Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Hyatt Taxi Services, Inc. vs. Catinoy, 359 SCRA 686, G.R. No. 143204
Escheat
Case/s:
In Re: Estate of Lao Sayco, 21 PHIL 445.
Laches and Prescription; Applicability and Requisites in registered land
In a number of cases, the Court has held that an action to
recover registered land covered by the Torrens System may not be
barred by laches. Laches cannot be set up to resist the
enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right. Laches, which is a
principle based on equity, may not prevail against a specific
provision of law, because equity, which has been defined as justice
outside legality, is applied in the absence of and not against
statutory law or rules of procedure.
In recent cases, however, the court held that while it is true
that a Torrens title is indefeasible and imprescriptible, the registered
landowner may lose his right to recover possession of his
registered property by reason of laches.
Yet, even if we apply the doctrine of laches to registered
lands, it would still not bar petitioners claim. It should be stressed
that laches is not concerned only with the mere lapse of time. The
following elements must be present in order to constitute laches:
(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under
whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is
made for which the complaint seeks a remedy;
(2) delay in asserting the complainants rights, the
complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the defendants
conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant
that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his
suit; and
(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is
accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred.
Case/s:
The Heirs of Anacleto B. Nieto vs. The Municipality of Meycauayan
Bulacan 540 SCRA 100 [1997]
and in Marina
Appeals, thus:
Properties
Corporation
v.
Court
of
to
present
additional
matters
or
to
reiterate his arguments in a diff erent
light, the courts should be slow to declare
the
same
outright
as pro
forma. The
doctrine relating to pro forma motions has a
direct bearing upon the movants valuable right
to appeal. It would be in the interest of justice
to accord the appellate court the opportunity to
review the decision of the trial court on the
merits than to abort the appeal by declaring
the motion pro forma, such that the period to
appeal
was
not
interrupted
and
had
consequently lapsed. (Emphasis supplied)
2. Should the questioned interlocutory order be
generic or descriptive element. The coined word may then be registered as trademark or
tradename. For instance, the word pas is generic or descriptive and may not, by itself,
be registered as a mark. However, as used to form the coined word Salompas, pas
loses its descriptive property and the resulting coined word can be monopolized and
registered as a trademark.
Case/s:
Marvez Commerical Co. Inc. vs. Petra Hawpia & Co., 18 SCRA 1178 (1966).
Payment of Wages; Who has burden of proving
Case/s:
1. Jimenez et al., vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 116960, April 2,
1996.
2. Dansart Security Force & Allied Services Company vs. Bagoy, 622
SCRA 694, G.R. No. 168495, July 2, 2010
Possession; Recovery
The action to recover property pertains to the owner of the thing, and he
may proceed not only against the person in actual possession but against
1
Dansart Security Force & Allied Services Company vs. Bagoy, 622 SCRA 694, G.R. No. 168495, July 2,
2010.
anyone unlawfully detaining it. The possessor has the presumption of title in his
favor, but if the plaintiff can prove his title as owner and establish the identity of
the property claimed as his, he will be entitled to recover the property, even if the
possession seems legalized by a conveyance.
Case/s:
Mendoza vs. Fulgencio, 8 PHIL. 243; Cleto vs. Salvador, 11 PHIL. 416; Vargas
vs. Egamino, 12 PHIL. 56; Samson vs. Salvilla, 12 Phil. 497; Peres vs. Cortes,
15 PHIL. 211; Salacup vs. Rambac, 17 PHIL. 21; Cid vs. Peralta, 24 PHIL. 142
Presumption of Death
Both provisions, as their language plainly implies, are intended as
a substitute for facts and so are not to be available when there are facts.
With particular reference to section 69 (ii) of Rule 123, "the situation
which it presents is one in which the facts are not only unknown but
unknowable. By hypothesis, there is no specific evidence as to the time of
death . . . ." . . . it is assumed that no evidence can be produced. . . . Since
the facts are unknown and unknowable, the law may apply the law of
fairness appropriate to the different legal situation that arises." (IX
Wigmore on Evidence, 1940 ed., 483.)
In In re Wallace's Estate, 220 Pac. 683, which the Court of Appeals
cited the applied with the respect to the deaths of the Navarro girls,
pointing out that "our rule is taken from the Fourth Division of Sec. 1936
of the California Code of Civil Procedure," the Supreme Court of
California said:
When the statute speaks of "particular
circumstances from which it can be inferred"
that one died before the other it means that
there are circumstances from which the fact of
death by one before the other may be inferred
as a relation conclusion from the facts proven.
The statute does not mean circumstances
which would show, or which would tend to
show, probably that one died before the other.
