Part

I. Courts and Its Jurisdiction

1. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORP. & PETRON CORP. v.
ROMARS INTERNATIONAL GASES CORP.
G.R. No. 189669, 16 February 2015, THIRD DIVISION, (Peralta, J.)

Proceedings for applications for search warrants are not criminal
in nature and, thus, the rule that venue is jurisdictional does not
apply thereto. Pilipinas Shell and Petron received information
that Romas International Gases Corp (RIGC) was selling, offering
for sale, or distributing liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) by illegally
refilling the steel cylinders manufactured by and bearing the
duly registered trademark and device of Petron. Pilipinas Shell
and Petron then requested the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) to investigate said activities of
RIGC for the purpose of apprehending and prosecuting
establishments conducting illegal refilling, distribution and/or
sale of LPG products using the same containers of Petron and
Shell.
The NBI proceeded with their investigation and reportedly found
commercial quantities of Petron Gasul and Shellane cylinders
stockpiled at RIGCs warehouselocated in San Juan, Baao,
Camarines Sur. The NBI, in behalf of Petron and Shell, filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Naga City (RTC-Naga), two separate
Applications for Search Warrants against RIGC and/or its
occupants. The RTC-Naga City issued an Order issuingthe search
warrants. On the same day, the NBI served the warrants at the
RIGCs premises in an orderly and peaceful manner,
and articles or items described in the warrants were seized. RIGC
filed a Motion to Quashthe search warrants. But the RTC-Naga
denied the Motion to Quash. However, RIGC's new counsel filed
an Appearance with Motion for Reconsideration (MR). It was
only in said motion where RIGC raised for the first time, the issue
of the impropriety of filing the Application for Search Warrant at
the RTC-Naga City when the alleged crime was committed in a
place within the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC-Iriga City. The

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RTC-Naga granted the MR, thereby quashing the search

warrants. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC Order.
ISSUE: Was the issuance of the search warrants within the
jurisdiction of RTCNaga when the crime was committed beyond
its territorial jurisdiction?
RULING: Yes. In accordance with the omnibus motion rule,
therefore, the trial court
could only take cognizance of an issue that was not raised in the
motion to quash if, (1) said issue was not available or existent
when they filed the motion to quash the search warrant; or (2)
the issue was one involving jurisdiction over the subject

2. People v. Taroy
DOCTRINE: Venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases. It can
neither be waived nor subjected to stipulation. The right venue
must exist as a matter of law.
FACTS: Accused Taroy was charged with two counts of rape
before the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet. Taroy was the stepfather
of the victim Des. Their family resided in Pucsusan Baranggay
, Itoyon, Benguet. According to Des, the first incident of rape
happened on August 10, 1997 when Des was only 10yrs old in
their house. She was alone inside their house, cleaning when
Taroy entered the house, undressed himself and ordered Des to
do the same. When she resisted, Taroy poked her with a knife in
the head and this compelled her to yield to him. The second
incident, which has almost the same facts as the first one except
that this happened in her room, took place sometime in
September 1998.
Des told her mother and aunt of the rape incident when she was
15 and they immediately accompanied her to the NBI to
complain. The complaint was filed in the RTC of La Trinidad
Benguet. According to the testimonies, the mother and a certain
Alumno accompanied Des to the hospital for examination the
results of which showed that there are signs of forcible penis

penetration. Taroy denied the offense and said that the

testimony was a fabrication made upon the prodding aunt who
disliked him.

3. Pestilos vs. Generoso

The RTC found Taroy guilty. Taroy then challenged the trial
courts jurisdiction over the crimes charged stating that the
offense took place in their residence at Pucsusan Baranggay,
Baguio City as testified by him. The RTC held that his testimony
did not strip the court of its jurisdiction since he waived the
jurisdictional requirement. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
RTCs ruling because the prosecution has sufficiently
established the jurisdiction of the RTC.

On February 20, 2005, at around 3: 15 in the morning, an

altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno
Generoso. Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District,
Station to report the incident. Acting on this report, the Desk
Officer dispatched policemen to go to the scene of the crime and
to render assistance. The policemen arrived at the scene of the
crime less than one hour after the alleged altercation and they
saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten. Atty. Generoso then pointed to
the petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted the
police officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to the Police
Station for investigation. The petitioners went with the police
officers. At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor found
that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed
weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the attack. The
petitioners were indicted for attempted murder.
The petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular
Preliminary Investigation on the ground that they had not been
lawfully arrested. They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest
took place since the police officers had no personal knowledge
that they were the perpetrators of the crime. They also claimed
that they were just "invited" to the police station. Thus, the
inquest proceeding was improper, and a regular procedure for
preliminary investigation should have been performed pursuant
to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
RTC denied the motion. The court likewise denied the
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling
before the CA on a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. They attributed
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, on the RTC for the denial of their motion for
preliminary investigation.

ISSUE: W/N the RTC of La Trinidad Benguet has jurisdiction to

hear and decide the case.
HELD: Venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases. It can neither be
waived nor subjected to stipulation. The right venue must exist
as a matter of law. Thus, for territorial jurisdiction to attach, the
criminal action must be instituted and tried in the proper court
of the municipality, city, or province where the offense was
committed or where any of its essential ingredients took place.
The Informations filed with the RTC of La Trinidad state that the
crimes were committed in the victim and the offenders house in
City Limit, Tuding, Municipality of Itogon, Province of Benguet.
This allegation conferred territorial jurisdiction over the subject
offenses on the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet. The testimonies of
MILA and DES as well as the affidavit of arrest point to this fact.
Clearly, Taroys uncorroborated assertion that the subject
offenses took place in Baguio City is not entitled to belief.
Besides, he admitted during the pre- trial in the case that it was
the RTC of La Trinidad that had jurisdiction to hear the case.
Taken altogether, that RTCs jurisdiction to hear the case is
beyond dispute.

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Facts:


CA dismissed the petition.
Issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE VALIDLY
ARRESTED WITHOUT A WARRANT.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE LAWFULLY
ARRESTED WHEN THEY WERE MERELY INVITED TO THE
POLICE PRECINCT.
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS VOID FOR FAILURE TO STATE
THE FACTS AND THE LAW UPON WHICH IT WAS BASED.
Ruling:
We find the petition unmeritorious and thus uphold the RTC
Order.
First Issue: For purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of
the warrantless arrest of the present petitioners, the question to
be resolved is whether the requirements for a valid warrantless
arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure were complied with, namely: 1) has the
crime just been committed when they were arrested? 2) did the
arresting officer have personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the petitioners committed the crime? and 3)
based on these facts and circumstances that the arresting officer
possessed at the time of the petitioners' arrest, would a
reasonably discreet and prudent person believe that the
attempted murder of Atty. Generoso was committed by the
petitioners?

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From a review of the records, we conclude that the police officers

had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances upon which
they had properly determined probable cause in effecting a
warrantless arrest against the petitioners.
The arresting officers went to the scene of the crime
upon the complaint of Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling; the
police officers responded to the scene of the crime less than one
(1) hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired
in a community where Atty. Generoso and the petitioners reside;
Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those
responsible for his mauling and, notably, the petitioners and
Atty. Generoso lived almost in the same neighborhood; more
importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the
arresting officers, they did not deny their participation in the
incident with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a different
version of what transpired.
With these facts and circumstances that the police
officers gathered and which they have personally observed less
than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene
of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we
deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers had
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the
petitioners' warrantless arrests. These circumstances were well
within the police officers' observation, perception and evaluation
at the time of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the
police officers' personal observation, which are within their
personal knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless
arrests.
Personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the
terms of the above-cited provision, does not require actual
presence at the scene while a crime was being committed; it is
enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is
patent (as in this case) and the police officer has probable cause

to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or

circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently
committed the crime.

several occasions as examples:

Second Issue: The term invited in the Affidavit of Arrest is

construed to mean as an authoritative command.

Third Issue: The RTC, in its Order dismissing the motion, clearly
states that the Court is not persuaded by the evidentiary nature
of the allegations in the said motion of the accused. Aside from
lack of clear and convincing proof, the Court, in the exercise of its
sound discretion on the matter, is legally bound to pursue and
hereby gives preference to the speedy disposition of the case."
We do not see any taint of impropriety or grave abuse of
discretion in this Order. The RTC, in resolving the motion, is not
required to state all the facts found in the record of the case.
Detailed evidentiary matters, as the RTC decreed, is best
reserved for the full-blown trial of the case, not in the
preliminary incidents leading up to the trial.
4. Uy v. Judge Javellana (GERLIE M. Uy vs JUDGE ERWIN B.
Javellana A.M. No. MTJ-07-1666)
Facts: This administrative case arose from a verified complaint
for "gross ignorance of the law and procedures, gross
incompetence, neglect of duty, conduct improper and
unbecoming of a judge, grave misconduct and others," filed by
Public Attorneys Gerlie M. Uy (Uy) and Ma. Consolacion T. Bascug
(Bascug) of the (PAO), La Carlotta District, against Presiding
Judge Javellana of the MeTC, La Castellana, Negros Occidental.
Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug alleged the following in their
complaint:
First, Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug cited

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In Crim. Case No. 04-097, entitled People v. Cornelio, for

Malicious Mischief, Judge Javellana issued a warrant of
arrest after the filing of said case despite Section 16 of
the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure;
In Crim. Case No. 04-075, entitled People v. Celeste, et al.,
for Trespass to Dwelling, Judge Javellana did not grant
the motion to dismiss for non-compliance with the Lupon
requirement under Sections 18 and 19(a) of the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure, insisting that said motion
was a prohibited pleading;
Also in People v. Celeste, et al., Judge Javellana refused to
dismiss outright the complaint even when the same was
patently without basis or merit, as the affidavits of
therein complainant and her witnesses were all hearsay
evidence; and
In Crim. Case No. 02-056, entitled People v. Lopez, et al.,
for Malicious Mischief, Judge Javellana did not apply the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and, instead,
conducted a preliminary examination and preliminary
investigation in accordance with the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, then set the case for arraignment
and pre-trial, despite confirming that therein
complainant and her witnesses had no personal
knowledge of the material facts alleged in their affidavits,
which should have been a ground for dismissal of said
case.

Third, Judge Javellana violated Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and issued warrants of
arrest without propounding searching questions to the
complainants and their witnesses to determine the necessity of
placing the accused under immediate custody. As a result, Judge
Javellana issued warrants of arrest even when the accused had
already voluntarily surrendered or when a warrantless arrest

had been effected.

