Statutory Construction (EH307MC)

7. Presumption against ineffectiveness

- In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature
intended to enact an effective statute.
Paras v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996)
FACTS: A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong Barangay.
The recall election was deferred due to Petitioners opposition that under Sec. 74 of RA No.
7160, no recall shall take place within one year from the date of the officials assumption to
office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election. Since the Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 2006, no recall may be instituted.
ISSUE: W/N the SK election is a local election.
HELD: No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context, and it
must be considered together and kept subservient to its general intent. The evident intent of Sec.
74 is to subject an elective local official to recall once during his term, as provided in par. (a) and
par. (b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines its construction. Thus, interpreting
the phrase regular local election to include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for
there will never be a recall election rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the
Court assumed that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation should be
avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, meaningless, inoperative
or nugatory.
8. Presumption against irrepealable laws
- It is always to be presumed in case of doubt or ambiguity that the legislature does not intend to
derogate from the authority of its successors, to make irrepealable laws, or to divest the state of
any portion of its sovereign powers.
City of Davao v RTC
G.R. No. 127383 (August 18, 2005)
Tax exemption rules governing GSIS and exceptions
The plenary powers of Congress cannot be limited by passage of irrepealable laws
FACTS: GSIS Davao City branch office received a Notice of Public Auction, scheduling public
bidding of its properties for non-payment of realty taxes from 1992-1994, amounting to the sum
total of Php 295, 721.61. The auction was, however, subsequently reset by virtue of a deadline
extension given by Davao City.
On July 28, 1994, GSIS received Warrants of Levy and Notices of Levy on three parcels of land
it owned and another Notice of Public Auction. In September of that same year, GSIS filed a
petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and/or Declaratory Relief with the Davao City
RTC.
During pre-trial, the only issue raised was whether sec. 234 and 534 of the Local Government
Code, which have withdrawn real property tax from GOCCs, have also withdrawn from the
GSIS its right to be exempted from payment of realty tax.
RTC rendered decision in favor of GSIS. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the GSIS tax exemptions can be deemed as withdrawn by the LGC
W/N sec. 33 of P.D. 1146 has been repealed by the LGC

Statutory Construction (EH307MC)

HELD: Reading together sec. 133, 232, and 234 of the LGC, as a general rule: the taxing powers
of LGUs cannot extend to the levy of taxes, fees, and charges of any kind on the National
Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and LGUs.
However, under sec. 234, exemptions from payment of real property taxes granted to natural or
juridical persons, including GOCCs, except as provided in said section, are withdrawn upon
effectivity of LGC. GSIS being a GOCC, then it necessarily follows that its exemption has been
withdrawn.
Regarding P.D. 1146 which laid down requisites for repeal on the laws granting exemption,
Supreme Court found a fundamental flaw in Sec. 33, particularly the amendatory second
paragraph.
Said paragraph effectively imposes restrictions on the competency of the Congress to enact
future legislation on the taxability of GSIS. This places an undue restraint on the plenary power
of the legislature to amend or repeal laws.
Only the Constitution may operate to preclude or place restrictions on the amendment or repeal
laws. These conditions imposed under P.D. 1146, if honored, have the precise effect of limiting
the powers of Congress.
Supreme Court held that they cannot render effective the amendatory second paragraph of sec.
33, for by doing so, they would be giving sanction to a disingenuous means employed through
legislative power to bind subsequent legislators to a subsequent mode of repeal. Thus, the two
conditions under sec. 33 cannot bear relevance whether the LGC removed the tax-exempt status
of GSIS.
Furthermore, sec. 5 on the rules of interpretation of LGC states that any tax exemption,
incentive or relief granted by any LGU pursuant to the provision of this Code shall be construed
strictly against the person claiming it.
The GSIS tax-exempt stats, in sum, was withdrawn in 1992 by the LGC but restored by the GSIS
Act of 1997, sec. 39. The subject real property taxes for the years 1992-1994 were assessed
against GSIS while the LGC provisions prevailed and thus may be collected by the City of
Davao.
De Guia v Guingona, et. Al
G.R. No. 119525 (April 18, 1995)
**cant find said case anywhere, including CDAsia
9. Presumption against Implied Repeals
- The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and clear finding thereof must surface, before
the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent
law cannot be constructed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and
repugnancy exists in terms of the new and old laws
2 requisites:
The statutes must touch the same subject
matter.
The latter statute must have an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy
with the prior statute.
Roma Drug, et Al. v RTC of Guagua, Pampanga
G.R. No. 149907 (April 26, 2009)
FACTS: Roma Drug was raided by the NBI and BFAD and seized several important medicines.
It appears that Roma Drug is one of six drug stores which were raided on or around the same
time upon the request of SmithKline which was the duly registered corporation to distribute such

