SC Reviews Death Penalty Conviction of Father Who Pleaded Guilty to Raping Daughters

EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 137256-58. August 6, 2003]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RUFINO ERNAS Y

VILLANUEVA, appellant.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
For automatic review is the joint judgment dated January 14, 1999 of the Regional
Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna (Branch 34) rendered in Criminal Cases Nos. 6178-98C, 6179-98 and 6180-98-C convicting appellant Rufino Ernas y Villanueva of three
counts of rape committed against his daughters Elsa and Celeste Ernas and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of death for each case. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
[1]
ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of his voluntary plea of guilty, judgment is hereby

rendered as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 6178-98-C, this Court finds accused Rufino Ernas y Florentino
(sic) GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as defined and penalized
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences him
to suffer the penalty of death.
Accused is further directed to indemnify the victim Elsa Ernas y Florentino the sum of
FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS as moral damages.
In Crim. Case No. 6179-98-C, this Court finds accused Rufino Ernas y
Florentino(sic) GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as defined and
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of death.
Accused is further directed to indemnify the victim Celeste Ernas y Florentino the
sum of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS as moral damages.
In Crim. Case No. 6180-98-C, this Court finds accused Rufino Ernas y Florentino(sic)
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as defined and penalized under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of death.
Accused is further directed to indemnify the victim Celeste Ernas y Florentino the
sum of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS as moral damages.
With costs against the accused in all cases.
SO ORDERED.
[2]
Three separate Informations were filed with the trial court on October 27, 1998
charging appellant with the crime of rape, thus:
[3]
Crim. Case No. 6178-98-C

That on or about May 11, 1998, at Tramo, Brgy. Masile, Municipality of Calamba,
Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with lewd design and thru force and intimidation and with intent to
satisfy his lust, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of his daughter ELSA ERNAS y FLORENTINO, 14 years old, against her
will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
[4]

That on or about September 21, 1998, at Tramo, Brgy. Masile, Municpality of
Calamba, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with lewd design and thru force and intimidation and with
intent to satisy (sic) his lust, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of his daughter CELESTE ERNAS y FLORENTINO, 15 years
old, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
[5]

That on or about September 18, 1998, at Tramo, Brgy. Masile, Municipality of
Calamba, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with lewd design and thru force and intimidation and with
intent to satisfy his lust, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of his daughter CELESTE ERNAS y FLORENTINO, 15 years old,
against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
[6]
Upon his arraignment on November 13, 1998, appellant, duly assisted by his
counsel, Atty. Rodel Paderayon, entered a separate plea of not guilty to each of the
three charges.
[7]
A joint pre-trial conference was conducted on December 9, 1998 where appellant

maintained his innocence of the crimes charged against him. The trial court then
issued its joint pre-trial order with the following stipulations of facts:
[8]
[9]
(1) the accused is the father of the complaining witness (sic);

(2) that the private complainants Elsa Ernas and Celeste Ernas were both
medically examined and the findings are reflected in the Medico-Legal
Certificate;
(3) the existence of the Medico-Legal Certificate;
(4) the identity of the accused; and
(5) the existence of the Sworn Statements.
No admissions were made by the prosecution.
At the initial hearing held on January 13, 1999, Atty. Eloida Capuno, counsel for the
appellant, manifested the intention of her client to withdraw his former plea of not
guilty. The Court then inquired from appellant whether he confirms the manifestation of
his counsel, as follows:
COURT:
Do You confirm the statement of your counsel that you are withdrawing your
former plea of not guilty and enter a voluntary plea of guilty to the three counts of
rape filed against you.
A: Yes, your honor.[10]
Thereafter, the Court granted the motion to withdraw his former plea and ordered
the re-arraignment of appellant. The three Informations were again read to him in
Tagalog, a language spoken, read and understood by him, who, with the assistance of
Atty. Capuno, voluntarily pleaded guilty to the three counts of rape. The Court then
propounded additional questions to appellant, as follows:
COURT:
Q : Rufino Ernas y Florentino (sic) are you fully aware of the consequences of your
voluntary plea of guilty to these three (3) counts of rape?
A : Yes, your honor.
Q : You have not been threatened, intimidated or coerced into withdrawing your former
plea of not guilty and in lieu thereof enter a plea of guilty to these three (3) counts
of rape?
A : No, your honor.
Q : You are fully aware and advised by your counsel that despite your plea of guilty you
will still be meted the maximum penalty of death?
Q : You fully admit that on or about May 11, 1998 at Tramo, Brgy. Masili,[11] Municipality
of Calamba, Province of Laguna, you had carnal knowledge of your daughter Elsa
Ernas y Florentino, 14 years old, against her will and consent?
Q : You fully admit that on September 21, 1998 at Tramo, Brgy. Masili, Municipality of
Calamba, Province of Laguna, you had carnal knowledge of your daughter Celeste
Ernas y Florentino, 15 years old, against her will and consent?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : You also fully admit that on or about September 18, 1998 at Tramo, Brgy. Masili,
Municipality of Calamba, Province of Laguna, you had carnal knowledge of your
daughter Celeste Ernas y Florentino, 15 years old, against her will and consent?
A : Yes, your honor.[12]
With the plea of guilty entered by the appellant on the three counts of rape, the
prosecution opted to dispense with the direct testimony of the complaining witnesses
and formally offered the following exhibits:

Exhibit A - Complaint filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba,
Laguna by complainant Elsa Ernas;
Exhibit B - Sworn Statement of complainant Elsa Ernas;
Exhibit B-1 - Sworn Statement of Ester Ernas;
Exhibit B-2 - Sworn Statement of Rosemarie Usi; and
Exhibit C - Medico-Legal Certificate.
Crim. Case No. 6179-98-C and 6180-98-C
Exhibit A - Complaint filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba,
Laguna by complainant Celeste Ernas;
Exhibit A-1 - Sworn Statement of complainant Celeste Ernas; and

Exhibit B - Medico-Legal Certificate.
[13]
On January 14, 1999, the trial court rendered its joint judgment finding appellant
guilty of three counts of rape and sentenced him to the supreme penalty of death for
each case.
Appellant raises a single assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT REQUIRING THE PROSECUTION TO

