Professional Documents
Culture Documents
# ASEN 2002
ABSTRACT. The aim of this article is to study the development of the Jewish-Zionist
national idea as expressed in the national narrative as it appeared in Israel's
mainstream press during the years 196797, against the background of five critical
events in the Israeli collective experience as well as in the wake of the Holocaust
Memorial Days. This development is studied as a case of the immanent tension
between nationalism's universalistic message and its particularistic application. The
Jewish-Zionist narrative in Israel is found to be `shifting' from its particularistic
towards its more universalistic pole. This development is discussed as a transition from
a `purely national' to a `post-national' narrative, and is positioned in its local and
global contexts.
Theoretical background
The development of the Jewish-Zionist national idea in the national narrative
of Israel's mainstream press needs to be located in a general theoretical
framework. This framework consists of two complementary segments. The
rst presents the ideological tension between particularism and universalism
in the nationalist doctrine, and specically within Jewish nationalism. The
second segment discusses the media's role in constituting national consciousness through the use of national narratives.
* I would like to thank Professor Charles S. Liebman and the anonymous readers of the original
manuscript for their illuminating comments. I would also like to express my appreciation for the
support given to me by the Yehuda Avner Chair in Religion and Politics, Bar-Ilan University.
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to fuse the universalistic values of the liberal doctrine with the particularistic
foundations of nationalism (see Kymlicka 1989; Tamir 1993; Taylor 1994).
Although these attempts have produced a handful of illuminating ideas
and practical suggestions for bridging the two poles, they nevertheless fail to
present a comprehensive fusion between the notions of liberal-universalistic
inclinations and nationalist-particularistic inclinations (see Seglow 1998).
This tension reaches considerable heights in the case of Jewish nationalism,
as it is intensified by the confrontation between Judaism's universalistic
aspirations and message on the one hand, and its isolationist trends in the
name of uniqueness (the `chosen people' doctrine) on the other. This confrontation was rooted in Judaism well before Zionism appeared as a modern
Jewish nationalistic movement.
Bernard Susser and Eliezer Don-Yehiya (1983) count the combination of
particularism with universalism among the prime characteristics of the Jewish
political tradition. The tension between these two elements, they claim, is
a prime feature of Jewish political philosophy. Moreover, this tension justifies
the separation of the corpus of Jewish political philosophy into two different
schools: `particularistic nationalism' emphasises the unique and distinct
status of the Jewish people among the nations of the world, whereas `universalistic nationalism,' while acknowledging the uniqueness of the Jewish
people, stresses the common ground shared by all nations and peoples by
accentuating universal moral values alongside particular national ones
(Susser and Don-Yehiya 1983).
Jewish nationalism has not diminished this tension; instead, it has oscillated between the contradictory poles. At times, Jewish history was inclined
towards particularistic nationalism; at other times, universalistic nationalism
had the upper hand. Susser and Don-Yehiya suggest that this tendency to
fluctuate between the two poles is tightly linked to the quality of the actual
relations reigning between Jews and the surrounding gentile populations and
governments. During periods of persecutions and distress, the isolationist
tendencies, accompanied by an emphasis on the particularistic elements of
Jewish tradition, would increase. Alternatively, during periods of relatively
peaceful and improved relations with the gentile environments, the inclination
towards tolerance, accompanied by an emphasis on the universalistic expressions of Judaism, would strengthen.
The history of Zionism, and Social Zionism in particular, was also characterised from its outset by a constant oscillation between the two poles.
Although the very authenticity of the universal-social idioms of the Zionist
moderate left which dominated the political and ideological Jewish leadership during the British mandate period and Israel's formative first two
decades has been questioned (see Sternhell 1997), it seems historically
correct to assert that both its ideological and political elites have continually
professed and celebrated national particularism alongside universal ethics of
humanism and socialism (see Shapira 1992). The tension was never resolved
but, rather, had accompanied Israeli political action and thought throughout
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the years, as Zionism shifted continuously back and forth between universalism and particularism.
The media, nationalism and national narratives
Building on Benedict Anderson's (1983) terms, the media, especially the press,
can be described as one of the main realms in which the national community is `imagined'. One of the more fruitful ways to understand this function
is derived from the role of the press in the construction of reality, namely
the `framing' of experiential fragments into coherent narrative-interpretive
patterns, each with its own internal logic and structure.
