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An overview on ADCO crude

oil storage tanks

370

Terminal and Pipeline Division Jebel Dhanna,

Abu Dhabi Company for Onshore Oil Operations (ADCO),
Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates

Ibrahim M. Shaluf and Salim Abdulla

Abstract
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to present an overview of storage tank incidents and the
causes of the incidents. The paper also seeks to present a brief overview on Abu Dhabi Company for
Onshore Oil Operations (ADCO) experience of Jebel Dhanna (JD) export terminal.
Design/methodology/approach Major hazard installations (MHIs) store large quantities of
flammable material in storage tanks. Storage tanks represent important capital assets and are often
critical operational items. The failure of a tank can have several undesirable effects such as
endangering personnel, affecting the environment and interrupting the operators business. The
storage tank incidents and ADCOs experience on operating of an export terminal are collected from
several sources such as technical articles, text books, internet web sites, and internal reports. The
incidents and the causes of the incidents are reviewed and summarised. The ADCOs experience in
operation of a crude oil tank farm are outlined.
Findings The world has witnessed 480 tank fire incidents in the period 1951-2003. The major cause
of storage tank fire incidents was due to lightning. The leaks and the spills from the tanks were due to
corrosion, operation, improper or lack of maintenance, poor design and/or maintenance of piping
systems, fire and explosion. Although several studies have been carried out to record the tank
incidents and the causes of the incidents the studies were not comprehensive. Many tank fire incidents
that occurred have not been recorded in the previous studies. ADCO have been operating the JD crude
oil terminal for more than three decades without a major incident. This was achieved through the
design, operation and maintaining of the tanks in accordance with international standards, periodical
studies by expert consultancy, and regular development of the control and protection systems with
up-to-date technology.
Originality/value The findings highlight that an international storage tank incidents database
should be established to compile the scattered data in one site. The tank incidents database encourges
the MHIS to publish tank incidents. The database can assist MHIs as well as the research institutes to
learn lessons from the incidents. MHIs publishing articles is one of the means of sharing and
exchanging the experience with similar installations and institutes.
Keywords Storage, Hazards, Old industry, United Arab Emirates
Paper type Research paper

Disaster Prevention and Management

Vol. 19 No. 3, 2010
pp. 370-383
q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
0965-3562
DOI 10.1108/09653561011052538

Introduction
Major hazard installation (MHI) is defined as an industrial activity which produces,
processes, handles, uses, disposes of or stores, whether permanently or temporarily, one
or more hazardous substances or a category or categories of hazardous substances in a
quantity or quantities which is or are equal to or exceed the threshold quantity (Shaluf,
2007). Oil companies, refineries, chemical plants, water treatment plants, etc. are
classifies as MHIs. MHIs store large quantity of hazardous substances in one place. Oil
companies store large quantity of crude oil in storage tanks. Storage tanks represent

