D.

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
1. CIVIL SERVICE COMISSION
A. COMPOSITION AND QUALIICATIONS OF COMMISSIONERS
CAYETANO VS MONSOD
FACTS:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the position of the COMELEC in a letter
received by the Commission on Appointments. Petitioner Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod
does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.
On June 5, 1991, the CA confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991,
he took his oath of office. On the same day he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. Hence, this petition by
Cayetano, as citizen and taxpayer, praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as
Chairman of COMELEC be declare null and void.
HELD:
Section 1(1), Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution provides that: There shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least 35 years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any
election position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
While there seems to be no Jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an
appointive office, Black defines practice of law as The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application
of legal principles and techniques to serve the interest of another with his comment. It is not limited to appearing in Court,
or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation but embraces the preparations of pleadings, and other papers
incidents to actions and special proceedings, conveyance, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving
of legal advises to clients. Xxx
The practice of law means any activity, In or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training, and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of
the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which devise or service requires
the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. Interpreted in the light of various definitions of the term practice of law,
particularly the modem concept of law practice, Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer economist, a lawyermanager, a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirementthat
he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. These are added to the fact that Mr. Monsod is a
member of the Philippine Bar, has been dues-paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in
1972-1973 and has also been paying his professional license fees as a lawyer for more than 10 years.
FUNA VS DUQUE
Section 1, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as independent.
Although their respective functions are essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President of
the Philippines in the discharge of such functions. Each of the Constitutional Commissions conducts its own proceedings
under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion.
FACTS: In 2010, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Francisco T. Duque III (Duque) as Chairman of the
Civil Service Commission, which was thereafter confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Subsequently, President
Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 864 (EO 864). Pursuant to it, Duque was designated as a member of the Board of
Directors or Trustees in an ex officio capacity of the following government-owned or government-controlled corporations:
(a) Government Service Insurance System (GSIS); (b) Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHILHEALTH), (c) the
Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), and (d) the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF).
Petitioner Dennis A.B. Funa, in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant petition
challenging the constitutionality of EO 864, as well as Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of Executive Order No. 292
(EO 292), otherwise known as The Administrative Code of 1987, and the designation of Duque as a member of the Board
of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHIC, ECC and HDMF for being clear violations of Section 1 and Section 2, Article
IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Does the designation of Duque as member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC
and HDMF, in an ex officio capacity, impair the independence of the CSC and violate the constitutional prohibition against
the holding of dual or multiple offices for the Members of the Constitutional Commissions?

RULING: Yes. The Court partially grants the petition. The Court upholds the constitutionality of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title
I-A, Book V of EO 292, but declares unconstitutional EO 864 and the designation of Duque in an ex officio capacity as a
member of the Board of Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF.
Section 1, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as
independent. Although their respective functions are essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the
President of the Philippines in the discharge of such functions. Each of the Constitutional Commissions conducts its own
proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and
rulings are subject only to review on certiorari by the Court as provided by Section 7, Article IXA of the 1987 Constitution.
To safeguard the independence of these Commissions, the 1987 Constitution, among others, imposes under Section 2,
Article IX-A of the Constitution certain inhibitions and disqualifications upon the Chairmen and members to strengthen
their integrity, to wit:
(a) Holding any other office or employment during their tenure;
(b) Engaging in the practice of any profession;
(c) Engaging in the active management or control of any business which in any way may be affected by the
functions of his office; and
(d) Being financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted
by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including governmentowned or
-controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
The issue herein involves the first disqualification abovementioned, which is the disqualification from holding any
other office or employment during Duques tenure as Chairman of the CSC. The Court finds it imperative to interpret this
disqualification in relation to Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the Constitution and the Courts pronouncement in
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary. Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B reads:
Section 7. x x x
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other
office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Being an appointive public official who does not occupy a Cabinet position (i.e., President, the Vice-President,
Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants), Duque was thus covered by the general rule enunciated under
Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B. He can hold any other office or employment in the Government during his tenure if
such holding is allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position.
Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution describes the CSC as the central personnel agency of the
government and is principally mandated to establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency,
integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service; to strengthen the merit and rewards system;
to integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks; and to institutionalize a management
climate conducive to public accountability.
Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 is clear that the CSC Chairmans membership in a governing
body is dependent on the condition that the functions of the government entity where he will sit as its Board member must
affect the career development, employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees.
Based on this, the Court finds no irregularity in Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A, Book V of EO 292 because matters
affecting the career development, rights and welfare of government employees are among the primary functions of the
CSC and are consequently exercised through its Chairman. The CSC Chairmans membership therein must, therefore, be
considered to be derived from his position as such. Accordingly, the constitutionality of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title I-A,
Book V of EO 292 is upheld.
The GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are vested by their respective charters with various powers and
functions to carry out the purposes for which they were created. While powers and functions associated with
appointments, compensation and benefits affect the career development, employment status, rights, privileges, and
welfare of government officials and employees, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are also tasked to perform
other corporate powers and functions that are not personnel-related. All of these powers and functions, whether
personnel-related or not, are carried out and exercised by the respective Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and
HDMF. Hence, when the CSC Chairman sits as a member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and
HDMF, he may exercise these powers and functions, which are not anymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman,
such as imposing interest on unpaid or unremitted contributions, issuing guidelines for the accreditation of health care
providers, or approving restructuring proposals in the payment of unpaid loan amortizations. The Court also notes that
Duques designation as member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF entitles him to
receive per diem, a form of additional compensation that is disallowed by the concept of an ex officio position by virtue of
its clear contravention of the proscription set by Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. This situation goes against
the principle behind an ex officio position, and must, therefore, be held unconstitutional.

Apart from violating the prohibition against holding multiple offices, Duques designation as member of the
governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF impairs the independence of the CSC. Under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution, the President exercises control over all government offices in the Executive Branch. An
office that is legally not under the control of the President is not part of the Executive Branch.
As provided in their respective charters, PHILHEALTH and ECC have the status of a government corporation and
are deemed attached to the Department of Health and the Department of Labor, respectively. On the other hand, the GSIS
and HDMF fall under the Office of the President. The corporate powers of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are
exercised through their governing Boards, members of which are all appointed by the President of the Philippines.
Undoubtedly, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF and the members of their respective governing Boards are under
the control of the President. As such, the CSC Chairman cannot be a member of a government entity that is under the
control of the President without impairing the independence vested in the CSC by the 1987 Constitution.
In view of the application of the prohibition under Section 2, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, Duque did not
validly hold office as Director or Trustee of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF concurrently with his position of CSC
Chairman. Accordingly, he was not to be considered as a de jure officer while he served his term as Director or Trustee of
these GOCCs. A de jure officer is one who is deemed, in all respects, legally appointed and qualified and whose term of
office has not expired. That notwithstanding, Duque was a de facto officer during his tenure as a Director or Trustee of the
GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF.
A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the office is
an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one who is in possession of an office,
and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however
irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just
as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are
concerned.
In order to be clear, therefore, the Court holds that all official actions of Duque as a Director or Trustee of the
GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, were presumed valid, binding and effective as if he was the officer legally
appointed and qualified for the office. This clarification is necessary in order to protect the sanctity and integrity of the
dealings by the public with persons whose ostensible authority emanates from the State. Duques official actions covered
by this clarification extend but are not limited to the issuance of Board resolutions and memoranda approving
appointments to positions in the concerned GOCCs, promulgation of policies and guidelines on compensation and
employee benefits, and adoption of programs to carry out the corporate powers of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and
HDMF.
B. POWERS
BARCELONA VS LIM (2014)
C. APPOINTMENT AND TERM OF OFFICE OF COMMISIONERS
RULE AGAINST REAPPOINTMENT
NACIONALISTA v. ANGELO 85 PHIL 101 (1949)
FACTS: On Nov. 9, 1949, while respondent Bautista held the Office of the Solicitor General of the Philippines, President
Quirino designated him as acting member of the COMELEC. He took his oath of office and forthwith proceeded to assume
and perform the duties of the office while at the same time continued to exercise all the powers and duties as Solicitor
General. Petitioner Nacionalista Party instituted this proceeding praying that after due hearing, a writ of prohibition be
issued commanding the respondent Solicitor General to desist forever from acting as member of the COMELEC unless is
legally appointed as regular Member of said Commission. Petitioner alleged that membership in the Commission is a
permanent constitutional office with a fixed tenure, and, therefore, no designation of a person or officer in an acting
capacity could and can be made because a member of the Commission cannot at the same time hold any other office;
and because the respondent as Solicitor General belongs to the Executive Department and cannot assume the powers
and duties of a member in the Commission.
HELD: Under the Constitution, the COMELEC is an independent body or institution. By the very nature of their functions,
the members of the COMELEC must be independent.
They must be made to feel that they are secured in the tenure of their office and entitled to fixed emoluments during their
incumbency, so as to make them impartial in the performance of their functions, their powers, and their duties. That
independence and impartiality mal- IV shaken and by designation of a person or officer to act temporarily in the
COMELEC. It would be more in keeping with the intent, purpose and aim of the framers of the Constitution to appoint a,
permanent Commission than to designate one to act temporarily.

