Hours worked: IRR Book III, Rule 1

G.R. No. L-15422

November 30, 1962
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL TEXTILE WORKERS UNION, respondents.
Government Corporate Counsel Simeon M. Gopengco and Lorenzo R. Mosqueda for petitioner.
Eulogio R. Lerum for respondent National Textile Workers Union.
Mariano B. Tuason for respondent Court of Industrial Relations.
REGALA, J.:
This is a case for review from the Court of Industrial Relations. The pertinent facts are the following:
At the National Development Co., a government-owned and controlled corporation, there were four shifts
of work. One shift was from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., while the three other shifts were from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m; then
from 2 p.m. to 10 p.m. and, finally, from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. In each shift, there was a one-hour mealtime
period, to wit: From (1) 11 a.m. to 12 noon for those working between 6 a.m. and 2 p.m. and from (2) 7
p.m. to 8 p.m. for those working between 2 p.m. and 10 p.m.
The records disclose that although there was a one-hour mealtime, petitioner nevertheless credited the
workers with eight hours of work for each shift and paid them for the same number of hours. However,
since 1953, whenever workers in one shift were required to continue working until the next shift, petitioner
instead of crediting them with eight hours of overtime work, has been paying them for six hours only,
petitioner contends that the two hours corresponding to the mealtime periods should not be included in
computing compensation. On the other hand, respondent National Textile Workers Union whose
members are employed at the NDC, maintained the opposite view and asked the Court of Industrial
Relations to order the payment of additional overtime pay corresponding to the mealtime periods.
After hearing, Judge Arsenio I. Martinez of the CIR issued an order dated March 19, 1959, holding that
mealtime should be counted in the determination of overtime work and accordingly ordered petitioner to
pay P101,407.96 by way of overtime compensation. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the
same was dismissed by the CIRen banc on the ground that petitioner failed to furnish the union a copy of
its motion.
Thereafter, petitioner appealed to this Court, contending, first, that the CIR has no jurisdiction over claims
for overtime compensation and, secondary that the CIR did not make "a correct appraisal of the facts, in
the light of the evidence" in holding that mealtime periods should be included in overtime work because
workers could not leave their places of work and rest completely during those hours.
In support of its contention that the CIR lost its jurisdiction over claims for overtime pay upon the
enactment of the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act No. 875), petitioner cites a number of decisions of
this Court. On May 23, 1960, however, We ruled in Price Stabilization Corp. v. Court of Industrial
Relations, et al., G.R. No. L-13206, that
Analyzing these cases, the underlying principle, it will be noted in all of them, though not stated in
express terms, is that where the employer-employee relationship is still existing or is sought to be
reestablished because of its wrongful severance, (as where the employee seeks reinstatement)
the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction over all claims arising out of, or in connection with
the employment, such as those related to the Minimum Wage Law and the Eight-Hour Labor Law.
After the termination of their relationship and no reinstatement is sought, such claims become
mere money claims, and come within the jurisdiction of the regular courts,
We are aware that in 2 cases, some statements implying a different view have been made, but
we now hold and declare the principle set forth in the next preceding paragraph as the one
governing all cases of this nature.
This has been the constant doctrine of this Court since May 23, 1960. 1
A more recent definition of the jurisdiction of the CIR is found in Campos, et al. v. Manila Railroad Co., et
al., G.R. No. L-17905, May 25, 1962, in which We held that, for such jurisdiction to come into play, the
following requisites must be complied with: (a) there must exist between the parties an employeremployee relationship or the claimant must seek his reinstatement; and (b) the controversy must relate to
a case certified by the President to the CIR as one involving national interest, or must arise either under
the Eight-Hour Labor Law, or under the Minimum Wage Law. In default of any of these circumstances, the

claim becomes a mere money claim that comes under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Here,
petitioner does not deny the existence of an employer-employee relationship between it and the members
of the union. Neither is there any question that the claim is based on the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Com. Act
No. 444, as amended). We therefore rule in favor of the jurisdiction of the CIR over the present claim.
The other issue raised in the appeal is whether or not, on the basis of the evidence, the mealtime breaks
should be considered working time under the following provision of the law;
The legal working day for any person employed by another shall be of not more than eight hours
daily. When the work is not continuous, the time during which the laborer is not working and can
leave his working place and can rest completely shall not be counted. (Sec. 1, Com. Act No. 444,
as amended. Emphasis ours.)
It will be noted that, under the law, the idle time that an employee may spend for resting and during which
he may leave the spot or place of work though not the premises 2 of his employer, is not counted as
working time only where the work is broken or is not continuous.
The determination as to whether work is continuous or not is mainly one of fact which We shall not review
as long as the same is supported by evidence. (Sec. 15, Com. Act No. 103, as amended, Philippine
Newspaper Guild v. Evening News, Inc., 86 Phil. 303).
That is why We brushed aside petitioner's contention in one case that workers who worked under a 6 a.m.
to 6 p.m. schedule had enough "free time" and therefore should not be credited with four hours of
overtime and held that the finding of the CIR "that claimants herein rendered services to the Company
from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. including Sundays and holidays, . . . implies either that they were not allowed
to leave the spot of their working place, or that they could not rest completely" (Luzon Stevedoring Co.,
Inc. v. Luzon Marine Department Union, et al., G.R. No. L-9265, April 29, 1957).
Indeed, it has been said that no general rule can be laid down is to what constitutes compensable work,
rather the question is one of fact depending upon particular circumstances, to be determined by the
controverted in cases. (31 Am. Jurisdiction Sec. 626 pp. 878.)
In this case, the CIR's finding that work in the petitioner company was continuous and did not permit
employees and laborers to rest completely is not without basis in evidence and following our earlier
rulings, shall not disturb the same. Thus, the CIR found:
While it may be correct to say that it is well-high impossible for an employee to work while he is
eating, yet under Section 1 of Com. Act No. 444 such a time for eating can be segregated or
deducted from his work, if the same is continuous and the employee can leave his working place
rest completely. The time cards show that the work was continuous and without interruption.
There is also the evidence adduced by the petitioner that the pertinent employees can freely
leave their working place nor rest completely. There is furthermore the aspect that during the
period covered the computation the work was on a 24-hour basis and previously stated divided
into shifts.
From these facts, the CIR correctly concluded that work in petitioner company was continuous and
therefore the mealtime breaks should be counted as working time for purposes of overtime compensation.
Petitioner gives an eight-hour credit to its employees who work a single shift say from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m.
Why cannot it credit them sixteen hours should they work in two shifts?
There is another reason why this appeal should dismissed and that is that there is no decision by the
CIR en bancfrom which petitioner can appeal to this Court. As already indicated above, the records show
that petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the order of March 19, 1959 was dismissed by the CIR en
banc because of petitioner's failure to serve a copy of the same on the union.
Section 15 of the rules of the CIR, in relation to Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, states:
The movant shall file the motion (for reconsideration), in six copies within five (5) days from the
date on which he receives notice of the order or decision, object of the motion for reconsideration,
the same to be verified under oath with respect to the correctness of the allegations of fact,
and serving a copy thereof personally or by registered mail, on the adverse party. The latter may
file an answer, in six (6) copies, duly verified under oath. (Emphasis ours.)
In one case (Bien, et al. v. Castillo, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-7428, May 24, 1955), We sustained the
dismissal of a motion for reconsideration filed outside of the period provided in the rules of the CIR. A
motion for reconsideration, a copy of which has not been served on the adverse party as required by the

rules, stands on the same footing. For "in the very nature of things, a motion for reconsideration against a
ruling or decision by one Judge is in effect an appeal to the Court of Industrial Relations, en banc," the
purpose being "to substitute the decision or order of a collegiate court for the ruling or decision of any
judge." The provision in Commonwealth Act No. 103 authorizing the presentation of a motion for
reconsideration of a decision or order of the judge to the CIR, en banc and not direct appeal therefore to
this Court, is also in accord with the principal of exhaustion of administrative remedies before resort can
be made to this Court. (Broce, et al., v. The Court of Industrial Relations, et al., G.R. No. L-12367,
October 29, 1959).
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been dismissed for its failure to serve a copy of the same
on the union, there is no decision of the CIR en banc that petitioner can bring to this Court for review.
WHEREFORE, the order of March 19, 1959 and the resolution of April 27, 1959 are hereby affirmed and
the appeal is dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-16275
February 23, 1961
PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS SYSTEM (PHILIPPINES), petitioner,
vs.
PAN AMERICAN EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, respondent.
Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner.
Jose Espinas for respondent.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations in Case No. 1055-V dated
October 10, 1959, and its resolution en banc denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner
herein.
The dispositive portion of the appealed decision reads: .
WHEREFORE, the Court orders the Chief of the Examining Division or his representative to
compute the overtime compensation due the aforesaid fourteen (14) aircraft mechanic and the
two employees from the Communication Department based on the time sheet of said employees
from February 23 1952 up to and including July 15, 1958 and to submit his report within 30 days
for further disposition by the Court; and the company shall show to the Court Examiner such time
sheets an other documents that may be necessary in the aforesaid computation; and two (2)
representatives for the company and two (2) representatives for the union shall be chosen to help
the Court Examiner in said computation.
The company is also ordered to permanently adopt the straight 8-hour shift inclusive of meal
period which is mutually beneficial to the parties.
SO ORDERED.
In this appeal, petitioner advances five proposition which, briefly, are as follows: (1) the Industrial Court
has no jurisdiction to order the payment of overtime compensation, it being a mere monetary claim
cognizable by regular courts; (2) the finding that the one-hour meal period should be considered overtime
work (deducting 15 minutes as time allotted for eating) is not supported by substantial evidence; (3) the
court below had no authority to delegate its judicial functions by ordering the Chief of the Examining
Division or his representative to compute the overtime pay; (4) the finding that there was no agreement to
withdraw Case No. 1055-V in consideration of the wage increases in the Collective Bargaining Contract
(Exh. "A") is not supported by substantial evidence; and (5) the court below had no authority to order the
company to adopt a straight 8-hour shift inclusive of meal period.
On the issue of jurisdiction over claims for overtime pay, we have since definitely ruled in a recent
decisions that the Industrial Court may properly take cognizance of such cases if, at the time of the
petition, the complainants were still in the service of the employer, or, having been separated from such
service, should ask for reinstatement; otherwise, such claims should be brought before the regular courts
(NASSCO v. CIR, et al., L-13888, April 29, 1960; FRISCO v. CIR, et al., L-13806, May 23, 1960; Board of
Liquidators, et al. vs. CIR, et al., L-15485, May 23, 1960; Sta. Cecilia, Sawmills Co. vs. CIR, L-14254 & L14255, May 27, 1960; Ajax International Corp. v. Seguritan, L-16038, October 25, 1960; Sampaguita
Pictures, Inc., et al. vs. CIR, L-16404, October 25, 1960). Since, in the instant case there is no question
that the employees claiming overtime compensation were still in the service of the company when the
case was filed, the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations cannot be assailed. In fact, since it is

