. Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, Feb. 17 1997

Facts: Tabuena, Gen. Manager of the Manila International Airport
Authority (MIAA), was instructed by Pres. Marcos to pay directly to
the presidents office and in cash what the MIAA owes the Phil.
National Construction Corp. (PNCC) in the amount of P55 million.
The order was done both through phone and through a Presidential
Memorandum, received through Gimenez, Marcos private
secretary. With the help of the Asst. Gen. Manager, Dabao, and
Acting Manager of the Financial Services Department, Peralta (they
were the ones authorized to make withdrawals), Tabuena was able
to release the amount of P55 million by means of 3 withdrawals.
The money was delivered to the presidents office through
Gimenez.

Cases were filed against Tabuena and Peralta in the

Sandiganbayan, charging them of malversation (Dabao was still at
large). SB convicted them, saying that MIAA did not have any
outstanding obligations to the PNCC. Tabuena and Peralta appealed
to the SC, alleging the defense of good faith.
Issue: Whether or not Tabuena and Peralta criminally liable?
Held: NO. The withdrawals were ordered by Pres. Marcos himself,
first through phone, and then through a Pres. Memorandum. Even
though Tabuena and Peralta had both thought that the
disbursements were out of the ordinary and not based on normal
procedures, they both had no choice but to follow such order.
Marcos was undeniably their superior, being President of the Phil.
who exercised control over government agencies like the MIAA and
PNCC. Marcos has a say in matters involving inter-government
agency affairs and transactions, such as directing payment of
liability of one entity to another and the manner in which it should
be carried out. As a recipient of such kind of directive coming from
the highest official of the land, good faith should be read on their
compliance, without hesitation nor any question, with the Marcos
Memorandum. They are entitled to the justifying circumstance of
Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior
for some lawful purpose.
However, Tabuena though acting in good faith, should still
be administratively or civilly liable. The disbursements were made
out of the ordinary and not based on normal procedures. True, the
deviation was inevitable under the circumstances that Tabuena was
in. He did not have the luxury of time to observe all auditing
procedures considering the fact that the Memorandum called for
his immediate compliance. Be that as it may, Tabuena surely
cannot escape responsibility for such omission.
Sandiganbayan decision REVERSED.
Independent Civil Actions and Prejudicial Questions
Abunado v. People
FACTS: This case involves BIGAMY
September, 1967 Abunado marries Narcisa
1988 Narcisa leaves for work in Japan

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1992 Narcisa returns to the Philippines upon finding out that her
husband is having an extra-marital affair and has left her conjugal
home. She found out that her husband had contracted a second
marriage with Zenaida Binas on January 1989.
1995 A bigamy case was filed against Abunado
Abunados defense: petitioner claims that his petition for
annulment/declaration of nullity of marriage was a prejudicial
question, hence, the proceedings in the bigamy case should have
been suspended during the pendency of the annulment case.
Petitioner, in fact, eventually obtained a judicial declaration of
nullity of his marriage to Narcisa on October 29, 1999.
ISSUE: Is the petition for annulment or declaration of nullity a
prejudicial question?
HELD: NO it is not. A prejudicial question has been defined as one
based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action,
it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in
the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of
suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to
avoid two conflicting decisions.
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity,
the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioners
assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases
considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare
his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action
as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners
marriage to Narcisa had no bearing upon the determination of
petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy,
because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is
that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second
marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or
voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a
judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually
obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the

point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting
before the first marriage was annulled.

COJUANGCO vs. PALMA

FACTS: The complainant Eduardo Cojuangco is a client of ACCRA,
w h o a s s i g n e d t h e c a s e t o A t t y. P a l m a , t h e
re spon de nt. The forme r hire d the latte r as his
p e r s o n a l c o u n s e l f o r h i s business. Atty. Palma becomes
very close to the family of Cojuangco, and he dines and
goes with them abroad. He even tutored, complainants 22year old daughter Maria Luisa Cojuangco (Lisa).
On June 22, 1982, respondent married Lisa in Hongkong
without the knowledge of the complainant and despite the
facts that the former is already m a r r i e d a n d w i t h t h r e e
(3) childre n. Complaina nt se nds his two sons to
persuade Lisa to go home with them, which she did. In the
celebration of respondents marriage with Lisa he misrepresented
himself as a bachelor. On August 24, 1982, complainant filed with
the Court of First Instance, a petition for declaration of nullity
of the marriage and which was granted. Subsequently
complainant fi led a disbarment complaint on the ground
of grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed in
him.
Respondent in his answer filed a motion to dismiss for lack of cause
of action. As he contends that complaint fails to allege acts
constituting deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct or violation of
his lawyers oath.
ISSUE: W O N r e s p o n d e n t s a c t s c o n s t i t u t e d e c e i t ,
m a l p r a c t i c e , gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral
conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer that would warrant his
disbarment. YES!
RULING:
There is no question that respondent as a lawyer, is well versed in
the law, fully well that in marrying Maria Luisa he was entering into
a bigamous marriage defined and penalized under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code. The respondent betrayed the trust
reposed in him by complainant. He was treated as part of the
family and was allowed to tutor Maria Luisa. For the foregoing

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reasons, it is submitted that respondent committed
grossly immoral conduct and violation of his
o a t h a s a l a w y e r , a n d i t i s recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of three (3) years and which later lessen to one (1) year.
According to IBP:At the outset, it must be stressed that the law
profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards among
its members. There is no distinction as to whether the
transgression is committed in the lawyers professional capacity or
in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his
personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen
at another. Thus, not only his professional activities but even
his private life, insofar as the latter may reflect unfavorably
upon the good name and prestige of the profession and the
courts, may at any time be the subject of inquiry on the
part of the proper authorities.P r o f e s s i o n a l c o m p e t e n c y
alone does not make a lawyer a worthy member
o f t h e B a r. G o o d m o r a l c h a r a c t e r i s a l w a y s a n
indispensable
requirement. T h e
interdict
upon
l a w y e r s , a s i n s c r i b e d i n Ru l e 1 . 0 1 o f t h e C o d e
of P r o f e s s i o n a l
Re s p o n s i b i l i t y ,
is
that
they
s h a l l n o t e n g a g e i n u n l a w f u l , dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.

Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities - July 30, 2008

Facts: Reyes is the Vice-President of Wincorp, a corporation that
arranges and brokers loans of its clients, one of whom is Pearlbank
Securities.
Sometime before this case, investors or lenders made
demands on Pearlbank to pay several loans that were brokered by
Wincorp. The investors alleged that they werent able to collect on
their outstanding credits with Wincorp because Pearlbank didnt
pay. Apparently, Pearlbank alleges that it did not have any
outstanding loans that WINCORP brokered. Thus Pearlbank
investigated on these alleged debts.
Pearlbank demanded from Wincorp a full and accurate
accounting of the identities and investments of the lenders and the
alleged debts of Pearlbank with supporting records and documents.
Wincorp did not respond to this demand.

Pearlbank instituted a case with the SEC, now pending with

the RTC (bec. of that law which transferred jurisdiction with the
RTCs, for full and accurate accounting of investments and alleged
loan obligations of Pearlbank.
Pearlbank, through its treasurer, also filed complaints with
the DOJ against officers of Wincorp, one of them was Reyes, for
falsification of commercial and private documents.
The DOJ filed the criminal case with the MTC. Later,
however, DOJ uSec Merciditas Gutierrez ordered the withdrawal of
the Informations. This decision was reversed by the DOJ Sec., thus
the case proceeded.
Reyes filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, where he
raised, among others, that the SEC case is a prejudicial question to
the criminal case for falsification. CA denied certiorari thus criminal
case proceeds.
Issue: Is the SEC case a prejudicial question that has to be resolved
before the criminal case for falsification may proceed? NO.
Ruling: SC affirms CA. Case proceeds.
A prejudicial question is defined as one which arises in a
case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case
before the court, but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question
must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based
on a fact distinct and separate from the crime, but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused; and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear
not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those
upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that
in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the
guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
It comes into play generally in a situation in which a civil
action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in
the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before
the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue
raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et
de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is
to avoid two conflicting decisions. The elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an

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issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not
determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal
action based on the same facts, or there is no necessity that the
civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case,
therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question.
Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal
action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.
One of the issues taken in the SEC case is whether
Pearlbank has outstanding loans with Wincorp. However, a finding
that Pearlbank indeed has outstanding debts will not totally absolve
Reyes of any criminal liability, in other words, its not an absolute
defense. Since, what is determinative in the Falsification case is
whether there really were falsified documents.

PIMENTEL V PIMENTEL
FACTS
Maria Chrysantine Pimentel (private respondent) filed an action for
frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner) before
the RTC QC.
Petitioner received summons to appear before the RTC Antipolo, for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family
Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before
the RTC QC on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question.
Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender
and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of the
case filed in RTC Antipolo would have a bearing in the criminal case
filed against him before the RTC QC.
The RTC QC held that the pendency of the case before the RTC
Antipolo is not a prejudicial question. Petitioner filed a MR. RTC QC
denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. CA dismissed
the petition.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before the SC.
ISSUE

W/N the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a

prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal
case for frustrated parricide against petitioner?
HELD
The petition has no merit.
Annulment of Marriage is not a
Prejudicial Question in Criminal Case for Parricide.
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal
action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue
which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action
may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action
is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The
issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim.
In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide,
the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which
would have killed respondent as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of
petitioners will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime,
petitioner and respondent were married.
Thus, even if the
marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled by RTC
Antipolo, petitioner could still be held criminally liable, since at the
time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to
respondent.
We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v. Court of
Appeals that the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the
spouses is concerned. First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the
judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for
bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case.
Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that there is a recognition
written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab
initio, may still produce legal consequences. In fact, the Court
declared in that case that a declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely
no moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned.
Concept of Marriage

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In re: Bucana (ACTUAL CASE NO DIGEST KASI)
FACTS: Acting upon the letter of Mrs. Angela Drilon Baltazar,
Barangay Captain of Victories, Dumangas, Iloilo, dated February 26,
1976, respondent Notary Public Rufillo D. Bucana was required by
this Court in its Resolution of March 23, 1976, to show cause within
ten (10) days from notice, why he should not be disciplinarily dealt
with for having notarized on November 10, 1975 at Dumangas,
Iloilo an Agreement executed by the spouses Gonzalo Baltazar and
Luisa Sorongon wherein the afore-mentioned spouses agreed
therein that "in case anyone of them will remarry both parties offer
no objection and waive all civil and criminal actions against them"
and that the afore-mentioned Agreement was "entered into for the
purpose of agreement to allow each and everyone of them to
remarry without objection or reservation ...", which affidavit is
contrary to law because it sanctions an illicit and immoral purpose.
On April 21, 1976, respondent . submitted his explanation,
admitting that he notarized the afore-mentioned document and
that the Agreement is "immoral and against public policy", but in
mitigation he asserted that the document in question was Prepared
by his clerk, Lucia D. Doctolero without his previous knowledge;
that when said document was presented to him for signature after
it was signed by the parties, he vehemently refused to sign it and
informed the parties that the document was immoral; that he
placed the said document on his table among his files and more
than a week later, he asked his clerk where the document was for
the purpose of destroying it, but to his surprise he found that the
same was notarized by him as per his file copies in the office; that
he dispatched his clerk to get the copy from the parties, but the
afore-mentioned parties could not be found in their respective
residences; that he must have inadvertently notarized the same in
view of the numerous documents on his table and at that time he
was emotionally disturbed as his father (now deceased) was then
seriously ill. The foregoing contentions of respondent were
corroborated substantially by the separate sworn statements of his
clerk, Lucia D. Doctolero and Angela Drilon Baltazar, both dated
April 20, 1976. 1
There is no question that the afore-mentioned Agreement is
contrary to law, morals and good customs. Marriage is an inviolable
social institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the
public is deeply interested for it is the foundation of the family and

of society without which there could be neither civilization nor

progress. 2
The contract, in substance, purports to formulate an agreement
between the husband and the wife to take unto himself a concubine
and the wife to live in adulterous relations with another man,
without opposition from either one, and what is more, it induces
each party to commit bigamy. 3 This is not only immoral but in
effect abets the commission of a crime. A notary public, by virtue of
the nature of his office, is required to exercise his duties with due
care and with due regard to the provisions of existing law.
As stressed by Justice Malcolm in Panganiban v. Borromeo, 4 "it is
for the notary to inform himself of the facts to which he intends to
certify and to take part in no illegal enterprise. The notary public is
usually a person who has been admitted to the practice of law, and
as such, in the commingling of his duties notary and lawyer, must
be held responsible for both. We are led to hold that a member of
the bar who performs an act as a notary public of a disgraceful or
immoral character may be held to account by the court even to the
extent of disbarment."
In the case at bar, respondent in effect pleads for clemency,
claiming that the notarization of the questioned document was due
to his negligence. We find, however, that the aforementioned
document could not have been notarized if the respondent had only
exercised the requisite care required by law in the exercise of his
duties as notary public.
WHEREFORE, We hold that respondent Rufillo D. Bucana is guilty of
malpractice and is hereby suspended from the office of not try
public for a period of six (6) months, with the admonition that a
repetition of the same or a similar act in the future will be dealt
with more severely.
Legal Capacity Sex
SILVERIO v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
537 SCRA 373, G.R. No. 174689, October 19, 2007.
FACTS: On November 26, 2002, Rommel Silverio filed a petition to
change his first name (to Mely) and sex (to female) in his birth
certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. He alleges to be a
male transsexual and that he has always identified more with girls
since childhood. After undergoing breast augmentation, hormone

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treatment and psychological examination, on January 27, 2001, he
finally underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok.
The petition was granted by the trial court, but was reversed by the
Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: W/N Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, and Rules 103
and 108 of the Rules of Court allow petitioner to change his name
and sex in his birth certificate. NO.
RATIO: A persons first name cannot be changed because of sex
reassignment. The State has an interest in the names carried by
individuals and entities for the purpose of identification. Change of
name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are
thus controlled by statute. Art. 376 of the Civil Code 2 was amended
by R.A. 9048.3 Section 1 of the said law provides:
Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical
or Typographical Error and Change of
First Name or Nickname. No entry in
a civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical
errors and change of first name or
nickname which can be corrected or
changed by the concerned city or
municipal civil registrar or consul
general in accordance with the
provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.
Thus, the petition should have been filed with the
local civil registrar, assuming it could be legally done,
instead of the trial court.
Moreover, the petition has no merit as the use of his true and
official name worked no prejudice towards him.
R.A. 9048 provides for the following grounds for which a change of
first name may be allowed:

2 No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority

3 Clerical Error Law

1. First name or nickname ridiculous, tainted with dishonor,

or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
2. First name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously used by petitioner and has been publicly
known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
3. Change will avoid confusion. 4
Here, Silverio failed to even allege any prejudice that he might
suffer as a result of using his true name. His basis in praying for the
change of his first name was the sex reassignment to make his
name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself
into. A change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil
status. The law does not sanction a change of first name on the
ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion,
granting the petition may only create complications in the civil
registry and the public interest.
Under R.A. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the
change of sex is not a mere clerical error. It is a substantial change
for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The entries correctable under Rule 108 and Art. 412 of the Civil
Code are found in Articles 407 and 408 of the same Code. 5 No
reasonable interpretation of the provisions can justify a conclusion
that they cover correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct means to make or set aright; to remove the faults or
error. To change means to replace something with something else
of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute. The
birth certificate of Silverio contained no error. No correction is
necessary.

22. Republic v. Cagandahan

4 Section 4, Republic Act 9048.

5 Art. 407. Acts, events, and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.
Art. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions;
(9)acknowledgements; (10) naturalization; (11) loss or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil
interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and
(16) changes of name.

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Topic of SEX under Legal Capacity/ Doctrine: Change of
Gender not a mere typographical or clerical error, hence
subject to judicial order.
Facts: In her petition, she alleged that she was born as a female in
the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed
secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where
persons thus afflicted possess both male and female
characteristics. Petitioner further alleges that for all interests and
appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a
male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be
corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male
and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff. (She has both
male and female organs!) Court granted petition, to which the OSG
countered, saying among others, that Rule 108 does not allow
change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondent's
claimed medical condition known as CAH does not make her a
male, and that the local civil registrar should be impleaded as an
indispensable party .
Issue: whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of
entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or
gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical
condition known as CAH, and her name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff,"
under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.
Held: Petition denied. Cagandahan wins.
Ratio: Article 412 of the Civil Code provides: No entry in a civil
register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was
amended by R.A. 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors
are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be
made through administrative proceedings and without the need for
a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the
ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such
errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and
corrections in entries in the civil register. In short, a correction in
the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical
or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the
applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Further, the medical testimony proves that Cagandahan has this

unique condition which makes her feel and appear like a man. In
other words, the Court respects her congenital condition and her
mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the
ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with
her unordinary state and thus help make her life easier, considering
the unique circumstances in this case. As for her change of name
under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a
matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light
of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow.
Considering the consequence that respondent's change of name
merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in
respondent's change of name. Such a change will conform with the
change of the entry in her birth certificate from female to male.
Prior existing marriage
Lilia Wiegel v. Hon. Semio-Dy
143 SCRA 499 (1986)
Facts:
Karl Heinz Wiegel filed a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage with Lilia Wiegel (Petitioner LILIA) on
the ground of LILIAs previous existing marriage to Eduardo
Maxion.
LILIA admitted the existence of her prior marriage to Maxion
but claimed that their marriage was null and void because
she and Maxion were allegedly forced to enter said marital
union.
During pre-trial, the issue agreed upon by LILIA and Karl
Wiegel was the status of the first marriage (void or
voidable?).
LILIA contested validity of the pre-trial order and asked the
court for an opportunity to present evidence that: (1) 1 st
marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and
Maxion and (2) Maxion, at the time of their marriage, was
already married to someone else.
Hon. Sempio-Dy ruled against the presentation f evidence
because the existence of force exerted on LILIA and Maxion
had already been agreed upon.
LILIA assailed Sempio-Dys Orders (compelling to submit the
case for resolution based on agreed facts and denying

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motion to present evidence in her favor) through a Petition
for Certiorari alleging GADALEJ.
Issue: Sempio-Dy guilty of GADALEJ?
Held: No. Petition dismissed.
There is no need for LILIA to prove that her 1 st marriage was
vitiated by force committed against both parties, because even
assuming this to be so, marriage WILL NOT BE VOID but merely
voidable, and therefore VALID until annulled. Since there was no
annulment yet, it is clear that when she married Karl Wiegel, she
was still validly married to Maxion. Thus, her marriage to Karl is
VOID.
There is likewise no need to introduce evidence about the existing
prior marriage of Maxion at the time he and LILIA were married,
because even if their marriage was void, a judicial declaration of
such fact is necessary. Without the judicial declaration, LILIA (for all
legal intents and purposes) was still regarded as a married woman
at the time she contracted her marriage with Karl Wiegel. Thus,
marriage to Karl would still be regarded as VOID under the law.