Statutory Construction (EH307MC)

medicines. The medicines of Roma Drug was purchased directly from abroad and not through
SmithKline.
During preliminary investigation, Rodriguez challenged the constitutionality of the law
on Special Law on Counterfeit Drugs (SLCD) regarding the distribution of their medicine that
were considered counterfeit although they only bought it directly and not from SmithKline.
ISSUE: Whether the contention of Roma Drug is correct.
HELD: Yes. Section 7 of Rep. Act No. 9502 unequivocally grants third persons the right to
import drugs or medicines whose patent were registered in the Philippines by the owner of the
product. The unqualified right of private third parties such as petitioner to import or possess
unregistered imported drugs in the Philippines is further confirmed by the Implementing
Rules to Republic Act No. 9502 promulgated on November 4, 2008.
It may be that Rep. Act No. 9502 did not expressly repeal any provision of the SLCD. However,
it is clear that the SLCOs classification of unregistered imported drugs as counterfeit drugs,
and of corresponding criminal penalties therefore are irreconcilably in the imposition conflict
with Rep. Act No. 9502 since the latter indubitably grants private third persons the unqualified
right to import or otherwise use such drugs. Where a statute of later date, such as Rep. Act No.
9502, clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the
subject that intention must be given effect.
The prosecution of petitioner is no longer warranted.
Mecano v Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 103982 (December 11, 1982)
FACTS: Claim for reimbursement by a government official of medical and hospitalization
expenses pursuant to Section 699 of the Revised Administration Code of 1917, which authorizes
the head of office to case a reimbursement of payment of medical and hospital expenses of a
government official in case of sickness or injury caused by or connected directly with the
performance of his official duty.
CoA denied the claim on the ground that AC of 1987 which revised the old AC, repealed Sec.
699 because it was omitted the revised code.
ISSUE: WON the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the RAC.
HELD: The legislature did not intend, in enacting the new Code, to repeal Sec. 699 of the old
code.
All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulation, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
New code did not expressly repeal the old as the new Code fails to identify or designate the act
to be repealed.
Two categories of repeal by implication
Provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter that are in irreconcilable conflict.
Later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier
If the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a statute, it
will operate to repeal the earlier law.
There is no irreconcilable conflict between the two codes on the matter of sickness benefits
because the provision has not been restated in the New Code.
The whereas clause is the intent to cover only those aspects of government that pertain to
administration, organization and procedure, and understandably because of the many changes
that transpired in the government structure since the enactment of the old code.
3 rules to remember:

Statutory Construction (EH307MC)

Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones.

Law A -> Law B expressly repeals Law A -> Law C repeals Law B = Law A is not revived.
Law A -> Law B impliedly repeals Law A -> Law C repeals law B = Law A is revived.
A general law does not repeal a special law, unless it is so expressly provided or they are
incompatible.
10. Presumption against violation of public policy
- It is presumed that the legislature intends its enactments to accord with the principles of sound
public policy and the interests of public morality, not to violate them; and due weight should be
given to this presumption in the construction of a doubtful or ambiguous statute.
Plainly put, public policy is that principle of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can
lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good. As
applied to contracts, in the absence of express legislation or constitutional prohibition, a court, in
order to declare a contract void as against public policy, must find that the contract as to the
consideration or thing to be done, has a tendency to injure the public, is against the public good,
or contravenes some established interests of society or is inconsistent with sound policy and
good morals, or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights, whether of personal
liability or of private property.
Avon Cosmetics v Luna
G.R. No. 153674 (December 20, 2006)
FACTS: The present petition stemmed from a complaint dated December 1, 1988, filed by
respondent Luna alleging, inter alia, that she began working for Beautifont, Inc. in 1972, first as
a franchise dealer and then a year later, as a supervisor. Sometime in 1978, Avon Cosmetics, Inc.
(Avon), acquired and took over the management and operations of Beautifont, Inc. Nonetheless,
respondent Luna continued working for said successor company. On November 5, 1985,
petitioner Avon and respondent Luna entered into an agreement (Supervisors Agreement),
included in the terms of said agreement are, (1) That the supervisor shall sell or offer to sell,
display or promote only and exclusively products sold by the company, (2) Either party may
terminate this agreement at will, with or without cause, at any time upon notice to the other.
Sometime in the latter part of 1988, respondent Luna was invited by former Avon employee who
was then currently a Sales Manager of Sandre Philippines, Inc., a domestic corporation engaged
in direct selling of vitamins and other food supplements, Luna accepted the offer and agreed to
sell said products.
In a letter dated October 11, 1988, petitioner Avon, through its President and General Manager,
Jose Mari Franco, notified respondent Luna of the termination or cancellation of her Supervisors
agreement.
Aggrieved respondent Luna filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 138 on the grounds that said Supervisors Agreement between her and Avon was void on
the grounds that it was contrary to law and public policy. The RTC of Makati City granted the
petition and rendered Avon liable for damages.
Avon now implores the Court to review, via a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON the RTC of Makati City erred in rendering its decision that said Supervisors
agreement was contrary to law and public policy.
HELD: SC granted Avons petition. Said Supervisors agreement is not deemed contrary to law
and public policy. When the terms of the agreement are clear and explicit, that they do not
justify an attempt to read into any alleged intention of the parties, the terms are to be understood

Statutory Construction (EH307MC)

literally just as they appear on the face of the contract. Plainly put, public policy is that principle
of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be
injurious to the public or against the public good. There is nothing invalid or contrary to public
policy either in the objectives sought to be attained by Paragraph 5, i.e., the exclusivity clause, in
prohibiting respondent Luna, and all other Avon supervisors, from selling products other than
those manufactured by petitioner Avon.