not pretended that, thereafter, the complainants were discharged or otherwise terminated their
relationship with the company for any reason, all of said complainants could still be with the company up
to the present.
Petitioner herein claims that the one-hour meal period should not be considered as overtime work (after
deducting 15 minutes), because the evidence showed that complainants could rest completely, and were
not in any manner under the control of the company during that period. The court below found, on the
contrary, that during the so called meal period, the mechanics were required to stand by for emergency
work; that if they happened not to be available when called, they were reprimanded by the leadman; that
as in fact it happened on many occasions, the mechanics had been called from their meals or told to
hurry Employees Association up eating to perform work during this period. Far from being unsupported by
substantial evidence, the record clearly confirms the above factual findings of the Industrial Court.
Similarly, this Court is satisfied with the finding that there was no agreement to withdraw Case No. 1055-V
in consideration of the wage increases obtained by the, union and set forth in the Collective Bargaining
Agreement Exhibit "A". As reasoned out by the court below, such alleged agreement would have been
incorporated in the contract if it existed. The fact that the union filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice,
after the Collective Bargaining Contract had been signed, did not necessarily mean that it had agreed to
withdraw the case in consideration of the wage increases. The motion itself (Annex "B", Petition
for Certiorari) was expressly based on an understanding that the company would "formulate a schedule of
work which shall be in consonance with C. A. 444". All in all, there is substantial evidence in the record to
support the finding of the court below that no such agreement was made.
It is next contended that in ordering the Chief of the Examining Division or his representative to compute
the compensation due, the Industrial Court unduly delegated its judicial functions and thereby rendered
an incomplete decision. We do not believe so. Computation of the overtime pay involves a mechanical
function, at most. And the report would still have to be submitted to the Industrial Court for its approval, by
the very terms of the order itself. That there was no specification of the amount of overtime pay in the
decision did not make it incomplete, since this matter would necessarily be made clear enough in the
implementation of the decision (see Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc. vs. CIR, et al., L-8718, May 11, 1956).
The Industrial Court's order for permanent adoption of a straight 8-hour shift including the meal period
was but a consequence of its finding that the meal hour was not one of complete rest, but was actually a
work hour, since for its duration, the laborers had to be on ready call. Of course, if the Company practices
in this regard should be modified to afford the mechanics a real rest during that hour (f. ex., by installing
an entirely different emergency crew, or any similar arrangement), then the modification of this part of the
decision may be sought from the Court below. As things now stand, we see no warrant for altering the
decision.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed. Costs against appellant.
c.2 Lectures, meetings, training programs
G.R. No. L-19945
December 29, 1966
NATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
PRISCO WORKERS UNION, ET AL., and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
Tomas P. Matic, Jr. for petitioner.
Vicente T. Ocampo for respondent Union.
M. B. Tuason for respondent Court of Industrial Relations.
CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review by writ of certiorari of an order of the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) dated
March 30, 1962, affirmed by the court en banc on June 18, 1962, extending the benefits of the order of
said court of May 20, 1960, issued in CIR Case 840-V, to a number of employees of the National
Marketing Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the NAMARCO) whose names are listed in Annex A-1 of
the petition dated January 10, 1961, for the reason that the said employees are similarly situated to the
beneficiaries of the aforementioned order of May 20, 1960.
The background antecedents are found in the decisions of this Court in three previous cases,
namely, Price Stabilization Corporation vs. Court of Industrial Relations, L-9834, November 29,
1957; Price Stabilization Corporation vs. Prisco Workers' Union, et al., L-9288, December 29, 1958;

and National Marketing Corporation and Price Stabilization Workers' Union, etc. vs. CIR, Prisco Board of
Liquidators and NAMARCO, L-17804, January 31, 1963.
On March 18, 1953, 58 workers, represented by the Prisco Workers Union, filed a petition with the CIR
(case 840-V) to enforce certain demands made upon their employer, the Price Stabilization Corporation
(hereinafter referred to as the PRISCO). On August 25, 1953 the CIR rendered a partial decision ordering
the PRISCO to pay 25% additional compensation for unpaid overtime work and for Sunday and legal
holiday service rendered from June 8, 1951.
On May 9, 1955 the CIR extended the benefits of the said partial decision to other workers of the PRISCO
who are similarly situated. This order was affirmed by this Court in L-9288, supra, for the reason that the
"workers involved in a dispute include other workers, unionist or not, who are presumed interested in the
outcome of the demands or strike one way or another." And on the merits of the other demands of the
union in CIR Case 840-V, this Court likewise upheld the CIR's ruling that the PRISCO is a governmentowned corporation run and operated like an ordinary business corporation, and that "when the
Government engages in business it becomes subject to the laws and regulations governing the relations
of labor and management," and is therefore not exempt from the provisions of the Eight-Hour Labor Law
(C.A. 444) (L-9834, supra).
On June 17, 1955 the PRISCO was abolished by R.A. 1345 which at the same time created the
NAMARCO and transferred the employees and fixed assets of the former to the latter, and its other
choses in action, obligations and liabilities to the PRISCO Board of Liquidators. Thereafter, both the
NAMARCO and the PRISCO Board of Liquidators were impleaded as respondents in the CIR, when on
March 20, 1958, 202 other employees and workers of the PRISCO, among them 45 employees of the
General Auditing Office (GAO) assigned thereto, filed a petition for payment of overtime, Sunday and
legal holiday work rendered from June 8, 1951 to June 30, 1953, based on the partial decision of the CIR
of August 25, 1953. On April 2, 1958 the PRISCO opposed this claim on the grounds that the partial
decision aforesaid covers only the 58 original petitioners; that the claim had already prescribed under
section 7-A, C.A. 444, as amended by R.A. 1993; and that some 45 employees among the claimants
therein were, and some still are, employees of the GAO and not of the PRISCO. Notwithstanding the
opposition, the CIR on June 10, 1960 granted the petition, and ordered the payment of their claims after a
computation thereof to be made by the CIR examiner or his duly authorized representative. The motion
for reconsideration of the last named order was denied by the CIR en banc, and the PRISCO appealed to
this Court (L-17804, supra). We affirmed on January 31, 1963 the decision subject of review with the sole
modification that the 45 GAO employees, not being employees of the PRISCO, are not entitled to
compensation for overtime, Sunday and legal holiday service.
It will be noted that the CIR order of May 20, 1960 was an offshoot of a petition filed by the petitioning
union for contempt of court against the NAMARCO. This petition alleged, among other things, that the
PRISCO was succeeded by the NAMARCO, hence, the inclusion of the latter as party respondent in all
the cases by the PRISCO Workers' Union against the PRISCO (Cases 840-V, 840-V-1, 840-V-2, 840-V-3,
840-V-4, 840-V-5 and 840-V-6); that the NAMARCO violated the decision of the CIR of August 25, 1953 in
not paying its employees and laborers for work done on Sundays and holidays, as well as the decision of
June 10, 1955 in not paying its employees and workers for night service from January 1, 1956. The
respondents therein demanded a bill of particulars which would enumerate the names of the employees
and laborers of the NAMARCO and specify the period covered by their claims. The petitioners then filed
annex A which lists the names of the employees and laborers so affected and specifies the period
covered by their claims. The CIR then issued the order of May 20, 1960, which states in part:
Considering the decision of this Court of August 25, 1953 ordering the respondent to "Pay all its
employees and workers involved herein 25% additional compensation for unpaid overtime and
legal holidays work rendered beginning June 8, 1951"; the decision of June 10, 1955 ordering the
respondent to `pay additional compensation of at least 25% of its security guards and other
employees performing night work, that is, from 6:30 p.m. to 6:00 a.m., as shown above, effective
August, 1946'; the order dated January 15, 1957 and also the decision of this Court dated
February 4, 1957 wherein the NAMARCO was included as party respondent in Cases Nos. 840V; 840-V(1); 840-V(2); 840-V(3); 840-V(5); 840-V(6) and the fact that respondents did not deny
the allegations of the petitioners that the list mentioned in Annex A of petitioners' reply to motion
for bill of particulars, rendered work on Sundays and legal holidays and night work from January
1, 1956, respondent NAMARCO is hereby ordered to pay those mentioned in said Annex A their

