EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-18727. August 31, 1964.]

JESUS MA. CUI, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO MA.
defendant-appellant, ROMULO CUI, intervenor-appellant.

CUI,

Jose W. Diokno for plaintiff-appellee.

Jaime R. Nuevas and Hector L. Hofilea for defendant-appellant.
Romulo Cui in his own behalf as intervenor-appellants.
SYLLABUS
1.
ATTORNEYS; "TITULO DE ABOGADO" MEANS MEMBERSHIP IN THE BAR.
The term "titulo de abogado" means not mere possession of the academic degree of
Bachelor of Laws but membership in the bar after due admission thereto, qualifying
one for the practice of law.
2.
ID.; POSSESSION OF LAW DEGREE NOT INDISPENSABLE TO QUALIFY AS
LAWYER. Possession of the law degree itself is not indispensable; completion of
the prescribed courses may be shown in some other way.
3.
ID.; REINSTATEMENT TO THE ROLL WIPES OUT DISABILITIES.
Reinstatement to the roll of attorneys wipes out the restrictions and disabilities
resulting from a previous disbarment.
4.
QUO WARRANTO; LIMITATIONS; ONE YEAR AFTER RIGHT OF PLAINTIFF TO
HOLD OFFICE AROSE. Under Section 16 of Rule 66 (formerly Sec. 16 Rule 68,
taken from Section 215 of Act 190), an action of quo warranto must be led within
one (1) year after the right of the plaintiff to hold the office arose.
5.
ID.; ID.; ID.; PERIOD NOT TO BE COUNTED FROM DATE DEFENDANT BEGAN
TO DISCHARGE DUTIES OF OFFICE. The basis of a quo warranto action being the
plainti's own right to oce, it is from the time such right arose that the one-year
limitation must be counted and not from the date the incumbent defendant began
to discharge the duties of said office.
DECISION
MAKALINTAL, J :
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This is a proceeding in quo warranto originally led in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu. The oce in contention is that of Administrator of the Hospicio de San Jose de

Barili. Judgment was rendered on 27 April 1961 in favor of the plainti, Jesus Ma.
Cui, and appealed to us by the defendant, Antonio Ma. Cui, and by the intervenor,
Romulo Cui.
The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and
Doa Benigna Cui, now deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of
indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons." It acquired corporate
existence by legislation (Act No. 3239 of the Philippine Legislative passed 27
November 1925) and endowed with extensive properties by the said spouses
through a series of donations, principally the deed of donation executed on 2
January 1926.
Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly and,
in case of their incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may nominate or
designate, in the order prescribed by them." Section 2 of the deed of donation
provides as follows:
"Que en caso de nuestro fallecimiento o incapacidad para administrar, nos
sustituyan nuestro legitimo sobrino Mariano Cui, si al tiempo de nuestra
muerte o incapacidad se hallare residiendo en la ciudad de Cebu, y nuestro
sobrino politico Dionisio Jakosalem. Si nuestro dicho sobrino Mariano Cui no
estuviese residiendo entonces en la ciudad de Cebu, designamos en su lugar
a nuestro otro sobrino legitimo Mauricio Cui. Ambos sobrinos administraran
conjuntamente el HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI. A la muerte o
incapacidad de estos dos administradores, la administracion del HOSPICIO
DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor
de edad, que descienda legitimamente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos
legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui y Victor Cui, y que posea
titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de
estos titulos, el que pague al Estado mayor impuesto o contribucion. En
igualidad de circumstancias, sera preferido el varon de mas edad
descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la administracion Cuando
absolutamente faltare persona de estas cualicaciones, la administracion del
HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara al seor Obispo de Cebu o quien
sea el mayor dignitario de la Iglesia Catolica, Apostolica, Romana, que tuviere
asiento en la cabecera de esta Provincia de Cebu, y en su defecto, al
Gobierno Provincial de Cebu."

Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer the Hospicio
until her death in 1929. Thereupon the administration passed to Mauricio Cui and
Dionisio Jakosalem. The first died on 8 May 1931 and the second, on 1 July 1931. On
2 July 1931 Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became the administrator.
Thereafter, beginning in 1932, a series of controversies and court litigations ensued
concerning the position of administrator, to which, in so far as they are pertinent to
the present case, reference will be made later in this decision.
Plainti Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of
Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa Benigna
Cui. On 27 February 1960 the then incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui,

resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between
them and embodied in a notarial document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma.
Cui took his oath of oce. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of either the
"convenio" or of his brother's assumption of the position.
Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5 September 1960 the plainti wrote a
letter to the defendant demanding that the oce be turned over to him; and on 13
September 1960, the demand not having been complied with, the plainti led the
complaint in this case. Romulo Cui later on intervened, claiming a right to the same
oce, being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another one of the nephews mentioned by
the founders of the Hospicio in their deed of donation.
As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective
qualications to the position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and
therefore under equal circumstances would be preferred, pursuant to section 2 of
the deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be applied the deed gives
preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of the nephews therein
named, "que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a
falta de estos titulos, el que pague al estado mayor impuesto o contribucion."
cda

The specic point in dispute is the meaning of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus
Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas
(Class 1926) but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations to
qualify him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar, and
although disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 (administrative case No. 141),
was reinstated by resolution promulgated on 10 February 1960, about two weeks
before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio de Barili.
The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of the plainti, said that the phrase
"titulo de abogado," taken alone, means that of a full-edged lawyer, but that "as
used in the deed of donation and considering the function of purpose of the
administrator, it should not be given a strict interpretation but a liberal one," and
therefore means a law degree or diploma of Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is assailed
as erroneous both by the defendant and by intervenor.
We are of the opinion that whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de
abogado" means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws
but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the
practice of law. In Spanish the word "titulo" is dened as "testimonio o instrumento
dado para ejercer un empleo, dignidad o profession" (Diccionario de la Lengua
Espaola, Real Academia Espaola, 1947 ed., p. 1224); and the word "abogado," as
follows: "Perito en el derecho positivo que se dedica a defender en juicio, por escrito
o de palabra, los derechos o intereses de los litigantes, y tambien a dar dictamen
sobre las cuestiones o puntos legales que se la consultan." (Id. p. 5) A Bachelor's
degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic
requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. The
English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney- at-law. This term has a xed
and general signication, and has reference to that class of persons who are by

license ocers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon
whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are developed by law as a
consequence.
In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the
authority of the Supreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires
passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certicate
from the Clerk of Court, this certicate being his license to practice the profession.
The academic degree of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do with admission to
the Bar, except as evidence of compliance with the requirement that an applicant to
the examinations has "successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law
school or university, ocially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this
purpose, however, possession of the law degree itself is not indispensable:
completion of the prescribed course may be shown in some other way. Indeed there
are instances, particularly under the former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons
who had not gone through any formal legal education in college were allowed to
take the Bar examinations and to qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code
required possession of "the necessary qualications of learning and ability.") Yet
certainly it would be incorrect to say that such persons do not possess the "titulo de
abogado" because they lack the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws from some law
school or university.
The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the
foregoing test advisedly, and provided in the deed of donation that if not a lawyer,
the administrator should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that
order; or failing all these, should be the one who pays the highest taxes among
those otherwise qualied. A lawyer, rst of all, because under Act No. 3239 the
managers or trustees of the Hospicio shall "make regulations for the government of
said institution (Sec. 3, b); shall "prescribe the conditions subject to which invalids
and incapacitated and destitute persons may be admitted to the institute (Sec. 3, d);
shall see to it that the rules and conditions promulgated for admission are not in
conict with the provisions of the Act; and shall administer properties of
considerable value for all of which work, it is to presumed, a working knowledge
of the law and a license to practice the profession would be distinct asset.

Under this particular criterion we hold that the plainti is not entitled, as against
the defendant, to the oce of administrator. But it is argued that although the
latter is a member of the Bar he is nevertheless disqualified by virtue of paragraph 3
of the deed of donation, which provides that the administrator may be removed, on
the ground, among others, of ineptitude in the discharge of his oce or lack of
evident sound moral character. Reference is made to the fact that the defendant
was disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 for immorality and unprofessional
conduct. It is also a fact, however, that he was reinstated on 10 February 1960,
before he assumed the oce of administrator. His reinstatement is a recognition of
his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for his admission to
the Bar in the first place.

"Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in

the sound discretion of the court. The court action will depend, generally
speaking, on whether or not it decides that the public interest in the orderly
and impartial administration of Justice will be conserved by the applicant's
participation therein in the capacity of an attorney and counselor at law. The
applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the court
that he is a person of good moral character a t and proper person to
practice law. The court will take into consideration the applicant's character
and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the
charge for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the
disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the
application for reinstatement. (5 Am. Jur., Sec. 301, p. 443)
"Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to
reinstatement, notwithstanding the attorney has received a pardon following
his conviction, and the requirements for reinstatement have been held to be
the same as for original admission to the bar, except that the court may
require a greater degree of proof than in an original admission." (7 G.J.S.,
Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 815.)
"The decisive questions on an application for reinstatement are whether
applicant is 'of good moral character' in the sense in which that phrase is
used when applied to attorneys-at-law and is a t and proper person to be
entrusted with the privileges of the oce of an attorney, and whether his
mental qualications are such as to enable him to discharge eciently his
duty to the public, and the moral attributes are to be regarded as a separate
and distinct from his mental qualications." (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec.
41, p. 816)."

As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking

reinstatement to the oce of attorney cannot be less exacting than that implied in
paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as a requisite for the oce which is disputed in
this case. When the defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions
and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.
This action must fail on one other ground: it is already barred by lapse of time
amounting to prescription or laches. Under Section 16 of Rule 66 (formerly sec. 16,
Rule 68, taken from section 216 of Act 190), this kind of action must be led within
one (1) year after the right of the plaintiff to hold the office arose.
Plainti Jesus Ma. Cui believed himself entitled to the oce in question as long ago
as 1932. On January 26 of that year he filed a complaint in quo warranto against Dr.
Teodoro Cui, who assumed the administration of the Hospicio on 2 July 1931.
Mariano Cui, the plainti's father, and Antonio Ma. Cui came in as intervenors. The
case was dismissed by the Court of First Instance upon a demurrer by the defendant
there to the complaint and complaint in intervention. Upon appeal to the Supreme
Court from the order of dismissal, the case was remanded for further proceedings
(Cui vs. Cui, 60 Phil. 37, 48). The plainti, however, did not prosecute the case as
indicated in the decision of this Court, but acceded to an arrangement whereby
Teodoro Cui continued as administrator Mariano Cui was named "legal adviser" and

plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui accepted a position as assistant administrator.