PROVE THE GUILT OF ACCUSED DESPITE THE PLEA OF GUILTY TO A
CAPITAL OFFENSE.
[14]
Appellant claims that aside from conducting a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his pleas, the trial court
should have also required the prosecution to prove his guilt to determine the precise
degree of his culpability as mandated under Section 3 of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules
of Court.
The Solicitor General filed his Manifestation and Motion, in lieu of appellees brief
fully concurring with appellants arguments and prays for the remand of the case to the
trial court for the presentation of evidence.
We agree.
When an accused enters a plea of guilty to a capital offense, the requirements
under Section 3 of Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure must be strictly
followed, to wit:
Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. - When the accused
pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require
the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of his culpability. The
accused may present evidence in his behalf.
Under the rule, three things are enjoined of the trial court after a plea of guilty to a
capital offense has been entered by the accused: (1) To conduct a searching inquiry into
the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea; (2) To
require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the
precise degree of his culpability; and (3) To inquire from the accused if he desires to
present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. This procedure is
mandatory, and a judge who fails to observe it commits a grave abuse of discretion.
The rationale behind the rule is that the courts must proceed with more care where
the possible punishment is in its severest form, namely death, for the reason that the
execution of such a sentence is irrevocable and experience has shown that innocent
persons have at times pleaded guilty. The primordial purpose is to avoid improvident
[15]
[16]
[17]
pleas of guilt on the part of an accused where grave crimes are involved since he might
be admitting his guilt before the court and thus forfeit his life and liberty without having
fully understood the meaning, significance and consequence of his plea. Moreover, the
requirement of taking further evidence would aid this Court on appellate review in
determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea.
[18]
[19]
To assist the trial judges in the proper conduct of searching inquiry, the Court,
in People vs. Pastor, collated the following guidelines which should be observed:
[20]
1. Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the
law; (b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and
preliminary investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and
interrogated during the investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that
the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats
of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply because of the judges
intimidating robes.
[21]
[22]
2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with,
and completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of
guilty.
[23]
3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age,
socio-economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy
index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
[24]
4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under
the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an
accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because
of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or
express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does not labor
under these mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the
admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of the aggravating circumstances
attending it, that increase punishment.
[25]
5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully explain
to him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the
court to do so would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of
the precise nature of the accusation against him and a denial of his right to due
process.
[26]
[27]
6. All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood
by the latter.
[28]
7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly
guilty. The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or
furnish its missing details.
[29]
Tested with the above guidelines which were enunciated in earlier cases prior to the
date of rendition of new assailed decision of the trial court, the questions propounded
and the proceedings taken by the trial court were not sufficient to apprise appellant of
the consequences of his plea of guilty.
Appellant has made an improvident plea of guilty.
First, there was no effort on the part of the presiding judge to comply with the
guidelines enumerated above. While Atty. Capuno manifested to the trial court that
appellant intimated to her the latters intention to withdraw his former plea of not guilty,
the trial court did not inquire from Atty. Capuno whether she had conferred and
explained to appellant the meaning and consequences of the latters plea of guilt.
Further, the records do not show the age, socio-economic status as well as the
educational attainment of the appellant to assist the court a quo as well as this Court in
determining if appellant has full understanding and capacity to give a free and informed
plea of guilty.
Second, the records show that during the pre-trial conference, appellant disputed
the ages of the victims. The trial judge should have pointed this out to appellant when
he was re-arraigned. The trial judge should have required the prosecution to present its
evidence on this matter considering that the true age of the victims would determine the
nature of the crimes of rape and the proper imposition of the corresponding
penalty. Although both qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority were
alleged in the Informations, they must be proved during the trial just as the crime of
rape.
Third, appellant was not even asked why he had a change of heart and decided to
plead guilty to the charges. The judge did not explain to him that in case of incestuous
rape of a minor child, the penalty is death under the law and his plea of guilt would not
under any circumstance affect or reduce his sentence.
Fourth, the Judge should have asked appellant to recount what he exactly did to
show that he fully understood the nature of the crimes filed against him. Moreover, as
already stated, the trial judge failed to require the prosecution to present its
evidence. We have consistently held that the taking of the testimony is the prudent and
proper course to follow for the purpose of establishing not only the guilt but also the
precise degree of culpability of the accused taking into account the presence of other
possible aggravating or mitigating circumstances - and thereafter, to make the accused
present his own evidence, if he is so minded, for the same purpose. A trial is meant to
be a safeguard against putting an innocent man in prison, and at the same time a
guaranty that the guilty obtains his just due, thus:
[30]
the presentation of evidence should be required in order to preclude any room for
reasonable doubt in the mind of the trial court, or the Supreme Court on review, as to
the possibility that there might have been some misunderstanding on the part of the
accused as to the nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, and to ascertain the
circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime which justify or require the
exercise of a greater or lesser degree of severity in the imposition of the prescribed
penalties.
[31]
It must be stressed that under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, a conviction in
capital offenses cannot rest alone on a plea of guilt. The prosecution evidence must be
sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction independently of the plea of guilt.
[32]
We, therefore, cannot accept as valid the plea of guilty entered by the appellant to
the three charges of rape. His re-arraignments as to the three charges are fatally
flawed. The trial court erred in believing that the questions propounded to the appellant
and the latters answers as well as the documentary exhibits offered by the People
would aid it in determining whether the accused really and truly understood and
comprehended the meaning, full significance and consequences of his plea.
It likewise erred in allowing the prosecution to dispense with the testimonies of the
complaining witnesses. As we have ruled, even if the trial court is satisfied that the plea
of guilty was entered with full knowledge of its meaning and consequences, the
introduction of evidence to establish the guilt and the degree of culpability of the
accused is still required. Judges therefore must be cautioned, toward this end, against
the demands of sheer speed in disposing of cases, for their mission after all, and as has
been time and again put, is to see that justice is done.
[33]
Finally, we note that the decision of the trial court failed to express the facts of the
case as mandated under Section 14, Art VIII of the Constitution which provides:
Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED for re-arraignment and thereafter, should the accused enter a plea of
guilty, the Regional Trial Court (Branch 34), Calamba, Laguna, is directed, with
reasonable dispatch, to receive the evidence for the prosecution as well as that of the
defense, if appellant opts to do so.
Presiding Judge Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr. is admonished not only to comply with the
guidelines of this Court in the conduct of searching inquiry, but also with the entire
provision of Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court and with the provisions of Section
14, Article VIII of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, YnaresSantiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, and Tinga,
JJ., concur.
Callejo, Sr., J., on leave.
Accused-appellant manifested that his correct name is Rufino Ernas y Villanueva and not Rufino Ernas
y Florentino as it appears in the appealed decision; that Florentino is the middle name of his wife.
This Court noted said Manifestation in a Resolution dated March 28, 2000, Rollo, p. 41. The
corrected middle name is now reflected in this decision.
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 155511-22
April 14, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
MARIO ODEN, appellant.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The Court is confronted with yet another case where a home ceases being an abode of safety and
protection, this time to a motherless daughter who has accused her own father, herein appellant, of
having repeatedly had carnal knowledge of her "by means of force and intimidation."
Appellant Mario Oden was charged with twelve (12) counts of "rape," defined and penalized under
Article 266-A, paragraph 1, in relation to Article 266-B, sixth paragraph of No. 1, of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, Republic Act No. 8353, and
Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 8369, before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City. The
corresponding Informations were docketed Criminal Case No. 01-20356, Case No. 01-20724 to
Case No. 34, inclusive.
"Criminal Case No. 01-20356
"`That on or about the 8th day of January 2001, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs and by
means of force and intimidation, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with one Anna Liza Oden y Ailes, who is [his] daughter and a fifteen year
old minor, against the latters will and consent.
`CONTRARY TO LAW.
`That on or about the 9th day of November 2000, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs
and by means of force and intimidation, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have sexual intercourse with one Anna Liza Oden y Ailes, who is [his] daughter and a fifteen
year old minor, against the latters will and consent.
`CONTRARY TO LAW.
`That on or about the 25th day of December 2000, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines, and
have sexual intercourse with one Anna Liza Oden y Ailes, who is his daughter and a fifteen
`CONTRARY TO LAW.
