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This study investigates the revolutions in the German Democratic Republic and
Czechoslovakia in the context of comparative theories of protest and revolution. After a
review of recent methodological advances and the two revolutions, the Gurr-Lichbach
mobilization of discontent model is adapted to the two cases and tested with longitudinal
data. Rational action theories are integrated into a final model that can be used to analyze
protest in authoritarian systems. The model performs better for the two revolutions than
any predecessor. In ex post and ex ante forecasting tests, the model generated large prediction error; however, it forecasted historically unprecedented levels of sustained protest.
The ossified regimes of Eastern Europe toppled like so many dominoes in the autumn of 1989. These revolutions unified Germany, de-
stroyed the Soviet block, and thus rendered moot the Cold War. Taken
as a whole, this was arguably the most significant political event since
1945.
Yet no one foresaw it. In Germany, academics have come under fire
for their inability to predict events of such scale or even to recognize the
revolution once it was under way. East European area studies specialists
in the United States fared no better.' The focus of this research, however
is on the problem of theory and forecasting of protest and revolution: the
revolutions of 1989 can move us closer to answering the fundamental
question posed in 1975 by Charles Tilly (1975, 183): "For [any] year and
*Thanks to Paul Johnson, Philip Schrodt, Deborah Gerner, and Paul D'Anieri for
helpful comments and to Carey Ewing and Trisha Beach for data analysis. This research
was supported in part by the University of Kansas general research fund.
'There was widespread recognition of serious problems (e.g., Brzezinski 1989;
Johnson 1987), but no one predicted the sequential collapse of successive regimes in revolu-
tions largely devoid of violence. Most accounts judged revolution least likely in the German
Democratic Republic.
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 37, No. 3, August 1993, Pp. 663-680
C 1993 by the University of Texas Press, P.O. Box 7819, Austin, TX 78713
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tween the traditional deprivation-protest linkage and the more recent rational action approach. Newer research supports the rational action idea
that protest is an outgrowth of opportunity and expected utility, not a
product of inequality or deprivation per se (Opp 1989; Muller and Weede
1990; Muller, Dietz, and Finkel 1991). Forecasting has not been a major
focus of either program. In fact, the rational action approach is only now
moving from formal theory to empirical tests.
A substantial segment of the comparative politics community rejects
the possibility of predicting protest and revolution. Eckstein (1990, 55)
Lewis-Beck and Rice (1992) use forecasting to assess the validity of elec-
toral models. Yet elections are "stable" events: they occur regularly,
within defined rules and stable party systems. Protests and revolutions
are "unstable"- irregular and, some argue, always unique (Dunn 1989).
Research on military coups is perhaps the most sophisticated attempt
2Lakatos (1970, 132) cites "Popper's supreme heuristic rule: 'devise conjectures which
have more empirical content than their predecessors.'"
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THEORIES
OF
PROTEST
665
most central cases of regime transition after reforms took hold in Poland
and Hungary. The revolutions in Eastern Europe, like most since 1970,
departed substantially from the "classic" form that has defined the lion's
Several studies in the rational action program have argued that protest evolves differently in distinct contexts like Western democracies or
highly repressive authoritarian regimes (Muller and Weede 1990; Opp
1989, 256). A first step toward better theory, then, lies in understanding
each major type of political context. This research examines the revolu-
and how well empirical theories of conflict can make forecasts, past,
present or future, of some quantifiable properties of internal conflict"
(Gurr and Lichbach 1986, 5).
The problems that have plagued attempts to forecast protest and
revolution stem primarily from the intrinsic complexity of political conflict processes (see Kuran 1991). Nonetheless, methodological factors
vant guidelines for the cases in this analysis: (1) emphasize disaggregated,
longitudinal research; (2) specify dependent variables that are system-
specific and functionally equivalent across cases; (3) incorporate the international dimension into any theory of revolution. Below, I explicate
each of these perspectives.
Longitudinal, Disaggregated Samples
Protest and revolution unfold as processes over time and are strug-
gles between at least two contending groups. The strategy of each affects
the evolution of the conflict. Tsebelis and Sprague (1989, 550) argue that
cross-sectional analysis is inappropriate for the analysis of such conflict
3Moshiri (1991) surveys the evolution of a broad range of revolution research.