unpaid additional compensation for work performed on Sundays and legal holidays and night
work from January 1, 1956, in accordance with the above-cited decisions dated August 25, 1953
and June 10, 1955.
Accordingly, the Court examiner or his duly authorized representative is hereby directed to
compute the amount due said workers as appearing on said Annex A, and thereafter to submit his
report to the Court for further disposition thereof.
The above constitutes a narration of the antecedent facts. Now to the petition at hand.
Prior to the rendition of our decision in L-17804, or on the previous January 10, 1961, the aforesaid union
(present respondent) filed a petition with the CIR, docketed as Case No. 840-V(9), entitled PRISCO
WORKERS UNION, et al. vs. PRISCO Board of Liquidation and NAMARCO, praying that the benefits of
the CIR order of May 20, 1960, affirmed by the CIR en banc resolution of July 11, 1960, now final and
executory, be extended to "some employees and laborers of the NAMARCO who also rendered Sundays,
legal holidays and night work services from January 1, 1956 up (to) the present but who were not
included therein and their names, designations, departments or offices where they work, and the period
covered by their claims, are enumerated in a list which is attached to this petition as annex A-1;" 1 and that
the said employees and laborers be adjudged entitled to the benefits of said order of May 20, 1960 and
their claims be included in the computation then being undertaken by the examiner duly designated by the
CIR.
The petitioner herein opposed the petition upon the grounds that the claims have already prescribed
pursuant to R.A. 1993; that there is no employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and the
claimants who are GAO employees; and that the decisions of the CIR of August 25, 1953 and June 10,
1955 can no longer be enforced because more than five years had elapsed from the entry of said
judgments when the instant petition was presented on January 10, 1961.
On March 30, 1962 the CIR issued an order of the following tenor:
The present petition has not yet prescribed. Although more than three years have elapsed after
the present action was instituted and more than five years have elapsed after the proposed
enforcement of the present action, the same defenses are untenable for the present action is a
continuation of the original case as well as an implementation of the decision of the court dated
August 25, 1953.
The employees who were not working at the time the present petition was filed are also entitled to
overtime pay and night time work pay. This is so, because even if they were no longer working
with the firm when the present petition was instituted, the Court had already acquired jurisdiction
over the questioned persons when the original case was filed. Since the Court had already
acquired jurisdiction over the same persons, it should not now be divested of the same.
The employees who are GAO personnel are not entitled to additional compensation from the
PRISCO for there is no employee-employer relationship existing between them and the
respondents. Since this is the state of affairs existing between the union and these employees,
the employer incurs no legal obligation to pay them their additional compensation.
Both parties moved to reconsider the above order, and the CIR en banc, by resolution of June 18, 1962,
ruled in effect that the claims of the additional claimants have not yet prescribed as their petition merely
seeks the implementation of the August 25, 1953 and June 10, 1960 decisions; that the aforesaid
decisions can still be enforced although more than five years have elapsed from the dates of entry of said
judgments; and that the GAO employees are "similarly circumstances" to those embraced by the order of
June 10, 1960, and are, therefore, entitled to overtime compensation.
Hence the present recourse by the NAMARCO.
The two issues tendered for resolution are: (1) are the employees embraced in the instant petition entitled
to the benefits granted by the CIR decisions of August 25, 1953 and June 10, 1960? and (2) have their
claims for overtime and Sunday and legal holiday work prescribed ? .
The petitioner contends that the claimants in the present petition (Case 840-V-[9]) are different from the
claimants in the main case (Case 840-V), for whose benefit the decisions of August 25, 1953 and June
10, 1955 were rendered; that for this reason the instant petition is not a continuation of the original case
nor an implementation of the aforesaid decisions, but should be considered a "new cause"; that the
benefits in the aforesaid decisions were intended only for the petitioners whose names appear in the

record as original parties in the main case; that because R.A. 1993, amending section 7-A of the EightHour Labor Law (C.A. 444), prescribes the period of three years for the filing of an action thereunder, the
present petition has already prescribed having been filed only on January 10, 1961, or more than three
years from June 10, 1955, and that therefore the CIR is without power to extend the benefits of its
decisions of August 25, 1953 and June 10, 1955 to the employees of the NAMARCO listed in Annex A-1
of the instant petition.
The CIR order of March 30, 1962 treats of two different sets of employees and workers, namely, (1)
employees of the NAMARCO; and (2) employees of the GAO who receive their salaries from, and work
with, the NAMARCO. The employees constituting the first set ask for the extension to them of the benefits
of the CIR order of May 20, 1960, affirmed by the CIR en banc resolution of July 11, 1960, 2 for their
services rendered on "Sundays, legal holidays and night work service from January 1, 1956 up to the
present but who were not included therein. . . ." This quoted portion of the petition undoubtedly shows that
these employees are similarly situated to the petitioners embraced in the order of May 20, 1960, because
the latter also sought unpaid additional compensation for services performed on Sundays and legal
holidays and night work from January 1, 1956, up to the filing of their petition on March 20, 1958. This
Court considered the petition of March 20, 1958 not to be a new petition but one for the execution of the
partial CIR decision of August 25, 1953, with regard to the other workers and employees who had not
been paid for overtime and Sunday and legal holiday services (L-17804, supra).3
The present petition is one for the execution of the partial decision of May 20, 1960, to affect the
employees of the NAMARCO who have not yet been paid their overtime and Sunday and legal holiday
services rendered from January 1, 1956. May 20, 1960 is the date of the latest execution of the partial
decisions of August 25, 1953 and June 10, 1955. The present petition was filed on January 10, 1961, less
than eight months from the said date of execution. The petitioner's contention that the present claims
have already prescribed is therefore patently untenable.
The case of the GAO employees presents a different problem. These employees serve in, and are paid
by, the NAMARCO. Are they entitled to compensation for overtime service?
The respondents maintain that these GAO employees are so entitled. They cite Republic of the
Philippines vs. Hernando, et al., 99 Phil. 687; San Miguel Brewery vs. CIR, 83 Phil. 663; and Manila
Terminal Co., Inc. vs. CIR, 83 Phil. 559, as well as Opinion 228 of the Secretary of Justice of September
10, 1954.
The Hernando case is not in point. The vital issue there was, who is the real party in interest in an action
affecting government employees and laborers employed in public works, concerning a claim for death
benefits. The San Miguel Brewery and the Manila Terminal Co., Inc. cases are likewise not pertinent. The
employees concerned were each "policia especial no es funcionario publico." Nor has Opinion 228 of the
Secretary of Justice any relevance. It speaks of gratuity, which is different from overtime pay. The former
concept signifies a gift, reward, present or something that is given and received by lucrative title (see
Mendoza vs. Dizon, 77 Phil. 533, 537),while the latter means compensation for work performed beyond
eight hours a day (C.A. 444, sec. 3).
We uphold the contention of the petitioner that the GAO employees and officials are not entitled to
recover overtime compensation from the NAMARCO, as there is no employer-employee relationship
between them. In three previous occasions we held that the GAO employees assigned to the National
Development Company (NDC), the PRISCO, and the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority
(NAWASA), even if their salaries are paid by those entities, are not their corporate employees, as they are
agents of the Government, appointed and supervised by the Auditor General, have an independent
tenure, and perform their work subject to orders and instructions of the Auditor General and not to those
of the management of the said entities (Batungbakal vs. National Development Co., 93 Phil. 182; National
Marketing Corporation, et al. vs. CIR, L-17804, Jan. 31, 1963; Nawasa vs. NWSA Consolidated Unions,
et al., L-18938, Aug. 31, 1964).
Moreover, in the last mentioned ease, we explicitly declared that these employees are "not covered by the
Eight-Hour Labor Law, but by other pertinent laws on the matter", more specifically sections 566 and 259
of the Revised Administrative Code. Section 566 provides that "When the interest of the public so
requires, the head of any Department, Bureau, or Office may extend the daily hours of work, in what
manner soever fixed, for any or all of the employees under him, and may likewise require any or all of
them to do overtime work not only on work days but also on holidays." Section 259 declares that "In the