24. TY v. CA
FACTS: Private respondent married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in
a civil ceremony on March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had a
church wedding on August 27, 1977. However, on August 4, 1980,
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared
their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage
license.
The church wedding on August 27, 1977, was also
declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties.
Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna
Maria, private respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on
April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated by the judge of the City
Court of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they also had a church wedding in
Makati, Metro Manila.
On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a civil case praying
that his marriage to petitioner be declared null and void. He
alleged that they had no marriage license when they got married.
He also averred that at the time he married petitioner, he was still
married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he married

petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had

not been issued. The decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna
Maria was rendered only on August 4, 1980, while his civil marriage
to petitioner took place on April 4, 1979.
Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent, pointed
out that his claim that their marriage was contracted without a
valid license is untrue. She submitted their Marriage License No.
5739990 issued at Rosario, Cavite on April 3, 1979, as Exh. 11, 12
and 12-A. He did not question this document when it was submitted
in evidence. Petitioner also submitted the decision of the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City dated August 4, 1980,
which declared null and void his civil marriage to Anna Maria
Regina Villanueva celebrated on March 29, 1977, and his church
marriage to said Anna Maria on August 27, 1977. These documents
were submitted as evidence during trial and, according to
petitioner, are therefore deemed sufficient proof of the facts
therein. The fact that the civil marriage of private respondent and
petitioner took place on April 4, 1979, before the judgment
declaring his prior marriage as null and void is undisputed. It also
appears indisputable that private respondent and petitioner had a
church wedding ceremony on April 4, 1982.
The Pasig RTC sustained private respondents civil suit and declared
his marriage to herein petitioner null and void ab initio in its
decision dated November 4, 1991.
Both parties appealed to
respondent Court of Appeals. On July 24, 1996, the appellate court
affirmed the trial courts decision.
It ruled that a judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage (to Anna Maria) must first
be secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly
contracted.
ISSUE: Whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is
required before a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly
HELD: The provisions of the Family Code requiring judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage before a subsequent marriage can
be contracted is not applicable in the present case. In the present
case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into
in 1979, before Wiegel. The first marriage of private respondent
being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for
judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second

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marriage.
In this case, therefore, we conclude that private
respondents second marriage to petitioner is valid.
Thus, the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively
applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested
rights of petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v. Court of
Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be
impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that impairment
of vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent.
Additionally, we are not quite prepared to give assent to the
appellate courts finding that despite private respondents deceit
and perfidy in contracting marriage with petitioner, he could
benefit from her silence on the issue. Thus, coming now to the civil
effects of the church ceremony wherein petitioner married private
respondent using the marriage license used three years earlier in
the civil ceremony, we find that petitioner now has raised this
matter properly. Earlier petitioner claimed as untruthful private
respondents allegation that he wed petitioner but they lacked a
marriage license. Indeed we find there was a marriage license,
though it was the same license issued on April 3, 1979 and used in
both the civil and the church rites. Obviously, the church ceremony
was confirmatory of their civil marriage. As petitioner contends,
the appellate court erred when it refused to recognize the validity
and salutary effects of said canonical marriage on a technicality,
i.e. that petitioner had failed to raise this matter as affirmative
defense during trial. She argues that such failure does not prevent
the appellate court from giving her defense due consideration
and weight. She adds that the interest of the State in protecting
the inviolability of marriage, as a legal and social institution,
outweighs such technicality. In our view, petitioner and private
respondent had complied with all the essential and formal
requisites for a valid marriage, including the requirement of a valid
license in the first of the two ceremonies. That this license was
used legally in the celebration of the civil ceremony does not
detract from the ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of
the same parties to the marriage, for we hold that the latter rites
served not only to ratify but also to fortify the first. The appellate
court might have its reasons for brushing aside this possible
defense of the defendant below which undoubtedly could have
tendered a valid issue, but which was not timely interposed by her
before the trial court. But we are now persuaded we cannot play

blind to the absurdity, if not inequity, of letting the wrongdoer profit

from what the CA calls his own deceit and perfidy.

Joselano Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose Emmanuel Eala

A.C. No. 7136
August 1, 2007
Facts: On March 4, 2002 a complaint of disbarment was filed
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar
Discipline against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala for
grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyers
oath. In the Complaint, Guevarra first met the respondent in
January 2000 when his then fiance Irene Moje introduced
respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne
Tantoco with whom he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, Complainant
noticed that from January to March 2001, Irene had been receiving
from respondent Cellphone calls, as well as messages some which
read I love you, I miss you, or Meet you at Megamall. He also
noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early
in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go
home from work. When he asked her whereabouts, she replied that
she slept at her parents house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was
busy with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and Respondent
together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted
them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house. On April
22, 2001 complainant went uninvited to Irenes birthday
celebration at which he saw her and the respondent celebrating
with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and
humiliation, he left the venue immediately. Following that incident,
Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal
belongings. Complainant later found a handwritten letter dated
October 7, 2007, the day of his wedding to Irene, Complainant soon
saw respondents car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71B11 Street, New Manila where as he was later learn sometime in
April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still later
that when his friends saw Irene on about January 18, 2002 together
with respondent during a concert, she was pregnant.

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Issue: Whether Concubinage or Adulterous relationship, be the
reason for the disbarment of Atty. Jose Emmanuel Eala.
Held: Lawyers oath stated that a lawyer should support the
Constitution and obey the laws, Meaning he shall not make use of
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct, grossly immoral
conduct, or be convicted in any crime involving moral turpitude. In
the case at bar Atty. Eala was accused of Concubinage, under ART.
334 of the Revised Penal Code, Any husband who shall keep a
mistress in a conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse,
under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife,
or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished by
prision correccional in its minimum and medium period. Section 2
of ART. XV states that Marriage, as an inviolable social institution,
is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the state.
Respondents grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the
constitution and the laws, that he as a lawyer has sworn to uphold.
Hence the court declared Atty. Jose Emmanul M. Eala DISBARRED
for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and
violation of canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
Authority of Solemnizing Officer
Beso v. Daguman
FACTS: Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr. with
solemnizing marriage outside his jurisdiction and of negligence in
not retaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with
the office of the Local Civil Registrar.
Judge Daguman is a municipal judge of Sta. Margarita, Samar. He
solemnized the marriage of Beso in his residence in J.P.R.
Subdivision in Calbayog City, Samar.
ISSUE: Whether or not Daguman is liable for solemnizing marriage
outside his area of jurisdiction.
HELD: YES. As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta. Margarita
Tarangnan-Pagsanjan, Samar, the authority to solemnize marriage
is only limited to those municipalities under his jurisdiction. Clearly,

Calbayog City is no longer within his area of jurisdiction.

There are only 3 instances, as provided by Article 8 of the FC,
wherein a marriage may be solemnized by a judge outside of his
chambers or at a place other than his sala, to wit:
1.when either or both of the contracting parties is at the point of
death;
2.when the residence of either party is located in a remote place;
3.where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in
writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house
or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
In this case, there is no pretense that either Beso or his fianc
Yman was at the point of death or in a remote place. Neither was
there a sworn written request made by the contracting parties to
the Judge that the marriage be solemnized outside his chambers or
at a place other than his sala. What, in fact appears on record is
that respondent Judge was prompted more by urgency to solemnize
the marriage because Beso was an overseas worker.
Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdiction may officiate
in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge
solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a
resultant irregularity in the formal requisites laid down in Article 3,
which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may
subject the officiating official to administrative liability.

27 Aranes v Occiano
Facts: Merceditas Aranes charged Judge Occiano with gross
ignorance of the law in a letter complaint because said judge
solemnized her marriage (Feb. 17, 2000) with Dominador Orobia
outside of his territorial jurisdiction and without the requisite
marriage license. She and Orobia relying on the marriage lived
together as husband and wife for many years but on his death she
was deprived of inheriting from him because their marriage was a
nullity. She was likewise deprived of receiving Orobias pension
from the navy.
In his comment, the Judge said that on Feb. 15, 2000, a Juan Arroyo
asked him to solemnize the marriage between the parties on the

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assurance that all the necessary documents were complete.He
agreed to conduct the wedding at Nabua because Orobia suffered
from a stroke and couldnt travel to Balatan. On the day of the
wedding, he noticed that no marriage license was presented and he
informed the parties that their marriage will be a nullity and had
wanted to move the date of the wedding but out of human
compassion decided to continue because the visitors were already
coming in, the delivery of provisions for the reception, the
possibility of further aggravating Orobias condition (nastroke) and
the parties assured him that they will give him the license the
afternoon of the same day. No license was ever delivered.
Aranes later desisted upon realization that it was her fault BUT the
Office of the Court Administrator still found the judge guilty of
solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license and
for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction and was fined 5K.
ISSUE: Whether the decision is correct?
HELD: Tama! Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or
B.P.129, the authority of the regional trial court judges and
judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined
to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.
Judge Occiano only had jurisdiction to solemnize marriages in
Balatan and not Nabua and he should be held administratively
liable for violating the law on marriage. He should also be faulted
for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license
because thats considered a gross ignorance of the law.
The fact of desistance of Aranes doesnt exculpate him from
liability. Disciplinary actions like this arent private matters, the
Court has the power to discipline judges.

28. NAVARRO v. DOMAGTOY

Facts:
Complainant Municipal Mayor Navarro filed an administrative case
against Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Domagtoy for gross
misconduct, inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. First, he
solemnized a wedding despite knowing that the groom is merely
separated from his first wife. Second, he performed another
marriage ceremony outside his courts jurisdiction. His jurisdiction
was Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte, but he solemnized the
wedding at his residence in Dapa.

Judge Domagtoy seeks exculpation from his act of having

solemnized the wedding of a married man because he merely relied
on the Affidavit issued by the MTC Judge confirming the fact that
the husband has not seen his first wife for almost 7 years.
Regarding the second charge, he did not violate Art. 7, par. 1 of the
FC (marriage may be solemnized by any incumbent member of the
judiciary within the courts jurisdiction) and that Art.8 applies: The
marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge
or in open court, in the churchand not elsewhere, except in cases
of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places
or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in
which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place
designated by them in a sworn statement
Issues:
Should he have solemnized the wedding to another of a married
man on the basis of an affidavit of presumptive death? NO
Did the judge have the authority to solemnize the other wedding
outside his courts jurisdiction? NO
Ratio:
Summary Proceeding for Declaration of Presumptive Death
Necessary
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in the FC
for the declaration of the death of the absentee. Absent this
judicial declaration, the husband remains married to his first wife.
Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous
marriage under Article 35, par. 4 (those bigamous marriage not
falling under Art. 41).
Authority of the Judge
Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of
the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority
of the solemnizing officer as provided under Art. 7. Judges who are
appointed to specific jurisdictions may officiate in weddings only
within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a
marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite, which while not affecting the
validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.

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Marriage License
Filipina Y. Sy v. CA
Facts: Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy got married on 1973. They were
blessed with 2 children. Filipina filed a petition for the declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. The RTC denied the petition, which was later on affirmed
by the CA. MR was denied as well. Hence, this appeal by certiorari.
Petitioner, for the first time, is raising the issue that there is an
absence of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony. The
date of issue of the marriage license and marriage certificate is
September 14, 1974, while the date of the celebration of the
marriage is on November 15, 1973.

October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When

the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the
marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push
through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed
an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living
together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got
married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding
judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the
civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and
respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live
together as husband and wife. Respondent filed a complaint for
support against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court. In her
complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and
that the latter has failed on his responsibility/obligation to
financially support her as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child.

The issue on psychological incapacity is mooted by the conclusion

that the marriage is void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at
the time the marriage was solemnized.

Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that

their marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was facilitated by
a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by
respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from
embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to her
pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental advice
from his parents before he got married. He also averred that they
never lived together as husband and wife and that he has never
seen nor acknowledged the child. Trial court ruled that the
marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid because it
was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared
petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to
give her support. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals, arguing that the lower court committed grave abuse of
discretion when, on the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it
ordered him to provide support to the child when the latter is not,
and could not have been, his own child.

REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, Petitioner, vs. ANNABELLE

ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, Respondent.

ISSUES: First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to

determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and
respondent in an action for support and second.

Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991.

They planned to get married, thus they applied for a marriage
license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in
September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in

Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had
jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between
petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be
collaterally attacked. However, other than for purposes of

Issue: Whether or not the marriage between the parties is void

from the beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the
ceremony
Held: Yes. The marriage license was issued almost one year after
the ceremony took place. Therefore, the marriage was indeed
contracted without a marriage license. Article 80 of the Civil Code is
applicable in this case. There being no claim of an exceptional
character, he purported marriage between petitioner and private
respondent could not be classified among those enumerated in
Article 72-79 of the Civil Code. Under Article 80 of the Civil Code,
the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is VOID
from the beginning.

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remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal
case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same
so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When
such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is
necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause
is the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final
judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere
irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses
with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who
have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband
and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years
before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing
the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant
with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid
marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a
marriage license. In the instant case, there was no scandalous
cohabitation to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all.
The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so
they could push through with the marriage has no value
whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from
the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and
present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.
Marriages exempt from marriage license
Ninal v. Badayog
Note: This digest is for the exemption to marriage license doctrine.
Case is also discussed under declaration of nullity.
Facts: Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September
26,
1974.
Out
of
their
marriage
were
born
herein
petitioners(ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of
the minors BABYLINE, INGRID, ARCHIE & PEPITO NIAL, JR.) .
Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24,

1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986,

Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any
marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an
affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus
exempt from securing a marriage license.
On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After Pepitos
death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was
void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the
assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage
would affect their successional rights. Norma filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action
since they are not among the persons who could file an action for
"annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand Marcos of the RTC said the Family Code was silent,
obscure and inefficient in resolving: a) petitioners cause of action,
b) WON Pepitos second marriage was null and void and c) WON the
plaintiffs are stopped from assailing the validity of the 2nd marriage
considering it was dissolved by Pepitos death. He ruled that the
action should have been filed before Pepitos death.
Issue: WON they Pepito Nial and Norma Badayog were exempt from
a marriage license.
Held: No. Not having met the marriagle license requirement, their
marriage is null and void.
Ratio: The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to
determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect
at the time of their celebration. A valid marriage license is a
requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence
of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article
80(3) in relation to Article 58. The requirement and issuance of
marriage license is the States demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general public is interested. This interest proceeds from the
constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of
family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic
"autonomous social institution."

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However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code
wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that
provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as
husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least
five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is
required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to
the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license.
The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such
persons from legitimizing their status.
There is no dispute that the marriage of Pepito to Norma Badayog
was celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they
executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of
majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry
each other." The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to
what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the
Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to
exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license.
Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to
marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or
should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together
and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the
entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a
legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment
may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the
cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived
together as husband and wife for five years without the benefit of
marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of
a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor
is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other
BORJA-MANZANO V. SANCHEZ
Herminia Borja-Mariano was married to the late David Manzano on
May 21, 1966. They had four children. However, on March 22, 1993,

words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is

counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a
period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately
before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party
was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is
unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then
the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties
to have common law relationships and placing them on the same
footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and Badayogs marriage, it
cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and
wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time
Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with
respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming
that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter
both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that
has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their fiveyear period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by
law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under
the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage
contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he
started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they
lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact
from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where
there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the
spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any
third party as being one as "husband and wife".

David contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before

Infanta, Pangasinan MTC Judge Roque Sanchez. During that time,
Payao was also married to Domingo Relos. Payao and David issued
an affidavit stating that they were both married however due to
incessant quarrels, they both left their families and they no longer

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communicated with them. They have lived together as husband
and wife for 7 years. Judge agreed to solemnize the marriage.
Herminia filed charges of gross ignorance of the law against
Sanchez.
ISSUE: Whether or not David Manzanos marriage with Payao is
valid?
RULING: For Article 34 of the Family Code (legal ratification of
marital cohabitation) to apply, the following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each
other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the
parties must be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have
lived together for at least five years [and are without legal
impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement
that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and
that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is
significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed
on March 22, 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself.
David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of
their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it
was indicated that both were separated. Respondent Judge knew
or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment
impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and
void. In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the
late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from
contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny
knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage,
as the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which
were subscribed and sworn to before him. The fact
that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective
spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the
Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal
separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case
the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal

separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize
the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the
separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar. Just like
separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for
at least five years does not sever the tie of a subsisting previous
marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between
two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is
merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not
serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a
subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing
marriage.

REPUBLIC VS. DAYOT

FACTS: Jose and Felisa Dayot were married. Later on, Jose filed a
complaint for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage with
the RTC. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham.
There was no marriage ceremony; his consent to the marriage was
secured through fraud; the affidavit of marital cohabitation was
false. However, the petition was dismissed. The CA likewise
affirmed. But then it changed its mind and ruled in favor of Jose.
ISSUE: WON the falsity of the affidavit of marital cohabitation
rendered the marriage void ab initio???
RULING: YES.
The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to
those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no
ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five
years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since
the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five
years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language
of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid,
this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the
law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a
mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also
prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite
facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who
solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took

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steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived
together for five years at the time they executed their sworn
affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose
and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five
months before the celebration of their marriage. The Court of
Appeals also noted Felisa's testimony that Jose was introduced to
her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or
March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. The appellate court also
cited Felisa's own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose
commenced to live in her house.
Non-Essential Requirements: Marriage Certificate
DELGADO V.RUSTIA

Anonuevo vs Intestate Estate of Rodolfo Jalandoni

Facts: Rodolfo Jaladoni died intestate. Bernadino Jalandoni
(Rodolfos brother) filed a petitioner for issuance of letters of
administration. Petitioners and their siblings filed a manifestation
that they were the children of Sylvia who in turn was the child of
Isabel Blee with one John Desantis. Note however that Isabel Blee
was allegedly legally married to Rodolfo Jalandoni at the time of the
latters death (hence, petitioners are supposedly Rodolfos
grandchildren).
Petitioners presented 2 marriage certificates between Isabel
and Rodolfo and Sylvias birth certificate. Petitioners assert that
these pieces of evidence are enough to establish that Isabel was
the spouse of Rodolfo and as such, they are the lawful
representatives. However, Bernardino begged to differ. Notably, the
birth certificate of Sylvia stated that she was the legitimate child of
Isabel and John Desantis which would negate the claim that Isabel
was legally married to Rodolfo.
The intestate court allowed the petitioners to intervene
because it was convinced that the evidence adequately established
Isabels status as Rodolfos wife. CA reversed this ruling of the trial
court.

Issue: whether the evidence was sufficient to establish Isabels

marriage to Rodolfo? NO!
Held: While a marriage certificate is considered the primary
evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and
exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact
of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the
marriage certificate. Hence, even a persons birth certificate may
be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage of ones
parents.
Here, the birth certificate of Sylvia serves as the competent
evidence to prove Isabels marriage to John Desantis and not
Rodolfo. The entry of being a legitimate child of Sylvia and John in
the birth certificate is accorded prima facie weight and will be
presumed to be true unless rebutted. Petitioners did not rebut this.
They merely tried to explain that these were untruthful statements.
This birth certificate shows that Isabel was previously
married to John Desantis. Consequently, absent any proof that that
such marriage was dissolved leads to the inescapable conclusion
that Isabels marriage to Rodolfo was void ab initio.
Note: important consideration in this case is the fact that the
marriage certificate showed the marriage between Isabel and
Rodolfo to have taken place in 1953while Sylvia was born in 1946.
Thus, it would really appear that Isabel was originally married to
John Desantis. No evidence was shown to prove that such marriage
was terminated before the marriage to Rodolfo in 1953.
Foreign Divorce
Van Dorn v. Romillo
Foreign Divorce
FACTS: Petitioner, Alice Van Dorn is a Filipino citizen while private
respondent, Richard Upton is a citizen of the U.S. They were
married in Hongkong in 1972, but established their residence in the
Philippines. In 1982, the parties were divorced in Nevada, U.S. and
the petitioner has re-married also in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn.
In 1983, Richard filed a suit against Alice in RTC, stating that Alices
business (the Galleon Shop) is a conjugal property. He is asking for

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an accounting of the business to be rendered, and seeking to be
declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Alice moved
to dismiss on the ground that the cause of action is barred by
previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada
Court where Richard had acknowledged that he and Alice had no
community property.

just. Alice should not be obliged to live together with, observe

respect and fidelity, and render support to Richard. She should not
be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice
are to be served.
Petition is granted.

The Court below denied the MTD on the ground that the property is
located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing
in the case. The denial is the subject of this Certiorari proceeding.

