Spouses Roberto and Adelaida Pen v.

Spouses Santos and Linda Julian

January 11, 2016
G.R. No. 160408

Facts:
A petition for certiorari was filed before the Supreme Court.
On April 9, 1968, the appellees obtained a P60, 000-loan from appellant
Adelaida Pena and followed by extended loans on May 13, 1986 and May 27, 1986
amounting P50, 000 and P10, 000. Both loans were charged interest at 6% per
month. As security, on May 23, 1986, the appellees executed a real estate
mortgage over their property covered TCT no. 32733 registered under the name of
Santos Julian Jr. The Owners duplicate of TCT was delivered to the appellants.
On July 1989, appellants alleged appellee Linda that she offered to
repurchase the property to which the former agreed at the repurchase price of
P436, 115 payable in cash due July 31, 1989. The appellees failed to repurchase on
the agreed date and offered again to repurchase on Feb. 1990 with the same
amount but still failed.
Appellants allege that instead paying the balance, the appellees instituted a
civil complaint against the on Sept. 8, 1994 and filed an adverse claim and lis
pendens which were annotated at the back of the title of the property.
On the other hand, the appellees aver the following: at the time the
mortgage was executed, they were likewise required by the appellant Adelaida to
sign a 1-page document purportedly an Absolute Deed of Sale. Said document did
not contain any consideration and was undated, unfilled and not notarized. They
allege that their total payment amounted to P115, 400 and their last payment was
made on June 28 1990 in the amount of P100,000.
In Dec. 1992, Linda offered to pay Adelaida the amount of P150, 000 but the
latter refused the offer. Linda then wanted to see the land title but Adelaida refused.
She later discovered in the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City that the said title to
the mortgaged property was already registered to Adelaida.
August 12, 1994, Linda and her spouse formally demanded the reconveyance
of the title and for the property to them but the appellants refused. The appellees
also discovered several Declaration of Real Property and a Deed of Sale consisting
of 2 pages which was notarized by Atty. Cezar Chung.
September 8, 1994, appellees filed a suit for the Cancellation of the Sale and
Cancellation of Title issued to the appellants, Recovery of Possession; Damages with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction.

RTC ruled in favour of the respondents that the sale of the said agreement
lacked one of the essential requisites of a valid contract; that the promissory notes
and the real estate mortgage in favour of the petitioners were nonetheless valid,
rendering the respondents to still pay their outstanding obligation with interest.
On the appeal of the petitioners to the Court of Appeals, the court affirmed
the RTC with modification under assailed decision on October 20, 2003. The CA
pronounced the Deed of Sale as void but not because if the supposed lack of
consideration as the RTC indicated, but because of the Deed of Sale having been
executed at the same time as the Real Estate Mortgage which rendered as details
would filled out upon the default by the respondents; that the promissory notes
contained no stipulation on the payment of the interest on the obligation for which
reason no monetary interest could be imposed for the use of money; and that
compensatory interest should instead be imposed as a form of damages arising
from Lindas failure to pay the outstanding obligations.
ISSUE:
i.
ii.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in the ruling against the
validity of the Deed of Sale; and
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in the ruling that no
monetary interest was due for Lindas use of Adelaidas money.

Ruling:
Article 2088 of the Civil Code of the Philippines prohibits the creditor from
appropriating the things given by way of pledge or mortgage or from disposing of
them. Any stipulation to the contrary is null and void. The elements for pactum
commisorium to exist are as follows. To wit: a.) that there should be a pledge or
mortgage wherein property is pledged and mortgaged by way of security for the
payment of the principal obligation; and b.) that there should be a stipulation for
automatic appropriation by the creditor of the thing pledged or mortgaged in the
event of non-payment of the principal obligation within the stipulation period. The
first element is present in the case at bar and the second element was implied from
Lindas having signed the blank Deed of Sale with her signing the Real Estate
Mortgage.
The haste with which the transfer of property was made upon tge default by
Linda on her obligation, and the eventual transfer of the property in a manner not in
the form of a valid Dacion en Pago ultimately confirmed the nature of the
transaction as a Pactum Commissorium.
IN the given facts, the Court should not disturb or undo CAs conclusion in
absence of the clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness or capriciousness on the part of
the CA.

The petitioners have theorized that their transaction with the respondent was
a
valid Dacion En Pago. Yet, the debt of the respondents subsisted despite the
transfer of the property in favour of Adelaida.
Article 1318 of the Civil Code states that the requisites for any contract to be
valid are namely: a) the consent of the contracting parties, b) the object, and c) the
consideration. There is a perfection of contract when there is meeting of the minds
of the parties on each of these requisites. The absence from Lindas copy of the
Deed of Sale was credible proof of the lack of an essential requisites for the sale.
In the issue of monetary interest from the judgement, Article 1956 of the Civil
Code states that no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in
writing. Hence, in the case at bar, monetary interest cannot be validly imposed.
Wherefore, the Supreme Court affirms the decision of CA with modification.

Apostolic Vicar of Tabuk, Inc represented by Bishop Prudencio

Andaya, Jr.,petitioner Versus Spouses Ernesto and Elizabeth Sison
and Venacio Wadas,respondents
GR No 191132, January 27,2016

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the November 23, 2009
and January 26, 2010 Civil Case No. 2-2009 of Branch 26, RTC of Luna,
Apayao. The RTC dismissed the petitioner's Rule 47 petition for annulment
of judgment addressing the decision of the 6th MCTC of Kabugao Conner in
SPL-Civil Case No.32-2005-Cr.

Antecedents: February 16,2005 - respondents spouses Wadas filed a

forcible entry complaint against the petitioner represented by Fr. Gerry
Gudmalin. August 29,2004- respondents alleged that Fr. Gudmalin, priest of
St. Anthony Church of the Vicar Apostolic of Mountain Province, ordered the
forcible demolition of their respective parameter fences in order to expand
the area of the Church. Priest dispossessed them of their land and began
constructing a building that encroached on portions of their respective lots.
March 11, 2005 MCTC Junior Process Server Raul Abad executed an officer's
return wherein defendant went to Manila, thus summons was only received

by the secretary. July 13, 2005 - case was submitted for decision due to
defendant's failure to file its answer despite of summons. August 12, 2005 MCTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondents.Ordered Petitioner to
(1) refrain from any further construction within the respondent's property (2)
remove their constructions (3) vacate the property (4) pay damages.
September 19, 2005 - petitioner filed an urgent manifestation and motion
beforethe MCTC that (1) land subject is owned and possessed by petitioner
represented by Rev. Monsignor Prudencio Andaya Jr., not by Fr. Gudmalin as
alleged in the complaint (2) it had been denied due process because it was
neither impleaded nor served summons.
August 28, 2006 - MCTC denied petitioner's urgent motion for it was
prohibited pleading under Section 19 of the Rules on Summary Procedure. It
stressed that in ejectment cases, basic issue is possession de facto, not
ownership; the proper defendant is the person who actually disturbed the
complainant's possession over the property.
September 7, 2007 - petitioner filed an appeal but was subsequently
dismissed due to failure to file an appellant's memorandum within
reglementary period.
November 23, 2009 - RTC reconsidered its denial and dismissed the
petition got failure to state the cause of action. The RTC reasoned that the
petitioner's filing of a notice of appeal and subsequent failure to file its
appeal memorandum precluded its resort to annulment of judgment; the
remedy is not available to a party who lost his right to appeal due to his own
fault.

Issue: Whether or not the respondents are the actual occupants if the
subject property and that the named defendant is the real party-in-interest.

Ruling: In an ejectment suit (accion interdictal) the sole issue is the right of
physical or material possession over the subject real property independent of
any claim of ownership by the parties involved. Ownership over the property
is immaterial and is only passed on provisionally got the limited purpose of
determining which party has better right to possession. Purpose of an
ejectment suit for Forcible Entry (detention) is to protect the person who had
prior physical possession against another who unlawfully entered the

property and usurped his possession. The suit is filed against the
possessor(s) of the property at the commencement of action and not against
one who does not in fact occupy the land. In the present case, it was alleged
that it was Fr. Gudmalin, acting for the church, who forcibly entered the
property previously held by the respondent's and who remains in possession.
Hence, they were correctly impleaded as defendant. Therefore, Vicariate of
Mt. Province have no legal personality to ask for the annulment of the MCTC
judgment and that respondents are the actual occupants of the subject
matter.

