Del SOCORRO vs Van Wilsen (2014)

ISSUE: Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law?
RULING: Yes, since Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC that he
is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give
support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. This does not, however,
mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Normas son altogether. In international law, the party
who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the
foreign law. In the present case, Ernst hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands,
he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While Ernst
pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his
son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to plead and prove that the national
law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child.
Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Even if the laws of
the Netherlands neither enforce a parents obligation to support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would
be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled
thereto.
FUJIKI vs MARINAY (2013)
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable. - NO
(2)

Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen
on the ground of bigamy. YES

(3)

Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. YES

RULING:
1. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does
not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."
2. Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay
and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning,
is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, 76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is
a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an
interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes.

3. YES. In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held
that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Braza is not applicable
because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. A Filipino citizen cannot
dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil
registry.
REPUBLIC VS OLAYBAR (2014)
ISSUE: WON CANCELLATION OF "ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE WIFE PORTION OF THE ALLEGED
MARRIAGE CONTRACT," IS IN EFFECT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO.
RULING: NO.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. To be sure, a petition for
correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to
invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive
and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other
related laws.
SANTIAGO vs PEOPLE (2015)
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the
marriage has not been legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity .
The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It
is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the
essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.
The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry each
other while the previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting.
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending
on the circumstances, as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware of his
previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous undissolved
marriage of the accused could she be included in the information as a co-accused.
ORION SAVINGS BANK vs Suzuki (2015)
ISSUE: WON KOREAN Law should be applied in conveying the conjugal property of spouses KANG
(Korean).
RULING: NO.
It is a universal principle that real or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the
country or state where it is located. The reason is found in the very nature of immovable property
its immobility. Immovables are part of the country and so closely connected to it that all rights
over them have their natural center of gravity there.
DACASIN VS DACASIN (2015)
FACTS:
For review is a dismissal of a suit to enforce a post-foreign divorce child custody agreement for
lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin
(respondent), Filipino, were married in Manila in April 1994. They have one daughter, Stephanie,
born on 21 September 1995. In June 1999, respondent sought and obtained from the Circuit
Court, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court) a divorce decree against
petitioner.3 In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent,
awarded to respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for
enforcement purposes. On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a
contract (Agreement4 ) for the joint custody of Stephanie.
ISSUE: The question is whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioners
suit and enforce the Agreement on the joint custody of the parties child.
RULING: The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioners suit but not to enforce the
Agreement which is void.
The relevant Philippine law on child custody for spouses separated in fact or in law 15 (under the
second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code) is also undisputed: "no child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the mother x x x." 16 (This statutory awarding of sole parental
custody17 to the mother is mandatory,18 grounded on sound policy consideration, 19 subject only to
a narrow exception not alleged to obtain here. 20 ) Clearly then, the Agreements object to
establish a post-divorce joint custody regime between respondent and petitioner over their child
under seven years old contravenes Philippine law.
Agreements on father visitation and other privileges are not inconsistent with the regime of sole
maternal custody under the second paragraph of Article 213 which merely grants to the
mother final authority on the care and custody of the minor under seven years of age, in case of
disagreements.
Santos vs Santos (1995)
FACTS: The TWO MARRIED. because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young
spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of
other things, like when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents
or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own
parents. On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse
despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January
1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return
home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance
to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to
locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with
him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia
Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A
wife who does not care to inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period of
five years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.
RULING: NOT PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY. Only lack of appreciation of one's marital obligations.
BAYOT vs CA (2008) (VELASCO CASE)

Issue:
Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in Dominican Republic is valid.
Ruling:
Yes. Civil Decrees No. 362/96 and 406/97 are valid.
Rebecca at that time she applied and obtained her divorce was an American citizen and remains
to be one, being born to American parents in Guam, an American territory which follows the
principle of jus soli granting American citizenship to those who are born there. She was, and still
may be, a holder of American passport.
Being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of
America, a country which allows divorce.
GRANDE vs ANTONIO (2014) (VELASCO CASE)
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of
their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate
children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the
father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public
document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the
right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The
legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
rt. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their
father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is
granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children. Respondents
position that the court can order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis. The
father cannot compel his illegitimate children to use his surname.
Thus, We exercise this power in voiding the provisions of the IRR of RA 9255 insofar as it
provides the mandatory use by illegitimate children of their fathers surname upon the latters
recognition of his paternity.
NERA VS. RIMANDO (LANDMARK CASE old case)
HELD: The Supreme Court emphasized that the true test of presence of the testator and the
witnesses in the execution of a will is not whether they actually saw each other sign, but whether
they might have seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so, considering their mental and
physical condition and position with relation to each other at the moment of inscription of each
signature.
The position of the parties with relation to each other at the moment of the subscription of each
signature, must be such that they may see each other sign if they choose to do so.

TMARGO VS CA (1992)
Facts;
On October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air
rifle causing injuries that resulted in her death. The petitioners, natural parents of Tamargo, filed
a complaint for damages against the natural parents of Adelberto with whom he was living the
time of the tragic incident.