Garcia vs Recio

ISSUE: What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and
their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines?
HELD: A divorce decree granted by a U.S. Court between a Filipina
and her American husband is binding on the American husband.
The decree is therefore binding upon Richard, being a citizen of the
U.S.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Art. 15
of the CC, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to
our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized here in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released Richard from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves marriage.
An American granted absolute divorce in his country with his
Filipina wife is estopped from asserting his rights over property
allegedly held in the Philippines as conjugal property. Pursuant to
his national law, Richard is no longer the husband of Alice. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as Alices husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by
the decision of his own countrys court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he did not repudiate, he
is estopped by his own representation before said court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain that under our laws, Alice has to be considered still
married to Richard and still subject to a wifes obligation cannot be

Recio, a Filipino, married Samson, an Australian, here in the

Philippines. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. A few
years later, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the
marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
After a few years, Recio became an Australian citizen. He married a
Garcia in Cabanatuan. However, they separated without prior
judicial dissolution of their marriage. Garcia filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of bigamy. She
contends that Recios marriage with Samson was still subsisting
when they got married.
Garcia: based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the FC,
marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place
where they were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationis). In effect,
the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the
conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of
the place where the marriage was performed.
Issue:
SC: case REMANDED in the interest of orderly procedure and
substantial justice, so that respondent can present evidence that
he had the legal capacity to marry petitioner
- Before a foreign judgment is given preseumptive evidentiary
value, the document must be 1st presented and admitted in
evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the
divorce decree itself.
In this case, the divorce decree
between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an
authentic one issued by an Australian family court.
However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
pertinent rules on evidence must be demonstrated6. But

6 Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2)
a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in

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since Garcias counsel did not object to its admissibility,

then the LC was correct in admitting the evidence of the
divorce decree issued by the Australian court.
Burden of Proving Australian Law: The burden of proof lies
with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.
The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the
national law of the party concerned.
The certificate
mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been
sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had
he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and
admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity
to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage
license. But here, Recio has not presented any evidence to
prove his legal capacity to marry Garcia.
The divorce decree did not ipso facto clothed respondent
with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to
adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal
law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his
legal capacity to contract the second marriage.

38. Amor-Catalan v. CA
Felicitas Amor-Catalan married Orlando Catalan on June 1950 in
Pangasinan. They migrated to the US and became naturalized
American citizens. They divorced in 1988.
2 months after the divorce, Orlando married Merope in Pangasinan.
Felicitas filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against
Merope, contending that she had a subsisting marriage with
Eusebio Bristol. She also wanted damages, claiming that the
marriage brought her embarrassment.
RTC ruled for Felicitas. It declared the Orlando-Merope marriage null
and void for being bigamous and awarded damaged to Felicitas. CA
reversed.
Issue: Does Felicitas have standing to question the nullity of the
Orlando-Merope marriage?

Ruling: This issue may not be resolved without first determining

whether Felicitas and Orlando had indeed become naturalized
American citizens and whether they had actually been divorced.
Other than allegations in the complaint, records are bereft of
evidence to prove their naturalization. Felicitas merely alleged in
her complaint that they had acquired American citizenship and
Orlando also only alleged their divorce. A divorce obtained abroad
by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
However, before it can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it, which must be proved
considering that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws. Also, the kind of divorce obtained is important, since there is
an absolute divorce (vincula matrimonii) which severs the marital
ties, and a limited divorce (mensa et thoro), which leaves the bond
in full force.
Under the NCC which is the law in force at the time Orlando and
Merope were married, and even in the Family Code, there is no
specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity
of marriage. Only a party who can demonstrate "proper interest"
can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like
any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of action.
Section 2(a) of The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which took effect
on March 15, 2003, now provides that only the husband or the wife
may file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity.
Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of
additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent
Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law
which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is
proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did
not allow respondent Orlandos remarriage, then the trial court
should declare respondents marriage as bigamous and void ab
initio but reduce the amount of damages. On the contrary, if it is
proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed
Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant
petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that Felicitas
lacks legal personality to file the same.

which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

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39. BAYOT V. COURT OF APPEALS
Foreign Divorce
FACTS: Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in the
Philippines. The marriage certificate stated that Rebecca was an
American citizen. Later on, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings
against her husband in the Dominican Republic. The Dominican
Court issued a decree ordering the dissolution of their marriage and
joint custody and guardianship over their child. Over a year later,
the court issued another decree settling the couples property
relations.
Less than a month from the issuance of said decrees,
Rebecca filed with the Makati RTC a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. She later on withdrew said petition and filed
another for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the
ground of Vicentes psychological incapacity. She also sought the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for
support pendente lite for her and Alix (child).
Vicente filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of
cause of action and that the petition is barred the prior judgment
of divorce. Rebecca insists on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by
the DOJ and that therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.
RTC denied the motion to dismiss and granted Rebeccas
application for support pendente lite.
ISSUE Whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time
the divorce judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on
February 22, 1996; and whether the judgment of divorce is valid
and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects? YES, REBECCA
WAS AN AMERICAN CITIZEN AT THE TIME DIVORCE WAS RENDERED.
SAID JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE WAS VALID.
HELD There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time
she applied for and obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an
American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an
effective repudiation of such citizenship. At the time of the divorce,
Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming for argument that she
was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented
herself in public documents as an American citizen. At the very
least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her
American citizenship to govern her marital relationship.

Being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the

national laws of the United States of America, a country which
allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and
Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their Agreement
executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was
rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree
No. 406/97 issued on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce
secured by Rebecca was valid.
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in
Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can be recognized here,
provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under
the national law of the alien spouse. Be this as it may, the fact that
Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the
divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the
States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce
decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree
is, as here, sufficient.
As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel,
personally secured the foreign divorce while Vicente was duly
represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said
proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce decrees rendered
and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid and,
consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.
Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly
recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000
affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995
Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify
or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an
American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the
outset, in determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad
would come within the pale of the country's policy against absolute
divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the
time a valid divorce is obtained.
Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by
Rebecca, the same shall be given a res judicata effect in this
jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained,
the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is considered
severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain
language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to
each other.
Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could
no longer be subject to a husband's obligation under the Civil

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Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca.
In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements
for the applicability of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:
x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between
a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
The petitioner lacks a cause of action for declaration of
nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the existence of a
marriage. With the valid foreign divorce secured by Rebecca, there
is no more marital tie binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no
more marriage to be dissolved or nullified.

Remo v. Secretary of Foreign Affairs

Facts: Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose
Philippine passport was expiring. Her passport stated her name as
Maria Virginia Remo Rallonza (her given name, middle name, and
husbands last name). Remo, whose marriage still subsists, applied
for the renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) with a request to revert to her maiden name and
surname in the replacement passport.
This was denied by the DFA on the ground that the use of
ones maiden name is allowed in passport applications only if the
married name has not been used in previous application. The
Implementing Rules and Regulations for Philippine Passport Act of
1996 (RA 8239) clearly define the conditions when a woman
applicant may revert to her maiden name, that is, only in cases of
annulment of marriage, divorce and death of the husband.
Remo contends that Art. 370 of the Civil Code states that
the use of a husbands surname is permissive and thus she should
be able to use her maiden name in her passport. The Office of the
President, then the CA, however did not agree with her.

Issue: Can Remo revert to the use of her maiden name in the
replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage?
Decision: No.
In its decision, the SC stated that a woman is not prevented
from using their maiden name in their passport. In fact, one may
opt to use her maiden name in initially obtaining a passport.
However, once a married woman opts to adopt her husbands
surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her
maiden name, except in the cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of
RA 8239. These instances are: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3)
annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage.
In this case, Remos marriage to her husband subsists and
she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement
passport. Otherwise stated, a married woman's reversion to the use
of her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the
marriage.
In justifying such strict requirements, the SC said that the
issuance of passports is impressed with public interest. A passport
is an official document of identity and nationality issued to a person
intending to travel or sojourn in foreign countries. It is issued by
the Philippine government to its citizens requesting other
governments to allow its holder to pass safely and freely, and in
case of need, to give him/her aid and protection

41. Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas (GR No. 186571, August 11, 2010)
Facts: Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship. He married respondent Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig.
Shortly after the wedding, Corpuz went back to Canada for
business. When he returned to the Philippines he found out that
Sto. Tomas was having an affair (mga babae talagatsk, tsk, tsk).
Corpuz went to Canada and got a divorce. He wanted to marry
another Filipina so he registered the divorce decree with the Pasig
City Civil Registry Office. Nevertheless, he was informed by a NSO
official that his marriage with Sto. Tomas still subsists and that for
the divorce decree to be enforceable, it must first be judicially
recognized by Philippine courts. So Corpuz filed a petition for
judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage. The RTC ruled that he was not the proper party to

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institute the action because he was an alien; that only the Filipino
spouse can avail of the remedy provided in the 2 nd paragraph of
Article 26 of the New Civil Code.
Issue: Can the alien spouse avail of the remedy in par. 2 of Article
26?
Held: No! Given the rationale and intent of the provision to avoid
the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to
the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse only the Filipino spouse can invoke
the 2nd paragraph of Article 26. The said provision bestows no rights
in favor of aliens.
However, the unavailability of the 2nd paragraph of Article 26
does not necessarily strip Corpuz of legal interest to petition the
RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign
divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the
aliens national law have been duly proven according to the rules of
evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of
Corpuz, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
provides for the effect of foreign judgments.
In other words, although an alien spouse cannot avail of the
2nd paragraph of Article 26, he/she can still avail of Section 48, Rule
39.
Void and Voidable Marriages
42. CARLOS v SANDOVAL
FACTS: The spouses Felix Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate
leaving 6 parcels of land. In order to avoid to inheritance taxes,
Felix, during his lifetime, transferred to his son, Teofilo, lots 1, 2 and
3 with the condition that Teofilo will transfer petitioner Carlos
(another son of Felix) share. Parcel 4 was registered in the name of
Carlos.
Teofilo died intestate. Parcel 5 and 6 was registered in the
name of the heirs of Teofilo including herein respondents Felicidad
Sandoval who was his surviving spouse and son Teofilo Carlos II.
Petitioner sues claiming that the marriage between Teofilo and
Felicidad was null and void for lack of marriage license.

Furthermore, petitioner contends that Teofilo Carlos II was neither

an adoptive or natural son of Teofilo Carlos.
Respondent submitted an affidavit of the justice of peace
who solemnized marriage and the certificate of live birth of Teofilo
Carlos II wherein it was stated that Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad
Sandoval are the parents. By virtue of these documents,
respondents move for summary judgment. Petitioner also moved
for summary judgment and presented as evidence the certificate of
the civil registrar attesting to the fact there is no birth certificate of
Teofilo II on record.
ISSUE: Whether or not a judgment on nullity of marriage may be
handed down in a summary judgment and without conducting a full
dress trial
Whether or not a person who is not a spouse may bring an
action for nullity of marriage
HELD:
1. According to AM 02-11-10-SC also known as the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, summary judgments and
judgments on pleadings are not applicable in nullity or
annulment cases. The reason behind this is that without a
full dress trial, the state is deprived the opportunity to
appear before the courts. The role of the prosecutor does
not stop by the simple declaration that there was no
collusion. The prosecutor must be given opportunity to
appear before the trial in order to make sure that no
evidence is fabricated.
2. For marriages solemnized under the Old Civil Code, testate
and intestate heirs may sue for nullity or annulment.
However, AM 02-11-10-SC now vests this right exclusively
on the spouses on the theory that since the spouses alone
are the builders of marital life, they alone have the right put
an end to it. However, the heirs are not entirely deprived of
their right to sue for nullity or annulment. They can do so
not on a proceeding for the nullity or marriage but on
settlement of estate. In the case at bar, since the marriage
between Teofilo and Felicidad was celebrated in 1962, the
old civil code applies but since the old civil code does not
specifically provide for who can sue, then we apply the real
party in interest rule. In this case, petitioner is a real party

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in interest because as a collateral relative of Teofilo, he
stands to succeed intestate when Teofilo II is declared not to
be either a legitimate, illegitimate and adoptive son of
Teofilo. Remember that the presence of legitimate,
illegitimate ascendants/descedants preclude the succession
of collaterals.

43. Ablaza v Republic

Can a person bring an action for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under
the regime of the old Civil Code?
Facts: The petitioner alleged that the marriage between his brother
Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated is void because there
was no a marriage license at the time the marriage was celebrated
(the license was given a week later). The marriage was in 1949. He
insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who
had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real
properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby
making him a real party in interest. He also claims that he can
impugn the validity of the marriage because it was void, even if
after the death of his brother.
Issue: Does he have standing?
Held: Yes.
The SC AM states that only the husband or the wife can bring an
action for the nullity of the marriage. However, in Carlos v
Sandoval, the Court said that this wont apply to:
1. those actions commenced before March 15, 2003 (when the
rules came out)
2. those filed for marriages celebrated before March 15, 2003
The marriage between Cresence and Leonila was under the Civil
Code. It was way back in 1949. The AM has no application to them.
The old Civil Code does not specify who can bring actions.
However, this does not mean that anyone can just bring actions to
declare absolute nullity. The plaintiff must still be the party who

stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails

of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action must
be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in
interest.Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a "proper
interest" can file the action. Interest within the meaning of the rule
means material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by
the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere
curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest.
Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresencianos
brother and surviving heir. Assuming that the petitioner was as he
claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the estate
of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in
the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a
compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the right to
succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the conditions
stated in the Rules of Succession.
However, petitioner must implead Leonila since there are some
cases under the Civil Code wherein a marriage license was not
needed for a valid marriage. She must be given a chance to say her
side.

44. Bolos v. Bolos, Oct. 20, 2010

Facts: Danilo and Cynthia Bolos were married on Feb. 14, 1980. On
July 2003, Cynthia filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of
their marriage under Art. 36 of the FC (psychological incapacity).
RTC granted the petition. Danilo filed a Notice of Appeal. The RTC
denied due course to the appeal for Danilos failure to file the
required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Sec.
20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (The RULE) (A.M. No. 02-1110-SC). Danilo then filed for certiorari (Rule 65) in the CA seeking to
annul the orders of the RTC. CA granted the petition and reversed
the RTCs decision. CA stated that the requirement of a motion for
reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. 02-11-10-SC
does not apply in this case as the Bolos marriage was solemnized
before the Family Code took effect. Cynthia then filed a petition
(Rule 45) in the SC.

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Issue: Whether or not The RULE is applicable to the case?
Held: NO. The Court ruled in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli that
the coverage of the RULE extends only to those marriages entered
into during the effectivity of the FC which took effect on Aug. 3,
1988. The Bolos marriage took place on Feb. 1980. The RULE,
which was promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope.
Sec. 1 of the same reads:
Sec. 1. Scope This Rule govern petitions for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable
marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
The categorical language of the RULE leaves no room for doubt.
The coverage extends only those marriages entered into during the
effectivity of the FC. The RULE sets a demarcation line between
marriages covered by the FC and those solemnized under the Civil
Code.
CA decision AFFIRMED.

DINO V. DINO
Difference of
Declaration

Void

and

Voidable:

Necessity

of

Court

46. Weigel vs. Sempio-Diy

Lilia Olivia Wiegel got married to Karl Heinz Wiegel on July 1978 at
the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church in Makati. Karl, upon
learning that Lilia had a subsisting marriage, filed for a declaration
of nullity of their marriage. Lilia contracted her first marriage with
Eduardo Maxion on June 25, 1972. She claims that the first
marriage is not valid because they were forced to enter the union
and Maxion was married to someone else at that time.
ISSUE: WON Lilias first marriage is void?
HELD: No. Its voidable. Petition dismissed.
RATIO: There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first
marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties

because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but
merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until
annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that
when she married respondent she was still validly married to her
first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID
(Art. 80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing
prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each
other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to
this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents
and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at
the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz
Wiegel; accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent
would be regarded VOID under the law.

Lolita D. Enrico v. Heirs of Eulogio B. Medinaceli

September 28, 2007

Facts: Petitioner, Lolita D. Enrico, is the second wife of Eulogio

Medinacili. They were married on August 24, 2004. This marriage
was celebrated 4 months after Eulogios first wife died on May
2004.
On February, 2005, or six months after his second marriage,
Eulogio died.
The respondents are Eulogios heirs and seek a declaration
of nullity of the marriage of Petitioner Lolita and Eulogio on the
ground that the marriage was celebrated without a valid marriage
license. And that 5-year cohabitation exception could not apply
since Eulogio was a bachelor for only 4 months.
Petitioner answered the complaint and alleged that they
have been living as husband and wife for 21 years as in fact they
had 2 children. Further, petitioner contended that it is only the
contracting parties while living can file an action for declaration of
nullity of their marriage.
RTC dismissed the complaint but on reconsideration
reinstated the case.
Petitioner Enrico directly filed for Rule 65 in the SC.
Issue: Do the heirs have standing to file the action for the
declaration of nullity? NO.

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Ruling: SC grants the petition and dismisses the petition for
declaration of nullity filed by the heirs.
First, Void marriages solemnized under the Family Code are
governed by the A.M. 02-11-10 of the SC, that is, marriages entered
into on and after August 3, 1988. The A.M. of the SC provides that
a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or the wife. It is clear. Thus, the
heirs have no standing. Case Dismissed!
Second, as to the Ninal v. Badayog ruling that allows heirs to
file a petition for declaration of nullity, this applies only to those
marriages under the Civil Code.
What is the remedy now of the heirs? Remember that a void
marriage can be collaterally attacked, hence since they only seek
to protect their property rights they can always impugn the
legitimacy of the marriage of petitioner and their father in the
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of their deceased
faither.
Void Marriages:
requirements

Grounds

Lack

of

essential/formal

REPUBLIC V CA
FACTS Respondent Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were
married in a civil ceremony performed by a City Court Judge of
Pasay City and was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's
parents. Cardenas personally attended the procuring of the
documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including
the procurement of the marriage license. Their marriage contract
states that a marriage license was issued in the name of the
contracting parties in Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife.
They decided to live together only when Castro discovered she was
pregnant. Their cohabitation lasted only for four months.
Thereafter, the couple parted ways. The baby was adopted by
Castros brother, with the consent of Cardenas.
Desiring to follow her daughter in the U.S, Castro wanted to put in
order her marital status before leaving. She then discovered that
there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the
celebration of their marriage as certified by the Civil Registrar of
Pasig, Metro Manila.

Respondent then filed a petition with the RTC of Quezon City

seeking for the judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage
claiming that no marriage license was ever issued to them prior to
the solemnization of their marriage.
The trial court denied her petition holding that the certification as
inadequate to establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage
license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the parties.
It ruled that the inability of the certifying official to locate the
marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no
marriage license issued. On appeal, the decision of the trial court
was reversed.
ISSUE Is the marriage valid?
HELD NO.
The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a secret
marriage, ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated
without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of the
contracting parties. At the time the marriage was solemnized on
June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the New
Civil Code which provides that no marriage shall be solemnized
without a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar.
Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of
a license would render the marriage void ab initio.
The certification of due search and inability to find issued by the
civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer
charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the
issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any
circumstance of suspicion, a certificate of due search and inability
to find sufficiently proved that his office did not issue a marriage
license to the contracting parties. There was absolutely no
evidence on record to show that there was collusion between
private respondent and her husband Cardenas.
Declaration of Presumptive Death
Republic vs. Nolasco (220 SCRA 20)
FACTS: Gregorio Nolasco, a seaman, met Janet Parker, a British, in
a bar in Liverpool, England. Thereafter, she lived together with
Nolasco on his ship for 6 months. When Nolascos contract expired,
they returned to his hometown in Antique. In 1982, the couple got

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married. His contract was then renewed, thus, he had to leave his
wife. In 1983, while working overseas, Nolasco got a letter from his
mother informing him that Janet gave birth to their son and that
she had left Antique. He asked permission from his employer to
return home so that he can look for Janet. In 1988, Nolasco filed a
petition to declare Janet presumptively dead. He testified that he
exerted every effort to look for her, but it proved to be fruitless. He
even sent letters to the address of the bar where the couple first
met, but they were all returned to him. He also inquired from their
friends, but they had no news about Janet. He also alleged that he
had no knowledge of Janets family background and that even after
they were married, she still refused to disclose such information.
Nolasco also testified that he did not report the incident to
Philippine authorities. The RTC granted the petition.
The CA
affirmed.
ISSUE: W/N Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife
is already dead.
HELD/RATIO: NO. Thus, the declaration of Janets
presumptive death is REVERSED, NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
Art. 41 of the Family Code provides for 4 requisites for the
declaration of presumptive death, namely:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four
consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil
Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the
absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
The SC, in reversing the CA, held that Nolasco did not comply
with the third requirement as he failed to conduct a search for his
missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a well-founded
belief that she is dead. The investigation allegedly conducted by
Nolasco in his attempt to ascertain the whereabouts of Janet is too
sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief
that she was already dead. For instance, when he arrived in

Antique, instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the

British Embassy, he secured another seaman's contract and went
to London. His testimony showed that he confused London for
Liverpool and this casts doubt on his supposed efforts to locate his
wife in England. There is no analogy between Manila and its
neighboring cities, on one hand, and London and Liverpool, on the
other, which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are around
350 km apart. We do not consider that walking into a major city like
Liverpool or London with a simple hope of somehow bumping into
one particular person there which is in effect what Nolasco says
he did can be regarded as a reasonably diligent search. The
Court also views Nolasco's claim that Janet declined to give any
information as to her personal background even after marrying
Nolasco as too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate
her. Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's
bare assertion that he had inquired from their friends of her
whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those
friends in his testimony.
Psychological Incapacity of Parties
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. (COURT OF APPEALS AND)
MOLINA
268 SCRA 198, G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997.
FACTS: On August 16, 1990, Roridel Molina filed a verified petition
for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo on the
ground of the latters psychological incapacity. She alleges that a
year after their marriage, Reynaldo presented signs of immaturity
and irresponsibility as both husband and father as Reynaldo:
preferred to spend time with, and spend money on, his friends; was
dependent on his parents for aid, and; was always dishonest with
her about the familys finances.
Reynaldo had been terminated from employment in February 1986
and Rorida had been the sole breadwinner since. In March 1987,
she resigned from her job and went to stay with her parents.
Shortly thereafter, Reynaldo left her and their son, Andre, and had
since abandoned their family.
The trial court declared the marriage void and the Court of Appeals
affirmed.