SHERYL LOU J. COLOMA

Gina Endaya Petitioner vs. Ernesto V.Villaos Respondent G-R.No.202416

Facts:
Petitioner and the other heirs of Atilano Villaos filed before the
RTC.The complaint sought the recovery of several lots, including that on which the
PVH and wooden Summer Homes are located.
The complaint in the main said that the purported sale of the affected
lots, from Atilano to respondent was spurious.
According to respondent, he bought from Atilano eight (8) parcels of
land, including those where PVH and WSH stood. Respondent then took the
possession of the lots and started to manage and operate the said hotels.
Respondent then told the petitioners to vacate the premises, through an ejectment
case with preliminary mandatory injunction, giving them a period of six (6) months
to do so.
Instead of living, petitioner even participated in a violent and
unlawful take-over of PVH and WSH.
Petitioner argued that during the alleged execution of said deeds,
Atillano was no longer ambulatory and could no longer talk and give assent to the
deeds of sale.
Finally, petitioner questioned the priority of the ejectment case
since according to her, they already have filed Civil Case No.4162 precisely to nullify
the deeds of sale.

In its decision, the MTCC held that the action questioning the
ownership does not bar the filing of an ejectment case since the only issue for
resolution in an unlawful detainer case is the physical or material possession of the
property independent of any claim of ownership.
On appeal. The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTCC, holding
that the pendency of Civil Case No.4162 could not be considered as ground for
dismissal of the present ejectment case under the principle of litis pendentia
because the parties their assert contrasting rights and prayed for different reliefs .
Aggrieved by the decision, the petitioner filed the petition for
review. An amended petition states that the RTC erred in affirming the MTCC; that
the MTCC and RTC erred in not passing upon the issue of validity of the deeds of
sale executed by Atilano in favour of respondent and declaring that said issue
should be resolved in Civil Case No. 4162 for declaration of the sale.
The CA denied the petition .It affirmed the decision of the RTC
when it ruled that the deeds of sale are presumed to be valid because these were
notarized.

Issue:
Who has the better right over the said property?
Ruling:
The petitioner has a better right over the assailed property.
In resolving the petition for review, the CA lost sight of the legal principle
that in resolving the issue of possession in an ejectment case, the registered owner
of the property is preferred over the transferee under an unregistered deed of sale.
In the present case, there is no dispute that the petitioner is the holder of a
Torrens title over the entire Lot 83. Respondents have only their notarized but
unregistered kasulatan sa Bilihan to support their claim of ownership. Thus, even if
respondents proof of ownership has in its favour of juris tantum presumption of
authenticity and due execution, the same cannot prevail over petitioners Torrens
tittle.
While respondent has in his favour deeds of sale over the eight parcels of
land, these deeds were not registered; thus, tittle remained in the name of the
owner and seller Atalino. Under the article 777 of the Civil Code, the rights of the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. Thus,
petitioners and her coheirs should have been favoured on the question of

possession, being heirs who succeeded the registered owner of the properties in
dispute. Clearly, the MTCC, RTCC and CA erred in ruling in favour of respondent.

SPOUSES ROLANDO AND SUSIE GOLEZ

vs
HEIRS OF DOMINGO BERTULDO
G.R. NO. 201289, MAY 30, 2016

Facts:
The case involves two neighboring unregistered parcels of land located at
Roxas City, designated as lots 1024 and 1025. In 1976, Benito Bertuldo sold
lot 1024 to Susie Golez. The metes and bounds of the lot were clearly
indicated in the executed Deed of Absolute Sale. Thereafter, the petitioners
began the construction of their house on lot 1025 instead of 1024. Domingo
Bertuldo claimed ownership over said lot and objected against the house
construction. After Domingos death, the relocation survey conducted by the
respondents revealed that the petitioners house is constructed on lot 1025.
Spouses Golez asserted that Benito clearly pointed the boundaries of the lot
which covered the entire area. They executed an Amended Deed of Absolute
Sale in 1993 to change the stated property sold as lot 1024 to lot 1025
along with the specification of the metes and bounds to correct the error.

In 2009, the respondents filed a complaint for Unlawful Detainer against

the petitioners with the MCTC court ruled in favor of the former, ordering the
latter to vacate and remove their house built on lot 1025. The RTC and CA
likewise affirmed the MCTC decision. Hence, the appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not an action for Unlawful Detainer is the proper remedy.

Held:
Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court defines two entirely distinct causes
of action for a person deprived of possession of land by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth: 1. action to recover possession founded on
illegal occupation from the beginning - Forcible Entry; and 2. action founded
on Unlawful Detention by a person who originally acquired possession legally
- Unlawful Detainer. The test in determining the cause of action is the nature
of entry into the land by the defendant. If the entry is illegal, the proper
cause of action against the intruder is forcible entry. If the entry is legal and
becomes illegal thereafter, the cause f action is unlawful detainer.

In the case at bar, the facts clearly show that the petitioners possession
of the land was unlawful from the start. There was no tolerance nor
permission from Domingo of such possession. In an unlawful detainer, the
defendants possession of the land must be permitted by the owner through
an express or implied contract. The proper cause of action should have been
one for forcible entry. However, such action prescribes one year reckoned
from the date of the defendants actual entry into the land. One of the
remedies available for the respondents to recover possession of the lot is
Accion Publiciana. Such remedy is the plenary action to recover right of
possession filed in the RTC when dispossession has lasted for more than a
year. Hence, in the present case, the action will not be one of forcible entry
nor unlawful detainer.

Petition for review on certiorari is granted. The complaint for unlawful

detainer is dismissed.

(PACIFER VICTORINO C. TICAO)

Tan Siok Kuan and Pute Ching vs Felicismo Boy Ho, Rodolfo C. Returta, Vicente Salas and
Lolita Malonzo
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari for a civil case in which the petitioners alleged that they are
the owners of a parcel of land and its improvements which the defendants were possessing. It
was stated that there were separate complaints for unlawful detainer and that the petitioner
alleged the defendants were leasing their land from the year 1973 and the defendants failed to

pay in 1997 and in 2003 the petitioners notified the defendants that for their failure to pay
rentals. The defendants were given 10 days to pay or else vacate the premises which was ignored
and as such prompted the petitioners to file a civil case. Two of the respondents contended that
they could not have been subjected to lease because of the reason that the petitioners were not
Filipino citizens which do not allow them to own land here in the Philippines while the other 5
contended that there is no existing contract between them and the petitioners and that they
already possess the land for 37 years. The defendants also added that if the titles of the
petitioners are authentic the case that should have been filed is accion publiciana and not
unlawful detainer because they have been in possession of the land. After trial in Metropolitan
Trial Court, it ruled in favor of the petitioners which said that the defendants impliedly admitted
the existence of the lease. Upon appeal the Regional Trial Court affirmed the decision of the
lower court. However when appealed to the Court of Appeals it was reversed in favor of the
defendants.
Issue: Whether or not the action that should have been filed is accion publiciana?
Ruling: Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that accion publiciana should have been filed considering
the fact that the petitioners failed to show evidence that there is an existing tenancy relationship
between them and the defendants which suggests that unlawful detainer will not apply. Although
defendants and respondents were made party to the complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the
petitioner, it is clear that they do not have the same defenses. Contrary to defendants positions,
respondents, as early filing for their response to petitioners demand letter, firmly and consistently
denied the existence of any lease contract between them and petitioners over the subject land.
Wherefore finding no reversible error in the assailed ruling, the court resolves to deny the present
petition.

ROSARIO VICTORIA and ELMA PIDLAOAN vs. NORMITA JACOB PIDLAOAN, HERMINIGILDA
PIDLAOAN and EUFEMIA PIDLAOAN

20, April 2019

Facts:
In 1984, Elma bought a parcel of land with in Lucena City, where Rosario caused the
construction of a house but she left again after the house was built the latter left for Saudi
Arabia.