`That on or about the 8th day of November 2000, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines, and
`CONTRARY TO LAW.
`That on or about the 3rd day of November 2000, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines, and
`CONTRARY TO LAW.
`That on or about the 17th day of October 2000, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines, and
`CONTRARY TO LAW.
`CONTRARY TO LAW.
`CONTRARY TO LAW.
`That on or about the 12th day of September 2000, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines, and
`CONTRARY TO LAW.
`CONTRARY TO LAW.
`That on or about the 26th day of August 2000, in the City of Antipolo, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs and by
means of force and intimidation, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with one Anna Liza Oden y Ailes, who is his daughter and a fifteen year
old minor, against the latters will and consent.
`CONTRARY TO LAW.
`CONTRARY TO LAW."1
On his arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, Atty. Harley Padolina of the Public
Attorneys Office (PAO), pleaded "guilty" to the charges.
The Solicitor General summed up the case for the prosecution; viz:
"Private complainant Anna Liza Oden is a fifteen (15) year old girl who lived with her siblings
and father x x x at Senora Dela Paz, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City. Her mother [has] already
[passed away].
"On 26 August 2000, about 2:00 oclock in the morning, Anna Liza - - then only about
fourteen (14) years old - - was sleeping with her younger sister in bed, when her father woke
her up. Accused told her that he is going to `use her for a while. Hurriedly, he undressed
Anna Liza, and, in an instant, inserted his penis in her vagina. As he was doing so, accused
kissed Anna Lizas breast. Anna Liza fought back and resisted such bestiality by kicking him,
but to no avail. She even pushed her younger sister who was asleep just to wake her up.
Anna Lizas resistance, however, was in vain as accused successfully penetrated his penis
inside Anna Lizas vagina. This caused Anna Liza to bleed in pain. Accused stopped only
when he had satisfied his lust. Thereupon, accused threatened Anna Liza not to tell others
what happened between them; otherwise, he would kill her and her siblings. Helpless, Anna
Liza acceded to her fathers threat and never reported the incident to anyone.
"On September 10, 11, and 12, 2000, about 11:00 oclock in the evening, accused repeated
what he had done to Anna Liza on 26 August 2000. On all of those three (3) occasions,
accused succeeded in inserting his penis inside Anna Lizas vagina against her will and
consent. Similar sexual assaults were made on October 15, 16, and 27, 2000 in their house.
"On November 3, 8, and 9, 2000, accused-appellant again repeated his sexual molestation
of Anna Liza. On those dates at early morning, accused entered Anna Lizas vagina against
the latters will.
"On December 25, 2000, around 10:00 oclock in the evening, accused-appellant for the
eleventh (11th) time - sexually assaulted private complainant (Anna Liza). After the
molestation, Anna Liza could only cry in helplessness.
"On January 8, 2001, around 9:00 oclock in the evening, while Anna Liza was sleeping with
her sister Josephine in their bedroom, accused woke her (Anna Liza) up, and again sexually
assaulted her.
"Due to fear, Anna Liza did not report to anyone all the twelve (12) incidents of sexual
molestation.
"However, unknown to Anna Liza, her Ate Mercy (wife of the complainants brother Arnold
Oden) witnessed the rape that took place on 08 January 2001. Ate Mercy saw through a
small hole on the wall inside the house - separating her bedroom from that of Anna Lizas
what accused had done to her (Anna Liza). And it was not only Ate Mercy who witnessed the
rape. Arnold Oden (brother of Anna Liza) also saw what the accused had done to Anna Liza.
Arnold was mad at accused; however he was not able to do anything because he, together
with the rest of the siblings, were afraid of their father (accused) - the reason being that
everytime accused would get angry, he would beat all of them.
"Nonetheless, Ate Mercy reported to a neighbor, Nanay Ludy, Anna Lizas harrowing
experience on 08 January 2001. In turn, Nanay Ludy talked to Anna Liza and directed her to
report the incident to the barangay. Anna Liza heeded Nanay Ludys directive. She
proceeded to the barangay - together with her Ate Mercy and Ate Marilou (wives of Anna
Lizas older brothers) - and reported her fathers outrageous wrongdoings. On 28 January
2001, based on Anna Lizas sworn statement, the barangay officials, together with the police,
arrested accused-appellant."2
After the prosecution had rested its case with the testimony of its lone witness (the private
complainant), Atty. Harley Padolina (PAO) manifested that the defense would not present any
evidence.
On 18 March 2002, the trial court rendered a decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of twelve counts of rape; it adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, after a careful cursory on the case, the evidences presented by the
prosecution which have remained unassailed by the defense due to the voluntary plea of
guilty by the accused to all the offense charged, this Court finds said accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and is hereby ordered to suffer the extreme penalty of death through lethal
injection for each case. That said penalty shall be enforced upon the accused after a year
and a half from the date said judgment shall have become final and executory or on the
month of October 30, 2003 at 3:00 p.m.
"The court hereby award to private complainant as civil indemnity the amount of P75,000.00
as compensatory damages and the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages." 3
In the review of his various cases by this Court, appellant asserts that his plea of guilty has been
improvidently made on the mistaken belief that he would be given a lighter penalty with his plea of
guilt.4 On this particular score, the Solicitor General agrees.
There is merit in the observation.
Section 3, Rule 116, of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure is explicit on the procedure to be taken
when an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, viz:
"SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. - When the accused pleads
guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness
and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to
prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present evidence in
his behalf."
The trial court is mandated (1) to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of the plea of guilt, (2) to require the prosecution to still prove
the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability, and (3) to inquire whether or not the
accused wishes to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. The records
must show the events that have actually taken place during the inquiry, the words spoken and the
warnings given, with special attention to the age of the accused, his educational attainment and
socio-economic status, the manner of his arrest and detention, the attendance of counsel in his
behalf during the custodial and preliminary investigations, and the opportunity of his defense counsel
to confer with him. All these matters should be able to provide trustworthy indices of his competence
to give a free and informed plea of guilt. The trial court must describe the essential elements of the
crimes the accused is charged with and their respective penalties and civil liabilities. It should also
direct a series of questions to defense counsel to determine whether or not he has conferred with
the accused and has completely explained to him the legal implications of a plea of guilt. 5
The process is mandatory and absent any showing that it has been duly observed, a searching
inquiry cannot be said to have been aptly undertaken. 6 The trial court must be extra solicitous to see
to it that the accused fully understands the meaning and importance of his plea. In capital
offenses7 particularly, life being at stake, one cannot just lean on the presumption that the accused
has understood his plea.8
While the records of the case are indeed bereft of any indication that the rule has sufficiently been
complied with, the evidence for the prosecution outside of the plea of guilt, nevertheless, would
adequately establish the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt. 9 The manner by which the plea
of guilt is made, whether improvidently or not, loses much of great significance where the conviction
can be based on independent evidence proving the commission by the person accused of the
offense charged.10
The prosecution presented at the witness stand Anna Liza. She recounted straightforwardly and in
sufficient detail the twelve harrowing and humiliating incidents of rape she had suffered in the hands
of her own father. She testified:
"Q Now, Miss witness, considering that your father admitted his guilt in all your accusations
against him on those various dates against him, on August 26, 2000 as alleged in the
information, you claimed that your father raped you, at about what time was that?
"A About 2:00 oclock in the early morning, sir.
"Q How did your father able to rape you in that early morning of August 26, 2000?
"COURT
Wait fiscal for awhile.
"Q So, in one room, you sleep with your sister and your father?
"A Yes, your Honor.
"Q But your father sleeps on the floor but you and [your] sister sleep on the bed?
"A Yes, your Honor.
"COURT
Continue, fiscal.
"PROSECUTOR PASCUAL
"Q So, how did your father able to rape you in that early morning of August 26, 2000?
"A He woke me up at 2:00 oclock in the morning and he told me that he is going to use me,
sir.
"Q And what happened next?
"A And he told me that it will only take for awhile, sir.
"Q And what happened next?
"A And he promised that he will not do it again, sir.
"Q Why? What did your father do when he promised that he will never do it again?
"A He raped me, sir.
"Q How did he rape you?
"A He undressed me and then, he inserted his penis in my vagina, sir.
"Q Did he kiss you?
"A He kissed me in my breast, sir.
"COURT:
Put on record that while narrating the incident, the child is crying.
"PROSECUTOR PASCUAL:
"Q So, you mean to say on that particular date and time, your father raped you?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q For how long did it take your father able to rape you on that early morning of August 26,
2000?
"A It took only for a while, sir.
"Q Did you not fight or shout?
"A No, sir.
"Q Why?
"A He told me that if I will shout, he will kill me, sir.
"Q In what particular portion of the house that your father was able to rape [you] in that early
morning of August 26, 2000?
"A Beside the bed (`sa gilid ng kama), sir.
"COURT
And you sleep beside your sister?
"WITNESS
Yes, sir.
"COURT
How old are you?
"WITNESS
Im 14 years old now, your Honor.
"COURT
Before?
"WITNESS
13 years old, your Honor.
"COURT
She did not wake up, your sister did not wake up?
"WITNESS
No, your Honor.
"COURT
Did you fight back?
"WITNESS
Yes, your Honor, I resisted.
"COURT
How did you resist?
"WITNESS
I was pushing my sister to wake her up but she was not awakened, your Honor.
"COURT
And what else did you do?
"WITNESS
I was kicking him, your Honor.
"COURT
Then what happened when you kicked him?
"WITNESS
He dressed up, your Honor.
"COURT
Proceed, fiscal.
"FISCAL PASCUAL
"Q At what point in time did you kick your father, before he inserted his penis in your vagina
or after he has inserted his penis in your vagina?
"A After having inserted his penis, sir.
"COURT
How many times did your father inserted his penis to your vagina?
"WITNESS
Twice, your Honor.
"COURT
Were you hurt?
"WITNESS
Yes, your Honor.
"COURT
Did it bleed?
"WITNESS
Yes, your Honor.
"COURT
Was that the first time that you had sexual encounter with a man?
"WITNESS
Yes, your Honor.
"COURT
So, it was your father whom you had first sex with?
"WITNESS
Yes, your Honor.
"COURT
Proceed, fiscal.
"PROSECUTOR PASCUAL
"Q Then after this first incident of having been raped by your father?
"COURT
Wait, fiscal, just for awhile. Then, after you have kicked your father, he dressed up?
"WITNESS
Yes, your Honor.
"COURT
Did you not try to report the incident to anyone?
"WITNESS
No, your Honor.
"COURT
Why?
"WITNESS
Because he threatened to kill us all, your Honor.