By doing so, journalists enter the rather small list of social groups that fulfil
the role of interpreting and presenting reality as a coherent and meaningful
construct.2 These interpreters and arbitrators of reality provide relevant frameworks for the political, cultural and social discourse. The primary instruments
they use to fulfil this function are symbols and myths. These constructs are, by
definition, tools applied in the interpretation of reality; they entail a narrative
representation of events, based on a specific system of values. Symbols associate events with values, reaffirming and `updating' them. Hence, their function in the interpretation of reality can be described as the placing of events
surrounding us into meaningful narrative frameworks, based on shared
symbolic systems that are reaffirmed as they are used (see Bird and Dardenne
1988; Bourdieu 1986; Klatch 1988; Martin and Szelenyi 1987).
Thus, this article takes the view that the media's messages in all genres,
from news reporting to film fiction are expressions of interpretive narratives. These messages are used, in turn, for disseminating the narratives, and
reaffirming and rewriting them.3
The national narrative is one of the most salient of the symbolic tools used
for this purpose. This narrative is the literary expression of sets of symbols and
values, which relate to the national collective as a distinct unit (see Pease 1997).
In its simplest sense, the national narrative is the story that a (national)
collective tells about itself. It tells the individuals constituting the nation (and
anybody else who is interested) who they are, what comprises their past (the
national, common one), the structure of their characteristics as a collective,
and where they are heading that is, how they should act in the political realm.
This story is constructed from a set of secondary narratives, myths, symbols,
metaphors and images; it is too complex a tale to be treated as one concise
unit. Unlike a specific, `local' myth, the national narrative answers too broad a
range of questions to be repeated at once. Thus, a researcher endeavouring to
trace a national narrative and formulate a `complete' presentation of its
contents must end up with a confused amalgam of references to the collective
character, its past, its raison d'etre, and its future. Moreover, many aspects of
the narrative are implicit, and difficult to express in concrete terms. The complexity of national identity, like any other identity, calls for an ambiguous if
not ambivalent presentation of certain aspects within the narrative. Although
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ambiguity may be problematic in short, one-dimensional tales, it is nevertheless functional within the multidimensional framework of the national
narrative, reflecting the complexity of individual and collective identity.
Methodology
Changes in the Jewish-Zionist national narrative are most fruitfully understood through the method of qualitative content analysis. In order to study
the national narrative, six guiding questions were compiled and used as
criteria for analysing the journalistic texts, as expressions of the narrative. My
interest focused on the answers given, explicitly or implicitly, by the writers to
these `narrative questions'. The accumulated answers were treated as constituents of the national narrative in its journalistic-interpretative expression.
These questions address six themes: the values of the nation, the interaction
between the national collective and other nations, the nation's past, the
collective's limits, expressed in terms of belonging and otherness, the nation's
attitude towards traditional religion (namely, in this case, Judaism), and the
nation's heroes and villains.
It should be stressed at the outset that the division of the narrative into this
list of separate themes is artificial, and the result of the researcher's interventionist analysis. The national narrative, like any other story, presents these
themes in an intertwined fashion, rarely demarcated from one another.
However, tracing the answers to the specific questions was used to analyse
the Israeli national narrative. The critical reading of the journalistic commentary was guided by the assumption that journalistic texts can be read as a reservoir of value judgements. The values guiding these judgements reveal the metaframework upon which the interpretation of events is constructed. Each text
was read as potentially containing one or more aspects of the national narrative.
In order to facilitate discrimination of the answers according to the six
thematic categories, expressions of the narrative were examined against the
background of five critical events4 in Israel's contemporary history. The
selection of these events was based on the presupposition of their influence on
the development of the national narrative. All critical events evoke existing
fundamental world-views and guiding narratives as tools for the interpretation of reality, which in turn are rewritten, reshaped and `updated' in accordance with the reality of the influential relevant event. Thus, this article
presupposes that the journalistic interpretations of the events studied here
both expose and rewrite these narratives.