Elma allegedly mortgaged the house and lot in 1989 and when the properties were about to
be foreclosed, Elma allegedly asked for help from her sister-in-law, Eufemia to redeem the
property and the latter's daughter, Normita, agreed to provide the funds.
Elma offered the sale of the parcel of land to Eufemia and her daughter, and was accepted.
Hence, Elma executed a deed of sale entitled transferring the ownership of the lot to
Normita. The last provision in the said instrument provides that Elma shall eject the person
who erected the house and deliver the lot to Normita.
When Elma and Normita were about to have the document notarized, the notary public
advised them to donate the lot instead to avoid capital gains tax. Hence, a deed of donation
was executed by Elma in favour of Normita and since then the latter had been paying the
real property taxes over the lot but Elma continued to occupy the house.
Rosario found out about the donation when she returned to the country a year or two after
the transaction and in 1997, herein petitioners filed a complaint for reformation of contract,
cancellation of Transfer of Certificate Title, and damages with prayer for preliminary
injunction against the respondents.
The petitioners argued that: first, they co-owned the lot because both of them contributed
the money used to purchase it; second, Elma and Normita entered into an equitable
mortgage to secure Elmas loan but they executed a deed of sale instead; and third, the
deed of donation was simulated.
In their answer, the respondents admitted that the deed of donation was simulated and that
the original transaction was a sale, however, there was no agreement to constitute a real
estate mortgage on the lot.
The RTC ruled that Rosario and Elma co-owned the lot and the house. Thus, Elma could only
donate her one-half share in the lot. Hence, the respondents appealed to the CA.
The CA reversed the RTCs decision and dismissed the petitioners complaint. Hence the
case was brought before the Supreme Court.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Rosario is a co-owner of the parcel of land.
2. Whether or not the deed of donation was simulated and that the transaction between
Elma and Normita was a mere equitable mortgage.
Ruling:
On the first issue, the court ruled that the land under consideration is solely owned
by Elma, and not under the claim of co-ownership. Petitioners failed to present proof of
Rosarios contributions in purchasing the lot from its previous owners. The execution of the
transfer documents solely in Elmas name alone militate against their claim of co-ownership.
Thus, the court finds no merit in the petitioners claim of co-ownership over the lot.

Neither does the mere construction of house in a parcel of land create a coownership. Article 448 of the Civil Code provides that if a person builds on anothers land in
good faith, the land owner may either: (a) appropriate the works as his own after paying
indemnity; or (b) oblige the builder to pay the price of the land. Thus, Rosarios construction
of a house on the lot did not create a co-ownership, regardless of the value of the house.
Rosario, however, is not without recourse in retrieving the house or its value.
As for the second issue, the court ruled that the deed of donation was simulated and
the parties real intent was to enter into a sale. In the present case, Elma and Normitas
contemporaneous and subsequent acts show that they were about to have the contract of
sale notarized but the notary public ill-advised them to execute a deed of donation instead.
Following this advice, they returned the next day to have a deed of donation notarized.
Clearly, Elma and Normita intended to enter into a sale that would transfer the ownership of
the subject matter of their contract but disguised it as a donation. Thus, the deed of
donation subsequently executed by them was only relatively simulated.

Article 1346 of the New Civil Code provides that:

An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when it
does not prejudice a third person and is not intended for any purpose contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or
public policy binds the parties to their real
agreement.
A review of the sale contract shows that the parties intended no equitable mortgage.
The contract even contains Elma's undertaking to remove Rosario's house on the property.
This undertaking supports the conclusion that the parties executed the contract with the end
view of transferring full ownership over the lot to Normita.
n sum, we rule that based on the records of the case, Elma and Normita entered in a
sale contract, not a donation. Elma sold the entire property to Normita. Accordingly, TCT was
validly issued in Normita's name.

National Housing Authority v Manila Seedling Bank Foundation Inc.

G.R. No. 183543

June 20 , 2016

FACTS:
NHA owned a 120-hectare of government property in Diliman, Quezon City. Through
Proclamation No. 1670 issued by President Marcos, he ordered to reserve a 7 hectare area and
granted usufructuary rights over it. However, respondent occupied a total of 16 hectares which
exceeded the 7-hectare area granted to it. The excess of the land was leased to private tenants.

On 15 Febuary 1993, President Ramos issued E.O. 58 creating an inter-agency Executive

Committee to inspect the 50 hectare of the North Triangle Property issued by former President
Aquino. A portion of the same was occupied by the former to vacate the area.
Respondent filed a writ of preliminary injunction against the petitioner. The latter
answered that the former vacate the area with the excess hectare, and to pay rent, with exemplary
damage, attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
On appeal, CA affirmed the RTC ruling. The RTC ruled that the turnover of only the
excess hectare to petitioner, but disallowed the recovery of rent, damages, fees and litigation
expenses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to recover rent, exemplary damages, attorneys fees
and litigation expenses from respondent.
RULING:
Yes. The petitioner is only entitled to recover rent. Respondent is a possessor in bad faith
as to the excess, the former had no right to act beyond the confines of 7-hectare area granted to
it.
Under Article 549 in relation to Art. 546 and 443 of the Civil Code, a possessor in bad
faith has to reimburse the legitimate possessor for everything that the former received and that
the latter could have received had its possession not been interrupted. Respondent shall be made
to account for the fruits it received from the time it took possession until the time it surrendered
the excess to petitioner. However, respondent is entitled to a refund of the necessary expenses it
incurred for the preservation of the land.

HELEN CALIMOSO, MARILYN P. CALIMOSO and LIBY P. CALIMOSO vs AXEL D.

ROULLO
FACTS:
In respondents complaint for Easement of Right of Way, he alleged: that he is
the owner of the lot that is isolated by several surrounding estates, including owned
by petitioners; that he needs a right-of-way in order to have access to a public road;
and that the shortest and most convenient access to the nearest public road passes
through the petitioners lot.

The petitioners objected to the establishment of the easement because it would

cause substantial damage to the two (2) houses already standing on their property.
They alleged that the respondent has other right-of-way alternatives.
RTC granted the respondents complaint and ordered the petitioners to provide the
respondent an easement of right-of-way.
The CA affirmed in toto the RTCs decision and held that all the requisites for
the establishment of a legal or compulsory easement of right-of-way were present in
the respondents case: first, that the subject lot is indeed surrounded by estates
owned by different individuals and the respondent has no access to any existing
public road; second, that the respondent has offered to compensate the petitioners
for the establishment of the right-of-way through the latters property; third, that
the isolation of the subject lot was not caused by the respondent as he purchased
the lot without any adequate ingress or egress to a public highway; and, fourth and
last, given the available options for the right-of-way, the route that passes through
the petitioners lot requires the shortest distance to a public road and can be
established at a point least prejudicial to the petitioners property.
The petitioners moved to reconsider the CAs decision arguing that, while the
establishment of the easement through their lot provided for the shortest route, the
adjudged right-of-way would cause severe damage not only to the nipa hut situated
at the corner of the petitioners lot, but also to the bedroom portion of the other
concrete house that stood on the property. The CA, however, did not consider the
petitioners arguments on the ground that the matters alleged were not raised or
proven before the trial court, thus, it denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether the right of way passing through petitioners lot satisfies the fourth
requirement of being established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
RULING:
Provided under Article 650 of the Civil Code, whenever there are several
tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the right-of-way must be established
on the tenement where the distance to the public road or highway is
shortest and where the least damage would be caused. If these two criteria
(shortest distance and least damage) do not concur in a single tenement, we have
held in the past that the least prejudice criterion must prevail over the shortest
distance criterion.
In this case, the establishment of a right-of-way through the petitioners lot
would cause the destruction of the wire fence and a house on the petitioners
property. Although this right-of-way has the shortest distance to a public road, it is
not the least prejudicial considering the destruction pointed out, and that an option
to traverse two vacant lots without causing any damage, albeit longer, is available.
It was held that "mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is
required by law as the basis of setting up a compulsory easement;" that "a longer

way may be adopted to avoid injury to the servient estate, such as when there are
constructions or walls which can be avoided by a round-about way."
Petition granted.

SPOUSES ROMULO H. ESPIRITU & EVELYN ESPIRITU

VS
SPOUSES NICANOR SAZON &ANALIZA G. SAZON
GR NO.204965
MARCH 2, 2016

FACTS: Sps. Espiritu are the registered owners of an 8,268 square meter parcel of land situated
in the Barangays of Bundagul and Paralayunan, Mabalacat, Pampanga. On October 5, 2006, Sps.
Sazon filed on the RTC of Angeles City an application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
against Sps. Espiritu, enjoining them from committing acts of possession and constructing a
factory and warehouse over the property. Sps. Sazon claimed to be the lawful owners of the
parcel of land when they purchased the land to Sps. Diaz, the latter surrendered the physical
possession to Sps. Sazon on December 27, 1996, the same day the Deed of Absolute Sale was
executed. On August 2003, Sps. Espiritu occupied and fenced the land, invoking that they
purchased the land to Sps. Peco on October 4, 2002. However, during an investigation, it was
found out that there has been a cancellation of sale when Sps. Peco purchased the parcel of land
from Sps. Diaz on December 4, 2002. Sps Sazon alleged that the title that Sps. Espiritu have is
null and void since Leticia Diaz died on March 2001, thereby making the said sale impossible.
The RTC granted the application, provided that Sps. Sazon will post a bond of 1 million pesos in
favour of the defendant. The CA affirmed the same when it was appealed to them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in finding that the RTC did not abuse
its discretion when it granted the writ of preliminary injunction in favour of Sps. Sazon.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the RTC did not abuse its discretion since a writ of
preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the
judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, an agency, or a person to refrain from a
particular act or acts. The reason behind this judicial power is to prevent a threatened or

continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly
investigated and advisedly adjudicated. The petition is denied. However, the act of possession by
the Sps. Espiritu to the land cannot be stopped because injunctive reliefs are not granted for the
purpose of taking the property.