"COURT
Proceed, fiscal.
"PROSECUTOR PASCUAL
"Q Now, after this first incident that you claimed you were raped by your father, did he repeat
the rape?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q When did your father again rape you?
"A September 10, 11, and 12, 2000, sir.
"Q And at about what time the alleged three (3) rape incidents?
"A On September 10, 2000, 11:00 P.M., and the same on September 11 & 12, 2000, sir.
"Q And he succeeded in raping you on September 10, 11, & 12, 2000?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q And of those three occasions that you claimed that you were raped by your father, how
did your father able to rape you?
"A The same thing as he did the first time, sir.
"Q How about on September 11, 2000?
"A Just the same, just a repetition of what he did on the first time, sir.
"Q And also on the 12th of September 2000, the same?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q And when did your father again rape you?
"A November 3, 8, & 9, 2000, sir.
"Q And how did your father able to rape you on those three (3) dates that you have
mentioned?
"A The same, sir, on November 3, early in the morning and on November 8 & 9, early in the
morning also, sir.
"Q And he did the same in raping you as in the previous incident?
"A Yes, sir.
"COURT
Did he make you do other unusual things?
"WITNESS
None, your Honor.
"PROSECUTOR PASCUAL
"Q In the month of October, do you recall having been raped by your father?
"A I could not recall, sir.
"Q How about in December, was your father also able to rape you?
"A Yes, sir. I told him that I will sleep in the house of my brother.
"Q And what did your father do when you informed him that you will sleep in the house of
your brother?
"A He got angry and he told me that we have our house why do we have to sleep to
somebodys house, sir.
"Q What happened next?
"A He again repeated what he did to me, sir.
"Q When was that?
"A December 25, 2000, sir.
"Q Where?
"A Also our house, sir.
"Q So, you mean to say, you went with your father when he fetched you on the house of your
brother?
"A No, sir, he just told us to go home to our house, sir.