Fourth, Judge Javellana failed to observe the constitutional rights
of the accused as stated in Section12(1), Article III of the
Constitution. Judge Javellana set Crim. Case No. 03-097, entitled
People v. Bautista, for preliminary investigation even when the
accused had no counsel, and proceeded with said investigation
without informing the accused of his rights to remain silent and
to have a counsel Judge Javellana stressed that the charges
against him were baseless and malicious; and the acts being
complained of involved judicial discretion and, thus, judicial in
nature and not the proper subject of an administrative
complaint. Consequently, Judge Javellana sought the dismissal of
the instant complaint against him. The Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), in its report, found Judge Javellana liable
for gross ignorance of the law or procedure when he did not
apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure in cases
appropriately covered by said Rule.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
Held: Judge Javellana committed a blatant error in denying the
Motion to Dismiss filed by the accused in People v. Celeste, et al.
and in insisting that said Motion was a prohibited pleading, even
though the case was never previously referred to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa as required by Sections 18 and 19(a) of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. A case which has not been
previously referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa shall be
dismissed without prejudice. A motion to dismiss on the ground
of failure to comply with the Lupon requirement is an exception
to the pleadings prohibited by the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure. Given the express provisions of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure, we find irrelevant Judge Javellanas
argument that referral to the Lupon is not a jurisdictional
requirement. The following facts are undisputed: People v.

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Celeste, et al. were not referred to the Lupon, and the accused
filed a Motion to Dismiss based on this ground. Judge Javellana
should have allowed and granted the Motion to Dismiss (albeit
without prejudice) filed by the accused in People v. Celeste, et al.
(hindi ko sure) Judge Javellana did not provide any reason as to
why he needed to conduct a preliminary investigation in People
v. Lopez, et al. Judge Javellana cannot be allowed to arbitrarily
conduct proceedings beyond those specifically laid down by the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, thereby lengthening or
delaying the resolution of the case, and defeating the express
purpose of said Rule.
Without any showing that the accused in People v. Cornelio and
People v. Lopez, et al. were charged with the special cases of
malicious mischief particularly described in Article 328 of the
Revised Penal Code the appropriate penalty for the accused
would be arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods
which under Article 329(a) of the Revised Penal Code, would be
imprisonment for two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6)
months. Clearly, these two cases should be governed by th
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
5. Malabed v. Atty. De La Pena
Facts:
In an administrative case, Atty. De la Pena was charged with
dishonesty and gross misconduct for misrepresenting that he
submitted a certificate to file action when there was none,
conflict of interest for notarizing a deed of donation executed by
complainants family when eventually he is a counsel for those
opposing parties in a case where complainants family is
involved, and for violation of prohibition in employment in
government office after his dismissal as a judge.
In his pleadings before the IBP, Atty. De la Pena called the
counsel of the complainant a silahis by nature and complexion
and also accused complainant of cohabiting with a married man

before the wife of that married man died. Respondent alleged

that the [Certificate toFile Action] title before the RTC in Naval,
Bilaran was the certification of Lupon Chairman Rudolfo Catigbe.
he used when he filed Civil Case No. [B-]1118 for quieting of The
IBP found that Atty. De la Pena is guilty of dishonesty and gross
misconduct, and also noted the offensive language used by the
lawyer. One-year suspension from the practice of law was
recommended. The Supreme Court increased it to 2-year
suspension for repeated gross misconduct.
Issue: W/N guulty of gross misconduct. (Yes)
Held: For having use foul language in pleadings, he violated the
ethics of the profession.
Also for not having submitted the certificate to file action: he
submission of the certificate to file action, which evidences
thenon-conciliation between the parties in the barangay, is a pre-
condition forthe filing of a complaint in court.14 Complainant
claims that there is no suchcertificate in the complaint filed by
respondent on behalf of FortunatoJadulco, et al. Instead, what
respondent submitted was the certificate to file action in the
complaint filed by complainants brother, Conrado
Estreller,against Fortunato Jadulco.15Respondent counters that
what he used when he filed Civil CaseNo. [B-]1118 for Quieting
of Title, etc. x x x was the certification x x xissued on May 9, 2001,
x x x.Based on the records, the complaint for quieting of title in
Civil CaseNo. B-1118 was filed with the RTC on 18 October 2000.
The Certificate ofEndorsement, which respondent claimed was
the certificate to file action heused in Civil Case No. B-1118, was
issued on 9 May 2001, or after the filingof the complaint on 18
October 2000. It is apparent that the Certificate ofEndorsement
did not exist yet when the complaint in Civil Case No. B-1118was
filed. In other words, there is no truth to respondents allegation
that thesubject matter of Civil Case No. B-1118 was brought

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before the LuponTagapamayapa and that a certificate to file

action was issued prior to thefiling of the complaint. Clearly,
respondent misrepresented that he filed acertificate to file action
when there was none, which act violated Canon 10,Rule 10.01,
and Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
G. Jurisdiction to issue hold departure order

1. Hold Departure Order issued by Judge Madronio,
MTC, Manaoag, Pangasinan

Bernadette, facing a criminal case for violation of BP 22 before
the sala of Judge Marino Buban, presiding judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court in Cities in Tacloban City, filed a
complaint against him for gross ignorance of the law, serious
irregularity, partiality and grave misconduct for allegedly issuing
a hold-departure order against her in violation of Supreme
Court Circular 39-97 which provides that hold departure orders
shall be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In his defense, the judge
said that he is not aware of the said circular and only became
aware of it when he instructed his legal researcher to secure a
copy from the Executive Judge of the RTC. He eventually lifted
the hold departure order.

The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that the
judge be severely reprimanded with a warning that repetition of
the same shall warrant a higher penalty.

The Supreme Court:

Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure
orders to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of second level
courts. Paragraph No. 1 of the said circular specifically provides
that hold-departure orders shall be issued only in criminal cases
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regional trial courts.

Clearly then, criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of

first level courts do not fall within the ambit of the circular, and it
was an error on the part of respondent judge to have issued one
in the instant case.

Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct exhorts judges
to be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.
The Court, in exercising administrative supervision of all lower
courts, has not been remised in reminding the members of the
bench to exert due diligence in keeping abreast with the
development in law and jurisprudence. Besides, Circular No. 39-
97 is not a new circular. It was circularized in 1997 and
violation of which has been accordingly dealt with in numerous
cases before the Court. Herein judge, therefore, cannot be
excused for his infraction. Judges should always be vigilant in
their quest for new developments in the law so they could
discharge their duties and functions with zeal and fervor.

2. Mupas v. Espanol
FACTS: Bizarre. The word would aptly describe this tale of the
accuser turning out to be the culprit. Judge Lorinda Mupas of
MTC Dasmarias, Cavite filed an administrative complaint
against Judge Dolores Espaol for allegedly illegally usurping
the functions of the Executive Judge of Dasmarias, for
ordering her (Mupas) "to desist from accepting, for preliminary
investigation,' criminal cases falling within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, where suspects are
apprehended pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure."
Judge Espaol filed her Comment that since she was appointed to
the single sala RTC of Dasmarias, under Supreme Court
Administrative Order No. 6 of 1975, she ipso facto became the
Executive Judge exercising supervision over the MTC of
Dasmarias. She further stated that her Order dated April 18,
2002, directing Mupas to desist from conducting preliminary

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investigation, did not deprive the latter of the authority to

conduct preliminary investigation but merely stopped Mupas
from conducting the same for being violative of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code and Republic Act No. 7438.
Judge Espaol said that Judge Mupas operated the MTC of
Dasmarias, Cavite as a "One-Stop Shop" where criminal
suspects apprehended without a warrant are ordered
detained in the municipal jail by virtue of an unsigned
"Detention Pending Investigation of the Case," in lieu of a
waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, as prescribed by R.A. No. 7438 and by Section 7, Rule
112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Thus,
according to Judge Espaol, the apprehended persons were
detained for a long time until Judge Mupas set the case for
preliminary investigation. If the detainee can post bail, Judge
Mupas would fix the amount of bail and require that the
premium, usually equivalent to 20% or 30% thereof, be paid in
cash. If the surety bond was secured outside of the MTC, the
bond would be rejected. Hence, the applicants for bail bonds
would go to the RTC of Dasmarias, Cavite to complain and apply
for the release of the detention prisoners.
On August 6, 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
dismissed the charges against Judge Espaol, and treated Judge
Espaols comment on Judge Mupas as a SEPARATE
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT against Judge Mupas. On
September 2003, Mupas filed for a motion seeking
reconsideration but the court This Court adopted the said
recommendation of the OCA in its Resolution dated May 31,
2004. Accordingly, Judge Mupas was faced with the following
charges:
(1) violation of Rule 112, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, and

Republic Act No. 7438; and

(2) violation of the rules on preliminary investigation: (a) for the
delay in the resolution of preliminary investigation cases
pending in [Judge Mupas] court; (b) for failure to perform her
ministerial duty of transmitting the
records of the case, including the resolution on the preliminary
investigation, within 10 days from the issuance of the said
resolution to the provincial prosecutor of Cavite; and
(c) for conducting preliminary investigation despite the fact that
there were many prosecutors in Cavite not indisposed to do the
job.

judges are ex officio executive judges, for purposes of

supervision in the interest of the service, their salas may be
merged with multi-sala stations. Therefore, the RTC of
Dasmarias, Cavite had long been merged with the multi-sala
station of the RTC of Imus, Cavite. In support of this claim, Judge
Mupas noted that then Executive Judge Lucenito N. Tagle of the
RTC of Imus, Cavite issued a Memorandum to all judges within
his supervision, including both Judge Espaol and Judge Mupas,
to submit periodic reports on detention prisoners.
d) She further argued that none of the detention prisoners had
filed an administrative complaint against her and that it was her
duty to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints filed
with her sala.

On September 19, 2005, Judge Mupas filed her Reply Judge

Espaols Comment where:

e) In addition, Judge Mupas posited that Judge Espaol could not

entertain applications for bail in the RTC because the cases were
pending before the MTC.

a) She claimed that under Rule 112, Section 2 of the Revised

Rules of Criminal Procedure, she is expressly authorized to
conduct preliminary investigation.