ORIX METRO LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION

Versus
CARDLINE INC., MARY C. CALUBAD, SONY M. CALUBAD AND NG BENG
SHENG
GR. NO. 201417, JANUARY 13, 2016
FACTS:
Cardline Inc., through its principal stockholders and respondents as their
officers signed the surety agreements in their personal capacities to guarantee the
companies obligation under each lease agreement when the latter leased four (4)
machines from Orix.
Orix formally demanded payment from Cardline when it failed to pay its rent
amounting to P 9, 369, 657.00 as of July 12, 2007, but Cardline refused to pay the
unpaid obligations.
Consequently, Orix formally filed a complaint for replevin, sum of money and
damages with an application of writ of seizure against Cardline and the individual
respondents. The RTC then issued the same allowing Orix to recover the machines
from Cardline. On May 6, 2008, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Orix.
The respondents filed an appeal and argued that RTC erred declaring them
default. Orix then filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution which the RTC
granted and then issued the same commanding the sheriff to enforce the order. The
respondents filed a motion for a status quo order but the RTC denied it.
The CA ruled granting the petition for prohibition executed by the
respondents under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailed December 1, 2010 order.
CA granted the petition and annulled the RTCs order and prohibits the sheriff from
executing the previous order dated May 6, 2008.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly prohibited the RTC from enforcing the writ of
execution.
HELD:
The CA cited Sections 19. 2 (d) and 19.3 of the lease agreements in
interpreting the judgment. It was erroneously decided by the CA when they erred in

deducting the guarantee deposit from the outstanding debt, which contradicts to
the provisions of the lease agreements.
Two points were identified for review under the lease agreements: first, the
machines market values were not intended to reduce much less offset, Cardlines
debt; and second, the guaranty deposit was intended to be automatically forfeited
to serve as penalty for Cardlines default.
Wherefore, it ruled that the RTCs judgment that the return or recovery of the
machined does not reduce Cardlines outstanding obligation unless the returned
machines are sold. No sale transpired pursuant to the lease agreements.
Furthermore, the guaranty deposit was not meant to reduce Cardlines unpaid
obligation. Thus, the latters actual damages remain at Php 9, 369, 651.00.
Hence, CA erroneously interpreted the RTCs judgment, in which it erred in
preventing the RTC from enforcing the writ of execution.
Petition granted in favor of Orix. The January 6, 2012 decision and April 16,
2016 resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby revered and set aside under CA.
GR SP No. 11826 with the costs against the respondents.

Anna Phersolle Sotelo

LLB 2A
Property

October 9, 2015

[G.R. No. 209011. April 20, 2016.]

MALAYAN INSURANCE
Respondent.

COMPANY,

INC.,

Petitioner,

v.

DIANA

P.

ALIBUDBUD,

Facts
As senior vice president for Malayan's Sales Department, Alibudbud was
issued a 2004 honda Civic sedan under the company's car financing plan, with the
following conditions: 1) she must continuously stay and serve Malayan for at least 3
full years from the date of availment of the car financing plan; 2) that in case of
resignation, retirement or termination before the 3-year period, she shall pay in full
100% share of Malayan and the outstanding balance of his/her share of the cost of

the motor vehicle. Diana also executed a promissory note and a deed of chattel
mortgage in favor of Malayan.
Alibudbud was dismissed from employment due to redundancy in July 2005.
The company demanded that she surrender possession of the car, but she refused.
Malayan filed a complaint for replevin and/or sum of money before the RTC of
Manila. In the meantime, Alibudbud filed a case of illegal dismissal with the NLRC,
and in her Answer with Counterclaim in the civil case, asked for suspension of the
proceedings in view of the pendency of the labor case. She also argued that a
reasonable depreciation should be deducted from the book value of the car.
The RTC denied Alibudbud's Motion to Suspend Proceedings, wherein she
asseverated that the labor case she filed presented a prejudicial question to the
instant case. The RTC ruled that the replevin case shall be determined only on the
basis of the promissory note and the chattel mortgage. Trial on the merits ensued.
In the meantime, the labor case was dismissed.
The RTC granted the complaint for replevin. On appeal, the CA reversed the
RTC's decision, explaining that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the replevin action
because of the employer-employee relations between the parties which Malayan
never denied.

Issue
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to rule on the complaint for replevin.

Decision
Yes. Replevin is an action whereby the owner or person entitled to
repossession of goods or chattels may recover those goods or chattels from one
who has wrongfully distrained or taken, or who wrongfully detains such goods or
chattels. It is designed to permit one having the right to possession to recover
property in specie from one who has wrongfully taken or detained the property. The
term may refer either to the action itself, for the recovery of personalty, or to the
provisional remedy traditionally associated with it, by which possession of the
property may be obtained by the plaintiff and retained during the pendency of the
action. The present action involves the parties' relationship as debtor and creditor,
not their "employer-employee" relationship, thus, the issue in the replevin action is
separate and distinct from the illegal dismissal case. Malayan's demand for
Alibudbud to pay the 50% company equity over the car or, to surrender its
possession, is civil in nature. The trial court's ruling also aptly noted the Promissory
Note and Deed of Chattel Mortgage voluntarily signed by Alibudbud to secure her
financial obligation to avail of the car being offered under Malayan's Car Financing

Plan. Clearly, the issue in the replevin action is separate and distinct from the illegal
dismissal case. The Court further considers it justified for Malayan to refuse to
accept her offer to settle her car obligation for not being in accordance with the
Promissory Note and Deed of Chattel Mortgage she executed.
The Decision and Resolution of the CA are reversed and set aside.

Heirs of Jose Extremadura, represented by Elena H. Extremadura, Vs. Manuel Extremadura and
Marlon Extremadura G.R. No. 211065
Facts: Jose, now deceased, filed a civil action for quieting of title with recovery of possession, rendition
of accounting and damages, against his brother Manuel and his nephew Marlon.
Jose purchased three parcels of agricultural land located in Casiguran, Sorsogon from his Aunt
Corazon through a deed of sale. Since Jose resided in Manila, he placed one parcel, the subject land, in
Manuels care and that together with his son Marlon, religiously delivered the produce of said land from
1984 until 1995.
Unfortunately, respondents refused to deliver and vacate the land despite of repeated demands.
Respondents defense is that they have been in an open, continuous, peaceful, adverse, and uninterrupted
for 50 years and that the deed of sale presented by Jose is not legal or beneficial title contemplated by
Article 476 of the Civil Code.
The RTC ruled in favor of Jose. They ruled that Jose had a better right over the land as proven by
the deed of sale. Respondents elevated it to the Court of Appeals. The CA ruled in favor of the
respondents. It held that Jose failed to establish legal and equitable title over the subject land.
Hence this petition.
Issue: WON the CA correctly dismissed the civil case filed by Jose.
Ruling:
No, the CA was wrong in dismissing the case. In order for an action for quieting of title
to prosper, it is essential that the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to the property. The court finds
that Jose satisfactorily established his equitable title over the subject land entitling him-and now
petitioners as his successors-in-interest-to the removal of the cloud or doubt thereon, particularly, the
claim over the land that the respondents are claiming for themselves. Joses claim was supported by a
notarized document denominated as Deed of Absolute sale dated Dec. 18, 1984, whereby the previous
owners transferred the subject land to Jose for and in consideration of P6,000.00, for which Jose duly paid
the required capital gains tax. In regards to respondents argument that they acquired the said land through
prescription is untenable. Under Article 524 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary that the owner of a
parcel of land should himself occupy the property as someone in his name may perform the act. In other
words, the owner of real estate has possession, either when he himself is physically in occupation of the
property, or when another person who recognizes his rights as owner is in such occupancy.
Therefore, the action for quieting of title in Civil Case No. 2005-7552 should prosper to the
benefit of his heirs, herein petitionrers.