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ISSUE: W/N Reynaldo is psychologically incapacitated NO. The
marriage subsists.
RATIO: It has not been established that the defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It is more of a difficulty, if not an outright refusal or
neglect in the performance of marital obligations. Roridels
evidence simply showed that she and Reynaldo could not get
along.
Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities are not tantamount to psychological incapacity.
Rather than merely failing to meet marital obligations, it is
necessary to show that said person is incapable of doing so
because of a psychological illness.
Psychological incapacity is the mental incapacity to the most
serious of psychological disorders demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. Psychological incapacity is characterized by: gravity,
judicial antecedence, and incurability.
(Art. 36 Guidelines laid down by the Court)
1. Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage is on the
plaintiff. Doubt is resolved in favor of the continuation of the
marriage.
2. The root of psychological incapacity must be: a.) clinically
identified; b.) alleged in the complaint; c.) proven by
experts; and d.) clearly explained in the decision. The
evidence should satisfy the court that either, or both, of the
parties is mentally ill to the extent that s/he could not have
known the obligation s/he was assuming; or knowing the
obligations, could not validly assume them.
3. Incapacity must exist at the time the marriage was
celebrated. Perception of a manifestation is unnecessary at
the time of the celebration, but the illness must be proven
to exist at such moment.
4. Incapacity must be shown to be incurable or permanent.
5. Illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

6. The essential obligations are those covered by Art. 68 to 71

of the Family Code, between spouses, and Art. 220, 221 and
225 as regards parents and their children.
7. Interpretation by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not decisive,
should be given great respect by the courts.
8. Trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State. No
decision shall be handed down without the Solicitor
Generals issuance of a certificate, stating his reasons for his
agreement or opposition to the petition. Such certificate will
be quoted in the decision. The certificate must be submitted
within 15 days from the date the case is submitted for
resolution.

Noel Baccay v. Maribel Baccay

Topic
under
Psychological
Incapacity/
Doctrine:
Unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage per
se, must clearly establish true incapability to perform basic
marital covenants.
Facts: Noel and Maribel were college sweethearts. Then, sometime
in November 1998, Maribel informed Noel that she was pregnant
with his child. They immediately wed days after before RTC QC.
After the marriage ceremony, both agreed to live with Noel's family
in their house. During all the time she lived with Noel's family,
Maribel remained aloof and did not go out of her way to endear
herself to them. She would just come and go from the house as she
pleased, She never contributed to the family's coffer leaving Noel
to shoulder all expenses for their support, she refused to have any
sexual contact with Noel. Surprisingly, despite Maribel's claim of
being pregnant, Noel never observed any symptoms of pregnancy
in her!
Trouble ensued and so Noel filed for declaration of nullity of the
marriage, to which the Court granted, stating that Maribel failed to
perform the essential marital obligations of marriage, and such
failure was due to a personality disorder called Narcissistic
Personality Disorder characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity
and incurability as determined by a clinical psychologist. CA
reversed, hence this petition.

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Issue: Marriage null and void under Article 36? Psychological
incapacity? (in short, will the personality disorder and no sexy-time
merit the nullity of marriage?)
Held: Petition denied! Totality of evidence by Noel fails to prove P.I.
Ratio: First, Santos v. Court of Appeals that the phrase
"psychological incapacity" is not meant to comprehend all possible
cases of psychoses. The intendment of the law has been to confine
it to the most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage.
Second, Republic v. CA laid down the guidelines to determine P.I.
a) Burden of Proof on petitioner/ Resolved in favor of validity and
continuity of marriage
b) Must be alleged in complaint that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given valid assumption thereof.
c) Medically proven to be permanently incurable in terms of marital
obligations (INCURABILITY)
d) Grave enough illness to not assume the essential obligations of
marriage (GRAVITY)
e) the obligations are those expressly enumerated by law/
Interpretation of NAMT Church should be given great respect/ TC
must order fiscal and Sol-Gen to appear as counsel for the State
Lastly, he failed to prove the root cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity and establish the requirements of gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability. As correctly observed by the
CA, the report of the psychologist, who concluded that Maribel was
suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder traceable to her
experiences during childhood, did not establish how the personality
disorder incapacitated Maribel from validly assuming the essential
obligations of the marriage.

Enrique Agraviador v. Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador

G.R. No. 170729, December 8, 2010
Facts:
PETITIONER (Enrique) met RESPONDENT (Erlinda) in 1971 at
a beerhouse where RESPONDENT worked. PETITIONER, at
that time, was a 24-year old security guard of the Bureau of
Customs, while RESPONDENT was a 17-year old waitress.

PETITIONER
and
RESPONDENT
eventually
became
sweethearts. They soon entered into a common-law
relationship.
In 1973, PETITIONER and RESPONDENT married in a
ceremony officiated by Reverend Reyes at a church in
Tondo. PETITIONERs family was apprehensive because of
the nature of RESPONDENTs work and because she comes
from a broken family.
Out of their union, they begot four children: Erisque,
Emmanuel, Evelyn, and Eymarey.
In 2001, PETITIONER filed with RTC a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code. PETITIONER alleged that RESPONDENT was
psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential
obligations of marriage as she was carefree and
irresponsible, and refused to do household chores like
cleaning and cooking; stayed away from their house for long
periods of time; had an affair with a lesbian; didnt take care
of their sick child; consulted a witch doctor in order to bring
him bad fate; and refused to use the family name
Agraviador in her activities.
PETITIONER further claimed RESPONDENT refused to have
sex with him since 1993 because she became very
close to a male tenant in their house (Enrique also
discovered their love notes to each other, and caught them
inside his room several times).
RESPONDENT moved to dismiss petition on the ground that
the root cause of her psychological incapacity was not
medically identified. RTC denied motion.
In her answer, RESPONDENT denied engaging in
extramarital affairs and maintained that PETITIONER refused
to have sex with her. PETITIONER allegedly wanted to have
their marriage annulled because he wanted to marry their
former household helper, Gilda Camarin. Lastly, PETITIONER
maintained she took care of her sick son (who eventually
died).
RTC ordered city prosecutor and Solgen to investigate if
collusion existed between the parties.
Aside from his testimony, PETITIONER presented Certificate
of True Copy of their Marriage Contract and the psychiatric
evaluation report of Dr. Juan Cirilo L. Patac. Dr. Patac: (1)

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PETITIONER psychologically capable to fulfill the essential
obligations of marriage; (2) RESPONDENT failed to fulfill the
essential obligations of marriage, manifesting inflexible
maladaptive behavior even at the time before their
marriage; and (3) RESPONDENT suffers from a Personality
Disorder.
Issue: Whether there is basis to nullify the petitioners marriage to
the respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity to comply
with the essential marital obligations?
Held: No. Petition denied.
1. TOTALITY OF EVIDENCE presented failed to establish
RESPONDENTs psychological incapacity. Psychological
incapacity under Art. 36 is not vitiation of consent; it does
not affect the consent to the marriage.
2. Summary of Jurisprudential Guidelines:
a. Santos v. Court of Appeals: psychological incapacity is a
mental incapacity (not physical capacity) that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage. Thus, it is
must be confined to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage. It is characterized by:
i.
Gravity;
ii.
Juridical antecedence; and
iii.
Incurability.
b. Molina Doctrine (Republic v. Court of Appeals):
Guidelines in interpreting Art. 36 of the Family Code:
i. Burden of Proof belongs to the Plaintiff. Doubt should
be resolved in favor of existence and continuation of
the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
ii. Root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
(a) medically or clinically identified; (b) alleged in the
complaint; (c) sufficiently proven by the experts; and
(d) clearly explained in the decision.

iii.

Incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time

of the celebration of the marriage (exchanged I dos).
iv. Incapacity must be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Incurability may be
absolute or relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolute against everyone of
the same sex.
v. Illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of the marriage; it should not be merely a
refusal, neglect, difficulty, or ill will. Ergo, the
natal/supervening disability effectively incapacitates
the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to the
marriage.
vi. Essential marital obligations = Arts. 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife &
Arts. 220, 221, and 225 of the Family Code w/ respect
to the children
vii. Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church of the
Philippines, while not controlling, should be given
great respect by the courts.
viii. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the SolGen to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
SolGen issues a certification stating his reasons for
agreeing or opposing the petition. SolGen shall
discharge the equivalent function of defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095.
c. Marcos v. Marcos: clarified that there is no requirement
that defendant/respondent should be personally
examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition
sine qua non for the declaration of marriage based on
psychologically incapacity. Introduction of expert opinion
in a petition under Art. 36 of the Family Code no longer
necessary if the totality of evidence shows psychological
incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence,
and incurability can be duly established.

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d. Ngo Te v. Yu-Te: rigid rules are in appropriate in resolving
all cases of psychological incapacity (PI) such as those
set out it Molina. This case put into question the
applicability of time-tested guidelines set forth in Manila.
e. Ting v. Velez-Ting & Suazo v. Suazo: clarified that Ngo Te
did not abandon Molina, it simply suggested the
relaxation of its stringent requirements. Ngo Te merely
stands for a more flexible approach in considering
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on
PI.
3. Summary of Evidence
a. Petitioners testimony: Petitioners theory that the
respondents psychological incapacity is premised on her
refusal or unwillingness to perform certain marital
obligations, and a number of unpleasant personality
traits such as immaturity, irresponsibility, and
unfaithfulness. These acts, in our view, do not rise to the
level of psychological incapacity that the law requires,
and should be distinguished from the difficulty, if not
outright refusal or neglect, in the performance of
some marital obligations that characterize some
marriages.
Petitioners testimony failed to establish that the
respondents condition is a manifestation of a disordered
personality rooted on some incapacitating or debilitating
psychological condition that makes her completely
unable to discharge the essential marital obligations. If
at all, the petitioner merely showed that the respondent
had some personality defects that showed their
manifestation during the marriage; his testimony sorely
lacked details necessary to establish that the
respondents defects existed at the inception of the
marriage. In addition, the petitioner failed to discuss
the gravity of the respondents condition; neither did he
mention that the respondents malady was incurable,
or if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
respondents means to undertake. The petitioners
declarations that the respondent does not accept her
fault, does not want to change, and refused to

reform are insufficient to establish a psychological or

mental defect that is serious, grave, or incurable as
contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code.
b. Psychiatric Evaluation Report: fell short in proving that
the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential marital duties. Dr. Patac did not
personally evaluate and examine the respondent; he, in
fact, recommended at the end of his Report for the
respondent to undergo the same examination [that the
petitioner] underwent.
We do not suggest that a personal examination of the
party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is
mandatory. If a psychological disorder can be proven by
independent means, no reason exists why such
independent proof cannot be admitted and given
credit. No such independent evidence appears on record,
however, to have been gathered in this case.
In his Report, Dr. Patac attempted to establish
the juridical
antecedence of
the
respondents
condition by stating that the respondent manifested
inflexible maladaptive behavior before marriage,
pointing out how the respondent behaved before the
marriage the respondent defied her parents and lived
alone; rented a room for herself; and allowed the
petitioner to sleep with her. These perceived behavioral
flaws, to our mind, are insufficient to establish that the
incapacity was rooted in the history of the respondent
antedating the marriage. This is an area where
independent evidence, such as information from a
person intimately related to the respondent, could prove
useful. In the absence of such evidence, it is not
surprising why the Psychiatric Report Evaluation failed to
explain how and why the respondents so-called
inflexible maladaptive behavior was already present at
the time of the marriage.
Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed
to
prove
the gravity or seriousness of
the
respondents condition. He simply made an enumeration

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of the respondents purported behavioral defects (as
related to him by third persons), and on this basis
characterized the respondent to be suffering from mixed
personality disorder. At best, the personality flaws
mentioned in the Report, even if true, could only amount
to insensitivity, sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity,
and irresponsibility, which do not by themselves warrant
a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
The Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to
adequately explain how Dr. Patac came to the conclusion
that the respondents personality disorder had no
definite treatment. It did not discuss the concept of
mixed personality disorder and failed to show how and to
what extent the respondent exhibited this disorder in
order to create a necessary inference that the
respondents condition had no definite treatment or is
incurable. A glaring deficiency, to our mind, is the
Psychiatric Evaluation Reports failure to support
its findings and conclusions with any factual basis.
The standards used in Court to assess the sufficiency of
psychological reports may be deemed very strict, but
these are proper, in view of the principle that any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.

OCHOSA v. ALANO G.R. NO. 167459, JANUARY 26, 2011

Soldier love story
FACTS: It appears that Jose met Bona in August 1973 when he was
a young lieutenant in the AFP while the latter was a seventeenyear-old first year college drop-out. They had a whirlwind romance
that culminated into sexual intimacy and eventual marriage on 27
October 1973 before the Honorable Judge Cesar S. Principe in
Basilan. The couple did not acquire any property. Neither did they
incur any debts. Their union produced no offspring. In 1976,
however, they found an abandoned and neglected one-year-old
baby girl whom they later registered as their daughter, naming her
Ramona Celeste AlanoOchosa.

During their marriage, Jose was often assigned to various parts of

the Philippine archipelago as an officer in the AFP. Bona did not
cohabit with him in his posts, preferring to stay in her hometown of
Basilan. Neither did Bona visit him in his areas of assignment,
except in one (1) occasion when Bona stayed with him for four (4)
days.
Sometime in 1985, Jose was appointed as the Battalion
Commander of the Security Escort Group. He and Bona, along with
Ramona, were given living quarters at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City
where they resided with their military aides.
In 1987, Jose was charged with rebellion for his alleged
participation in the failed coup detat. He was incarcerated in Camp
Crame.
It appears that Bona was an unfaithful spouse. Even at the onset of
their marriage when Jose was assigned in various parts of the
country, she had illicit relations with other men. Bona apparently
did not change her ways when they lived together at Fort Bonifacio;
she entertained male visitors in her bedroom whenever Jose was
out of their living quarters. On one occasion, Bona was caught by
Demetrio Bajet y Lita, a security aide, having sex with Joses driver,
Corporal Gagarin. Rumors of Bonas sexual infidelity circulated in
the military community. When Jose could no longer bear these
rumors, he got a military pass from his jail warden and confronted
Bona.
During their confrontation, Bona admitted her relationship with
Corporal Gagarin who also made a similar admission to Jose. Jose
drove Bona away from their living quarters. Bona left with Ramona
and went to Basilan.
In 1994, Ramona left Bona and came to live with Jose. It is Jose who
is currently supporting the needs of Ramona.
Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, docketed
as Civil Case No. 97-2903 with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140,
seeking to nullify his marriage to Bona on the ground of the latters
psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential obligations of
marriage. One of the evidence presented is the testimony of
psychiatrist, who reached the conclusion that respondent
(Bona)was suffering from histrionic personality disorder. The RTC
granted the nullity of marriage, but the CA reversed the decision of
RTC. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.

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HELD: NO.
After a careful perusal of the evidence presented in this case, that
Bona had been, on several occasions with several other men,
sexually disloyal to her spouse, Jose. Likewise, Bona had indeed
abandoned Jose. However, we cannot apply the same conviction to
Joses thesis that the totality of Bonas acts constituted
psychological incapacity as determined by Article 36 of the Family
Code. There is inadequate credible evidence that her defects
were already present at the inception of, or prior to, the marriage.
In other words, her alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy
the jurisprudential requisite of juridical antecedence.
Also, the psychiatric report of Dr. RondainregardingBonas
psychological condition was gathered solely from Jose and his
witnesses.
Contrary to Joses assertion, Bona had no manifest desire to
abandon Jose at the beginning of their marriage and was, in fact,
living with him for the most part of their relationship from 1973 up
to the time when Jose drove her away from their conjugal home in
1988. On the contrary, the record shows that it was Jose who was
constantly away from Bona by reason of his military duties and his
later incarceration. A reasonable explanation for Bonas refusal to
accompany Jose in his military assignments in other parts of
Mindanao may be simply that those locations were known conflict
areas in the seventies. Any doubt as to Bonas desire to live with
Jose would later be erased by the fact that Bona lived with Jose in
their conjugal home in Fort Bonifacio during the following decade.
In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bonas alleged psychological
incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and abandonment, can only be
convincingly traced to the period of time after her marriage to Jose
and not to the inception of the said marriage.
We have stressed time and again that Article 36 of the Family Code
is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond
at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to
71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.

Nial vs. Bayadog 328 SCRA 122

March 14, 2000

Declaration of Nullity

FACTS:

Facts: Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa on September 26,

1974. On April 24, 1985, he shot and killed her. 20 months
thereafter, he remarried Norma Badayog, the respondent herewith.
After Pepito died, his heirs by his first marriage filed a petition for
declaration of nullity on the marriage of their father with Norma
Badayog on the ground of lack of marriage license. Norma Badayog
contends that the ground have no legal basis for her marriage to
Pepito according to Article 34 of the Family Code no marriage
license is necessary for person who have cohabited for atl east five
years. The respondent also contends that petitioners are not
among those allowed by the law to file a suit for declaration of
nullity of her marriage to Pepito.
The trial court ruled in favor of the respondent on the
ground that indeed the Family Code is silent as to situation. The
Petition should have been filed before the death of Pepito and not
after his death. Thus, the petitioner appealed to the Supreme
Court.
Issue: (1) Whether or not the respondent is right to contend that
no need of marriage license was necessary for Pepito and her have
cohabited for at least five years.
(2)Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito valid.
Held: Pepito and Norma could not have possibly be legally
cohabited for at least five years since Pepito was still married to
Teodulfa counting backwards from the time he and Norma
celebrated their marriage. A period of cohabitation is characterized
by exclusivity and continuity. There should be no legal impediment
on either party to marry. Pepitos previous marriage to Teodulfa is a
legal impediment disqualifying him to the exception of a marriage
license. Thus, his second marriage should have a marriage license
to be valid. In this case, the marriage of Pepito and Norma lacking
the formal requisite of a marriage licese is therefore void.

Cojuango v. Palma
Eduardo Cojuangco filed with the court the instant

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complaint for disbarment against Atty. Leo Palma alleging as
grounds deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office, violation
of his oath as a lawyer and grossly immoral conduct.
Cojuangco and Palma met sometime in the 70s . Cojjuangco was a
client of ACCRA and Palma was the lawyer assigned to handle his
cases. Consequently, Palmas relationship with Cojuangcos family
became intimate. He traveled and dined with them abroad. He
frequented their house and even tutored Cojuangcos 22-year old
daughter, Maria Luisa, then a student of Assumption Convent.
Without the knowledge of Cojuangco, Palma married Lisa in H.K. It
was only the next day that Conjuangco was informed and Palma
assured him that everything is legal. Cojuangco was shocked,
knowing fully well that Palma is a married man and has 3 children.
ISSUE: Whether or not Palma should be held liable.
HELD: YES. Palma married LIsa while he has a subsisting marriage
with
Elizabeth Hermosisima. Undoubtedly, Palmas act constitute grossly
immoral conduct, a ground for disbarment. He made a mockery of
marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and
dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage is contrary to
honesty, justice, decency and morality.
The circumstances here speak of a clear case of betrayal of trust
and abuse of confidence. Moreover, he availed of Cojuangcos
resources by securing a plane ticket from Cojuangcos office in
order to marry his daughter in H.K. without his consent.
Palmas culpability is aggravated by the fact that Lisa was 22 and
was under psychological treatment for emotional immaturity.
Palma is disbarred from the practice of law.