ISSUES: 1. WON Judge Espaol has the authority as Executive

Judge exercising

b) She questioned the authority of Judge Espaol in ordering her

to desist from conducting preliminary investigations in the guise
of "supervising" or "reviewing" her actions, as the said
authority was lodged in the provincial prosecutors. She
pointed out that, in the case of "People vs. Belinda Ventura
Singello" (Criminal Case No. 9292-01), subject of Judge Espaols
Order dated April 18, 2002, the provincial prosecutor affirmed
her (Mupas) finding of probable cause against the accused
without any question on the manner in which the preliminary
investigation was conducted.
c) She claimed that pursuant to Administrative Order No. 59-99
dated 1 June 1999, while in single-sala stations the presiding

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supervision over the MTC of Dasmarias to order Judge

Mupas to desist from accepting, for preliminary investigation,'
criminal cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court, where suspects are apprehended pursuant
to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
2. WON Judge Mupas violated the rights of the accused whose
preliminary investigation is pending in her court, they being
detained by virtue only of a "Detention Pending Investigation of
the Case" in place of a valid waiver signed in the presence of
counsel for considerable lengths of time
HELD: 1. YES, Judge Espaols order to Judge Mupas was lawful
and within her authority to issue as the OCA, and she was merely

performing her function

as Executive Judge of Dasmarias, Cavite 2. YES, Judge Mupas
was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law in
violating the rights of the accused because the document entitled
"Detention Pending Investigation of Cases" cannot validly be
deemed to be an implied waiver of the rights of the accused
under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
Sec. 2 e) of RA 7438 is in point, thus:
xxx Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, or under
custodial investigation, shall be in writing and signed by
such person in the presence of his counsel; otherwise the
waiver shall be null and void and of no effect. (Underscoring
supplied)
Note: this being the fourth offense of Judge Lorinda B. Toledo-
Mupas she was ordered dismissed from the service with forfeiture
of all benefits due her, excluding her accrued leave benefits, and
with perpetual disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
Part II. Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

A. Law
1. Inding v. Sandiganbayan
Danilo was a Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
with Salary Grade 26 when he was charged with violation of
Section 8 in relation to Section 11 of Republic Act 6713. An
Information was thus filed against him before the
Sandiganbayan. Prior to his arraignment, he filed a Motion to

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Dismiss With Prayer to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest,

asserting that under Presidential Decree 1606 as amend by
Section 4 (A) (1) of RA 8249, the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction to try and hear a case because he is an official of the
executive branch occupying the position of a Regional Director
but with a compensation that is classified as below Salary Grade
27. The Office of the Special Prosecutor opposed, arguing that he
qualification as to Salary Grade 27 and higher applies only to
officials of the executive branch other than the Regional Director
and those specifically enumerated. This is so since the term
Regional Director and higher are separated by the
conjunction and, which signifies that these two positions are
different, apart and distinct, words but are conjoined together
relating one to the other to give effect to the purpose of the law.
The fact that the position of Regional Director was specifically
mentioned without indication as to its salary grade signifies the
lawmakers intention that officials occupying such position,
regardless of salary grade, fall within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan Second Division denied the motion, holding
that the position of Regional Director is one of those exceptions
where the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction even if such position is
not Salary Grade 27. It was opined that Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A
No. 8249 unequivocally provides that respondent court has
jurisdiction over officials of the executive branch of the
government occupying the position of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Salary Grade 27 and higher, of R.A.
No. 6758, including those officials who are expressly enumerated
in subparagraphs (a) to (g). In support of the ruling, this Courts
pronouncements in Inding and Binay v. Sandiganbayan were
cited.
The petitioner elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.
The Issue:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case.

The Ruling:
We find merit in the petition.
The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5,
Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution.1 By virtue of the powers
vested in him by the Constitution and pursuant to Proclamation
No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972, former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1486.2 The decree was later
amended by P.D. No. 1606,3 Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
1294 P.D. No. 1860,5 and P.D. No. 18616.
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the special court was
retained as provided for in Section 4, Article XI thereof.7 Aside
from Executive Order Nos. 148 and 14-a,9 and R.A. 7080,10 which
expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606
was further modified by R.A. No. 797511, R.A. No. 8249,12 and
just this year, R.A. No. 10660.13
For the purpose of this case, the relevant provision is Section 4 of
R.A. No. 8249, which states:
SEC. 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to
read as follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are

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officials occupying the following positions in the government,

whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27
and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of
consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and
all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the
position of provincial director and those holding the rank of
senior superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and
officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and
special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities
or educational institutions or foundations.

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(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as

Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions
of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission,
without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27
and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with
other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their
office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection
with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
x x x
Based on the afore-quoted, those that fall within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan are: (1) officials of the
executive branch with Salary Grade 27 or higher, and (2) officials
specifically enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g), regardless
of their salary grades.14 While the first part of Section 4 (A)
covers only officials of the executive branch with Salary Grade 27
and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive
officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and
higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.15

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That the phrase otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher

qualifies regional director and higher is apparent from the
Sponsorship Speech of Senator Raul S. Roco on Senate Bill Nos.
1353 and 844, which eventually became R.A. Nos. 7975 and
8249, respectively:
As proposed by the Committee, the Sandiganbayan shall exercise
original jurisdiction over the cases assigned to it only in
instances where one or more of the principal accused are
officials occupying the positions of regional director and higher
or are otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher by the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, whether in
a permanent, acting or interim capacity at the time of the
commission of the offense. The jurisdiction, therefore, refers
to a certain grade upwards, which shall remain with the
Sandiganbayan.16 (Emphasis supplied)
To speed up trial in the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 7975
was enacted for that Court to concentrate on the larger fish and
leave the small fry to the lower courts. This law became
effective on May 6, 1995 and it provided a two-pronged solution
to the clogging of the dockets of that court, to wit:
It divested the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over public
officials whose salary grades were at Grade 26 or lower,
devolving thereby these cases to the lower courts, and
retaining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only over
public officials whose salary grades were at Grade 27 or
higher and over other specific public officials holding
important positions in government regardless of salary
grade; x x x17 (Emphasis supplied)
The legislative intent is to allow the Sandiganbayan to devote its
time and expertise to big-time cases involving the so-called big
fishes in the government rather than those accused who are of

11

limited means who stand trial for petty crimes, the so-called
small fry, which, in turn, helps the court decongest its
dockets.18
Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may
still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, provided
that they hold the positions enumerated by the law.19 In this
category, it is the position held, not the salary grade, which
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.20 The specific
inclusion constitutes an exception to the general qualification
relating to officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.21 As ruled in Inding:
Following this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4 which
provides that if the accused is occupying a position lower than SG
27, the proper trial court has jurisdiction, can only be properly
interpreted as applying to those cases where the principal
accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27 and not among
those specifically included in the enumeration in Section 4 a. (1)
(a) to (g). Stated otherwise, except for those officials specifically
included in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary
grades, over whom the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, all other
public officials below SG 27 shall be under the jurisdiction of the
proper trial courts where none of the principal accused are
occupying positions corresponding to SG 27 or higher. By this
construction, the entire Section 4 is given effect. The cardinal
rule, after all, in statutory construction is that the particular
words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached
and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the
statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its
parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. And courts
should adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of a
statute, if at all possible. Ut magis valeat quam pereat or that

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construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the

statute its every word.22
Thus, to cite a few, We have held that a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod,23 a department manager of the
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth),24 a student
regent of the University of the Philippines,25 and a Head of the
Legal Department and Chief of the Documentation with
corresponding ranks of Vice-Presidents and Assistant Vice-
President of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and
Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS)26 fall within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner is not an executive official with Salary Grade 27 or
higher. Neither does he hold any position particularly
enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g). As he correctly argues,
his case is, in fact, on all fours with Cuyco. Therein, the accused
was the Regional Director of the Land Transportation Office,
Region IX, Zamboanga City, but at the time of the commission of
the crime in 1992, his position was classified as Director II with
Salary Grade 26.27 It was opined:
Petitioner contends that at the time of the commission of the
offense in 1992, he was occupying the position of Director II,
Salary Grade 26, hence, jurisdiction over the cases falls with the
Regional Trial Court.
We sustain petitioners contention.
The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section
3(a) and (e), Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, unless
committed by public officials and employees occupying positions
of regional director and higher with Salary Grade 27 or higher,
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office.

12

In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though petitioner

admittedly occupied the position of Director II with Salary Grade
26 under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in
serious error of jurisdiction, and acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in suspending
petitioner from office, entitling petitioner to the reliefs prayed
for.28
In the same way, a certification issued by the OIC Assistant
Chief, Personnel Division of the BIR shows that, although
petitioner is a Regional Director of the BIR, his position is
classified as Director II with Salary Grade 26.29
There is no merit in the OSPs allegation that the petition was
prematurely filed on the ground that respondent court has not
yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. Records
disclose that when a warrant of arrest was issued by respondent
court, petitioner voluntarily surrendered and posted a cash bond
on September 17, 2009. Also, he was arraigned on April 14, 2010,
prior to the filing of the petition on April 30, 2010.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition
for certiorari is GRANTED.The August 18, 2009 Resolution and
February 8, 2010 Order of the Sandiganbayan Second Division,
which denied petitioners Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
2. People v. Sandiganbayan
Facts:
Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of Cebu at the time pertinent
to this case. She was able to get hold of a cash advance in the

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amount of P71,095.00 under a disbursement voucher in order to

defray seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and
Environmental Protection, which she headed. After almost two
years since she obtained the said cash advance, no liquidation
was made.
As such, Toledo City Auditor Manolo V. Tulibao issued a
demand letter to respondent Amante asking the latter to settle
her unliquidated cash advance within seventy-two hours from
receipt of the same demand letter. The Commission on Audit,
submitted an investigation report to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB-Visayas), with the
recommendation that respondent Amante be further
investigated to ascertain whether appropriate charges could be
filed against her under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445,
otherwise known as The Auditing Code of the Philippines.
Thereafter, the OMB-Visayas, issued a Resolution
recommending the filing of an Information for Malversation of
Public Funds against respondent Amante. The Office of the
Special Prosecutor (OSP), upon review of the OMB-Visayas'
Resolution, prepared a memorandum finding probable cause to
indict respondent Amante.
The OSP filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan
accusing Victoria Amante of violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445.
The case was raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan.
Thereafter, Amante filed with the said court a MOTION TO
DEFER ARRAIGNMENT AND MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION
and was opposed by The OSP.
The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution dismissed the case
against Amante. Hence, the present petition.
Issue: Whether or not a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
under Salary Grade 26 who was charged with violation of The
Auditing Code of the Philippines falls within the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.