REBECCA FULLIDO VS. GINO GRILLI

FEBRUARY 29, 2016
G.R NO. 215014
FACTS:
Gino Grilli (Italian) and Rebecca Fullido (Filipino) had a common-law relationship for sixteen years.
Grilli financially assisted Fullido in procuring a lot located in Bikibg I, Dauis, Bohol which was
registered in her name under TCT No. 30626. On the said property, they built a residential house, which
was also funded by Grilli.
In 1998, Grilli and Fullido executed a contract of lease, a memorandum of agreement and a special power
of attorney. In the contract of lease, it was stipulated that Grilli as the lessee, would rent the lot in the
name of Fullido, for a period of fifty years and to be automatically renewed for another fifty years upon
its expiration in the amount of P 10,000.00 for the whole term of the lease contract. Also, Fullido, as the
lessor, was prohibited from selling, donating, or encumbering the said lot without the written consent of
Grilli. On the other hand, it was stated in the MOA that the ownership of the house and lot belongs to
Grilli since he paid for the purchase price. Moreover, if their common-law relationship be terminated,
Fullido could only sell the property to whomever Grilli so desired. Lastly, the SPA allowed Grilli to
administer, manage, and transfer the house and lot on behalf of Fullido.
Unfortunately, their common-law relationship ended due to infidelity. On September 8, 2010, Grilli filed
a complaint for unlawful detainer with a prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction against Fullido
before the MCTC which was later on dismissed. Grilli elevated the decision to the RTC which ruled in
his favor by virtue of the contract of lease executed by the parties.
Aggrieved, Fullido instituted an appeal before the CA alleging that her land was unlawfully transferred by
Grilli to Jacqueline Guibone by virtue of the SPA earlier executed by Fullido. On May 31, 2013, the CA
upheld the decision of the RTC, emphasizing that both the MOA and the contract of lease gave Grilli the
possession and use of the house and lot.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rebecca Fullido may be ejected from the property?
HELD:
The Court rules that Grilli has no cause of action for unlawful detainer against Fullido. Section 1 of Rule
70 of the Rules of Court provides that the complainant must either be a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other
person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld. In other words, the
complainant in unlawful detainer case must have some right of possession over the property.
In the present case, the lease contract and the MOA, from which Grilli purportedly drew his right of
possession, were found to be null and void for being unconstitutional. A contract that violates the
Constitution and the law is null and void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligation. It

produces no legal effect at all. Hence, as void contracts could not be the source of rights, Grilli had no
possessory right over the subject land. A person who does not have any right over a property from the
beginning cannot eject another person possessing the same. Consequently, Grillis complaint for unlawful
detainer must be dismissed for failure to prove his cause of action.
The petition is granted. The May 31, 2013 decision of the CA and its September 24, 2014 resolution are
reversed and set aside.

REBECCA FULLIDO VS. GINO GRILLI

FEBRUARY 29, 2016
G.R NO. 215014
FACTS:
Gino Grilli (Italian) and Rebecca Fullido (Filipino) had a common-law relationship for sixteen years.
Grilli financially assisted Fullido in procuring a lot located in Bikibg I, Dauis, Bohol which was
registered in her name under TCT No. 30626. On the said property, they built a residential house, which
was also funded by Grilli.
In 1998, Grilli and Fullido executed a contract of lease, a memorandum of agreement and a special power
of attorney. In the contract of lease, it was stipulated that Grilli as the lessee, would rent the lot in the
name of Fullido, for a period of fifty years and to be automatically renewed for another fifty years upon
its expiration in the amount of P 10,000.00 for the whole term of the lease contract. Also, Fullido, as the
lessor, was prohibited from selling, donating, or encumbering the said lot without the written consent of
Grilli. On the other hand, it was stated in the MOA that the ownership of the house and lot belongs to
Grilli since he paid for the purchase price. Moreover, if their common-law relationship be terminated,
Fullido could only sell the property to whomever Grilli so desired. Lastly, the SPA allowed Grilli to
administer, manage, and transfer the house and lot on behalf of Fullido.
Unfortunately, their common-law relationship ended due to infidelity. On September 8, 2010, Grilli filed
a complaint for unlawful detainer with a prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction against Fullido
before the MCTC which was later on dismissed. Grilli elevated the decision to the RTC which ruled in
his favor by virtue of the contract of lease executed by the parties.
Aggrieved, Fullido instituted an appeal before the CA alleging that her land was unlawfully transferred by
Grilli to Jacqueline Guibone by virtue of the SPA earlier executed by Fullido. On May 31, 2013, the CA
upheld the decision of the RTC, emphasizing that both the MOA and the contract of lease gave Grilli the
possession and use of the house and lot.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rebecca Fullido may be ejected from the property?
HELD:
The Court rules that Grilli has no cause of action for unlawful detainer against Fullido. Section 1 of Rule
70 of the Rules of Court provides that the complainant must either be a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other
person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld. In other words, the
complainant in unlawful detainer case must have some right of possession over the property.
In the present case, the lease contract and the MOA, from which Grilli purportedly drew his right of
possession, were found to be null and void for being unconstitutional. A contract that violates the
Constitution and the law is null and void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligation. It
produces no legal effect at all. Hence, as void contracts could not be the source of rights, Grilli had no
possessory right over the subject land. A person who does not have any right over a property from the
beginning cannot eject another person possessing the same. Consequently, Grillis complaint for unlawful
detainer must be dismissed for failure to prove his cause of action.
The petition is granted. The May 31, 2013 decision of the CA and its September 24, 2014 resolution are
reversed and set aside.

Melicio Domingo vs Spouses Genaro Molina and Elina Molina, substituted by Ester
Molina
GR No. 200274, 20 April 2016

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Melecio Domingo

assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 9, 2011.
FACTS:
Spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a parcel of land in Tarlac. During his
lifetime Anastatcio borrowed money from the respondents. After the death of Flora,
Anastacio sold his interest over the lad to spouses Molina to pay his debts. The sale
was annotated at the OCT of the property. Anastacio died in 1986.
In 1995 the one half of the undivided portion of the land was transferred to the
spouses Molina. Melecio, one of the children of Anastacio learned about the transfer
and filed a Complaint for Annulment of Title and Recovery of Ownership. He claims
that the land was given to the spouses Molina as collateral for the money borrowed

by Anastacio. Anastaco could not validly sell his interest over the land without the
approval of Flora because Flora was already dead at the time of the sale.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale of the conjugal property to spouses Molina is valid.

RULING:
Yes, the sale is valid. An implied co-ownership among Floras heirs governed the
conjugal properties pending litigation and partition. Article 493 of the Civil Code on
co-ownership provides:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his art and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co
ownership.

Anastacio, as a co-owner, had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided
interest of co-owners. Consequently, Anastacios sale to the spouses Molina without
the consent of the other co-owners was not totally void, for Anastacios rights or a
portion thereof were thereby effectively transferred, making the spouses Molina a
co-owner of the subject property to the extent of Anastacios interest. This result
conforms with the well-established principle that the binding of a contract must be
recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so (quando res non valet ut ago,
valeat quantum valere potest).

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
Milagros Diaz et. al. VS Spouses Punzalan
G.R. No. 203075
March 16, 2016

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners alleged that their mother, Rufina Vda. De Catacutan, who died on November
17, 2005, had acquired a parcel of land in Mapanique, Candaba, Pampanga, consisting of 3, 272
square meters. They contended that respondent spouses Punzalan constructed their house on a
portion of said lot without their consent and knowledge. But petitioners allowed them to stay,
thinking that they would vacate once their need for the property arises. However, when they
made a demand, the Spouses Punzalan refused to vacate. Thus, on April 9, 2008, petitioners
wrote the spouses a formal demand letter to vacate. Still they refused to leave the property. On
August 22, 2008, petitioners filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer with the MCTC.
The MCTC then rendered a Decision on June 22, 2009, in favor of the plaintiffs. The
defendants were ordered to vacate and surrender its possession to the plaintiffs.
The Spouses Punzalan brought the case to the RTC. The RTC also then affirmed the
MCTC Decision in toto. Aggrieved, the Spouses Punzalan forwarded the cases to the Court of
Appeals. On February 17, 2012, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction.
The petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied hence this petition.
The petitioners insist that their complaint causes an action for unlawful detainer which therefore
gives the MCTC jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners claim or cause of action is one for unlawful detainer and
not for forcible entry.
HELD:
The Supreme Court disagrees. A complaint for unlawful detainer should have the
following: 1) the defendants initial possession of the property was lawful; 2) that such
possession became illegal; 3) because they refused to vacate and as a result deprived the plaintiff
of the property; and 4) the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment within one (1) year
from the last demand to vacate the property.