56 De Castro v De Castro
Declaration of Nullity
FACTS: Reilen and Annabelle De Castro applied for a marriage
license which however expired so instead they executed an
affidavit stating that they had been living together as husband and
wife for five years and got married in a civil rite with a judge. They

in fact became sweethearts during 1991 and only started engaging

in sex in October 1994. They executed the affidavit on March 1995.
Annabelle gave birth to Reinna and is now asking for support from
Reilen as his wife and for their child. He says that their marriage
was void ab initio because they executed a fake affidavit; that he
was just asked to sign the marriage contract because she wanted
to be saved from embarrassment because she was pregnant and
he didnt obtain the necessary parental advice. He avers that they
never lived as husband and wife and he never acknowledged the
child.
Trial Court: No valid marriage because no marriage license but as
father of child need to give support.
CA: Since the presumption is marriage is valid until declared null
and void then child is presumed his and he must give support and
TC is wrong in declaring the marriage a nullity when the action was
for support.
ISSUE: 1. W/N TC had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
marriage?
2. W/N child is the daughter of Reilen?
HELD:
1. YES! The trial court had jurisdiction to determine the
validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent. The
validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked. In
Ninal v Bayadog, the Court said that other than for purposes of
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question
the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a
marriage an absolute nullity.
In this case, they had no marriage license and had a false affidavit.
The falsity of which Annabelle admitted upon cross-examination so
under the Family Code the absence of any of the essential and
formal requisites renders the marriage void.
2. Yes! Reinna is his illegitimate daughter and is entitled to
support, he admitted so in his affidavit for tax exemption.
Declaration of Nullity and Bigamy

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57. JARILLO v. PEOPLE (MR)
Facts: Victoria Jarillo was convicted for bigamy, which was affirmed
by the CA and SC. She is now moving for reconsideration arguing
that since her marriages were entered into before the FC took
effect, the applicable law is Sec. 29 of the Marriage Law (Act 3613)
instead of Art. 40 of the FC, which requires a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void before a person may contract
a subsequent marriage.
Background: In the original case kase, she got married twice to two
different guys. Her second husband filed an annulment case
against her which ended up with her conviction of bigamy. But
during the proceedings, she instituted an annulment case against
her first husband. The RTC declared her first marriage null and void
because of psychological incapacity. She filed an MR with the CA
on her bigamy case using this subsequent declaration as a defense.
But the CA and the SC did not allow it because a judicial declaration
of nullity is needed before a person can enter into a subsequent
marriage (Art. 40).
Issue: Should the FC apply? - YES
Ratio:
As far back as 1995, the SC made the declaration that Art. 40,
which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively
because Art. 256 of the FC itself provides that the Code shall have
retroactive effect insofar as it does nor prejudice or impair vested
or acquired rights. The retroactive application of procedural laws is
not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected. The reason is that as a general law, no vested
right may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws.
In the case at bar, Victorias clear intent is to obtain a judicial
declaration of nullity of her first marriage and thereafter to invoke
the very same judgment to prevent her prosecution for bigamy.
She cannot have her cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an
adventurous bigamist has to do is disregard Art. 40 of the FC,
contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of
nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void.
Such scenario would render nugatory the provision on bigamy (the

original case said that for bigamy to exist, it is enough that the first
marriage subsisted when the second marriage was entered into).

Antone v. Beronilla
Facts: Antone executed a complaint for bigamy against Beronilla,
alleging that her marriage with respondent had not yet been legally
dissolved when the latter contracted a second marriage with
Maguillo. Beronilla moved to quash the information because his
marriage with Antone was declared null and void by the RTC.
Absent a first marriage, he cannot be charged with bigamy. The
court quashed the information. MR denied. CA dismissed the case
as well.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion when it sustained the motion to quash on the basis of a
fact contrary to those alleged in the information
Held: Yes
A motion to quash an information is a mode by which an accused
assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information against
him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which
are apparent in the face of the information.
The court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity
is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted,
or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage
The issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between
petitioner and respondent only after the latter contracted the
subsequent marriage is immaterial for the purpose of establishing
that the facts alleged in the information does not constitute an
offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such defense
be interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by way of
exception to the established rule that facts contrary to the
allegations in the information are matters of defense which may be
raised only during the presentation of evidence.
The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in quashing the
information. It considered an evidence introduced to prove a fact
not alleged thereat disregarding the settled rules that a motion to
quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts stated in the

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information, and that facts not alleged thereat may be appreciated
only under exceptional circumstances, none of which is present in
this case.
Case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Voidable Marriages: Grounds
MANUEL G. ALMELOR versus THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF LAS PINAS CITY
Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida
Trinidad (Leonida) were married on January 29, 1989 at the Manila
Cathedral. Their union bore three children.Manuel and Leonida are
both medical practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician.
After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the
RTC in Las Pinas City to annul their marriage on the ground that
Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations. Leonida averred that Manuels kind and gentle
demeanor did not last long. In the public eye, Manuel was the
picture of a perfect husband and father. This was not the case in his
private life. At home, Leonida described Manuel as a harsh
disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered. Manuels
unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their children was the
cause of their frequent fights as a couple. Leonida complained that
this was in stark contrast to the alleged lavish affection Manuel has
for his mother. Manuels deep attachment to his mother and his
dependence on her decision-making were incomprehensible to
Leonida.
Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his
homosexuality. Her suspicions were first aroused when she noticed
Manuels peculiar closeness to his male companions. For instance,
she caught him in an indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting
his affection for a male caller. She also found several pornographic
homosexual materials in his possession. Her worse fears were
confirmed when she saw Manuel kissed another man on the lips.
The man was a certain Dr. Nogales. When she confronted Manuel,
he denied everything. At this point, Leonida took her children and
left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving
support to their children.
Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was
presented to prove Leonidas claim. Dr. del Fonso Garcia testified
that she conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of

psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also had a one-time interview with

Manuel and face-to-face interviews with Ma. Paulina Corrinne (the
eldest child). She concluded that Manuel is psychologically
incapacitated. Such incapacity is marked by antecedence; it existed
even before the marriage and appeared to be incurable.
ISSUE: Whether not the marriage could be annulled based on
homosexuality? NO.
Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to
annul a marriage, not homosexuality per se.
Manuel is a desperate man determined to salvage what remains of
his marriage. Persistent in his quest, he fought back all the heavy
accusations of incapacity, cruelty, and doubted masculinity thrown
at him. The trial court declared that Leonidas petition for nullity had
no basis at all because the supporting grounds relied upon can not
legally make a case under Article 36 of the Family Code. It
went further by citing Republic v. Molina: Indeed, mere allegations
of conflicting personalities, irreconcilable differences, incessant
quarrels and/or beatings, unpredictable mood swings, infidelities,
vices, abandonment, and difficulty, neglect, or failure in the
performance of some marital obligations do not suffice to establish
psychological incapacity. If so, the lower court should have
dismissed outright the petition for not meeting the guidelines set in
Molina. What Leonida attempted to demonstrate were Manuels
homosexual tendencies by citing overt acts generally predominant
among homosexual individuals. She wanted to prove that the
perceived homosexuality rendered Manuel incapable of fulfilling the
essential marital obligations.
Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate
the allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed
this to Leonida at the time of their marriage. The lower court
considered the public perception of Manuels sexual preference
without the corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of
Manuels peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality. Even
assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the
lower court cannot appreciate it as a ground to annul his marriage
with Leonida. The law is clear a marriage may be annulled when
the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, such as
concealment of homosexuality. Nowhere in the said decision was it
proven by preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a
homosexual at the onset of his marriage and that he deliberately
hid such fact to his wife. It is the concealment of homosexuality,

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and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent of the
innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and intent
to defraud the other party in giving consent to the marriage.
Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid, it
must be freely given by both parties. An allegation of vitiated
consent must be proven by preponderance of evidence. The Family
Code has enumerated an exclusive list of circumstances
constituting fraud. Homosexuality per se is not among those cited,
but its concealment.
Procedure and Effects of Termination of Marriage
Tuason v. CA
Facts: In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason
(Maria) filed a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of her
marriage to petitioner Emilio R. Tuason (Tuason) on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Tuasons defense was that he and Maria
initially had a normal relationship but that this changed in 1982
when his wife did not accord the respect and dignity due him as a
husband but treated him like a persona non grata.
After Maria rested her case, the trial court scheduled the reception
of Tuasons evidence. Two days before the scheduled hearing, a
counsel for petitioner moved for a postponement on the ground
that the principal counsel was out of the country and due to return
on the first week of June. The court reset the hearing. But on the
new date, Tuason failed to appear. On Marias oral motion, the court
declared Tuason to have waived his right to present evidence and
deemed the case submitted for decision on the basis of the
evidence presented.
The RTC declared the marriage null and void and awarded custody
of the children to Maria on the ground of Tuasons psychological
incapacity.
The judgment was said to be without prejudice to the application of
the other effects of annulment as provided for under Arts. 50 and
51 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
While his counsel received a copy of the decision, Tuason did not
file any appeal.
Afterwards, Tuason filed a "Motion for Dissolution of Conjugal
Partnership of Gains and Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal
Properties." Maria opposed the motion. Also on the same day,

Tuason, through new counsel, filed with the trial court a petition for
relief from judgment of the decision of nullity.
The RTC denied the relief from judgment. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the RTCs order.
Issues: 1. WON the relief of judgment should be granted.
2. WON the prosecurtor is required to intervene in all cases for
annulment or declaration of nullity.
Held:1. No!
2. No!
Ratio:1. Under Sec. 2 of Rule 38, a final and executory judgment or
order of the Regional Trial Court may be set aside, and relief from
judgment granted, on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence. In addition, the petitioner must assert facts
showing that he has a good, substantial and meritorious defense or
cause of action. If the petition is granted, the court shall proceed to
hear and determine the case as if a timely motion for new trial had
been granted therein.
In the case at bar, the decision had already become final and
executory when Tuason failed to appeal during the reglementary
period. Tuason however contends he was denied due process when,
after failing to appear on two scheduled hearings, the trial court
deemed him to have waived his right to present evidence and
rendered judgment on the basis of the evidence for Maria. He
justifies his absence at the hearings on the ground that he was
then "confined for medical and/or rehabilitation reasons." The
records, however, show that the former counsel of Tuason did not
inform the trial court of this confinement. And when the court
rendered its decision, the same counsel was out of the country for
which reason the decision became final and executory as no appeal
was taken therefrom.
The failure of petitioners counsel to notify him on time of the
adverse judgment to enable him to appeal therefrom is negligence
which is not excusable. Notice sent to counsel of record is binding
upon the client. Similarly inexcusable was the failure of his former
counsel to inform the trial court of Tuasons confinement and
medical treatment as the reason for his non-appearance at the
scheduled hearings. Tuason has not given any reason why his
former counsel, intentionally or unintentionally, did not inform the
court of this fact.

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2. Because of the danger of collusion, in all cases for annulment,
declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the
state for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the
parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. If the defendant spouse fails to answer the complaint,
the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should
order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists
between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may
oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through
the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof
adduced is dubious and fabricated.
The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of
Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code. For one, Tuason was not
declared in default by the trial court for failure to answer. Tuason
filed his answer to the complaint and contested the cause of action
alleged by Maria. He actively participated in the proceedings below
by filing several pleadings and cross-examining the witnesses of
private Respondent. It is crystal clear that every stage of the
litigation was characterized by a no-holds barred contest and not
by collusion.
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of
marriage and legal separation proceedings is to determine whether
resort in Cavite. When the husband wanted to marry again, he filed
before the Regional Trial Court a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage with the petitioner on the ground of
psychological incapacity on June 5, 1995. Although he knew that
the petitioner was already residing at the resort in Cavite, he
alleged in his petition that the petitioner was residing at Las Pias,
Metro Manila, such that summons never reached her. Nevertheless
substituted service was rendered to their son at his residence in
Cavite. Petitioner was then declared in default for failing to answer
the said petition. Just over a month after it was filed, the trial court
granted the petition and declared the marriage of the parties void
ab
initio.
Five years later, petitioner challenged the trial courts order
declaring as void ab initio her marriage with respondent Rodolfo,
citing extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction over her person,
among others. She alleged that the respondent lied on her real
address in his petition so she never received summons on the case,
hence depriving her of her right to be heard. The Court of Appeals

collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the
evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Tuasons vehement
opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion
that collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by
Tuason that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the
parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the nonintervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion
between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the
proceedings in the trial court.

ANCHETA vs. ANCHETA

424 SCRA 725
FACTS
Petitioner Marietta Ancheta and respondent Rodolfo Ancheta were
married on March 5, 1959 and had eight children. After 33 years of
marriage the petitioner left the respondent and their children. Their
conjugal properties were later separated through a courtsanctioned compromise agreement where the petitioner got among
others a
dismissed her petition so she now comes to the Supreme Court for
review on certiorari.
ISSUE Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage was
valid?
HELD NO. The trial court and the public prosecutor defied Article
48 of the Family Code and Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of
Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure).
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is
fraught with the danger of collusion, says the Court. Hence, in all
cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal
separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear
on behalf of the State for the purpose of preventing any collusion
between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer
the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but
instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if

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collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or
fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or annulment
through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the
proof adduced is dubious and fabricated. Here, the trial court
immediately received the evidence of the respondent ex-parte and
rendered judgment against the petitioner without a whimper of
protest from the public prosecutor who even did not challenge the
motion to declare petitioner in default. The Supreme Court
reiterates: The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social
institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not mere
pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred
institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union
but the exposure of an invalid one as well.

The final judgment in such cases [for the annulment or declaration

of nullity of marriage] shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and
support of the common children, and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such other matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings." (Emphasis and
underscoring added)
By Erics filing of the case for declaration of nullity of marriage
before the Pasig RTC he automatically submitted the issue of the
custody of Bianca as an incident thereof. After the CA subsequently
dismissed the habeas corpus case, there was no need for Eric to
replead his prayer for custody for, as above-quoted provisions of
the Family Code provide, the custody issue in a declaration of
nullity case is deemed pleaded.

YU VS. YU

Legal separation: Procedure

FACTS: Eric Jonathan Yu filed a petition for habeas corpus before

the CA, alleging that his estranged wife, Caroline Tanchay-Yu,
unlawfully withheld from him the custody of their minor child,
Bianca Yu. The petition included a prayer for the award to him of
the custody of Bianca.
Eric also filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and
the dissolution of absolute community of property before the Pasig
RTC. The petition also included a prayer for the award to him of the
custody of Bianca, subject to the final resolution by the CA of his
petition for habeas corpus. Because of this, the CA dismissed the
petition for habeas corpus, having been rendered moot and
academic.

ENRICO L. PACETE, CLARITA DE LA CONCEPCION, EMELDA C.

PACETE, EVELINA C. PACETE and EDUARDO C. PACETE vs.
HON. GLICERIO V. CARRIAGA, JR. and CONCEPCION
(CONCHITA) ALANIS PACETE

ISSUE: WON the Pasig RTC acquired jurisdiction over the custody
issue???
RULING: YES.
Art. 49. During the pendency of the action [for annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriage] and in the absence of adequate
provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court
shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and
support of their common children. x x x It shall also provide
for appropriate visitation rights of the other
parent. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)17
Art. 50. x x x x

Facts: Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint for the declaration of

nullity of the marriage between her husband Enrico Pacete and one
Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation (between
Alanis and Pacete), accounting and separation of property. In her
complaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete in 1938 in
Cotabato. In 1948, Pacete contracted a second marriage with
Clarita de la Concepcion in Kidapawan, North Cotabato which Alanis
only learned of in 1979. During Alanis marriage to Pacete, the
latter acquired vast property consisting of large tracts of land,
fishponds and several motor vehicles and placed the several pieces
of property either in his name and Clarita or in the names of his
children with Clarita and other dummies.
The defendants were each served with summons on
November 15, 1979. They filed a motion for an extension of 20
days within which to file an answer. The court granted the motion.
The defendants filed a second motion for an extension of another
30 days which was granted but reduced to 20 days. The Order of
the court (reducing the extension) was mailed to defendants'
counsel but it appears that the defendants were unaware of
this so they again filed another motion for an extension of 15

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days counted from the expiration of the 30-day period previously
sought" within which to file an answer. The following day, the court
denied this last motion on the ground that it was filed after the
20-day extension had expired. The plaintiff thereupon filed a
motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court
forthwith granted. The plaintiff was then directed to present her
evidence. The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the
issuance of a Decree of Legal Separation, and declared the
properties as conjugal properties of the plaintiff and defendant halfand-half. The subsequent marriage between Pacete and Conception
was also declared void ab initio. Defendants filed a special civil
action of certiorari.
Issue: WON defendants were improperly placed in default YES!
Ruling: Art. 101 of the Civil Code provides: No decree of legal
separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the
defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire
whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no
collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in
order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not
fabricated.
The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for the
intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested
proceedings for legal separation, is to emphasize that marriage is
more than a mere contract; that it is a social institution in which the
state is vitally interested, so that its continuation or interruption
cannot be made to depend upon the parties themselves. (Brown
v. Yambao)
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code,
further mandates that an action for legal separation must in no
case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing
of the petition, obviously in order to provide the parties a "coolingoff" period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward
getting the parties to reconcile.
Also, Sec.6 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provides that if the
defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the
parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State
in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.

It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray for legal
separation. That other remedies, whether principal or incidental,
have likewise been sought in the same action cannot dispense, nor
excuse compliance, with any of the statutory requirements.
Liquidation: Effect of Death of One of the Parties
Carmen Lapuz Sy (represented by Macario
Eufemio S. Eufemio (alias Eufemio Sy Uy)

Lapuz) vs

Facts: Carmen Lapuz filed a petition for legal separation against

Eufemio S. Eufemio. It was alleged that they were married, they
had no child and that they acquired properties during their
marriage. She discovered that Eufemio was cohabiting with a
Chinese woman named Go Hiok.
Eufemio counter-claimed that his marriage with Carmen
Lapuz was void ab initio on the ground that he had a prior and
subsisting marriage under Chinese laws and customes with one Go
Hiok.
Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their evidence.
However, before the trial could be completed, Carmen Lapuz died
in a vehicular accident. The court was notified. Counsel for Carmen
also moved that Macario Lapuz substitute his daughter Carmen.
Eufemio then moved to dismiss the petition for legal
separation on the ground that the death of Carmen abated the
action. The court issued an order dismissing the case. Notably,
even if Eufemio filed counterclaims (for nullity of the marriage), he
no longer pursued this after the case was dismissed.
Issue: Does the death of a plaintiff (before final decree) in an action
for legal separation abate the action?
Held: An action for legal separation which involves just a physical
separation of the spouses is purely personal. Thus, being purely
personal in character it follows that the death of one party to the
action causes the death of the action itself.
The resulting property relations would also appear to be the
sole effect of the decree of legal separation issued. Thus, the
property rights cannot also survive the death of the plaintiff.
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated
by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is
that these rights are mere effects of the decree of separation, their

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source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do
not come into existence.
As to the action of Eufemio to declare his marriage with
Carmen as void ab initio, it is apparent that such action became
moot and academic after Carmen died because such death
automatically dissolved the union. Their property rights should be
resolved and determined in a proper action for partition.

Antionio Macadangdang vs. CA, Filomena Gaviana

Macadangdang
Effect of death of one of the parties
Antonio and Filomena got married in 1946 after living together for 2
years. Their business grew from a humble buy-and-sell business
and sari-sari store operation into merchandising, trucking,
transportation, rice and corn mill businesses, abaca stripping, real
estate, and others. They have 6 children. While their financial
stabilized, their marriage became shaky up to 1965 when they split
up and the wife, Filomena, left for Cebu. When she returned to
Davao in 1971, she learned of the illicit affairs of her estranged
husband and she decided to file a complaint for legal separation.
The judgment was rendered ordering the legal separation of the
spouses. Since there is no complete list of the community property
which has to be divided, pending the dissolution of the conjugal
property, Antonio was ordered to pay P10k as support for the wife
and the children.
Filomena filed a motion for the appointment of an administrator
and urging favorable action to impede unlawful sequestration of
some conjugal assets and clandestine transfers by Antonio. Several
motions objecting to this were filed by Antonio but were denied by
the court. Antonio then appealed to CA, which dismissed the case.
Hence, the case was brought to SC. Pending appeal, Antonio died.
Counsel for Antonio informed the court and filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the case is already moot and academic
as a consequence of the death of petitioner. Filomena agreed.
ISSUE: WON the death of the petitioner rendered the case moot
and academic?