"Q And what time was your father able to rape you as you claimed on December 25, 2000?
"A 10:00 oclock in the evening, sir.
"Q And where was your brother at the time he raped you?
"A In their house, sir.
"Q So, you were alone with your father in your house on December 25, 2000?
"A Yes, sir, and with my sister.
"Q What is the name of your sister?
"A Josephine, sir.
"Q And where was Josephine at that time as you claimed your father raped you?
"A Also beside me sleeping, sir.
"Q What did she do?
"A Sleeping, sir.
"Q And for how long did your father rape you on December 25, 2000?
"A Only for awhile, sir.
"Q And what did you do after having been raped by your father?
"A I cried, sir.
"Q And, was this molestation to you by your father again repeated?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q When was that?
"A January 8, 2001, sir.
"Q Where did your father again rape you as you claimed?
"A Also in our house, sir.
"Q At about what time?

"A About 9:00 oclock in the evening, sir.
"Q And at that time, where are your brothers and sisters?
"A They were sleeping in their house, sir.
"Q And who were with you at that time as you claimed you were raped by your father?
"A My sister Josephine Oden, sir.
"Q And what was Josephine doing at that time?
"A She is also asleep and I was again kicking her but she did not awake, sir.
"Q And how did your father again able to rape you on January 8, 2001?
"A I wore my pants and so he would not be able to rape me but he told me that even how
many pants I will wear, he will do it again, sir.
"Q In all these molestations done to you by your father, did you report to anybody?
"A No, sir.
"Q Why did you not report to anybody these molestations of your father to you?
"A I was afraid, sir.
"Q Do you know if any members of your family know this alleged molestations?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Who among the members of your family knows the alleged molestation or rape?
"A Ate Mercy, sir.
"Q How did your Ate Mercy able to know the incident?
"A There was a small hole in the room and she peeped in that hole and she [saw] what my
father is doing to me, sir.
"COURT
When was that?
"WITNESS
January 8, 2001, your Honor.
"PROSECUTOR PASCUAL
"Q Where was your Ate Mercy at that time?
"A Inside their room, sir.
"Q By the way, who is the husband of your Ate Mercy?
"A My brother Arnold Oden, sir.
"Q And how did you come to know that your Ate Mercy peeped thru that hole and saw what
was your father doing to you?
"A She told me, sir.
"Q And what did your Ate Mercy do when she saw what your father was doing to you?
"A She let my brother see it by peeping [in] the hole and my brother got angry to my father,
sir.
"Q And what did your brother do, if any?
"A Nothing, just speak to me, sir.
"Q What did your brother do with your father?
"A None, sir, all my brothers are afraid of him.
"Q How about [you], are you afraid of him?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Why are you afraid of your father together with your brothers?
"A Because if he got angry, he mauls us, sir.
"Q He also mauls your brothers?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Now, considering that the last incident was on January 8, 2001, was this again repeated?
"A No, sir.

"Q Why?
"A Because our neighbor told me to report the incident to the barangay.
"Q And who is this neighbor that you are referring to?
"A Nanay Ludy, sir.
"Q And how did your neighbor able to know about this incident?
"A My sister-in-law told them, sir.
"Q And, by reason of this information by your sister, your neighbor directed you to report to
the barangay?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q And did you indeed report the incident to the barangay?
"A Yes, sir.
"COURT
Who is your companion when you reported the incident to the barangay?
"WITNESS
Ate Mercy and Ate Marilou, your Honor.
"COURT
Who is this Ate Marilou?
"WITNESS
The wife of my other brother, your Honor.
"COURT
What is the name of your other brother who is the husband of Marilou?
"WITNESS
Roberto Oden, your Honor.
"COURT
Proceed, fiscal.
"PROSECUTOR FISCAL
"Q And what did the barangay do when you reported this incident?
"A On that evening, they went to our house, sir.
"Q And who went to your house?
"A The barangay together with the police, sir.
"Q And what did the barangay officials and the police do, if any? When they went into your
house?
"A They arrested my father, sir.
"Q And when your father was arrested by the police, what did you do?
"A None, sir.
"Q And where did they bring your father when they arrested him?
"A In the jail, sir.
"Q And when was that when your father was arrested by the police?
"A January 28, 2001, sir.
"Q Now, in connection with your complaint of various [incidents of] rape in your person by
your father, were you investigated by the police?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q And did you give your statement to the police?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q And your statement was reduced in writing?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q And in your statement, you narrated all those incidents of rape that was done to you by
your father?
"A Yes, sir.

"Q And have you read the statement you executed before the police?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q And did you affix your signature on the statement you have executed before the police?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Do you still remember how many pages [constituted] this statement [as] typewritten by
the police?
"A Not anymore, sir.
"Q Now, if that statement which you have given to the police will be shown to you, will you be
able to identify the same?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Now, I have here with me a typewritten statement of one Anna Liza Oden constituting of
two (2) pages, will you kindly go over this statement and inform that Honorable Court, if what
is the relation of this statement to the statement you have given to the police in connection
with this incidents?
"A This is the one, sir.
"Q And on the second page of this sworn Statement which appear to be the continuation of
the first page, will you kindly go over the same and tell the Honorable Court, if that is also
your statement?
"A Yes, sir.
"PROSECUTOR PASCUAL
For purposes of identification, may we request, your Honor, that the Sworn Statement
identified by the witness be marked as Exhibit `B and the second page as Exhibit `B-1.
"COURT
Mark them.
"PROSECUTOR PASCUAL
"Q On the first page at the top portion of this Sworn Statement, there appears a printed
name Anna Liza Oden Y Ailes and on top of the printed name, there appears a signature,
whose signature is that?
"A My signature, sir.
"PROSECUTOR PASCUAL
Which for purposes of identification, we would like to request, your Honor, that the signature
of the witness on the first page be marked as Exhibit `B-2.
"COURT
Mark it.
"PROSECUTOR PASCUAL
"Q On the second page of this statement, there [is] likewise a signature [appearing] on top of
the printed name Anna Liza Oden y Ailes,
"A My signature, sir.
"PROSECUTOR PASCUAL
Same manifestation, your Honor, the signature of the witness on the second page at the
bottom portion thereof be marked as Exhibit "B-3".
"COURT
Mark it.
"PROSECUTOR PASCUAL
"Q And who among your relatives assisted you in giving your statement to the police?
"A Ate Mercy, sir.
"Q So, you mean to say, your Ate Mercy was with you when you give your statement to the
police?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Now, at the left bottom portion of this Sworn Statement is a signature above the
typewritten name Mercy Oden Y Onda, whose signature is this?
"A Signature of Ate Mercy, sir.
"Q How did you come to know that this is the signature of your Ate Mercy?
"A I was [present] when she signed the same, sir.
"Q And do you affirm and confirm the contents of your statement?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Now, you said earlier that you cannot recall whether you were also raped by your father in
the month of October, in your affidavit wherein you affirm and confirm the same, specifically
on the second page, you also stated that you were also raped by your father on October 15,
16, & 27, 2000, do you affirm that?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q If you can recall, where were you raped by your father on those three (3) dates?
"A I was in the house, sir.
"Q And your father [was] able to rape you similar to the previous incidents and after the
month of October that you were raped?
"A Yes, sir.
"PROSCECUTOR PASCUAL
I think , that will be all for the witness, your Honor.
"COURT
Cross.
"ATTY. PADOLINA
Just a few cross, your Honor.
"WITH THE KIND PERSMISSION OF THE HONORABLE COURT.
"COURT
PROCEED.
"ATTY. PADOLINA (On Cross Examination)
"Q Miss Witness, you testified awhile ago that you are residing in your house together with
your father, brothers Arnold, Alvin, Roberto and your sister Josephine?
"A Yes, sir.