11. Presumption of Knowledge of Existing Laws

- It is presumed that the legislature in drafting and enacting a statute had full knowledge and took
cognizance of all existing laws on the same subject matter or relating thereto.
Manila Lodge No. 761 v CA
G.R. L-41001 (September 30, 1976)
Facts: Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1360 which authorized the City of Manila to
reclaim a portion of Manila Bay. The Act provided that the reclaimed area "Shall be the property
of the City of Manila" and that "the City of Manila is hereby authorized to set aside a tract of the
reclaimed land formed by the Luneta extension. Philippine Commission passed on May 18,
1907 Act No. 1657, amending Act No. 1360, so as to authorize the City of' Manila either to lease
or to sell the portion set aside as a hotel site. The City of Manila applied for the registration of
the reclaimed area, and on January 20, 1911, O.C.T. No. 1909 was issued in the name of the City
of Manila. City of Manila, affirming a prior sale dated January 16, 1909 cancelled 5,543.07
square meters of the reclaimed area to the Manila Lodge No. 761, Benevolent and Protective
Order of Elks of the U.S.A. (BPOE) on the basis of which TCT No. 2195 was issued to the latter
over the Marcela. Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, subsequently sold the said 5,543.07 square
meters to the Elks Club, Inc., to which was issued TCT No. 67488. 4 The registered owner, "The
Elks Club, Inc.," was later changed by court order to "Manila Lodge No. 761, Benevolent and
Protective Order of Elks, Inc." BPOE sold for the sum of P4,700,000 the land together with
all the improvements thereon to the Tarlac Development Corporation (TDC)City of Manila filed
with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for the reannotation of its right to
repurchase; the court, after hearing, issued an order, dated November 19, 1964,directing the
Register of Deeds of the City of Manila to reannotate in toto the entry regarding the right of the
City of Manila to repurchase the property after fifty years. TDC and BPOE appealed to this
Court which on July 31, 1968 affirmed in G.R. Nos. L-24557 and L-24469 the trial court's order
of reannotation, but reserved to TDC the right to bring another action for the clarification of its
rights. Trial court rendered decision that subject land to be part of the "Public Park or plaza" and,
therefore, part of the public domain, dismissing the complaint.CA affirmed the decision of
lower court.
Issues: Whether or not property subject of the action, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 1360,
as amended by Act No. 1657, was patrimonial property of the City of Manila and not a park
or plaza?
Held: Neither. It is public dominion. Petitions in both G.R. Nos. L-41001 and L-41012 are
denied for lack of merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals of June 30, 1975, is hereby
affirmed. Ruling:(1) Although the City of Manila was to pay for the construction of such work
and timber bulkheads or sea walls as may be necessary for the making of the Luneta extension,
the area to be reclaimed would be filled at the expense of the Insular Government and without
cost to the City of Manila, with material dredged from Manila Bay. Hence, the letter of the
statute should be narrowed to exclude maters which if included would defeat the policy of the
legislation. The reclaimed area, an extension to the Luneta, is declared to be property of the
City of Manila. Property, however, is either of public ownership or of private ownership. It is
of public dominion, intended for public use.

Statutory Construction (EH307MC)

Without the authorization expressly given by Act No. 1360, the City of Manila could not lease
or sell even the northern portion; much less could it dispose of the whole reclaimed area.
Consequently, the reclaimed area was granted to the City of Manila, not as its patrimonial
property. At most, only the northern portion reserved as a hotel site could be said to be
patrimonial property for, by express statutory provision it could be disposed of, and the
Title thereto would revert to the City should the grantee fail to comply with the terms provided
by the statute. The subject property is not that northern portion authorized to be leased or sold;
the subject property is the southern portion. Hence, applying the rule of expresio unius est
exlusio alterius, the City of Manila was not authorized to sell the subject property. Article 344 of
the Civil Code of Spain provides that to property of public use, in provinces and in towns,
comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares streets fountains, and public waters the
promenades, and public works of general service paid for by such towns or provinces." A park or
plaza, such as the extension to the Luneta, is undoubtedly comprised in said article.(2) The
sale of the subject property executed by the City of Manila to the Manila Lodge No. 761,BPOE,
was void and inexistent for lack of subject matter. It suffered from an incurable defect that could
not be ratified either by lapse of time or by express ratification. The Manila Lodge No. 761
therefore acquired no right by virtue of the said sale. Hence to consider now the contract
inexistent as it always has seen, cannot be, as claimed by the Manila Lodge No. 761,
an impairment of the obligations of contracts, for there was it, contemplation of law, no contract
at all.
12. Presumption of Acquiescence to Judicial Construction
- If congress fails to supply or falls short in providing the specific legislation on a certain subject
(like inclusion of copyright), then it is presumed Congress will acquiesce to the Supreme Courts
interpretation of the statute.
13. Presumption of Jurisdiction
- A statute will not be construed as ousting or restricting the jurisdiction of the superior courts, or
as vesting a new jurisdiction in them, unless there will be express words or a necessary
implication to that effect.
Manila Lodge No. 761 v CA
G.R. L-41001 (September 30, 1976)
**refer to case in number 11 (Presumption of knowledge of existing laws)
14. Presumption of acting within the scope of authority
- It has something to do with agency. All agents are presumed to act under the scope of their
authority. It may extend to the presumption of regularity of acts by public officials.
- But also has implications in partnerships and corporation laws, that the partners and the Board
of Directors of a corporation are presumed to have acted within the scope of their authority.
- Presumption of acting within the scope of authority has something to do with burden of proof
on whether or not someone was within his or her authority to act. Without countervailing
evidence, the court will presume that the agent acted properly and with authority. It is for the
party who alleges that the person has no authority to prove the lack thereof.
15. Presumption against violation of International Law
- Philippines as democratic and republican state adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations
Section 2, Article II, 1987 Constitution
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
IV. GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTEPRETATION OF LAWS