important capital assets and are often critical operational items. Proper maintenance and
care of tanks can allow smoother facility operation and prevent fires or environmental
impairment. There are numerous industrial standards for design, construction and
maintenance of the storage tanks. American Petroleum Institute (API) (2008) standards
650, 653 and 620 are the primary industry standards by which most above
ground-welded storage tanks are designed, constructed and maintained. API has
published standards for the construction of above ground storage tanks since mid 1930s.
Lieb(2002) summarized the most significant changes to API industry standards.
The world has witnessed many tank fire incidents due to operating the storage
tanks. There have been a total of 480 incidents identified in the period of 1951 until
2003 (Persson and Lonnermark, 2004). Buncifield incident (Newton, 2006) is a recent
worst storage tank incident. It was similar to piper alpha tragedy in offshore industry.
It was pointed out that the major cause of storage tank fire incidents was due to
lightning. It was also found that the causes of the leaks and the spills from the tanks
were due to corrosion, operation, improper or lack of maintenance, poor design and/or
maintenance of piping systems, fire and explosion.
ADCO produces crude oil from five onshore oil fields. The crude oil is transported
from oil fields to JD terminal through Main Oil Lines (MOLs) network comprise 450 km
of pipelines (ADCO, 2008a, b).
This paper presents an overview on the storage tank incidents, and the incident
causes. The paper also presents briefly an overview on ADCO crude oil storage
terminal.
Storage tank incidents
The failure of a tank can have several undesirable effects such as endangering
personnel, affecting the environment and interrupting the operators business. The
world has seen many tank fire incidents. On January 15, 1919 a US Industrial Alcohol
Companys distilling tank exploded emptying its entire contents of about 2.5 million
gallons of molasses, into Commercial Street in the space of a few seconds. On failure, a
15ft high wave of dark molasses moving about 35 miles per hour swallowed the streets
of Bostons North End. Almost 150 people lie injured in the streets with the final death
toll being 21 (Cornell and Baker, 2002). Cornell and Baker (2002), also summarized
several incidents that drove API standard 653.
EPA-CEPP (1997) pointed out that several accidents have occurred where lightning
has struck facilities handling flammable substances, resulting in explosions and fires.
A fire incident due to lightning occurred in May 1998 at an oil field in Egypt. Five
degassing operational and storage tanks were burned and several firefighters injured.
The incident also resulted in closure of the plant and environmental impact (Mohamed,
2008).
Moss et al. (2001) highlighted that, a survey was conducted by API, on the tank
incidents worldwide. It was noted that tank ruptures accounted for 5 per cent of the 132
releases that occurred worldwide between 1970 and 1988 but accounted for almost 19
per cent of the released material. An example of a failure with dramatic results was in
January 1988 in Pennsylvania, where 500,000 gallons of fuel flowed from an above
ground tank into the Monogahela River, the major source of water for many local
towns. The cost of clean up, damage to the environment and adverse publicity

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associated with this and other releases spawned present tank regulations and the
development of API 653.
A literature review has been conducted to gather information related to the
extinguishment of tank fires. In total, 480 tank fire incidents have been identified
worldwide in the period 1951 until 2003 (Persson and Lonnermark, 2004).
On September 26, 2003 a tank fire incident occurred at the Hokkaido refinery of
Idemitsu Kosan. The fire started from the ring area of a crude oil storage tank
(33.000kl). This was attributable to crude oil leaking from the perimeter of the floating
roof lid of the tank. Another fire broke out from a separate naphtha storage tank
(33,000kl). It was caused because the floating roof of the tank sank and volatile naphtha
was exposed to air, and resulted in full surface fire (FDMA, 2003).
State-run Saudi Arabian Oil Company, Aramco, said that four of its foreign
employees died in a fire on July 2007 at the Ras Tanura terminal on the countrys east
coast. Also, 12 other employees were injured in the blaze, including one Saudi national
(IHT, 2007).
On April 7, 2003, an 80,000-barrel storage tank at ConocoPhillips Companys
Glenpool South tank farm in Glenpool, Oklahoma, exploded and burned as it was being
filled with diesel. The cost of the accident was $2,357,483. There were no injuries or
fatalities. The probable cause of the storage tank explosion and fire was a static
electricity (National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), 2004).
On December 11, 2005, a number of explosions occurred at Buncefield Oil Storage
Depot, Hemel Hempstead, Hertfordshire. Over 40 people were injured. Significant
damage occurred to both commercial and residential properties in the vicinity and a
large area around the site. The fire burned for several days, destroying most of the site
and emitting large clouds of black smoke into the atmosphere (Newton, 2006).
On January 17, 2006, five workers who were cleaning the inside of an empty crude
oil tank died when it burst into flames in Southwestern Japan. Two other workers
escaped with minor injuries (Isachenkov, 2006).
Storage tank incidents causes
EPA-CEPP (1997) highlighted that lightning strikes cause more deaths, injuries, and
damage than all other environmental elements combined, including hurricanes,
tornadoes, and floods. The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) estimates
there were 26,400 lightning-caused fires annually between 1989 and 1992; property
damage during this time was estimated to be in billions of dollars. Storage tanks
containing flammable substances may represent a special fire or explosion hazard in
the event of a lightning strike; a spark, that might otherwise cause little or no damage,
could ignite flammable vapors, resulting in a fire or explosion.
One part of the LASTFIRE project study was a review of the cause of fires and
escalation mechanisms. Of the 480 identified fire incidents, lightning was declared to
be the cause for ignition of 152 fires. The explosion, sabotage, overfilling, maintenance,
and static electricity, resulted in 27, 17, 13, nine, and seven fires respectively (Persson
and Lonnermark, 2004).
Alyeska Pipeline Service Company (2004) reported 113 fire incidents occurred in
cone, internal and external floating roof tanks. It was pointed out that 68 fire incidents
were due to lightning.