Held: Yes. The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No.
1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 which took effect

13

on May 16, 1995, which was again amended on February 5, 1997

by R.A. No. 8249. The alleged commission of the offense, as
shown in the Information was on or about December 19, 1995
and the filing of the Information was on May 21, 2004. The
jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at
the time of the institution of the [15] action, not at the time of the
commission of the offense. The exception contained in R.A. 7975,
as well as R.A. 8249, where it expressly provides that to
determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases
involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379,
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is
not applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein
is a violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines.
Thus, the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a
criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of
the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense
applies in this present case. Since the present case was instituted
on May 21, 2004, the provisions of R.A. No. 8249 shall govern.
The above law is clear as to the composition of the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4(a),
the following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of
R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section
2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the
Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the
latter must be committed by, among others, officials of the
executive branch occupying positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. However,
the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are classified as
Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus
enumerated by the same law.
By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the
pertinent law, respondent Amante, being a member of the

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Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of the alleged commission of

an offense in relation to her office, falls within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

3. Serrana v. Sandiganbayan

FACTS: Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student
of the UP-Cebu. She was appointed by then President Joseph
Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve
a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and ending on
December 31, 2000. On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her
siblings and relatives, registered with the SEC the Office of the
Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).3 One of the projects of
the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex.4
President Estrada gave P15,000,000.00 to the OSRFI as financial
assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds,
according to the information, was the Office of the President. The
renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.5 The
succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and
Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa
U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the state
university, consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of
Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.6
The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioner and
her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa and filed the case to the
Sandiganbayan.7 Petitioner moved to quash the information. She
claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction
over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as
UP student regent. The Sandiganbayan denied petitioners
motion for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied with finality.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over an estafa case? (2) Whether or not petitioner is a public
officer with Salary Grade 27?

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DOCTRINE: (1) Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 which defines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan reads: Other offenses or
felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office. (2) While
the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary
Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other
executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27
and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under
the jurisdiction of the said court.

RATIONALE:
(1) The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes
should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or
an absurd conclusion.33 Every section, provision or clause of the
statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to
arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature.34 Evidently,
from the provisions of Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by
public officials in relation to their office. Plainly, estafa is one of
those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin
requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials
and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to
their office.

(2) Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
even if she does not have a salary grade 27, as she is placed there
by express provision of law.44 Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No.
1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over
Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under
this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR
performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a

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non-stock corporation.45 By express mandate of law, petitioner

is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.

4. Garcia v. Sandiganbayan
FACTS: A forfeiture case for ill-gotten wealth amounting to
P143,052,015.29 was filed against Major Gen. Carlos F. Garcia
and his family in October 2004. The case, filed by the Office of the
Ombudsman, was raffled to the fourth division of the
Sandiganbayan.

A second case for forfeiture of funds and properties
amounting to P202,005,980.55 was filed against the Garcias in
July 2005. The second case was also raffled to the fourth division
of the abovementioned court.

Subsequent to the filing of the first forfeiture case but
prior to the filing of the second forfeiture case, or in April 2005,
the Garcias and three others were charged by the OMB with a
violation of the plunder law for properties and funds amounting
to P303,272,005.99. This case was raffled to the second division
of the SB.

After the filing of the first forfeiture case, summons were
issued to Gen. Garcia. The Garcias filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of the SBs lack of jurisdiction over separate civil actions
for forfeiture. However, this motion was dismissed, and the
Garcias were declared in default.

Despite the standing default order, the petitioners moved
for the transfer and consolidation of the first forfeiture case with
the plunder case which were pending in different divisions of the
SB. The petitioners are arguing that such was mandated by RA
8249.
The fourth division of the SB denied the motion for the
reason that the forfeiture case is not the corresponding civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the criminal
case of plunder. Despite foisting the argument that the fourth
division of the SB was stripped of jurisdiction over the
petitioners after the filing of the plunder case, the court still
denied the motion to dismiss.

15

After the filing of the second forfeiture case, summons

were served to Gen. Garcia who received them, as well as the
summons for the other Garcias. However, he qualified this
acceptance by stating that he will not guarantee service of the
summons to the petitioners. Mrs. Garcia and her children moved
for the dismissal of the case, arguing that the court did not have
jurisdiction over their person. This was, however, dismissed by
the SB.

ISSUE: WON
(1) the SB has jurisdiction over Mrs. Garcia and her children; and
(2) the plunder case and the forfeiture cases should be
consolidated for having the same cause of action and in
order to avoid placing the petitioners under double
jeopardy.

HELD/RATIO:
(1) NO. The SB did not acquire jurisdiction over Mrs.
Garcia and her children due to a defective substituted service of
summons. Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure clearly provides for the requirements of a valid
substituted service of summons, thus:
SEC. 7. Substituted service.If the defendant cannot be
served within a reasonable time as provided in the
preceding section [personal service on defendant],
service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the
summons at the defendants residence with some person
of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or
(b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof.
In the instant case, such substituted services of summons
were invalid for being irregular and defective.

(2) NO. Executive Order No. (EO) 14, Series of 1986, authorizes
under its Sec. 31 the filing of forfeiture suits under RA 1379
which will proceed independently of any criminal proceedings.
The Court, in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, interpreted this
provision as empowering the Presidential Commission on Good
Government to file independent civil actions separate from the
criminal actions.
The petitioners thesis on double jeopardy does not hold
water because double jeopardy presupposes two separate
criminal prosecutions. However, the causes of action in the
plunder case and in forfeiture cases are different. The plunder
case is criminal in nature while the forfeiture case is civil in
nature.
In a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be
established is the commission of the criminal acts in furtherance
of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. In the language of Sec. 4 of
RA 7080, for purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it is
sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt
or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy [to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth].
On the other hand, all that the court needs to determine,
by preponderance of evidence, under RA 1379 is the
disproportion of respondents properties to his legitimate
income, it being unnecessary to prove how he acquired said
properties. As correctly formulated by the Solicitor General, the
forfeitable nature of the properties under the provisions of RA
1379 does not proceed from a determination of a specific overt
act committed by the respondent public officer leading to the
acquisition of the illegal wealth.
The forfeiture proceedings, insofar as they pertain to
Mrs. Garcia and her children, are void for lack of jurisdiction
over their persons.

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16

B. Inordinate delay

Part III. Office of the Ombudsman

A. Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman

1. Department of Justice vs. Liwag G.R. No. 149311 February
11, 2005.

should be dismissed. They cited the ruling in Uy vs.

Sandiganbayan where the SC ruled for the primary jurisdiction of
the Ombudsman in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

Doctrine of Concurrent Jurisdiction; Concurrent Jurisdiction of DOJ

and Ombudsman in complaints

The DOJ now brings the matter before the SC to challenge Judge
Liwags order.

involving same facts, accused, and circumstances. Differences in

power of DOJ and Ombudsman;

Issue: W/N The DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary

investigation despite the pendency before the Ombudsman of a
complaint involving the same accused, facts, and circumstances.
(NO.)

Facts: The case at bar is a petition for certiorari and prohibition

filed by the DOJ and NBI challenging the order RTC Manila Judge
Liwag. Judge Liwag had issued a writ of preliminary injunction
against the conduct of a preliminary investigation by the
Department of Justice Panel due to an already ongoing
investigation by the Ombudsman.

On January 8, 2001 a certain Mary Ong allegedly a member of the
Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) filed a
complaint-affidavit against PNP General Panfilo M. Lacson and
PNP Colonel Michael Ray B. Aquino and other PNP officials and
private individuals before the Ombudsman.
On March 9, 2001, Mary Ong and other witnesses executed
sworn-statements alleging the same facts as those she disclosed
to the Ombudsman. NBI Director Wycoco in a letter to DOJ Sec.
Perez recommended for an investigation into allegations of
Kidnapping for ransom and murder against Lacson, Aquino, et. al.
Lacson, Aquino et. al averred that the complaint in the DOJ

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Petitioner DOJ however denied their motion to dismiss. On June

22, 2001, Judge Liwag issued an order prohibiting the DOJ from
conducting a preliminary investigation against Lacson and
Aquino.

Held: The SC held that the settled rule is that the agency that first
takes cognizance of a case shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all others. (Carlos v. Angeles)
The power of the DOJ is Statutory, that of the Ombudsman is
Statutory and Constitutional.By virtue of Sec. 13, Art. XI of the
Constitution the Ombudsman is vested with plenary power and
primary jurisdiction to investigate complaints specifically
directed against public officers and employees.
By virtue of RA 6770, the ombudsman has primary jurisdiction
over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and authorizes the
ombudsman to take over the investigation at any stage from any
government investigating agency.
The power of the DOJ on the other hand, comes as an extension
of the executive branch and is covered by the 1987
Administrative Code. The DOJ has general jurisdiction over cases
involving violations of the penal code, but such jurisdiction

17

cannot diminish the Constitutionally vested plenary power of the

independent Ombudsman.
The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction
(capability) to deal with the same subject matter, it does not
mean that both the DOJ and Ombudsman are co-equal or that
both may be the venue of investigations on the exact same
matters. This is to avoid multiplicity in proceedings, conflicting
resolutions, unnecessary expenditures, and to promote an
orderly administration of justice.
Wherefore, the petition of the DOJ is DISMISSED.
2. OMBUDSMAN V. GALICIA [ GR No. 167711, October 10,
2008 ]

FACTS:
Respondent Ramon C. Galicia was a former public school teacher
at M.B. Asistio Sr. High School (MBASHS) in Caloocan City. Based
on the academic records that the submitted forming part of his
201 file, Galicia graduated with degree in civil engineering from
the Far Eastern University but failed to pass the board exam. He
also presented himself to have earned 12 units in education from
Caloocan City Polytechnic College and passed the Teachers
Professional Exam.
The school principal of MBASHS proceeded to verify the
authenticity of Galacias Transcript of Records from Caloocan
City Polytechnic College and was informed the had no record of
such. He lodged an affidavit for falsification, dishonesty, and
grave misconduct against Galicia before the Ombudsman.

ISSUE:
As between the Ombudsman and the DepEd Schools
Superintendent who has the jurisdiction to investigate non-
feasance and mal-feasance by public school teachers?