Statutory Construction (EH307MC)

i. Statutes as a Whole
- Statutes should be construed as a whole; one portion may be qualified by others
JMM Promotions v NLRC
G.R. No. 109835 (November 22, 1993)
Facts: Following Secs. 4 and 17, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules, the petitioner, a
recruiting agency, made the following:
a. Paid the license fee (Sec. 4)
b. Posted a cash bond of 100k and surety bond of 50k(Sec. 4)
c. Placed money in escrow worth 200k (Sec.
17)
The petitioner wanted to appeal a decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) to the respondent NLRC, but the latter dismissed the appeal because of
failure of the petitioner to post an appeal bond required by Sec. 6, Rule V, Book VII of the
POEA Rules. The decision being appealed involved a monetary award.
The petitioner contended that its payment of a license fee, posting of cash bond and surety
bond, and placement of money in escrow are enough; posting an appeal bond is
unnecessary. According to Sec. 4, the bonds are posted to answer for all valid and
legal claims arising from violations of the conditions for the grant and use of the license,
and/oraccreditation and contracts of employment. On the other hand, according to Sec. 17, the
escrow shall answer for valid and legal claims of recruited workers as a result
of recruitment violations or money claims.
Sec. 6 reads:
In case the decision of the Administration involves a monetary award, an appeal by
the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond The bonds
required here are different from the bonds required in Sec. 4.
Issue: Was the petitioner still required to post an appeal bond despite the fact that it has posted
bonds of 150k and placed 200k in escrow before?
Held: Yes. It is possible for the monetary reward in favor of the employee to exceed the amount
of 350,000 because of the stringent requirements posed upon recruiters. The reason for such is
that overseas employees are subjected to greater risks and hence, the money will be used to
insure more care on the part of the local recruiter in its choice of foreign principal to whom the
worker will be sent.
Doctrine: Construction:
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this
case), care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was
enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res
magis valeat quam pereat. That the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed.
The rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided;
instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a
coordinated and harmonious whole. With regard to the present case, the doctrine can be applied
when the Court found that Sec. 6 complements Sec. 4 and Sec. 17.
Casela v CA
L-26754 (October 16, 1970)
Facts: (Oct 26, 1956) In CAR Case No. 5666-R-Z of the Court of Agrarian Relations of Iba,
Zambales, Mateo Casela, was the defendant, and Exequiel Magsaysay, the plaintiff. The said
court decided against the defendant and the decision become final and executory commanding
Casela to vacate the premises and remove his house therefrom. Casela refused to comply with
the said writ.

Statutory Construction (EH307MC)

(Aug 12, 1957) the court issued another writ commanding the defendant to vacate the premises
and remove his house. He again refused to comply with the writ.
(May 6, 1958) the court again issued another writ.
(April 14, 1959) and another writ.
Instead of obeying the writ, the defendant instituted a Civil case before the Court of First
Instance of Zambales asking Magsaysay to pay him the value of his house in the amount of 5,000
and improvements of 2,000. In addition to damages in the sum of 1,600. At the same time, he
also filed a motion for suspension of the implementation of the writ of execution pending the
final outcome of the said civil case.
Magsaysay filed a countermotion against the motion of suspension to declare Casela and the
provincial sheriff in contempt of court.
After hearing the respective mtions, the court granted Casela motion for suspension until the
Civil Case would have been disposed of on the merits.
(Oct 6, 1965) The civil case eventually reached the Court of Appeals and the court dismissed
Caselas appeal. The court ruled the the claims of Casela for indemnification were in the nature
of of compulsory counterclaims and must be pleaded before the agarian court and not the court
of first instance where they were brought. Magsaysay could not be compelled to pay the claims.
By reason of this pronouncement, Magsaysay filed a motion (DEC 2, 1963) and another (FEB
11, 1964) praying for the issuance of an alia writ of execution attaching a copy of the appealed
decision.
(March 5, 1964) The agrarian court denied Magsaysays motion holding that its decision on mere
motion for the reason that a period of five years had already elapsed from the said date.
(April 10, 1964) Magsaysay moved for a reconsideration of the order of denial of March 5, 1964;
this was granted by the Court in its order of October 1, 1964, which forthwith directed the
execution of its judgment of October 26, 1956.
Issue: That the agrarian court denied Magsaysays motion holding that its decision on mere
motion for the reason that a period of five years had already elapsed from the said date.
Held: That the decision of October 26, 1956 of the Court of Agrarian Relations became final and
executory on December 17, 1956, is not controverted. Counting five years from December 17,
1956, the plaintiff Exequiel Magsaysay had until December 17, 1961 within which to move for
execution of the said decision. It would thus appear that Magsaysay's motion for execution of
December 11, 1963, having been filed beyond the five-year reglementary period, was timebarred. This would indicate that the said motion for execution was filed on time.
Where the writs of execution were not implemented because of petitioner Casela's stubborn
refusal to vacate the premises and because of the lower court's order sustaining Casela's for
suspension of execution twice, all covering a period of 3 yrs. 9 mos. and 25 days, respondent
Magsaysay should not be considered to have incurred in delay in the enforcement of the
judgment when he filed a motion for execution 6 yrs. 11 mos. and 24 days after the decision in
question became final and executory. From this latter period must be deducted the time during
which the writs of execution could not be served, or a period of 3 yrs. 9 mos. and 25 days.
Consequently, only 3 yrs. 1 month and 29 days can be charged against the five year reglementary
period. Undoubtedly, Magsaysay's motion for execution was filed well within the five-year
reglementary period.