HELD: No. Legal problems do not cease simply because one of the
parties dies and in view of the significant issues raised, this Court
resolved to meet said issues frontally.
In this case, Antonio had averred that the CA gravely erred in
holding that respondent Judges incomplete decision of January 4,
1973 (which declared them legally separated) had become final
and executor; and that the same Court committed an error in
holding that the appointment of an administrator in the case was
proper.
It is important to note that the TC had resolved only the issue of
legal separation and reserved for supplemental decision the
division of the conjugal properties. A supplement decision on the
division of property is a mere incident of the decree of legal
separation the latter being the main judgment.
We do not find merit in petitioners submission that the questioned
decision had not become final and executory since the law
explicitly and clearly provides for the dissolution and liquidation of
conjugal partnership of gains of the absolute community of
property as among the effects of the final decree of legal
separation.
A decree of legal separation, which does not yet include an order of
division of property is not an incomplete judgment and if not
appealed, becomes final and executory. Such dissolution and
liquidation are necessary consequences of the final decree and are
mandated by Art. 106 of the Old Civil Code. Moreover, American
jurisprudence held that the provisions of the decree of legal
separation should definitely and finally determine the property
rights and interests of the parties.
Considering that the decree of legal separation of the parties had
long become final and executory, the only issue left is the division
of the conjugal property. By reason of the final decree of legal
separation, however, conjugal partnership of gains had been
automatically dissolved. The law clearly spells out the effects of a
final decree of legal separation on the conjugal property. Thus, the
rules on dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership of
gains under the provisions of the Civil Code would be applied

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effective January 4, 1973 when the decree of legal separation
became final.

and under Article 921 one of the causes for disinheriting a spouse is
"when the spouse has given cause for legal separation."

Side note..
Due to the death of the petitioner, the law on intestate succession
should take over in the disposition of whatever remaining
properties have been allocated to petitioner.

67. Sabalones v. CA

Petition is dismissed.
Effects of Legal Separation Pendente Lite
Lerma vs CA
Lerma and Diaz were married. However, Lerma filed a case against
his wife Diaz and a certain Ramirez for adultery. While this case
was pending, Diaz likewise filed a complaint for legal separation
against Lerma based on 2 grounds: concubinage and attempt
against her life. During the pendency of the legal separation case,
Diaz moved for and was granted support pendente lite. Lerma
opposed, saying that the pending adultery case against her is a
sufficient basis to deny the motion for support pendente lite. (it
must be noted that later on, Diaz was found guilty of adultery by
the trial court)
ISSUE: Is the pending adultery case valid ground to deny the other
spouse support pendente lite?
SC: YES
Jurisprudence provides that adultery is a good defense.
The right to separate support or maintenance, even from the
conjugal partnership property, presupposes the existence of a
justifiable cause for the spouse claiming such right to live
separately. This is implicit in Article 104 of the Civil Code, which
states that after the filing of the petition for legal separation the
spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other. A
petition in bad faith, such as that filed by one who is himself or
herself guilty of an act which constitutes a ground for legal
separation at the instance of the other spouse, cannot be
considered as within the intendment of the law granting separate
support. In fact under Article 303 of the same Code the obligation
to give support shall cease "when the recipient, be he a forced heir
or not, has committed some act which gives rise to disinheritance;"

Petitioner Samson Sabalones was a member of our diplomatic

service assigned to different countries during his successive tours
of duties. He left to his wife, herein respondent Remedios, the
administration of some of their conjugal properties for 15 years.
When Samson retired as an ambassador, he came back to the
Philippines but not to his wife and kids. 4 years later, he sought
judicial authorization to sell a lot and building in Greenhills. It
belonged to the conjugal partnership, but he claimed that he was
68 y.o, then, very sick and living alone without any income. He
needed his share of the proceeds to defray his hospitalization costs.
Remedios filed a counterclaim for legal separation. She alleged that
the property in Greenhills was being occupied by her and her 6 kids
and that they merely depended on support from the rentals earned
by another conjugal property in Forbes Park. She also alleged that
Samson was living with another woman, Thelma, and their 3 kids.
She wanted a decree of legal separation and to order the
liquidation of their properties, and that her husbands share be
forfeited because of his adultery.
It was found out in trial that Samson contracted a bigamous
marriage with Thelma. Court granted legal separation and forfeiture
of Samsons shares in the conjugal properties.
On appeal to the CA by Samson, Remedios filed for issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Samson from interfering with
the administration of their properties. She alleged that he harassed
the tenant of the Forbes Park property and that he disposed of their
valuable conjugal property in U.S in favor of his paramour. CA
granted the preliminary injunction.
Samson now assails the order of the CA arguing that the law
provides no injunctive relief in such a case, since the law provides
for joint administration of conjugal properties. He cites Art 124 of
the FC.

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Issue: w/n it was proper for the CA to issue injunctive relief YES
Ruling: The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint
administration over the conjugal properties as provided in Art. 124.
However, Art. 61 states that after a petition for legal separation has
been filed, the court shall, in the absence of a written agreement
between the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a third
person to act as the administrator.
While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has
been made, it was implicit in the decision of the trial court denying
the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties (and thus also
disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation was
approved by the CA when it issued in favor of the respondent wife
the preliminary injunction.
The primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to
preserve the status quo of the things or the relations between the
parties and thus protect the rights of the plaintiff respecting these
matters during the pendency of the suit. It may issue to prevent
future wrongs although no right has yet been violated.
The Court noted that the wife has been administering the subject
properties for almost 19 years now without complaint on the part of
the petitioner. He has not alleged that her administration has
caused prejudice to the conjugal partnership.
In her motion for the preliminary injunction, the wife alleged that
the petitioner's harassment of their tenant at Forbes Park would
jeopardize the lease and deprive her and her children of the income
therefrom. She also testified the numerous properties they owned dollar accounts, houses in QC and Cebu and a Benz. Remedios also
complained that Samson executed a quitclaim over their conjugal
property in California, U.S.A., in favor of Thelma, to improve his
paramour's luxurious lifestyle to the prejudice of his legitimate
family. These allegations, none of which was refuted by the
husband, show that the injunction is necessary to protect the
interests of the private respondent and her children and prevent
the dissipation of the conjugal assets.

The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a

right and its actual or threatened violation. Regardless of the
outcome of the appeal, it cannot be denied that as the petitioner's
legitimate wife, Remedios has a right to a share of the conjugal
estate. There is also enough evidence to raise the apprehension
that entrusting said estate to the petitioner may result in its
improvident disposition to the detriment of his wife and children.
Inasmuch as the trial court had earlier declared the forfeiture of the
petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, it would be prudent
not to allow him in the meantime to participate in its management.
Let it be stressed that the injunction has not permanently installed
the respondent wife as the administrator of the whole mass of
conjugal assets. It has merely allowed her to continue
administering the properties in the meantime without interference
from the petitioner, pending the express designation of the
administrator in accordance with Article 61 of the Family Code.

68. SIOCHI V. GOZON

Effects of Legal Separation Pendente Lite/After Finality
Facts: This case involves a 30,000 SQ.M. parcel of land
(property)registered in the name of the Spouses Gozon.
Elvira filed with Cavite RTC a petition for legal separation
against her husband Alfredo. Elvira filed a notice of lis pendens,
while the legal separation case was still pending. Meanwhile,
Alfredo and Mario Siochi (Mario) entered into an Agreement to Buy
and Sell involving the property for the price of P18 million. They
stipulated that Alfredo was to remove the notice of lis pendens on
the title, to have the land excluded from the legal separation case
and to secure an affidavit from the wife Elvira that the property was
the exclusive property of Alfredo.
However, despite repeated demands from Mario, Alfredo
failed to comply with these stipulations. After paying the P5 million
earnest money as partial payment of the purchase price, Mario took
possession of the property in September 1993.
Meanwhile, the courts declared the Gozon spouses legally
separated. As regards the property, the RTC declared it conjugal.
Alfredo also executed a deed of donation over the said property in
favour of their daughter Winifred without annotating the notice of
lis pendens. Alfredo, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney

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executed in his favor by Winifred, sold the property to InterDimensional Realty, Inc. (IDRI) for P18 million.
Mario then filed with the Malabon RTC a complaint for
Specific Performance and Damages, Annulment of Donation and
Sale, with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order. RTC ruled in favour of Mario. CA
affirmed. Mario appealed, contending that the Agreement should be
treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected by the
acceptance of the other spouse before the offer is withdrawn. Since
Elviras conduct signified her acquiescence to the sale, Mario prays
for the Court to direct Alfredo and Elvira to execute a Deed of
Absolute Sale over the property upon his payment of P9 million to
Elvira.
IDRI alleges that it is a buyer in good faith and for value.
ISSUE Could Alfredo /dispose alienate the property? NO.
Was Alfredos share in the conjugal property already
forfeited in favour of their daughter by virtue of the decree of legal
separation? NO.
HELD This case involves the conjugal property of Alfredo and Elvira.
Since the disposition of the property occurred after the effectivity of
the Family Code, the applicable law is the Family Code.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person,
and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance
by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors.
In this case, Alfredo was the sole administrator of the
property because Elvira, with whom Alfredo was separated in fact,
was unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
property. However, as sole administrator of the property, Alfredo
still cannot sell the property without the written consent of Elvira or
the authority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the
sale is void. The absence of the consent of one of the spouse

renders the entire sale void, including the portion of the conjugal
property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale. Even if
the other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of
the property, that other spouses written consent to the sale is still
required by law for its validity. The Agreement entered into by
Alfredo and Mario was without the written consent of Elvira. Thus,
the Agreement is entirely void.
As regards Marios contention that the Agreement is a
continuing offer which may be perfected by Elviras acceptance
before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was
subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI
clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn.
We disagree with the CA when it held that the share of
Alfredo in the conjugal partnership was already forfeited in favour
of the daughter. Among the effects of the decree of legal separation
is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the
offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits
earned by the conjugal partnership. It is only Alfredos share in the
net profits which is forfeited in favor of Winifred. Clearly, what is
forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredos share in the conjugal
partnership property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal
partnership property.
With regard to IDRI, we agree with the Court of Appeals in
holding that IDRI is not a buyer in good faith. As found by the RTC
Malabon and the Court of Appeals, IDRI had actual knowledge of
facts and circumstances which should impel a reasonably cautious
person to make further inquiries about the vendors title to the
property.
Exercise of Profession
Go v CA
Facts: The Ong spouses contracted the services of Alex and Nancy
Go to provide video coverage of their (Ong spouses) wedding.
Three times thereafter, the Ongs tried to claim the video tape of
their wedding, which they planned to show to their relatives in the
United States where they were to spend their honeymoon, and
thrice they failed because the tape was apparently not yet
processed. The parties then agreed that the tape would be ready
upon the return of the Ong spouses.

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When the Ongs came home from their honeymoon,
however, they found out that the tape had been erased and
therefore, could no longer be delivered. They sued the Go spouses
for damages. The lower court and CA ruled in favor of the Ongs.
The SC ruled in favor of the Ongs and held that the Gos are
solidarily liable. However, Alex Go contended that his wife, Nancy
Go should be the only one liable as when his wife entered into the
contract with the Ongs, she was acting alone for her sole interest.
Issue: Are the Go spouses solidarily liable to the Ong spouses?
Decision: No, only Nancy is liable.
Under Article 73 of the Family Code, the wife may exercise
any profession, occupation or engage in business without the
consent of the husband.
In this case, it was only Nancy Go who entered into the
contract with the Ongs. Thus, she is solely liable for the damages
awarded, pursuant to the principle that contracts produce effect
only as between the parties who execute them
CPG: Exclusive Properties
70. Sarmiento vs. IAC (153 SCRA 104)
Facts: 2 cases. First was an action for support filed by Norma
Sarmiento against Cesar Sarmiento. Court granted, awarding
P500/month support in favor of Norma. Second case was an action
filed by Norma asking for a declaration from the court that the
retirement benefits of Cesar from PNB is part of the conjugal
property, 50% of which should be given to her. Cesar failed to
appear during the pre-trial. Eventually, the court ruled in favor of
Norma and ordered PNB to refrain from releasing to Cesar all his
retirement benefits and to deliver thereof to Norma.
Issue:
Cesar?

Is Norma entitled to of the retirement benefits of

Held: No! The order of the lower court violated Section 26 of

CA186 (GSIS Charter) which prohibits the attachment, garnishment

or freezing of any benefit granted by the Act. The order was in

effect, a freeze order.
The directive to deliver of the retirement benefits to
Norma makes the default judgment doubly illegal because
retirement benefits have been adjudged as gratuities or reward for
lengthy and faithful service of the recipient and should be treated
as separate property of the retiree-spouse. Thus, if the monetary
benefits are given gratis by the government because of previous
work (like the retirement pay of a provincial auditor in Mendoza vs.
Dizon, L-387, October 25, 1956) or that of a Justice of the Peace
(Elcar vs. Eclar, CA-40 O.G. 12th Supp. No. 18, p. 86), this is a
gratuity and should be considered separate property (Art. 148, Civil
Code).
NB. See the comment in page 144 of the reviewer, differentiating
contributory and non-contributory retirement plans. The latter
forms part of the separate property while the former, which is given
by most private companies where EEs contribute to their own
retirement plans, should form part of the conjugal partnership.
Charges
upon
the
Obligations
Community/Conjugal Partnership

of

Absolute

71. WONG V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

FACTS: Romarico Henson and Katrina Pineda were married. During
their marriage Romarico bought a parcel of land from his father
using money borrowed from an officemate. Most of the time, the
spouses were living separately; Romarico stayed in Angeles while
Katrina was in Manila. One time, while Katrina was in Hong Kong,
pieces of jewelry were consigned to her by Anita Chan. Katrina
issued a check for 55,000 as payment for the jewelry but was
dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Thereafter, Anitan Chan,
assisted by her husband Ricky Wong , filed a complaint for estafa.
However the lower court dismissed the complaint on the theory
that estafa cannot be committed when the issuance of the check
was for the payment of a pre-existing obligation. Hence, the liability
was only civil.
Thus, petitioners filed a civil case for collection of a sum of
money. The lower court ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered that
the property of the spouses Romarico and Katrina be levied upon.

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Take note that during the hearing only Katrina was represented by
counsel.
Romarico assails the levy of the parcel of lands belonging to
him saying that (1) he was deprived of his day in court and (2) he
had nothing to do with the transaction. Lower court sustained this
contention.
The CA sustained the decision of the lower court saying that
the parcel of lands levied were not conjugal properties but was
exclusive capital of Romarico bought using his own funds; that even
assuming it was conjugal property, it cannot be proceeded against
because the debt of Katrina was not consented to by Romarico
neither was it for the daily expenses of the family nor did it redound
to the benefit of the family. In fact, there was no evidence to the
effect that administration of the property was transferred to
Katrina.
ISSUE: Whether or not the parcels of land levied upon form part of
the conjugal property YES
Whether or not the obligation incurred by Katrina is
chargeable
against
the
conjugal
property
NO
HELD:
1. The presumption is that a property is conjugal unless
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. In this case,
while it may be true that the money used to buy the land
was loaned from an officemate by Romarico, no
evidence was shown as to where the repayment of that
loan came. If it came from Romaricos salary, the land is
conjugal property
2. Under the old civil code only the following are
chargeable to the conjugal property: (1) debts incurred
for the necessary support of the family (2) when the
administration of the conjugal property was transferred
to the wife by the court or by the husband (3) when
moderate gifts of charity are given. There was not
showing that the instant case falls in any of these.

72. Ayala Investments v CA

Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, what debts and obligations
contracted by the husband alone are considered for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership which are chargeable against the

conjugal partnership? Is a surety agreement or an accommodation

contract entered into by the husband in favor of his employer
within the contemplation of the said provision?
Facts: Philippine Blooming Mills obtained a P50.3M loan from
petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation. As
added security for the credit line extended to PBM, respondent
Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice President of PBM, executed security
agreements making himself jointly and severally answerable with
PBMs indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan, Ayala
sued, and the court rendered judgment ordering PBM and
respondent-husband Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC
the principal amount with interests.
Spouses filed a case of injunction against petitioners with the court
to enjoin the auction sale alleging that petitioners cannot enforce
the judgment against the conjugal partnership levied on the ground
that, among others, the subject loan did not redound to the benefit
of the said conjugal partnership.
On June 25, 1982, the auction sale took place. Ayala won the
auction. HOWEVER, the trial court declared the sale on execution
null and void. On appeal to the CA, the court stated that the debt
incurred by husband Ching did not incur to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership, hence, it could not be levied upon. Ayala
claims that the provisions of Civil Code and the Family Code are
different and that jurisprudence is on their side.
Issue: Did it redound to the benefit of the spouses?
SC: We do not agree with petitioners that there is a difference
between the terms redounded to the benefit of or benefited
from on the one hand; and for the benefit of on the other. They
mean one and the same thing. Article 161 (1) of the Civil Code and
Article 121 (2) of the Family Code are similarly worded, i.e., both
use the term for the benefit of. On the other hand, Article 122 of
the Family Code provides that The payment of personal debts by
the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be
charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they
redounded to the benefit of the family. As can be seen, the terms
are used interchangeably.

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Petitioners further claim that the husband as head of the
family and as administrator of the conjugal partnership is presumed
to have contracted obligations for the benefit of the family or the
conjugal partnership (Cobb-Perez). They are wrong. The court
derived the following rules from jurisprudence:
a. If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e.,
he directly received the money and services to be used in or for his
own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the
term obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Here,
no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to
the family is apparent at the time of the signing of the contract.
Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf
of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such
obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
b. If the money or services are given to another person or entity,
and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract
cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context
of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The
contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal
debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption can be
inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or
accommodation agreement, it is for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. Proof must be presented to establish benefit
redounding to the conjugal partnership.
Here, Ching signed as surety. Ayala should have adduced evidence
to prove that Alfredo Chings acting as surety redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.
But it could be argued that even in such kind of contract of
accommodation, a benefit for the family may also result, when the
guarantee is in favor of the husbands employer. However, these
are not the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the Civil Code.
The benefits must be one directly resulting from the loan. It cannot
merely be a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself. There must
be the requisite showing x x x of some advantage which clearly
accrued to the welfare of the spouses or benefits to his family or
that such obligations are productive of some benefit to the
family. Unfortunately, the petition did not present any proof to
show: (a) Whether or not the corporate existence of PBM was
prolonged and for how many months or years; and/or (b) Whether
or not the PBM was saved by the loan and its shares of stock

appreciated, if so, how much and how substantial was the holdings
of the Ching family.
The CA correctly applied the provisions of the Family Code to
this case. These provisions highlight the underlying concern of the
law for the conservation of the conjugal partnership; for the
husbands duty to protect and safeguard, if not augment, not to
dissipate it.
This is the underlying reason why the Family Code clarifies
that the obligations entered into by one of the spouses must be
those that redounded to the benefit of the family and that the
measure of the partnerships liability is to the extent that the
family is benefited.
These are all in keeping with the spirit and intent of the other
provisions of the Civil Code which prohibits any of the spouses to
donate or convey gratuitously any part of the conjugal property.
Thus, when Ching entered into a surety agreement he, from then
on, definitely put in peril the conjugal property (in this case,
including the family home) and placed it in danger of being taken
gratuitously as in cases of donation.
The fact that on several occasions the lending institutions did
not require the signature of the wife and the husband signed alone
does not mean that being a surety became part of his profession.
Neither could he be presumed to have acted for the conjugal
partnership.
Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Family Code is emphatic that
the payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the
wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the
conjugal partnership except to the extent that they redounded to
the benefit of the family.
Here, the property in dispute also involves the family home.
The loan is a corporate loan not a personal one. Signing as a
surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession nor
an act of administration for the benefit of the family.