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HELD:
The court held that it is the school superintendent and not
the Ombudsman that has the jurisdiction over administrative
cases against public school teachers. However in the case at bar,
Galicia stopped from belated assailing the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman. His right to due process was fully satisfied when he
participated fully in the investigation proceedings. The
investigation conducted by the Ombudsman is therefore valid.

3. ANGELES v. MERCEDITAS GUTIERREZ G.R. Nos. 189161 &
189173 March 21, 2012
This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Court to determine whether the Office of the
Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in the exercise
of its discretionary powers to investigate and prosecute criminal
complaints.
Facts

Petitioner Judge Adoracion Angeles was the Presiding

Judge of Branch 121 of Caloocan City RTC, while private
respondent Emmanuel V elasco was a senior state
prosecutor at the Department of Justice.

Judge Angeles filed a criminal complaint against

Velasco with the Ombudsman for:
Giving unwarranted benefit to the accused in a criminal
complaint for smuggling
by failing to present a material witness;
Engaging in private practice by insisting on the re-
opening of child abuse cases against
petitioner;
Falsifying a public document to make it appear that a
clarificatory hearing on the child
abuse Complaint was conducted.

The Ombudsman dismissed the charges against

respondent Velasco. After evaluation of facts and

18

evidence presented by complainant, there was no cause

to conduct preliminary investigation or an administrative
adjudication.
1st charge of suppression of testimonial evidence in
connection with smuggling case: Ombudsman dismissed
the charge on the ground that petitioner had no sufficient
personal interest in the subject matter. Petitioner was
neither a party nor the presiding judge in the said
criminal case. Petitioner acted based on his discretion as
prosecutor.
2nd charge of private practice: Dismissed on the ground
of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Petitioner
should have elevated her concern to the DOJ which had
primary jurisdiction.
3rd charge of falsification of private document:
Dismissed. The Ombudsman said the issue should have
been raised earlier. To add, mere presentation of the
alleged falsified document did not in itself establish
falsification.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
was denied by the Ombudsman for lack of merit.
Hence, the present Rule 65 petition.

Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
dismissing the Complaint against respondent Velasco.

Held No. Power of the Court over the Ombudsmans Exercise of
its Investigative and Prosecutorial.

Powers: The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether
there exists a reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty, and
thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the
appropriate courts. As a general rule, the Court doesnt interfere
with the Ombudsmans exercise of its investigative and

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prosecutorial powers without good and compelling reason. Such

reasons are absent in this Petition. The rule is based not only
upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutorial powers
granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but
upon practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions
seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the
Ombudsman will hamper the functions of the office and the
courts. The rationale for the plenary powers of the Ombudsman
which is virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial
intervention is to insulate it from outside pressure and improper
influence.
No Grave Abuse of Discretion in the Ombudsmans
Evaluation of Evidence: The determination of grave abuse of
discretion as the exception to the general rule of non-
interference in the Ombudsmans exercise of its powers is
precisely the province of the extraordinary writ of certiorari. In
this Petition, the Court does not find any grave abuse of
discretion that calls for the Courts exceptional divergence from
the general rule.
The burden of proof to show grave abuse of discretion is on
petitioner, and she has failed to discharge this burden. She
merely stated why she did not agree with the findings of the
Ombudsman. Petitioner passed upon the SC the factual findings
of the Ombudsman. However, the Court is not a trier of facts.
Although the Court diverged from some of the conclusions
reached by the Ombudsman, it found that its dismissal of the
charges against respondent Velasco was arrived at with a
rational deliberation. The Ombudsman did not overstep the
boundaries of its plenary powers and acted within its
permissible limits. Court did not find any arbitrariness or abuse
that was so gross and patent in the manner it exercised its
jurisdiction.

19

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSED the petition for certiorari

filed by Judge Adoracion Angeles and AFFIRMED the Joint Orders
of the Ombudsman.
4. EMILIO A. GONZALES III, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE PHILIPPINES, acting through and represented by
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR G.R. No.
196232
WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT, Petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT. PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
These two petitions have been because they raise a common thread
of issues relating to the President's exercise of the power to remove
from office herein petitioners who claim the protective cloak of
independence of the constitutionally-created office to which they
belong - the Office of the Ombudsman.

The cases, G.R. No. 196231 and G.R. No. 196232 primarily seeks
to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of
1989, which gives the President the power to dismiss a
Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman.
FACTS: G.R. No. 196231: A formal charge for Grave Misconduct
(robbery, grave threats, robbery extortion and physical injuries)
was filed before PNP-NCR against Manila Police District Senior
Inspector (P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza and four others. Private
complainant, Christian M. Kalaw, before the Office of the City
Prosecutor, filed a similar charge. While said cases were still
pending, the Office of the Regional Director of the National Police
Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the request of petitioner
Gonzales III, all relevant documents and evidence in relation to
said case to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate
administrative adjudication. Subsequently a case for Grave
Misconduct was lodged against P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and

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his fellow police officers in the Office of the Ombudsman.

Meanwhile, the case filed before the Office of the city Prosecutor
was dismissed upon a finding that the material allegations made
by the complainant had not been substantiated "by any evidence
at all to warrant the indictment of respondents of the offenses
charged." Similarly, the Internal Affairs Service of the PNP issued
a Resolution recommending the dismissal without prejudice of
the administrative case against the same police officers, for
failure of the complainant to appear in three (3) consecutive
hearings despite due notice. However, upon the recommendation
of petitioner Gonzales III, a Decision finding P/S Insp. Rolando
Mendoza and his fellow police officers guilty of Grave Misconduct
was approved by the Ombudsman. Mendoza and his colleagues
filed for a motion for reconsideration which was forwarded to
Ombudsman Gutierrez for final approval, in whose office it
remained pending for final review and action when P/S Insp.
Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful
day of August 23, 2010 in a desperate attempt to have himself
reinstated in the police service.
In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which ended in
the tragic murder of eight HongKong Chinese nationals, the
injury of seven others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando
Mendoza, a public outcry against the blundering of government
officials prompted the creation of the Incident Investigation and
Review Committee (IIRC). It was tasked to determine
accountability for the incident through the conduct of public
hearings and executive sessions. The IIRC found Deputy
Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable
negligence and gross violation of their own rules of
procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for
reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9) months
without any justification, in violation of the Ombudsman
prescribed rules to resolve motions for reconsideration in
administrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days from
submission. The inaction is gross, considering there is no

20

opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated the

desperate resort to hostage-taking. Petitioner was dismissed
from service. Hence the petition.
G.R. No. 196232: Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office
of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia, his
wife Clarita D. Garcia, their sons Ian Carl Garcia, Juan Paulo
Garcia and Timothy Mark Garcia and several unknown persons
with Plunder and Money Laundering before the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan denied Major General Garcia's urgent
petition for bail holding that strong prosecution evidence
militated against the grant of bail. However, the government,
represented by petitioner, Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit and
sought the Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea Bargaining
Agreement ("PLEBARA") entered into with the accused. The
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding the change of plea
warranted and the PLEBARA compliant with jurisprudential
guidelines.
Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major
General Garcia to get off the hook with nothing but a slap on
the hand notwithstanding the prosecution's apparently
strong evidence of his culpability for serious public offenses,
the House of Representatives' Committee on Justice
conducted public hearings on the PLEBARA. At the
conclusion of these public hearings, the Committee on
Justice passed and adopted Committee Resolution No. 3,
recommending to the President the dismissal of petitioner
Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing of appropriate
charges against her Deputies and Assistants before the
appropriate government office for having committed acts
and/or omissions tantamount to culpable violations of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust, which are
violations under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
and grounds for removal from office under the Ombudsman
Act. Hence the petition.

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ISSUE: Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction

to exercise administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the
constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman.

HELD: YES. The Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary
power over a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor is
not exclusive. While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline
administratively is extensive and covers all government officials,
whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those
officials removable by impeachment such authority is by no
means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they should be
solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the
Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 of R.A. 6770 declares the
Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all government
officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President
express power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a
Special Prosecutor. A harmonious construction of these two
apparently conflicting provisions in R.A. No. 6770 leads to the
inevitable conclusion that Congress had intended the
Ombudsman and the President to exercise concurrent
disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman
and Special Prosecutor, respectively. Indubitably, the manifest
intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and
Section 21 - in the same Organic Act was to provide for an
external authority, through the person of the President, that
would exercise the power of administrative discipline over the
Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least
diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of the
Ombudsman over all government officials and employees. Such
legislative design is simply a measure of "check and balance"
intended to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that
the Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect one another
from administrative liabilities.
By granting express statutory power to the President to

21

remove a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor,

Congress merely filled an obvious gap in the law. While the
removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided
for in the Constitution, which is by impeachment under Section 2
of the same Article, there is, however, no constitutional provision
similarly dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy
Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting
Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law
without running afoul of any provision in the Constitution or
existing statutes. In fact, the Constitution itself, under Section 2,
authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of all other public
officers, including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, who are not subject to impeachment.
The Power of the President to Remove a Deputy
Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor is Implied from his
Power to Appoint. In giving the President the power to remove
a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress simply
laid down in express terms an authority that is already implied
from the President's constitutional authority to appoint the
aforesaid officials in the Office of the Ombudsman. The integrity
and effectiveness of the Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a
military watchdog looking into abuses and irregularities that
affect the general morale and professionalism in the military is
certainly of primordial importance in relation to the President's
own role as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. It would
not be incongruous for Congress, therefore, to grant the
President concurrent disciplinary authority over the Deputy
Ombudsman for the military and other law enforcement offices.
Granting the President the Power to Remove a Deputy
Ombudsman does not Diminish the Independence of the
Office of the Ombudsman. he claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No.
6770 granting the President the power to remove a Deputy
Ombudsman from office totally frustrates, if not resultantly
negates the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman is

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tenuous. The independence which the Office of the Ombudsman

is vested with was intended to free it from political
considerations in pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a
protector of the people. What the Constitution secures for the
Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially, political independence.
This means nothing more than that "the terms of office, the
salary, the appointments and discipline of all persons under the
office" are "reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians."
Petitioner Gonzales may not be removed from office where
the questioned acts, falling short of constitutional standards,
do not constitute betrayal of public trust. Petitioner's act of
directing the PNP-IAS to endorse P/S Insp. Mendoza's case to the
Ombudsman without citing any reason therefor cannot, by itself,
be considered a manifestation of his undue interest in the case
that would amount to wrongful or unlawful conduct. After all,
taking cognizance of cases upon the request of concerned
agencies or private parties is part and parcel of the constitutional
mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman to be the "champion of
the people." The factual circumstances that the case was turned
over to the Office of the Ombudsman upon petitioner's request;
that administrative liability was pronounced against P/S Insp.
Mendoza even without the private complainant verifying the
truth of his statements; that the decision was immediately
implemented; or that the motion for reconsideration thereof
remained pending for more than nine months cannot be simply
taken as evidence of petitioner's undue interest in the case
considering the lack of evidence of any personal grudge, social
ties or business affiliation with any of the parties to the case that
could have impelled him to act as he did. There was likewise no
evidence at all of any bribery that took place, or of any corrupt
intention or questionable motivation. The OP's pronouncement
of administrative accountability against petitioner and the
imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty of dismissal
must be reversed and set aside, as the findings of neglect of duty
or misconduct in office do not amount to a betrayal of public

22

trust. Hence, the President, while he may be vested with

authority, cannot order the removal of petitioner as Deputy
Ombudsman, there being no intentional wrongdoing of the grave
and serious kind amounting to a betrayal of public trust.