Statutory Construction (EH307MC)

Conscience and equity should always be considered in the construction of statutes. The courts are
not to be hedged in by the literal meaning of the language of the statute; the spirit and intendment
thereof must prevail over its letter. This rule of construction is especially applicable where
adherence to the letter of the statute would result in absurdity and injustice.
ii. Legislative Intent must be ascertained from the statute as a whole
- Legislative intent is the vital part, the essence of the law. The intent of the legislature is the law,
and the key to, and the controlling factor in, its construction or interpretation. Intent is the spirit
which gives life to legislative enactment. It must be enforced when ascertained, although it may
not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. The term intent includes two concepts, that
of purpose and that of meaning, it has been held, however, that the ascertainment of legislative
intent depends more on a determination of the purpose and object of the law.
A. Optima statuli interpretatix est ipsum statutum
the best interpreter of the statute is the statute itself
B. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat.
because a statute is enacted in whole and not in parts or sections, which implies that one part is
as important as the other, the statute should be construed and given effect as a whole. 3
approaches in determining the legislative intent: (1) Literal Rule (2) Purpose Rule (3) Golden
Rule depart from the ordinary meaning.
Datu Michael Abas Kida v Senate of the Philippines
G.R. No. 196271 (February 28, 2012)
FACTS: These cases are motions for reconsideration assailing the SCs Decision dated October
18, 2011, where it upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 10153. Pursuant to the
constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No. 10153 postponed the regional elections in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (which were scheduled to be held on the
second Monday of August 2011) to the second Monday of May 2013 and recognized the
Presidents power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) to temporarily assume these positions
upon the expiration of the terms of the elected officials.
ISSUE: Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM regional elections with
national and local elections?
HELD: The framers of the Constitution could not have expressed their objective more clearly
there was to be a single election in 1992 for all elective officials from the President down to the
municipal officials. Significantly, the framers were even willing to temporarily lengthen or
shorten the terms of elective officials in order to meet this objective, highlighting the importance
of this constitutional mandate. That the ARMM elections were not expressly mentioned in the
Transitory Provisions of the Constitution on synchronization cannot be interpreted to mean that
the ARMM elections are not covered by the constitutional mandate of synchronization. The
ARMM had not yet been officially organized at the time the Constitution was enacted and
ratified by the people. Keeping in mind that a constitution is not intended to provide merely for
the exigencies of a few years but is to endure through generations for as long as it remains
unaltered by the people as ultimate sovereign, a constitution should be construed in the light of
what actually is a continuing instrument to govern not only the present but also the unfolding
events of the indefinite future. Although the principles embodied in a constitution remain fixed
and unchanged from the time of its adoption, a constitution must be construed as a dynamic
process intended to stand for a great length of time, to be progressive and not static.
Meridian Assurance Corporation v Dayrit
G.R. No. 59154 (April 3, 1990)

10

Statutory Construction (EH307MC)

FACTS: The sole issue of this special civil action for certiorari concerns the rate of interest
properly imposable in relation to a judgement for the payment of money: 6%, as provided by
Article 2209 of the Civil Code, or 12%, conformably with Central Bank Circular No. 416. The
petitioner, Meridian Assurance Corporation, was a defendant in Civil Case No. 62317 of the then
Court of First Instance in Manila. The case resulted in a verdict adverse to the defendants making
them liable jointly and severally, for the sum of $21,933.38 or its equivalent in Pesos at the rate
of P3.9390 to a dollar. The Trial Courts judgment was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals
on October 9, 1980. On September 16, 1980 offered to pay the amount of the judgement with 6%
interest per annum and the approved costs of P237.00. The offer was rejected by First Western, in
its letter of September 21, 1981, its view being that the rate of interest should be 12% per annum
in accordance with Central Bank Circular No. 416. Meridian thereupon proceeded to this Court
praying for a writ of certiorari to annul the orders denying its aforementioned motion to deposit,
etc. dated September 1981, and to authorize it "to satisfy the amount of the judgment with 6%
interest per annum and the approved costs of P237.00 totaling P170.061.03
ISSUE: WON Circular No. 416 of the Central Bank of the Philippines amending Section 1 of
the Usury Law (Act No. 2655) by prescribing twelve percent (12%) per annum as the "rate of
interest for the loan, or forbearance of any money, goods, or credits and the rate allowed in
judgments, in the absence of express contract as to such rate of interest be applied to all kinds of
monetary judgement.
HELD: Petition granted. Any other kind of monetary judgment which has nothing to do with,
nor involving loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits does not fall within the
coverage of the said law (P.D. No. 116) for it is not within the ambit of the authority granted to
the Central Bank. The Monetary Board may not tread on forbidden grounds. It cannot rewrite
other laws. That function is vested solely with the legislative authority. It is axiomatic in legal
hermeneutics that statutes should be construed as a whole and not as series of disconnected
articles and phrases. In the absence of a clear contrary intention, words and phrases in statutes
should not be interpreted in isolation from one another. A word or phrase in a statute is always
used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning may thus be modified or
restricted by the latter. The Orders promulgated on October 15, 1981 and December 2, 1981 are
ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. The petitioner's deposit with the Trial Court of the amount of
P170,061.03 is declared to constitute full satisfaction.
Socorro Ramirez v Hon. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 93833 (September 25, 1995)
FACTS: Petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez filed a civil case in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office,
allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner
offensive to his dignity and personality, contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. In
support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral
damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in
addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript
on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by
petitioner. As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of
secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to
prohibit and penalize wiretapping and other related violations of private communication, and
other purposes.
ISSUE: Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the
taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.
RULING: No. Section 1 of the Republic Act 4200 states that it shall be unlawful for any
person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to