In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto Bundoc. Such
petition was granted on November 1982 after the tragic incident.
ISSUE: WON parental authority concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make
adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against the adopted child
where actual custody was lodged with the biological parents.
HELD:
Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and responsibilities of parents, their
parental authority which includes instructing, controlling and disciplining the child.
SC did not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose
a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when they had no actual or physical
custody over the adopted child.
CORPUZ vs STO TOMAS (2010)
FACTS: Petitioner was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization. He was married to the respondent but was shocked of the infidelity on the part of
his wife. He went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce and was granted. Desirous to
marry another woman he now loved, he registered the divorce decree in the Civil Registry Office
and was informed that the foreign decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent
Philippine court. Petitioner filed for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of
marriage.
Issues: WON the second paragraph of Art 26 of the FC extends to aliens the right to petition a
court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
RULING: NO.
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void 15 and
voidable16 marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other
hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage. 17 Our
family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.
CONTINENTAL STEEL vs MONTAO (2009)
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the fetus is a legitimate dependent? - YES
2. Whether or not a person has to be born before it could die? - NO

HELD:
1. Yes. In the first place, the fact of marriage between Hortillano and his wife was never put in
question, hence they are presumed to be married. Second, children conceived or born during
the marriage of the parents are legitimate. Hence, the unborn child (fetus) is already a legitimate
dependent the moment it was conceived (meeting of the sperm and egg cell).
2. No. Death is defined as cessation of life. Certainly, a child in the womb has life. There is no
need to discuss whether or not the unborn child acquired juridical personality that is not the
issue here. But nevertheless, life should not be equated to civil personality. Moreover, while the
Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not
explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die. In this
case, Hortillanos fetus had had life inside the womb as evidenced by the fact that it clung to life
for 38 weeks before the unfortunate miscarriage. Thus, death occurred on a dependent hence
Hortillano as an employee is entitled to death benefit claims as provided for in their CBA.

DAYOT vs. DAYOT (2008)

FACTS: The two were married. In lieu of a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that
they had lived together for at least 5years.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage is void.
RULING: VOID. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law
and invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit
relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage
as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it
refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the
parties under oath The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.
The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised any time.

IRON CURTAIN RULE

Art. 992 of the Civil Code provides that illegitimate children cannot inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his mother or father. Legitimate children and relatives cannot
inherit in the same way from the illegitimate child.
Note: The iron curtain rule only applies in intestate succession. There is a barrier recognized by
law between the legitimate relatives and the illegitimate child so that one cannot inherit from the
other and vice-versa.
Rationale: The law presumes the existence of antagonism between the illegitimate child and the
legitimate relatives of his parents.
COJUANCO VS REPUBLIC (VELASCO CASE) (2012)
ISSUE: WON PCA-COjuangco agreement cannot be accorded the status of law for the lack of the
requisite publication.

RULING: YES. CANNOT BE ACCORDED.

Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 incorporated, by reference, the "Agreement for the Acquisition of a
Commercial Bank for the Benefit of the Coconut Farmers" executed by the PCA. Particularly,
Section 1 states:
Section 1. Declaration of National Policy. It is hereby declared that the policy of the State is to
provide readily available credit facilities to the coconut farmers at preferential rates; that this
policy can be expeditiously and efficiently realized by the implementation of the "Agreement for
the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the benefit of the Coconut Farmers" executed by the
Philippine Coconut Authority, the terms of which "Agreement" are hereby incorporated by
reference; and that the Philippine Coconut Authority is hereby authorized to distribute, for free,
the shares of stock of the bank it acquired to the coconut farmers under such rules and
regulations it may promulgate. (Emphasis Ours.)
It bears to stress at this point that the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement referred to above in Section 1 of
P.D. 755 was not reproduced or attached as an annex to the same law. And it is well-settled that
laws must be published to be valid. In fact, publication is an indispensable condition for the
effectivity of a law. Taada v. Tuvera 37 said as much:
Publication of the law is indispensable in every case
NASCAR vs GALLERY FRAMES (2013)
Anent the issue of award of interest in the form of actual or compensatory damages, the Supreme
Court ruled that the old case of Eastern Shipping Lines vs CA is already modified by the
promulgation of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board Resolution No. 796 which lowered
the legal rate of interest from 12% to 6%. Specifically, the rules on interest are now as follows:
1. Monetary Obligations ex. Loans:
a. If stipulated in writing:
a.1. shall run from date of judicial demand (filing of the case)
a.2. rate of interest shall be that amount stipulated
b. If not stipulated in writing
b.1. shall run from date of default (either failure to pay upon extra-judicial demand or upon
judicial demand whichever is appropriate and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the
Civil Code)
b.2. rate of interest shall be 6% per annum
2.

Non-Monetary Obligations (such as the case at bar)

a. If already liquidated, rate of interest shall be 6% per annum, demandable from date of
judicial or extra-judicial
demand (Art. 1169, Civil Code)
b. If unliquidated, no interest

Except: When later on established with certainty. Interest shall still be 6% per annum
demandable from the date of judgment because such on such date, it is already deemed that
the amount of damages is already ascertained.
3. Compounded Interest
This is applicable to both monetary and non-monetary obligations
6% per annum computed against award of damages (interest) granted by the court. To be
computed from the date when the courts decision becomes final and executory until the award
is fully satisfied by the losing party.
4. The 6% per annum rate of legal interest shall be applied prospectively:
Final and executory judgments awarding damages prior to July 1, 2013 shall apply the 12%
rate;
Final and executory judgments awarding damages on or after July 1, 2013 shall apply the
12% rate for unpaid obligations until June 30, 2013; unpaid obligations with respect to said
judgments on or after July 1, 2013 shall still incur the 6% rate.