The Office of the President is vested with statutory authority

to proceed administratively against petitioner Barreras-
Sulit to determine the existence of any of the grounds for her
removal from office as provided for under the Constitution
and the Ombudsman Act.

WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of

the President in OP Case No. 10-J-460 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED
with payment of backwages corresponding to the period of
suspension effective immediately, even as the Office of the
Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the investigation in
connection with the above case against petitioner. In G.R. No.
196232, We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No. 11-B-
003 against Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for
alleged acts and omissions tantamount to culpable violation of
the Constitution and a betrayal of public trust, in accordance
with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989.

The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the

Ombudsman Act is hereby DENIED.
B. Review of Decisions of the Ombudsman

1. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE
OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH
DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR., Respondents.

Facts:

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A complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal

and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before the Office of the
Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers
and employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay,
Jr., et al), accusing them of Plunder11 and violation of
Republic Act No. (RA) 3019,12 otherwise known as "The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in connection with
the five (5) phases of the procurement and construction
of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking
Building).
The Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of
Investigators14 to conduct a fact-finding investigation,
submit an investigation report, and file the necessary
complaint, if warranted (1st Special Panel). the 1st
Special Panel filed a complaint16 (OMB Complaint)
against Binay, Jr., et al, charging them with six (6)
administrative cases17 for Grave Misconduct, Serious
Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
of the Service, and six (6) criminal cases18 for violation of
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds,
and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases).
Binays First Term:
o Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award21 for Phase
III, IV and V of the Makati Parking Building
project to Hilmarc's Construction Corporation
(Hilmarc's), and consequently, executed the
corresponding contract without the required
publication and the lack of architectural
design,24 and approved the release of funds
therefor.
Binays Second Term:
o Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the
remaining balance of contract with Hilmarc's for
Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project;
and

23

Approved the release of funds for the remaining

balance of the contract48 with MANA Architecture
& Interior Design Co. (MANA) for the design and
architectural services covering the Makati
Parking Building.
Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their counter-affidavits,
the Ombudsman, the subject preventive suspension
order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive
suspension for not more than six (6) months without pay,
during the pendency of the OMB Cases.53 The
Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for the preventive
suspension of a public officer are present,54 finding that:
o (a) the evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.'s guilt was
strong given that
(1) the losing bidders and members of the
Bids and Awards Committee of Makati
City had attested to the irregularities
attending the Makati Parking Building
project;
(2) the documents on record negated the
publication of bids; and
(3) the disbursement vouchers, checks,
and official receipts showed the release of
funds; and
o (b) (1) Binay, Jr., et al. were administratively
charged with Grave Misconduct, Serious
Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service;
o (2) said charges, if proven to be true, warrant
removal from public service under the Revised
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(RRACCS), and
o (3) Binay, Jr., et al.'s respective positions give
them access to public records and allow them to
influence possible witnesses; hence, their
continued stay in office may prejudice the
o

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investigation relative to the OMB Cases filed

against them.
Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals:
o Binay contends: that he could not be held
administratively liable for any anomalous
activity attending any of the five (5) phases of the
Makati Parking Building project since: (a) Phases
I and II were undertaken before he was elected
Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V
transpired during his first term and that his re-
election as City Mayor of Makati for a second
term effectively condoned his administrative
liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the
administrative cases against him moot and
academic.61In any event, Binay, Jr. claimed that
the Ombudsman's preventive suspension
order failed to show that the evidence of guilt
presented against him is strong, maintaining
that he did not participate in any of the purported
irregularities.62 In support of his prayer for
injunctive relief, Binay, Jr. argued that he has a
clear and unmistakable right to hold public office,
having won by landslide vote in the 2010 and
2013 elections, and that, in view of the
condonation doctrine, as well as the lack of
evidence to sustain the charges against him, his
suspension from office would undeservedly
deprive the electorate of the services of the
person they have conscientiously chosen and
voted into office.
At noon of the same day, the CA issued a
Resolution65 (dated March 16, 2015), granting Binay, Jr.'s
prayer for a TRO,66 notwithstanding Pena, Jr.'s
assumption of duties as Acting Mayor earlier that day.
o The OMB manifested71 that the TRO did not state
what act was being restrained and that since the

24

preventive suspension order had already been

served and implemented, there was no longer any
act to restrain
Proceedings before the SC:
o In view of the CA's supervening issuance of a WPI
pursuant to its April 6, 2015 Resolution, the
Ombudsman
filed
a
supplemental
petition99 before this Court, arguing that the
condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the
determination of whether the evidence of guilt is
strong for purposes of issuing preventive
suspension orders. The Ombudsman also
maintained that a reliance on the condonation
doctrine is a matter of defense, which should
have been raised by Binay, Jr. before it during the
administrative proceedings, and that, at any rate,
there is no condonation because Binay, Jr.
committed acts subject of the OMB Complaint
after his re-election in 2013.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction
to issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the
implementation of a preventive suspension order
issued by the Ombudsman; YES.
2. Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion
in issuing the TRO and eventually, the WPI in CA-G.R.
SP No. 139453 enjoining the implementation of the
preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. based
on the condonation doctrine (not included)

Held:
First issue: YES. OMB contends that the CA has no jurisdiction to
issue any provisional injunctive writ against her office to enjoin
its preventive suspension orders. As basis, she invokes the first
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 in conjunction with her

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office's independence under the 1987 Constitution. She advances

the idea that "[i]n order to further ensure [her office's]
independence, [RA 6770] likewise insulated it from judicial
intervention,"157particularly, "from injunctive reliefs traditionally
obtainable from the courts,"158 claiming that said writs may work
"just as effectively as direct harassment or political pressure
would."

A. The concept of Ombudsman independence.

Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution guarantees
the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman:
o Section 5. There is hereby created
the independent Office of the Ombudsman,
composed of the Ombudsman to be known as
Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one
Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas[,] and Mindanao.
A separate Deputy for the military establishment
may likewise be appointed.
Gonzales III v. Office of the President is the first case which
grappled with the meaning of the Ombudsman's
independence vis-a-vis the independence of the other
constitutional bodies. the concept of Ombudsman's
independence
covers
three
(3)
things:

First: creation by the Constitution, which means that
the office cannot be abolished, nor its constitutionally
specified functions and privileges, be removed, altered,
or modified by law, unless the Constitution itself allows,
or an amendment thereto is made;cralawlawlibrary

Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office
"may not be obstructed from [its] freedom to use or
dispose of [its] funds for purposes germane to [its]
functions;168hence, its budget cannot be strategically
decreased by officials of the political branches of

25

government so as to impair said functions; and

Third: insulation from executive supervision and
control, which means that those within the ranks of the
office can only be disciplined by an internal authority.

Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to
protect the Office of the Ombudsman frompolitical
harassment and pressure, so as to free it from the
"insidious tentacles of politics."

That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman
independence cannot be invoked as basis to insulate
the Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally
vested unto the courts. Courts are apolitical bodies,
which are ordained to act as impartial tribunals and
apply even justice to all. Hence, the Ombudsman's
notion that it can be exempt from an incident of
judicial power - that is, a provisional writ of
injunction against a preventive suspension order -
clearly strays from the concept's rationale of
insulating the office from political harassment or
pressure.

B. The
first
paragraph
of
Section
14,
RA
6770 in light of the powers of Congress and the
Court under the 1987 Constitution.

The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 textually
prohibits courts from extending provisional injunctive
relief to delay any investigation conducted by her office.
Despite the usage of the general phrase "[n]o writ of
injunction shall be issued by any court," the Ombudsman
herself concedes that the prohibition does not cover the
Supreme Court.

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Despite the ostensible breach of the separation of powers

principle, the Court is not oblivious to the policy
considerations behind the first paragraph of Section 14,
RA 6770, as well as other statutory provisions of similar
import. Thus, pending deliberation on whether or not to
adopt the same, the Court, under its sole prerogative and
authority over all matters of procedure, deems it proper
to declare as ineffective the prohibition against courts
other than the Supreme Court from issuing provisional
injunctive writs to enjoin investigations conducted by the
Office of the Ombudsman, until it is adopted as part of the
rules of procedure through an administrative circular
duly
issued
therefor.

Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of
procedure (through passing the first paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770) without the Court's consent thereto,
it remains that the CA had the authority to issue the
questioned
injunctive
writs
enjoining
the
implementation of the preventive suspension order
against Binay, Jr. At the risk of belaboring the point, these
issuances were merely ancillary to the exercise of the
CA's certiorari jurisdiction conferred to it under Section 9
(1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended, and which it had
already acquired over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453
case.