The events selected here compose major milestones in Israel's history during
the period studied here (196797): the Six Day War (1967), which represents a
`classic' case of a war-induced national mobilisation; the Yom Kippur War
(1973), one of the most traumatic events in the evolution of Israel's national
consciousness; the Lebanon War (1982), which combined a military campaign
that initiated a broad-based political protest movement; the signing of the Oslo
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Accord between Israel and the PLO (1993), one of the most important changes
in Israel's policy toward the Arab world to date; and the assassination of Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin (1995), one of the most important (and one of the
latest) critical events experienced by Israeli society, marking the intensifying
socio-political cleavages rending this society. These five occurrences compose
a balanced combination of critical events during the period studied here.
The texts studied are those published during the month following the
publication of the first reports on these events as well as the texts published at
each event's first anniversary. The texts appeared in Israel's three nonpartisan, mainstream newspapers that were published through the whole
period: Haaretz, Yediot Aharonot and Maariv. In addition, a similar textual
analysis focused on articles written in the wake of the Holocaust Memorial Day prior to, and following, each of the critical events. These cyclical
national ceremonies also evoke expressions of the national narrative, and can
be used as a fixed benchmark, against which the developments of the national
narrative can be examined.
Of all the news media's sub-genres, the editorial and opinion columns and
the editorials are those that touch upon the interpretive issues in the most
direct, conscious and explicit way. In other words, this kind of writing represents the most self-conscious and explicit appearance of specific interpretive
narratives. These narratives are used as interpretive prisms, through which
reality is perceived and explained. This means that these narratives guide the
expression of opinions, while also being reaffirmed and remoulded. My
analysis therefore focused primarily on this type of journalistic writing.5
In order to present a concise thesis in this paper, I omit a detailed presentation of the narratives (for such a presentation see Yadgar 1999), and
except for a brief summary I focus on the discussion, conclusions and implications derived from my findings on the wider issue studied here.
Israel's national narrative: from Jewish particularism to humanist universalism
During the period discussed here, the Israeli-Jewish national narrative, in its
journalistic-interpretive formulation, has undergone fundamental changes.
Using a sweeping generalisation, it is suitable to describe the narrative's
development as a victory (at least a temporary one) of one narrative, a universalistic, humanistic narrative here called the peace narrative over its
predecessor, the particularistic, more ethno-centric version, here labelled the
`Jewish narrative'. These labels point to the mythic-value cores of the two
narratives. Their aim is to capture the hierarchy of symbols and values
presented by each narrative, namely the transcendent status and sacred aura
given to Jewish ethnicity in the `Jewish narrative', and given to peace in the
peace narrative. It is important to note here that these labels do not suggest
that the two symbols-values are immanently contradictory, but rather that
they reect two different hierarchies of values.
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The transition from the particularistic pole of national identity to its universalistic pole was retarded by the influence of the Holocaust. Indeed, during
the 1990s there were those in the Israeli press who endeavoured to present a
new, revisionist view of the Holocaust, one that was more consistent with the
universalistic and humanistic tones of the post-national narrative (see, for
example, Segev 1995). In the wake of the Holocaust Memorial Day, however,
many disseminators of this narrative formulated more isolationist, particularistic versions of the narrative, while openly testifying to the role of the
Holocaust in their perceptions.
Discussion
As mentioned, the selection of the ve critical events guiding my analysis was
based on the presupposition that these events bear considerable inuence on
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the development of the national narrative. Of the ve, the Yom Kippur War
emerges as the main watershed. This war's impact as was demonstrated in
the framing of the following occurrence, the Lebanon War was a `deconstructing' one. As testied to by several columnists during the Yom Kippur
War itself, this event undermined some of the essential foundations of Israel's
national image. The previous narrative `truth' failed to explain the current
reality; as a result a new, updated version was needed. The commentary
regarding the Lebanon War exemplied the difculty of formulating an
agreed-upon alternative framework, upon the rubble of the previous one. The
interpretive handling of the Lebanon War was characterised by the apparent
lack of a clear guiding narrative framework.
The collapse of the old, pre-Yom Kippur War interpretive-narrative
framework also found forceful political and cultural expression in the `trend'
of `shattering' national myths, which began during the 1980s and seemed to
have swept significant segments of Israel's intellectual elite, followed by other
groups within the wider society. The rapid and impressive ascent of those
calling themselves `the new historians'7 and the consolidation of post-Zionist
(and in extreme cases even anti-Zionist) positions among certain sectors of
Israeli society are two of the phenomena suggesting the same tendency.
