PHIL 560: Dasguptas (2015) Substantivalism vs.

relationalism

Spatial Realism: reality has a determinate spatial structure (e.g. three-dimensional

Euclidean geometry).
Substantivalism: spatial structure is determined by spatial parts that ground the
relations between material bodies.
Relationalism:

spatial structure is determined by the geometric relations that material bodies can stand to each other.

Q1 (semantics): Is the following correct: a relationalist might say that space is

Euclidean, but we should understand this as shorthand for a variety
of claims about what geometric patterns matter can exhibit (602)?
Motivation for substantivalism vs. relationalism dispute:
Dicult to determine which parts of our mathematical representation of space
correspond to physical features of space.
Our use of spatial parts could be a notational artifact of convenient mathematics,
with no ontological significance (p. 603).
Q2 (bucket): Are relationalist responses to Newtons bucket argument satisfactory?
How important is it to be able to explain why some systems undergo
inertial forces while others do not?
Is this explanatory question primarily physical or philosophical? (604-5)
Sklar1 : We observe that objects in motion can experience inertial forces.
Stop the theory train here!
Sklar2 : Material bodies possess a primitive, intrinsic acceleration (a nonrelational property, not grounded by movement relative to spatial parts).
Is this a notational variant of substantivalism?
Shifted worlds: e.g. shift everything over 5 meters.
Boosted worlds: e.g. increase everythings velocity by 5 meters/second.
Redundancy objection to substantivalism (4):
(1) Absolute position is not invariant under spatial shifts. Absolute velocity is
not invariant under velocity boosts.
(2) Yet, these transformations (shifts/boosts) leave the laws of classical mechanics
invariant; they preserve all fundamental quantities/properties.
(3) Hence, absolute position and absolute velocity are not fundamental quantities/properties.
Josh Hunt

Thursday, November 10, 2016

Q3 (redundancy): Can position and velocity still be genuine physical quantities/properties even if they are not fundamental?
Is substantivalism wedded to the fundamental nature of spatial parts?
Idea from special relativity: length is not invariant under velocity
boosts, but length remains a useful coordinate-dependent quantity.
Undetectability objection to substantivalism: Between two boosted or shifted worlds,
there is no empirically detectable dierence.
Furthermore, all competing hypotheses about absolute position
or velocity share the same theoretical virtues.
Galilean space-time: Spatial distance defined only between simultaneous points.
Primitive distinction between straight (unaccelerated) and curved
(accelerated) paths through space-time.
Absolute acceleration but no absolute velocity.
Preserves both bucket argument and boost argument intuitions.
Plausibly retains redundancy/undetectability from spatial shifts.
Sophisticated substantivalism:
Spatial shifts do not generate distinct possibilities.
Reason: assuming anti-haecceitism, distinct possible worlds must
have a qualitative dierence.
Dasguptas objection:
An adequate sophisticated substantivalism must explain why shifts do not
generate distinct possible worlds by appealing to the structure of space-time.
Galilean space-time itself does not preclude spatial parts from having haecceities.
Q4 (shifts vs. boosts):
Does the boost argument problematize Newtonian space in a way that the
shift argument does not problematize Galilean space-time?
Q5 (qualitativist substantivalism):
Space-time is fundamental but comprises qualitative geometric relations rather
than entities in geometric relations.
Virtue: insucient spatial structure for shifts to generate distinct possibilities.
In what ways is this view distinct from relationalism (space-time as a qualitative
structure vs. manifestation of geometric possibility)?