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tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as
a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however
otherwise described.
The law is clear and unambiguous. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not
distinguish. The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision. The instant petition is hereby
DENIED. Cost against petitioner.
iii. Verba Legis
- plain meaning rule: Where the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given
its literal meaning and applied without interpretation. This plain meaning rule or verbal legis
derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the
valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its
intention or will and preclude the court from construing it differently.
SSC and SSS v Teresa G. Favila
G.R. No. 170195 (March 28, 2011)
FACTS: Respondent Teresita Favila filed a claim with the SSS for pension benefits, and averred
therein that after she was married to Florante Favila (Florante) on January 17, 1970, the latter
designated her as the sole beneficiary in the E-1 Form he submitted before petitioner Social
Security System (SSS), Quezon City Branch on June 30, 1970.When they begot their children
Jofel, Floresa and Florante II, her husband likewise designated each one of them as beneficiaries.
Teresa further averred that when Florante died on February 1, 1997, his pension benefits under
the SSS were given to their only minor child at that time, Florante II, but only until his
emancipation at age 21.Believing that as the surviving legal wife she is likewise entitled to
receive Florantes pension benefits, Teresa subsequently filed her claim for said benefits before
the SSS. The SSS, however, denied the claim.
Resolving Teresitas claim, the SSC stated that the surviving spouses entitlement to an SSS
members death benefits is dependent on two factors which must concur at the time of the latters
death, to wit: (1) legality of the marital relationship; and (2) dependency for support. As to
dependency for support, the SSC opined that same is affected by factors such as separation de
facto of the spouses, marital infidelity and such other grounds sufficient to disinherit a spouse
under the law. Thus, although Teresa is the legal spouse and one of Florantes designated
beneficiaries, the SSC ruled that she is disqualified from claiming the death benefits because she
was deemed not dependent for support from Florante due to marital infidelity.
The CA, however, reversed the SSCs decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Teresita is a primary beneficiary in contemplation of the Social Security
Law as to be entitled to death benefits accruing from the death of Florante
HELD: The petition is granted.
LABOR LAW: Meaning of a dependent spouse entitled to pension benefits - Under Sec. 8(e) and
(k) of RA 1161, for a spouse to qualify as a primary beneficiary under paragraph (k) thereof,
he/she must not only be a legitimate spouse but also a dependent as defined under paragraph (e),
that is, one who is dependent upon the member for support. There is no question that Teresa was
Florantes legal wife. What is at point, however, is whether Teresa is dependent upon Florante for
support in order for her to fall under the term "dependent spouse" under Section 8(k) of RA 1161.
In this case, aside from Teresas bare allegation that she was dependent upon her husband for
support and her misplaced reliance on the presumption of dependency by reason of her valid and
then subsisting marriage with Florante, Teresa has not presented sufficient evidence to discharge