Lieb (2002) highlighted that most common causes of leaks and spills in
aboveground storage tanks are typically classified in seven basic categories. These are:
(1) Leaks due to corrosion.
(2) Leaks or spills due to operation.
(3) Spills or leaks due to failure of the tank.
(4) Improper maintenance or lack of maintenance.
(5) Sabotage or vandalism.
(6) Poorly designed and/or maintained piping systems.
(7) Fire and explosion.
A statistical analysis has been conducted to examine possible relationships between
certain facility characteristics and spill incidents. The analysis was based on the
results of EPAs 1996 survey of oil storage facilities, which collected information from
more than 2,600 oil-storing facilities in 23 different industries. The results of the
analysis indicated that facilities with larger storage capacity are likely to have a
greater number of oil spills, larger volumes of oil spilled, and greater cleanup costs
(EPA-CEPP, 1997).
ADCO terminal facilities
JD terminal is storage and exporting terminal for crude oil. The terminal provides
facilities for crude oil storage, pumping, metering, exporting and services facilities. The
terminal has been divided into; tank farm; industrial area; offshore marine facilities;
camp area and fire and environmental systems. The tank farm is located on Jebel
Dhanna (Dhanna Mountain) about 3 km from the coast. Figure 1 shows the JD terminal
and Figure 2 shows the JD tank farm flow diagram.
JD storage tanks
JD terminal consists of 16 floating storage tanks with capacity of 8.3 million barrels.
Storage tank sizes, capacity, flow rates in and out and the elevation above the sea level
are summarized in Table I.
The JD storage tanks are atmospheric floating roof tanks. The small and large tanks
have double deck roofs. The medium tanks have pan roofs. A floating roof is not
effective against evaporation unless the peripheral space between the shell and the rim
of the floating roof is sealed. The tanks are provided with pantograph mechanical shoe
and secondary seals (ADCO, 1997).
Floating roof tanks require special precautions to safeguard against the possibility
of overflowing the tank and damaging the seals, sinking a roof, or damaging a roof by
landing it inadvertently. There is also the risk of rim fires by lightning, but bonding
roofs to shells and earthing tank shells minimizes this hazard.
Floating roofs are provided with steel legs to support the roof when it is landed for
cleaning and repairs. These roof legs can be adjusted from the top of the roof to either
the low roof operating position or to the high roof maintenance position which gives an
under roof head clearance of at least 6ft 6in. This adjustment is made by removing
retaining pins which rest on the tops of sleeves passing through the roof raising or
lowering the leg as necessary and re-inserting the retaining pin.