Despite the petitioners contention, the Supreme Court finds that the allegations make up
a case for forcible entry and not unlawful detainer. The evidence clearly reveal that the spouses
possession was illegal at the inception and not merely tolerated. The Spouses Punzalan started to
occupy the lot and built a house in it without the permission and consent of petitioners. This is
categorized as possession by stealth which is forcible entry.
In the similar case of Zacarias vs Anacay, the fact that petitioners actually tolerated the
spouses continued occupation after discovery of their entry into the subject premises will not
and cannot automatically create an action for unlawful detainer. It must be stressed that the
defendants possession in unlawful detainer is originally legal but simply became illegal due to
the expiration or termination of the right to possess. The plaintiffs supposed acts of tolerance
must have been present right from the start of possession. Otherwise, if it was unlawful from the
start it is actionable for forcible entry. Filing for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.
In this instant case, the failure of petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts
constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal. Since the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for
unlawful detainer was not met, the MCTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case. A void
judgment for lack of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. Petitioners may be the lawful possessors
of the subject property, but they unfortunately availed of the wrong remedy to recover
possession. Nevertheless, they may still opt to file an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria
with the proper RTC.
This petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals; dated February 17,
2012, and Resolution dated July 25, 2012, are AFFIRMED.

REX DACLISON vs. EDUARDO BAYTION

G.R. No. 219811, April 06, 2016
Eduardo Baytion, together with his siblings, co-owned a parcel of land consisting of
1,500 sq. m which is bounded by a creek. Erected on the said land is a building
which Baytion, as administrator, leased to third persons. In 1978, Baytion leased the
property Antonio dela Cruz who started a business therein. Ten or fifteen years later,
the government erected a stone walling called riprap at the creek, leaving a deep
down-sloping area between the property and the riprap. Antonio negotiated with a
certain engineer so that he will have the possession of the said down-sloping area.
After paying the right to possess the area, Antonio had it filled up such that it would

be level with the property of Baytion. Ernanie dela Cruz succeeded Leonida dela
Cruz who had assumed the business upon Antonios death. On February, 2008,
Ernanie entered in a business venture with Rex Daclison.
On May 2008, the lease expired and Baytion made oral and written demands for
Daclison to vacate the property. Despite negotiations to continue with the lease,
Baytion still demanded that Daclison and De la Cruz vacate his property. As such,
Daclison and De la Cruz moved to the filled-up area. Baytion then instituted a
complaint for forcible entry and damages claiming that the said filled-up area is still
part of his property by virtue of accretion, construction, or improvement on the
property. Daclison contends that he owns the filled-up area by virtue of his open,
continuous and adverse possession and use of the property
The MeTC dismissed the case without prejudice on the ground that Baytion failed to
include his siblings as plaintiffs. On appeal, the RTC ruled that MeTC had no
jurisdiction on the ground that Baytions allegations failed to constitute a case of
forcible entry. It then took cognizance of the case and ruled that Baytion had a
better right to possess the property because the filled-up area was an improvement
of the land. The CA affirmed the RTCs decision.
Issue:
1
2

Whether or not Baytion has the right to possess the filled-up property by virtue
of accretion
Whether or not Baytion has the right to possess the filled-up property by virtue
of improvement or accession

Ruling:
1. No. Accretion occurs when:
a. the deposit be gradual and imperceptible;
b. it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and,
c. the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.
In the case at bar, the filled-up area was not a result of a gradual and imperceptible
deposit. The deposits were artificial and man-made and not the exclusive result of
the current from the creek adjacent to his property. Alluvion must be the exclusive
work of nature and not a result of human intervention. As such, no accretion to the
land was involved.
2. No. In order for accession to happen, Art. 445 of the Civil Code provides that the
improvement should be made, introduced or constructed within or on the property.
In the case at bar, the improvement was made in the creek outside of Baytions
property. Hence, the land could not be owned by Baytion through accession.

Republic of the Philippines et al. vs. Spouses Ildefonso B. Regulto and Francia R.
Regulto
Facts: Spouses Regulto own a parcel of land which they acquired by virtue of a deed
of absolute sale. The subject property originated from a Free Patent property.
Sometime in April 2011, DPWH apprised the spouses that the construction of its
road project will traverse their property. DPWH offered them just compensation.
However, DPWH withdrew its offer because the title of their land originated from a
Free Patent title, which contained a reservation in favour of the government of an
easement of right of way to 60 meters for public highways and similar works that
the government or any public or quasi-public service enterprise may reasonably
require for carrying on their business, with payment of damages for the
improvements only. The spouses filed a complaint for payment of proper just
compensation, damages with prayer for issuance of TPO and/or writ of preliminary
injunction against the petitioners. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the spouses do not have cause of action, however the RTC denied it.
Petitioners filed a motion for the issuance of the writ of possession of the subject
property in their favour, which the RTC affirmed. The RTC dismissed the Motion for
Reconsideration of the spouses and ordered the petitioners to pay the spouses just
compensation for the affected portion.
Issue: Whether the petitioners are liable for just compensation in enforcing the
Governments legal easement of right-of-way on the subject property, which
originated from the 7,159 sq. m. of public land awarded by free patent to the
predecessor-in-interest of the Spouses Regulto.
Held: Partially Granted. The Court held that a legal easement of right-of-way exists
in favour of the Government over the land that was originally a public land awarded
by free patent even if the land is subsequently sold to another. Lands granted by
patent shall be subject to a right-of-way not exceeding 60m. in width for public
highways, irrigation ditches, aqueducts and other similar works of the government
or any public enterprise, free of charge, except only for the value of the
improvement existing thereon that may be affected. The reservation contained in
the OCT of lands granted by free patent is not limited by any time period, thus, the
same is subsisting. This belies the supposition that the Government waived the
enforcement of its legal easement of right-of-way on the subject property when it
did not oppose the subdivision of the property in 1995. Although petitioners are not
obliged to pay just compensation, they are not free from any liability as to the
consequences of enforcing the said right-of-way, considering that more than half of
the property shall be devoted to the bypass road. They are liable to pay just
compensation for the remaining area.

Gr No. 193374
Heirs of the late Gerry Ecarma namely: Avelina Suiza-Ecarma, Dennis Ecrma, Jerry
Lyn Ecrma Pena, Antonia Ecarma, and Natalia Ecarma Sangalang, Petitioners
Vs
Court of Appeals and Renato Ecarma, Respondents
June 8, 2016

Facts:
The case involves the heirs quarrelling each other over inherited properties
and disagreement on how the properties shall be partitioned. This prompted the
petitioners to file petition for certiorari citing the Rules 65 of the Rules of Court. The
petitioner contend that the court of appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of discretion due to the two resolutions it issued.
The petitioners appealed the two orders of the RTC that approved the project
partition proposed by respondent Renato Ecarma, the administrator of the estate of
decedent Arminda vda de Ecarma, covering four properties. But the appeal to the
appellate court did not favor the petitioners in fact dismissed the petition due to the
procedural defects for not having complied with the section 13, Rule 44 of the Rules
of Court.
The properties were owned by Arminda and Natalio Ecarma. The properties
were acquired during the marriage. They have seven children. Upon the death of
natalio, the heirs executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of four properties
namely: Kintalad, Cuyapa and two properties in Lala. The half of Lala property was
intended for the decedent Arminda share. The four properties will be divided as
follows: two ninth will be that of Arminda, and the rest of the children will have oneninth each. The method of partitioning as agreed and signed by all of the heirs. This
was stipulated in the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate. But the properties were
not divided. The heir continue to co-owned the properties even until the death of
their mother Arminda on April 17, 1983.
Renato Ecarma, upon the death of his mother, petitioned for the probate of
Armindas will but was dismissed by the RTC of Quezon City. He then filed for
intestate proceedings before the Quezon City RTC last May 18, 1990. He was then

appointed as Special Administrator by the RTC. The conflict among the heirs
continue to persist thereby prompting Renato to move to terminate the coownership and filed or Partition of the Kitanlad property by March 9, 2005. This was
followed by project of partition of the LAla and Cuyapo properties through the
Omnibus Motion filed by Renato Ecarma dated April 7, 2005. The RTC approved the
proposed partition through the Order issued sated July 28, 2005.
The decision was opposed by heirs of Gerry and Rodolfo Ecarma. Then Renato
filed a comment on opposition to motion for reconsideration filed by Gerry and
Rodolfo Ecarma. The RTC denied the motion. Gerry Ecarma filed an appeal to the
CA. The CA ordered the petitioner to file an appellate brief. On the pendency of the
appeal, Gerry died. He was replaced by his heirs. Renato filed a motion to dismiss
the appellees brief.
The CA finding the brief devoid of merit due to the procedural defects, and
violation of Section 13 Rule 44 of the Rules of Court of Civil Procedure. The CA
dismissed the petition. The Petitioner filed motion for reconsideration attaching the
Supplemental Appellants brief which was dismissed by CA.
The petitioners thereby filed petition for certiorari under rule 65 of Rules of
Court.