Grand Lodge A.O.W.W. vs. Miller, 8 Cal. App. 28,
96 Pac. 22. When by circumstantial evidence
alone, a party seeks to prove a survivorship
contrary to the statutory presumption, the
circumstances by which it is sought to prove
the survivorship must be such as are
competent and sufficient when tested by the
general rules of evidence in civil cases. The
inference of survivorship cannot rest
xxx
xxx
A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and
skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It
is, rather a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the
court the facts in issue and then brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all
imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done on
the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality,
when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance
and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. There should be no
vested right in technicalities. . . .
This case illustrates the application of the legal precept that the law aids the vigilant, not
those who slumber on their rights. Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus jura subverniunt. 2
Motions conform to rules
ALCARAZ VS. JUDGE ASDALA, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2272, Feb 16, 2011.
The Rules of Court require every written motion, except those that the court
may act upon without prejudicing the rights of an adverse party, to be set for
hearing by its proponent.[36] When a motion ought to be heard, the same rules
prescribe that it must be served to the adverse party with a notice of
hearing.[37]
The substance of a notice of hearing is, in turn, laid out in Section 5 of
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. The provision states:[38]
Section 5. Notice of hearing. The notice of hearing shall
be addressed to all the parties concerned, and shall specify the
time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten
(10) days after the filing of the motion. (Emphasis supplied)
explains that the petition dismissed with finality by this Court was a
special civil action distinct from the case before it which is an ordinary
appeal. It explained that the appeal the trial court itself considered
perfected, does not deserve outright dismissal since the dismissal of
such perfected appeal would not conform to law nor jurisprudence. To
support its contention, respondent court relied alone on Aguirre vs. The
Honorable Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch III, et. al., 192 SCRA
454, 456-457 (1990).
In our view, public respondent misapplied Aguirre. It is true that like
the instant case, Aguirre involved a timely notice of appeal to the Court
of Appeals from the decision of the trial court; an approval by the trial
court of the record on appeal and appeal bond; the perfection of the
appeal; a motion to dismiss the appeal for failure to prosecute the
appeal; dismissal by a trial court of an appeal for failure to prosecute; an
opposition to the motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court had
lost jurisdiction in view of the perfection of the appeal; a resolution
granting the motion to dismiss the appeal for failure to prosecute the
appeal;
and
a
petition
for certiorari before
the
Supreme
Court. Thus ends the kinship between Aguirre and the present case. For
unlike Aguirre, this case involves another appeal of the same case
resulting to a reversal of a previous final adjudication by a division of
another of equal rank.
In Aguirre, we made three pronouncements. One, that an appeal
from the decision of the Court of First Instance, (now Regional Trial
Court) to the Court of Appeals may be dismissed for failure to
prosecute. Two, that once an appeal has been perfected, the trial court
loses jurisdiction over the case and the proper court which must dismiss
an appeal for failure to prosecute upon motion of the appellant himself
or upon the court's own motion is the Court of Appeals and not the Court
of First Instance. Three, that the order granting private respondents'
motion to dismiss appeal for failure of petitioners to prosecute their
appeal is not merely an order for the protection of the rights of the
parties but is an order which disposes the case.[10] This is the extent of
our pronouncements in Aguirre and only under these instances
is Aguirre pertinent to this case.
In his petition before us now, petitioner asserts that respondent
Second Division erred in not denying the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No.
29581 on the ground that said appeal is barred by res judicata. He
avers that CA-G.R. SP No. 22695 and CA-G.R. CV No. 29581 have the
same parties, the same facts and the same issues in the
Petitioners are now before this Court contending that respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in refusing to act on their Motion to Inhibit.
Eventually, after the present petition was filed with this Court, respondent
judge issued an Order[3] dated August 9, 2002 denying the petitioners Motion
to Inhibit for lack of just and valid reason.
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides:
SEC. 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer
shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife, or child is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor, or otherwise, or in
which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he
has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or
in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or
decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all
parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify
himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than
those mentioned above.
In People v. Kho,[4] this Court held that the foregoing Rule contemplates two
kinds of inhibitions compulsory and voluntary. The first paragraph provides
that compulsory disqualification conclusively presumes that the judge
cannot actively or impartially sit on a case. The second paragraph, in turn,
leaves to the judges discretion whether he should desist from sitting in a case
for other just and valid reasons. A judge, however, does not enjoy a wide
latitude in the exercise of his discretion to inhibit himself from hearing a
case, as the inhibition must be for just and valid causes.[5]
In 1964, this Court, in People v. Gomez[6] and Mateo, Jr. v. Villaluz,[7] held
that a judge may voluntarily inhibit himself on grounds other than those
mentioned in paragraph 1, Section 1, Rule 137 and these grounds include
bias and partiality. In Pimentel v. Salonga,[8] the Court laid the following
guideposts for voluntary inhibition of judges:
A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation.