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Figure 1.
Jebel Dhanna crude oil
terminal

The floating roofs are provided with vacuum barkers. The devices allow for the removal
or entrance of air when the roof is resting on its legs. As they must be closed when the
roof is floating, they are designed to open just before the roof lands on its legs and to close
when it is refloated. They are very simple devices being comprised of a longer leg than
roof support legs with an attached cover plate which rests on top of a nozzle in the roof
deck and which is pushed open when the vacuum breaker leg touches the floor.
Each storage tank has a minimum operating height to avoid inadvertent landing of
roofs during normal operations, which would result in considerable damage and
present fire hazards. Each storage tank has a maximum operating height to prevent
overfilling with resultant roof shoes and seals damage, also potential fire risk and oil
spill. High and low level alarms are provided in all tanks, which actuate in the central
control room. Figure 3 shows the tank 1503 level heights during 2005. The lowest level
height was recorded 6.5 feet and the maximum level height was 54.2ft.
Operation capabilities
Terminal operations at JD are controlled remotely from the central control room in the
industrial area. However, there is a tank farm control room from which tank farm

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375

Figure 2.
JD tank farm flow diagram

Description
Diameter (ft)
Overall height (ft)
Overall weir (ft)
Maximum operating height (ft)
Minimum operating height (ft)
Maximum operating capacity (barrels)
Maximum flow in (b/h)
Maximum flow out (T/h)
Elevation above sea level (ft)

Small tanks
(TT2-TT7)
165
64
60
56
6
213,164
5,708
16,126
210.5

Medium tanks
(TT10-TT16)
260
64
60
56
6
529,558
18,333
32,252 (TT10-12)
24,922 (TT13-16)
210.5

Large tanks
(TT17-TT19)
335
64
58
53
6
823,452
41,667
73,300
223.5

operations could be handled in emergency situations except the fire alarms, which are
operable from the central control room only. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) control system is housed in the central control room. The SCADA
incorporates the crude measurement system, electronically operates all motorized
valves, loading pump controls, proving sequencers, remote tank level indicators and
telecommunication with company main office and the various oilfields.
JD terminal has the capability to load the oil tankers at each of its three offshore
berths. In normal operating conditions one tank farm is dedicated to loading from all
available tanks whilst the other tank farm is receiving oil from the fields. However
tanks can be filled at the same time as they are loading cargo to tankers. During such
operations it is extremely important to ensure that segregation is sustained between

Table I.
JD floating storage tanks
information

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376

Figure 3.
Tank 1503 level heights

the new high tanks and the old lower tanks. Loading is normally carried out by gravity
through three 48in. gravity lines. However, five United Centrifugal Pumps (UCP)
driven by Ruston diesel fired turbines are available on demand. Each pump has a rated
capacity of 1,302,557 barrel per day.
The exported oil is metered by positive displacement meters, each meter bank has
eight meters. A uni-directional prover loop is utilized to determine the relationship (or
meter factor) between the volume of oil, which actually passes through a meter against
the volume as indicated by that meter. A bi-directional prover loop was added in
January 1988 (ADCO, 1997).
Reliability of safety system
It is a common practice that process plants are provided with control and protective
systems. The control system normally maintains the process in a safe condition. The
safety system will operate if unsafe conditions are approached. The protective system
should be a reliable system. A reliable system often uses redundancy techniques. A
parallel system will be more reliable than systems made up with only single
components using no redundancy at all (Raafat, 2008).
Lees (1996) summarized the reliability relations of protective systems using the
fractional dead time approach. The fractional dead time (FDT) of an item of equipment
or a system gives the probability that it is in the failed or non-functioning state. The
FDT is function of failure rate of an item and the proof testing. It was found that the
smaller the FDT of the protective system the smaller the chance that the protective
system will fail when a demand occurs. The failure of the protective system cannot be
detected without regular testing.

