Adin Greenstein

Proffesor Juan M. Siaz

Criminal Justice and Constitution
8/29/16
Griswold vs. Connecticut
Facts:
From November 1st through November 10th of the year 1961, appellants Griswold and Buxton
served as Executive Director and Medical Director for the Planned Parenthood League in the
state of Connecticut. They provided counseling to legally married couples as to how to go about
preventing conception through the safest and most affordable means available to them. On
November 10th, both the league was shut down, and both appellants were arrested for violating
sections 53-32 and 54-196 of the 1958 revision of the General Statutes of Connecticut. In
summary, these statutes hold that A) the use of any medical device, service, or prescription for
purposes of preventing conception is punishable by law, and B) that anyone who offers
assistance in a crime in any manner is held just as responsible as the primary offender. The
defendants claimed that the statute regarding accessory violated the 14th amendment.
Procedure:
The appellants were found guilty and fined $100 each. Griswold and Buxton appealed that
decision, but the Appellate division of the Circuit Court affirmed the ruling. Appealing yet again,
the courts decision was once again affirmed by the Supreme Court of errors. It was at this point
that the Supreme Court of the United States noted possible jurisdiction, and the case was brought
to their attention.
Issue:
The primary issue of this case is whether or not, given the rather intimate and private nature of
the relationship between partners capable of naturally having children and whomsoever they
chose to be their doctor, that section 54-196 of the General Statutes of Connecticut as they are
applied in this case are in incongruity with the 14 th Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, which covers the protection of immunities and privileges under law, of which privacy is
one.
Holding:
The Supreme Court decided to reverse the decision by a vote of 7-2 against, delivered by the
Honorable Judge Justice William Douglas. The Honorable Justices agreed that section 54-196
was indeed a violation of a couples innate and intrinsic right to privacy.
Rationale:
Justice Douglas holds that this case fundamentally rests on the intimate relationship of man and
wife, and the physician role in that relationship. These types of associations are not expressly

covered by either the Bill of Rights or the United States Constitution. However, as was decided
in Pierce v, Society of Sisters, that the First Amendment allowed parents to send their children to
a school of their choosing without the interference of the state, even though the First Amendment
says nothing to the effect of education in specifics. Also, in NAACP v. Alabama, it was ruled that
the freedom to associate was also an extension of First Amendment rights, as well as privacy in
those associations. Therefore, it would be against the law to force an organization of any size to
disclose its membership unless the constitutionality of that organization was somehow called into
question. These cases show that Amendments intrinsically carry with them certain penumbras,
rights which are implied but not expressly stated.
In Boyd v. United States, it was held that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments served to protect
the Sanctity of a mans home and the privacies of life from invasion by any Governmental
Agency, at any level of the local/state/federal level. The decision of Mapp v. Ohio asserted that
the right to privacy is no less important than any other right granted to citizens under law.
Therefore, the issues being discussed in this case lay under the purview of Privacy as it has
been previously defined. Since section 54-196 prevents the use of any form of contraceptive
rather than the sale or manufacture of those items thereof, the law has thusly intruded into the
private sphere of a domestic union, carrying with it the potential to inflict, as Justice Douglas put
it, maximum damage on the relationship. Thusly, the Judgement was reversed.
Justice Harlan, despite agreeing with the ruling of reversal, offered a wholly different rationale.
The Honorable Justice proposed that the ruling of reversed should be given because the law as
it stands violates the Due Process clause of the 14 th Amendment, which is the Amendment that
the appellants used to protest the initial ruling. They do, however, feel that due process was
violated because the enactment of section 54-196 violates values Implicit in the concept of
liberty, although he states that his reasoning can be found in their judgement of Poe v. Ullman,
and does not repeat them here. Justice Douglass rationale involving the First, Fourth, and Fifth
amendments may serve as adequate accessory, but Justice Harlan affirms that the Fourteenth
Amendments Due Process clause is more than strong enough to stand on its own bottom.
Both Justice Black and Justice Stewart offered dissenting opinions, both preface their arguments
by stating that they believe this law to be, in more moderate terms, silly and un-enforceable
except for in the most extreme of cases, such as this one. They do, however, see no constitutional
basis as to why the law as it applies in this case should be repealed. Justice Black claims that
Justice Douglass reliance on such a broad term as Privacy is misleading, and can easily be
twisted to invoke constitutional bans against much more than simple searches and seizures. He
argues that the penumbra of the First Amendment is cast too wide in this case, and although the
privacy of an individual should be both protected and enjoyed, it should only be done within the
letter of the law, as too much interpretation can lead to ambiguous judgements. In this, both
Black and Stewart identify themselves as staunch originalists, and that is the source of their
argument again Justice Douglas, on whos rationale this case was decided.