2. ANTONINO VS. DESIERTO G.R. No. 144492 December 18,
2008

This is a Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner, former
Congresswoman assailing that portion of the Resolution of the
Office of the Ombudsman dismissing the case against private
respondents.
Facts

26

 Presidential Proclamation No. 168 was issued by then

President Macapagal on October 3, 1963. The pertinent provision
of which states that a certain parcel of land is withdrawn from
sale or settlement and reserved for recreational and health
resort site purposes, under the administration of the
municipality of General Santos, to be known as the Magsaysay
Park.
Pres. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2273 amending
Proclamation No. 168 which provided that certain portions of the
land embraced in Proclamation No. 168 are excluded from the
operation of 168, which established the recreational and health
resort reservation situated in General Santos and declared the
same open to disposition under the provisions of the Public Land
Act thus, leaving only Lot X as that covered by Presidential
Proclamation No. 168 and is therefore reserved for recreational
and health resort site purposes.
Private respondents were issued Certificates of Titles over
portions of Lot X.
Petitioner filed a verified complaint-affidavit before the
Ombudsman against the respondents for violation of Paragraphs
(e), (g) and (j), Section 3 of RA No. 3019 and for malversation of
public funds or property through falsification of public
documents. This concerns the alleged conspiracy involving
respondents to cheat and defraud the city government of General
Santos through the
illegal disposition of Lot X of the Magsaysay Park in violation of
law and its charter.
The Ombudsman issued a resolution dismissing the charges
against the respondents. Petitioner filed MR which was denied
by the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman held that since the
criminal Information were already filed and the cases were
already pending before the Sandiganbayan and the regular
courts of General Santos City, the Ombudsman had lost
jurisdiction over the said case.

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Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of

discretion, amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in the
exercise of his prosecutor functions, by dismissing the charges
against the respondents.

Held: No. The alleged grave abuse of discretion imputed to the
Ombudsman is found wanting in this case. Well- settled is the
rule that the Court will not ordinarily interfere with the
Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory
powers without good and compelling reasons that indicate
otherwise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the
investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon
practicality as well. A contrary rule would encourage a number
of petitions seeking the dismissal of investigatory proceedings
conducted by the Ombudsman, which would hamper the
functions of the office and the courts, in much the same way that
courts would be swamped by a deluge of cases if they have to
review the exercise of discretion on the part of public
prosecutors each time they decide to file an information or
dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. Indeed, while the
Ombudsman's discretion in determining the existence of
probable cause is not absolute, nonetheless, petitioner must
prove that such discretion was gravely abused in order to
warrant the reversal of the Ombudsman's findings by this Court.
In this respect, petitioner fails.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

3. Enemecio v. Office of the Ombudsman G.R. No 146731
January 13, 2004
Facts:

Petitioner Agustina M. Enemecio is a utility worker at the

Cebu State College of Science and Technology, College of
Fisheries Technology (CSCST-CFT), Carmen, Cebu

27

Private respondent Servando Bernante is an Assistant

Professor
March 30, 1998: Enemecio filed an administrative
complaint for gross misconduct, falsification of public
documents, malversation, dishonesty and defamation
against Bernante before the office of the Executive Dean
of CSCSCT-CFT
- Executive Dean indorsed the administrative
complaint to the Office of the Ombudsman for the
Visayas
- Enemecio also filed with the Ombudsman a
criminal complaint against Bernante for
falsification of public document.
Enemecio alleged that Bernante had caused the spray-
painting of obscene and unprintable words against her
on the walls of the CSCST Campus
Enemecio also claimed that Bernante shouted
defamatory words against her while she was inside the
school premises
Enemecio further asserted that that Bernante made it
appear in his leave application that he was on forced
leave from May 15 to 21, 1996 and on vacation leave
from May 22 to 31. In truth, Bernante was serving a 20-
day prison term for his conviction of the crime of slight
physical injuries
The Ombudsman rendered a decision dismissing the
administrative complaint against Bernante. On the same
date, the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal complaint
against Bernante finding no probable cause
Enemecio filed a special civil action for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals questioning the Ombudsmans
resolution dismissing the criminal case against Bernante
Applying the ruling in Fabian v. Desierto, the appellate
court dismissed Enemecios petition for having been filed
out of time. The appellate court also stated that the

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proper remedy available to Enemecio was a petition for

review under Rule 43 and not a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65
Enemecio contended that Fabian declared void only
Section 27 of RA 6770 and Section 7, Rule III of AO No. 07
insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative
disciplinary cases from the Ombudsman to the Supreme
Court.
Enemecio asserted that the other provisions of Section
27 of RA 6770 and Section 7 of AO No. 07, including the
final and unappealable character of orders, resolutions
or decisions exonerating a respondent from any criminal
liability, still stand.
Enemecio stated that she filed the petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals because she
considered
Bernantes
absolution
from
the
administrative complaint in OMB-VIS- ADM-98-0201 as
already final and unappealable. As there was no adequate
remedy of appeal, Enemecio claimed that her only
recourse was a petition for certiorari before the appellate
court under Rule 65.
The appellate court stated that what Fabian declared
void was Section 27 of RA 6770, which authorized
appeals to the Supreme Court from decisions of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. Under
the Fabian ruling, the appellant should take such appeal
in administrative disciplinary cases to the Court of
Appeals under Rule 43. The Court of Appeals added that
it follows that the power to review decisions of the
Ombudsman in criminal cases is retained by the Supreme
Court under Section 14 of RA 6770. Thus, the appellate
court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction
Issue: Whether or not petitioner availed of the wrong remedy
Held: YES. It is clear from the records that Atty. Fernandez filed
with the Court of Appeals a certiorari petition

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assailing the Ombudsmans Resolution and Order dismissing the

criminal case, not the administrative case against Bernante. For
this reason, the appellate court in its 7 December 2000
Resolution rectified itself and stated that Fabian does not apply
to Enemecios petition as the Fabian ruling applies only to
administrative disciplinary actions.
4. Baviera v. Zoleta
FACTS: Baviera, a former employee of Standard Chartered Bank
(SCB) as well as an investor, filed against SCBs officers and
directors, one of whom is named Raman (Indian national), for
defrauding the public by soliciting funds in unregistered and
unauthorized foreign stocks and securities. Baviera then also
requested for a Hold Order departure against all officers, which
was granted by Secretary of Justice Datumanong and
immediately implemented by the Bureau of Immigration.
Meanwhile Sec. Datumanong went to a conference in Vienna,
designating Usec. Merceditas Gutierrez as Acting Secretary of the
DOJ. On September 28, 2003, Raman at NAIA for his Singapore
trip but was banned. The next day, however, he was allowed to
leave after Gutierrez verbally allowed him to go. She later on
gave an Order allowing Raman to leave the country on the
ground that the Chief State Prosecutor had indicated no
objections to Ramans travel to Singapore.
Baviera filed a complaint to the Office of the Ombudsman against
Gutierrez for violating RA 3019 and averring that her actuations
were highly illegal (no law granting special permissions and
decision was made on a weekend; extending unwarranted
preference.) Gutierrez contended that she merely upheld his
right to travel and requested the Ombudsman to dismiss the
complaint.
Eventually the officers of SCB filed for a motion for
reconsideration of the HDO against them. Sec. Datumanong lifted

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the HDO. The case against Gutierrez was also recommended for
dismissal for lack of evidence. This was approved and copies of
the Resolution were sent to Baviera. Baviera filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in the CA,
assailing the resolutions of the Ombudsman. However, on
January 7, 2005, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the
petition on the ground that the proper remedy was to file a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, conformably with the ruling of this Court in
Enemecio v. Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, insisting that his petition for certiorari in the CA
under Rule 65 was in accordance with the ruling in Fabian v.
Desierto. He insisted that the Office of the Ombudsman is a quasi-
judicial agency of the government, and under Batas Pambansa
Bilang 129, the CA has concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme
Court over a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. He asserted that the filing of his petition for certiorari with
the CA conformed to the established judicial policy of hierarchy
of courts as explained by this Court in People v. Cuaresma.
ISSUE:
(1) whether the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner in the
CA was the proper remedy to assail the resolution of the Office of
the Ombudsman; and (2) whether respondent officials
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction in dismissing the criminal complaint of petitioner
against respondent Acting Secretary of Justice Gutierrez for lack
of probable cause. HELD:
the Court ruled that the remedy to challenge the
Resolution of the Ombudsman at the conclusion of a
preliminary investigation was to file a petition for
certiorari in the Supreme Court under Rule 65.
the Court finds that petitioner failed to establish that the

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respondent officials committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.


Part IV. Power of the Department of Justice

1. Dino v. Olivarez
GR No. 170447 December 4, 2009
In this case, the Court reversed its initial decision through a
Motion for Reconsideration by the respondent. It ruled that the
City Prosecutor exceeded its authority by filing an Amended
Information despite the COMELECs suspension of its delegated
authority.
Facts:
Petitioner instituted a complaint for vote buying against
respondent Olivarez
After finding probable cause in Joint Resolution of Assistant
City Prosecutor and City Prosecutor of Paranaque City, two
(2) Informations were filed before the RTC against
respondent
Respondent filed an appeal of the Joint Resolution to the Law
Department of the COMELEC
Law Department of the COMELECC directed the city
prosecutor to transmit and elevate the entire records of the
case and suspend further implementation of the questioned
resolution until final resolution of said appeal by the
COMELEC En Banc
Respondent filed a Motion to Quash the two Informations on
the ground that they charged more than one offense. On the
other hand, Assistant Prosecutor filed a Motion to Admit
Amended Informations which charge respondent with

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only one offense.

Judge Madrona denied the respondents Motion to Quash and
reset the arraignment, with a warning that the arraignment
would proceed without any more delay
Respondent failed to appear in court during the arraignment
and ordered the arrest of the respondent and the
confiscation of the cash bonds
However, through COMELEC Resolution No. 7457, the
Commission revoked the authority of the City Prosecutor
of Paranaque to prosecute the case, designating therein
the Law Department of the COMELEC to prosecute the case
In the Supreme Courts initial decision, they found that the
public prosecutor of Paranaque did not exceed the authority
delegated by the COMELEC, since the delegated authority
was not yet revoked when the said amended Informations
were filed. Hence, this motion for reconsideration by the
respondent
Respondent argues that the directive of the COMELEC to the
public prosecutor of Paranaque to transmit the entire
records of the case to the COMELEC Law Department is a
revocation of the prosecutors delegated authority.
Issue: WON the city prosecutor defied the order or directive of
the COMELEC when it filed the amended Informations
Held/ Ratio: YES. Article IX, Section 20 of the Constitution and
Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code, granted the COMELEC
the power to investigate and prosecute election cases and may
avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the
government. Also, COMELEC Rules of Procedure gives COMELEC
an authority to revoke or withdraw such delegation, or revise,
modify and reverse the resolution of the prosecutor. When the
COMELEC Law Department ordered the transmission of the
records of the case, it had the effect of SUSPENDING the
authority of the City Prosecutor. The Court, in its initial decision,
overlooked the fact that the order issued was with the authority

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of the COMELEC En Banc. Hence, it was as if the COMELEC En

Banc was the one that ordered the prosecutor to transmit the
records and suspend further implementation of the questioned
resolution. By filing the Amended Information, the City
Prosecutor of Paranaque clearly exceeded the legal limit of its
delegated authority, thus, VOID and of NO EFFECT.
This suspension of delegated authority was made permanent and
this delegated authority was revoked by COMELEC Resolution
No. 7457.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion for reconsideration filed by
respondent Pablo Olivarez is GRANTED, and our assailed
decision dated 23 June 2009 isRECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 September 2005 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 89230 is REINSTATED. The amended
informations filed by the City Prosecutor of Paraaque on 28
October 2004 are declared VOID and of NO EFFECT.
2. VIUDEZ II v CA
FACTS:

Honorato Galvez and his driver were fatally shot on June
9, 2000 in Bulacan. On June 26, 2000, a complaint for the alleged
murder was filed by the NBI with the provincial prosecutor
against de la Cruz, Chico, Fernando, a certain Ronald, a certain
Gerry, Villanueva, and 3 John Does. On July 14, 2000, a complaint
for murder was filed against Viudez II by Estrella Galvez, the
widow of Honorato Galvez.