Moreover, the permanent office of the respondent as Solicitor General is the broad sense incompatible with the temporary
one to which he has been designated, because his duties and functions as Solicitor General require that all his time be
devoted to their efficient performance. Nothing short of that is required and expected of him. The Supreme Court said that
the appointment to the Commission is permanent, they cannot be temporary or in an acting capacity. Only permanent
appointees are secured in their offices. A person not secured in his office may retain from exercising his duties in such a
manner that he will clash with the appointing authority. There may be hesitation on his part, that is not conducive to the
independence of the Commission. Only a permanent appointment can make the person secured from the appointing
authority.
BRILLANTES v. YORAC GR 93867 (Dec. 18, 1990)
FACTS: Petitioner Brillantes is challenging the designation by the President of the Philippines of Associate Commissioner
Haydee Yorac as acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario Davide, who had been
named Chairman of the fact-finding Commission to investigate the 1989 December coup dtat attempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President has the power to make the challenged designation.
HELD: No. The President does not have the power to make the challenged designation. Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution
provides that: In no case shall any Member of the Commission on Elections be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity. Art. IX-A, Section 1 of the Constitution, likewise expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions
as independent. Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines
in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the
applicable laws and its own rules and the exercise of its own discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even
with its consent, by the President of the Philippines. The choice of the acting Chairman is an internal matter that should be
resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the President violates their independence.
This case talks about the designation of the appointment of the temporary chairperson. Who shall be the acting
chairperson. Because the permanent chairperson is appointed President, how about the acting? Should the President
make the appointment?
It is within the discretion of the remaining members, who in the meantime will be the acting chairperson. Because:
1st- the Constitution prohibits appointment in a temporary or acting capacity
2nd- it is still not conducive to the independence of the Commission.
NP v. VERA 85 PHIL 149 (1951)
FACTS: This is a special civil action for prohibition filed by the Nacionalista Party and its official candidates for Senators
against Vicente de Vera, Chairman of the COMELEC to enjoin him from sitting or taking part in the deliberations of said
Commission in connection with the elections of the Liberal Party for the position of Senator in the last elections, and for
that reason, he is disqualified from acting on all matters connected with said elections, the Nacionalista Party also argued
that his appointment as Chairman of the COMELEC is a violation of the constitution and, therefore, it is void ab initio. It
was found out that de Vera was already a member of the Commission when he is appointed its chairman. Nacionalista
Party argued that such appointment was in fact a reappointment which is expressly prohibited by the Constitution.
HELD: The Supreme Court pronounced that the ground invoked by petitioners would be proper in quo warrant to
proceedings but not in a petition for prohibition because it is inquiring into a persons title he is holding under color of right.
Nevertheless, the Court gave its view on the 1985 Constitutional appointment of COMELEC that There shall be an
independent Commission on Elections composed of a chairman and two other members to be appointed by the President
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, who shall hold office for a term of nine years and may not be
reappointed. xxx it must be noticed from this provision that the prohibition against reappointment comes as a continuation
of the requirement that the Commissioners shall hold office for a term of 9 years. This imports that the Commissioners
may not be reappointed only after they have held office only for, say, 3 or 6 years, provided his term will not exceed 9
years at all.
REP v. IMPERIAL 96 PHIL 770 (1955)
FACTS: The Solicitor General filed this quo warrant to proceeding against respondents Hon. Imperial and Hon. Perez, to
test the legality of their continuance in office of as Chairman and Member, respectively, of the COMELEC. According to
the Solicitor General, the first Commissioners of COMELEC were duly appointed and qualified on July 12, 1945 with the
following terms of office:
Hon. Vito, Chairman, for 9 years, expiring on July 12, 1954;
Hon. Enage, Member, for 6 years, expiring on July 12, 1951;
Hon. Vera, Member, for 3 years, expiring on July 12, 1948;

Upon death of chairman Vito in May 1947, Member Vera was promoted Chairman on May 26, 1947.The Solicitor General
argued that based on the case of NP V. Bautista, the term of office of Vera would have expired on July 12, 1954 or the
date when the term of office if the late Vito would have expired. But Chairman Vera also died in August, 1951 and the
respondent Hon. Imperial was appointed Chairman to serve for a full term of 9 years or to expire on July 12, 1960 despite
the theory that he could legally server as Chairman only up to July 12. 1954. Respondent Hon. Perez was appointed
member on Dec.8, 1949 again for a full term of 9 years expiring on Nov. 24, 1958. The solicitor General argued that Hon.
Perez could serve only up to July 12, 1951 or the date when the term of office of Member Enage who was his predecessor
would have expired.
HELD: Sec 1. Par. 1 of Art. X of the 1935 Constitution provides that: There shall be an independent Commission on
Elections composed of a Chairman and two other members to be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, who shall hold office for a term of nine years and may not be reappointed. Of the Members
of the Commission first appointed, one shall hold office for a term of nine years, another for six years, and the third for
three years. The Chairman and the other Members of the Commission on Elections may be removed from office only by
impeachment in the manner provided in this Constitution.
The provision that of the first 3 Commissioners appointed one shall hold office for nine years, another for 6 years and the
third for 3 years when taken together with the prescribed term of office for 9 years, without reappointment, evidences a
deliberate plan to have a regular rotation or cycle in the membership of the Commission, by having subsequent members
appointable only once every 3 years, so that no President can appoint more than one Commissioner, thereby preserving
and safeguarding the independence and impartiality of the Commission as a body. The rotation plan and selection of the
fixed term of 9 years for all subsequent appointees were evidently for the purpose of preserving it from hasty and
irreflexive changes.
The operation of the rotational plan requires two conditions, both indispensable to its workability: (1) That the terms of the
first 3 Commissioners should start on a common date; and, (2) That any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability
before the expiration of the term should be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term. The starting date, however,
should be June 21, 1941 since that is the date of the organization of the Constitutional COMELEC under CA 657 ( which
was formerly, a purely statutory commission under CA 607), not July 12, 1945 as pointed out by the Solicitor General.
Hence, the terms of office of the first appointees are as follows:
Hon. Vito, Chairman, for 9 years, expiring on June 20, 1950;
Hon. Enage, Member, for 6 years, expiring on June 20 1947.
The first 3-year term expiring on June 20, 1944 was not filled (because Hon. Vera was appointed on July 12,
1945).
Hence, when Hon. Vera was appointed on July 12, 1945, the first 3-year had already expired and so his
appointment must be deemed for the full 9 years, expiring on June 20, 1953.
When Chairman Vito died on May 7, 1947, Commissioner Vera was appointed Chairman. Such appointment
could only be for the unexpired period of Veras term or up to June 20, 1953.
Chairman Veras tenure as Chairman expired on June 20, 1950 and his reappointment was expressly prohibited
by the Constitution. The next Chairman was respondent Hon. Imperial whose terms of 9 years must be deemed to have
begun on June 21, 1950, expiring only on June 20, 1959.
As to Perezs case, he succeeded Hon. Enage whose initial 6-year term expired on June 21, 1947. Perez was to
serve for a 9-year term which must be deemed to have started on June 21, 1947, expiring only on June 20, 1956. Hence,
the legal terms of office of the respondents Hon. Imperial and Hon. Perez have not yet expired.
They were trying to discuss whether reappointment is possible. The term before is 9 years. If you are appointed
for only 3 years, you can be reappointed for another 6 years. Or if you have been appointed to serve the unexpired term
of the incumbent Commissioner who has died or becomes incapacitated or has been removed, you can be reappointed
provided it does not exceed 9 years.
Supreme Court said in those cases that reappointment is still not possible because of the so-called rotation plan.
The purpose of the rotation plan is to afford the independence and to protect and safeguard the independence of the
Constitutional Commissions. They are performing executive functions but not under the executive branch. They are strictly
independent from the executive.
If theres a vacancy before the expiration of the term- the appointees shall serve only for the unexpired term and
that appointee cannot be reappointed. No Member shall be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
This is also traceable to the independence of the Commission.
GAMINDE v. COA 347 SCRA 655 (2000)
FACTS: On June 11, 1993, the President of the Philippines appointed petitioner Thelma P. Gaminde, ad interim,
Commissioner, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. She assumed office on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of office. On