The JD tank farm fire fighting safety system is comprised of sea water intake fire
pumps located at the jetty, fire water tanks, automatic foam system, and cooling
system. The jetty pumps consist of three diesel driven pumps (two on duty and one
standby). The pumps supply the tank farm with water through 16in. reinforced epoxy
resin (GRE) pipeline. The firewater facilities at tank farm consist of two firewater
storage tanks; each with a capacity of 234,000 gallons, which are interconnected;
supplying water to five diesel engine driven pumps. There are three diesel driven fire
pumps and one electrically driven jockey pump in the old pump house. These pumps
are backup fire water supply. The two diesel driven pumps, and two electrically jockey
pumps at the new house are in auto-start mode. If the pressure drops in the fire system,
one pump will operates and second pump remains stand by.
The floating roof tanks are provided with seals to prevent vaporizing of the crude
oil. The vaporizing however cannot be prevented 100 per cent. So there is a risk for
combustible gas concentrations that can be ignited by lightning or sparks (Saval,
2008). The floating roof tanks are provided with fire detection system. Linear Heat
Detector (LHD) installed around the perimeter of every floating roof tank. The detector
is run in the area between the shell and the foam dam over the secondary seal. The
detector provides an early warning of rim fires in the seal area of the tanks.
The storage tanks are fitted with a foam system. Once the foam is automatically
actuated it pours directly on the rim seals area to smother a rim fire. If the foam system
is not shut off manually, a timer set at 30 minutes will shut down the foam system to
avoid excess water building up on the tank-floating roof. Three fire fighting vehicles
are available for backup of the fixed foam system. The 52m water foam tower (fire
fighting truck) is capable of reaching the entire tank roof for foam coverage in case of
rim seal fires.
The cooling system consist of a main ring provides cooling water for the whole tank
farm via fixed and oscillating and mobile monitors.
The firefighting system is tested weekly, by electrical, instrument, control, and
mechanical engineers. One-week test interval guarantees that the system will work
when required to do so.
Integrity of JD storage tanks
A wide range of damage mechanisms can cause a storage tank to deteriorate and fail.
The main mechanisms are corrosion, erosion, creep, fatigue, chemical attack,
mechanical damage, and brittle fracture (HSE, 2008).
The vast majority of storage tanks are constructed from carbon steel and corrosion
is a prime cause of deterioration of them and their accessories. It can be associated
almost equally from external attack or from internal mechanism. Corrosion is rarely
uniform, random, localized, pitting corrosion attack, particularly of flat-bottomed tank
floors appears to be the most common failure. Corrosion attack of lower shell strakes is
also common as is attack of annular plates where these are fitted. External corrosion is
often found where fittings are welded to tank shell or at water traps for example
around and below wind girders, stairwells and vertical stairway connections.
The integrity of the storage tanks need to be well managed because they contain
a large inventory of hazardous material and because of the high costs such as
cleaning and waste disposal prior to inspection and maintenance. The integrity can

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be achieved through an integrated program ensures control and monitoring of the

corrosion, protection, inspection and maintenance of the storage tanks and
associated piping.
Internal corrosion control and monitoring
The small and medium storage tanks are equipped with cathodic protection system for
bottom underside protection and internal sacrificial anode system to protect floor
topside. The large tanks are using with GRE lining internally and non-metallic
membrane externally. A periodic batching of chemical injection (biocide) is conducted
to keep the sulphate reducing bacteria (SRB) level as low as possible.
Inspection
The inspection and maintenance activities are based on a prepared plan. The plan
covers many years in advance because of normally long intervals between internal
inspections.
ADCO adopted and adapted the Shell Oil Company procedures (Shell, 1998) and API
653 (ADCO, 2008a, b) for storage tanks inspection. The following criteria for the
inspection of the storage tanks are used:
.
On-stream inspection; external routine visual inspection of the tank in service
shall be carried out yearly.
.
On-stream dimensional survey is carried out between five to seven years.
.
Acoustic emission survey is carried out between five to seven years.
.
Off-stream inspection; detailed internal inspection should be carried out every
ten to 15 years. The detailed internal inspection is carried out during the
refurbishment of the tanks.
On stream inspection
The on stream inspection of the tanks and associated piping is carried out annually
(ADCO, 2006). The on stream inspection includes the visual, ultrasonic (UT), dye
penetrant, magnetic particle inspections (MPI). The inspection covers the tanks
foundations, out side portion of the annular plates, tank shell; ladders, stairways,
platforms, wind girders, nozzles, man ways, roof structure and accessories, and the fire
fighting system. The on stream inspection results are submitted to Engineering
Division in order to compile it with the tender document.
Dimensional survey
On and off stream dimensional surveys are carried out as per API 653 in order
to enable seal manufacturer to design the relevant new roof seal. It is also to
accommodate the tank actual rim gaps. The survey is carried out while the tank is still
in service and just before taking the tank out of service for refurbishment.
Acoustic emission survey
As a qualitative inspection technique, the acoustic emission survey was utilized as a
prioritizing planning tool for oil storage tanks refurbishment program. It is
recommended the acoustic emission (AE) technique to obtain qualitative risk based