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mended "always employing data over time." Snyder (1978, 528) similarly
advised "shifts toward 'disaggregated' treatment, both theoretically and
empirically. No theoretical explanation as currently formulated is univer-
sally valid." Snyder particularly stressed the measurement of core concepts at the appropriate level of analysis.
System-specific, Functionally Equivalent Indicators
equivalent indicators, particularly for the dependent variable. In this analysis, the revolutions of the GDR and Czechoslovakia evolved differently,
but in both cases the dependent variable (protest) reflects a desire to
replace a communist regime with a responsive alternative.
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THEORIES
OF
PROTEST
667
church-affiliated groups who were impressed by the ability of the Philippine people peacefully to overthrow a repressive regime. For years dissi-
old tactics failed to stop the demonstrations. Instead, they grew larger,
and once the number of demonstrators reached 70,000, GDR security
authorities did not attempt to stop them.
The revolution in Czechoslovakia began to build momentum after
the Soviet military failed to intervene in the GDR. At the core of dissident
politics in Czechoslovakia was the redress of the suppression of the 1968
5For more complete accounts of the revolutions, see Ramet (1991, esp. 291-346). The
GDR revolution is covered more fully in Wallach and Francisco (1992, chap. 3). Eisenstadt
(1992) places the 1989 revolutions in historical context.
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Prague Spring. The ultimate goal of Vaclav Havel and other dissidents
was to remove the Stalinist leaders who ousted Dubcek and to restore a
responsive government. The Czechoslovak regime was in the end even
more staunchly resistant to reform than the GDR. Its desperate attempt
at self-preservation led to higher levels of violence and repression. The
turning point came on 17 November when dissidents transformed a statesponsored rally into the largest antiregime demonstration since 1968. Riot
police killed one demonstrator and injured 17. Public revulsion to the
regime's actions took active form in growing demonstrations and political
strikes. After 20 November, the arrests stopped, but the regime held out
after the opening of the wall persuaded the new party leaders to resign.
In Czechoslovakia, though, Gustav Husak held out until (cumulatively)
more than half of the country's population had actively rejected the
regime.
Macrotheories of Protest and the Revolutions of 1989
All are based upon the theory of protest that has performed best in one
set of empirical applications (Gurr and Lichbach 1979), augmented by
recent advances in rational action research. Models from these theories
are adapted for the GDR and Czechoslovakia. Refinements to these mod-
els arise from contextual features either in the Soviet bloc generally or
in one of the countries.
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GDR
Cumulative
Cumulative
Dissidentsa
Dissidentsa
Concession
Concession
resignations 17.88
Borders open 21.69
complex model of the mobilization of discontent. One test of the forecasting ability of protest theories was performed by Gurr and Lichbach (1986)
using two sets of cross-sectional data, a pre-1971 base set to "predict"
conflict in another data set for 1971-75. Although this test provided weak
support for the mobilization model, it performed better than any alternative.
(Gurr and Lichbach 1979, 157): "The fundamental axiom of the theoretical system states that discontent, dispositions (toward conflict) and organizational strength are interactive: each contributes to the extent of challenges to the degree that others are present. Moreover, the organizational
strength of challenging groups cannot be assessed absolutely, but rather
must be judged relative to the strength of opponents." Formally, the
axiom is represented:
where
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applied by the regime (Muller and Weede 1990). In the GDR, this is the
percentage of demonstrators arrested per week. In Czechoslovakia,
where the police were more brutal, coercion is the percentages of arrests
and of injuries per week.6
The organizational strength component of the Gurr-Lichbach model
the part of dissidents (e.g., Opp 1989; Muller, Dietz, and Finkel 1991).
The balance of force in Eastern Europe had for decades overwhelmingly
favored the regime. Citizens in the GDR and Czechoslovakia were especially attuned to the weakened position of their rulers wrought by the
reform movement in the USSR.
6Protest and coercion were coded from the 1989 editions of FAZ, FBIS, and NYT;
additional sources for the GDR were Bundesminister fur innerdeutsche Beziehungen and
Mitter and Wolle (1990). Because coercion is used as a deterrent, reported levels from a
week of confrontation were coded as persisting until the next encounter between regime
and dissidents. These data reflect only the coercion that was applied against groups. Both
regimes employed more sinister tactics at the individual level (e.g., permanently removin
children from dissident parents). See Vaclav Havel's statement in Brzezinski (1989, 111).