absence of special provision, persons regularly and permanently appointed under the Civil Service Law or
whose salary, wages, or emoluments are fixed by law or regulation shall not, for any service rendered or
labor done by them on holiday or for other overtime work, receive or be paid additional compensation."
(emphasis ours)
ACCORDINGLY, we affirm the CIR order of March 30, 1962 as well as the CIR resolution en banc of June
18, 1962, insofar as they extend the benefits of the CIR order of May 20, 1960 to the employees and
workers of the NAMARCO, but reverse and set aside the same with respect to the GAO employees who
work in and with the said entity. No pronouncement as to costs.
C.3 Semestral break
G.R. No. 75093 February 23, 1990
DELIA R. SIBAL, petitioner,
vs.
NOTRE DAME OF GREATER MANILA, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.
Semproniano S. Ochoco for petitioner.
Williard B. Riano for private respondent.
PARAS, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Delia R. Sibal prays for the reversal of the decision dated April 11,
1986 of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission which affirmed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter dated October 8, 1982 awarding to petitioner separation pay but denied her claim (1) for
compensation for teaching Health subject to 19 sections; (2) for moral damages; and (3) negating the
existence of unfair labor practice. The within petition further seeks the reinstatement of petitioner to her
former position as school nurse in respondent school without loss of seniority rights with fun backwages
from the date of her illegal dismissal up to the time of actual reinstatement; and finally, seeks the
desistance of private respondent Notre Dame of Greater Manila from further committing unfair labor
practice.
The prefatory facts and proceedings as aptly summed up by the Solicitor General and which stand
undisputed are:
Petitioner Delia R. Sibal was employed as school nurse by private respondent Notre
Dame of Greater Manila starting January 1973. Prior to school year 1976-1977, she was
compensated on a 12-month basis, although she worked only during the ten-month
period of classes. She was not required to report for work for the entire Christmas and
summer vacations. However, on March 10, 1976, respondent's director, Fr. Enrique
Gonzales, requested her to shorten her summer vacation, from two weeks after the last
day of classes to two weeks before the first day of classes of the next school year.
Petitioner acceded to the request (Rec. p. 246).
Sometime in April 1980, Fr. Gonzales required petitioner to report during that summer to
help in the library. In a letter dated April 11, 1980, petitioner contested the order, stating
that it will necessitate a change in the terms and conditions of her employment and that
library work is alien to her profession as nurse (Rec. p. 45). Fr. Gonzales relented.
In November 1980, Fr. Gonzales was replaced by Fr. Pablo Garcia, an American, as new
director. Fr. Garcia required petitioner to report for work during the summer before the
beginning of school year 1981-1982. Petitioner informed him that her contract does not
require her to report for work during the summer vacation. Fr. Garcia promised to verify
her allegation. However, he failed to inform petitioner of his findings. Thus, in order that
her failure to report for work may not be misinterpreted, petitioner filed leaves of absence
extending from April 1, 1981 to June 14, 1981 (Rec. pp. 223-225). Petitioner failed to
receive her vacation pay.
During school year 1981-1982, petitioner was assigned to teach health subjects to 900
students spread out in nineteen (19) sections of the entire high school department. This
situation came about because the two (2) teachers of the health subjects had left the
school. Petitioner, however, was not given compensation for teaching, notwithstanding
the fact that other teachers were duly compensated for extra work done. During that

school year petitioner tried to arrange for a meeting with Fr. Garcia regarding her
vacation pay, but to no avail because Fr. Garcia was always busy. In October 1981, Fr.
Garcia suffered a heart attack which necessitated his hospitalization. In December 1981,
petitioner received her 13th month pay which was computed on the basis of a 10-month
period only.
On April 5, 1982, Fr. Garcia again required petitioner to work during that summer to
update all the clinical records of the students (Rec. p. 242). In a letter dated April 7, 1982,
petitioner objected to the order by reiterating that her contract does not require her to
report for work during summer. In addition, she reminded Fr. Garcia that she had not
received any compensation for teaching health subjects the past school year (Rec. p. 6).
On the same day, Fr. Garcia replied in a letter to the effect that it was imperative for her to
report for work during the summer because it is the best time to update the clinical
records when no students could disturb her. Also, petitioner was not entitled to extra
compensation for teaching because teaching was allegedly part of her regular working
program as a school nurse (Rec. p. 221).
On April 14, 1982, petitioner, apart from reiterating her objection to the order, called the
attention of Fr. Garcia to the school's failure to pay her salary for the summer of 1981 and
of the deficiency in her 13th month pay for that year (Rec. p. 8). The following day, Fr.
Garcia adamantly refused to consider petitioner's demands and threatened to take drastic
measures against her if she remains obstinate in her refusal to follow his order to report
for work that summer (Rec. p. 243). This letter was followed the next day by a
memorandum to the same effect (Rec. p. 244). In a letter dated April 19, 1982, petitioner,
for the fourth time, informed Fr. Garcia that her contract does not require her to report for
work during summer, and she does not intend to do so that summer of 1982 (Rec. p.
241).
Failing to receive the compensation demanded, May 10, 1982, petitioner filed a complaint
for non-payment of the following; (1) vacation pay for four (4) summer months; (2)
compensation for teaching health subjects; and (3) deficiency in the 13th month pay for
1981 (Annexes A, B, petition). Summons was served on respondent school on the
opening day of classes on June 14, 1982 (Rec. p. 19). That very day when petitioner
reported for work, respondent school served petitioner her letter of termination effective
immediately and it also submitted a copy of the termination paper to the Ministry of Labor
and Employment (MOLE) (Rec. pp. 218- 219). The following day, petitioner filed an
amended complaint, adding two more charges: illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice
(Annex C, D, petition). For the next four to five weeks, more than 20 teachers and
personnel, backed up by the Faculty Association of respondent school, pressed for the
ouster of Fr. Garcia with the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports (MECS) by virtue
of PD 176 and the following charges: oppressive behavior, arrogance, contempt for
Filipinos in general and Filipino teachers in particular; unfairness in dealing with
personnel; dictatorial conduct; and use of abusive language (See Annexes A to F of
Annex F, petition). Fr. Garcia was eventually replaced on September 8, 1983.
In the meantime, respondent school filed its position paper on June 29, 1982, while
petitioner filed hers on July 1, 1982 (Rec. pp. 22, 210). In the hearing of July 13, 1982,
petitioner directed clarificatory questions to Miss Cristina Sison, corporate secretary of
respondent school (Rec. pp. 57-141). On July 27, 1982, respondent filed its
memorandum, while petitioner filed hers on August 2, 1982 (Rec. pp. 142, 162).
On October 8, 1982, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision. Petitioner filed a
memorandum of partial appeal on November 11, 1982 (Annex F, petition). Respondent
filed opposition to the appeal on January 5, 1983. On January 18, 1983, petitioner filed
reply to the opposition. In an urgent ex parte manifestation dated September 20, 1983,
petitioner informed the NLRC that Fr. Pablo Garcia had been replaced by Fr. Jose Arong,
a Filipino, as new director effective September 8, 1983 (Annex G, petition). On April 11,
1986, public respondent NLRC rendered the questioned decision which affirmed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. (Rollo, pp. 131-136).
Petitioner thus resorted to this petition which she filed on July 15, 1986.

Petitioner and both the Solicitor General and public respondent NLRC have narrowed down the issues for
resolution to the following:
1. Whether or not the award of separation pay instead of reinstatement is the proper
remedy under the circumstances;
2. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to compensation for teaching health subjects; and
3. Whether or not unfair labor practice existed which would entitle petitioner to moral
damages.
For the affirmative resolution of the aforestated issues, petitioner alleges the following:
1. Respondent NLRC failed to give full respect to the constitutional mandate on security
of tenure when the majority decision affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter separating
and, in effect, dismissing petitioner on the basis of her perception that petitioner and the
director could no longer work harmoniously. The award of separation pay would defeat
and render nugatory the Constitutional guaranty of security of tenure.
2. Petitioner is entitled to compensation relative to her teaching job which is distinct and
separate from her duties as school nurse.
3. Petitioner was, from the very start, subjected to harassment and fabricated charges.
She had suffered and continues to suffer from the time of her dismissal on June 14, 1982
up to the present. She must be entitled to an award of moral damages.
Public respondent NLRC, however, submits the following:
1. The relationship between petitioner and respondent school had come to the point that
reinstatement of petitioner would cause undue burden on both parties. It would affect
petitioner's performance of her duties as school nurse and private respondent's business.
2. Teaching health subjects is allied to petitioner's job as school nurse, particularly so
when the same is done within the official eight (8) working hour schedule.
3. Petitioner failed to prove her membership in a union. There was no union among the
employees of the school in which case the instances where unfair labor practice may be
committed, with the exception of one instance, and predicated on the existence of a
union, would not apply. Private respondent has not been found guilty of unfair labor
practice and it, therefore, follows that she is not entitled to moral damages.
This Court finds merit in the petition.
The Labor Arbiter herself had found that the termination of petitioner was not supported by any just cause
or reason. Yet, she erroneously ordered separation pay instead of reinstatement with backwages based
on the alleged reason that petitioner's working relations with the former director, Father Garcia, had
become so strained and deteriorated that it became impossible for them to work harmoniously again. And
the NLRC affirmed such finding which is untrue and merely speculative.
It should be noted that the alleged conflict between the petitioner and the director was strictly official in
nature, the cause of which was the violation of the terms of employment by the latter. Petitioner's
assertion of her right to unpaid salaries and bonus differential was not motivated by any personal
consideration. Rather, she simply claimed benefits which, under the law, she was entitled to and legally
due her. In her act of asserting these money claims, petitioner observed utmost tact, courtesy and civility
so as not to unduly offend the sensibilities of the director by waiting for his frill recovery from his illness
before sending her formal letter of demand; and only after the school refused to satisfy her money claims
did she file the formal complaint with the proper NLRC branch. Ironically, however, the director gave her a
downright shabby treatment by terminating her services without prior notice and without first filing a case
against her wherein she could have defended herself . The school did not even give credit to her more
than nine (9) years of continuous service. Petitioner's termination was a blatant disregard of due process
and Constitutional guarantee of protection to labor.
Thus, in the case of Callanta v. Carnation Philippines, Inc. (145 SCRA 268), this Court held that one's
employment, profession, trade or calling is a "property right", and the wrongful interference therewith is an
actionable wrong. The right is considered to be property within the protection of a constitutional guaranty
of due process of law.