Undermining the `old' narrative frameworks had become a popular intellectual preoccupation and had been consolidated to the level of a complete
world-view. In a wider sense, this local Israeli phenomenon should be understood as belonging to the wider intellectual and cultural current, usually
labelled `post-modernism'. The shattering of Israel's national `truths' should
thus be located in the framework of subjectivism and relativism (as viewed
from the standpoint of its opponents) or, in contrast, in an enlightened, pluralistic, tolerant and multicultural framework (as viewed from the perspective of
its supporters).
During the period between the Lebanon War and the signing of the
Oslo Accords the universalistic narrative consolidated (in its journalisticinterpretive formulations, it must be stressed) into a coherent story, with a
clear core set of values, consistent with the `post-' tendencies namely, postZionism (the revisionist interpretations of Israeli history) on the local level,
and post-modernism on the global level. This amalgamation was further
consolidated with the narrative's latest appearance, following the Rabin
assassination. I believe that this narrative elucidation is to a large extent a
result of another `critical event', one that is not included in the list mentioned
in this article the Palestinian civilian uprising, the Intifada. (The extended
character of this continuous `incident' precludes application of the term
`critical event'. `Critical process' appears to be a more suitable description.)
The Intifada challenged the narrative images with a harsh reality, one that
undermined two fundamental notions of Israel's national identity. On the one
hand, the Palestinian popular uprising was a violent national struggle that
was neither concluded quickly (as Israel's other wars had been) nor clearly
decided in favour of the Jewish-Israeli nation (some would even say that it
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concluded with Israel's defeat). On the other hand, the Intifada exposed the
Israeli public to some violent, racist and inhumane elements in the personalities of those traditionally considered to symbolise the heroic human element of Israel as a nation: the Jewish-Israeli soldiers.
The dissonance caused by the confrontation between reality and the narrative's ideal image was severe. Reality violently clashed with Israelis' selfimage as a strong, independent and unconquered nation, one that did not
succumb to the use of force. Reality also clashed with the humanistic selfimage, embodied in the notion of the `enlightened occupier'. The process of
reconciliation between the Jewish-Israeli nation and its Arab enemies, which
was politically embodied in the negotiations between the Israeli government
and the PLO and the Oslo Accords that followed, also entered as an essential component into the formulation of the universalistic version of the
national narrative. This process was often interpreted, given the dissonance,
as national surrender to the use of violence.
The consolidation of the updated, post-national narrative framework,
namely the peace narrative, resolved the dissonance. First, it `silenced' the
image of the Arab as the national `other'. The peace narrative, both in its
appearances vis-a-vis the Oslo Accords and the Rabin assassination,
presented its audience with a new, revised image of `the Arab'. The latter
ceased to fulfil the key role designated to him by the previous, particularistic
versions of the narrative: `the Arab' no longer embodied the villain in `our'
national story nor did he continue to represent the whole gentile world and its
hostility toward the Jews. The image of the Arab was transformed into that of
a mostly passive actor, a possible (and even desired) partner in `our' new
camp the peace camp. Thus, the process of reconciliation was presented as a
victory rather than a surrender to the Intifada (the latter interpretation was
implicitly understood from the `Jewish narrative'). Accordingly, `we' are not a
spineless nation that knuckles under in the face of terror and the use of force.
On the contrary, volitionally, we have taken a morally supreme step and
chosen to act as gracious winners. As loyal adherents of the principles of
humanism we have understood that power corrupts our humanness and hurts
the other's right of self-definition, and we have headed toward peace. The
`peace narrative' thus describes an updated collective image, cleansed of the
possible dissonance. `We' are left humane, seekers of peace, and strong.
The consolidation of the peace narrative also appears to have fulfilled a
wider collective need for a new mythic-interpretive framework. The deconstructionist tendencies mentioned previously and the fact that the Zionist
paradigm in both its statist and `Jewish' versions had failed to provide
adequate answers to the contemporary reality, bore the seeds of havoc. The
deconstruction and `shattering' of the nation's symbols, myths and values
implied the decomposition of the national `us', threatening to empty the
collective identity of its content. A shared symbolic-mythic framework is a
necessary condition for the preservation of a national collective; whether real
or not, a national community must be `imagined' by its individual members.
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And the national narrative is one of the main tools used to achieve this aim.