Issue
1. Whether or not the Appellate Court committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by dismissing the motion filed
by the petitioners Gerry and Rodolfo Ecarma?
2. Whether or not there is a merit on the decision of the RTC granting the
order of partition on the subject properties.
Ruling
First, the appeal by certiorari under the Rule 45 of Rules of Court is different
from the petition for certiorari under the Rule 65. Hence, these two rules cannot be
used interchangeably in order to seek remedy for the grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, if indeed there is, on the decision of the
Court of Appeals. The Special civil Action or certiorari can be availed if the lower
tribunal has acted without or excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and if there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. If the petition filed
was to review the ruling if it is marred with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction the petition will not automatically transform into
special civil action for certiorari. The dismissal of the CA of the appeal was final. But
then it can be appealed and be questioned in the Supreme Court by invoking the
Rule 65.

The action of dismissal by the CA is allowed under section1 of Rule 50 of the

Rules of Court. It is apparent that the CA did not act in capricious, whimsical and
arbitrary manner. Hence, the petitioners should have filed for review on certiorari
under Rule45 and not under Rule 65. The error of judgement is different from grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. While errors of
judgement can be remedied by appeal, the jurisdictional questions are reviewable
by certiorari.
On the other hand, the CA is correct in dismissing the petitioners Appellants
Brief for failure to comply with the requirements under Section13 of Rule 44. The
review of the Appellants Brief by Supreme Court upheld earlier ruling of the CA.
According to the Supreme Court, the Appellants Brief is devoid of the legal basis.
Hence, the Supreme Court cannot establish the legal basis of the petition to
withhold the partitioning of the properties.
Lastly, the Supreme Court sustained the appellate courts dismissal of the
petitioners appeal. The Supreme Court found merit on the Order of Partition issued
by the RTC Branch 220. It emphasized that no further delay shall be incurred in the
settlement of the decedent Armindas estate.
There is no objection on the parties involve that the properties are part of the
conjugal partnership of gains of spouses Natalio and Arminda. The Extrajudicial
Settlement has stipulated the share of the heirs. After the death of Arminda, the
heirs right to the succession is vested and their co-ownership over the properties is
governed by operation of law. In the absence of a will, all the parties involved coowned the properties as compulsory heirs to Arminda and Natalio. The opposition of
Gerry and Rodolfo Ecarma on the proposal of partitioning the properties is not
feasible, impractical and detrimental to the property. The Article 495 of the Civil
Code provided for the remedy of termination of the co-ownership. The parties who
petitioned cannot deprive the other co-owners to exercise all the rights to full
ownership.
The court ordered the dismissal of the petition.

GR no. 199464
Rogelio Rosario, Rudy Rosario, Mary Ann Gutierrez, Sylvia Castillo, Lourdes Jose, Lorena
Estepa, Virgina Estepa and Remedios Sabado vs Rizalito F. Alba
Decided: April 18, 2016
Facts: T

he subject properties were adjudged as shares of Luz Florendo Alba, one of the heirs to the estate
belonging to the late Urbano Rosario and Vicenta Zarate The respondent is the son and only
surviving legal heir of Luz while the petitioners are fellow heirs to the estate of Urbano and
Vicenta. The petitioners introduced residential dwellings and other improvements on the subject
properties even before the death of Luz. The respondent sent out notices to vacate upon the
petitioners after Luz died. Because of the petitioners refusal to leave, an action for ejectment was
instituted by the respondent. The MTC ruled in favor of the respondent stating that the
petitioners possession was merely tolerated, which became unlawful after the respondent
demanded them to vacate subject properties. The RTC ordered in its Decision setting aside the
decision of the MTC and ruled that the complaint cannot give rise to an unlawful detainer action.
The CA rendered the assailed decision and setting aside the decision of the RTC and reinstated
the MTC judgment. Hence this petition
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents complaint is constitutive of the forms od cases for ejectment.
Ruling:
After a careful perusal of the complaint, the court agrees with the RTC that the respondents
complaint is not the constitutive of any of the forms of cases for ejectment. The complaint cannot
be considered as one for forcible entry, neither can the court consider the complaint as one for
unlawful detainer. It has been held in a catena for cases that in actions fir unlawful detainer, a
complaint sufficiently alleges said cause of action if it states the following elements, to wit: (1)
the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff; (2) such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the defendant of the
terminations of the latters right of possession; (3) the defendant remained in the possession of
the property and deprived the plaintiff of its enjoyment; and (4) within one year from the making
of the last demand to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain any averment of fact
that would substantiate respondents claim that he permitted or tolerated the occupation of the
property by the petitioners. Nothing has been said on how petitioners entry was effected or how
and dispossession started. Admittedly, no express contract existed between the parties. This
failure to allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal. Since the
complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the
MTC had no jurisdiction over the case. Accordingly, the appellate court committed riverside
error when it reinstated the MTC decision which took cognizance of the case, dealt upon its
merits, and conducted summary proceedings as id the subject matter is, indeed, one of the
ejectment. Wherefore, premises considered, the petition is granted.

Apostolic Vicar of Tabuk, Inc represented by Bishop Prudencio

Andaya, Jr.,petitioner Versus Spouses Ernesto and Elizabeth Sison
and Venacio Wadas,respondents
GR No 191132, January 27,2016

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the November 23, 2009
and January 26, 2010 Civil Case No. 2-2009 of Branch 26, RTC of Luna,
Apayao. The RTC dismissed the petitioner's Rule 47 petition for annulment
of judgment addressing the decision of the 6th MCTC of Kabugao Conner in
SPL-Civil Case No.32-2005-Cr.

Antecedents: February 16,2005 - respondents spouses Wadas filed a

forcible entry complaint against the petitioner represented by Fr. Gerry
Gudmalin. August 29,2004- respondents alleged that Fr. Gudmalin, priest of
St. Anthony Church of the Vicar Apostolic of Mountain Province, ordered the
forcible demolition of their respective parameter fences in order to expand
the area of the Church. Priest dispossessed them of their land and began
constructing a building that encroached on portions of their respective lots.
March 11, 2005 MCTC Junior Process Server Raul Abad executed an officer's
return wherein defendant went to Manila, thus summons was only received
by the secretary. July 13, 2005 - case was submitted for decision due to
defendant's failure to file its answer despite of summons. August 12, 2005 MCTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondents.Ordered Petitioner to
(1) refrain from any further construction within the respondent's property (2)
remove their constructions (3) vacate the property (4) pay damages.
September 19, 2005 - petitioner filed an urgent manifestation and motion
beforethe MCTC that (1) land subject is owned and possessed by petitioner
represented by Rev. Monsignor Prudencio Andaya Jr., not by Fr. Gudmalin as
alleged in the complaint (2) it had been denied due process because it was
neither impleaded nor served summons.
August 28, 2006 - MCTC denied petitioner's urgent motion for it was
prohibited pleading under Section 19 of the Rules on Summary Procedure. It

stressed that in ejectment cases, basic issue is possession de facto, not

ownership; the proper defendant is the person who actually disturbed the
complainant's possession over the property.
September 7, 2007 - petitioner filed an appeal but was subsequently
dismissed due to failure to file an appellant's memorandum within
reglementary period.
November 23, 2009 - RTC reconsidered its denial and dismissed the
petition got failure to state the cause of action. The RTC reasoned that the
petitioner's filing of a notice of appeal and subsequent failure to file its
appeal memorandum precluded its resort to annulment of judgment; the
remedy is not available to a party who lost his right to appeal due to his own
fault.