Significantly, about a month after petitioner's termination on June 14, 1982, more than twenty teachers
and personnel of respondent school, backed by the Faculty Association, petitioned for the ouster of
Director Fr. Garcia for serious charges under P.D. 176. Consequently, Fr. Garcia was replaced on
September 8, 1983. Clearly, therefore, when the assailed NLRC decision was rendered on April 11, 1986,
the alleged "strained relations" or "irritant factors" which the Labor Arbiter capitalized on had been totally
eliminated. Respondent NLRC obviously failed to consider this and thus perpetuated the error committed
by the Labor Arbiter in her prior decision. The eventual replacement of Fr. Garcia all the more confirmed
the discriminatory and oppressive treatment which he gave petitioner.
The dissenting NLRC Commissioner aptly observed thus:
Moreover, it should be emphasized, that no strained relations should arise from a valid
and legal act of asserting ones right, such as in the instant case, for otherwise, an
employee who shall assert his/ her right could be easily separated from the service by
merely paying his/her separation pay on the pretext that his/her relationship with his/her
employer had already become strained.
To Our mind, strained relations in order that it may justify the award of separation pay in
lieu of reinstatement with backwages, should be such, that they are so compelling and so
serious in character, that the continued employment of an employee is so obnoxious to
the person or business of the employer, and that the continuation of such employment
has become inconsistent with peace and tranquility which is an Ideal atmosphere in every
workplace. (pp. 98-99, Rollo)
The respondent NLRC erred is sustaining the Labor Arbiter's ruling that petitioner is not entitled to
compensation for teaching health subjects allegedly because petitioner taught during her regular working
hours; the subject Health is allied to her profession as nurse; and she and respondent school had no clear
understanding regarding extra compensation.
The Solicitor General who normally and expectedly speaks for the NLRC has ably refuted the position
taken by the latter. The Court thus finds valid and decisive the following submission of the Solicitor
General:
It is submitted, however, that petitioner is entitled to compensation for teaching health
subjects. Although the subject taught is Health and allied to her profession, and is taught
during regular working hours, petitioner's teaching the subject in the classroom and her
administering to the health needs of students in the clinic involve two different and distinct
jobs. They cannot be equated with each other for they refer to different functions.
Teaching requires preparation of lesson plans, examinations and grades, while clinical
work entails preparation of clinical records and treating illnesses of students in school.
There can be no doubt that teaching health subjects is extra work for petitioner, and
therefore necessitates extra compensation. After all it has been the practice of the school
to pay extra compensation to teachers who were given extra load even during regular
working hours (Annex G of Annex F, Petition). The fact that respondent school failed to
produce the records of those teachers prove that they were paid for extra work. Hence,
petitioner should likewise be paid compensation. (pp. 138-139, Rollo)
It must be noted that petitioner has established that in several precedents, non-teaching personnel of
respondent school who were made to handle teaching jobs were actually paid actual compensation.
Besides, justice and equity demand that since the principle of equal work has long been observed in this
jurisdiction, then it should follow that an extra pay for extra work should also be applied.
Significantly, this Court has enunciated in the care of University of Pangasinan Faculty Union v. University
of Pangasinan (127 SCRA 691) that semestral breaks may be considered as "hours worked" under the
Rules implementing the Labor Code and that regular professors and teachers are entitled to ECOLA
during the semestral breaks, their "absence" from work not being of their own will.
The records show that when summons with attached complaint of petitioner for money claims was served
on respondent school on June 14, 1982, said respondent, on the very day, gave petitioner her walking
papers. Respondent did not waste any time in dismissing her in brazen violation of these provisions of the
Labor Code, as amended:
Art. 118 of the Labor Code provides:

Retaliatory measures. It shall be unlawful for an employer to refuse to pay or reduce

the wages and benefits, discharges or in any manner discriminate against any employee
who has filed any complaint or instituted any proceeding under this Title or has testified
or is about to testify in such proceedings.(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, too, Art. 249 (f) provides:
Art. 249. Unfair tabor practice of employers. It shall be unlawful for an employer to
commit any of the following unfair labor practice.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(f) to dismiss, discharge, or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee for
having given or being about to give testimony under this Code,
xxx xxx xxx
For the aforestated violations, respondent becomes liable under Arts. 289 and 290 of the same Code.
This Court has, time and again, condemned illegal termination of services of employees. In Remerco
Garments Manufacturing v. Minister of Labor and Employment (135 SCRA 167), it declared that while it is
true that it is the sole prerogative of the management to dismiss or lay-off an employee, the exercise of
such a prerogative, however, must be made without abuse of discretion, for what is at stake is not only
private respondent's position (petitioner in this case) but also his means of livelihood.
In arguing for petitioner's entitlement to moral damages, the Solicitor General has aptly summed up her
plight. The Solicitor General has submitted this valid justification for the award of moral damages under
Art. 1701 of the Labor Code:
Petitioner had been the subject of discrimination for over a year before she was ultimately
dismissed. When she justifiably refused to obey the order to report for work for two
summers, she was not given her vacation pay for both occasions. Unlike her, the doctor
and dentist who worked in the same clinic, were not required to report during summer
and were given their respective vacation pay. Again, petitioner, unlike the teachers who
accepted extra load, was not given extra compensation when she taught health subjects
to 900 students for one year. By withholding such compensation, respondent school
stood to gain at the expense of petitioner, the amount of the salary which it could have
paid to two (2) health teachers. Petitioner's 13th month pay was likewise underpaid
because the basis for computation was only ten months, and not one year as in the case
of other regular office personnel. Finally, petitioner's travails culminated in her
unceremonious termination without due process at the beginning of the school year on
June 14, 1982, by the service of her termination paper antedated June 11, 1982.
Termination without due process is specifically prohibited by Rule XIV Section 1 under
Section 8 of the Rules Implementing BP Blg. 130:
Security of tenure and due process. No worker shall be dismissed
except for a just or authorized cause provided by law and after due
process.
The series of discriminatory and oppressive acts of respondent school against petitioner
invariably makes respondent liable for moral damages under Art. 1701, which prohibits
acts of capital or labor against each other, and Art. 21 on human relations in relation to
Art. 2219 No. 10 and Art. 2220, all of the Civil Code (Philippine Refining Co., Inc. v.
Garcia, 18 SCRA 107). (Rollo, pp. 140-141)
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of respondent NLRC is hereby SET ASIDE. Private respondent is
hereby ordered to REINSTATE petitioner to her former position without loss of seniority rights and with
backwages for three (3) years from the time of her illegal dismissal; to pay her the regular extra
compensation relative to her teaching health subjects; and to pay her moral damages, the amount of
which shall be determined by respondent NLRC. Let this case be remanded to the NLRC for the proper
implementation of this decision.
SO ORDERED.
c.4 work hours of seamen

Soriano v Phil. Rock September 28 1956 I cant find it

G.R. No. L-9265
April 29, 1957
LUZON STEVEDORING CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
LUZON MARINE DEPARTMENT UNION and THE HON. MODESTO CASTILLO, THE HON. JOSE S.
BAUTISTA, THE HON. V. JIMENEZ YANSON and THE HON. JUAN L. LANTING, Judges of the Court
of Industrial Relations, respondents.
Perkins, Ponce Enrile and Associates for petitioner.
Mariano B. Tuason for respondent Judge of the Court of Industrial Relations.
Sioson, Roldan and Vidanes for respondent union.
FELIX, J.:
This case involves a petition for certiorari filed by the Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc., to review a resolution
dated June 5, 1955, issued by the Court of Industrial Relations. On September 5, 1955, with leave of
court, a supplemental petition was filed by said petitioner, and both petitions were given due course by
resolution of this Court of September 15, 1955. The facts of the case may be summarized as follows:
On June 21, 1948, herein respondent Luzon Marine Department Union filed a petition with the Court of
Industrial Relations containing several demands against herein petitioner Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc.,
among which were the petition for full recognition of the right of COLLECTIVE bargaining, close shop and
check off. However, on July 18, 1948, while the case was still pending with the CIR, said labor union
declared a strike which was ruled down as illegal by this Court in G.R. No. L-2660 promulgated on May
30, 1950. In view of said ruling, the Union filed a "Constancia" with the Court of Industrial Relations
praying that the remaining unresolved demands of the Union presented in their original petition, be
granted. Said unresolved demands are the following:
a. Point No. 2.
That the work performed in excess of eight (8) hours he paid an overtime pay of 50 per cent the
regular rate of pay, and that work performed on Sundays and legal holidays be paid double the
regular rate of pay.
b. Point No. 7.
That all officers, engineers and crew members of motor tugboats who have not received their pay
corresponding to the second half of December, 1941, be paid accordingly.
c. Point No. 11.
That Ciriaco Sarmiento, Chief Mate, M/V Marlin, Rafael Santos, Port Engineer, and Lorenzo de la
Cruz, Chief Engineer, M/V Shark who have been suspended without justifiable cause and for
union activities, be reinstated with pay from time of suspension.
d. Point No. 12.
That all officers, engineers and crew members of the motor tugboats "Shark", "Hearing", "Pike"
and "Ray", who have been discharged without justifiable cause and for union activities, be
reinstate with pay from time of discharge. (p. 65-66, Record).
On the basis of these demands, the case was set for hearing and the parties submitted their respective
evidence, both oral and documentary, from June 8,1951, to January 7, 1954. In one of the hearings of the
case, the original intervenor in Union de Obreros Estibadores de Filipinas (UOEF), through counsel,
moved for the withdraw al of said Union from the case, which motion was granted by the Court.
After the parties had submitted exhaustive memoranda, the trial Judge rendered a decision on February
10, 1955, finding that the company gave said employees 3 free meals every day and about 20 minutes
rest after each mealtime; that they worked from 6:00 am. to 6:00 p.m. every day including Sundays and
holidays, and for work performed in excess of 8 hours, the officers, patrons and radio operators were
given overtime pay in the amount of P4 each and P2 each for the rest of the crew up to March, 1947, and
after said date, these payments were increased to P5 and P2.50, respectively, until the time of their
separation or the strike of July 19, 1948; that when the tugboats underwent repairs, their personnel
worked only 8 hours a day excluding Sundays and holidays; that although there was an effort on the part
of claimants to show that some had worked beyond 6:00 p.m., the evidence was uncertain and indefinite