Subsequently the plainti tried to get the position by a series of extra-judicial
maneuvers. First he informed the Social Welfare Commissioner, by letter dated 1
February 1950, that as of the previous 1 January he had "made clear" his "intention
of occupying the oce of administrator of the Hospicio." He followed that up with
another letter dated 4 February, announcing that he had taken over the
administration as of 1 January 1950. Actually, however, he took his oath of oce
before a notary public only on 4 March 1950, after receiving a reply of
acknowledgment, dated 2 March, from the Social Welfare Commissioner, who
thought that he had already assumed the position as stated in his communication of
4 February 1950. The rather muddled situation was referred by the Commissioner
to the Secretary of Justice, who in an opinion dated 3 April 1950 (op. No. 45, S.
1950), correcting another opinion previously given, in eect ruled that the plainti,
not being a lawyer, was not entitled to the administration of the Hospicio.
Meanwhile, the question again become the subject of a court controversy. On 14
March 1950 the Hospicio commenced an action against the Philippine National Bank
in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Civ. Case No. R-1216) because the bank had
frozen the Hospicio's deposits therein. The Bank then led a third-party complaint
against herein plainti-appellee, Jesus Ma. Cui, who had, as stated above, taken
oath as administrator. On 19 October 1950, having been deprived of recognition by
the opinion of the Secretary of Justice he moved to dismiss the third-party
complaint on the ground that he was relinquishing "temporarily" his claim to the
administration of the Hospicio. The motion was denied in an order dated 2 October
1953. On 6 February 1954 he was able to take another oath of oce as
administrator before President Magsaysay, and soon afterward filed a second motion
to dismiss in Civil Case No. R-1216. President Magsaysay, be it said, upon learning
that a case was pending in Court, stated in a telegram to his Executive Secretary
that "as far as (he) was concerned the court may disregard the oath" thus taken.
The motion to dismiss was granted nevertheless and the other parties in the case
led their notice of appeal from the order of dismissal. The plainti then led an exparte motion to be excluded as party in the appeal and the trial court again granted
the motion. This was on 24 November 1954. Appellants thereupon instituted a
mandamus proceeding in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-8540), which was decided
on 28 May 1956, to the eect that Jesus Ma. Cui should be included in the appeal.
That appeal, however, after it reached this Court was dismissed upon motion of the
parties, who agreed that "the oce of administrator and trustee of the Hospicio . . .
should be ventilated in quo warranto proceedings to be initiated against the
incumbent by whomsoever is not occupying the oce but believes he has a right to
it" (G.R. No. L-9103). The resolution of dismissal was issued 31 July 1956. At that
time the incumbent administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, but no action in quo
warranto was led against him by plainti Jesus Ma. Cui as indicated in the
aforesaid motion for dismissal.
On 10 February 1960, defendant Antonio Ma. Cui was reinstated by this Court as
member of the Bar, and on the following 27 February Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned as
administrator in his favor, pursuant to the "convenio" between them executed on

the same date. The next day Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office.
The failure of the plainti to prosecute his claim judicially after this Court decided
the rst case of Cui vs. Cui in 1934 (60 Phil. 3769), remanding it to the trial court
for further proceedings; his acceptance instead of the position of assistant
administrator, allowing Dr. Teodoro Cui to continue as administrator; and his failure
to le an action in quo warranto against said Dr. Cui after 31 July 1956, when the
appeal in Civil Case No. R-1216 of the Cebu Court was dismissed upon motion of
the parties precisely so that the conicting claims of the parties could be ventilated
in such an action all these circumstances militate against the plainti's present
claim in view of the rule that an action in quo warranto must be led within one
year after the right of the plainti to hold oce arose. The excuse that the plainti
did not le an action against Dr. Teodoro Cui after 31 July 1956 because of the
latter's illness did not interrupt the running of the statutory period. And the fact
that this action was led within one year of the defendant's assumption of oce in
September 1960 does not make the plainti's position any better, for the basis of
the action is his own right to the oce and it is from the time such right arose that
the one-year limitation must be counted, not from the date the incumbent began to
discharge the duties of said office. Bautista vs. Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624; Lim vs. Yulo, 62
Phil. 161.
Now for the claim of intervenor and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a
lawyer, grandson of Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of the Hospicio
mentioned by them in the deed of donation. He is farther, in the line of succession,
than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui, who is a son of Mariano Cui, another one of the
said nephews. The deed of donation provides: "a la muerte o incapacidad de estos
administradores (those appointed in the deed itself) pasara a una sola persona que
sera el varon, mayor de edad, que deacienda legitimante de cualquiera de nuestros
sobrinos legitimas Maiano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui, Victor Cui, y que posea
titulo de abogado . . . En egualdad de circumtancias, sera preferido el varon de mas
edad descendiente e quien tenia ultimamente la administracion." Besides being a
nearer descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is older than he and therefore
is preferred when the circumstances are otherwise equal. The intervenor contends
that the intention of the founders was to confer the administration by line and
successively to the descendants of the nephews named in the deed, in the order
they are named. Thus, he argues, since the last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui,
who belonged to the Mauricio Cui line, the next administrator must come from the
line of Vicente Cui, to whom the intervenor belongs. This interpretation, however, is
not justified by the terms of the deed of donation.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is

reversed and set aside, and the complaint as well as the complaint in intervention
are dismissed, with costs equally against plaintiff-appellee and intervenor-appellant.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes an d Regala, JJ.,
concur.