September 07, 1993, the Commission on Appointment (CA), Congress of the Philippines confirmed the appointment also
informing her that her will expire on February 2, 1999.
On February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the President as to the expiry date of her term of
office. In reply to her request, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, opined that petitioners term of office would expire on
February 02, 2000, not on February 02, 1999. Relying on said advisory opinion, petitioner remained in office after
February 02, 1999. On February 04, 1999, Chairman Corazon Alma G. de Leon, wrote the COA requesting opinion on
whether or not Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her co-terminous staff may be paid their salaries notwithstanding
the expiration of their appointments on February 02, 1999.
On February 18, 1999, the General Counsel, COA, issued an opinion that the term of Commissioner Gaminde has
expired on February 02, 1999 as stated in her appointment conformably with the constitutional extent. Consequently, on
March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas U. Felipe issued notice of disallowance, disallowing in audit the salaries
and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her coterminous staff, effective February 02, 1999. On April 5, 1999,
petitioner appealed the disallowance to the COA en banc. On June 15, 1999, the COA dismissed petitioner appeal. The
COA affirmed the propriety of the disallowance, holding that the issue of petitioners term of office may be properly
addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper which set the expiration date on February 02, 1999, and that the
Commission is bereft of power to recognize an extension of her term, not even with the implied acquiescence of the Office
of the President. In time, petitioner moved for reconsideration; however, on August 17, 1999, the COA denied the motion.
ISSUE: Whether the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as Commissioner, CSC, to which she was appointed on
June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as stated in the appointment paper, or on February 02, 2000, as claimed by
her.
HELD: The term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as Commissioner, CSC, under an appointment extended to her by
President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999.
The term of office of the Chairman and members of the CSC is prescribed in the 1987 Constitution, as follows: Section 1
(2). The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of 7 years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for 7
years, a Commissioner for 5 years, and another Commissioner for 3 years, without reappointment. Appointment to any
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated
in a temporary or acting capacity.
In Republic vs. Imperial, we said that the operation of the rotational plan requires 2 conditions, both indispensable to its
workability: (1) that the terms of the first three (3) Commissioners should start on a common date, and, (2) that any
vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the expiration of the term should only be filled only for the unexpired
balance of the term.
The terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the CC under the 1987 Constitution must start on a common date,
irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of the appointees, in order that the expiration
of the first terms of 7, 5 and 3 years should lead to the regular recurrence of the 2-year interval between the expiration of
the terms.
Applying the foregoing conditions to the case at bar, we rule that the appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the
first appointees to the Cc under the 1987 Constitution must be on February 02, 1987, the date of adoption of the 1987
Constitution. In case of a belated appointment or qualification, the interval between the start of the term and the actual
qualification of the appointee must be counted against the latter.
In concluding that February 02, 1987 is the proper starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the CC of a
staggered 7-5-3 year terms, we considered the plain language of Article IX (B), Section 1 (2), Article IX (C), Section 1 (2)
and Article IX (D), Section 1(2) of the 1987 Constitution that uniformly prescribed a 7-year term of office for Members of
the CC, without re-appointment, and for the first appointees terms of 7, 5 and 3 years, without re-appointment. In no case
shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. There is no need to expressly state the
beginning of the term of office as this is understood to coincide with effectivity of the Constitution upon its ratification.
G. APPEAL
EUGENIO S. CAPABLANCA VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION G.R. NO. 179370, NOVEMBER 18, 2009.
FACTS:
Capablanca was appointed into the PNP service with the rank of PO1 with a temporary status and was assigned
at the PNP Station in Butuan City. After two years, he took the PNP Entrance Examination conducted by the NAPOLCOM
and passed the same. On 2000, he took the Career Service Professional ExaminationComputer Assisted Test (CSP-CAT)
given by the CSC and likewise passed the same. Thereafter, the Police Regional Office XIII conferred upon him the
permanent status as PO1.