and that demand was, therefore, denied; that respondent Company, by the nature of its business and as
defined by law (Section 18-b of Commonwealth Act as amended) is considered a public service operator
by the Public Service Commission in its decision in case No. 3035-C entitled "Philippine Shipowners.
Association vs. Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc., et al."(Exh. 23), and, therefore, exempt from paying
additional remuneration or compensation for work performed on Sundays and legal holidays, pursuant to
the provisions of section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 444 (Manila Electric Co. vs. Public Utilities
Employees Association, 79 Phil., 408. 44 Off. Gaz., 1760); and ruled that:
For the above reasons, the aforementioned employees are only entitled to receive overtime pay
for work rendered in excess of 8 hours on ordinary days including Sundays and legal holidays.
However, the respondent company has proved to the satisfaction of the Court that it has paid its
employees for such overtime work as shown above Exhs. 1 to 20-B).
It is, therefore, only a matter of computation whether such over time pay by the respondent for
overtime services rendered covers the actual overtime work performed by the employees
concerned equivalent to 25 per cent which is the minimum rate fixed by law in the absence of
other proof to justify the granting of more beyond said minimum rate.
Demands Nos. 11 and 12 regarding the reinstatement to the service of the employees named therein
were denied and respondent Company was only or to pay the separation pay and overtime work rendered
by Ciriaco Sarmiento, Rafael Santos and Lorenzo de la Cruz, after making the pronouncement that their
separation or dismissal was not due to union activities but for valid and legal grounds.
The Luzon Marine Department Union, through counsel, therefore, filed a motion for reconsideration
praying that the decision of February 10, 1955, be modified so as to declare and rule that the members of
the Union who had rendered services from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. were entitled to 4 hours' overtime pay;
that allotted to the taking of their meals should not be deducted from the 4 hours of overtime rendered by
said employees, that the amounts of P3 and P2 set aside for the daily meals of the employees be
considered as part of their actual compensation in determining the amount due to said employees
separated from the service without just cause be paid their unearned wages and salaries from the date of
their separation up to the time the decision in case L-2660 became final; and for such other relief as may
be just and equitable in the premises.
Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. also sought for the reconsideration of the decision only in so far as it
interpreted that the period during which a seaman is aboard a tugboat shall be considered as "working
time" for the purpose of the Eight-Hour-Labor Law.
In pursuance of Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 254
and further amended by Commonwealth Act No. 559, the motions for reconsideration were passed upon
by the Court en banc, and on June 6, 1955, a resolution modifying the decision of February 10, 1955, was
issued, in the sense that the 4 hours of overtime work included in the regular daily schedule of work from
6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. should be paid independently of the so-called "coffee-money", after making a
finding that said extra amounts were given to crew members of some tugboats for work performed
beyond 6:00 p.m. over a period of some 16 weeks. The Company's motion for reconsideration was
denied.
From this resolution, the Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. filed the present petition for certiorari and when the
Court of Industrial Relations, acting upon said Company's motion for clarification, ruled that the 20
minutes' rest given the claimants after mealtime should not be deducted from the 4 hours of overtime
worked performed by said claimants, petitioner filed a supplemental petition for certiorari dated
September 5, 1955, and both petitions were given due course by this Court.
Respondent Luzon Marine Labor Union filed within the reglementary period a motion to dismiss, which
this Court considered as an answer by resolution of October 14, 1955, alleging that the decision,
resolution and order of the Court of Industrial Relations sought to be reviewed by petitioner do not present
any question of law, the issues in said CIR case No. 147-V being purely factual. The respondent Judges
of the Court of Industrial Relations, represented by counsel, timely filed an answer likewise asserting that
there could have been no question of law involved or error of law committed by the said Judges in the
resolutions appealed from, same having been based on purely findings of fact.
In this instance, petitioner does not seek to alter the lower court's finding that the regular daily schedule of
work of the members of the herein respondent Union was from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Petitioner, however,
submits several "issues" which We will proceed to discuss one after the other. They are the following:

I. Is the definition for "hours of work" as presently applied to dryland laborers equally applicable to
seamen? Or should a different criterion be applied by virtue of the fact that the seamen's employment is
completely different in nature as well as in condition of work from that of a dryland laborer?
Petitioner questions the applicability to seamen of the interpretation given to the phrase "hours of work"
for the purpose of the Eight-Hour Labor Law, insinuating that although the seamen concerned stayed in
petitioner's tugboats, or merely within its compound, for 12 hours, yet their work was not continuous but
interrupted or broken. It has been the consistent stand of petitioner that while it is true that the workers
herein were required to report for work at 6:00 a.m. and were made to stay up to 6:00 p.m., their work
was not continuous and they could have left the premises of their working place were it not for the
inherent physical impossibility peculiar to the nature of their duty which prevented them from leaving the
tugboats. It is the Company's defense that a literal interpretation of what constitutes non-working hours
would result in absurdity if made to apply to seamen aboard vessels in bays and rivers, and We are called
upon to make an interpretation of the law on "non-working hours" that may comprehend within its
embrace not only the non-working hours of laborers employed in land jobs, but also of that particular
group of seamen, i.e., those employed in vessels plying in rivers and bays, since admittedly there is no
need for such ruling with respect to officers and crew of interisland vessels which have aboard 2 shifts of
said men and strictly follow the 8-hour working period.
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 444, known as the Eight-Hour Labor Law, provides:
SEC. 1. The legal working day for any person employed by another shall be of not more than
eight hours daily. When the work is not continuous, the time during which the laborer is not
working AND CAN LEAVE HIS WORKING PLACE and can rest completely, shall not be counted.
The requisites contained in this section are further implemented by contemporary regulations issued by
administrative authorities (Sections 4 and 5 of Chapter III, Article 1, Code of Rules and Regulations to
Implement the Minimum Wage Law).
For the purposes of this case, We do not need to set for seamen a criterion different from that applied to
laborers on land, for under the provisions of the above quoted section, the only thing to be done is to
determine the meaning and scope of the term "working place" used therein. As We understand this term,
a laborer need not leave thepremises of the factory, shop or boat in order that his period of rest shall not
be counted, it being enough that he "cease to work", may rest completely and leave or may leave at his
will the spot where he actually stays while working, to go somewhere else, whether within or outside the
premises of said factory, shop or boat. If these requisites are complied with, the period of such rest shall
not be counted.
In the case at bar We do not need to look into the nature of the work of claimant mariners to ascertain the
truth of petitioners allegation that this kind of seamen have had enough "free time", a task of which We
are relieved, for although after an ocular inspection of the working premises of the seamen affected in this
case the trial Judge declared in his decision that the Company gave the complaining laborers 3 free
meals a day with a recess of 20 minutes after each meal, this decision was specifically amended by the
Court en banc in its Resolution of June 6, 1955, wherein it held that the claimants herein rendered
services to the Company from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. including Sundays and holidays, which implies
either that said laborers were not given any recess at all, or that they were not allowed to leave the spot of
their working place, or that they could not rest completely. And such resolution being on a question
essentially of fact, this Court is now precluded to review the same (Com. Act No. 103, Sec. 15, as
amended by Sec. 2 of Com. Act No. 559; Rule 44 of the Rules of Court; Kaisahan Ng Mga Manggagawa
sa Kahoy sa Filipinas vs. Gotamco Sawmill, 80 Phil., 521; Operators, Inc. vs. Pelagio, 99 Phil, 893, and
others).
II. Should a person be penalized for following an opinion issued by the Secretary of Justice in the
absence of any judicial pronouncement whatsoever?
Petitioner cites Opinion No. 247, Series of 1941 of the Secretary of Justice to a query made by the
Secretary of Labor in connection with a similar subject matter as the one involved, in this issue, but that
opinion has no bearing on the case at bar because it refers to officers and crew on board interisland
boats whose situation is different from that of mariners or sailors working in small tugboats that ply along
bays and rivers and have no cabins or places for persons that man the same. Moreover, We can not pass
upon this second issue because, aside from the fact that there appears nothing on record that would

support petitioner's assertion that in its dealing with its employees, it was guided by an opinion of the
Secretary of Justice, the issue involves a mere theoretical question.
III. When employees with full knowledge of the law, voluntarily agreed to work for so many hours in
consideration of a certain definite wage, and continue working without any protest for a period of almost
two years, is said compensation as agreed upon legally deemed and retroactively presumed to constitute
full payment for all services rendered, including whatever overtime wages might be due? Especially so if
such wages, though received years before the enactment of the Minimum Wage Law, were already set
mostly above said minimum wage?
IV. The members set of respondent Union having expressly manifested acquiescence over a period of
almost two years with reference to the sufficiency of their wages and having made no protest whatsoever
with reference to said compensation does the legal and equitable principle of estoppel operate to bar
them from making a claim for, or making any recovery of, back overtime compensation?
We are going to discuss these two issues jointly. Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 444 provides:
Sec. 6. Any agreement or contract between the employer and the laborer or employee contrary to the
provisions of this Act shall be null and void ab initio.
In the case of the Manila Terminal Co. vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., 91 Phil., 625, 48 Off. Gaz.,
2725, this Court held:
The principles of estoppel and laches cannot be, invoked against employees or laborers in an
action for the recovery of compensation for past overtime work. In the first place, it would be
contrary to the spirit of the Eight-Hour Labor Law, under which. as already seen, the laborers
cannot waive their right to extra compensation. In the second place, the law principally obligates
the employer to observe it, so much so that it punishes the employer for its violation and leaves
the employee free and blameless. In the third place, the employee or laborer is in such a
disadvantageous position as to be naturally reluctant or even apprehensive in asserting a claim
which may cause the employer to devise a way for exercising his right to terminate the
employment.
Moreover, if the principle of estoppel and laches is to be applied, it would bring about a situation
whereby the employee or laborer, can not expressly renounce the right to extra compensation
under the Eight-Hour Labor Law, may be compelled to accomplish the same thing by mere
silence or lapse of time, thereby frustrating the purpose of the law by indirection.
This is the law on the matter and We certainly adhere, to it in the present case. We deem it, however,
convenient to say a few words of explanation so that the principle enunciated herein may not lead to any
misconstruction of the law in future cases. There is no question that the right of the laborers to overtime
pay cannot be waived. But there may be cases in which the silence of the employee or laborer who lets
the time go by for quite a long period without claiming or asserting his right to overtime compensation may
favor the inference that he has not worked any such overtime or that his extra work has been duly
compensated. But this is not so in the case at bar. The complaining laborers have declared that long
before the filing of this case, they had informed Mr. Martinez, a sort of overseer of the petitioner, that they
had been working overtime and claiming the corresponding compensation therefor, and there is nothing
on record to show that the claimants, at least the majority of them, had received wages in excess of the
minimum wage later provided by Republic Act No. 602, approved April 6, 1951. On the contrary, in the
decision of the trial Judge, it appears that 34 out of the 58 claimants received salaries less than the
minimum wage authorized by said Minimum Wage Law, to wit:
Per month
1. Ambrosio Taada ..
oiler
but after passing the examinations his wages
were increased to P225 per month;