But when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced
to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a
litigant arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of inciting
such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful selfexamination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the
peoples faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary
norm is that he reflects on the probability that a losing party might
nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge had
unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him.
In a long line of cases,[9] this Court has unceasingly re-affirmed the standards
laid down in Pimentel.
It may be recalled that at the onset of the proceedings, petitioners sought a
change of venue in Criminal Cases Nos. 1316-P and 1317-P from Palayan
City to Metro Manila, due to fear for their lives and those of their
witnesses. The prosecution also pointed out that the RVG has the capability
of pressuring respondent judge. Despite its pending request for change of
venue,
respondent
judge
opted
to
continue
with
the
proceedings. Significantly, the grounds specified by movants in their Motion
to Inhibit are obviously meritorious.
RESTITUTION IN MALVERSATION
Villacorta L-68268, Nov 12 1986
After a careful review of the evidence, we find that petitioner has successfully rebutted the prima
facie evidence of his misappropriation. The cash in petitioner's possession was found short of what he
should have had because of the disallowance by the Audit Team of certain items. Those items
comprising the alleged shortage were paid to government personnel either as wages, travelling
expenses, salaries, living allowances, commutations of leave, terminal leaves and for supplies.
Petitioner did not put such missing funds to personal uses. Proof of that being that when he demanded
payment from those officials and personnel, they redeemed their chits and made restitution.
In the case at bar, petitioner successfully overthrew the presumption of guilt. He satisfactorily proved
that not a single centavo of the missing funds was used by him for his own personal interest, a fact
conceded by the Tanodbayan 'the bulk of the reported shortage actually referred to the items
disallowed by the Audit Team representing cash advances extended to co-employees. In fact,
evidence disclosed that the itemized list of the cash advances (Annex "B " of Motion for ReInvestigation and/or Reconsideration, p. 31, Rollo) was verified and found to be correct by an Auditing
Examiner, Petitioner explained that the granting of the cash advances was done in good faith, with no
intent to gain and borne out of goodwill considering that it was a practice tolerated in the office. Such
being the case, negligence evidentiary of malice or intent to defraud the government cannot be
imputed to him. Also to be considered is the circumstance that the actual cash shortage was only
P1.74 which, together with the disallowed items, was fully restituted within a reasonable time from date
of audit,
As pointed out in People vs. Nery, novation prior to the filing of the criminal
information as in the case at bar may convert the relation between the parties
into an ordinary creditor-debtor relation, and place the complainant in estoppel to
insist on the original transaction or "cast doubt on the true nature" thereof.
Again, in the latest case of Ong vs. Court of Appeals (L-58476, 124 SCRA 578, 580-581 [1983] ), this
Court reiterated the ruling in People vs. Nery ( 10 SCRA 244 [1964] ), declaring that:
t.hqw
The novation theory may perhaps apply prior to the filling of the criminal information
in court by the state prosecutors because up to that time the original trust relation
may be converted by the parties into an ordinary creditor-debtor situation, thereby
placing the complainant in estoppel to insist on the original trust. But after the justice
authorities have taken cognizance of the crime and instituted action in court, the
offended party may no longer divest the prosecution of its power to exact the criminal
liability, as distinguished from the civil. The crime being an offense against the state,
only the latter can renounce it (People vs. Gervacio, 54 Off. Gaz. 2898; People vs.
Velasco, 42 Phil. 76; U.S. vs. Montanes, 8 Phil. 620).
It may be observed in this regard that novation is not one of the means recognized by
the Penal Code whereby criminal liability can be extinguished; hence, the role of
novation may only be to either prevent the rise of criminal habihty or to cast doubt on
the true nature of the original basic transaction, whether or not it was such that its
breach would not give rise to penal responsibility, as when money loaned is made to
appear as a deposit, or other similar disguise is resorted to (cf. Abeto vs. People, 90
Phil. 581; U.S. vs. Villareal, 27 Phil. 481).
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioners Guingona and Martin executed a promissory note
on June 17, 1981 assuming the obligation of the bank to private respondent David; while the criminal
complaint for estafa was filed on December 23, 1981 with the Office of the City Fiscal. Hence, it is
clear that novation occurred long before the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City
Fiscal.
While demand is not an element of the crime of malversation, [26] it is a requisite for
the application of the presumption. Without this presumption, the accused may still be
proved guilty under Art. 217 based on direct evidence of malversation. In this case,
the prosecution failed to do so. There is no proof that Pescadera misappropriated the
amount for his personal use.