73. Ching v. CA, Feb. 23, 2004

Facts: The Phil. Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a
loan of P9M from the Allied Banking Corp. (ABC). By virtue of the
loan, PBMCI executed a promissory note through Alfredo Ching

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(Alfredo), its EVP. As added security, Alfredo, together with 2
others, executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC binding them
to jointly and severally guarantee the payment of all PBMCIs
obligations owing to ABC to the extent of P38M. After a year, PBMCI
contracted another loan with ABC for P13M.
Thereafter, PBMCI defaulted in the payment of its loans. ABC
filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of
preliminary attachment against PBMCI to collect the amounts due
to it, impleading as co-defendants Alfredo and the 2 others in their
capacity as sureties of PBMCI. The court granted ABCs application
for a writ of preliminary attachment. In this regard, the deputy
sheriff of the trial court levied on attachment the 100,000 common
shares of Citycorp stocks in the name of Alfredo.
Encarnacion Ching (Encarnacion), assisted by Alfredo, her
husband, filed a motion to set aside the levy on attachment. She
alleged that the 100,000 shares of stocks levied by the deputy
sheriff were acquired by her and Alfredo during their marriage out
of conjugal funds. Furthermore, the indebtedness covered by the
continuing guaranty contract executed by Alfredo for the account of
PBMCI did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Likewise, she alleged that being the wife of Alfredo, she was thirdparty claimant entitled to file a motion for the release of the
properties. ABC filed a comment alleging mainly that Encarnacion
has no personality to file any motion, not a being a party to the
case. RTC granted the motion, lifting the writ of preliminary
attachment on the shares of stocks. CA reversed such order, citing
the same reasons given by ABC.
Issue: Whether or not Encarnacion has the right to file the motion
to quash the levy on attachment on shares of stocks?
Held: YES. In Ong v. Tating, Court held that the sheriff may attach
only those properties of the defendant against whom a writ of
attachment has been issued by the court. When the sheriff
erroneously levies on attachment and seizes the property of a third
person in which the said defendant holds no right or interest, the
superior authority of the court which has authorized the execution
may be invoked by the aggrieved third person in the same case.
Art. 160 of the New Civil Code (NCC) provides that all
properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. In this case, although the

shares of stocks appeared in the books of Citycorp as belonging

only to the husband, the fact that these were acquired during the
marriage makes them presumably conjugal property. ABC failed to
adduce evidence that Alfredo acquired the stocks with his exclusive
money. He who claims that property acquired by the spouses
during their marriage is exclusive property of one of the spouses is
burdened to prove the source of the money utilized to purchase the
same.
In addition, the Court held that by executing a continuing
guaranty and suretyship agreement with ABC for the payment of
PBMCIs loans, Alfredo was not in the exercise of his profession,
pursuing a legitimate business. The conjugal partnership is not
liable for the account of PBMCI under Art. 161 (1) of the NCC which
states:
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those
contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the
cases where she may legally bind the partnership.
In Ayala Investment and Development Corp. v. CA, the Court held
that the signing as surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry
or profession. It is not embarking in a business. No matter how
often an executive acted on or was persuaded to act as surety for
his own employer, this should not be taken to mean that he thereby
embarked in the business of suretyship or guaranty.

Munoz v. Ramirez, G.R. 156125, August 23, 2010.

Facts: This case involves a dispute of ownership over a
parcel of land between Munoz and the spouses Erlinda
Ramirez and Eliseo Carlos.
1989: Eliseo Carlos obtained a P136,500 housing loan and
constructed a 2 story residential house over the subject parcel of
land. This was secured by a real estate mortgage over the land.
1993: The land was purportedly sold to Munoz via deed of absolute
sale for the total consideration of P602,000. Munoz claims that
under the said sale, the spouses were given a chance to repurchase
the lot within 1 year but they failed to do so.
The spouses allege that the deed of sale is void for being
falsified because what they entered into was a mortgage contract
and not a deed of sale. They claim that they asked Munoz for a loan

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of P602,000 pesos. Munoz agreed but gave them P200,000 only
and promised to give the P402,000 after they cancel the GSIS
mortgage. The spouses cancelled the GSIS mortgage and turned
the TCT over to Munoz but he refused to give the balance. He also
had the TCT of the spouses cancelled and a new one issued for
himself depriving the spouses of their property.
The spouses claim that the results of an NBI examination
show that the signatures of Eliseo on the purported deed of sale are
all forgeries.
Munoz claims that even though these signatures are forged,
they would be immaterial because the property was the parphernal
property of Erlinda and therefore, the consent of Eliseo, manifested
by his signature, was immaterial.
The CA applied art. 158 of the CIVIL CODE, and ruled that
since improvements were made over the parcel of land using
conjugal funds, the parcel of land was converted from paraphernal
to conjugal therefore the consent of Eliseo was needed in order to
validate the sale.
Issue:
W/N the parcel of land is conjugal?
W/N the sale with right to repurchase is an equitable mortgage?
1. The land is paraphernal. The CA erred in applying the Civil
Code because what properly applies in this case is art. 120
of the FAMILY CODE that states that if the improvements
made with conjugal funds have a higher value than the
paraphernal property, the paraphernal property will become
part of the conjugal partnership subject to reimbursement in
favor of the spouse who lost property. In this case, the house
had a value less than the lot. Because of this, the property
remained parphernal. The signatures of Eliseo are therefore
immaterial.
2. It was an equitable mortgage.
Ownership, Administration and Disposition of ACP/CPG:
Presumption of Ownership/Effect of Registration in name of
one of the spouses
MAGALLON V. MONTEJO

Spouses Estonina v. Court of Appeals 266 SCRA 627 January

27, 1997
Facts: A lot was owned by Santiago Garcia, who has 9 children and
a wife named Consuelo Garcia. Santiago already died when this
controversy arose.
Petitioners, the spouses Estonina, filed a case against
Consuelo Garcia and was able to obtain an attachment over the
land. While the case was pending, the 9 children sold their 1/10
share in the lot to Spouses Atayan, who are the respondents here.
Estonina were able to obtain a favorable judgment against
Consuelo Garcia. The land was sold at public auction and a TCT was
issued in the name of Estonina.
Atayan however filed a complaint for annulment of the
sheriff sale and the TCT claiming that they own 9/10 of the land.
The RTC said that the land was presumed to be conjugal
hence Consuelo Garcia owned 50% of the land plus 5% as her share
in the intestate estate of her husband Santiago Garcia. RTC ordered
the amendment of the TCT to show that Estonina owns 55% while
Atayan owns 45%.
Both parties appealed.
The CA modified the judgment. The CA held that lot was the
exclusive property of Santiago Garcia and not conjugal. It held that
Estonina only owns 1/10 or 10% and Atayan owns 9/10 or 90%.
Issue: Is the property exclusive or conjugal? Exclusive share of the
deceased Santiago
Whats the real share of Estonina and Atayan? 10% and
90%, respectively.
Ruling: SC affirms CA in toto.
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership only when there is proof that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Otherwise stated, proof of acquisition
during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of
the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.
Here, Estonino failed to present any proof that the property
was acquired during the marriage. Estonino merely relies on the
certificate of title which was issued during the marriage. The TCT
does not suffice to establish the conjugal nature of the property.

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Acquisition of property and registration of title are two
different acts. Registration does not confer title but merely confirms
one already existing.
Thus, the property is the exclusive property of the deceased
Santiago and when he died leaving 10 compulsory heirs, each one
got 10% of the lot. Hence, what the Estonino spouses purchased in
the public auction was merely the rights of Consuelo Garcia
consisting of 10% of the lot.

CRUZ V LEIS
FACTS Adriano Leis and Gertrudes Isidro were married on 19 April
1923.
On 27 April 1955, Gertrudes acquired from the DANR a parcel of
land in Marikina. The Deed of Sale described Gertrudes as a widow.
Thereafter, TCT No. 43100 was issued in the name of "Gertrudes
Isidro," who was also referred to therein as a widow.
On 2 December 1973, Adriano died.
On 5 February 1985, Gertrudes obtained a loan from petitioners,
the spouses Cruz, in the amount of P15,000.00 at 5% interest,
payable on or before 5 February 1986. The loan was secured by a
mortgage over the property.
On March 11 1986, due to her inability to pay her outstanding
obligation when the debt became due and demandable, Gertrudes
executed two contracts in favor of the petitioners. The first is
denominated as "Kasunduan," a pacto de retro sale, granting
Gertrudes one year within which to repurchase the property. The
second is a "Kasunduan ng Tuwirang Bilihan," a Deed of Absolute
Sale covering the same property. For failure of Gertrudes to
repurchase the property, ownership thereof was consolidated in
favor of the petitioners.
On 9 June 1987, Gertrudes Isidro died. Thereafter, her heirs, herein
private respondents, received demands to vacate the premises
from petitioners, the new owners of the property. Private
respondents responded by filing an action before the RTC of Pasig
seeking the nullification of the contracts of sale executed by
Gertrudes Isidro.
The RTC ruled in favour of the respondents. It held that the land
was conjugal property, no fraud attended the execution of the
contracts, and that the petitioners failed to comply with the
provisions of Article 1607 of the Civil Code requiring a judicial order

for the consolidation of the ownership in the vendee a retro to be

recorded in the Registry of Property.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE W/N the petitioners acquired ownership over the land?
HELD It is conceded that, as a rule, a co-owner such as Gertrudes
could only dispose of her share in the property owned in common.
Unfortunately for private respondents, however, the property was
registered solely in the name of "Gertrudes Isidro, widow." Where a
parcel of land, forming part of the undistributed properties of the
dissolved conjugal partnership of gains, is sold by a widow to a
purchaser who merely relied on the face of the certificate of title
thereto, issued solely in the name of the widow, the purchaser
acquires a valid title to the land even as against the heirs of the
deceased spouse. The rationale for this rule is that "a person
dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the
register to determine the condition of the property. He is only
charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted
on the face of the register or the certificate of title. To require him
to do more is to defeat one of the primary objects of the Torrens
system."
It bears stressing that notwithstanding Article 1607, the recording
in the Registry of Property of the consolidation of ownership of the
vendee is not a condition sine qua non to the transfer of ownership.
Petitioners are the owners of the subject property since neither
Gertrudes nor her co-owners redeemed the same within the oneyear period stipulated in the "Kasunduan." The essence of a pacto
de retro sale is that title and ownership of the property sold are
immediately vested in the vendee a retro, subject to the resolutory
condition of repurchase by the vendor a retro within the stipulated
period. Failure thus of the vendor a retro to perform said resolutory
condition vests upon the vendee by operation of law absolute title
and ownership over the property sold. As title is already vested in
the vendee a retro, his failure to consolidate his title under Article
1607 of the Civil Code does not impair such title or ownership for
the method prescribed thereunder is merely for the purpose of
registering the consolidated title.

Anno v. Anno
G.R. No. 163743 (480 SCRA 419)

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Facts: Petitioner Dolores Pintiano-Anno (Dolores) and respondent
Albert Anno (Albert) were married in 1963. Dolores claims that
during their marriage, they acquired a 4-hectare agricultural land in
La Trinidad, Benguet. In 1974, the land was declared for tax
purposes solely in the name of her husband, respondent Albert.
Dolores further claims that without her knowledge, Albert executed
two documents of transfer covering the subject land: 1) Affidavit of
Waiver where Albert waived and quitclaimed in favor of Dolores
first cousin, respondent Patenio Suanding, his rights over a portion
of the land; 2) Deed of sale where Albert conveyed to Suanding the
remainder of the land more than a year later. In both documents,
Albert declared that he is the lawful owner and possessor of the
land. Thus, the documents of transfer did not bear the signature
and written consent of Dolores as the wife of the vendor. The land
was transferred by Suanding to third persons, Myrna Nazarro and
Silardo Bested.
Dolores filed a case against Albert and Suanding for Cancellation of
the Waiver of Rights, Deed of Sale and Transfer Tax Declarations,
and Damages. She alleged the land belongs to their conjugal
partnership and thus could not have been validly conveyed by
Albert to Suanding without her written consent as spouse. Suanding
testified that Albert represented to him that the land was his
exclusive property as the land was part of his inheritance and he
had been in possession thereof prior to his marriage to petitioner.
MTC ruled in favor of Dolores. RTC reversed the MTC. CA affirmed
the RTC.
Issue: whether the subject land belongs to the conjugal
partnership of gains of spouses Anno and thus cannot be validly
conveyed by one spouse without the consent of the other.
Held and Ratio: Land belongs to Albert not to the conjugal
partnership of gains of the spouses.
All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal in
nature. However, for this presumption to apply, the party who
invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired during
the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a
condition sine qua non to the operation of the presumption in favor
of the conjugal partnership. However, a careful examination of the
records shows that Dolores evidence (their marriage contract and

the initial 1974 tax declaration over the property) failed to prove
that the subject land belongs to their conjugal partnership.
Moreover, since it is Dolores allegation that the land belongs to
their conjugal partnership of gains, then she has the burden of
proof to substantiate, by preponderance of evidence, that the land
was conjugal in nature. This she failed to do (i.e. Dolores failed to
identify when she and Albert, first occupied and possessed the
land). While the initial tax declaration she presented was dated
1974, it cannot be automatically deduced therefrom that
occupation of the subject land was likewise done in the same year.
To so conclude will amount to speculation or conjecture on the part
of the court. Declaration of a land for taxation purposes cannot be
equated with its acquisition for, in the ordinary course of things,
occupation of a piece of land usually comes prior to the act of
declaring it for tax purposes. More importantly, the 1974 tax
declaration presented by Dolores cannot be made a basis to prove
its conjugal nature as the land was declared for tax purposes solely
in the name of her husband, Albert, who sold the land as his
exclusive property. Tax declarations, especially of untitled lands, are
credible proof of claim of ownership and are good indicia of
possession in the concept of an owner.
Since the circumstances do not show when the property was
acquired by spouses Anno, the presumption of the conjugal nature
of the property allegedly acquired by the spouses Anno during the
subsistence of their marriage cannot be applied. Consequently, the
land is the exclusive property of Albert which he could validly
dispose of without the consent of his wife.
Sole/Transfer of Administration
REYES v. ALEJANDRO (RE: PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF
ABSENCE)
141 SCRA 65, G.R. No. L-32026. January 16, 1986.
Doctrine: It is not necessary that a declaration of absence be made
in a proceeding separate from and prior to a petition for
administration
FACTS: On October 25, 1969, Erlinda Reynoso Reyes filed a
petition praying for the declaration of her husband, Roberto L.
Reyes, as an absentee.

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Erlinda and Roberto were married on March 2, 1960. In April 1962,
Roberto left due to a misunderstanding, and Erlinda alleges that:
(1) she has not heard from him since; (2) they have not acquired
property during the marriage; (3) they have no outstanding
obligations; and (4) her purpose for filing the petition is to establish
the absence of Roberto.
She invokes Article 384 of the Civil Code and Rule 107 of the New
Rules of Court.
The lower court dismissed the petition because Roberto left no
properties, stating that the sole purpose for the declaration of
absence is to enable the taking of necessary precautions for the
administration of the estate of absentee.
ISSUE: W/N a judicial declaration of absence is proper when the
absentee spouse left no properties NO.
RATIO: The need to have a person judicially declared an absentee
is: (1) when he has properties which have to be taken care of or
administered by a Court-appointed representative; (2) the spouse
present is seeking a separation of property, or the spouse is asking
that the administration of the conjugal property be transferred to
her. The petition to declare the husband an absentee and the
petition to place the management of the conjugal property in the
hands of the wife may be combined and heard in the same
proceeding.

Uy v. CA
Topic under Joint Administration; Sole/Transfer of
Administration
Doctrine: Incapacitated spouse warrants Judicial
Guardianship under Rules of Court, not under the Family
Code.
Facts: Ernesto Jardeleza suffered stroke, so his son Teodoro filed a
petition for guardianship of his father. Son averred that there was a
need for a court-appointed guardian to save his fathers properties
and assets, and further added that in the meantime, no properties
shall be alienated or mortgaged to third persons.

Ernestos wife then filed petition declaring Ernestos incapacity and

assumption of powers as sole administrator of conjugal properties,
and prayed to Court that she be granted permission to dispose of a
land for the medical expenses of her husband. Court granted.
Teodoro opposed, saying that such assumption as sole admin is in
effect a petition for guardianship over person and properties of
Ernesto, and should be covered by Special Proceedings under the
ROC. Also, Ernesto already acquired vested rights as a conjugal
partner and thus cannot be impaired without consent. He also
averred that the CPG has sufficient assets to cover the medical
expenses! Nonetheless, Ernestos wife still sold land to her
daughter Glenda Uy. TC affirms, but CA reverses, ordering sale of
land void.
Issue: Comatose condition of husband warrants the assuming of
sole power of administration over properties and dispose of land
with court approval?
Held: Petition denied.
Ratio: the condition of her husband makes the Rule on Art. 124 of
CC inapplicable (covers only absence, separation in fact,
abandonment, or withheld consent). And so Rule 93 of the Rules of
Court 1964 applies, as this covers a non-consenting spouse due to
incapacity or incompetence to give consent.
As such, ernestos wife should observe procedure for sale of wards
estate required of judicial guardians under the Rules of Court, not
the summary proceedings under the Family Code. In the case at
bar, RTC failed to comply with procedures of the ROC, and even FC
(no notice to incapacitated spouse and to show cause why petition
should not be granted).
Dispositions/Donations
SIOCHI V. GOZON
Facts: This case involves a 30,000 SQ.M. parcel of land
(property)registered in the name of the Spouses Gozon.
Elvira filed with Cavite RTC a petition for legal separation
against her husband Alfredo. Elvira filed a notice of lis pendens,
while the legal separation case was still pending. Meanwhile,
Alfredo and Mario Siochi (Mario) entered into an Agreement to Buy
and Sell involving the property for the price of P18 million. They
stipulated that Alfredo was to remove the notice of lis pendens on
the title, to have the land excluded from the legal separation case

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and to secure an affidavit from the wife Elvira that the property was
the exclusive property of Alfredo.
However, despite repeated demands from Mario, Alfredo
failed to comply with these stipulations. After paying the P5 million
earnest money as partial payment of the purchase price, Mario took
possession of the property in September 1993.
Meanwhile, the courts declared the Gozon spouses legally
separated. As regards the property, the RTC declared it conjugal.
Alfredo also executed a deed of donation over the said property in
favour of their daughter Winifred without annotating the notice of
lis pendens. Alfredo, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney
executed in his favor by Winifred, sold the property to InterDimensional Realty, Inc. (IDRI) for P18 million.
Mario then filed with the Malabon RTC a complaint for
Specific Performance and Damages, Annulment of Donation and
Sale, with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order. RTC ruled in favour of Mario. CA
affirmed. Mario appealed, contending that the Agreement should be
treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected by the
acceptance of the other spouse before the offer is withdrawn. Since
Elviras conduct signified her acquiescence to the sale, Mario prays
for the Court to direct Alfredo and Elvira to execute a Deed of
Absolute Sale over the property upon his payment of P9 million to
Elvira.
IDRI alleges that it is a buyer in good faith and for value.
ISSUE Could Alfredo /dispose alienate the property? NO.
Was Alfredos share in the conjugal property already
forfeited in favour of their daughter by virtue of the decree of legal
separation? NO.
HELD This case involves the conjugal property of Alfredo and Elvira.
Since the disposition of the property occurred after the effectivity of
the Family Code, the applicable law is the Family Code.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing

offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person,
and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance
by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors.
In this case, Alfredo was the sole administrator of the
property because Elvira, with whom Alfredo was separated in fact,
was unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
property. However, as sole administrator of the property, Alfredo
still cannot sell the property without the written consent of Elvira or
the authority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the
sale is void. The absence of the consent of one of the spouse
renders the entire sale void, including the portion of the conjugal
property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale. Even if
the other spouse actively participated in negotiating for the sale of
the property, that other spouses written consent to the sale is still
required by law for its validity. The Agreement entered into by
Alfredo and Mario was without the written consent of Elvira. Thus,
the Agreement is entirely void.
As regards Marios contention that the Agreement is a
continuing offer which may be perfected by Elviras acceptance
before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was
subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI
clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn.
We disagree with the CA when it held that the share of
Alfredo in the conjugal partnership was already forfeited in favour
of the daughter. Among the effects of the decree of legal separation
is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved and liquidated and the
offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits
earned by the conjugal partnership. It is only Alfredos share in the
net profits which is forfeited in favor of Winifred. Clearly, what is
forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredos share in the conjugal
partnership property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal
partnership property.
With regard to IDRI, we agree with the Court of Appeals in
holding that IDRI is not a buyer in good faith. As found by the RTC
Malabon and the Court of Appeals, IDRI had actual knowledge of
facts and circumstances which should impel a reasonably cautious
person to make further inquiries about the vendors title to the
property.