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her burden of proving that she was dependent upon her husband for support at the time of his
death. She could have done this by submitting affidavits of reputable and disinterested persons
who have knowledge that during her separation with Florante, she does not have a known trade,
business, profession or lawful occupation from which she derives income sufficient for her
support and such other evidence tending to prove her claim of dependency.
On the contrary, what is clear is that she and Florante had already been separated for about 17
years prior to the latters death as Florante was in fact, living with his common law wife when he
died. Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or her right
thereto by substantial evidence. Hence, for Teresas failure to show that despite their separation
she was dependent upon Florante for support at the time of his death, Teresa cannot qualify as a
primary beneficiary. Hence, she is not entitled to the death benefits accruing on account of
Florantes death.
Globe Mackay Cable v NLRC
G.R. No. 82511 (March 3, 1992)
Facts: Wage Order No. 6 increased the cost-of-living allowance (COLA) of non-agricultural
workers in the private sector.
Petitioner Corporation complied with said Order by paying its monthly-paid employees the
mandated P3.00 per day COLA. In its computation, Petitioner Corporation multiplied the P3.00
daily COLA by 22 days, which is the number of working days in the company.
Respondent Union disagreed with the computation alleging that prior to the effectivity of the
Wage Order, Petitioner Corporation had been computing and paying the COLA on the basis of 30
days per month and that this constituted an employer practice, which should not be unilaterally
withdrawn.
The Labor Arbiter sustained the position of Petitioner Corporation by holding that the monthly
COLA should be computed on the basis of 22 days, since the evidence showed that there are only
22 days in a month for monthly-paid employees in the company.
The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter on appeal, holding that Petitioner Corporation was guilty
of illegal deductions considering that COLA should be paid and computed on the basis of 30
days since workers paid on a monthly basis are entitled to COLA on days unworked; and the
full allowance enjoyed by Petitioner Corporations monthly-paid employees before the CBA
executed between the parties constituted voluntary employer practice, which cannot be
unilaterally withdrawn.
Issue: WON the computation and payment of COLA on the basis of 30 days per month
constitute an employer practice which should not be unilaterally withdrawn.
Held: No. Section 5 of the Rules Implementing Wage Orders Nos. 2, 3, 5 and 6 provides that all
covered employees shall be entitled to their daily living allowance during the days that they are
paid their basic wage, even if unworked. The primordial consideration for entitlement of COLA
is that basic wage is being paid. The payment of COLA is mandated only for the days that the
employees are paid their basic wage, even if said days are unworked. On the days that employees
are not paid their basic wage, the payment of COLA is not mandated.
Moreover, Petitioner Corporation cannot be faulted for erroneous application of a doubtful or
difficult question of law. Since it is a past error that is being corrected, no vested right may be
said to have arisen nor may any diminution of benefit under Article 100 of the Labor Code be
said to have resulted by virtue of the correction.
Felicito Basbacio v Office of the Secretary, DOJ
G.R. No. 109445 (November 7, 1994)

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FACTS: Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were convicted
of frustrated murder and of two counts of frustrated murder for the killing of Federico Boyon and
the wounding of the latter's wife Florida and his son Tirso, at Palo, Calanuga, Rapu-Rapu, Albay,
on the night of June 26, 1988. The motive for the killing was apparently a land dispute between
the Boyons and petitioner. Petitioner and his son-in-law were sentenced to imprisonment and
ordered immediately detained after their bonds had been cancelled.
Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. Only petitioner's appeal proceeded to judgment, however,
as the appeal of the other accused was dismissed for failure to file his brief. On June 22, 1992 the
Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting petitioner on the ground that the prosecution
failed to prove conspiracy between him and his son-in-law. He had been pointed to by a daughter
of Federico Boyon as the companion of Balderrama when the latter barged into their hut and
without warning started shooting, but the appellate court ruled that because petitioner did nothing
more, petitioner's presence at the scene of the crime was insufficient to show conspiracy.
Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under Rep. Act No. 7309, sec. 3(a), which
provides for the payment of compensation to "any person who was unjustly accused, convicted,
imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal."
ISSUE: WON Petitioner can rightfully claim compensation for damages on the grounds of
unjust imprisonment
HELD: Petition is dismissed. The law is clear and does not call for interpretation. It is believed
therefor that the phrase any person unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned in Section
3(a) of R.A. No. 7309 refers to an individual who was wrongly accused and imprisoned for a
crime he did not commit, thereby making him a victim of unjust imprisonment. In the instant
case, however, Claimant/ Appellant cannot be deemed such a victim since a reading of the
decision of his acquittal shows that his exculpation is not based on his innocence, but upon, in
effect, a finding of reasonable doubt.
iv. Spirit and Purpose of the Law
- The intent or spirit of the law is the law itself. For this reason, legislative intent or spirit is the
controlling factor, the leading star and the guiding light in the application and interpretation of a
statute.
- The spirit, rather than the letter, of a statute determines its construction; hence a statute must be
read according to its spirit or intent.
Elena Salenillas v Honorable Court of Appeals, et. Al
G.R. No. 78687 (January 31, 1989)
Statutory Rule: Between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the
law should prevail.
Facts: The parents of Elena Salenillas, one of the petitioners, were grantees of free patent. The
subject property was later sold to Elena Salenillas and her husband, petitioners in the instant
case. On December 4, 1973, the property of petitioners was mortgaged to Philippine National
bank as security for a loan of P2,500. For failure to pay their loan, the property was foreclose by
PNB and was bought at a public auction by private respondent. Petitioner maintains that they
have a right to repurchase the property under Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act. Respondent states
that the sale of the property disqualified petitioner from being legal heirs vis-a-vis the said
property.
Issue: W/N petitioners have the right to repurchase the property under Sec. 119 of the Public
Land Act.
Held: Yes. Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act provides that "every conveyance of land acquired
under the free patent or homestead provisions shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his
widow or legal heirs within a period of five years from the date or conveyance." The provision
makes no distinction between the legal heirs. The distinction made by respondent contravenes