On March 31, 2001, a resolution was issued by the
Investigating State Prosecutor finding probably cause to indict
the Viudez and the others for the crime of murder. On September
19, 2001, 2 information for murder was filed with the RTC of
Malolos which then issued warrants of arrests on the same day.

On September 21, 2001, Viudez filed a motion to suspend
proceedings and to suspend the implementation of the warrant
of arrest arguing that all the accused in the case filed a timely

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petition for review with the Secretary of Justice pursuant to

Department Circular No. 70 of the DOJ, the implementation of the
warrant of arrest against Viudez should be suspended and/or
recalled pending resolution of the said petition for review.

The RTC denied the motion stating that said warrant had
already been issued for his apprehension. There is also no way
for it to recall the warrant in the absence of any compelling
reason, and that jurisdiction over his person had not yet been
acquired by it, therefore, Viudez has no personality to file any
pleading until he was arrested or voluntarily surrendered
himself to the court. Viudez filed a motion for reconsideration,
but was denied.

Viudez filed with the CA but the latter court dismissed
the petition for certiorari for lack of merit and found no
whimsicality or oppressiveness in the exercise of the
respondent Judge's discretion in issuing the challenged Orders.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not a pending resolution of a petition for
review filed with the Secretary of Justice concerning a
finding of probable cause will suspend the proceedings in
the trial court, including the implementation of a warrant
of arrest. NO

HELD:

NO. Viudez contention is wrong. Dept. Cir. No. 20 states
that pending resolution of the appeal, the proceedings in court
are held in abeyance, Viudez is of the opinion that the suspension
of the proceedings in court includes the suspension of the
implementation of the warrants issued by the court.

The function of the judge to issue a warrant of arrest
upon the determination of probable cause is exclusive, and the
implementation of the warrant cannot be deferred pending the
resolution of a petition for review by the Secretary of Justice as
to the finding of probable cause.

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There is also nowhere in the said provision that the court
must hold the proceedings (with regard to the warrant) in
abeyance, therefore, it is the discretion of the court whether or
not to suspend the proceedings or the implementation of the
warrant of arrest. Once a complaint or information is filed in
court, any disposition of the case as to its dismissal, or the
conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound
discretion of the said court, as it is the best and sole judge of
what to do with the case before it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Part V. Role of the OSG in Criminal Cases
1. People v. Duca
FACTS: In 1999, Pedro Calanayan filed an action for ejectment
and damages over a bungalow property against Cecilia Duca
before the MCTC of San Fabio-San Jacinto, Pangasinan. The MCTC
decided in favor of Calanayan. There being no appeal, the
decision became final and executory, and a writ of execution was
issued. The properties were then sold on a public auction and a
certificate of sale was issued in favor of the highest bidder,
Jocelyn Barque, on March 2001.
On October 2001, Cecilia Duca filed an action for Declaration of
Nullity of Execution and Damages with prayer for Writ of
Injunction and TRO against the sheriff and some police officers
ordered to implement the writ of execution. During the hearing,
Cecilia Duca testified that her son Aldrin Duca owns the house
erected on the lot subject of the ejectment case and presented a
property document as evidence. A TRO was issued.
Respondent Arturo Duca and his mother were then charged with
Falsification of Official Document. The prosecution asserts that
the signature at the back of the property document affixed above
the name of Aldrin Duca was that of Arturo Duca, and that Arturo

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even made it appear that his CTC is that of his brother Aldrin,
who was then out of the country. The prosecution argues that
because of these misrepresentations, the RTC was mislead to
issue a TRO. Both accused denied falsification charges. Cecilia
testified that she had no participation in the execution. Arturo,
however, testified that it was indeed his signature atop the name
of Aldrin Duca. He also interposed the defense that he was duly
authorized by Aldrin to procure the said tax declaration. The
MCTC convicted Arturo and acquitted Cecilia.
On appeal to the CA via petition for review, Arturo was acquitted.
The CA found that he was duly authorized by his brother Aldrin
to secure a tax declaration on the house erected on the land
registered under their mothers name. Arturo, therefore, could
not have falsified the document.
ISSUE: W/N the CA gravely abused its discretion and had acted
without jurisdiction when it resolved Arturo Ducas appeal
without giving People of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), the opportunity to be heard
HELD: Yes. The authority to represent the State in appeals of
criminal cases before the CA and the Supreme Court is solely
vested in the OSG. Sec. 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of
the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly provides:
SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. The Office of the Solicitor
General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the
services of lawyers. x x x It shall have the following specific
powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the
Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and Court of

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Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and
special proceedings in which the Government or any officer
thereof in his official capacity is a party.
The records show that the CA failed to require the Solicitor
General to file his Comment on Ducas petition. Nowhere was it
shown that the Solicitor General had ever been furnished a copy
of the said Resolution. The failure of the CA to require the
Solicitor General to file his Comment deprived the prosecution of
a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case.
The State, like the accused, is entitled to due process in criminal
cases, that is, it must be given the opportunity to present its
evidence in support of the charge. The doctrine consistently
adhered to by this Court is that a decision rendered without due
process is void ab initio and may be attacked directly or
collaterally. A decision is void for lack of due process if, as a
result, a party is deprived of the opportunity to be heard. The
assailed decision of the CA acquitting the respondent without
giving the Solicitor General the chance to file his comment on the
petition for review clearly deprived the State of its right to refute
the material allegations of the said petition filed before the CA.
The said decision is, therefore, a nullity.
The service of a copy of the petition on the People of the
Philippines, through the Prosecutor would be inefficacious. The
respondents failure to have a copy of his petition served on the
People of the Philippines, through the OSG, is a sufficient ground
for the dismissal of the petition as provided in Section 3, Rule 42
of the Rules of Court. Thus, the CA has no other recourse but to
dismiss the petition. However, the CA, instead of dismissing
respondents petition, proceeded to resolve the petition and even
acquitted respondent without the Solicitor Generals comment.
We, thus, find that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its
assailed decision.

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SIDE NOTE: On a procedural matter, the Court notes that

petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65
without filing a motion for reconsideration with the CA.
Ordinarily, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a
motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent
tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to correct its assigned errors.
This rule, however, is not without exceptions. The filing of a
motion for reconsideration is not a condition sine qua non when
the issue raised is purely one of law, or where the error is
patent or the disputed order is void, or the questions raised on
certiorari are the same as those already squarely presented to
and passed upon by the lower court.
The CA decision being void for lack of due process, the filing of
the instant petition for certiorari without a motion for
reconsideration is justified.
2. Republic v. Iyoy
Facts: The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by
the Office of the Solicitor General on certiorari praying for
thereversal of the decision of the CA dated July 30, 2001
affirming the judgment of the RTC declaring the marriage of
Crasus L. Iyoy(respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void
based on Article 36.
On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy married
each other, they had 5 children. In 1984, Fely went to the US,
inthe same year she sent letters to Crasus asking him to sign
divorce papers. In 1985, Crasus learned that Fely married an
Americanand had a child. Fely went back to the Philippines on
several occasions, during one she attended the marriage of one of
her children inwhich she used her husbands last name as hers in
the invitation.
March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of

33

nullity alleging that Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to

the family and were manifestations of her psychological
incapacity. Crasus submitted his testimony, the certification of
the recording of their marriage contract, and the invitation
where Fely used her new husbands last name as evidences.
Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard,
womanizer, had no job, and thatsince 1988 she was already an
American citizen and not covered by our laws. The RTC found the
evidences sufficient and granted the decree; it was affirmed in
the CA.
In his Comment to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained
that Felys psychological incapacity was clearly established after a
full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code of the Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of
respondent Crasus and Fely, because the latter had already
become an American citizen. He further questioned the
personality of petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of
the Solicitor General, to institute the instant Petition, because
Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the
Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the State, in
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages.
Issue: whether or not the OSG is authorized to intervene? Yes.

The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the
Republic, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity
of marriages.
Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
respondent Crasus argued that only the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in

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proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages;

hence, the Office of the Solicitor General had no personality to
file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48 provides

ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the
Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the
State to take steps to prevent collusion between
the parties and to take care that the evidence is
not fabricated or suppressed.

That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General
does not bar him or his Office from intervening in proceedings
for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive
Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987, appoints the Solicitor General as the principal law officer
and legal defender of the Government.[33] His Office is tasked to
represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of
lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the
law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties
requiring the services of lawyers.[34]

The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to
ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected
in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the
fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that
the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal
defender of the land, then his intervention in such proceedings
could only serve and contribute to the realization of such intent,
rather than thwart it.

34

Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is

authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or
the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before
this Court or the Court of Appeals.[35] While it is the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the State,
in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes
over when the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this
Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible for taking the case
to the appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is
only reasonable and practical that even while the proceeding is
still being held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General
can already exercise supervision and control over the conduct of
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the
protection of the interests of the State.

In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of
the Solicitor General in several cases for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages that were appealed before it,
summarized as follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta[36]

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268
SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court laid down the
guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns
the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
State:

(8) The trial court must
order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues
a certification, which will be

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quoted in the decision, briefly

stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit
to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted
for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculicontemplated
under Canon 1095. [Id., at 213]

This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v.
Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated its
pronouncement in Republic v. Court of
Appeals[Supra.] regarding the role of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the State[37]

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