data about the floor condition. Two specialized companies carried out two separate AE
tests on tank 1517. The two reports indicated high potential corrosion associated with
severe loss at the floor plates, which supported the off-stream inspection priority for
this tank.
Refurbishment of storage tanks
ADCO established a maintenance plan of the small and medium tanks. Five small, and
seven medium tanks, are planned to be refurbished, in the period 2007 and 2013. Two
tanks are refurbished every year. The refurbishment of tanks depends on the condition
of every tank. Table II summarizes the maintenance history of the JD oil storage tanks
(ADCO, 2008a, b). A matrix is produced to maintain the flow and sequence of
inspection activities during the tank refurbishment activities.

Tank no.

First commissioning date

Refurbishment date

TT-1502

November 1963

TT-1503

November 1963

TT-1504

November 1963

TT-1505

November 1963

TT-1506

November 1963

TT-1507

November 1963

TT-1510

September 1968

TT-1511

November 1968

TT-1512

April 1970

TT-1513

March 1974

TT-1514

March 1974

TT-1515

March 1974

TT-1516
TT-1517
TT-1518
TT-1519

March 1974
October 1992
September 1992
December 1992

June 1974-January 1976

November 1981-March 1983
March 1994-November 1994
August 2007-May 2008
July 1975-June 1974
May 1993-September 1981
May 2004-March 1995
February 1973-March 1974
August 1980-September 1981
April 1994-March 1995
February 1975-March 1976
June 1994-April 1995
June 1976-August 1977
February 1990-December 1990
June 1993-May 1994
June 1976-August 1977
September 1993-May 1994
August 2006-June 2007
February 1976-September 1976
April 1995-October 1996
November 1975-July 1976
October 1994-June 1996
July 1974-December 1975
March 1997-June 1998
September 2001-June 2002
December 1984-December 1986
October 1996-February 1998
October 1988-October 1989
April 1998-May 1998
February 1991-August 1992
July 2007-May 2008
January 1993-July 1994
July 2004-May 2005
March 2006-January 2007
October 2002-December 2003

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Table II.
The maintenance history
of the JD oil storage tanks