"Q Now, Miss Witness, you said that these rape took place in the room where your sister was
sleeping?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Now, Miss Witness, are there any other room beside that room where you were sleeping
with your sister and your father?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q And who sleeps there?
"A Ate Mercy and my brother, sir.
"Q How about the other side, there is a room also?
"A Yes, sir, the one renting.
"Q So, how may rooms are there surrounding your room where you were sleeping?
"A Two (2), sir.
"Q Now, Miss Witness, according to you, on August 26, 2000 at about 2:00 A.M., you were
first raped by your father is that correct?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q And according to you, you resisted by kicking him?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q And it was after he had finished satisfying his lust, is that correct?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q How about at the time when he was [undressing] you, were you fighting?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q How were you able to fight?
"A I was also kicking him, sir.
"Q How about the time when he was inserting his penis?
"A I was crying, sir.

"Q You did not kick him at that time?
"A I was kicking him, sir.
"Q Now, Miss Witness, did you shout for help?
"A No, sir.
"Q Now, Miss Witness, everytime he finished after satisfying his lust, what did you do?
"A I just cried, sir.
"Q You did not tell anybody about that, Miss Witness?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Are you studying during that time?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q You did not tell that to your classmate or to your teacher?
"A No, sir.
"Q And also, all these things that happened on the same way that he did on September,
October, December, and January, you did not tell to anybody?
"A No, sir.
"Q On those dates that I have mentioned, was he armed with any weapon?
"A None, sir.
"Q And all those things happened while your sister was sleeping with you?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q All those instances?
"A Yes, sir.
"ATTY. PADOLINA
THAT WILL BE ALL, YOUR HONOR.
"COURT
Any re-direct.
"PROSECUTOR PASCUAL
May I be allowed to conduct additional direct examination, your Honor.
"COURT
You may proceed, fiscal.
"PROSECUTOR PASCUAL (ADDITIONAL DIRECT EXAMINATION)
"Q Miss Witness, you claimed that the reason why you did not report immediately this
incident was because you are afraid of your father?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q And you also claimed that all your brothers are also afraid [of] your father?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Now, you have pointed to a skinny person inside this courtroom as your father, the
accused in this case?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Is that the kind of person whom you and your brothers are afraid of?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Is that [the] size of the body of your father at the time he was [molesting] you?
"A No, sir.
"Q What is the size of the body of your father during the time he molested you?
"A Bigger built than today, sir.
"Q So, you mean to say because you are afraid [of] your father, your father can do whatever
he wants to do inside your house?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q And because your brothers are also afraid [of] your father, he can do whatever he wants
to do because during that time, your father has a big body?
"A Yes, sir.
"PROSECUTOR PASCUAL:
I THINK THAT WILL BE ALL, YOUR HONOR."11
In rape cases, the lone testimony of the victim, if credible and free from fatal and material
inconsistencies and contradictions, can be the basis for the prosecution and conviction of an
accused.12 The rule can no less be true than when a rape victim testifies against her own father;
unquestionably, there would be reason to give it greater weight than usual. In any event, matters
affecting credibility are best left to the trial court with its peculiar opportunity to observe the
deportment of a witness on the stand as against the reliance by an appellate court on the mute
pages of the records of the case.13 The spontaneity with which the victim has detailed the incidents
of rape, the tears she has shed at the stand while recounting her experience, and her consistency
almost throughout her account dispel any insinuation of a rehearsed testimony. The eloquent
testimony of the victim, coupled with the medical findings attesting to her non-virgin state, should be
enough to confirm the truth of her charges.
The death penalty, however, was indeed erroneously imposed. The Solicitor General conceded that
the prosecution had failed to establish private complainants age at the time of commission of the
offenses. It was only the bare statement of the victim, when asked to describe her personal
circumstances in the hearing held on 05 February 2002, that mention was made of her being merely
17 years of age.
The age of the victim, in order that this qualifying circumstance can be properly considered, needs to
be credibly proved.14 In People vs. Javier,15 the Court explains:
"x x x Although the victims age was not contested by the defense, proof of age of the victim
is particularly necessary in this case considering that the victims age which was then 16years old [was] just two years less than the majority age of 18. In this age of modernism,
there is hardly any difference between a 16-year old girl and an 18-year old one insofar as
physical features and attributes are concerned. A physically developed 16-year old lass may
be mistaken for an 18-year old young woman, in the same manner that a frail and young
looking 18-year old lady may pass [for] a 16-year old minor. Thus, it is in this context that
independent proof of the actual age of a rape victim becomes vital and essential so as to
remove an iota of doubt that the victim [was] indeed under 18 years of age as to fall under
the qualifying circumstances enumerated in Republic Act No. 7659. In a criminal prosecution
especially of cases involving the extreme penalty of death, nothing but proof beyond
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which an accused is
charged must be established by the prosecution in order for said penalty to be upheld, x x x.
Verily, the minority of the victim must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the
crime itself. Otherwise, failure to sufficiently establish the victims age is fatal and
consequently bars conviction for rape in its qualified form."16
In People vs. Galas,17 the Court has held:

"To justify the imposition of death, proof of the victims age is indubitable. There must be
sufficient and clear evidence proving her age, even if not denied by the accused. A duly
certified certificate of his birth accurately showing the complainants age or some other
authentic document such as a baptismal certificate or a school record, has been recognized
as competent evidence.
"While it may be true that the testimony of a person as to her age, although hearsay, is
admissible as evidence of family tradition, we cannot consider Sharons statement at the
beginning of her testimony describing her personal circumstances as proof of age beyond
reasonable doubt that we have considered indispensable in the criminal prosecution of
cases involving the extreme penalty of death. No corroborative or supporting evidence was
presented by the prosecution. Although a `certified transcription copy of a certificate of live
birth of Sharon Galas is found on page 10 of the Record of the preliminary investigation held
by the 16th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Jordan, Guimaras, this document was not
presented in evidence during the trial. Accordingly, it does not form part of the record of the
case and not having been formally offered nor marked as an exhibit, it cannot be considered
as evidence nor be given evidentiary value."17
And thus, too, is the ruling of the Court in People vs. Tipay19 "This does not mean, however, that the presentation of the certificate of birth is at all times
necessary to prove minority. The minority of a victim of tender age who may be below the
age of 10 is quite manifest and the court can take judicial notice thereof. The crucial years
pertain to the ages of 15 to 17 where minority may seem to be indubitable due to ones
physical appearance. In this situation, the prosecution has the burden of proving with
certainty the fact that the victim was under 18 years of age when the rape was committed in
order to justify the imposition of the death penalty under the above cited provision.
"The record of the case at bar is bereft of any independent evidence which would accurately
show complainants age. That complainants age was alleged in the information and/or
complaint as under 16 years is not sufficient. Nor does the lack of denial on the part of
accused-appellant excuse the prosecution from discharging its burden in this regard." 20
It is the burden of the prosecution to prove with moral certainty the minority of the victim, i.e., below
18 years of age at the time of commission of rape, coupled with the requisite relationship, in order to
justify the imposition of the death penalty.
Moral damages, in addition to civil indemnity, are awarded to rape victims. The father-daughter
relationship between the accused and the rape victims also justifies the award of exemplary
damages, a measure to help deter fathers with perverse tendencies and aberrant sexual behavior
from preying upon and sexually abusing their daughters.21
WHEREFORE, the decision under review is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Mario Oden
is convicted of twelve (12) counts of simple rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua for each
count. Appellant is further ordered to indemnify Anna Liza Oden in the amount of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) moral damages, and Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) exemplary damages for each count of rape.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, AustriaMartinez, Corona, Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
NELY T. CO, G.R. No. 160265
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, SOCIAL
SECURITY SYSTEM,
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL and SPOUSES JOSE
and MERCEDES LIM.,
Respondents. Promulgated:
July 13, 2009
x---------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] of the May 15, 2003 and October 6,
2003 resolutions[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 69510.
On January 12, 2001, an Information charging petitioner Nely T. Co with violation
of Section 22(d) in relation to Section 28(e) of RA [3] 1161, as amended by RA 8282
(the Social Security Law of 1997)[4] was filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Quezon City, Branch 78, on the basis of the complaint of respondent spouses Jose
and Mercedes Lim, who claimed to be petitioners employees. [5] Petitioner was
accused of failing to remit the compulsory contributions of respondent spouses to
respondent Social Security System (SSS).[6]
On July 3, 2001, petitioner filed a motion to quash the Information, arguing that
the facts alleged in the Information did not constitute an offense because
respondent spouses were not her employees. In support of her motion, petitioner
cited the ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on the issue
of whether petitioner and respondent spouses had an employer-employee
relationship with her or her company.
Prior to this, on March 27, 2000 (before the filing of the Information), respondent
spouses had filed a labor case for illegal dismissal and nonpayment of overtime
pay, holiday pay, holiday premium pay, service incentive leave and 13 th month pay
against Ever-Ready Phils., Inc.[7] and its officers Joseph Thomas Co, William Co,
Wilson Co and petitioner.[8]
On September 29, 2000, labor arbiter (LA) Ernesto S. Dinopol rendered a decision
dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. He held that respondent spouses had
voluntarily left the company as shown by the deeds of release and quitclaim they
executed. They were also not entitled to their monetary claims under Article 82 of
the Labor Code because they were field personnel of the company.[9]
Aggrieved, both parties appealed to the NLRC. In a resolution dated May 31, 2001,
it affirmed the decision of the LA and ruled that the respondent spouses, as sales
representatives, were independent contractors.[10] Therefore, there was no
employer-employee relationship between the parties. This NLRC resolution
attained finality on December 20, 2001.[11]
Notwithstanding the NLRC ruling on the lack of employer-employee relationship
between petitioner and respondent spouses, Judge Percival Mandap Lopez of the
RTC denied petitioners motion to quash (the Information charging violation of the
SSS law) in a resolution dated November 12, 2001. [12] On March 8, 2002,
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against Judge Lopez in the
CA seeking to set aside the November 12, 2001 RTC resolution denying her
motion to quash.
In a resolution dated January 13, 2003, the CA required petitioner to implead the
People of the Philippines, SSS, Office of the Solicitor General and respondent
spouses.[13] For petitioners failure to comply with this order, the CA dismissed the
petition on May 15, 2003 and denied reconsideration on October 6,
2003. According to the CA, petitioner was bound by the negligence of her former
counsel.
Hence, this petition.
For our resolution are the following issues: (1) whether petitioners motion
for reconsideration of the CAs dismissal of the petition was correctly denied and
(2) whether petitioners motion to quash should have been granted by the RTC.
On the first issue, petitioner argues that the CA should have granted her
motion for reconsideration of the May 15, 2003 resolution. She asserts that under
Rule 37, Section 1 (a) of the Rules of Court, the abandonment of her case by her
former counsel[14] amounted to extrinsic fraud which was a meritorious ground.
Petitioner is incorrect. Extrinsic fraud is a valid ground in a motion for new
trial, not a motion for reconsideration:
SECTION 1. Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or
reconsideration. Within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party
may move the trial court to set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new
trial for one or more of the following causes materially affecting the substantial
rights of said party:
(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary
prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved
party has probably been impaired in his rights; or
(b) Newly discovered evidence, which he could not, with reasonable
diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial, and which if presented would
probably alter the result.
Within the same period, the aggrieved party may also move for
reconsideration upon the grounds that the damages awarded are excessive,
that the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or final order, or that
the decision or final order is contrary to law. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner asserted no other ground aside from extrinsic fraud. Therefore, her
motion was properly denied and we do not see the need to discuss the merits of
such ground.
Nevertheless, in the interest of justice and to prevent undue delay in the
disposition of this case, we tackle the next issue raised by petitioner despite the
CAs proper dismissal of her petition.[15] This was a criminal case and the possibility
of a person being deprived unjustly of her liberty due to the procedural lapse of
counsel was a strong and compelling reason to warrant suspension of the Rules of
Court.[16] For the rule-making power of this Court is coupled with the duty to
protect and promote constitutional and substantive rights,[17] not to defeat them.
Thus, the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, resulting in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be avoided.[18]
Petitioner maintains that the factual finding in the illegal dismissal case that
respondent spouses were not her employees is binding in this case. There being no
employer-employee relationship, respondent spouses were not entitled to coverage
under RA 1161, as amended, and petitioner should not be penalized under said law.
We agree.
Well-settled is the rule that the mandatory coverage of RA 1161, as
amended, is premised on the existence of an employer-employee relationship.
[19]
Applicable here is Smith Bell & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals:[20]