Hence, in the present case, the need for a reformulated narrative framework
was acute. The consolidation of the universalistic peace narrative and its
dissemination in the journalistic interpretive framework can thus be understood as the media's fulfilment of one of its main functions: formulating,
rewriting and disseminating a new, updated narrative framework through
which the nation can be imagined, and the collective confirmed.
The period studied was also accompanied by wide-ranging cultural changes
in Israel. One of the labels usually given to these transformations is `Americanisation'. This term connotes the triumph of `Western', mostly `American',
values over `traditional' ones. One can sweepingly describe this process as
the victory of the capitalistic market, the culture of consumption, and individualism over collectivism and socialism. The perception of the collective as a
main and distinct actor gave way to that of the individual as the main
actor. This political-cultural philosophy celebrates personal self-fulfilment
and happiness, over and above the binding force of communal frameworks.8
This broad cultural trend clearly parallels the post-national, looser (in the
sense of not presenting a demand for individual sacrifice for the sake of the
collective) themes of the peace narrative. The new narrative elevates individualism as it relegates binding collective values to lower levels of importance
and commitment.
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texts especially the `peripheral' press, such as the ultra-orthodox and partisan newspapers would inspire a somewhat different, if not completely
opposing, image of national narratives. Moreover, I believe that the sociocultural fragmentation currently experienced by Israeli society only further
emphasises the need to limit the scope of my argument. These processes have
been accompanied by the necessity for contested versions of the national
narrative, as instruments in the overall conict over collective and individual
identity. Hence, in light of the contemporary resurgence of particularistic
ethnic and religious denitions of collective identities, there is an acute need
for a further, far more elaborate investigation of the national narratives
beyond the Israeli mainstream, than that presented here.
Notes
1 Despite the prominence of `nation' and `nationalism' in the literature, the wide-ranging
discussion on the issue does not offer agreed-upon denitions of the terms (see Hutchinson and
Smith 1994). The term `nation' combines two basic elements: a sharing of culture and a sharing of
common consciousness. That is, two individuals belonging to the same nation hold a shared
system of concepts, symbols and associations, and acknowledge each other as belonging to the
same nation (Gellner 1983). According to Benedict Anderson (1983), this acknowledgement
represents the `imagining' of the community, and is the factor that sustains the nation. The
denition of `nationalism' is more complex, because the term relates to `national sentiment', that
is, the above-mentioned feeling of sharing, as well as to an ideology. As an ideology, nationalism
is based on ve core factors: (a) the prioritisation of a particular group the nation as the
primary element framing the individual's identity; (b) the positive valorisation of one's own
nation; (c) the desire to give political-institutional expression to the rst factors (that is, (a) and
(b)); (d) the consideration of space and time as crucial determinants of social identity; and (e) a
sense of belonging and membership in which sentiment and emotion are central (Freeden 1998:
7512). I believe that Ernest Gellner's (1983: 7) solution to the issue approaching the discussion
itself and using these terms without expending any scholarly efforts in formulating a formal
denition is also valid here.
2 Barbie Zelizer (1992) offers the term `interpretative community' for relating this function.
3 For discussions regarding the media as an interpretive symbolic system, see Bird and
Dardenne 1988; Carey 1992; Chaney 1983; Gamson 1992; Goethals 1981; Knight and Dean 1982;
Silverstone 1988.
4 Critical events are occurrences that have a signicant inuence on a given society for a
signicant period (Staggenborg 1993).
5 My choice of writers was guided by two criteria: afliation to the editorial board and number
of publications. Thus, the study includes all the articles written by members of the editorial board
and the articles written by writers who are not afliated with the editorial board but who
published at least four articles during the respective months covered by the study.
6 On statism as a civil religion, see Liebman and Don-Yehiya 1983.
7 For a critical review of Israel's `new historians', see Karsh 1997.
8 The recognition of the collective's rights, as formulated by the communitarian idea, is also
based on individualistic presuppositions. That is, the community's rights are granted in the name
of true individual self-fullment. See Kymlicka 1989; Tamir 1993; Taylor 1994.
9 See also Buell's (1998: 549) discussion on the narrative of globalisation.
10 Plamenatz uses `Western' and `Eastern' according to the prevailing dichotomies of the Cold
War era.
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