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the very purpose of the act. Between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the
purpose of the law should prevail.
B/Gen. Jose Commendador, et. Al v B/Gen. Demetrio Camera, et, al.
G.R. No. 96948 (August 2, 1991)
Statutory rule: When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases.
Facts: Petitioners are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and were charged with
violations of Articles of War in relation with their alleged participation in a failed coup detat.
Their case was referred to General Court Martial No. 14. At a hearing, petitioners manifested
their desire to exercise their right to raise peremptory challenges against the President and the
members of the general court martial invoking Art. 18 of CA No. 408. GCM No. 14 ruled that
peremptory challenges had been discontinued under PD 39.
Issue: W/N the right to peremptory challenge provide by Art. 18 of CA No. 408 has been
discontinued under PD 39.
Held: No. Although PD 39 disallowed peremptory challenged allowed under CA No. 408, PD 39
however was issued to implement General Order No. 8 issued during martial law to create
military tribunals. With the lifting of Martial Law, General Order No. 8 was revoked and military
tribunals were dissolved. As such, the reason for the existence of PD 39 ceased automatically.
When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex.
v. Statute of Later Date Prevails
- because it favors the latest intention of the legislature
Pacis v Averia
G.R. No. L-22526 (November 29, 1996)
vi. Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant
- Special provisions prevail over a general one.
vii. A special law prevails over a general law.
Fiestan v CA
G.R. No. 81552 (May 28, 1990)
FACTS: For failure of petitioner spouses Dionisio Fiestan and Juanita Arconada (spouses
Fiestan) to pay their mortgage indebtedness to respondent Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP), the latter was able to acquire at a public auction sale on August 6, 1979 the parcel of land
(Lot No. 2-B covered by TCT No. T-13218) that the spouses Fiestan owned in Ilocos Sur after
extrajudicial foreclosure of said property. The Provincial Sheriff issued a certificate of sale that
same day which was registered on September 28 in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos
Sur. Earlier, or on September 26, spouses Fiestan also executed a Deed of Sale in favor of DBP
which was likewise registered on September 28, 1979. When spouses Fiestan failed to redeem
their parcel of land within the 1 year period which expired on September 28, 1980, the Register
of Deeds cancelled their title over the subject property and issued TCT No. T-19077 to DBP upon
the latters duly executed affidavit of consolidation of ownership.
On April 13, 1982, the DBP sold the lot to Francisco Peria, so the Register of Deeds of Ilocos
Sur cancelled DBPs title over said property and issued TCT No. T-19229 to Perias name, who
later secured a tax declaration for said lot and accordingly paid the taxes due thereon. He
thereafter mortgaged said lot to the PNB-Vigan Branch as security for his loan of P115,000.00.
Since the spouses Fiestan were still in possession of the property, the Provincial Sheriff ordered
them to vacate the premises, but instead of leaving, they filed a complaint in the RTC of Vigan,
Ilocos Sur for annulment of sale, mortgage and cancellation of transfer certificates of title against

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the DBP-Laoag City, PNB-Vigan Branch, Ilocos Sur, Francisco Peria and the Register of Deeds
of Ilocos Sur.
The lower court dismissed said complaint, declaring valid the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the
mortgaged property in favor of the DBP and its subsequent sale to Francisco Peria as well as the
real estate mortgage constituted in favor of PNB-Vigan. The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed
said decision. The spouses Fiestan herein seek to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the
mortgaged property on the ground that the Provincial Sheriff conducted the foreclosure without
first effecting a levy on said property before selling the same at the public auction sale.
ISSUE: Who has the right to acquire by purchase the subject property?
HELD: In denying the petition, the Supreme Court reiterated that the formalities of a levy,
which the Provincial Sheriff of Ilocos Sur allegedly failed to comply with, are not basic
requirements before an extrajudicially foreclosed property can be sold at public auction. The
spouses Fiestan insisted that what prevails over the case are par. (2) of Article 1491 and par. (7)
of Article 1409 of the Civil Code which prohibits agents from acquiring by purchase, even at a
public or judicial auction either in person or through the mediation of another, the property
whose administration or sale may have been entrusted to them unless the consent of the principal
has been given. However, the Supreme Court ruled that the power to foreclose is not an ordinary
agency that contemplates exclusively the representation of the principal by the agent but is
primarily an authority conferred upon the mortgagee for the latter's own protection, as provided
under Section 5 of Act No 3135, as amended, which is a special law that must prevail over the
Civil Code which is a general law. Even in the absence of statutory provision, there is authority
to hold that a mortgagee, and in this case the DBP, may purchase at a sale under his mortgage to
protect his own interest or to avoid a loss to himself by a sale to a third person at a price below
the mortgage debt
Bagatsing v Ramirez
G.R. No. 41636 (December 17, 1976)
FACTS: In 1974, the Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 7522, regulating the
operation of public markets and prescribing fees for the rentals of stalls and providing penalties
for violation thereof. The Federation of Manila Market Vendors Inc. assailed the validity of the
ordinance, alleging among others the noncompliance to the publication requirement under the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila. CFI-Manila declared the ordinance void. Thus, the
present petition.
ISSUE: What law should govern the publication of a tax ordinance? Is the ordinance valid?
HELD: The Local Tax Code prevails. There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City
of Manila is a special act since it relates only to the City of Manila whereas the Local Tax Code
is a general law because it applies universally to all local governments. The fact that one is
special and the other general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as
remaining an exception of the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a
particular case. However, the rule readily yields to a situation where the special statute refers to a
subject in general, which the general statute treats in particular. The Revised Charter of the City
prescribes a rule for the publication of ordinance in general, while the Local Tax Code
establishes a rule for the publication of ordinance levying or imposing taxes fees or other
charges in particular.
The ordinance is valid.