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The refurbishment activities include de-sludging, and cleaning; off stream inspection
(detailed internal inspection), maintenance, and commissioning of the tanks.
The off stream inspection activities include preliminary inspection, tank shell and
attachments inspections, tank roof and accessories inspections, and tank interior
inspections. The inspection, is implemented, by the contractor, immediately after
de-sludging, degassing, and cleaning. The visual inspection is conducted on all
accessible parts of tank components. The MPI test is carried out on 25 per cent of roof
and shell plates T-welds, 100 per cent shell to tank bottom; wind girders and nozzles.
The UT (B-scan) test is carried out on 100 per cent of annular plates, shell nozzles,
bleeders etc. Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) testing is conducted on all roof plates to
detect and record the tank floor corrosion. Kerosene tests are conducted on tank roof
pontoon compartments. Vacuum tests are conducted on all new welds in tank floor
plates, which are repaired or replaced.
The collected data are analyzed and evaluated. The remedial action is implemented
in order to restore the mechanical integrity of the tanks.
Conclusions
This paper presents an overview on the storage tank incidents and the causes of the
incidents. The paper also presents briefly an overview on the ADCO oil storage tanks.
The following have been noted:
(1) The world has witnessed 480 incidents in the period 1951 until 2003.
(2) The largest cause of the storage tank fire incidents was lightning strikes
accounting for 150 of the fires. In the 1990s and 2000s the average number of
fires was 15 per year. Considering the volume of tanks worldwide the risk
associated with this type of incident is very low.
(3) The Buncfield fire incident was the worst depot incident.
(4) The causes of the leak and the spill from the tanks were due to corrosion,
operation, improper or lack of maintenance, poor design and/or maintenance of
piping systems, fire and explosion.
(5) The storage tank incident investigation recommendations should be adopted in
the design, operation, and maintenance of the tanks.
(6) Tanks represent important capital assets and are often critical operational
items. Proper maintenance and care of tanks can allow smoother facility
operation and prevent fires or environmental impairment.
(7) Inspection and maintenance plan and activities are crucial elements for the
integrity of the storage tanks. Standards such as API-653 provide proven tank
inspection guidelines for periodic inspections and maintenance for tanks placed
into service.
(8) The incidents cannot be prevented solely through regulatory requirements.
Understanding the fundamental root causes and integrating the lessons learned
into safe operations are required.
(9) Lieb(2004) pointed out that tank owners and operators should be aware that
compliance with the minimum requirements of API 650 does not necessarily
ensure that a floating roof will perform reliably or tolerate unanticipated

(10)

(11)

(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)

loading conditions that can often occur. The following are some conditions that
API 650 does not specifically address:
.
gas bubbling effects;
.
seal friction;
.
flexible nature of most floating roofs; and
.
seismic loading.
The databases are useful references for the research institutes and industrial
organizations. Storage tank incidents database can be established similar to
internet, CRED (2008) and UNEP (2008) industrial databases.
The ADCO storage tanks were located on a high site at JD. The location saves
power energy, pumps maintenance and operational costs on long operation
terms.
The storage tanks are located about 3 km from the industrial area. Therefore
storage tanks do not present a hazard to the properties in the event of a fire.
The oil tankers are loaded by gravity, so the risk of high pressure from loading
pumps is minimized.
The storage tanks are not a stagnant entity, they are developed regularly to go
hand in hand with the up to date technology.
The JD storage tanks were designed and maintained according to the API
standards.
The JD storage tanks are operated in safe operating conditions. The tanks are
provided with reliable control and safety systems
The integrity of the storage tanks need to be well managed because they
contain a large inventory of hazardous material and because of the high costs
such as cleaning and waste disposal prior to inspection and maintenance.

References
ADCO (1997), Jebel Dhanna terminal operating procedural manual, Tank Farm & Industrial
Area Basic Manual, Vol. 1-6, available at: www.adco.ae (accessed April 2008).
ADCO (2006), Annual on-stream inspection, internal report.
ADCO (2008a), Jebel Dhanna storage tanks refurbishment data, internal report.
ADCO (2008b), Abu Dhabi Company for Onshore Oil Operations, available at: www.adco.ae
(accessed February).
Alyeska Pipeline Service Company (2004), Fire Hazard Assessment for Valdez Crude Tank
Internal Floating Roofs, available at: www.pwsrcac.org/docs/d0012300.pdf (accessed May
2008).
American Petroleum Institute (API) 653 (2008), Tank Inspection, Repair, Alteration and
Reconstruction, available at: www.adco.ae (accessed April).
(The) Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) (2008), The International
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Cornell, J.R. and Baker, M.A. (2002), Catastrophic tank failure: highlights of past failures along
with proactive tank designs, Proceedings of the US EPA Fourth Biennial Freshwater

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Spills Symposium (FSS 2002) Sheraton Cleveland City Centre Hotel in Cleveland, OH,
March 19-21, available at: www.epa.gov/emergencies/content/fss/02table.htm (accessed
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Corresponding author
Ibrahim M. Shaluf can be contacted at: ishaluf@ADCO.ae and ishaluf@yahoo.com

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