On 2001, The CSC Caraga informed PO1 Capablanca about certain alleged irregularities relative to the CSP-CAT
which he took on 2000. According to the CSC, the person in the picture pasted in the Picture Seat Plan (PS-P) is different
from the person whose picture is attached in the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) and that the signature appearing in the PSP was different from the signature affixed to the PDS.
During the preliminary investigation, Capablanca, represented by a counsel, moved to dismiss the proceedings.
He argued that it is the NAPOLCOM which has sole authority to conduct entrance and promotional examinations for
police officers to the exclusion of the CSC. Thus, the CSP-CAT conducted was void. Moreover, he alleged that the
administrative discipline over police officers falls under the jurisdiction of the PNP and/or NAPOLCOM.
In an Order, the CSC Caraga held that there was no dispute as to the sole authority of NAPOLCOM as argued by
him. However, since he submitted a CSC Career Service Professional eligibility to support his appointment on a
permanent status, then the CSC had jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation. So, the motion was denied.
PO1 Capablanca, then, filed a Petition for prohibition and injunction with a prayer for the issuance of a TRO and
writ of preliminary injunction with the RTC. Instead of filing its Answer, the CSC Caraga moved to dismiss the case. It
argued that, other than not exhausting administrative remedies, the CSC was not stripped of its original disciplinary
jurisdiction over all cases involving civil service examination anomalies. The court denied CSCs motion, and later, ruled
that that the CSC had no jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation, much less to prosecute PO1 Capablanca.
The CSC filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. The CA granted CSC Petition.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT IT HAS ONLY APPELLATE JURISDICTION
OVER THE CASE AND IT IS THE NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION (NAPOLCOM) WHICH HAS THE JURISDICTION
TO CONDUCT INITIATORY INVESTIGATION OF THE CASE.
RULING:
The petition lacks merit.
It is clear that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction when it initiated the conduct of a preliminary investigation on
the alleged civil service examination irregularity committed by the petitioner. Petitioner anchors his argument that the
heads of departments, agencies, offices or bureaus should first commence disciplinary proceedings against their
subordinates before their decisions can be reviewed by the CSC.
It has already been settled in Cruz v. Civil Service Commission that the appellate power of the CSC will only apply when
the subject of the administrative cases filed against erring employees is in connection with the duties and functions of their
office, and not in cases where the acts of complainant arose from cheating in the civil service examinations.
Moreover, in Civil Service Commission v. Albao, we rejected the contention that the CSC only has appellate
disciplinary jurisdiction on charges of dishonesty and falsification of documents in connection with an appointment to a
permanent position in the government service.
Finally, petitioners reliance on Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals, is misplaced. In said case, the
NAPOLCOM assailed Item 3 of CSC Resolution No. 96- 5487, which provides:
3. Appointees to Police Officer and Senior Police Officer positions in the Philippine National Police must have
passed any of the following examinations
a) PNP Entrance Examination;
b) Police Officer 3rd Class Examination; and
c) CSC Police Officer Entrance Examination.
The NAPOLCOM took exception to this provision, particularly letter (c), arguing that the requirement of taking a
CSC Police Officer Entrance Examination is only applicable to entrance in the first-level position in the PNP, i.e., the rank
of PO1. NAPOLCOM stressed that what would entitle a police officer to the appropriate eligibility for his promotion in the
PNP are the promotional examinations conducted by the NAPOLCOM, and not the CSC Police Officer Entrance
Examination.
The Court of Appeals found in favor of the NAPOLCOM and held that the CSC, by issuing Item 3 of CSC
Resolution No. 96-5487 encroached on the exclusive power of NAPOLCOM under RA 6975 to administer promotional
examinations for policemen and to impose qualification standards for promotion of PNP personnel to the ranks of PO2 up
to Senior Police Officers 1-4.
On the contrary, the issue in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the CSC with regard to anomalies or
irregularities in the CSP-CAT, which is a totally different matter.
H. SCOPE OF CIVIL SERVICE
JUCO VS NLRC (1997)

Facts: Benjamin C. Juco was hired as a project engineer of National Housing Corporation (NHC) from November 16,
1970 to May 14, 1975. On May 14, 1975, he was separated from the service for having been implicated in a crime of theft
and/or malversation of public funds. On March 25, 1977, Juco filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the NHC with
the Department of Labor. On September 17, 1977, the Labor Arbiter rendered A decision dismissing the complaint on the
ground that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case. Juco then elevated the case to the NLRC which rendered a
decision on December 28, 1982, reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. NHC then appealed the NLRC decision
before the Supreme Court and on January 17, 1985 which petition the Court granted thereby setting aside the NLRC
decision and reinstating the labor arbiters decision of dismissing the case. On January 6, 1989, Juco filed with the Civil
Service Commission a complaint for illegal dismissal, with preliminary mandatory injunction. On February 6, 1989, NHC
moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Civil Service Commission has no jurisdiction over the
case. CSC granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. On April 28, 1989, Juco filed with NLRC a
complaint for illegal dismissal with preliminary mandatory injunction against NHC. NLRC find NHC guilty of illegal
dismissal. On June 1, 1990, NHC filed its appeal before the NLRC and on March 14, 1991, the NLRC promulgated a
decision which reversed the decision of Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is not governed by the
Labor Code
Held: Yes. Under the laws then in force, employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations were governed
by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code. Although in National Housing Corporation v. Juco, it was held that
employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations, whether created by special law or formed as subsidiaries
under the general Corporation Law, are governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code, this ruling has
been supplanted by the 1987Constitution which states that the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government owned or controlled corporations with original
charter.
In National Service Corporation (NASECO) v. National Labor Relations Commission, it was held that the NLRC has
jurisdiction over the employees of NASECO on the ground that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs because it is the
Constitution in place at the time of the decision. It was further held that the new phrase "with original charter" means that
government-owned and controlled corporations refer to corporations chartered by special law as distinguished from
corporations organized under the Corporation Code. Thus, NASECO which had been organized under the general
incorporation statute and a subsidiary of the National Investment Development Corporation, which in turn was a
subsidiary of the Philippine National Bank, is excluded from the purview of the Civil Service Commission. The above
doctrine applies in this case. In the case at bench, the National Housing Corporation is government owned corporation
organized in 1959 in accordance with Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as the Uniform Charter of Government
Corporation, dated January 1, 1959. Its shares of stock are and have been one hundred percent (100%)owned by the
Government from its incorporation under Act 1459, the former corporation law. The government entities that own its
shares of stock are the Government Service Insurance System, the Social Security System, the Development Bank of the
Philippines, the National Investment and Development Corporation and the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation.
Considering the fact that the NHA had been incorporated under Act1459, the former corporation law, it is but correct to say
that it is a government-owned or controlled corporation whose employees are subject to the provisions of the Labor Code.
This observation is reiterated in the recent case of Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) v National
Housing Corporation, where the SC held that the NHA is now within the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor and
Employment, it being a government-owned and/or controlled corporation without an original charter. Furthermore, the
Court previously ruled that the workers or employees of the NHC (now NHA) undoubtedly have the right to form unions or
employee's organization and that there is no impediment to the holding of certification election among them as they are
covered by the Labor Cod
HDMF VS COA (2004)
PNB VS TEJANO (2009)
2. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
BARRO VS COMELEC 1ST DIVISION 603 SCRA 292 (2009)
CAGAS VS COMELEC (2012)
A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a COMELEC Division in an election protest may not directly assail
the order before the Supreme Court through a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of said
interlocutory order during the appeal of the decision of the Division.