P82.50

2. Patricio Santiago ..
quartermaster
but after passing the examinations his wages
were increased to P225 per month;

82.50

3. Fidelino Villanueva

82.50

oiler

4. Pedro Filamor
then his wage was reduced to P67.50 per
month as cook;

quartermaster

82.50

5. Emiliano Irabon .
then his wage was reduced to P60 and he
stayed for 1 month only; it was increased again
to P67.50;

seaman

82.50

6. Juanito de Luna

oiler

82.50

7. Benigno Curambao

oiler

82.50

8. Salvador Mercadillo

oiler

82.50

9. Nicasio Sta. Lucia

cook

82.50

10. Damaso Arciaga

seaman

82.50

11. Leonardo Patnugot

oiler

82.50

12. Bienvenido Crisostomo

oiler

82.50

13. Isidro Malabanan

cook

82.50

14. Saturnino Tumbokon

seaman

67.50

15. Bonifacio Cortez

quartermaster

82.50

16. Victorio Carillo

cook

67.50

17. Francisco Atilano

cook

67.50

18. Gualberto Legaspi

seaman

67.50

19. Numeriano Juanillo

quartermaster

82.50

20. Moises Nicodemus

quartermaster

82.50

21. Arsenio Indiano

seaman

82.50

22. Ricardo Autencio

oiler

82.50

23. Mateo Arciaga

seaman

67.50

24. Romulo Magallanes

quartermaster

82.50

25. Antonio Belbes

seaman

67.50

26. Benjamin Aguirre

quartermaster

82.50

27. Emilio Anastasio

quartermaster

82.50

28. Baltazar Labrada

oiler

82.50

29. Emeterio Magallanes

seaman

67.50

30. Agripino Laurente

quartermaster

82.50

31. Roberto Francisco

oiler

82.50

32. Elias Matrocinio

seaman

82.50

33. Baltazar Vega

seaman

67.50

34. Jose Sanchez

oiler

82.50

Consequently, for lack of the necessary supporting evidence for the petitioner, the inference referred to
above cannot be drawn in this case.
V. Granting, without conceding, that any overtime pay in arrears is due, what is the extent and rule of
retro-activity with reference to overtime pay in arrears as set forth and established by the precedents and
policies of the Court of Industrial Relations in past decisions duly affirmed by the Honorable Supreme
Court?
VI. Is the grant of a sizeable amount as back overtime wages by the Court of Industrial Relations in
consonance with the dictates of public policy and the avowed national and government policy on
economic recovery and financial stability?
In connection with issue No. 5, petitioner advances the theory that the computation of the overtime
payment in arrears should be based from the filing of the petition. In support of this contention, petitioner
cites the case of Gotamco Lumber Co. vs- Court of Industrial Relations, 85 Phil., 242; 47 Off. Gaz., 3421.
This case is not in point; it merely declares that Commonwealth Act No. 444 imposes upon the employer
the duty to secure the permit for overtime work, and the latter may not therefore be heard to plead his
own negligence as exemption or defense. The employee in rendering extra services at the request of his
employer has a right to assume that the latter has complied with the requirements of the law and
therefore has obtained the required permission from the Department of Labor (47 Off, Gaz., 3421). The
other decisions of the Court of Industrial Relations cited by petitioner, to wit: Cases 6-V, 7-V and 8-V,
Gotamco & Co., Dy Pac & Co., Inc. and D. C. Chuan; Case 110-V, National Labor Union vs. Standard
Vacuum Oil Co.; Case No. 76-v, Dee Cho Workers, CLO vs. Dee Cho Lumber Co., and Case No. 70V, National Labor Union vs. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., do not seem to have reached this Court
and to have been affirmed by Us.
It is of common occurrence that a workingman has already rendered services in excess of the statutory
period of 8 hours for some time before he can be led or he can muster enough courage to confront his
employer with a demand for payment thereof. Fear of possible unemployment sometimes is a very strong
factor that gags the man from asserting his right under the law and it may take him months or years
before he could be made to present a claim against his employer. To allow the workingman to be
compensated only from the date of the filing of the petition with the court would be to penalize him for his
acquiescence or silence which We have declared in the case of the Manila Terminal Co. vs. CIR, supra,
to be beyond the intent of the law. It is not just and humane that he should be deprived of what is lawfully
his under the law, for the true intendent of Commonwealth Act No. 444 is to compensate the worker for
services rendered beyond the statutory period and this should be made to retroact to the date when such
services were actually performed.
Anent issue No. VI, petitioner questions the reasonableness of the law providing for the grant of overtime
wages. It is sufficient for Us to state here that courts cannot go outside of the field of interpretation so as
to inquire into the motive or motives of Congress in enacting a particular piece of legislation. This
question, certainly, is not within Our province to entertain.
It may be alleged, however, that the delay in asserting the right to back overtime compensation may
cause an unreasonable or irreparable injury to the employer, because the accumulation of such back
overtime wages may become so great that their payment might cause the bankruptcy or the closing of the
business of the employer who might not be in a position to defray the same. Perhaps this situation may
occur, but We shall not delve on it this time because petitioner does not claim that the payment of the
back overtime wages it is ordered to pay to its claimant laborers will cause the injury it foresees or force it
to close its business, a situation which it speaks of theoretically and in general.
VII. Should not a Court of Industrial Relations' resolution, en banc, which is clearly unsupported in fact
and in law, patently arbitrary and capricious and absolutely devoid of sustaining reason, be declared
illegal? Especially so, if the trial court's decision which the resolution en banc reversed, is most detailed,
exhaustive and comprehensive in its findings as well as most reasonable and legal in its conclusions?
This issue was raised by petitioner in its supplemental petition and We have this much to say. The Court

of Industrial Relations has been considered "a court of justice" (Metropolitan Transportation Service vs.
Paredes,* G.R. No. L-1232, prom. January 12, 1948), although in another case. We said that it is "more
an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation" (Ang Tibay vs. Court of
Industrial Relations, 69 Phil., 635). But for procedural purposes, the Court of Industrial Relations is a court
with well-defined powers vested by the law creating it and with such other powers as generally pertain to
a court of justice (Sec. 20, Com. Act No. 103). As such, the general rule that before a judgment becomes
final, the Court that rendered the same may alter or modify it so as to conform with the law and the
evidence, is applicable to the Court of Industrial Relations (Connel Bros. Co.(Phil.) vs. National Labor
Union, G.R. No. L-3631, prom. January 30, 1956). The law also provides that after a judge of the Court of
Industrial Relations, duly designated by the Presiding Judge therein to hear a particular case, had
rendered a decision, any agrieved party may request for reconsideration thereof and the judges of said
Court shall sit together, the concurrence of the 3 of them being necessary for the pronouncement of a
decision, order or award (See. 1, Com. Act No. 103). It was in virtue of these rules and upon motions for
reconsideration presented by both parties that resolution subject of the present petition was issued, the
Court en banc finding it necessary to modify a part of the decision of February 10, 1955, which is clearly
within its power to do.
On the other hand, the issue under consideration is predicated on a situation which is not obtaining in the
case at bar, for, it presupposes that the resolutions en banc of the respondent Court "are clearly
unsupported in fact and in law, patently arbitrary and capricious and absolutely devoid of any sustaining
reason", which does not seem to be the case as a matter of fact.
Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing consideration, the resolutions of the Court of Industrial
Relations appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioner. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador. Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and Endencia,
JJ., concur.
National v CIR, March 2, 1991 Also cant find it