Issue: Whether or not the respondents are the actual occupants if the
subject property and that the named defendant is the real party-in-interest.

Ruling: In an ejectment suit (accion interdictal) the sole issue is the right of
physical or material possession over the subject real property independent of
any claim of ownership by the parties involved. Ownership over the property
is immaterial and is only passed on provisionally got the limited purpose of
determining which party has better right to possession. Purpose of an
ejectment suit for Forcible Entry (detention) is to protect the person who had
prior physical possession against another who unlawfully entered the
property and usurped his possession. The suit is filed against the
possessor(s) of the property at the commencement of action and not against
one who does not in fact occupy the land. In the present case, it was alleged
that it was Fr. Gudmalin, acting for the church, who forcibly entered the
property previously held by the respondent's and who remains in possession.
Hence, they were correctly impleaded as defendant. Therefore, Vicariate of
Mt. Province have no legal personality to ask for the annulment of the MCTC
judgment and that respondents are the actual occupants of the subject
matter.

SHERYL LOU J. COLOMA

Gr No. 193374
Heirs of the late Gerry Ecarma namely: Avelina Suiza-Ecarma, Dennis Ecrma, Jerry
Lyn Ecrma Pena, Antonia Ecarma, and Natalia Ecarma Sangalang, Petitioners
Vs
Court of Appeals and Renato Ecarma, Respondents
June 8, 2016

Facts:
The case involves the heirs quarrelling each other over inherited properties
and disagreement on how the properties shall be partitioned. This prompted the
petitioners to file petition for certiorari citing the Rules 65 of the Rules of Court. The
petitioner contend that the court of appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of discretion due to the two resolutions it issued.
The petitioners appealed the two orders of the RTC that approved the project
partition proposed by respondent Renato Ecarma, the administrator of the estate of
decedent Arminda vda de Ecarma, covering four properties. But the appeal to the
appellate court did not favor the petitioners in fact dismissed the petition due to the
procedural defects for not having complied with the section 13, Rule 44 of the Rules
of Court.
The properties were owned by Arminda and Natalio Ecarma. The properties
were acquired during the marriage. They have seven children. Upon the death of
natalio, the heirs executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of four properties
namely: Kintalad, Cuyapa and two properties in Lala. The half of Lala property was
intended for the decedent Arminda share. The four properties will be divided as
follows: two ninth will be that of Arminda, and the rest of the children will have oneninth each. The method of partitioning as agreed and signed by all of the heirs. This
was stipulated in the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate. But the properties were
not divided. The heir continue to co-owned the properties even until the death of
their mother Arminda on April 17, 1983.
Renato Ecarma, upon the death of his mother, petitioned for the probate of
Armindas will but was dismissed by the RTC of Quezon City. He then filed for
intestate proceedings before the Quezon City RTC last May 18, 1990. He was then
appointed as Special Administrator by the RTC. The conflict among the heirs
continue to persist thereby prompting Renato to move to terminate the coownership and filed or Partition of the Kitanlad property by March 9, 2005. This was

followed by project of partition of the LAla and Cuyapo properties through the
Omnibus Motion filed by Renato Ecarma dated April 7, 2005. The RTC approved the
proposed partition through the Order issued sated July 28, 2005.
The decision was opposed by heirs of Gerry and Rodolfo Ecarma. Then Renato
filed a comment on opposition to motion for reconsideration filed by Gerry and
Rodolfo Ecarma. The RTC denied the motion. Gerry Ecarma filed an appeal to the
CA. The CA ordered the petitioner to file an appellate brief. On the pendency of the
appeal, Gerry died. He was replaced by his heirs. Renato filed a motion to dismiss
the appellees brief.
The CA finding the brief devoid of merit due to the procedural defects, and
violation of Section 13 Rule 44 of the Rules of Court of Civil Procedure. The CA
dismissed the petition. The Petitioner filed motion for reconsideration attaching the
Supplemental Appellants brief which was dismissed by CA.
The petitioners thereby filed petition for certiorari under rule 65 of Rules of
Court.

Issue
1. Whether or not the Appellate Court committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by dismissing the motion filed
by the petitioners Gerry and Rodolfo Ecarma?
2. Whether or not there is a merit on the decision of the RTC granting the
order of partition on the subject properties.
Ruling
First, the appeal by certiorari under the Rule 45 of Rules of Court is different
from the petition for certiorari under the Rule 65. Hence, these two rules cannot be
used interchangeably in order to seek remedy for the grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, if indeed there is, on the decision of the
Court of Appeals. The Special civil Action or certiorari can be availed if the lower
tribunal has acted without or excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and if there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. If the petition filed
was to review the ruling if it is marred with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction the petition will not automatically transform into
special civil action for certiorari. The dismissal of the CA of the appeal was final. But
then it can be appealed and be questioned in the Supreme Court by invoking the
Rule 65.
The action of dismissal by the CA is allowed under section1 of Rule 50 of the
Rules of Court. It is apparent that the CA did not act in capricious, whimsical and

arbitrary manner. Hence, the petitioners should have filed for review on certiorari
under Rule45 and not under Rule 65. The error of judgement is different from grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. While errors of
judgement can be remedied by appeal, the jurisdictional questions are reviewable
by certiorari.
On the other hand, the CA is correct in dismissing the petitioners Appellants
Brief for failure to comply with the requirements under Section13 of Rule 44. The
review of the Appellants Brief by Supreme Court upheld earlier ruling of the CA.
According to the Supreme Court, the Appellants Brief is devoid of the legal basis.
Hence, the Supreme Court cannot establish the legal basis of the petition to
withhold the partitioning of the properties.
Lastly, the Supreme Court sustained the appellate courts dismissal of the
petitioners appeal. The Supreme Court found merit on the Order of Partition issued
by the RTC Branch 220. It emphasized that no further delay shall be incurred in the
settlement of the decedent Armindas estate.
There is no objection on the parties involve that the properties are part of the
conjugal partnership of gains of spouses Natalio and Arminda. The Extrajudicial
Settlement has stipulated the share of the heirs. After the death of Arminda, the
heirs right to the succession is vested and their co-ownership over the properties is
governed by operation of law. In the absence of a will, all the parties involved coowned the properties as compulsory heirs to Arminda and Natalio. The opposition of
Gerry and Rodolfo Ecarma on the proposal of partitioning the properties is not
feasible, impractical and detrimental to the property. The Article 495 of the Civil
Code provided for the remedy of termination of the co-ownership. The parties who
petitioned cannot deprive the other co-owners to exercise all the rights to full
ownership.
The court ordered the dismissal of the petition.

Eilene A. Pama
LLB II A

PROPERTY CASE DIGEST

G.R. No. 197825, January 11, 2016

CAMILO SIBAL, Petitioner, v. PEDRO BUQUEL, SANTIAGO BUQUEL, JR., ROSALINDA BUQUEL,
REPRESENTED BY FRANCISCO BUQUEL, Respondents.

Facts:
A parcel of land consisting of 81, 022 square meters with Original Certificate of Title No. 0-725 was
inherited by respondents Pedro, Santiago Jr., Rosalinda and Francisca Buquel from their parents,
Santiago Sr. and Faustina Buquel. Petitioner Camilo Sibal and Tobi Mangoba took a portion of Santiago
Buquel Sr.s property.
With this, the respondents demanded the petitioners to vacate and turn over the property, but the
latter refused to do so. Hence, a complaint was filed before the Tuguegarao RTC for recovery of
possession and damages.
The Tuguegarao RTC ruled in favour of the Buquels on January 5, 2007. About a year after, Sibal filed a
petition for Annulment of the RTC Decision before the CA but it was later dismissed on March 16, 2011.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied. Thus, he filed the instant
petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
Whether or not the respondents were guilty of extrinsic fraud

Ruling:
Wherefore, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the CA dated March 16, 2011 and its Resolution
dated July 7, 2011 are hereby AFFIRMED.

Petitioner admitted that he attended only one stage of the proceeding, Hence, he was not able to
prove the negligence of his former counsel in handling his defense that allegedly violated his right to
due process. There was also no indication that his counsel was in cahoots with the respondents to
obtain the assailed judgment.
Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available without fault
on the part of the petitioner. A petition for annulment that ignores or disregards any of the safeguards
cannot prosper. Furthermore the RTS has jurisdiction over the case contrary to petitioners allegation.
Upon review of the records, the Court notes that the Real Property was truly assessed according to its
real value which the petitioner failed to refute.