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May, 400,000 defied the regime by voting against its slate, an action
organized by dissident groups, thus providing a good estimate of the
extent of antiregime organizational strength. During the rest of the year,
challenging organizations grew by another 100,000.
and secret police forces, its military force, all Soviet forces in either
country, and all Kampftruppen, party members who formed a reserve riot
force. The Warsaw Pact repealed the Brezhnev doctrine on 7 July; the
USSR affirmed its commitment to this decision in October, thus removing
Soviet troops from the regimes' resource base. As demonstrations grew
larger, many Kampftruppen refused to act against the dissidents. By De-
The GDR revolution did not gather momentum until over 100,000
citizens had fled illegally to the West through third countries. They chose,
in Hirschman's (1970) terms, to exit when the opportunity arose, leaving
7The Czechoslovak organizational strength variables were coded from FAZ, FBIS,
NYT, Kurian (1989), Ramet (1991), and Starr (1989).
8The organizational strength variables for the GDR were coded from FAZ, Bundesminister fur innerdeutsche Beziehungen, Holzweil3ig (1985), Kurian (1989), Mitter and
Wolle (1990), NYT, and Starr (1989).
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voice and loyalty choosers to define the fate of the regime. The sudden
wave of refugees was critical. Erich Honecker's regime made the right
to emigrate the transcendent issue in the country; from 1961 the state
alone could decide. The flood of GDR refugees that followed the opening
of Hungary's border to the West became a crucial test for the regime.
Protest-specific Models
When attempting to forecast only the extent of protest, Gurr and
Lichbach depart from their general model. They add a term for the extent
of democracy in the regime and limit the organizational strength variable
to the dissidents. Since the GDR and Czechoslovak regimes were brought
down largely by relentless demonstrations involving hundreds of thou-
sands of protesters, this specialized Gurr-Lichbach model is tested. However, since the democracy score for both countries was constant and one
of the lowest in the world (Gurr 1989), it is omitted. Once again, the
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share the same goals as activists. An insightful regime might try to grant
concessions sufficient to satisfy the broad mass of demonstrators, if not
the protest leaders. In such a situation, dissident organizations face a
variant of the "unraveling problem" (see Johnson 1990).
authoritarian regimes?9 Even in tyrannies that seek to wall out the rest
of the world (e.g., Albania), there is evidence that the people learn
enough to resent strongly the repression they endure. In such cases (e.g.,
ticularly differences in organizational strengths, should provide a significant statistical explanation in the East European cases without the deprivation and disposition term.
dissident demands.
Results
The fact that the data are time series raises the inherent possibilit
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.00231*
(2.921)
OSd
.00197
REFUGEES
.00001
(-.018)
-.00001
(1.122) (- .123)
.0821*
.08389*
(4.300)
ACCEDE
.000114
(.436)
(5.317)
.061610*
(3.263)
1,076.24*
(2.678)
.1795
.6682
.4577
.7653
855.83
743.86
.0363
.6303
903.41
.4599
.7798
735.03
.5950
.7915
709.42
Note: GDR results are Yule-Walker estimates correcting for autocorrelation. OSNET is the
net difference in organizational strength. ACCEDE is a dummy variable reflecting regime
concessions. T-values are in parentheses below each parameter.
* Significant at the .05 level, one-tailed test.
found by Gurr and Lichbach (1986, 17): R2 = .67 for the GDR; .21 for
Czechoslovakia versus .18 in Gurr and Lichbach's cross-sectional sample. Introducing refugees into the GDR model (2) with a lagged dependent
'0The Yule-Walker, or two-step full transform correction method, is used in all reported
findings. The Yule-Walker method is a stepwise procedure that corrects for AR(l) and
higher order autoregressive error (see Harvey 1981). Models 1 and 3 indicated only firstorder autocorrelation. The autoregressive parameters of models 2 and 4 were significant at
the second order. Model 5 exhibited first- and third-order autocorrelation. The GDR data
also were analyzed with the maximum likelihood and unconditional least squares methods.