G.R. No. 109156 July 11, 1996

STOLT-NIELSEN MARINE SERVICES (PHILS.) INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION and MEYNARDO J. HERNANDEZ, respondent.
ROMERO, J.:p
Private respondent Meynardo J. Hernandez was hired by petitioner Stolt-Nielsen marine Services
(Phils.) Inc. (STOLT-NIELSEN, for short) as radio officer of board M/T Stolt Condor for a period of ten
months. He boarded the vessel on January 20, 1990.
On April 26, 1990, the ship captain ordered private respondent to carry the baggage of crew member
Lito Loveria who was being repatriated. He refused to obey the order out of fear in view of the
utterance of the said crew member "makakasaksak ako" and also because he did not perceive such
task as one of his duties as radio officer. As a result of such refusal, private respondent was ordered
to disembark on April 30, 1990 and was himself repatriated on May 15, 1990. He was paid his
salaries and wages only up to May 16, 1990.
On June 21, 1990, private respondent filed before the public respondent POEA a complaint for illegal
dismissal and breach of contract paying for, among all things, payment of his salaries, wages,
overtime and other benefits due to him for the unexpired portion of the contract which was six (6)
months and three (3) days.
Petitioner STOLT-NIELSEN in its answer alleged that on April 26, 1990, private respondent refused
to follow the "request" of the master of the vessel to explain to Lolito Loveria the reason for the
latter's repatriation and to assist him in carrying his baggage, all in violation of Article XXIV, Section 1
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and the POEA Standard Contract. Hence, private

respondent, after being afforded the opportunity to explain his side, was dismissed for gross
insubordination and serious misconduct.
In reply, he denied that the master of the vessel requested him to explain to Loveria the reason for
the latter's repatriation.
Thereafter, POEA Administrator Jose N. Sarmiento rendered an award in favor of private
respondent, as follows:
The issue to be resolved is whether or not complainant was legally dismissed.
We rule in the affirmative.
Record shows that on April 26, 1990, complainant was directed by the master of the vessel
to carry the luggage of an outgoing seaman offshore. Complainant, however, refused to obey
the said order, hence, his dismissal from his employment.
Evaluating the reason for complainant's dismissal, we find the penalty imposed too severe
considering the violation committed. To our mind, a warning would have been sufficient since
this was the first offense committed. Moreover, as radio officer, it is not one of his official
duties to carry the luggage of outgoing seaman.
In the light of the foregoing, we hold that complainant's dismissal due to the aforesaid
incident arbitrary, whimsical and contrary to human nature and experience, hence, not
justified. Accordingly, he is entitled to his salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract
computed as follows:
1. Remaining portion of his contract 6 months
& 3 days
2. Basic salary US$1,024.00
3. Fixed Overtime 420.00 1

TotalUS$ 1,434.00
4. Salary/day = ($1,434/30 days) = US$47.8/day
5. Salary for 3 days ($47.8 x 3) = US$143.4
6. Salary for 6 months ($1,434 x 6) = US$8,604.00
7. Salary for the unexpired
portion of his contract
(basic salary + fixed O.T.)
for 6 months and 3 days
(US$8,604 + 143.4) = US$8,747.40
Complainant's claim for day's leave with pay for the unexpired portion of the contract is
hereby denied since the same is only given during actual service.
The claim for damages is hereby denied for want of jurisdiction.
Complaint is however entitled to five (5%) percent of the total award as and by way of
attorney's fees.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
respondent to pay complainant the following or its peso equivalent at the time of payment:
1. EIGHT THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN & 40/100 US DOLLARS
(US$8,747.40) or its peso equivalent at the time of payment, as salaries for the unexpired
portion of his contract.
2. Five percent (5%) of the total award as and by way of attorney's fees.
All other claims are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 2
Aggrieved, petitioner Stolt-Nelson appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission. (NLRC).

The NLRC, in a resolution 3 dated November 27, 1992, concurred with the PEOA Administrator in ruling
that private respondent, having been illegally dismissed, was, therefore, entitled to the monetary award. It
further stated that the private respondent's duty as a radio officer or radio operator does not include the
carrying of the luggage of any seaman or explaining to said seaman the reason for his repatriation. Thus,
concluded the NLRC, his termination on this ground was not proper and, therefore, had every right to the
monetary award. The NLRC likewise granted private respondent's claim for fixed overtime pay and
attorney's fees.
Petitioner, having moved for reconsideration without success, is before this court on certiorari.
The issues posed for resolution in this case are: (a) whether private respondent was legally
dismissed on the ground of gross insubordination and serious misconduct; and (b) whether private
respondent was entitled to the award of overtime pay.
With respect to the first issue, petitioner Stolt-Nielsen emphasizes how "(e)mployment on board
ocean-going vessels is totally different from land-based ones in that the former strict and faithful
compliance of all lawful commands and orders of the master or captain of the vessel is of paramount
and crucial importance." Petitioner then cites Part I, Section A (2) of the POEA Standard
Employment Contract which provides:
2. The seaman binds himself to the following:
"a. to faithfully comply with and observe the terms and conditions of this
contract, violation of which shall be subject to disciplinary action pursuant to
appendix 2 of this crew contract.
xxx xxx xxx
d. To be obedient to the lawful commands of the master or any person who
shall succeed him."
It likewise adverts to Article XXIV, Section 1 of the CBA, viz:
Authority of the Master
Sec. 1. It is understood and agreed that nothing contained in this is intended or shall be
construed so as to restrict in any way the superiority of the master or to prevent
the obedience of the crew to any lawful order of any superior officer. (Emphasis ours)
Petitioner contends that since the captain's order to assist the crew member who was being
repatriated in carrying his baggage is lawful, private respondent's refusal to obey the
command is wilful, thus warranting his dismissal.
Article 282 of the Labor Code provides in part:
Art. 282. Termination by Employer . An employer may terminate an
employment for any of the following causes: a) Serious misconduct or wilful
disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work;
xxx xxx xxx
Wilful disobedience of the employers lawful orders, as a just cause for the dismissal of an employee,
envisages the concurrence of at least two (2) requisites: the employee's assailed conduct must have
been wilful or intentional, the wilfulness characterized by a "wrongful and perverse attitude"; and the
order violated must be reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the
duties which he had been engaged to discharged. 4
The Court agrees that by virtue of the aforementioned CBA and POEA Standard Contract provisions
cited by the petitioner, private respondent is indeed bound to obey the lawful commands of the
captain of the ship, but only as long as these pertain to his duties. The order to carry the luggage of
a crew member, while being lawful, is not part of the duties of a radio officer. Assuming Arguendo
that lawful commands of a ship captain are supposed to be obeyed by the complement of the ship,
private respondent's so-called "act of disobedience" does not warrant the supreme penalty of
dismissal.
In Gold City Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 5 the Court Ruled:

. . . We believe that not every case of insubordination or wilful disobedience by an employee

of a lawful work-connected order of the employer or its representative is reasonably
penalized with dismissal. For one thing, Article 282 (a) refers to "serious misconduct or wilful
disobedience ". There must be reasonable proportionality between, on the one hand, the
wilful disobedience by the employee and, on the other hand, the penalty imposed therefor. . .
In instant case, the POEA found that private respondent's actuation which led to his dismissal was
the first and only act of disobedience during his service with the petitioner. Furthermore, examination
of the circumstances surrounding private respondent's disobedience shows that the repatriated
seaman's utterance of "makakasaksak ako" so instilled fear in private respondent that he was
deterred from carrying out the order of the captain. Hence, his act could not be rightfully
characterized as one motivated by a "wrongful and perverse attitude." Besides, said incident posed
no serious or substantial danger to the well-being of his other co-employees or of the general public
doing business with petitioner employer. Neither did such behavior threaten substantial prejudice to
the business of his employer.
In light of the foregoing, we agree with the NLRC that termination of the private respondent's
services was a disproportionately heavy penalty.
Coming to the second issue involving the award of overtime pay, the NLRC in its assailed resolution
states:
Anent the overtime pay, compliant alleged that he is entitled thereto as the same is a fixed
overtime pay. The respondents failed to controvert said allegations. In short, the
complainant's claim for overtime pay was undisputed and for this reason, the grant of this
claim must be upheld. 6
Petitioner, on the other hand, cites this Court's pronouncement in Cagampan v. NLRC, 7 thus:
As regards to the question of overtime pay, the NLRC cannot be faulted for disallowing the
payment of said pay because it merely straightened out the distorted interpretation asserted
by the petitioners and defined the correct interpretation of the provision on overtime pay
embodied in the contract conformably with settled doctrines on the matter. Notably, the
NLRC ruling on the disallowance of overtime pay is ably supported by the fact that
petitioners never produced any proof of actual performance of overtime work.
Petitioners have conveniently adopted the view that the "guaranteed or fixed overtime pay of
30% of the basic salary per month" embodied in their employment contract should be
awarded to them as part of a "package benefit." They have theorized that even without
sufficient evidence of actual rendition of overtime work they would automatically be entitled
to overtime pay. Their theory is erroneous for being illogical and unrealistic. Their thinking
even runs counter to the intention behind the provision. The contract provision means that
the fixed overtime pay of 30% would be a basis for computing the overtime pay if and when
overtime work would be rendered. Simply stated, the rendition of overtime work and the
submission of sufficient proof that the said work was actually performed are conditions to be
satisfied before a seaman could be entitled to overtime pay which would be computed on the
basis of 30% of the basic monthly salary. In short, the contract provision guarantees the right
to overtime pay but the entitlement to such benefit must first be established. Realistically
speaking, a seaman, by the very nature of his job, stays on board a ship or vessel beyond
the regular eight-hour work schedule. For the employer to give him overtime pay for the extra
hours when he might be sleeping or attending to his personal chores or even just lulling
away his time would be extremely unfair and unreasonable.
Petitioner's argument is well taken. A close scrutiny of the computation of the monetary
award 8 shows that the award for overtime was for the remaining six (6) months and three (3) days of
private respondent's contract at which time he was no longer rendering services as he had already been
repatriated. In light of our aforequoted ruling in Cagampan v. NLRC, said award for overtime should be,
as it is hereby, disallowed for being unjustified.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the NLRC is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the award
for overtime pay should be DELETED.