FACTS: Petitioner Douglas R. Cagas was proclaimed the winner for the gubernatorial race for the province of Davao del
Sur. Respondent Claude P. Bautista, his rival, filed an electoral protest alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, votebuying and violations of election laws, rules and resolutions. The protest was raffled to the COMELEC First Division.
In his affirmative defense, Cagas argued that Bautista did not make the requisite cash deposit on time and that
Bautista did not render a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of. The COMELEC First Division
denied the special affirmative defenses. Thus, Cagas prayed that the matter be certified to the COMELEC En Banc.
Bautista countered that the assailed orders, being merely interlocutory, could not be elevated to the COMELEC En Banc.
The COMELEC First Division issued an order denying Cagas motion for reconsideration, prompting him to file a petition
for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order issued by a
Division of the COMELEC
HELD: Petition DENIED.
Although Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution confers on the Court the power to review any decision,
order or ruling of the COMELEC, it limits such power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does
not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to
review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC.
There is no question, therefore, that the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for certiorari
assailing the denial by the COMELEC First Division of the special affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The proper
remedy is for the petitioner to wait for the COMELEC First Division to first decide the protest on its merits, and if the result
should aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special affirmative defenses to the COMELEC En Banc along with the
other errors committed by the Division upon the merits.
It is true that there may be an exception to the general rule, which is when an interlocutory order of a Division of
the COMELEC was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, as the Court conceded in
Kho v. Commission on Elections. However, the said case has no application herein because the COMELEC First Division
had the competence to determine the lack of detailed specifications of the acts or omissions complained of as required by
Rule 6, Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, and whether such lack called for the outright dismissal of the
protest.
JALOSJOS VS COMELEC (2012)
FACTS: In May 2007 Romeo M. Jalosjos, Jr., petitioner in G.R. 192474, ran for Mayor of Tampilisan, Zamboanga del
Norte, and won. While serving as Tampilisan Mayor, he bought a residential house and lot in Barangay Veterans Village,
Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay and renovated and furnished the same. In September 2008 he began occupying the house. On
November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the Second
District of Zamboanga Sibugay for the May 10, 2010 National Elections. This prompted Erasmo to file a petition to deny
due course to or cancel his COC before the COMELEC, claiming that Jalosjos made material misrepresentations in that
COC when he indicated in it that he resided in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. The COMELEC, on June 3, 2010 the En Banc
granted Erasmos motion for reconsideration and declared Jalosjos ineligible to seek election as Representative of the
Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay. It held that Jalosjos did not satisfy the residency requirement since, by continuing
to hold the position of Mayor of Tampilisan, Zamboanga Del Norte, he should be deemed not to have transferred his
residence from that place to Barangay Veterans Village in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Jalosjos challenges the COMELECs
finding that he did not meet the residency requirement and its denial of his right to due process.
HELD: While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to decide all questions affecting elections such power is
not without limitation. It does not extend to contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the
House of Representatives and the Senate. The Constitution vests the resolution of these contests solely upon the
appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives.
The Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of the COMELEC ends and when that of the
HRET begins. The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over
disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed Representative in favor of the HRET.
The fact is that on election day of 2010 the COMELEC En Banc had as yet to resolve Erasmos appeal from the
Second Divisions dismissal of the disqualification case against Jalosjos. Thus, there then existed no final judgment
deleting Jalosjos name from the list of candidates for the congressional seat he sought. The last standing official action in
his case before election day was the ruling of the COMELECs Second Division that allowed his name to stay on that list.
Meantime, the COMELEC En Banc did not issue any order suspending his proclamation pending its final resolution of his
case. With the fact of his proclamation and assumption of office, any issue regarding his qualification for the same, like his
alleged lack of the required residence, was solely for the HRET to consider and decide. Here, when the COMELEC En
Banc issued its order dated June 3, 2010, Jalosjos had already been proclaimed on May 13, 2010 as winner in the
election. Thus, the acted without jurisdiction when it still passed upon the issue of his qualification and declared him
ineligible for the office of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.

LOKIN JR VS COMELEC (2012)

SEVILLA VS COMELEC
ATONG PAGLAUM VS COMELEC
FACTS: These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52 party-list
groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying
them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the
party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations. Pursuant to the
provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280
groups and organizations registered and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Divisions
resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bidas (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political party in the National
Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections because PBB does not
represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector; PBB failed to apply for registration as a party-list group; and
PBB failed to establish its track record as an organization that seeks to uplift the lives of the "marginalized and
underrepresented."
These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI, ALONA, ALAM, KALIKASAN,
GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court. The COMELEC, on 7
January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official
ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc
scheduled summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of
intent to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections have continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No.
7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani). The COMELEC disqualified the 39
groups and organizations from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections:
These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BRO-PGBI, 1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A
BLESSED Party-List, 1-CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO, AGRI, AKMAPTM, KAP, AKO-BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG
MASDA, KAKUSA, AG, ANAD, GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP, BAYANI, AANI, A-IPRA,
COCOFED, ABANG LINGKOD, ABROAD, BINHI, BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS, 1-UTAK, SENIOR CITIZENS) were able to
secure a mandatory injunction from this Court, directing the COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the
printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections. From the efforts of 4-manresa class 2013 Page 158
Constitutional law 1 case digest 201 3
ISSUES:
1. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new
petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations
2. Whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections49 (BANAT) should be
applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Ruling: We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions of this
Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However, since the
Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the
party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we
remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the
party-list system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed
in this Decision.
The objective of the party list system under the 1987 constitution is to democratize political power by giving
political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives.
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply put, the party-list
system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a
chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. The voter elects two representatives in the House of
Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and another for his or her party-list group or organization of choice.

10

Both sectoral and well as non-sectoral parties are included in the party list system. Indisputably, the framers of the
1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The
framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system.
As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list system [F]or as
long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this
Constitution.
Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors was outvoted. Instead, the
reservation of seats to sectoral representatives was only allowed for the first three consecutive terms.
There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected the proposal to
make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly intended the party-list system to
include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties.
The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to win in
legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same number of votes that winning
candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The party-list system will be the entry point to membership in the
House of Representatives for both these non-traditional parties that could not compete in legislative district elections.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2)
regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or
organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not
be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
What is the proof that the party list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties? Section 5(2), article VI of the
1987 constitution which mandates that, during the first three consecutive terms of congress after the ratification of the
1987 constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three consecutive terms
of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall
be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. This provision clearly
shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to non-sectoral
party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing
the marginalized and underrepresented. Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties
applies only for the first three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, clearly making the party-list
system fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no
seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
Political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies
for the general conduct of government.
A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in section 5
hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a party as either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of
parties. Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a
political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the
general conduct of government. On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a sectoral party refers to
an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political and
a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the party-list system to represent the
marginalized and underrepresented is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties
from the party-list system. How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district
elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the
partylist system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle.
To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent
and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or

11

cause-oriented political party is clearly different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral
party and need not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional
political party must represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists
of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and policies, regardless of
their economic status as citizens.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.56 The sectors
mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily marginalized and underrepresented. For sure, professionals are not by
definition marginalized and underrepresented, not even the elderly, women, and the youth. However, professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth may lack well-defined political constituencies, and can thus organize themselves into
sectoral parties in advocacy of the special interests and concerns of their respective sectors.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law does not require national
or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to represent the marginalized and
underrepresented. Section 6 provides the grounds for the COMELEC to refuse or cancel the registration of parties or
organizations after due notice and hearing.
On the contrary, to even interpret that all the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are marginalized and
underrepresented would lead to absurdities.
The phrase marginalized and underrepresented should refer only to the sectors in section 5 that are, by their
nature, economically marginalized and underrepresented. These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors.
For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented. The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of
advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sector does not mean one
must wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity. It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle class.
More specifically, the economically marginalized and underrepresented are those who fall in the low income group as
classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.
How about sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, do they need to be marginalized?
No. They belong to ideology-based and cause oriented parties. Allowing them to run as party list will give small ideologybased and cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined political constituencies a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives.
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly, women
and the youth, need not be marginalized and underrepresented will allow small ideology-based and cause-oriented
parties who lack well-defined political constituencies a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. On the
other hand, limiting to the marginalized and underrepresented the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature
are economically at the margins of society, will give the marginalized and underrepresented an opportunity to likewise
win seats in the House of Representatives. This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and
will give rise to a multi-party system where those marginalized and underrepresented, both in economic and ideological
status, will have the opportunity to send their own members to the House of Representatives.
Political parties can participate in the party-list elections through their sectoral wings. They cannot directly
participate because they neither lack well defined political constituencies nor represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections.
Major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack well-defined political
constituencies nor represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Thus, the national or regional parties under
the party-list system are necessarily those that do not belong to major political parties. This automatically reserves the
national and regional parties under the party-list system to those who lack well-defined political constituencies, giving
them the opportunity to have members in the House of Representatives. Political parties are allowed to participate in the
party list elections through their sectoral wings in order to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their
constituencies to the marginalized and underrepresented and to those who lack well-defined political constituencies.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-list elections so as to
encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the marginalized and underrepresented and to
those who lack well-defined political constituencies. The participation of major political parties in party-list elections must
be geared towards the entry, as members of the House of Representatives, of the marginalized and underrepresented
and those who lack well-defined political constituencies, giving them a voice in lawmaking.
Thus, to participate in party-list elections, a major political party that fields candidates in the legislative district
elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing,
that can register under the party-list system.