Based on the records of the case at bar and those of G.R. No. L-44620, it
is clear that the resolution of this Court dated 26 January 1977, rendered in G.R.
No. L-44620 [illegal dismissal case], constitutes a bar to SSC Case No. 2453. We,
therefore, find merit in the petition at bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that in SSC Case No. 2453, private respondents sought to enforce
their alleged right to compulsory coverage by the SSS on the main allegation that
they are employees of petitioner company. On the other hand, in NLRC Case No.
ROVII-153, private respondents, in order to support their position that they were
illegally dismissed by petitioner company from their work, maintained that there
was an employee-employer relationship existing between petitioner and private
respondents at the time of such dismissal. In other words, the issue common to
both cases is whether there existed an employee-employer relationship at the
time of the occurrence of the acts complained of both in SSC Case No. 2453
and NLRC Case No. RO-VII-153.
It is well to note that the said issue was adjudged with finality in G.R.
No. L-44620, through this Court's resolutions dated 26 January 1977 and 14
March 1977. The dismissal of the petition of the herein private respondents in
G.R. No. L-44620, though contained in a minute resolution, was an adjudication
on the merits of the case.
The present controversy, therefore, squarely falls under the umbrage
of res judicata, particularly, under the rule on "conclusiveness of
judgment." Following this rule, as stated in Bienvenida Machoca Arcadio vs.
Carriaga, Jr., we hold that the judgment in G.R. No. L-44620 bars SSC Case No.
2453, as the relief sought in the latter case is inextricably related to the ruling in
G.R. No. L-44620 to the effect that private respondents, are not employees of
petitioner.[21] (Emphasis supplied)
The only difference is that the instant case is a criminal case whereas the
case in Smith Bell was a civil case. However, the doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgment also applies in criminal cases. As we declared in Constantino v.
Sandiganbayan (First Division):[22]
Although
the
instant
case
involves
a
criminal
charge
whereas Constantino involved an administrative charge, still the findings in the
latter case are binding herein because the same set of facts are the subject of both
cases. What is decisive is that the issues already litigated in a final and executory
judgment preclude by the principle of bar by prior judgment, an aspect of the
doctrine of res judicata, and even under the doctrine of "law of the case," the relitigation of the same issue in another action. It is well established that when a
right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the
parties and those in privity with them. The dictum therein laid down became the
law of the case and what was once irrevocably established as the controlling legal
rule or decision continues to be binding between the same parties as long as the
facts on which the decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case
before the court. Hence, the binding effect and enforceability of that dictum can
no longer be resurrected anew since such issue had already been resolved and
finally laid to rest, if not by the principle of res judicata, at least by
conclusiveness of judgment.
It may be true that the basis of administrative liability differs from
criminal liability as the purpose of administrative proceedings on the one hand is
mainly to protect the public service, based on the time-honored principle that a
public office is a public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of the criminal
prosecution is the punishment of crime. However, the dismissal by the Court of
the administrative case against Constantino based on the same subject matter and
after examining the same crucial evidence operates to dismiss the criminal case
because of the precise finding that the act from which liability is anchored does
not exist.
It is likewise clear from the decision of the Court in Constantino that the
level of proof required in administrative cases which is substantial evidence was
not mustered therein. The same evidence is again before the Court in connection
with the appeal in the criminal case. Ineluctably, the same evidence cannot with
greater reason satisfy the higher standard in criminal cases such as the present
case which is evidence beyond reasonable doubt.[23]
We are mindful that in Republic v. Asiapro Cooperative,[24] we ruled that the

question on the existence of an employer-employee relationship for the purpose of
determining the coverage of the SSS law falls within the jurisdiction of the Social
Security Commission (SSC) which is primarily charged with the duty of settling
disputes under RA 1161, as amended.[25] In that case, the SSS filed a petition in the
SSC praying that Asiapro Cooperative (Asiapro) be directed to register as an
employer, to report its owners-members as covered employees under the
compulsory coverage of SSS and to remit the necessary contributions in
accordance with the law.[26] Asiapro sought the dismissal of the petition alleging
that no employer-employee relationship existed between it and its ownersmembers, thus SSC had no jurisdiction over it. We held that, based on Section 5 of
RA 8282,[27] SSC had jurisdiction over the petition.
Republic v. Asiapro Cooperative, however, is inapplicable here as this case
does not concern the issue of jurisdiction of the SSC. Furthermore, the question of
the existence of an employer-employee relationship was already disposed of with
finality, albeit in the context of an illegal dismissal case in the NLRC. There was
no need for the RTC to make an independent finding because the doctrine of
conclusiveness of judgment had already set in.
The reasons for establishing the principle of "conclusiveness of judgment"
are founded on sound public policy, and to grant this petition would have the
effect of unsettling this well-settled doctrine. It is allowable to reason back from a

judgment to the basis on which it stands, upon the obvious principle that where a
conclusion is indisputable, and could have been drawn only from certain
premises, the premises are equally indisputable with the conclusion. When a fact
has been once determined in the course of a judicial proceeding, and a final
judgment has been rendered in accordance therewith, it cannot be again
litigated between the same parties without virtually impeaching the
correctness of the former decision, which, from motives of public policy, the
law does not permit to be done.[28]
Res judicata has two concepts. The first is bar by prior judgment under
Rule 39, Section 47 (b), and the second is conclusiveness of judgment under Rule
39, Section 47 (c). Both concepts are founded on the principle of estoppel, and are
based on the salutary public policy against unnecessary multiplicity of suits. Like
the splitting of causes of action, res judicata is in pursuance of such
policy. Matters settled by a Court's final judgment should not be litigated
upon or invoked again. Relitigation of issues already settled merely burdens
the Courts and the taxpayers, creates uneasiness and confusion, and wastes
valuable time and energy that could be devoted to worthier cases.
[29]
(Emphasis supplied)
To sum up, the final and executory NLRC decision (to the effect that
respondent spouses were not the employees of petitioner) was binding on this
criminal case for violation of RA 1161, as amended. Accordingly, the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion when it refused to grant petitioners motion to
quash the Information. Simply said, any conviction for violation of the SSS law
based on the erroneous premise of the existence of an employer-employee
relationship would be a transgression of petitioners constitutional rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Criminal Case No. Q01-97619 is ORDERED dismissed.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

SC Reviews Death Penalty Conviction of Father Who Pleaded Guilty to Raping Daughters

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SC Reviews Death Penalty Conviction of Father Who Pleaded Guilty to Raping Daughters

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EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 137256-58. August 6, 2003]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RUFINO ERNAS Y

ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of his voluntary plea of guilty, judgment is hereby

Crim. Case No. 6178-98-C

Crim. Case No. 6179-98-C

Crim. Case No. 6180-98-C

A joint pre-trial conference was conducted on December 9, 1998 where appellant

(1) the accused is the father of the complaining witness (sic);

Crim. Case No. 6178-98-C

Exhibit A-1 - Sworn Statement of complainant Celeste Ernas; and

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT REQUIRING THE PROSECUTION TO

Republic of the Philippines

April 14, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

Because he threatened to kill us all, your Honor.

"A No, sir, he just told us to go home to our house, sir.

"Q At about what time?

"A No, sir.

"A Yes, sir.

"A Yes, sir.

"A I was crying, sir.

In People vs. Galas,17 the Court has held:

Applicable here is Smith Bell & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals:[20]

We are mindful that in Republic v. Asiapro Cooperative,[24] we ruled that the

effect of unsettling this well-settled doctrine. It is allowable to reason back from a

ANTONIO T. CARPIO TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

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