Fuentes v. Roca

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Facts: Sabina Tarroza owned a titled 358-square meter lot in
Canelar, ZamboangaCity. In 1982, she sold it to her son, Tarciano T.
Roca (Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale. But Tarciano did not
for the meantime have the registered title transferred to his name.
In 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel and
Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses). They later signed an
agreement to sell prepared by one Atty. Plagata dated April 29,
1988, which agreement expressly stated that it was to take effect
in six months.
The agreement required the Fuentes spouses to pay
Tarciano a down payment of P60,000.00 for the transfer of the lots
title to him. And, within six months, Tarciano was to clear the lot of
structures and occupants and secure the consent of his estranged
wife, Rosario Gabriel Roca (Rosario), to the sale. Upon Tarcianos
compliance with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses were to take
possession of the lot and pay him an additional P140,000.00
orP160,000.00, depending on whether or not he succeeded in
demolishing the house standing on it. If Tarciano was unable to
comply with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses would become
owners of the lot without any further formality and payment.
As soon as Tarciano met the other conditions, Atty. Plagata
notarized Rosarios affidavit in Zamboanga City. On January 11,
1989 Tarciano executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of the
Fuentes spouses. They then paid him the additional P140,000.00
mentioned in their agreement. A new title was issued in the name
of the spouses who immediately constructed a building on the
lot. On January 28, 1990 Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife
Rosario who died nine months afterwards.
Eight years later, the children of Tarciano and Rosario filed
an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land
against the Fuentes spouses with the RTC- Zamboanga City. The
Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses was void since
Tarcianos wife, Rosario, did not give her consent to it. Her
signature on the affidavit of consent had been forged. They thus
prayed that the property be reconveyed to them upon
reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano.
RTC dimissed the action. CA reversed. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the Rocas action for the declaration of
nullity of that sale to the spouses already prescribed

Held: No, the action has not yet prescribed.

Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that
applies to this case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although
Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the
conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a
few months after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period
within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her
husbands sale of the real property. It simply provides that without
the other spouses written consent or a court order allowing the
sale, the same would be void. Under the provisions of the Civil
Code governing contracts, a void or inexistent contract has no force
and effect from the very beginning. And this rule applies to
contracts that are declared void by positive provision of law, as in
the case of a sale of conjugal property without the other spouses
written consent. A void contract is equivalent to nothing and is
absolutely wanting in civil effects. It cannot be validated either by
ratification or prescription.
Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses
in 1997 for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the real
property that Tarciano sold without their mothers (his wifes)
written consent. The passage of time did not erode the right to
bring such an action.
Ownership,
Administration
Separate/Exclusive Properties

and

Disposition

of

Manotoc Realty Inc. v. CA

FACTS: Felipe Madlangawa had been occupying a part of the land
owned by Clara Tambunting as the latters paraphernal property,
with the understanding that he would eventually buy the lot. Clara
died and her estate was placed under custodia legis. Felipe then
made a downpayment to the husband of Clara, Vicente Legarda, as
part of the purchase price of the property he occupied. Around 3
months later, the court appointed Vicente as a special
administrator of the estate.
ISSUE: WON the sale by Vicente to Felipe was valid.
HELD: NO. Under Arts. 136-137 of the old CC, the wife retains
ownership of paraphernal property, and the only way that the

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husband shall have administration over it is if the wife delivers the
same to the husband by means of a public instrument, recorded in
the Registry of Property, empowering the latter to administer such
property. There is nothing in the records that will show that Vicente
was the administrator of the paraphernal properties of Clara during
the lifetime of the latter. Thus, it cannot be said that the sale which
was entered into by Felipe and Vicente had its inception before the
death of Clara and was entered into by the former for and on behalf
of the latter, but was only consummated after her death. Vicente,
therefore, could not have validly disposed of the lot in dispute as a
continuing administrator of the paraphernal properties of Clara.
It is also undisputed that the probate court appointed Vicente as
administrator of the estate only 3 months after the sale had taken
place. The inevitable conclusion is, therefore, that the sale between
Vicente and Felipe is void ab initio, the former being neither an
owner nor administrator of the subject property.
Pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, after the
appointment of Vicente as administrator of the estate of Clara, he
should have applied before the probate court for authority to sell
the disputed property in favor of Felipe. If the probate court
approved the request, then Vicente would have been able to
execute a valid deed of sale in favor of the Felipe. Unfortunately,
there was no effort on the part of the administrator to comply with
the above-quoted rule of procedure, nor on that of Felipe to protect
his interests.
Dissolution of ACP/CPG: Grounds
85 Partosa-jo v C.A.
FACTS: Jose Jo admits to cohabiting with 3 women and fathering 15
children. (wow) Prima Jo is allegedly the legal wife who has a
daughter named Monina. Prima filed for separation of conjugal
property and support. The TC ruled in favor of Prima in the support
case but failed to render a decision on the separation of property.
Jose appealed, CA affirmed support but dismissed the separation of
property for lack of a cause of action and on the ground that
separation by agreement was not covered by Article 178 of the Civil
Code.

ISSUE: Did the CA err in saying that (1) the judicial separation of
conjugal property sought was not allowed under Articles 175, 178
and 191 of the Civil Code and (2) no such separation was decreed
by the TC- Jose says since the TC decision became final sorry
nalang si Prima
HELD: The Court decided (2) first so even if Jose is correct in
saying that the decision of the TC failed to state the separation the
Court cant let technicality prevail over substantive issues so the
Court may clarify such an ambiguity by an amendment even after
the judgment have become final.
On (1) -The CA dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
separation of the parties was due to their agreement and not
because of abandonment. It held that an agreement to live
separately without just cause was void under Article 221 of the Civil
Code and could not sustain any claim of abandonment by the
aggrieved spouse. Its conclusion was that the only remedy
available to her was legal separation which will result in the
termination of the conjugal partnership.
Prima contends that CA misinterpreted Articles 175, 178 and
191 of the Civil Code. She says that the agreement was for her to
temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her
pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. They never agreed
to separate permanently. And even if they did, this arrangement
ended in 1942, when she returned to him and he refused to accept
her.
Art. 128 which superseded Art. 178 states that the aggrieved
spouse may petition for judicial separation on either of these
grounds:
1. Abandonment by a spouse of the other without
just cause; and
2. Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her
obligations to the family without just cause, even if
she said spouse does not leave the other spouse.
Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the intent
never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause,
and without providing for one's family although able to do so. The
acts of Jose in denying entry to the conjugal home to his wife as
early as 1942 and consistently refusing to give support from 1968
constitutes abandonment.
Since Jose had abandoned her and their child she is entitled to ask
for the dissolution of their property regime. Jose used a dummy to

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keep the properties from Prima but the Court said that these
properties that should now be divided between them, on the
assumption that they were acquired during coverture and so belong
to the spouses half and half. The division must include such
properties properly belonging to the conjugal partnership as may
have been registered in the name of other persons in violation of
the Anti-Dummy Law.
Separation with Dissolution Effects
86. TODA v. CA
Facts:
Benigno Toda and Rose Marie Tuason were married in 1951 and
were married and blessed with 2 children.
But because of
individual differences and the alleged infidelity of Benigno, Rose
Marie filed a petition for termination of conjugal partnership for
alleged mismanagement and dissipation of conjugal funds.
To avoid further disagreeable proceedings, the parties filed a joint
petition for judicial approval of dissolution of conjugal partnership
under Art. 191 of the CC. This petition embodied a compromise
agreement allocating to the spouses their respective shares in the
conjugal partnership assets and dismissing with prejudice the civil
case filed by Rose Marie.
The compromise agreement was
incorporated in the petition for dissolution, which was approved by
the court.
Ironically, the said agreement failed to fully subserve the intended
amicable settlement of all the disputes. Instead of terminating a
litigation, it spawned two new petitions. The parties are now
arguing on the award of cash dividends, which depends on the date
of the effectivity of the compromise agreement. Rose Marie said
that it became effective only after judicial approval and not upon its
execution.
Issue: Whether the compromise agreement became effective only
after judicial approval - YES
Ratio:
Under Art. 190 of the CC, in the absence of an express declaration
in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between
spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a

judicial order. Hence, the separation of property is not effected by

the mere execution of the contract or agreement of the parties, but
by the decree of the court approving the same. Furthermore, Art.
192 explicitly provides that the conjugal partnership is dissolved
only upon the issuance of a decree of separation of property.
Other issue: Benigno deducted P360k from the P2M supposed to
be paid to Rose Marie. It is not clear from the records where it
came from. The CA presumed it to be in the nature of cash
dividends declared prior to the approval of the compromise
agreement and held that it is conjugal and therefore, belongs to
Benigno. While no sufficient proof was adduced to conclusively
explain such deduction, there exists the legal presumption that all
property of the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership
absent any proof that it is the exclusive property of either spouse.
Since Rose Marie failed to prove that the amount forms pat of the
paraphernal property, it is presumed to be conjugal property.
Liquidation of ACP/CPG Assets and Liabilities: Two or more
marriages
Dael v. IAC
Facts:
Cabutihan married Bienvenida Durana, their marriage
produced 5 children
Less than a year after Bienvenidas death, Cabutihan
married Vitorina Durana, the sister of his first wife (no kids)
Cesario Cabutihan died
5 years later, Victorina died as well
The brother and sister of Victorina are claiming 2/3 of the
estate, while the mother of Bienvenida and the other sister
of Victorina are claiming 1/3
Issue: How should the estate of Victorina be partitioned?
Held:
When Bienvenida died, the first conjugal partnership was
automatically dissolved. That conjugal partnership was then
converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership. It was also at this
point of time that the inheritance was transmitted to the heirs of
Bienvenida (5 children). The heirs will receive of the conjugal

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partnership property which pertained to Binevenida. The other half
belongs to Cesario.
Due to the marriage of Cesario and Victorina, the fruits and
income of Cesarios share in the inheritance from Bienvenida and of
his conjugal share in the property of the first conjugal partnership
would form part of the conjugal partnership of properties of he
second marriage. The fruits and income derived or acquired
through these properties would also be conjugal in nature.
The problem is how to apportion the properties involved
between the two conjugal partnerships. According to the Civil Code,
whenever the liquidation of the partnership of 2 or more marriages
contracted by the same person should be carried out at the same
time and there is no evidence to show the capital or the conjugal
property belonging to each of the partnerships to be liquidated, the
total mass of the partnership property shall be divided between the
different partnerships in proportion to the duration of each and to
the property belonging to the respective spouses.
Property Relations of Union without Marriage: Either not
Capacitated to marry or not living together exclusively
TUMLOS V. TUMLOS

Homeowners Bank v. Miguela Dailo

Facts: Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on
August 8, 1967. During their marriage, they purchased a house and
lot situated at Barangay San Francisco, San Pablo City. The Deed of
Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife,
Miguel.
On December 1, 1993, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power
of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing her
to obtain a loan from Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be
secured by the spouses Dailo's house and lot in San Pablo City.
Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan in the amount of
P300,000.00 from Homeowners. The house and lot served as the
security for the Real Estate Mortgage. Miguela had no knowledge of
the SPA and of the REM.
The loan was not paid and the house and extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings followed. At the sale, Homeowners ended up being the

highest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued to Homeowners. A

year passed and the property wasnt redeemed so Homeowners
consolidated the ownership thereof by executing on June 6, 1996
an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute
Sale.
Marcelino died on December 20, 1995. In one of her visits to the
subject property, Miguela learned that Homeowners had already
employed a certain Roldan Brion to clean its premises and that her
Ford sedan was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire
in the compound
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted
on the subject property, which was conjugal in nature, Miguela filed
a case with the RTC for declaration of nullity of the mortgage and
its subsequent sale, and for reconveyance.
The RTC nullified the mortgage and the sale. It also instructed
Homeowners to pay Miguela 40,000 for her Ford Sedan.
The CA affirmed.
Issues: 1. WON the mortgage constituted by Marcelino on the
subject property as co-owner is valid as to his undivided share.
2. WON the conjugal partnership is liable for the payment of the
loan, because it redounded to the benefit of the family.
Held: 1. NO! Co-ownership doesnt even apply here. Without the
other spouses consent any disposition or encumbrance of the
conjugal property shall be void.
2. NO! This assertion wasnt proven.
Ratio: 1. In Guiang v. Court of Appeals it was held that the sale of a
conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and
wife. In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared
that the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null
and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining
to the husband who contracted the sale. The same principle in
Guiang squarely applies to the instant case. There is no legal basis
to construe Article 493 (co-ownership provision) of the Civil Code as
an exception to Article 124 of the Family Code.
Miguela and the late Marcelino were married on August 8, 1967. In
the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains governed the property
relations between respondent and her late husband. With the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on
Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was made

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applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already established
before its effectivity unless vested rights have already been
acquired under the Civil Code or other laws.
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property
relations of Miguela and Marcelino even in a suppletory manner.
The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of
partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund
the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate
properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through
their efforts or by chance. Unlike the absolute community of
property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory
manner, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on
contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is
expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of
gains) or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus, the
property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be
governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains
of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership
under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails
because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only when
the Family Code is silent on the matter.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without
the knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which
formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of
Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority
or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or
encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.
2. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, '[T]he conjugal partnership
shall be liable for: . . . (3) Debts and obligations contracted by
either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that
the family may have been benefited; . . . . For the subject property
to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the late Marcelino
Dailo, Jr. must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the
creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Homeowner's sweeping
conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to
finance the construction of housing units without a doubt
redounded to the benefit of his family, without adducing adequate
proof, does not persuade this Court. Other than petitioner's bare
allegation, there is nothing from the records of the case to compel a

finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo,
Jr. redounded to the benefit of the family. Consequently, the
conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the
principal obligation.

Abing vs. Waeyan

Facts: Petitioner John Abing and respondent Juliet Waeyan
cohabited as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
Together, they bought a 2-storey residential house. Later on, Juliet
left for overseas employment in Korea. While there, she would still
send money to John who deposited the same in their joint account
In 1992, the original 2-storey residential house underwent
renovation. To it was annexed a new structure which housed a sarisari store.
In 1995, she went back from Korea and lived with John. She
also managed the sari-sari store.
However, their relationship did not last. They decided to
partition their properties. In the Memorandum of Agreement, they
both settled that while John should leave his share of the
properties, Juliet should pay him the amount of P428,870.00 which
she failed to pay fully. Hence, John demanded that Juliet vacate the
annex structure. When she refused, John instituted an ejectment
case. The two lower courts ruled in favor of the petitioner, saying
that the construction of the said structure solely came from his
exclusive funds. On appeal, the Court of Appeals decided on the
contrary stating that the property is owned in common by both of
them.
Issue: Whether or not the property subject of the suit pertains to
the exclusive ownership of petitioner, John.
Ruling: No. Art 147 of the Family Code reads:
When a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages
and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares
and the property acquired by both of them through

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their work or industry shall be governed by the rules
on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary,
properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them
in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party
who did not participate in the acquisition by other
party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the
formers efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.
The law is clear. In the absence, as here, of proofs to the
contrary, any property acquired by common-law spouses during
their period of cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained thru
their joint efforts and is owned by them in equal shares. Their
property relationship is governed by the rules on co-ownership.
And under this regime, they owned their properties in common in
equal shares.
John and Juliet lived together as husband and wife from
1986 to 1995 without the benefit of marriage, and it was within this
period that they acquired the property and constructed the annex
structure.
In the instant case, petitioner failed to prove that the
property came from his exclusive funds. Hence, the property is
owned by the parties in common. Being co-owner of the structure
in question, Juliet, as correctly ruled by the CA, may not be ejected
therefrom.

SAN LUIS VS. SAN LUIS

FACTS:
Felicisimo contracted 3 marriages. Felicisimo married Virginia Sulit
but she died [6 children]. Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin but
divorced later on [one son]. Felicisimo married Felicidad San Luis
but this time, Felicisimo died [no children].
Thereafter, Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate before
the RTC. However, one of the children of Felicisimo in the first

marriage, Rodolfo San Luis, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground

that Felicidad has no legal personality since she was just a mistress
of Felicisimo, the latter being legally married to Merry Lee. The RTC
ruled in favor of Rodolfo. However, CA reversed.
ISSUE: WON Felicidad has the legal personality to file the petition
for letters of administration???
RULING: YES.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file
the petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the
issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse
abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that
Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974,
or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In
resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions
of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that
there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the
affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between
a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently
dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming
that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien
spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their
conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however,
recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien
spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino
wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent
from the marriage from the standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L.
Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of
matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the existing
status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them
both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one
party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides,
in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry
again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from
the bond of the former marriage."

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Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer
the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the
case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own countrys
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property.
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled
that she should no longer be considered married to the alien
spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital
duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our
laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be
just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights
to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against
in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree
allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo
to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality
to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse.
However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to
prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as
the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the
U.S.A.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for
further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by
Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry
respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the
legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of
administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of
Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through
their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union
of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but
who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to
properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their

respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent

of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry.
Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and
corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
Co-ownership
MAXEY V. CA

Cario vs Cario
Facts: Santiagio Carino contracted 2 marriages during his liftetime.
The 1st was with Susan Nicdao and the 2 nd was with Susan Yee
(hindi sya mahilig sa mga Susan eh noh? Haha). When Santiago
died, both Susan Nicdao and Susan Yee filed claims for monetary
benefits and financial assistance from the offices in which Santiago
worked for (he was a police).
Susan Yee filed a case for the collection of a sum of money
against Susan Nicdao for some benefits she received. Susan Nicdao
did not file her answer and was declared in default. Susan Yee
admits that her marriage to Santiago took place without first
obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity on the marriage of
Santiago to Susan Nicdao. However, Susan Yee argued that the 1 st
marriage was void ab initio because it was solemnized without the
required marriage license. She presented the marriage certificate of
Santiago and Susan Nicdao which bears no marriage license
number. In addition, a certification from the local civil registrar
showed that they had no record of the marriage license.
Issue: Whether Susan Yee is entitled to the monetary benefits she is
claiming from Susan Nicdao?
Held: 1) In this case, the marriage of Susan Nicdao and Santiago
does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license
requirement. Despite this however, the records reveal that their
marriage was solemnized without a marriage license. As such, their
marriage is void ab initio.
However, this does not automatically mean that the 2 nd
marriage is already valid. Under art40 of the family code, for
purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of a previous marriage. Even though the 1 st

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marriage is void, the parties will still have to wait for the
declaration otherwise the 2nd marriage will also be void. Hence,
since Susan Yees marriage to Santiago was solemnized without
first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the earlier marriage void,
theirs is also void ab initio.
2) One of the effects of the declaration of nullity is the
separation of property of the spouses. Considering that the 2
marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime wont
be absolute community nor conjugal partnership. The marriages
are governed by Art147 and 148 of the FC on Property Regime of
Unions Without Marriage.
Under art. 148 refers to the property regime of bigamous
marriages, adulterous relationships...etc. Under this regime, the
property acquired by the parties through their actual joint
contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries
earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively.
Considering that the marriage of Susan Yee and Santiago is
bigamous having been solemnized during the subsistence of
another marriage which is presumed to be valid, article 148
applies.
The disputed claims in this case are clearly renumerations,
incentives and benefits from governmental agencies by the
deceased as a police officer. Unless proof to the contrary is shown,
it cannot be said that Susan Yee contributed money, property or
industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they
are not owned in common they belong to the deceased alone and
Susan Yee has no right to claim them.
By intestate succession, these death benefits shall pass to
the legal heirs. But since Susan yee is not legal wife, she is not a
legal heir.
3) Article 147 govern the property regime of Santiago and
Susan Nicdao (1st null marriage). This article applies to unions of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to marry but whose marriage is nonetheless void for
other reasons.
Under this article, wages and salaries earned by either party
during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal
shares and will be divided equally between them even if only one
party earned the wages and the other did not contribute. Thus,
even if the disputed death benefits were earned by Santiago alone,
art147 creates a co-ownership entitling Susan Nicdao to share
thereof.

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