Both of these provided estimates consistent with or higher than the Yule-Walker values.
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THEORIES
OF
PROTEST
675
Variable
Model
Model
Model
OSNET
(-.850)
.03837*
(3.258)
OSd
(-.48)
.02662
(1.928)
.2811464*
(3.772)
ACCEDE
5,504.029
(1.591)
.2940
5,349
.0012
.3423
5,063
.0001
.3751
5,035
.0001
Note: OSNET is the net difference in organizational strength. ACCEDE is a dummy variable
reflecting regime concessions. T-values are in parentheses below each parameter.
* Significant at the .05 level, one-tailed test.
variable raises R2 to .76 and wrests from the mobilization variable the
role of the most significant factor in the equation.
are based on the authoritarian mobilization model (5) for the full year.
Table 4 shows the same values, but its parameters are calculated on only
the first 42 weeks of data in the GDR and the first 45 in Czechoslovakia.
These points follow the rise in protest but predate the massive levels that
developed in later weeks. The forecast error is large in both tables but
understandably better for the GDR, where protest levels are better explained by model 5.
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0
0
744.11
3,738.52
656.18
46
5,353.43
10,390.05
47
41,995.50
744.11
3,738.52
6,456.77
11,784.24
4,697.25
-
3,933.28
30,211.26
7,917.58
48
3,866.66
11,784.24
49
3,796.24
11,784.24
7,988.00
50
3,796.24
11,784.24
7,988.00
GDR
43
4,460.37
44
7,926.83
45
3,579.27
1,793.24
3,626.25
2,342.13
46
2,250.00
47
2,115.85
2,667.13
-4,300.58
-
1,237.14
2,344.41
2,344.41
94.41
228.56
48
1,817.07
3,639.91
1,822.84
49
2,134.15
3,639.91
1,505.76
50
1,393.29
3,639.91
2,246.62
Attempting to forecast protest in the most intense weeks of the revolution deliberately sets a difficult task. Forecasts are most accurate when
observation t + 1 is close to the mean for the time series. Here we have
the obverse: unprecedented levels of sustained protest. Still, they are not
of forecasting models. This was not a problem in the GDR, but a good
deal of the protest in Czechoslovakia took the form of a long-term student
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THEORIES
OF
PROTEST
677
(.706)
46
10,390.05
47
41,995.50
(6.644)
355.56
310.32
(-
.611)
10,034.48
-41,685.18
48
3,866.66
310.32
3,556.34
49
3,796.24
310.32
3,485.92
50
3,796.24
310.32
3,485.92
GDR
P(1+1) = 397.395 + 2.68 COERCION + .00065* OSNET
(2.96) (1.29) (2.83)
43
4,460.37
572.97
3,887.40
44
7,926.83
788.50
7,138.33
45
3,579.27
724.43
2,854.84
46
2,250.00
737.48
-1,512.52
47
2,115.85
737.48
-1,378.37
48
1,817.07
49
2,134.15
50
1,393.29
866.81
866.81
866.81
-950.26
-1,267.34
526.48
Note: OLS regressions based on 45 cases in Czechoslovakia and 42 in the GDR. (No
significant autocorrelation exists in this GDR analysis.) T-values are in parentheses.
*p < .05.
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Discussion
The models in this analysis performed better for the GDR than for
Czechoslovakia. The sudden rise of protest and the tenacity of the Prague
regime probably account for some of this difficulty, but it may also be
necessary to expand the notion of an international dimension. One of the
best single predictors of Czechoslovak protest is the amount of East
German protest four weeks earlier. It is clear that these revolutions are
linked. A contagion model might explain this facet of the Czechoslovak
and subsequent East European revolutions.
The results of this study indicate that one can enhance the explanation of antiauthoritarian protest by merging rational action perspectives
with more traditional mobilization measures in an integrated model. Attempts to forecast high levels of protest were less successful. Forecast
error was large in all cases, but the models were able to provide a general
prediction of high, historically unprecedented levels of sustained protest.
Perhaps no linear model can fully explain processes that often take the
form of pulses on historical dates and reactions to unexpected events.
Further work on the process of domestic conflict should confront the
nonlinear, event-driven character of most revolutions.
Manuscript submitted 11 November 1991
Final manuscript received 15 July 1992
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