12

The qualification of a party-list nominee: A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or
organization which he or she seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one
must either belong to the sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such sector.
THE NEW PARAMETERS TO BE FOLLOWED BY COMELEC:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2)
regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along
sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and
do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields
candidates in legislative district elections can participate in partylist elections only through its sectoral
wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent
sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in welldefined political constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and
underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent.
Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack well-defined political
constituencies must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent those who lack
well-defined political constituencies, either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track
record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees
are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
REYES VS COMELEC 708 SCRA 197 (2013)
FACTS:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Banc Resolution of June 25, 2013 which found no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections and affirmed the March 27, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division.
Petitioner raised the issue in the petition which is: Whether or not Respondent COMELEC is without jurisdiction
over Petitioner who is duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of Member of
the House of Representatives for the lone congressional district of Marinduque. Petitioner is a duly proclaimed winner and
having taken her oath of office as member of the House of Representatives, all questions regarding her qualifications are
outside the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive jurisdiction.
The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner submission.The crucial question is
whether or not petitioner could be proclaimed on May 18, 2013. Differently stated, was there basis for the proclamation of
petitioner on May 18 , 2013.
The June 25, 2013 resolution held that before May 18, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed
of the issue of petitioner lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its resolution dated May 14, 2013, cancelling
petitioner certificate of candidacy. The proclamation which petitioner secured on May 18, 2013 was without any basis. On
June 10, 2013, petitioner went to the Supreme Court questioning the COMELEC First Division ruling and the May 14,
2013 COMELEC En Banc decision, baseless proclamation on 18 May 2013 did not by that fact of promulgation alone
become valid and legal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner was denied of due process?
HELD:
Petitioner was denied of due process.
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took cognizance of "newly-discovered
evidence" without the same having been testified on and offered and admitted in evidence. She assails the admission of
the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy of the Certification from the Bureau of Immigration. She

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likewise contends that there was a violation of her right to due process of law because she was not given the opportunity
to question and present controverting evidence.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of procedure in the
presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure "shall be liberally construed in
order to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought
before the Commission." In view of the fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of
candidacy are summary in nature, then the "newly discovered evidence" was properly admitted by respondent
COMELEC.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was given every opportunity to
argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tan's petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the
First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period of five (5) months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did
not avail herself of the opportunity given her.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be given the opportunity or
right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC: The petitioners should be reminded that due process does
not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by
verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through
pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied;
administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due
process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration.
In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, respondent submitted records of the Bureau of Immigration
showing that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and that her status is that of a "balikbayan." At this point, the burden
of proof shifted to petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not lost
the same, or that she has re-acquired such status in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare
allegation that she is a natural-born citizen, however, petitioner submitted no proof to support such contention. Neither did
she submit any proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her.
G. APPEAL
GARCES VS CA (1996)
FACTS:
Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte on July 27, 1986. She was to
replace respondent Election Registrar Claudio Concepcion, who, in turn, was transferred to Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte.
Both appointments were to take effect upon assumption of office. Concepcion, however, refused to transfer post as he did
not request for it. Garces was directed by the Office of Assistant Director for Operations to assume the Gutalac post. But
she was not able to do so because of a Memorandum issued by respondent Provincial Election Supervisor Salvador
Empeynado that prohibited her from assuming office as the same is not vacant.
Garces received a letter from the Acting Manager, Finance Service Department, with an enclosed check to cover
for the expenses on construction of polling booths. It was addressed Mrs. Lucita Garces E.R. Gutalac, Zamboanga del
Norte which Garces interpreted to mean as superseding the deferment order. Meanwhile, since Concepcion continued
occupying the Gutalac office, the COMELEC en banc cancelled his appointment to Liloy.
Garces filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus with preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction and
damages against Empeynado and Concepcion. Meantime, the COMELEC en banc resolved to recognize respondent
Concepcion as the Election Registrar of Gutalac and ordered that the appointments of Garces be cancelled.
Empeynado moved to dismiss the petition for mandamus alleging that the same was rendered moot and
academic by the said COMELEC Resolution, and that the case is cognizable only by the COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art. IXA of the 1987 Constitution. Empeynado argues that the matter should be raised only on certiorari before the Supreme
Court and not before the RTC, else the latter court becomes a reviewer of an en banc COMELEC resolution contrary to
Sec. 7, Art. IX-A.
RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus on two grounds, viz., (1) that quo warranto is the proper remedy, and
(2) that the cases or matters referred under the constitution pertain only to those involving the conduct of elections.
CA affirmed the RTCs dismissal of the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case is cognizable by the Supreme Court?
HELD:
No. The case is cognizable in the RTC.
Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution provides:

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Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought
before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or
matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the rules of the commission or by the commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided by this constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each commission
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
receipt of a copy thereof.
This provision is inapplicable as there was no case or matter filed before the COMELEC. On the contrary, it was
the COMELECs resolution that triggered this Controversy.
The case or matter referred to by the constitution must be something within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC,
i.e., it must pertain to an election dispute. The settled rule is that decision, rulings, order of the COMELEC that may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A are those that relate to the COMELECs exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers involving elective regional, provincial and city officials.
In this case, what is being assailed is the COMELECs choice of an appointee to occupy the Gutalac Post which is
an administrative duty done for the operational set-up of an agency. The controversy involves an appointive, not an
elective, official. Hardly can this matter call for the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
To rule otherwise would surely burden the Court with trivial administrative questions that are best ventilated before
the RTC, a court which the law vests with the power to exercise original jurisdiction over all cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
3. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
VELOSO VS COA (2011)
FACTS:
The City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8040, authorizing the conferment of Exemplary Public Service
Award (EPSA) to elective local officials of Manila who have been elected for three consecutive terms in the same position.
Pursuant to the ordinance, the City made partial payments in favor of a number of former councilors.
However, the Supervising Auditor of the City of Manila issued an Audit Observation Memorandum, with the
following observations: that the Ordinance is without legal basis; the monetary reward is excessive and tantamount to
double compensation in contravention to the IRR of RA 7160; and that the appropriations to implement the Ordinance was
improperly classified.
Thereafter, a Notice of Disallowance (ND) was issued.
The councilors filed a Motion to Lift the Notice of Disallowance, which was granted by the Legal Adjudication
Office-Local of the COA. Upon review however, the COA rendered the assailed Decision, sustaining the Notice of
Disallowance.
ISSUE: Whether the COA has the authority to disallow the disbursement of local government funds.
RULING:
YES.
It was the contention of the petitioners that the power and authority of the COA to audit government funds and
accounts does not carry with it in all instances the power to disallow a particular disbursement.
Citing Guevara v. Gimenez, they claim that the COA has no discretion or authority to disapprove payments on the
ground that the same was unwise or that the amount is unreasonable. The SC however disagreed. As held in National
Electrification v. COA, the ruling in Guevara cited by petitioners has already been overturned in Caltex Philippines, Inc. v.
COA. It was explained that under the 1935 Constitution, the Auditor General could not correct irregular, unnecessary,
excessive or extravagant expenditures of public funds, but could only bring the matter to the attention of the proper
administrative officer. Under the 1987 Constitution, however, the COA is vested with the authority to determine whether
government entities, including LGUs, comply with laws and regulations in disbursing government funds, and to disallow
illegal or irregular disbursements of these funds.
Section 2, Article IX-D of the Constitution gives a broad outline of the powers and functions of the COA, to wit:
Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and
settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and
property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies,
or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on
a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal
autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other governmentowned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities receiving

15

subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the Government, which are required by law or the
granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal
control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures,
including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It
shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law,
preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto.
(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the
scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses
of government funds and properties.
Under the first paragraph of the above provision, the COA's audit jurisdiction extends to the government, or any of
its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters. Its jurisdiction likewise covers, albeit on a post-audit basis, the constitutional bodies, commissions and offices
that have been granted fiscal autonomy, autonomous state colleges and universities, other government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, and such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity from or
through the government. The power of the COA to examine and audit government agencies cannot be taken away from it
as Section 3, Article IX-D of the Constitution mandates that "no law shall be passed exempting any entity of the
Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the COA."
Pursuant to its mandate as the guardian of public funds, the COA is vested with broad powers over all accounts
pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property. This includes the exclusive
authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods for such review, and
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations. The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine,
prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds.
Thus, LGUs, though granted local fiscal autonomy, are still within the audit jurisdiction of the COA.
AGRA VS COA (2011)
FACTS:
This case involves the grant of rice allowance to employees of the National Electrification Administration (NEA) by
virtue of RA 6758 (the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989). A group of NEA employees, claiming that
they did not receive such allowances, filed a special civil action for mandamus against NEA before the RTC which later
decided in their favor and directed NEA to settle said claims.
This decision was issued a certificate to the effect that is has become final and executory. This decision was
questioned by NEA before the CA which ordered the implementation of a writ of execution against the funds of NEA. This
was reversed by the SC on the following grounds:
COA had already passed upon claims similar to the subject of the case in their earlier resolution. COA opined
that the court may have exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the petition for the entitlement of the
employees which had already been passed upon by COA. Thus, employees, pursuant to the above COA
decision, cannot defy that decision by filing a petition for mandamus in the lower court. PD 1445 and the 1987
Constitution prescribe that the only mode for appeal from decisions of COA is on certiorari to the Supreme
Court in the manner provided by law and the Rules of Court. Clearly, the lower court had no jurisdiction when
it entertained the subject. And void decisions of the lower court can never attain finality, much less be
executed.
NEA is a GOCC. As such GOCC, NEA cannot evade execution; its funds may be garnished or levied upon in
satisfaction of a judgment rendered against it. However, before execution may proceed against it, a claim for
payment of the judgment award must first be filed with the COA.
Under CA 327, as amended by PD 1445, it is the COA which has primary jurisdiction to examine, audit and
settle "all debts and claims of any sort" due from or owing the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies
and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. With
respect to money claims arising from the implementation of R.A. No. 6758, their allowance or disallowance is
for COA to decide, subject only to the remedy of appeal by petition for certiorari to the SC.
As to the grant of the allowance under said final and executory decision, NEA requested for a legal opinion before
the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) which opined for the approval of the release of the allowance.
Hence, NEA issued a Resolution approving the same and the release of the funds.
However, the resident auditor of COA did not allow the payment of rice allowance for a particular period. The
Notice of Allowance was appealed, but the same was denied by COA. They went again to the SC questioning the
disallowance of their rice subsidy.

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RULING: (Discussion is primarily on the entitlement to the subsidy. The following are the matters relating to the powers of
COA)
The immutability rule applies only when the decision is promulgated by a court possessed of jurisdiction to hear
and decide the case. Undoubtedly, the petition in the guise of a case for mandamus is a money claim falling within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of COA. Noting the propensity of the lower courts in taking cognizance of cases filed by
claimants in violation of such primary jurisdiction, the SC issued Administrative Circular 10-2000 dated October 23, 2000
enjoining judges of lower courts to exercise caution in order to prevent "possible circumvention of the rules and
procedures of the Commission on Audit" and reiterating the basic rule that: "All money claims against the Government
must be filed with the Commission on Audit which shall act upon it within sixty days. Rejection of the claim will authorize
the claimant to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court on certiorari and in effect sue the State thereby."
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, when an administrative body is clothed with original and exclusive
jurisdiction, courts are utterly without power and authority to exercise concurrently such jurisdiction. Accordingly, all the
proceedings of the court in violation of that doctrine and all orders and decisions reached thereby are null and void. It will
be noted in the cited Supreme Court Circular that money claims are cognizable by the COA and its decision is appealable
only to the Supreme Court. The lower courts have nothing to do with such genus of transactions.
COCOFED VS REPUBLIC (2012)
FACTS:
In 1971, RA 6260 created the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to administer the Coconut Investment Fund, a
fund to be sourced from levy on the sale of copra. The copra seller was, or ought to be, issued COCOFUND receipts. The
fund was placed at the disposition of COCOFED, the national association of coconut producers having the largest
membership.
When martial law started in 1972, several presidential decrees were issued to improve the coconut industry
through the collection and use of the coconut levy fund:
PD 276 established the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF) and declared the proceeds of the CCSF
levy as trust fund, to be utilized to subsidize the sale of coconut-based products, thus stabilizing the price of edible oil.
PD 582 created the Coconut Industry Development Fund (CIDF) to finance the operation of a hybrid coconut seed
farm.
In 1973, PD 232 created the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) to accelerate the growth and development of the
coconut and palm oil industry.
Then came P.D. No. 755 in July 1975, providing under its Section 1 the policy to provide readily available credit
facilities to the coconut farmers at preferential rates. Towards achieving this, Section 2 of PD 755 authorized PCA to utilize
the CCSF and the CIDF collections to acquire a commercial bank and deposit the CCSF levy collections in said bank,
interest free, the deposit withdrawable only when the bank has attained a certain level of sufficiency in its equity capital. It
also decreed that all levies PCA is authorized to collect shall not be considered as special and/or fiduciary funds
or form part of the general funds of the government.
Both P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 also provide that the CCSF shall not be construed by any law as a special and/or
trust fund, the stated intention being that actual ownership of the said fund shall pertain to coconut farmers in their
private capacities.
Shortly before the issuance of PD 755 however, PCA had already bought from Peping Cojuangco 72.2% of the
outstanding capital stock of FUB / UCPB. In that contract, it was also stipulated that Danding Cojuanco shall receive
equity in FUB amounting to 10%, or 7.22 % of the 72.2%, as consideration for PCAs buy-out of what Danding Conjuanco
claim as his exclusive and personal option to buy the FUB shares.
The PCA appropriated, out of its own fund, an amount for the purchase of the said 72.2% equity. It later
reimbursed itself from the coconut levy fund.

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While the 64.98% (72.2 % 7.22%) portion of the option shares ostensibly pertained to the farmers, the
corresponding stock certificates supposedly representing the farmers equity were in the name of and delivered to PCA.
There were, however, shares forming part of the 64.98% portion, which ended up in the hands of non-farmers. The
remaining 27.8% of the FUB capital stock were not covered by any of the agreements.
Through the years, a part of the coconut levy funds went directly or indirectly to various projects and/or was
converted into different assets or investments. Of particular relevance to this was their use to acquire the FUB / UCPB,
and the acquisition by UCPB, through the CIIF and holding companies, of a large block of San Miguel Corporation (SMC)
shares.

RULING: Jurisdiction over coconut levy funds.

The Constitution, by express provision, vests the COA with the responsibility for state audit. As an independent
supreme state auditor, its audit jurisdiction cannot be undermined by any law. Indeed, under Article IX (D), Section 3 of the
1987 Constitution, [n]o law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise
whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of [COA]. Following the mandate of the COA and the
parameters set forth by the foregoing provisions, it is clear that it has jurisdiction over coconut levy funds, being special
public funds. Conversely, the COA has the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to
the coconut levy funds and, consequently, to the UCPB shares purchased using said funds. However, declaring the said
funds as partaking the nature of private funds, ergo subject to private appropriation, removes them from the coffer of the
public funds of the government, and consequently, renders them impervious to the COA audit jurisdiction. Clearly, the
pertinent provisions of PD Nos. 961 and 1468 divest the COA of its constitutionally mandated function and undermine its
constitutional independence. Accordingly, Article III, Section 5 of both PD Nos. 961 and 1468 must be struck down for
being unconstitutional.
VERSOZA VS CARAGUE (2012)
FACTS:
This resolves the MFR of the SCs Decision affirming COA decision which substantially held that petitioner (as
former Executive Director of the Cooperative Development Authority or CDA) is personally and liable for the amount of
P881,819.00 covered by a COA Notice of Disallowance and involved overpriced computer units.
Among others, the MFR is anchored on the following ground: whether brand should be considered by COA as one
basis of comparison, in light of compliance with intellectual property laws on software piracy and hardware imitation.
RULING:
The COA, under the Constitution, is empowered to examine and audit the use of funds by an agency of the
national government on a post-audit basis. For this purpose, the Constitution has provided that the COA shall have
exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the
techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those
for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or
uses of government funds and properties.
As such, CDAs decisions regarding procurement of equipment for its own use, including computers and its
accessories, is subject to the COAs auditing rules and regulations for the prevention and disallowance of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive and extravagant expenditures. Necessarily, CDAs preferences regarding brand of its equipment
have to conform to the criteria set by the COA rules on what is reasonable price for the items purchased. In this case, the
brand information was found by the COA as irrelevant to the determination of the reasonableness of the price of the
computers purchased by CDA. Hence, on this ground, the MFR is dismissible.
DELOS SANTOS VS COA (2013)
FUNA VS VILLAR (2012)
FACTS:
Funa challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of Villar as Chairman of the COA.
Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of Villar as COA
Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008.
Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter, on June
11, 2008, the Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as

18

expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of the original term of his office as COA Commissioner
or on February 2, 2011.
Challenged in this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his hold on the chairmanship, insists
that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of 7 years which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in
fine, that his term of office, as such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when
he was appointed to that position.
Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter to President Aquino III, signified his intention to step
down from office upon the appointment of his replacement. True to his word, Villar vacated his position when President
Aquino III named Tan as COA Chairman. This development has rendered this petition and the main issue tendered therein
moot and academic.
Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Chairman Tan and the resignation of Villar, the SC
consider the instant case as falling within the requirements for review of a moot and academic case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Villars appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that body and after having served for 4
years of his 7-year term as COA commissioner, is valid in light of the term limitations imposed under Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D)
of the Constitution
RULING: Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that:
(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the
Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one commissioner for five years, and the other commissioner for three
years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of
the predecessor. In no case shall any member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Petitioner argues that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution proscribes reappointment of any kind within
the commission, the point being that a second appointment, be it for the same position (commissioner to another position
of commissioner) or upgraded position (commissioner to chairperson) is a prohibited reappointment and is a nullity ab
initio.
This is however incorrect. The flaw lies in regarding the word reappointment as, in context, embracing any and
all species of appointment. The rule is that if a statute or constitutional provision is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA Chairman shall be appointed by the President for a term of 7
years, and if he has served the full term, then he can no longer be reappointed or extended another appointment. In the
same vein, a Commissioner who was appointed for a term of 7 years who likewise served the full term is barred from
being reappointed. In short, once the Chairman or Commissioner shall have served the full term of 7 years, then he can
no longer be reappointed to either the position of Chairman or Commissioner. The obvious intent of the framers is to
prevent the president from dominating the Commission by allowing him to appoint an additional or two more
commissioners.
On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional appointment from commissioner to
chairman as long as the commissioner has not served the full term of 7 years, further qualified by the third sentence of
Sec. 1(2), Article IX (D) that the appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor. In addition, such promotional appointment to the position of Chairman must conform to the rotational plan or
the staggering of terms in the commission membership such that the aggregate of the service of the Commissioner in said
position and the term to which he will be appointed to the position of Chairman must not exceed 7 years so as not to
disrupt the rotational system in the commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly precludes a promotional appointment from
Commissioner to Chairman, provided it is made under the aforestated circumstances or conditions.
The Court is likewise unable to sustain Villars proposition that his promotional appointment as COA Chairman
gave him a completely fresh 7- year termfrom February 2008 to February 2015given his four (4)-year tenure as COA
commissioner devalues all the past pronouncements made by this Court. While there had been divergence of opinion as
to the import of the word reappointment, there has been unanimity on the dictum that in no case can one be a COA
member, either as chairman or commissioner, or a mix of both positions, for an aggregate term of more than 7 years. A
contrary view would allow a circumvention of the aggregate 7-year service limitation and would be constitutionally
offensive as it would wreak havoc to the spirit of the rotational system of succession.
In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have had, under any circumstance, validly appointed
Villar as COA Chairman, for a full 7- year appointment, as the Constitution decrees, was not legally feasible in light of the
7- year aggregate rule. Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year term as COA Commissioner. A shorter term,
however, to comply with said rule would also be invalid as the corresponding appointment would effectively breach the
clear purpose of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so appointed subsequent to the first set of commissioners, a

19

fixed term of office of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA commissioner like respondent Villar who serves for a period less
than 7 years cannot be appointed as chairman when such position became vacant as a result of the expiration of the 7year term of the predecessor (Carague). Such appointment to a full term is not valid and constitutional, as the appointee
will be allowed to serve more than 7 years under the constitutional ban.
To sum up, the SC restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, viz:
1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions, after the expiration of the uneven
terms of office of the first set of commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of 7 years; an appointment for a
lesser period is void and unconstitutional. The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of 7 years
in case of the expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion of the rotational system prescribed by the
Constitution.
2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only
be for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but such appointments cannot be less than the
unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed for a full term of 7 years and
who served the entire period, are barred from reappointment to any position in the Commission. Corollarily, the
first appointees in the Commission under the Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against
reappointment.
4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than 7 years is eligible for an appointment
to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such appointment is
not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as
commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed 7 years and provided
further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by
impeachment. The Court clarifies that reappointment found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one
and the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an
appointment involving a movement to a different position or office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a
new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the Constitution.
5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
FUNA VS MANILA OFFICE (2015)
TESDA VS COA (2014)
G. APPEAL
REYES VS COA (1999)
FACTS: Petitioner Reyes filed this petition with the SC as an appeal by certiorari under Rule 44 of the Revised Rules of
Court, assailing the decision of the COA disallowing the refund of the government share in the fund to them as employeemembers of TLRC, and the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the said decision. ISSUE: Whether or not
petitioners mode of appeal is correct.
RULING: Incorrect. Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that decision, orders of rulings of the Commission
on Audit may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party. Under Rule 64, Section 2, 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, judgment or final order of the Commission on Audit may be brought by an aggrieved party to this Court
on certiorari under Rule 65. However, the petition in this case was filed on June 17, 1996, prior to the effectivity of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Nevertheless, the mode of elevating cases decided by the Commission on Audit to this
Court was only by petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as provided by the 1987 Constitution.
The judgments and final orders of the Commission on Audit are not reviewable by ordinary writ of error or appeal
via certiorari to this Court. Only when the Commission on Audit acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may this Court entertain a petition for certiorari under Rule
65. Hence, a petition for review on certiorari or appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 44 or 45 of the 1964
Revised Rules of Court is not allowed from any order, ruling or decision of the Commission on Audit. From the efforts of 4manresa class 2013 Page 502 Constitutional law 1 case digest 201 3 [But note that in this case, the SC set aside the
procedural error pro hac vice, and treated the petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, albeit not finding that the COA
committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the distribution of the government share in the aborted TLRC Provident
Fund to its members.]
REBLORA VS AFP (2013)

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